e_PRINTS e_PRINTSExecutive Summary
Title: USAF TACS Battle Management: Preparing for High Tempo Future Operations
Author: Major C.B. Miller, Officer, United States Air Force
Thesis: The shifting nature of warfare will bring with it demands on the USAF theater air control system (TACS) that the current USAF command, control, and execution framework and battle management training system are not preparing it for.
Background: The conceptual approach to warfare prior to Desert Storm was, for the most part, very sequential in nature. Operations were time sequenced with very specific constraints on the order of each phase, which steps preceded which, with operations progressing along a fairly set time schedule. In essence it was a building block approach to the conduct of armed conflict. The analogy of peeling an onion is very close to describing the historical approach to warfare. Beginning at the outer layer and working sequentially towards the heart. According to some scholars, Desert Storm, the war everyone speaks of as being so revolutionary, conducted operations in much the same way as they always had been. This step-stone method would try to degrade or destroy, in order, those target sets that Col John Warden described in his five-ring model of the modern nation-state. The actual air war during Desert Storm attacked targets in each of the five target categories. Although occurring in sequential phases, the phases overlapped and were time compressed to the point of apparent simultaneity. This shift, from the distinct sequential application of airpower against individual target sets, to application of forces in a systemic approach to attack, is characteristic of what many believe is the new approach to warfare that armed forces will use in future years. Enhanced mobility of fighting systems and improved communications systems have dispersed and mobilized the battlefield beyond Clausewitz's wildest dreams. As a result, the US and other friendly nations will be forced to use maneuver, dispersion, speed, mobility, range, and deception to a far greater extent when facing unpredictable enemies who may potentially be armed with weapons of mass destruction. The shifting nature of warfare that we will face in the future, with its whirlwind tempo, fluidity, and reliance on responsive flexible command and control structures, begs the question--is our TACS ready for the future.
Although very successful during the Gulf War, the doctrinal approaches of centralized command and control with decentralized execution may prove too cumbersome and restrictive to win the fluid battle of the future. Criticisms of the Air Force planning and execution process during Desert Storm centered around the lengthy air tasking order (ATO) process and the sluggish responsiveness to real-time needs.
Additionally, several manpower changes and events which took place during the early 90s degraded the officer air battle management career field and with it the system for training new battle managers. Conversion of 50% of the officer battle manager positions to enlisted billets, consolidation of three other unrelated career fields with the battle management career field, selective early retirement boards, and reduction in forces all had compounding disastrous effects on the USAF battle management manpower pool. During the onset of these disastrous manpower events, training for battle management officers was dismantled, and has only now just begun to be rectified. The problem, however, is the fixes are merely Band-Aids on the wound.
Recommendation: If the Air Force wants to continue to dominate air operations in the battlefield of the future it must take steps now to ensure that it stays ahead of the OODA loop power curve. The Air Force must be able to command, control, and execute air operations faster, and more efficiently than the enemy can. As a first measure the conceptual approach to command, control, and execution of air operations must change. To maintain maximum flexibility, responsiveness, and timeliness in the application of scarce air resources, control and execution must be decentralized to the lowest possible command levels. The keys to effective decentralization are many faceted. First, all forces involved must have a common operational outlook; they must be oriented similarly towards the task at hand. Additionally, the main focus of effort or desired outcome must be clearly identified and communicated continuously to all participants. Further, lower command levels must be given the latitude to use their initiative in order to capitalize on fleeting opportunities when they fall within the framework of the commander's intent.
We must act now to design a training system which will prepare our battle managers for future warfare, otherwise we must prepare ourselves to accept the consequences. The entry level Air Battle Manager course at Tyndall AFB is appropriately focused on giving the new accessions the basics of controlling and Air Force aviation tactics. The shortfall in the training system, however, is in advanced battle management training. Advanced training for actual battle management positions, like senior director (SD), mission crew commander (MCC), and battle commander (BC), must be formalized. These positions bring with them the responsibilities of integrating, supporting, and redirecting the joint/combined air effort in support of the air, land and maritime component commander's schemes of maneuver as well as the joint force commander's intent and desired focus of effort. The battle manager's position, as the fulcrum in the effort to leverage our combat forces, demands that training be conducted in formal courses that are manned, equipped, and funded to do the job right. To do this correctly, the Air Force needs to create two new formal training courses. The Initial Battle Management Training course (IBMT) for SDs would focus primarily on the mid to upper end of the tactical level of warfare while just touching on the lower operational level. Students would attend this course after their control focused apprenticeship period when enroute to their second assignment. The Advanced Battle Management Training course (ABMT) for MCCs, on the other hand, would focus primarily on the upper end of the tactical level through the mid to upper end of the operational level of warfare. Students would attend while enroute between assignments at the appropriate point in their career (possible the eight to ten year point). The importance of training cannot be understated. It is the key to producing and maintaining effective, ready, combat forces, and therefore must be attended to with relish in peacetime. If we are to continue to espouse the old adage of "train how you plan to fight", then we as a service must be ready to put our money where our mouth is. Professional quality, realistic training is not a frivolous waste, it is a necessity for ensuring success in the future.
USAF TACS Battle Management:
Preparing for High Tempo Future Operations
The conflict in South West Asia (Desert Storm), in the minds of many people, was a turning point in the rapidly progressing revolution in military affairs. Never in the history of mankind has the employment of information and weaponry taken place at the blistering pace of that witnessed during the Gulf War. This warfare of hyper tempo created stresses on the supporting USAF Theater Air Control System (TACS) command, control, and execution network that stretched it to its limits. The expected trend is for the tempo of warfare and the levels of information overload to continue their upward spiral. The USAF Theater Air Control Systems (TACS) battle management capabilities are at a fork in the road which will determine their capability to orchestrate and execute the air war in future conflicts. The pace of real-time information updates and the focus on information dominance will demand more and more time-critical/real-time decision making be made by the operators at the lower level command and control platforms orchestrating the show. This decentralization will be crucial to ensuring we can operate at a tempo faster than the enemy can react to. The increased operations tempo and reduced margins for error will put demands on the USAF TACS that the current framework for command and the training process isn't preparing it for. More importantly it calls for a shift in the current conceptual framework of lower-level USAF command, control, and execution.
In this paper I will suggest ways in which the USAF TACS battle management system can be changed to make it viable and reliable, with the long term ability to produce proficient battle managers that are able to perform at the tempo that future operations will require. I will begin by describing the character of warfare, both past and future. I will then assess the USAF TACS and its ability to enhance the flexibility of air power employment. Specifically I'll review the current doctrinal approach to command, control and execution, as well as a review of the current USAF TACS training system. Finally I will outline some changes which must take place in two areas. first, there are doctrinal changes which must take place; in terms of our approach to command, control and execution. Second, changes must take place in the structure of the USAF TACS battle management training system. These changes are crucial to ensuring that the USAF TACS can meet the needs that future warfare will demand.
The Shifting Nature of Warfare
Clausewitz, in his masterpiece On War, defined war as "an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will."(1)
In many ways, early approaches to conflict followed the essence of this often quoted description of warfare. Set piece battles, lines of warriors squaring off against one another, plans laid out down to the finest detail all serve as examples throughout history of an extremely linear approach to the conduct of war. The conceptual approach to warfare prior to Desert Storm was, for the most part, very sequential in nature. Operations were time sequenced with very specific constraints on the order of each phase, which steps preceded which, with operations progressing along a fairly set time schedule. In essence it was a building block approach to the conduct of armed conflict. The analogy of peeling an onion is very close to describing the historical approach to warfare. Beginning at the outer layer and working sequentially towards the heart. Even today Army Field Manual 100-5 talks specifically of the sequencing, phasing and synchronization of different parts of an operation.(2)
According to some scholars, Desert Storm, the war everyone speaks of as being so revolutionary, conducted operations in much the same way as they always had been. As Colonel Mann said in his book Thunder and Lightening: Desert Storm and the Air Power Debates:
In accordance with FM 100-20, the campaign would employ the whole
weight of the available air power against selected target areas in turn.
Airpower would be the principal weapon in a coordinated multi-axis
air, naval, and ground attack beginning with Phase I, the strategic air
campaign.(3)
This sequentially phased approach to warfare was normally designed to set up the decisive battle which would result in the defeat of the enemy. This step-stone method would try to degrade or destroy, in order, those target sets that Col John Warden described in his five-ring model of the modern nation-state. Military operations would, for the most part, sequentially attack the enemy's fielded forces, national population, national infrastructure, key production essentials, and finally national leadership (peeling the onion from outside in). In planning the air campaign for what was to eventually be Desert Storm, Col Warden developed a concept of inside-out-warfare which, in essence, called for targeting Iraqi leadership and other key targets while bypassing the Iraqi army until very near the end.(4)
The actual air war during Desert Storm attacked targets in each of the five target categories. Although occurring in sequential phases, the phases overlapped and were time compressed to the point of apparent simultaneity. This shift, from the distinct sequential application of airpower against individual target sets, to application of forces in a systemic approach to attack, is characteristic of what many believe is the new approach to warfare that armed forces will use in future years.
Modern military technology has had a tremendous impact on the shape and characteristic of the modern battlefield. Enhanced mobility of fighting systems and improved communications systems that are available down to practically every fighting platform have dispersed and mobilized the battlefield beyond Clausewitz's wildest dreams. Many experts see this trend continuing far into the future. As a result, the US and other friendly nations will be forced to use maneuver, dispersion, speed, mobility, range, and deception to a far greater extent when facing unpredictable enemies who may potentially be armed with weapons of mass destruction.(5)
Although this will detract from our freedom to mass forces for an attack, modern systems are capable of delivering effective fires while remaining relatively dispersed right up until the moment of attack. Where in the past, even as late as Vietnam, hundreds or thousands of bomber sorties had to attack a single target group at a time (often a single target), the smart weapons and stealth technologies of today enable a single aircraft to attack a single target while providing a high degree of certainty that the target will be destroyed or disabled. This increased efficiency of airpower allows the offensive capability of the air arm to be used in a way that theorists like Douhet and Mitchell dreamed it would be. In 1943 the US Army Air Corps bombers of 8th Air Force were only able to effectively strike 50 strategic targets in the entire year, while the coalition air forces of Desert Storm struck over 150 targets in the first 24 hours of that war.(6)
This expanded ability to strike an astronomical number of targets nearly simultaneously is what many experts believe allows the new parallel approach to warfare.
Parallel warfare allows the key nodes (centers of gravity) in each of Warden's five rings to be struck nearly simultaneously. The objective of parallel warfare is to rapidly bring on the effect of strategic systemic paralysis by overcoming the enemy with destruction beyond his ability to recover.(7)
The resulting characteristics of an air war prosecuted following the principle of parallelism is an operation of astonishing tempo, volume, and overwhelming complexity, attacking systemically across the depth and breadth of the enemy's nation-state. During Desert Storm the Coalition used its massive air forces in just this manner. Beginning on 17 January 1991 they targeted strategic military forces, leadership, infrastructure facilities, early warning sites, airfields, integrated air defense nodes, communications facilities, electrical power facilities, as well as many other target sets.(8)
As Col John Boyd would say, the overarching goal of this warfare of increased operations tempo is to overwhelm one's enemy by being able to observe, orient, decide, and act (OODA) faster than he is able to. To do this, however, a force must have three things. It must have access to nearly instantaneous information, the ability to use that information to adapt and focus the effort where and when it is needed, and an effectively trained system to carry out the newly focused effort. Our enemies (e.g. PRC or North Korea) around the world watched the progression and outcome of Desert Storm and surely learned many lessons from it. Enemies in the future will go to great lengths to disguise, disperse, mobilize, camouflage, hide, and harden their critical resources, nodes, and weapons. They will use disinformation and deceit to try to increase the fog and friction on our side of the conflict. The effects of successfully winning this information and communication battle were evident during Desert Storm and are likely to be lessons our enemies surely won't miss capitalizing on in the future.
Knowing this, we must ask ourselves...what will the battle of the future look like? The answer is simply it will be faster, more fluid, more dispersed, more accurate, more lethal, and more difficult to get our arms around than anything we've ever seen before. The following simple table gives a flavor for the shift in OODA loop processing that has taken place throughout the last couple centuries of warfare(9)
.
|
Revolutionary War | Civil War | World War II | Gulf War | Tomorrow's War | ||
| Observe | Telescope | Telegraph | Radio/Wire | Near Real Time | Real Time | |
| Orient | Weeks | Days | Hours | Minutes | Continuous | |
| Decide | Months | Weeks | Days | Hours | Immediate | |
| Act | A Season | A Month | A Week | A Day | Hour or Less |
The most difficult of these characteristics to deal with, however, are the tempo and volume of future operations as well as the fluidity of the battlefield. High tempo, high volume operations will demand an enhanced ability to rapidly and efficiently communicate with and direct, forces during on-going operations. Additionally, the fluidity of the modern battlefield will require the ability to shift focus rapidly enough to retain the initiative and the ability to deal with highly mobile target sets. The question then is whether our current command and control structure, methods, systems, and training are preparing us for the high tempo, fluid, highly dynamic battle to come.
USAF TACS
The structure of the Theater Air Control System we operate under today has its roots in the early command and control architecture of World War II. The components, functions, and command structure are virtually identical. Although technology has resulted in a few of the components falling by the wayside, most of the major pieces have remained the same (aside from some minor name changes) through World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and Desert Storm.
As with the structure of today's TACS, the structures of the past were vertical in nature, both for command and for information flow. Planning and close supervision of the employment of airpower has always been done at the very highest levels. Although Vietnam saw the fielding of an entirely new type of command and control platform, the airborne elements of the TACS did not change the underlying
fundamental principle of centralized command and control with decentralized execution. Today's command and control structure, like that of Desert Storm, is not all that different from those structures of the distant past. Although ground radar elements of the TACS did not play a significant part in the execution of the Desert Storm air campaign, many of them were present and capable of performing their doctrinally assigned tasks. The end result is that the command, control, and execution concepts for the TACS today is virtually identical to what it has been for over 50 years.
Having thought through the shifting nature of warfare that we will face in the future, with its whirlwind tempo, fluidity, and reliance on responsive flexible command and control structures, the question to be dealt with is--is our TACS ready for the future? Is our TACS structure, methodology, and training optimized to prepare us for the future conflicts we will undoubtedly face?
Current Command, Control, and Execution Concepts
The true test of the Air Force's ability to meet the demands of future battle will be determined by its approach to the tasks of planning, commanding, controlling, and executing the use of air power in pursuit of future military objectives. As with everything in life, success will be measured as a bi-product of a tradeoff between total flexibility and efficient use of the scarce and precious resource--airpower.
Much has been written in condemnation of the USAF approach to daily planning during Desert Storm. Most of the criticism stems from what, to most casual observers, appears to be the inordinate amount of time and effort it took to put together the daily Air Tasking Order (ATO). The volume of reports and intelligence processed by the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) resulted in the TACC staff swelling to roughly 2000 people, and often stretched the planning cycle out to 48-72 hours. The result was that the ATO often lagged significantly behind the ongoing war.(10)
This completely centralized approach to planning stems from the Air Force's doctrinal tenets on airpower planning and employment, that of centralized control and decentralized execution.
Centralized control is the tool by which the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) achieves unity of effort, focusing all available resources on achieving the intended results of the Joint Force Commander (JFC).(11)
The problem occurs when the planning is done down to excruciating levels of detail and when control is extended into the execution phase. Decentralized execution is the implementation of the plan established under centralized control. The current air tasking order (ATO) process assigns the instruments of airpower (weapon systems and support assets) exact tasks to accomplish, but does little to communicate the JFACC's vision and intent for the overall operation to those same instruments of airpower. This shortfall in commander's intent is what drives far-reaching centralized control, from the highest levels of the TACS, throughout the execution phase. The deleterious result, however, is that the front line warriors are often relegated to being simple mouthpieces relaying directions from higher command echelons that are overcome with information overload.
Our system is currently structured for the many fielded sensors, both tactical and strategic, to feed information up the command structure to a centralized node for processing and decision making. Once decisions are reached the new command guidance is disseminated down the command channel until it finally reaches the operators where action is finally taken. This linear command and control structure works fine in reaction to targeting decisions needed on the order of hours or days, but will be virtually useless in light of the exploding demands of the battlefield of the future.(12)
Like Napoleon at Leipzig and Waterloo, forces that operate under a centralized command system, lacking detailed instructions and a clear understanding of the intent of the commander, are ill-prepared to take independent action which is in concert with the intended focus of effort.(13)
Desert Storm, in contradistinction to this doctrinal approach to command and control, had many good examples of control being decentralized to lower levels of the TACS. Airborne Command Elements (ACE) aboard airborne warning and control system (AWACS), airborne battlefield command and control center (ABCCC), and joint strategic target attack radar system (JSTARS) aircraft were given the authority to divert missions from their primary ATO assigned targets in order to hit fleeting targets of opportunity.(14)
To institutionalize this successful process all the time, however, the lower echelons of the USAF TACS must have two things--timely access to critical intelligence and information, and the training and experience necessary to carry it out.
Our information/intelligence structure, systems, and methods are designed to feed information and intelligence up channel for processing before it is finally sent down to the actual users. Often the information or intelligence needed is available but is hung up being processed at higher levels or working its way up and down the command and communications chain. The SCUD hunt experiences during Desert Storm are testimony to the need for timely information/intelligence, and a command and communications system which is responsive enough to capitalize on the momentary vulnerability of mobile targets.(15)
Many information and intelligence fusion systems are being developed for fielding in the near future which may or may not meet this need. Systems which centralize information/intelligence at the highest command levels, however, will have a high propensity of reducing our ability to prosecute timely actions in the battles of the future. The highest echelons of command will have extremely accurate yet perishable intelligence information. By the time it reaches the forces carrying out the commander's intent, the window for exploiting the fleeting opportunity will be gone.
Current TACS Training
Beginning in 1991 the TACS battle management forces were subject to tremendous changes directed by the highest level of USAF leadership. The conversion of nearly 50% of the entry level company grade officer positions to enlisted billets; consolidation of four dissimilar career fields into one; and Selective Early Retirement Boards (SERB) and Reduction In Forces (RIF), which decapitated the field, all began to cause a degenerative slide from which we are still trying to recover. The company grade to field grade manning imbalance caused by the conversion left a critical segment of the operational air force that was shaped like an upside down pyramid, unable to grow the field grade officers the system would need over time. The consolidation created the potential for officers from drastically different career fields, with absolutely no battlefield command and control (TACS) experience, to cross over into critical battle management leadership positions. The effects of the SERB and RIF devastated the experience base of the battle management community at a time when that experience was most needed. Unfortunately, in the midst of all this turmoil, the element that has always given US armed forces an edge in previous conflicts, was left languishing. The training system for TACS battle managers was dismantled by the conversion, consolidation, SERB and RIF of the early 1990s, and is only now beginning to be repaired. The question is; will the new training system be structured to prepare future USAF TACS battle managers for the demands they will face in future conflicts?
The training system now in place and that which will take shape in the near future will prove to be woefully inadequate in preparing our future battle managers. Most of the formal courses are either introductory in nature, aimed primarily at controlling, or are only available for a select few students. When set against the monumental task of training a large number of operators, that have minimal lower tactical level experience, to orchestrate and manipulate the fluid dynamic air battle of the future, the true size of the problem comes to light. Our formal training courses, as a system, are completely inadequate for the task.
Formal entry level training for tomorrow's USAF TACS battle managers begins with the entry level Air Battle Manager school which was reopened for officers at Tyndall AFB in the later part of 1996. The focus of this course is divergent, in that it is trying to do several things at once. It is designed to orient new officers to the concepts of battle management, while at the same time trying to prepare these officers for the duties they will perform when they arrive at their first unit. Their first duty will be as battle management apprentices, where they will conduct anywhere from 18 months to three years of orientation level weapons controller training while they begin transition to their first battle management position (either as a senior director or air surveillance officer). The nine month course is broken into three major blocks which teach air surveillance concepts, basic controlling techniques and weapons system capabilities and tactics, and a cursory exposure to the basics of integrated (weapons and surveillance) battle management. As of this date, this is the last formal school that all battle management officers will attend.(16)
The course lacks the ability to participate in any large scale live flying battle management exercises, and is not equipped to participate with any joint agencies during any large scale simulation exercises. Once the students graduate from this course, they proceed to their first unit where they enter into a program of unit level upgrade training. The focus of unit level upgrade training is on refining controlling skills and enlarging the base of knowledge that the beginning controllers have on their own system. The career field plan is for entry level officers to perform controlling duties in their first unit for a maximum of 18 months to three years. The hope is that this brief orientation period will allow the young officers to garner a base line of experience that will serve as a foundation for their battle management training. There are, however, critical flaws in this plan. Depending on where the officer is stationed during this period, he/she will probably not experience anything larger than an occasional four aircraft versus four aircraft (4v4). In all likelihood the majority of experience the new battle manager will get during this 24 month period will be very narrow exposure to 2v2 and 2v4 air combat training (ACT/DACT) mission profiles with an occasional single receiver--single tanker refueling. Although there are controlling assignments where a new officer will be exposed to large force employment missions, the volume of those they will get, in the brief orientation period, will make proficiency highly doubtful. During this same apprenticeship period they will enter upgrade training for their first battle management position, normally senior director (SD) or air surveillance officer (ASO). This dual direction focus creates a dilemma for the trainee and the unit--what should they focus the scarce training resources on. The high value training opportunities, like large force employment missions, will most likely be given to the enlisted weapons controllers (rightly so) who will be performing those duties for the long run, while the young battle manager apprentice will get the left-overs. Additionally, they won't ever really be qualified as a weapons controller, so the pressure will be to focus on training for the battle management position they are getting qualified in. The short orientation period will provide very limited exposure to actual warfighting tactics, techniques, and procedures from a controlling perspective, and as a result we will be filling the battle management ranks with individuals who lack a solid tactical base. Years down the road, that same battle manager may enter training for mission crew commander (MCC) and eventually battle commander (BC) positions. In most units, training for these positions is conducted entirely through unit level, on-the-job (OJT) training. Historically there have always been advanced training opportunities, although there is a drastic mismatch between the current qualification pre-requisites for these courses, the focus of these advanced courses, and the experience levels the planned career field path will provide prospective selectees. The Counter Air Tactics Awareness Training Course (CATATC), at Tyndall AFB, is designed as an intermediate level controller course focused on enhancing the controlling skills in a two/four fighter, multi-bogey environment. Since this course normally requires three years controlling experience before attending, most young battle management officers will never qualify. Additionally, the CATATC course is only equipped to handle approximately 32 students per year.(17)
Another avenue for advanced training is through the USAF Weapons School at Nellis AFB. The Weapons School, although originally designed around a heavy controlling syllabus, has been shifting its concentration to battle management concepts since early 1990. The school's primary reason for existence is to enhance the officer's knowledge of threat tactics and techniques, joint and combined large force employment tactics, and to enhance the student's instructional skills. The goal is for graduates to return to their units to function as the squadron weapons and tactics officer. The Weapons School could serve as an excellent advanced battle management course except for several key weaknesses. Admission to the school still requires applicants to have four to seven years controlling (or operational) experience. Additionally, due to the specialized focus on preparing future weapons and tactics officers, the Weapons School is only equipped to handle a maximum of 12 students per year(18)
. An additional limitation on the utility of the Weapons School as an advanced battle management course for the community at large is the fact that the school currently has no capability for large scale joint air battle simulation. Since live, large-scale joint training exercises are so expensive and so few and far between, this lack of a simulation capability creates an almost insurmountable barrier to expanded course utility (note: The Weapons School originally asked Tactical Air Command (TAC)) to fund this capability in 1987).
As is readily apparent, the system set up to train the Air Force's battle managers of the future is rife with weaknesses. There is no solid formal battle management training, beyond the introductory course, that all battle management officers go through. Whatever basic level academic exposure to battle management concepts the young second lieutenants may get at the basic controller course will soon be forgotten in the wake of focusing on honing the controlling skills they need to build their knowledge base on the tactical level of war. By the time they begin their concerted OJT upgrade to their first battle management position, the academic overviews they received at the entry level course at Tyndall Air Force Base (AFB) will be all but distant memories.
Another major problem with the structure of the current and planned training system is the reliance on the OJT method to train future battle managers. This puts the education and nurturing of the Air Force's battle management forces into the hands of those who are least able to deliver on this task--unit personnel. It's not that the unit instructors aren't able to teach, it is a question of overloading. With operations tempos driving average TDY rates above 180 days a year; maintenance of personal qualification and training requirements; limited access to large-scale, live joint training events; and poor simulation training support equipment; in-depth, high pay-off battle management training for junior officers is at best deficient.(19)
In summary, the Air Force's ability to successfully prosecute future conflict is clearly in question. If the nature of warfare in the not-to-distant future does shift more and more towards one of increased mobility, dispersion, deception, and lethality as expected, then our approach to the command, control, and execution of the air effort must change. Our current conceptual framework of detailed precise planning of every level of minutiae, along with over-centralization of decision making will rob us of our ability to win the war of the OODA loop. We must develop a method for maintaining a healthy measure of centralized command, while retaining the flexibility inherent in decentralizing the control and execution as much as possible. Additionally, we must create a formal training system which has the resources, expertise, and time to train our battle managers to handle the increased complexity and responsibility of decentralization. In other words, our system must retain the benefits of the tenet of unity of effort, while unleashing the enhanced flexibility, timeliness, and responsiveness inherent in the aggressive initiative of subordinate command levels. If done properly the enemy can always be kept two steps behind the power curve.
Conclusions/Recommendations
Command, Control, and Execution:
If the Air Force wants to continue to dominate air operations in the battlefield of the future it must take steps now to ensure that it stays ahead of the OODA loop power curve. The Air Force must be able to command, control, and execute air operations faster, and more efficiently than the enemy can. As a first measure the conceptual approach to command, control, and execution of air operations must change. To maintain maximum flexibility, responsiveness, and timeliness in the application of scarce air resources, control and execution must be decentralized to the lowest possible command levels. The keys to effective decentralization are many faceted. First, all forces involved must have a common operational outlook; they must be oriented similarly towards the task at hand. Additionally, the main focus of effort or desired outcome must be clearly identified and communicated continuously to all participants. Further, lower command levels must be given the latitude to use their initiative in order to capitalize on fleeting opportunities when they fall within the framework of the commander's intent. The information/intelligence structure and systems must provide all levels an equally clear, timely understanding of the battlefield without having to flow information/intelligence up and down vertical command channels (fig 5). Finally, effective communications must exist to allow the highest command levels to redirect the main effort when needed.(20)
As a simple example, the trend in planning must move towards a system that combines the best elements (integration, coordination, synchronization, and deconfliction) of the current highly scripted, detailed, lock-step type air tasking orders with a system that clearly delineates and communicates commander's intent, guidelines, and acceptable retargeting limits to ensure maximum flexibility. This system needs to go way beyond simple identification of alternate targets, to a point where lower levels can react to and capitalize on fleeting moments of vulnerability of the enemy. The structure of the system must provide the flexibility for lower command echelons to conduct real-time, immediate alteration and reallocation of mission resources when the combat situation demands. This system of mission-type orders, originally conceptualized under the early Prussian General Staff of General Von Moltke, would place a premium on maintaining the room for application of individual judgment by the command elements closest to the action that have the information necessary to make decisions.(21)
This decentralization of on-scene decision making is very similar to the principle of mission-type orders used by the US Marine Corps and US Army, as well as the Navy's command by negation.
Battle Management Training System
As seen during operations from Panama, to Desert Storm, to Haiti, to Bosnia; command and control forces are positioned and tasked in a manner that can make or break an operation. Conduct of Operation Desert Storm, without a trained and ready battle management system, would have been difficult, if not impossible to orchestrate and execute. This fact is even more striking when you consider the fact that we dictated the terms and tempo of the battle with Iraq from the very beginning. It is imperative, therefore, that we ensure our battle managers receive the best training we can give them. Erwin Rommel, during World War II, said: "the best form of welfare for the troops is first-class training, for this saves unnecessary casualties."(22)
We must act now to design a training system which will prepare our battle managers for future warfare, otherwise we must prepare ourselves to accept the consequences.
The entry level Air Battle Manager course at Tyndall AFB, although not far off-base, would be more appropriately focused on ensuring the new accessions firmly grasp the basics of controlling and Air Force aviation tactics, while providing a sound orientation to battle management concepts and techniques. The dangerous shortfall in the training system, however, is in advanced battle management training. Advanced training for actual battle management positions, like senior director (SD), mission crew commander (MCC), and battle commander (BC), must be formalized. These positions bring with them the responsibilities of integrating, supporting, and redirecting the joint/combined air effort in support of the air, land and maritime component commander's schemes of maneuver as well as the joint force commander's intent and desired focus of effort. The battle manager's position, as the fulcrum in the effort to leverage our combat forces, demands that training be conducted in formal courses that are manned, equipped, and funded to do the job right.
To do this correctly, two new formal courses need to be created. These courses would provide the initial battle management training for SDs and advanced battle management training for MCCs. The Initial Battle Management Training course (IBMT) for SDs would focus primarily on the mid to upper end of the tactical level of warfare while just touching on the lower operational level. Students would attend this course after their control focused apprenticeship period when enroute to their second assignment. This course would concentrate on the coordination, integration, and management of air assets in the prosecution of offensive, defensive, and support missions. Additionally, it would expand the SDs knowledge base of joint command and control systems integration, offensive air support to ground forces, and control and employment of ground based air defense assets (fig 6). Most importantly it would provide the foundational knowledge and skills required to conduct real-time resource allocation decisions at the tactical level of warfare.
The Advanced Battle Management Training course (ABMT) for MCCs, on the other hand, would focus primarily on the upper end of the tactical level through the mid to upper end of the operational level of warfare. Students would attend while enroute between assignments at the appropriate point in their career (possible the eight to ten year point). It would concentrate on the integration of joint air power with the ground and naval maneuver warfare concepts. The course would be designed to give the MCC a solid foundational understanding of campaign level force integration concepts, as well as the hands-on skills to make it happen. It would ground the MCC in concepts such as battle-field shaping, joint fires coordination, special forces integration, and other areas. Additionally, it would give the MCC in-depth knowledge of joint command and control systems integration, offensive air support to ground forces; as well as concepts of integration, control, and employment of joint theater air and missile defense system assets. Like the IBMT course, it would continue to develop the MCC's real-time resource allocation decision making capabilities only at the higher operational level of war. Finally, it would begin to expose the MCC to capabilities, limitations, and concepts of exploitation and integration of theater, service, and national level intelligence sensors into the battle management effort(fig 6).
The IBMT and ABMT courses could easily be meshed with the Undergraduate Controller Training course (UCT) for entry level enlisted controllers for those portions of the course that are focused on development of hands-on execution level skills. These courses could be integrated into exercises such as US Forces Command's Joint System Training Exercise as a capstone exercise for all three courses.
When a battle management officer reaches the point of being ready for a position such as battle commander or higher, the focus must shift towards the upper operational/lower strategic level of war. At this point in an officer's travels he/she would have had an extensive level of formal, technical, tactical, and operational training through the battle management training system. Additionally, their experience level would be such that an appropriate level of further education can be found in the intermediate or senior level professional military education (PME) courses offered by all the services. These courses, with their focus on operational campaign planning as well as strategic and National Command Authority level planning and operation, would provide just the right mixture of education to top-off the battle managers clue-bag (fig 6).
Senior Air Force leadership must ensure that the existing critical advanced courses such as CATATC and the Weapons School are fully manned and equipped to continue to function much as they do today in order to develop the highly skilled officer and enlisted operators. Battle management officers who show exceptional operational skills should maintain a controlling qualification just long enough to qualify for and attend the CATATC course prior to attending the IBMT course and beginning their transition into their first battle management position of SD (fig 7). These same individuals would most likely make very good candidates for Weapons School when the timing is appropriate. Retaining this capability for officers to attend CATATC will ensure they gain enough lower end tactical skill to apply the weapons officer concepts learned at the Weapons School across the full spectrum of command and control employment. This enhanced foundation of lower level tactical acumen would ensure that they have the solid base of knowledge and skills necessary for good weapons officership. Additionally, this will ensure that the Weapons School will continue to have a healthy base of battle managers, with solid tactical backgrounds, from which to select potential weapons and tactics officers (WTO). Another benefit, therefore, is that battle management units like AWACS, JSTARS, control and reporting centers (CRC), control and reporting elements (CRE), and ABCCC will continue to get the WTOs that have proven so crucial over the last 12 years (fig 7). Additionally, since the Weapons School has shifted its focus to higher level battle management over the past several years, it could easily perform double duty, delivering weapons officer and MCC centered training.
This would prevent prospective weapons officers from having to go to ABMT in addition to weapons school (fig 7).
The importance of training can not be understated. It is the key to producing and maintaining effective, ready, combat forces, and therefore must be attended to with relish in peacetime.(23)
If we are to continue to espouse the old adage of "train how you plan to fight", then we as a service must be ready to put our money where our mouth is. Professional quality, realistic training is not a frivolous waste, it is a necessity for ensuring success in the future.(24)
Force cutbacks which came out of Secretary Aspin's bottom-up-review , and those we are undoubtedly about to face in the near future under quadrennial reviews, demand we face this issue squarely. Declining force levels and funding mixed with increased operations tempo means only one thing--fewer opportunities for battle managers to effectively train to develop/hone critical warfighting skills.(25)
It is a critical mistake to think that by starting up an entry level course for battle management officers we have solved all the problems for the community. Until we analyze what the future of warfare holds for us and how we want to deal with it, battle management will be a hit-or-miss element in the complex events that will determine our success or failure. After witnessing the success of Desert Storm, our enemies around the globe have surely learned the importance of negating the effective operation of critical command nodes. We doom ourselves if we continue our trek down the path of increasing verticalization and centralization of information, intelligence, command, and control. Like our precious combat forces, we must find ways to decentralize, disperse, and flatten the command, control, and execution of air power. Our goal must be a system that is flexible, responsive, and robust. We must take this as far as possible while still ensuring our ability to determine, communicate, and prosecute a given focus of effort while retaining unity of effort of the scarce resource--air power.
The most sure way of making uncoordinated noise is by having the orchestra filled with very talented musicians, using the newest top-of-the-line musical instruments, led by a wino with poor to no musical training. We must ensure that the forces that will orchestrate, direct, adapt, coordinate, and facilitate the air effort are up to the task at hand. USAF battle management concepts and training must be scrubbed from top to bottom.
Glossary of Acronyms
ABCCC: airborne battlefield command, control, and communications system
ABM: Air Battle Management course at Tyndall AFB
ABMT: Advanced Battle Management Training
ACE: airborne command element
ACT: air combat training
ADA: air defense artillery
AEWC: airborne early warning and control
AFB: air force base
AOC: air operations center
ASOC: air support operations center
ATO: air tasking order
AWACS: airborne warning and control system
BC: battle commander
CATATC: Counter Air Tactics Awareness Training Course
CRC: control and reporting center
CRE: control and reporting element
CRP: control and reporting post
DACT: dissimilar air combat training
FDP: forward director post
IBMT: Initial Battle Management Training
JFACC: joint force air component commander
JFC: joint force commander
JSTARS: joint strategic target attack radar system
LCC: land component commander
LFECC: Large Force Employment Controller Course
MCC: mission crew commander
MEWU: microwave early warning unit
OJT: on the job training
OODA: observe, orient, decide, act
RIF: reduction in forces
SD: senior director
SERB: selective early retirement board
TACC: tactical air control center
TACP: tactical air control party
TACS: theater air control system
TADC: tactical air direction center
TCC: tactical control center
TDY: temporary duty
UCT: Undergraduate Controller Training
USAF: United States Air Force
WD: weapons director (used interchangeably with WC: weapons controller)
WS: Weapons School
WTO: weapons and tactics officer
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1 Clausewitz, Carl Von, On War, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton Univ Press, 1989, 75,77
2 Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, Fort Monroe, Va: US Army TRADOC, Jun 1993, 6-9
3 Mann, Col Edward C III, USAF. Thunder and Lightening: Desert Storm and the Airpower Debates, Air University Press, Apr 1995, 61
4 Mann, 98
5 Schneider, Barry R. and Lawrence E. Grinter, "Overview: Introduction to the Battlefield of the Future", in Battlefield of the Future: 21st Century Warfare Issues, Sep 1995, 1
6 Schneider, Barry R., "New Era Warfare? A Revolution in Military Affairs?" in Battlefield of the Future: 21st Century Warfare Issues, Sep 1995, 43
7 Szafranski, Col Richard, USAF. "Parallel War and Hyperwar: Is Every Want a Weakness?", in Battlefield of the Future: 21st Century Warfare Issues, Sep 1995, 126
8 McLendon, Col James W., USAF. "Information Warfare: Impacts and Concerns", in Battlefield of the Future: 21st Century Warfare Issues, Sep 1995, 187
9 Roman, Gregory A. LtCol, USAF, "C2 Dilemma: When Technical and Organizational Orientation Collide", Aug 96, downloaded from Air Force 2025 Home Page au.af.mil/au/20205/volume1/chap04/v1c4-4.htm, 10 Mar 95
10 Fischer, Maj E. Michael, USAF. Mission-Type Orders in Joint Air Operations: The Empowerment of Air Leadership, Thesis, Maxwell AFB, Al. School of Advanced Airpower Studies, May 1995, 38
11 Fischer, 55,57
12 Vincent, 1Lt Gary A., USAF. A New Approach to Command and Control: The Cybernetic Design, Air Power Journal, Summer 1993, 28
13 Fischer, 9
14 Ibid, 39,43
15 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, DOD Final Report to Congress, Washington DC, Department of Defense, Apr 1992, 97, 167
16 LtCol Bruce Walls, Staff Officer HQ Air Combat Command/DOYG, interview by author, 5 Mar 97
17 LtCol Bruce Walls, Staff Officer HQ Air Combat Command/DOYG, interview by author, 5 Mar 97
18 Maj Mike Kegler, Operations Officer USAF Weapons School, interview by author, 5 Mar 97. Manning shortfalls as a result of the conversion and consolidation of the early 90s has reduced the schools ability to handle students down to a paultry eight to 10 per year. This amount of graduating students is not even close to satisfying the Combat Air Forces requirements for weapons and tactics officers
19 Conversion, consolidation, SERBs, RIF, and operations tempos over the past seven years have devastated the battle management community, particularly in experienced senior company grade levels, leaving line units with weak to no instructor cadres. This subject is worthy of a research paper in and of itself.
20 Fischer, 13
21 Holborn, Hajo, "The Prusso-German School: Moltke and the Rise of the General Staff" in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, 1986, 290,291
22 Force Marines Field Manual (FMFM) 1, Warfighting. Washington, DC: Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 38
23FMFM 1, 46-49
24 "Air Force Issues - Maintain Combat Readiness", downloaded from nellis.af.mil/range/99rg, 11/20/96, 3
25 "Air Force Issues - Maintain Combat Readiness", 3