Air Force Intelligence and Security Doctrine
Air Force INTELLIGENCE
This Air Force doctrine provides Air Force doctrine for intelligence and supports basic air and space doctrine. This document is consistent with and complements the Joint Pub 2-0 series, but its purpose is to promulgate the Air Force perspective on intelligence. As such, it focuses on how Air Force intelligence can be organized, trained, equipped, and operated. This AFDD applies to all active duty, Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, and civilian Air Force personnel. This doctrine is authoritative but not directive; commanders are encouraged to exercise judgment in applying this doctrine to accomplish their missions.
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Chapter 1--Introduction
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Figures
3.1. Air Operations Center (AOC) Information Flow 5
4.1. Intelligence Cycle 7
Attachment
1. Glossary of References, Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Terms 10
INTRODUCTION
1.2. Intelligence Definition. Intelligence is the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. Timely, accurate, and relevant intelligence provides mission focus, reduces the risk of surprise, and enhances operational effectiveness.
1.3. Intelligence Value. Intelligence is a primary contributor to information dominance in support of the Air Force concept of global awareness. (See AFDD 5, Information Warfare). Further, the intelligence mission is essential to the success of a broad array of Air Force missions and activities. For example:
1.3.1. Counterair, Counterspace, and Counterinformation. Successful aerospace control enables us to use the air, space, and information realms without suffering losses, and to inflict substantial losses on the enemy's use of those realms. A commander's first objective is to control the environment. To do this, intelligence provides detail on foreign air, space, and information warfare (IW) capabilities, ranging from surface-to-air missile order of battle to cyberspace displays of foreign space operation's networks.
1.3.2. Strategic Attack, Interdiction, and Close Air Support. In order to affect an adversary's will and capability to fight, intelligence provides analysis on vulnerabilities that can lead to success through paralyzing the enemy's ability to exercise command and control. Nodal analysis, including detail on target status and location is crucial to effective Strike missions. With considerable weight of effort expended on developing and maintaining target sets, particularly for mobile and concealed units and facilities, intelligence is key to the achieving campaign objectives.
1.3.3. Airlift and Air Refueling. Intelligence provides a threat display along air lines of communications, to include threat and infrastructure data associated with en route and destination airfields as well as potential drop and landing zones.
1.3.4. Information. (C4, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation and positioning, and weather service.) Information operations include any action involving the acquisition, transmission, storage, or transformation of information that enhances the employment of military forces. The commander with better information holds a powerful advantage over the adversary. Success depends on the integrity of information operations as well as the information itself. Intelligence contributes in many ways to the overall information effort, most notably in allowing commanders and decision makers to "know the enemy" and operate smarter.
1.3.5. Sustainment and Preparation. Intelligence provides essential information for the success of a variety of Air Force sustaining activities. It supplies a complex threat
backdrop for education and training efforts and critical information needed for the design, development, and deployment of Air Force weapons and combat support systems.
AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE PRINCIPLES
2.2. Synchronization. Operations and intelligence must work in unison to meet the timeliness and accuracy requirements of air power. Intelligence personnel should be full participants in the entire planning process and should be well-represented on the commander's staff. A close working relationship between intelligence and operations personnel will facilitate the two-way flow of essential information. The commander considers both the capabilities and limitations of intelligence systems and organizations in the decision-making, planning, and preparation processes. Similarly, intelligence personnel must be fully aware of mission goals and objectives.
2.3. Accuracy. In order for intelligence to better support Air Force operations, it must be as accurate as possible. This requires corroboration and analysis of all available information. Extensive knowledge of enemy strategy, tactics, capabilities, and culture enables intelligence personnel to anticipate actions in providing the most complete and exact picture to planners and operators. During crises, one of the most demanding tasks for intelligence personnel is the need to balance requirements for accuracy with expediency. Judging the appropriate balance of expediency and accuracy requires very close coordination with operations planners in order to understand their requirements.
2.4. Relevance. Intelligence information and collection imperatives should be directly applicable to determining, planning, conducting, and evaluating operations. Relevant intelligence is tailored to current operational needs. The intelligence system provides information that applies to the responsibilities of each level of command. It should focus on the command's potential, planned, and ongoing courses of action.
2.5. Timeliness. Timely intelligence is essential to prevent surprise, conduct defense, seize the initiative, and use forces effectively. Intelligence must be available in time for commanders and units to tailor operations as required. This principle applies to identifying and stating requirements, collecting information, and producing intelligence. In crises, prompt distribution of up-to-date intelligence information--especially order of battle changes, target materiels, and collection requirements--is critical to overall operational success. Communications connectivity is the key to delivering in-time intelligence to users.
2.6. Fusion. Enemy efforts to deny information and inherent limitations of each collection system inhibit the ability of a single source to provide adequate information for decision-making. Therefore, information from many collection sources is combined, evaluated, and analyzed to produce accurate intelligence useful for decision making. This process is called fusion. The dynamic pace of modern warfare and the vast quantity of data collected by many systems demands the automation of the fusion process, thus ensuring commanders have a complete picture. Care should be taken not to promote fusion at the expense of timeliness. Significant single-source information (for example, a previously undetected surface-to-air missile (SAM) site near the target) should be sent to users immediately. The importance of fusion was clearly demonstrated during WWII; data obtained through signals intelligence (codenamed "Ultra") was comprehensively fused with other sources of information, providing proof of German vulnerability in oil. Based on this data, General Eisenhower (in May 1944) reorganized priorities and oil became the targeted center of gravity for the remainder of the war. The results for Germany were catastrophic. As Albert Speer said, "It meant the end of German armaments production."
2.7. Accessibility. Intelligence information must be readily accessible to be usable. Extensive intelligence facilitates perceptive analysis of developing crises only if it is easily retrievable. Massive amounts of intelligence are of limited value if it can't be correlated with other information. Whenever possible, the types of intelligence needed must be anticipated and arrangements made for the personnel involved to have the appropriate clearances and access. Some intelligence requires extraordinary protection (e.g., to protect sensitive sources and methods, or the fact that certain knowledge is held); however, intelligence should always be classified at the lowest possible classification consistent with security. This ensures the widest possible dissemination and use.
2.8. Security. Intelligence staffs must protect classified information and sensitive sources while keeping commanders and their staffs fully informed. The difference between peacetime and combat policies and priorities must be determined ahead of time and well understood. Protection of classified information and sources must be consistent with established DOD policies and procedures, even if operations are conducted with coalition partners. Detailed guidance should be developed and disseminated for crises operations. Criteria, authority, and procedures for declassifying or sanitizing intelligence should be available at all appropriate levels and tested during selected exercises. Overclassification and unnecessary compartmentation must be avoided, since they can prevent personnel from receiving or using intelligence they need. If appropriate directives are found to be too restrictive to meet operational requirements, requests for revised guidance should be submitted to the responsible organization.
2.9. Survivability. Intelligence resources, activities, and communications must be survivable to ensure support is available when needed. Important components of survivability are redundancy and hardening of critical intelligence and communications capabilities. Accordingly, organizations at all levels of command must develop concepts of intelligence operations that provide for continuity even if communications are severely stressed or lost.
2.10. Unity of Effort. Organizations at all levels should have clearly defined functions which minimize duplication, maximize sharing of information between Services, and are mutually supportive. Allied and multinational national forces' intelligence requirements and production need to be agreed upon and tested in advance of operations. Their scope depends upon the command, the forces assigned, and the anticipated operations. A good example of unity comes from the Vietnam War. During that conflict, Task Force Alpha (a group made up from several intelligence disciplines) demonstrated the importance of cooperation and integration of functional intelligence specialists, analysts, and targeteers. This group provided fused all-source (signals, photo, and human intelligence) derived targets directly to operational personnel in a closed-loop process. Face-to-face discussions between targeteer, analysts, and specialists resulted in centralize target development and assessment.
THE INTELLIGENCE MISSION
3.2. Strategic Level Intelligence. Intelligence is required at the strategic level to formulate national as well as theater strategy, policy, and plans. A goal of strategic level intelligence organizations is to provide accurate, timely intelligence that enable decision makers to take appropriate actions before crises develop. Air Force intelligence activities train, equip, and organize to ensure air intelligence support is available when needed. Air intelligence is also integral to research and development, weapon system acquisition, and national level programs. Identifying, monitoring, and targeting of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) development programs are intelligence functions required by National Security Directives and the USAF Counterproliferation Master Plan. In support of these efforts, intelligence capabilities in all disciplines and functions are established in peacetime to be available for contingencies. This is especially critical when certain skills, such as area specialists, targeteers, and human intelligence (HUMINT) collectors, require significant lead times because they cannot be "surged" easily. Usually, the intelligence community works together to arrange special training and organizations in anticipation of future intelligence needs.
3.3. Operational Level Intelligence. Operational level intelligence is required for planning and accomplishing strategic level objectives within theaters. Operational campaign planners rely on intelligence support to the targeting effort. Intelligence analysis helps define those vulnerable, vital elements of the enemy's national structure which will result in strategic paralysis (if neutralized). In a threat environment, a priority for air operations is to gain and maintain air superiority by neutralizing air and air defense forces. Before this can be achieved, intelligence personnel must identify and access an integrated assessment of enemy sensors, command and control (C2) systems, and threats to friendly forces.
3.3.1. Air Component Support. The Air Force's component at the operational level is normally a Numbered Air Force (NAF) supported by the Air Intelligence Squadron. The NAF senior intelligence officer (SIO) is generally the focal point for directing all-source, all-discipline cohesion and focus with the Air Force Forces (AFFOR) intelligence system. Establishing this central point in the combat theater for target development and threat assessment improves intelligence support to air operations and ensures coordination between various intelligence functions. The Air Operations Center (AOC) combat intelligence division provides overall theater situational awareness to help the Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) identify and exploit the enemy's centers of gravity, to help formulate objectives, and to support the commander's forces. Near-real-time intelligence is especially crucial to air tasking order (ATO) execution in providing up-to-date targeting information. Similarly, the intelligence structure should be designed to expedite tailored intelligence to operational units. It is essential that intelligence personnel are integrated with Combat Plans and Combat Operations personnel in order to provide direct support to ATO development and execution (figure 3.1).
3.3.2. Targeting. Intelligence personnel evaluate incoming data on combat operations and revise target nomination priorities. High priority targets are closely monitored to ensure strike execution and desired level of destruction. Targeteers must be prepared to deal with the highly mobile, ambiguous targeting environment of military operations. Providing near-real-time sensor information requires the intelligence community to rapidly focus and filter a flood of data into meaningful targeting information. Additionally, AOC battle damage assessment (BDA) responsibilities depend on rapid and accurate information on targets in order to assess combat effectiveness.
Figure 3.1. Air Operations Center (AOC) Information Flow.
3.3.3. Collection. Collection managers prepare and update a collection plan based upon potential collection assets and the specific needs of the combat planners and battle managers. The plan includes identification of collection assets and their capabilities, procedures for tasking these assets, coordination requirements, responsibilities of supporting elements, and standing requirements. Requests for Information (RFIs) from Air Force units are passed to the appropriate intelligence element for action. If the RFI cannot be satisfied, it is processed for tracking, prioritizing, and integrating with other requests into collection requirements. Collection managers forward requirements to appropriate offices--for example, the supporting Joint Intelligence Center (JIC).
3.3.4. REACHBACK. REACHBACK is the process of obtaining products and services that are unavailable through the chain of command from Air Force intelligence organizations. Although the majority of intelligence support for deployed air forces comes from theater JICs, REACHBACK can provide continuity for forces from stateside resources.
3.3.4.1. Air Force Intelligence REACHBACK is characterized by the need for rapid response to requests involving air-related intelligence. In a deployment-driven JTF environment, intelligence support is provided by the theater command through supporting air component intelligence units. Air Force Intelligence REACHBACK may continue the necessary intelligence support to deploying units while their component intelligence unit support sections are in transition and unable to provide normal, timely support.
3.3.4.2. REACHBACK is theater dependent and depends on joint force capabilities. Typical unit requirements, such as for manpower and equipment, flow through the AOC and are coordinated with the theater J2. JICs provide core intelligence, including general military intelligence (GMI)
products, installation data, and orders of battle. When Air Force intelligence units require support not available from the theater, for example, weapon system-unique target materials, they may rely on the REACHBACK concept. The Air Force Air Intelligence Agency (AIA) is the focal point for supporting Air Force unit requirements not obtainable from JICs or national sources. AIA's Air Force Information Warfare Center (AFIWC) provides time-critical intelligence information 24 hours per day.
3.4. Tactical Level Intelligence. Intelligence actively participates in planning and executing air operations. Threat assessment is the most common unit level intelligence function conducted in support of tactical level Air Force operations. This includes current assessment, defense and penetration analysis, and warning. These activities rely on the intelligence organization to pull information as required. Information, such as target area imagery, must be immediately available because of reduced planning times. ATO time compression will continue to heighten this need. Wing and squadron intelligence analysts support the operational level combat assessment process by preparing mission reports based on onboard sensor data and aircrew debriefs. These reports are forwarded to the AOC for consolidation, evaluation, integration, and dissemination.
3.4.1. Current Assessment. Air Force planners, commanders, and other users rely on current assessments for accurate and timely knowledge of daily events. Current assessments tend to confirm or deny previous estimates and often provide the essential insight for changing tactics or strategy.
3.4.2. Defense and Penetration Analysis. Intelligence personnel assess threats to forces that penetrate or operate close to enemy territory. They also analyze enemy force capabilities to penetrate or operate over friendly territory. Defense and penetration analysis products provide a basis for detailed mission profile planning and defense suppression, as well as for assessments of the vulnerabilities of friendly forces. This analysis is essential in projecting operational costs against anticipated strike results
3.4.3. Warning. Warning is the most time-urgent threat assessment function. It involves the focused collection, fusion, and dissemination of intelligence about actual or potential threats to the US or its forces and allies. The security of the nation, air forces, and installations depends on this. One of the most important tactical warning functions is SIGINT participation in electronic warfare (EW). In an EW support role, SIGINT personnel search, intercept, and exploit electromagnetic radiation only to the extent required to immediately identify or locate the source of enemy emissions. (See AFDD 32 for more information.)
3.5. Air Force Intelligence Organizations. Intelligence squadrons assigned to the Air Force's "service intelligence command"--the Air Intelligence Agency (AIA)--as well as units assigned to the Air Combat Command (ACC) collect, process, exploit, and disseminate intelligence worldwide in response to taskings from national authorities and theater commanders. AIA and ACC intelligence squadrons conduct various missions including IMINT and SIGINT collection, processing, exploitation, and dissemination. AIA's Centers of Excellence--the National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC) and the Air Force Information Warfare Center (AFIWC)--provide a myriad of intelligence services, directly and indirectly, to all levels of operations.
3.5.1. NAIC. The NAIC produces integrated scientific and technical (S&T), and general military intelligence (GMI) vulnerabilities and capabilities analysis on foreign aerospace weapon systems and organizations. In a contingency environment, it supports the rapid exploitation of foreign military equipment made available through capture or other circumstances. It also has the capability to produce specialized target materials and provide air intelligence services that are unavailable within the chain of command during deployments.
3.5.2. AFIWC. The AFIWC develops, maintains, and deploys Information Warfare (IW)/Command and Control Warfare (C2W) capabilities in support of operations, campaign planning, acquisition and testing. AF IW, and its goal of information dominance, depends on AFIWC battlespace preparation such as the construction and maintenance of target sets for C2 nodal analysis, centers of gravity, and concealed facilities. (See AFDD 5 for more information on IW and C2W.) AFIWC also acts as a time-sensitive, single focal point for intelligence data and C2W services. It provides technical expertise for computer and communications security, and is the Air Force focal point for tactical deception and operations security training.
JOINT INTELLIGENCE
4.2. Intelligence Cycle. A basic understanding of the intelligence cycle -- the steps by which information is converted into intelligence and made available to the user -- is necessary for both intelligence practitioners and consumers. These steps represent sequential phases of planning and direction, collection, processing and production and dissemination. However, they should not be viewed as separate elements but as an interrelated whole. Mission input, in the form of user-validated requirements, is essential throughout the cycle. See figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1. Intelligence Cycle.
4.3. Planning and Direction. The Joint Staff J-2/DIA conducts long-range planning, forms intelligence task forces in response to crises, and augments subordinate joint force staffs with National Intelligence Support Teams. Combatant commands produce theater plans, such as the Command Intelligence Architecture Plan (CIAP), and tailor Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs) to meet crisis requirements. Subordinate Joint Force J-2s form JICs to manage intelligence operations and theater requirements. Component forces provide collection, processing, production, and dissemination capabilities.
4.4. Collection. The Joint Staff J-2/DIA coordinates tasking of national reconnaissance systems, manages the DOD HUMINT program, coordinates with the intelligence community on other collection programs, and responds to
RFIs submitted by JICs. Combatant commands devise theater collection plans, coordinate theater organic sensors, and respond to subordinate RFIs or submits the requests for national tasking. Subordinate Joint Force J-2s develop collection plans, validate component requirements, and task components for unique sensor collection efforts. Components identify and prioritize EEIs and RFIs. Services ensure collection systems are interoperable and provide trained collection personnel and assets.
4.5. Processing and Production. The Joint Staff J-2 DIA establishes standards for C4 I equipment to support joint operations. The Joint Staff J-2 provides analytic estimates, reports on adversary capabilities and activates an interagency BDA cell to directly support targeting missions. Combatant command J-2s provide theater assessments, maintain data bases, produce target materials for operating forces in an AOR, act as overall BDA validation authority, and support the J-3 in the combat assessment process. Joint Force J-2s maintain knowledge of adversary and terrain, conduct target development and nomination, and report operational BDA. Components update data bases, perform target analysis, development, and nomination, produce target materials, and report mission BDA. Services ensure interoperability with joint processing and dissemination systems. Services also provide input to data bases, train and equip personnel to perform targeting, and augment or tailor JIC materials, as required. Joint doctrine provides for augmentation of JIC production capabilities by the military Services. The Air Force, in a REACHBACK role, provides air-related intelligence and Information Warfare products and services unavailable in the theater or through the normal chain of command. Depending on theater capabilities, REACHBACK is available during the readiness, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment phases of conflict.
4.6. Dissemination. The Joint Staff J-2/DIA serves as repository for basic data bases and manages the Department of Defense Intelligence Information System (DODIIS). Combatant command J-2s maintain archives for theater intelligence and provide tailored regional intelligence to supporting commands or components as required. They also disseminate tailored intelligence produced at other levels and direct intelligence support to components. Components are consumers of tailored intelligence support, provide limited production for tactical use, and ensure units have timely and complete intelligence to perform missions. Services ensure nondeployed forces are provided necessary information for readiness and training.
CONCLUSION
5.2. Response. The Air Force response to this changing environment will demand a totally integrated intelligence
effort. Achieving information dominance, while "new" only in terms of means and methods, will be as essential as air and space superiority for Air Force operational success. To participate effectively, Air Force intelligence will require innovative approaches to collecting and targeting in cyberspace or a virtual environment. The system stress associated with providing on-time intelligence for employing precision weapons will mandate fielding highly robust and seamless intelligence processing and dissemination networks. Meanwhile, the Air Force's extensive contribution to MOOTW, such as counterdrug or peace-keeping operations, places unusual demands on Air Force intelligence (see AFDD 3). Intelligence support for these operations will focus on collecting against targets of low or no visibility and establishing and maintaining (or securing access to) peacetime data bases.
5.3. Vision. To keep pace in a changing world, Air Force intelligence personnel should view the challenges of the future as opportunities rather than problems. Technology must be understood and mastered to effectively perform enduring intelligence tasks such as briefing aircrews or preparing collection plans. Concomitant operating concepts, organizational structures, and training methods must be flexible and innovative in order to capitalize on technological gains. An ever-more demanding Air Force requires intelligence personnel to cultivate an atmosphere that encourages initiative and anticipates the future. Only then can Air Force intelligence fully play its part to ensure that modern air and space power are employed to maximum benefit in pursuit of the nation's interests.
Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 20 Oct 94
Joint Pub 2-0, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations, 12 Oct 93
Joint Pub 2-01, Joint Intelligence Support to Operations (draft)
Joint Pub 2-01.1, Joint Intelligence Support to Targeting (draft)
Joint Pub 2-02, National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations (draft)
JFACC Primer, Feb 94
AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine (draft)
AFDD 2, Theater Air Warfare (draft)
AFDD 5, Information Warfare (draft)
AFDD 100, Air Force Glossary of Standardized Terms (draft)
Abbreviations and Acronyms
AFIWC Air Force Information Warfare Center
AIA Air Intelligence Agency
AOC Air Operations Center
AOR Area of Responsibility
ATO Air Tasking Order
BDA Battle Damage Assessment
C2 Command and Control
C4 Command, Control, Communications, and Computers
C4 I Systems Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence Systems
CIAP Command Intelligence Architecture Plan
COMINT Communications Intelligence
CONUS Continental United States
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency
DMA Defense Mapping Agency
DoD Department of Defense
DODIIS Department of Defense Intelligence Information System
EEI Essential Elements of Information
ELINT Electronics Intelligence
EW Electronic Warfare
GMI General Military Intelligence
HUMINT Human Intelligence
I&W Indications and Warning
IMINT Imagery Intelligence
IPB Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace
IW Information Warfare
JFACC Joint Force Air Component Commander
JIC Joint Intelligence Center
NAF Numbered Air Force
NAIC National Air Intelligence Center
R&D Research and Development
RFI Request For Information
S&T Scientific and Technical
SIO Senior Intelligence Officer
SIGINT Signals Intelligence
Terms
Collection-- Acquisition of information and the provision of this information to processing and/or production elements. (Joint Pub 1-02)
Information Warfare--Any action to deny, exploit, corrupt, or destroy the enemy's information and its functions; protecting ourselves against those actions; and exploiting our own military information functions.
Intelligence--1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. 2. Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding. (Joint Pub 1-02)
Operational Intelligence--Intelligence that is required for planning and conducting campaigns and major operations to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)
REACHBACK--The process of obtaining air intelligence products, services, and applications that are unavailable in the area of responsibility or chain of command from Air Force intelligence organizations.
Reconnaissance--A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. (Joint Pub 1-02)
Surveillance--The systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. (Joint Pub 1-02)
Strategic Intelligence--Intelligence that is required for the formulation of strategy, policy, and military plans and operations at national and theater levels. (Joint Pub 1-02)
Tactical Intelligence-- Intelligence that is required for planning and conducting tactical operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)
Targeting--The process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking account of operational requirements and capabilities. (Joint Pub 1-02)