NOSCINST 5530.2
3301/JRC:ab
27 January 1988
NOSC INSTRUCTION 5530.2
From: Commander, Naval Ocean Systems Center
To: Department Heads and above, and All Military
Subj: CENTER ANTITERRORISM PLAN
Ref: (a) ALNAV 011/87 (CNO Washington DC 202050Z Jan 87)
(b) NOSCINST 5500.1, Security Manual
(c) OPNAVINST 3100.6D, Special Incident Reporting (OPREP-3 and Unit
SITREP) Procedures
(d) OPNAVINST 5530.14A, U.S. Navy Physical Security and Loss Prevention
Manual
(e) CNO Washington DC 081919Z Apr 86
(f) NOSCINST 5530.3, NOSC Auxiliary Security Force (proposed)
Encl: (1) Threat Conditions and Measures
1. Purpose. To provide personnel assigned to Naval Ocean Systems Center
(NOSC) with planned emergency response procedures for all terrorist threat
conditions (THREATCONS).
2. Scope. This instruction incorporates the requirements of references (a)
through (e), and covers all NOSC security policies and procedures for imple-
mentation of THREATCONS.
3. Definitions. The following terms are used in this instruction:
a. Security. The sum of all actions relating to the day-to-day protec-
tion of personnel, property, and individual rights at facilities under the
direction of the U.S. Navy.
b. Physical Security. The part of security concerned with physical meas-
ures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equip-
ment, installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against
espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft.
c. Antiterrorism. All efforts designed to prepare facilities, personnel,
and equipment to ward off or discourage terrorist attack. This includes edu-
cation, training, physical alterations, mental preparedness, etc.
d. Counterterrorism. All efforts designed to halt a terrorist attack
after the attack has begun. The attack may be overt or covert.
e. THREATCON Alpha. This condition applies when there is a general
threat of possible terrorist activity against installations and personnel, the
nature and extent of which are unpredictable, when the circumstances do not
justify full implementation of the measures of THREATCON Bravo.
NOSCINST 5530.2
27 January 1988
f. THREATCON Bravo. This condition applies when an increased and more
predictable threat of terrorist activity exists. The measures in this threat
condition must be capable of being maintained for weeks without causing undue
hardship, without affecting operational capability, and without aggravating
relations with local authorities.
g. THREATCON Charlie. This condition applies when an incident occurs or
when intelligence is received indicating that some form of terrorist action
against installations and personnel is imminent. Implementation of this meas-
ure for more than a short period will probably create hardship and will affect
the peacetime activities of the Center and its personnel.
h. THREATCON Delta. This condition applies in the immediate area where a
terrorist action against a specific location is likely. Normally, THREATCON
Delta is declared as a localized warning.
4. Responsibility and Authority
a. Chief Staff Officer (Code 03). The Chief Staff Officer is responsible
for directing development of, and maintaining effective procedures for, the
NOSC Antiterrorism Plan.
b. Head, Security/Safety Office (Code 15). The Head, Security/Safety
Office, is responsible for notifying the Commander, NOSC; the Chief Staff
Officer; and the Head, Military Support Department (Code 30), of potential
emergency situations, setting the threat condition (THREATCON) contained in
enclosure (1) as directed, and taking appropriate action specified in that
THREATCON. During the emergency situation, Code 15 is responsible for all
matters pertaining to protection of human life and Government property, pre-
vention of classified material compromise, and controlled access into the
Center. Under the direct control of Code 15, the following specific functions
will be accomplished:
(1) Provide emergency assistance in the form of badging and vehicle
passes to control access.
(2) Provide guidance and other assistance to protect classified docu-
ments and equipment.
(3) Direct operations of the contract guard force and coordinate with
the Auxiliary Security Force (ASF) Officer in Charge (OIC) assignments of NOSC
ASF personnel to control access, prevent compromise of classified material,
and exercise physical control over buildings and areas.
(4) Provide interface and coordination of functions with other mili-
tary and law enforcement activities as directed.
(5) Provide safety advice and other emergency assistance to minimize
safety and health hazards.
c. Head, Intelligence Office (Code 17). The Intelligence Officer is
responsible for locating, securing, and safeguarding all Sensitive Compart-
mented Information (SCI) areas, materials, and documents.
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NOSCINST 5530.2
27 January 1988
d. Disaster Preparedness Officer (Code 154). The Disaster Preparedness
Officer will coordinate actions with NOSC departments and the Facilities Engi-
neering Office, Code 006, for securing, repairing, or restoring utility sys-
tems, facilities, and transportation equipment. Code 154 will:
(1) Advise and assist the ASF OIC on facility, utility, and transpor-
tation matters.
(2) Ensure that adequate and proper internal support resources are
identified and readily available for disaster assistance.
(3) Use in-house labor and material resources to expedite recovery and
minimize disruptions.
e. Supply Officer (Code 20). The Supply Officer is responsible for pro-
curement, receipt, issue, and storage of all material necessary to effect a
rapid recovery from an emergency situation.
f. Head, Military Support Department (Code 30). Code 30 is responsible
for training, equipping, and maintaining the NOSC ASF per reference (f).
g. ASF Officer in Charge (OIC)/Assistant Officer in Charge (AOIC). The
OIC of the NOSC Auxiliary Security Force is responsible for directing actions
of the ASF per reference (f).
h. Command Duty Officer. If an emergency situation requiring actions in
excess of normal security measures occurs outside normal work hours, the Com-
mand Duty Officer will refer to required procedures under THREATCONS contained
in enclosure (1) and:
(1) Set THREATCON A, B, C, or D as directed by COMNAVBASE San Diego;
Commander, NOSC; or the Chief Staff Officer.
(2) Make voice telephone reports to COMNAVBASE San Diego.
(3) Assume command of ASF until relieved by the ASF OIC or AOIC, or
until directed otherwise by the On-Scene Commander. The On-Scene Commander is
the senior line officer present on the Center.
(4) Coordinate closely with NOSC Security personnel (Code 15) and the
ASF OIC to ensure initial perimeter safeguards are in effect.
(5) Start communications control through use of the "REMINDER ECHO"
communications net.
(6) Start appropriate message advisories to higher authority (OPREP-3
reports).
(7) Conduct liaison with local commands for additional assistance as
required and directed by Commander, NOSC, or the On-Scene Commander.
i. Public Affairs Officer (Code 032). The Public Affairs Officer is
responsible for responding to queries from the news media.
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NOSCINST 5530.2
27 January 1988
5. Action. Addressees shall take appropriate action to ensure compliance
with policies and timely execution of procedures established by this instruc-
tion.
6. Directive Responsibility. The Head, Security/Safety Office, Code 15, is
responsible for keeping this instruction current.
/s/T. F. BAILEY
Acting
Distribution:
A
E
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NOSCINST 5530.2
27 January 1988
THREAT CONDITIONS AND MEASURES
The following threat conditions will be implemented as directed:
1. Threat Conditions Alpha. This condition applies when there is a general
threat of possible terrorist activity against the Center, the nature and
extent of which are unpredictable, when the circumstances do not justify full
implementation of the measures of Threat Condition Bravo. However, it may be
necessary to implement certain selected measures from Threat Condition Bravo
as a result of intelligence received or as a deterrent. The measures in this
threat condition must be capable of being maintained indefinitely.
a. Measure 1. At regular intervals, remind all personnel including
dependents, to be suspicious and inquisitive about strangers, particularly
those carrying suitcases or other containers; alert for unidentified vehicles
on, or in the vicinity of, the Center; and alert for abandoned parcels or
suitcases or any unusual activity.
b. Measure 2. Keep available at all times the duty security officer or
other appointed personnel who have access to plans for evacuating buildings
and areas in use and for sealing off any areas where an explosion or attack
has occurred. Keep on call day personnel who may be needed to implement secu-
rity plans.
c. Measure 3. Secure buildings, rooms, and storage areas not in regular
use.
d. Measure 4. Increase security spot checks of vehicles and persons
entering the Center.
e. Measure 5. Limit access points for vehicles and personnel commensur-
ate with a reasonable flow of traffic.
f. Measure 6. As a deterrent, apply one of the following measures from
THREATCON Bravo individually and randomly.
(1) Secure and regularly inspect all buildings, rooms, and storage
areas not in regular use.
(2) At the beginning and end of each workday and at other regular and
frequent intervals, inspect the interior and exterior of buildings in regular
use for suspicious activity or packages.
(3) Check all deliveries to the Center.
(4) As far as resources allow, increase surveillance of domestic
accommodations and other soft targets to improve deterrence and defense and to
build confidence among Center personnel.
g. Measure 7. Review all plans, orders, personnel details, and logistic
requirements related to the introduction of the higher THREATCON.
Enclosure (1)
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NOSCINST 5530.2
27 January 1988
h. Measure 8. Review and implement security measures for high-risk per-
sonnel as appropriate.
i. Measure 9. Spare.
2. Threat Condition Bravo. This condition applies when an increased and more
predictable threat of terrorist activity exists. The measures in this threat
condition must be capable of being maintained for weeks without causing undue
hardship, without affecting operational capability, and without aggravating
relations with local authorities.
a. Measure 10. Repeat measure 1 and warn personnel of any other form of
attack to be used by terrorists.
b. Measure 11. Keep all personnel involved in implementing antiterrorist
contingency plans on call.
c. Measure 12. Check plans for implementation of the measures contained
in the next THREATCON.
d. Measure 13. Where possible, cars and such objects as crates, trash
containers, etc., are to be moved at least 25 yards from buildings, particu-
larly those buildings of a sensitive or prestigious nature. Consider using
centralized parking.
e. Measure 14. Secure and regularly inspect all buildings, rooms, and
storage areas not in regular use.
f. Measure 15. At the beginning and end of each workday and at other
regular and frequent intervals, inspect the interior and exterior of buildings
in regular use for suspicious packages.
g. Measure 16. Examine all mail for letter or parcel bombs.
h. Measure 17. Check all deliveries to the Center.
i. Measure 18. As far as resources allow, increase surveillance of
domestic accommodations.
j. Measure 19. To stop rumors and prevent unnecessary alarm, make Center
personnel aware of the general situation.
k. Measure 20. At an early stage, inform members of local security com-
mittees of any action being taken and why.
l. Measure 21. Upon entry of visitors to the Center, physically inspect
them and a percentage of their suitcases, parcels, and other containers.
m. Measure 22. Whenever possible, operate random patrols to check vehi-
cles, people, and buildings.
n. Measure 23. Protect off-Center military personnel and military trans-
port per prepared plans. Remind drivers to lock parked vehicles and to insti-
tute a positive system of checking before they enter and drive a car.
Enclosure (1)
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NOSCINST 5530.2
27 January 1988
o. Measure 24. Implement additional security measures for high-risk
personnel as appropriate.
p. Measure 25. Brief personnel who may augment guard force on use of
deadly force.
q. Measures 26-29. Spare.
3. Threat Condition Charlie. This condition applies when an incident occurs
or when intelligence is received indicating that some form of terrorist action
against the Center and Center personnel is imminent. Implementation of this
measure for more than a short period will probably create hardship and will
affect the peacetime activities of the Center.
a. Measure 30. Continue all THREATCON Bravo measures or introduce those
outstanding.
b. Measure 31. Keep available at their places of duty all personnel who
are responsible for implementing antiterrorist plans.
c. Measure 32. Limit access points to absolute minimum.
d. Measure 33. Strictly enforce control of entry and search a percentage
of vehicles.
e. Measure 34. Enforce centralized parking of vehicles away from sensi-
tive buildings.
f. Measure 35. Issue weapons to guards.
g. Measure 36. Increase patrolling of the Center.
h. Measure 37. Protect all designated vulnerable points.
i. Measure 38. Erect barriers and obstacles to control access.
j. Measure 39. Spare.
4. Threat Condition Delta. This condition applies in the immediate area
where a terrorist attack has occurred or when intelligence has been received
that terrorist action against a specific location is likely. Normally,
THREATCON Delta is declared as a localized warning.
a. Measure 40. Continue or introduce all measures for THREATCON's Bravo
and Charlie.
b. Measure 41. Augment guards as necessary.
c. Measure 42. Identify all vehicles already on the Center within opera-
tional or mission support areas.
d. Measure 43. Search all vehicles entering the Center as well as vehi-
cles' contents.
Enclosure (1)
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NOSCINST 5530.2
27 January 1988
e. Measure 44. Control all access and implement positive identification
of all personnel.
f. Measure 45. Search all suitcases, briefcases, packages, etc., brought
onto the Center.
g. Measure 46. Take measures to control access to all areas under juris-
diction of the Center.
h. Measure 47. Make frequent checks of the exterior of all buildings and
parking areas.
i. Measure 48. Minimize all administrative journeys and circuits.
j. Measure 49. Consult local authorities about closing public and mili-
tary roads and facilities that might make sites vulnerable to terrorist
attack.
k. Measure 50. Spare.
Enclosure (1)
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