1. Overview. This chapter focuses on the factors that affect the planning, tasking, coordination, and execution of RSTA operations. It concentrates on those considerations that involve how RSTA assets are tasked. RSTA doctrine is intended to assist the JFC in using assigned and supporting RSTA forces in the most efficient and effective ways possible, thereby providing combat forces with the means to achieve the JFC's objectives.

2. The Intelligence Cycle. The intelligence cycle is the process by which information is obtained, converted into intelligence, and made available to the requester. This section looks at the intelligence cycle as it relates to RSTA operations. (See Joint Test Pub 2-0, "Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations," for greater detail on this subject.) The five steps in the cycle include planning and direction, collection, processing, production, and dissemination. Understanding the intelligence cycle enables the JFC to use RSTA assets more effectively. RSTA operations are linked to all five steps of the cycle and are particularly important to the planning and collection steps.

1. Planning and Direction. The intelligence cycle is geared to support the commander directly in the formulation of an Estimate of the Situation, a Concept of Operations, and an Operation Plan (OPLAN) or a Campaign Plan. The process of planning RSTA operations must include identifying, prioritizing, and validating the need for the operation.
   (1) First, a requirement for information must be identified. Before hostilities, the JFC's direction and guidance establishes baseline intelligence requirements. This also includes MC&G requirements. The most critical of these requirements are identified by the JFC as his essential elements of information (EEI). The designation of EEIs help to ensure the reconnaissance and surveillance effort is focused on the most critical information needs to support the operational effort. Once hostilities begin and as they continue, new direction and guidance evolve creating new requirements or modifying existing requirements.

   (2) Once a requirement is established, it must be prioritized among the other requests for information. Again, the JFC's guidance and direction are the driving factors. As intelligence needs are aligned against collection capabilities, factors such as the enemy threat to RSTA assets, timeliness of RSTA response, availability of RSTA assets, and the impacts of terrain, range, and sensor capabilities will affect how RSTA assets are selected and employed.

   (3) The information requirement must then be validated. Does it meet the JFC's concept of operations and the concepts of the supporting subordinate commanders? Has the information been acquired but not distributed to the requester? Are there other operations ongoing that might satisfy the intelligence requirement? If either of the latter conditions are met, the requested RSTA operation may be unnecessary.

   OPSEC and OPDEC planning guidance must be examined to ensure RSTA operations do not compromise the commander's intentions and ongoing deception operations. This process requires close and effective coordination between the J-3 operations planner and the J-2 intelligence collection manager. The JFC operational concept and plan of operations establish baseline intelligence requirements.

2. Collection. This step includes not only the actual physical collection of information, but also in some cases, the transfer of that information to processing and production facilities. This requires close coordination between operations planners and intelligence collection managers. The J-2 establishes collection requirements to meet the JFC's operational objectives, while the J-3 determines how to employ assigned RSTA systems available to satisfy the collection requirements. If assigned assets cannot meet the CINC's objectives, then external RSTA support may be required. Also, different types of collection capabilities may be needed to validate information acquired from another source. Furthermore, collection capabilities need redundancy so the loss or failure of one system can be compensated for by another collection capability. Collection capabilities (or systems) must also be interoperable so that the information collected can be integrated and correlated into an all-source analysis. The collection architecture must be in place and the procedures exercised during peacetime in order to implement a collection plan effectively at the beginning of hostilities.

3. Processing and Production. Although past RSTA operations have not participated in the processing and production steps of the intelligence cycle, advances in modern technology are changing the way in which information is processed and produced into intelligence. Some RSTA assets possess an onboard data processing capability allowing the data to be processed into raw intelligence. Further processing may be necessary to produce a finished intelligence product. For example, Joint STARS can process the data it obtains either onboard and data link it to the requester or data link the data directly to specific ground stations where the processing is completed. In either case, the information can be sent directly to the user in NRT.

4. Dissemination. This final step in the intelligence cycle also is being greatly affected by advances in technology. Some RSTA assets are capable of disseminating collected information to consumers on a real or near-real-time basis, vastly increasing their speed and responsiveness in meeting the commander's needs. This is especially critical for those RSTA operations supporting ongoing military operations, in which the situation may be evolving rapidly and perishable information could lose its usefulness within a matter of minutes or even seconds. This expanding capability of RSTA systems makes interoperability, commonality, and connectivity all the more important because a real-time planning and targeting system depends on these capabilities. The dissemination process requires continuous management. Without effective management, communications paths can become saturated by information from single sources being retransmitted by many intermediate collection agencies. This well-intentioned data flow can exceed the users' RSTA data processing capability.

4. Planning RSTA Operations. Planning requires the integration of several complex elements.

1. Force Disposition. The JFC must determine the best way to employ RSTA forces that allows maximum effectiveness while weighing the risks. The JFC must determine if it is better to deploy the assets near the area of primary interest where the C3 facilities and processing facilities are located, or in the case of aerial assets, near the maintenance facilities. Both have advantages and disadvantages that must be considered before executing the mission. For example, if the joint force is primarily conducting land operations, the JFC may wish to position aerial reconnaissance systems at an optimum location to ensure maximum responsiveness in support of ground operations. If the enemy poses a significant threat to the forces, the JFC may need to disperse the assets to improve overall force survivability. If the threat increases while the RSTA operation is ongoing, it may be necessary to fall back to positions out of the threat's range. RSTA planners must consider the tradeoffs of survivability and information acquisition. The intelligence information may not become available if the RSTA asset is destroyed, captured, or isolated and unable to exploit, process, and disseminate the acquired information. If the campaign is conducted in a maritime environment, the JFC may position land-based RSTA forces to operate beyond the range of sea-based reconnaissance forces.

2. Force Composition. The JFC must determine information requirements and then identify available RSTA capabilities. This analysis begins by defining command relationships to determine what assets are assigned to the JFC. RSTA assets may be tasked directly (if assigned) or indirectly through other supporting commanders or agencies. The JFC's staff must then assess the operational parameters of available RSTA assets--range, endurance, survivability, and their collection, processing, and dissemination capabilities. The blend of objectives and guidance, threats, force capabilities, and system availability is exceedingly complicated and requires thorough analysis and effective coordination among all elements of RSTA planning to meet the JFC's needs.

3. Prioritization. The JFC should establish priorities for RSTA operations before the onset of hostilities, knowing these priorities may change as the situation develops. The priorities should generally conform to the military objectives; for example, the most capable RSTA assets support the most critical objectives. The JFC must determine the enemy's centers of gravity and may employ RSTA assets to monitor these centers of gravity. Experience has shown that combat operations seldom go as planned, with the fog and friction of war causing operations to evolve in unanticipated directions. Therefore, prioritization of RSTA requirements is critical. RSTA planners must be prepared to adjust priorities to support new requirements. Also, the JFC's requirements may conflict with other requirements, such as MC&G requirements. Although it is important to attempt to satisfy all user requests, the reality of many requests against limited resources dictates judicious and prudent use of RSTA assets.