1. Overview. This chapter focuses on the broad capabilities that RSTA assets must possess. No single system can stand alone to meet all the JFC's information needs; therefore, the types of data that may be needed will be addressed along with general characteristics of RSTA platforms and capabilities.

2. Types of Information

1. Different types of information are required to support various types of military operations; for example, the needs of a fleet commander differ from those of an armored brigade commander. It is important to note that RSTA operations do not always collect intelligence; rather, they collect data that becomes intelligence after it is processed, evaluated, and integrated with other pieces of information and data (fused). The following is a list of intelligence source types through which RSTA operations gather data and information. This list reflects the variety of information that may be needed by or be available to the JFC.
   (1) Human resources intelligence (HUMINT).

   (2) Imagery intelligence (IMINT).
   

   (a) Electro-optical-infrared (EO-IR).
   (b) Photographic intelligence (PHOTINT).
   (c) Synthetic aperture radar (SAR).

   (3) Measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT).
   
   (a) Acoustic intelligence (ACINT).
   (b) Infrared intelligence (IRINT).
   (c) Optical intelligence (OPTINT).
   (d) Laser intelligence (LASINT).
   (e) Nuclear intelligence (NUCINT).
   (f) Unintentional radiation intelligence (RINT).
   (g) Radar intelligence (RADINT).

   (4) Signals intelligence (SIGINT).
   
   (a) Communications intelligence (COMINT).
   (b) Electronic intelligence (ELINT).
   (c) Foreign instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT).

   (5) Counterintelligence (CI)

2. Although there are many forms of intelligence, not all of them are of immediate use to commanders and their staffs in planning and conducting operations. For example, FISINT can provide important technical information on enemy systems supporting technical threat assessments and US weapon system acquisition activities; however, it usually has very limited utility in the near term for planning or conducting military operations. Comprehensive intelligence support to the JFC requires analysis and integration of multiple intelligence collection products in order to resolve ambiguities and provide the most accurate information. Sanitization may be necessary to protect sensitive sources and methods for information requiring broad dissemination. Timely support also requires that information be properly formatted for processing, display, and dissemination in a manner that makes efficient use of available communications resources and is in a form useful to the users.

3. Although not an intelligence discipline, meteorologic and oceanographic information is required by the JFC to plan and conduct combat operations. RSTA assets can provide timely data to meteorological and oceanographic support forces that process the data into information for JFC use.

4. Commanders also require mapping, charting, and geodesy (MC&G) support to conduct military operations. MC&G support is provided through the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA). Commanders identify prioritized MC&G product and component requirements to DMA for validation in accordance with CJCS MOP 31. DMA then requests RSTA support to update the areas of interest. DMA normally requests national-level RSTA support directly to national agencies.

5. Counterintelligence is a discipline separate and distinct from foreign intelligence. Through the implementation of the four functions of CI, operations, investigations, collection, and analysis and production, CI can support the commander's RSTA capabilities. Joint Pub 2-03, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Counterintelligence Support," provides commanders information on the capabilities and responsibilities for CI support to the JFC and component commanders.

1. RSTA forces and assets that may be used in support of the joint force encompass a broad range of capabilities and limitations to include:
   (1) Comprehensive collection systems with a narrow range of data.

   (2) Limited specific collection capability with a broad range of data.

   (3) Near-real-time (NRT) collection systems that cover limited geographical areas.

   (4) Limited response systems that cover large geographical areas.

   These assets provide the JFC the capability to obtain the information required to plan and conduct successful combat operations. The assets discussed here include aerial systems (manned and unmanned), subsurface systems, surface systems (ground and sea), space systems (military and nonmilitary), and national systems.

2. Aerial systems are the primary source of RSTA assets for the JFC. All the Services possess and operate these systems, which have varying, but complimentary, capabilities, limitations, and operating characteristics.
   (1) Systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) offer significant advantages and limitations. The greatest advantage of these systems is that they are relatively threat-insensitive because they normally do not put friendly personnel at risk. Furthermore, because of their relatively small radar cross-section, they can be sent into high-threat areas with an enhanced probability of undetected ingress and mission accomplishment. They can provide a broad range of collection capabilities, including SIGINT, ELINT, SAR, electro-optical, infrared imagery, multispectral imagery, and real-time television imagery. UAVs can also be used as a line-of-sight communications relay for forces attacking at low level.

   Future systems may include laser designators to highlight targets for attacking weapon systems. The range and endurance of UAVs vary considerably depending on the situations for which they are designed to be employed. Close-range UAVs (CR-UAV) have an approximate range of 50 km and provide the capability for 24-hour coverage. Short-range UAVs (SR-UAV) have an approximate range of 150 km beyond the forward line of own troops (FLOT) and an endurance of approximately 8 to 12 hours. Medium-range UAVs (MR-UAV) will serve as a tactical reconnaissance platforms which will have a range on the order of 650 km, but will have an on station endurance of only two hours. Presently, only one UAV system is fielded, the Pioneer system.

   During Operation DESERT STORM, UAVs were successfully employed by the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps to provide NRT day/night RSTA, BDA, and battlefield management. The primary limitation of these systems is their lack of flexibility. Generally, because of their payload limitations, they can carry only one sensor and must be either preprogrammed or controlled by personnel within line of sight. The smaller, short-range unmanned systems, although cheaper than manned systems, are limited in range and payload. As their payload and loiter time increase, their cost increases significantly. They are also susceptible to adverse weather conditions. For a more detailed discussion of UAVs, see Joint Pub 3-55.1, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles."

   (2) Manned aerial systems are also available to support RSTA operations and offer the JFC several important capabilities. They generally are among the most mobile and responsive RSTA assets available, capable of carrying out critical missions and gathering vital information in near-real-time. Manned systems can often respond to changing conditions and may be able to modify missions while in progress. They can cover relatively large areas and can carry a wide range and mix of sensors, including IMINT, MASINT, and SIGINT sensors.

   Many RSTA systems have common data link capabilities that can provide large volumes of data. Other RSTA systems have voice-only or no NRT dissemination capability. Without a NRT dissemination capability, a RSTA system's critical information loses its timeliness and, therefore, its usefulness to the consumer. Users must understand RSTA assets must collect and process their data prior to disseminating it. This processing includes developing target data to a point where there is confidence that the information is correct and required accuracy is achieved. It is this processed data that is sent via the dissemination medium.

   The primary disadvantage of manned systems is that they put friendly personnel at risk during military operations where damage to RSTA assets has historically been high. In addition, standoff requirements limit depth of sensor capability before and during hostilities. Also, adverse weather conditions degrade many of the sensor systems, especially optical sensors.

3. Subsurface systems vary greatly in size, complexity, and capability. These include sensors generally best suited for long-term surveillance of a specific and limited geographic region. Seismic detectors, for example, can indicate that enemy forces might be moving in an area, making further reconnaissance of the area useful. Submarines, on the other hand, are invaluable platforms for clandestine reconnaissance operations within waters peripheral to enemy territory.

4. Surface platforms also vary greatly in size and complexity, with great differences between land-based and sea-based assets.

   (1) Land-based RSTA assets provide a diverse mix of capabilities that can range from a small force conducting a reconnaissance patrol, to dedicated SIGINT and electronic warfare units, to highly technical target acquisition radars. Such assets can be employed to support operations across the operational continuum and can obtain extremely diverse types of information. For example, a reconnaissance patrol can determine the extent and location of obstacles and defensive positions while also performing counterreconnaissance operations to deceive and deny friendly force disposition to the enemy.

   As with aerial platforms, there are advantages and disadvantages to land-based RSTA systems. The primary advantage is that they are generally organic to the tactical commander, allowing direct access to the required information. However, their range is usually limited by physical constraints or the military situation and the risk factor of personnel assigned will need to be taken into account.

   (2) Sea-based surface platforms have varying degrees of RSTA capability, including organic manned and unmanned aerial platforms. Part of this capability is required for defense of maritime forces, such as sonar and underwater acoustic surveillance of enemy submarines and surface ships and various radar for air and surface targets. Other capabilities, such as SIGINT-gathering assets, can support a broad range of military activities ranging from monitoring arms control treaty compliance to establishing enemy orders of battle and preparation of combat strike plans.

   Deployment aboard ships also provides sea-based RSTA assets with several advantages. Ships have greater power and load-carrying capabilities than do some other RSTA platforms, enabling them to carry heavier and bulkier equipment that may have greater information gathering and processing capabilities. Ships also possess the advantages of mobility and sustainability, enabling them to position and reposition RSTA assets. Access is relatively unrestricted because maritime areas of interest to RSTA are often close to international waters. Many classes of ships have organic air assets that can extend shipboard sensor horizons and provide valuable on-site reconnaissance. These qualities at times provide advantages over other RSTA assets.

   (3) Special operations forces (SOF) are valuable assets and should be considered for employment in joint RSTA operations. Special reconnaissance (SR) operations can be conducted when there is a need to obtain or verify information about enemy capabilities, intentions, and activities, or to gather data about meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of an area not available using technical sensors. SR operations complement national and theater RSTA assets across the operational continuum to obtain specific, time-sensitive information of strategic and operational significance. SOF offer the availability of technically knowledgeable observers to verify critical information about targets or target complexes. These observers will use their human judgment to defeat enemy deception attempts and transmit a more complete picture of what is happening on the target.

5. Space systems have become an integral part of the national military forces providing support across the operational continuum and at all levels of war. Space systems provide information allowing commanders to assess the situation, develop concepts of operations, and disseminate changes to their forces quickly. During Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, space systems provided a myriad of support functions. These include communications, navigation, surveillance, and environmental monitoring support functions. However, commanders must be aware of the advantages and limitations of these systems.

   The prime advantage of these systems as it pertains to RSTA is their ability to provide worldwide, quick-reaction coverage of areas of interest, especially those remote or hostile areas where little or no data can be obtained from conventional sources. Other advantages these RSTA system possess are their survivability and relative immunity to enemy action, the ability to place satellites into orbits that maximize their effectiveness, their mission longevity, and their ability to maneuver. Their limitations, especially to surveillance systems, include atmospheric and weather disturbances that effect most imagery systems. In addition, space systems schedules are predictable and are therefore vulnerable to deception practices and signature control activities such as emission control, camouflage, etc. The kinds of support provided by space systems are divided into military and nonmilitary space systems.

   (1) Military space systems provide and support warfighting capabilities. Military space systems employ a variety of sensor suites and provide a broad and increased range of capabilities. Space support focuses first on deterrence, and if deterrence fails, on aiding, protecting, and complementing joint combat operations. This principle in no way ignores the important support that space forces provide to hostilities other than war and war. Space systems routinely support military activities during peacetime. These include, but are not limited to, joint training exercises, peacekeeping operations, indications and warnings, disaster and humanitarian assistance, and counterterrorism and counternarcotics operations.

   Space surveillance systems' unique advantage of global coverage allows commanders to observe areas of operations or other areas of interest over great distances and where other RSTA systems cannot be employed. Access to space surveillance information helps commanders determine where the enemy is, how strong he is, and what his intentions are. Detection and warning sensors provide early detection of ballistic missile attack and down-link this data to ground stations, allowing commanders to take appropriate action against the missiles. Environmental monitoring systems are crucial in understanding and reacting to weather and ocean conditions that may affect military operations. The information acquired by these systems helps in the assessment of the environmental impacts on both friendly and enemy forces alike. Ignorance of environmental conditions can jeopardize the success of a mission. Space surveillance systems provide joint forces with terrain and threat information necessary to enhance mission planning capabilities. Often, these systems can cue or be cued by other RSTA systems to watch a specific area of interest, enhancing accuracy and reaction times to the user.

   (2) Nonmilitary space systems (including civil, commercial, and allied space capabilities) may augment DOD space systems. These capabilities are used when they are the only means available to provide the type of requested support, when the requests outstrip available military means, or if primary DOD capabilities are lost.

   These systems possess a variety of capabilities, many of which complement rather than duplicate those of DOD-controlled space systems. These include weather, communications, and multispectral imagery satellites. Remote sensing imagery was used extensively by US and allied forces during air campaign against Iraq for attack planning, target coordinates, and mission execution. Additionally, these products were used extensively by ground forces for terrain analysis and map substitutes. The JFC may be able to task these systems directly depending on how share-use agreements are negotiated with the owners. The next chapter will discuss these procedures.

6. National RSTA systems are controlled by the US Intelligence Community and provide direct support to the National Command Authorities (NCA). The information provided by these systems is used by senior government leaders to make strategic political or military decisions, and is also of great utility to combatant commanders. Information from national systems is provided to the JFC via Service component Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities Program (TENCAP) systems. Army corps, numbered Air Force, or numbered Navy fleet, or Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) receive raw data or processed reports, dependent upon the specific TENCAP equipment organic within the element. Dependent upon the specific intelligence discipline, timelines can be good--within seconds of collection. Other disciplines are inherently slow--hours to days from the request. Accuracy is system dependent. Additionally, the security of these systems and their sources may require sanitization of the information before it can be made available to the user. National RSTA systems provide invaluable intelligence, especially when local access by conventional RSTA systems is denied by range limitation, lack of air superiority, or political reasons. The JFC must develop specific requirements well in advance so the responses will be usable and timely. These systems should be considered when the JFC's organic RSTA assets cannot satisfy the intelligence requirements or to verify information using another collection source. The JFC has the ability to request specific support from these systems and should exercise the process during peacetime exercises.