THE INTELLIGENCE THREAT
1. Introduction. Adversaries and potential adversaries collect and analyze information about US military operations in order to determine current capabilities and future intentions. To perform this function, most adversaries have created intelligence organizations and systems. The capabilities and levels of sophistication of these threats differ greatly, but they all share certain core characteristics. The most important of these are how intelligence is developed and how it is collected. This appendix will describe those characteristics.
2. The Intelligence Cycle. All intelligence systems follow a process. This process begins with a consumer (a commander or decisionmaker) requesting answers to certain questions and ends with the intelligence system providing those answers. Figure B-1 illustrates a typical intelligence cycle (in this case, the intelligence cycle described in Joint Pub 2-0). Understanding the concept of the intelligence cycle is basic to understanding the total adversary intelligence threat to friendly operations in general and to the specific threat to the critical information that OPSEC seeks to protect.
(2) These information requirements will normally include any information that would allow the decisionmaker to better understand an adversary's goals, intentions, current capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses. At the operational and strategic levels of war, decisionmakers will want to know what their adversary counterparts think; how they make their decisions; and their social, cultural, economic, and political beliefs and habits.
(3) Intelligence specialists take the decisionmaker's information requirements and turn them into specific intelligence taskings.
(2) Information may be collected either overtly or clandestinely.
(b) Clandestine collection acquires information while concealing the collection effort and consists of espionage and technical means such as signals and imagery intelligence.
Production
(2) Generally, every product attempts to address the questions, What is the adversary doing now and what is it going to do next? In many cases, because of inadequate collection or insufficient time for processing and analysis, intelligence analysts will not be able to provide unambiguous answers to those questions. This phase of the intelligence cycle is still more art than science.
Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)
(2) An increasing number of countries are starting to use photoreconnaissance satellites. In addition to being a major strategic collection capability, they are becoming an increasingly important operational and tactical capability. The traditional airborne IMINT platforms remain an important capability for those countries without access to satellite imagery.
(2) ELINT is technical or geo-location intelligence derived from foreign noncommunications electromagnetic radiations emanating from other than nuclear detonations or radioactive sources. Radars are the primary ELINT source.
(3) FISINT is derived from the intercept and analysis of electronically transmitted data containing measured parameters of performance, such as a ballistic missile's performance during a test flight.
Open Source Intelligence (OSINT). OSINT is information of intelligence value that is available to the general public. OSINT is available from such sources as the news media, public affairs announcements, unclassified government documents and publications, public hearings, and contracts and contract-related material.
Technical Intelligence (TECHINT). TECHINT is derived from the exploitation of foreign material and equipment. It results from the analysis of captured or otherwise obtained foreign equipment.