

Joint Publication 3-07.4



Counterdrug Operations



5 February 2019



PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides fundamental principles and guidance to plan, execute, and assess US military support for counterdrug operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and it provides considerations for military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational forces, and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs), and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing and executing their plans and orders. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of objectives.


3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, the Services, and combat support agencies.

b. This doctrine constitutes official advice concerning the enclosed subject matter; however, the judgment of the commander is paramount in all situations.

c. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CJCS, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'D. J. O'Donohue', written in a cursive style.

DANIEL J. O'DONOHUE
Lieutenant General, USMC
Director, Joint Force Development

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**SUMMARY OF CHANGES
REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-07.4
DATED 14 AUGUST 2013**

- Updates the text to incorporate changes from Fiscal Year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act.
- Expands discussion on existential threats within the strategic and operational environments.
- Clarifies the roles of the National Guard Counterdrug Program-State and National Guard Bureau J-32 [Counterdrug Division] in supporting federal law enforcement agency requests.
- Establishes acronym for transnational organized crime (TOC) in this joint publication (JP) and the *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.
- Replaces use of the acronym CTOC [countering transnational organized crime] in the body and glossary of this JP with counter or countering TOC when appropriate.
- Aligns scope of major drugs of abuse with those identified in the Controlled Substances Act.
- Enhances the text to include discussions about the importance of network engagement in planning counterdrug operations.
- Enhances discussion of Integrated Cross-border Maritime Law Enforcement Operations.
- Updates discussion of geographic combatant command counterdrug operations to reflect current theater campaign plans.
- Expands discussion on joint interagency task force command and control and employment of assigned forces during maritime counterdrug operations.
- Enhances discussion of international organizations that support the counterdrug effort.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- Discusses counterdrug approaches, statutory limitations and policy guidance, counterdrug policy and guidance, and threats
 - Outlines organizational and command relationships for counterdrug operations
 - Discusses the context provided by strategic guidance and objectives to plan for counterdrug operations using the Adaptive Planning and Execution enterprise and the joint planning process
 - Outlines combatant command counterdrug operations
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Overview

The Department of Defense (DOD) supports federal, state, and local (including territorial and tribal) law enforcement agencies (LEAs) in their efforts to disrupt the transport and transfer of illicit drugs and drug-related materials, such as precursor chemicals, into the US. The Armed Forces of the United States, as part of a whole-of-government effort, also assists our partner nations (PNs) in their counterdrug (CD) efforts. Illicit drug trafficking, maritime smuggling, and the regional and global movement of violent extremists are closely linked financially, politically, and operationally.

Background and History

The US role in CD initiatives has evolved from independent actions to one of joint military and civilian cooperation. In the past century, the US CD effort has changed in response to the drug abuse and drug trafficking problem. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and its predecessor agencies have had primary federal-level responsibility for enforcing US drug laws since 1914. However, significant expansion in illicit drug activities has required additional federal, state, territorial, tribal, and local agencies to join the CD effort.

Counterdrug Approaches

Whether in the US, overseas, or in a declared theater of conflict, the operational themes of a CD strategy are generally the same and most often go together in tandem. The two key themes are demand reduction and supply

reduction. In some cases, a third alternative, harm reduction, is stressed.

Statutory Limitations and Policy Guidance

DOD is the lead federal agency (LFA) of the United States Government (USG) for detection and monitoring (D&M) of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs and drug-related materials, such as precursor chemicals, into the US. DOD has the authority to provide support for CD activities and activities to counter transnational organized crime (TOC) of any state, local, tribal, territorial, or foreign LEA. DOD may also conduct or support a program or programs to provide training and equipment to national security forces of one or more foreign countries for the purpose of building the capacity of such forces to counter illicit drug trafficking, conduct maritime or border security operations, or counter TOC operations.

Counterdrug Policy and Guidance

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3710.01, *DOD Counterdrug Support*, establishes policies and guidelines for international CD policy implementation, criteria for approval of requests for international support, department international CD support, and approval procedures for departmental international CD support. These policies and guidelines will require staff judge advocate review to align with new law and authorities outlined in Title 10, United States Code (USC), Sections 284 and 333.

The Threats

The strategic environment is uncertain and complex and evolves rapidly. It is fluid, with changing alliances, partnerships, and national and transnational threats that rapidly emerge, disaggregate, and reemerge. These factors significantly affect how CD operations are conducted. The operational environment (OE) and the threats it presents are increasingly transregional, multi-domain, and multifunctional (TMM) in nature. CD operations and TOC will increasingly operate in a TMM environment, which cuts across combatant commands (CCMDs) and throughout OEs.

Organizational and Command Relationships

Command Relationships

The command relationships established for CD operations will vary based on the operational areas in which they are conducted. Considering most CD operations are in support of either PNAs or US LEAs, it is important to remember that, even though command of US military

forces will remain within DOD, the overall control of the mission may be determined by other USG departments and agencies and agreements with PN authorities. Two primary considerations are integrated communications and sufficient liaison to support operational coordination, the effective sharing of information, and efficient use of assets.

Interagency Relationships

The Department of State (DOS) is the LFA for the coordination of US international illicit drug supply reduction strategies.

The DEA is the lead drug law enforcement agency (DLEA) for coordinating all US and multinational counterparts' efforts in conjunction with US elements.

For unified action, other USG departments and agencies support to or from DOD assets should be coordinated through the country team and/or the interagency task force if representation is available.

Department of Homeland Security

Homeland security and counterterrorism capabilities and activities complement many of those used for international drug control. The intelligence community, working with foreign intelligence services and US and international LEAs, provides capabilities for homeland security and counterterrorism that also affect international CD efforts.

Department of Defense

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Performing the role of global integrator, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff advises the President and Secretary of Defense on ongoing operations and the allocation of forces between CCMDs and provides strategic guidance to the combatant commanders for the conduct of CD operations. Within the Joint Staff, the Joint Staff J-3 [Operations Directorate] and Joint Staff J-5 [Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate] perform key CD functions.

Combatant Commanders. Commander, United States Indo-Pacific Command (CDRUSINDOPACOM); Commander, United States Southern Command; and Commander, United States Northern Command (CDRUSNORTHCOM), have delegated authority to approve certain types of domestic CD support, while all of the geographic combatant commanders have delegated authority to approve CD support outside of the US.

Additionally, the Military Departments (through the Services); CDRUSINDOPACOM; and Commander, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), are DOD force providers for supporting CDRUSNORTHCOM CD operations. Details are provided in CJCSI 3710.01, *DOD Counterdrug Support*.

National Guard Counterdrug Program-State (NGCDP-State). An NGCDP-State is established throughout the 50 states, US territories, and the District of Columbia. An NGCDP-State is closely tied to both the Office of National Drug Control Policy and DOD strategies.

Department of Justice

DEA. The mission of the DEA is to enforce the controlled substances laws and regulations of the US.

Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Federal Bureau of Investigation's drug program targets major drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) through long-term investigations aimed at dismantling major national and international DTOs.

Department of State

The Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs has major policy and program responsibilities. The US Agency for International Development is an independent agency that takes policy direction from Secretary of State and administers nonmilitary assistance programs. US embassy country teams are responsible for US CD activities within the host nation, and the Bureau of International Information Programs advances US foreign policy goals directly with foreign audiences in support of US embassies, consulates, and missions abroad.

National Guard

The National Guard Counterdrug Program is executed at the state level under the control of the governor or territorial government. Each state or territory's National Guard (NG) joint force headquarters-state exercises operational control of their CD activities and is responsible for the oversight of the federally funded NG support to civilian agencies.

Planning

Strategic Context

Strategic guidance and objectives provide context and the basis for the military's support and participation in CD

operations. The Office of the National Drug Control Policy develops, and the President signs, the National Drug Control Strategy, which provides broad, strategic direction and establishes the administration's CD strategy, policy, objectives, and priorities. The US interdiction coordinator develops the supporting National Interdiction Command and Control Plan (NICCP), which outlines the USG's strategy for drug interdiction and states specific roles and responsibilities for relevant federal agencies that execute that strategy. Other CD-related elements of strategic guidance may be found in presidential directives, the *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, and other national department-level statements of CD policy.

Planning

Within the context provided by strategic guidance and objectives, joint planning for specific CD operations occurs using two closely related, integrated, collaborative, and adaptive processes: the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) enterprise and the joint planning process (JPP). The combination of the APEX enterprise and the JPP promotes coherent planning across all levels of warfare and command echelons, whether the requirement is for a limited, single-phase drug interdiction operation or for a multiphase CD operation that requires a variety of capabilities and participation by many agencies and multinational partners.

Interagency and Multinational Considerations

CD operations are inherently law enforcement in nature and therefore involve interagency partners and/or PNs. When authorized by law to support LEA CD operations, DOD will normally support the USG lead agency for both domestic and international CD operations. Military planning should anticipate unified action with relevant agencies and PNs. This helps effectively integrate military capabilities, including forces and equipment that support law enforcement activities of the other partners.

Detection and Monitoring

D&M provides early notification to LEAs, enabling interception and drug interdiction operations, and facilitates searches for contraband, which may lead to drug seizures and arrests. DOD, in consonance with the NICCP, utilizes national task forces to conduct D&M operations.

Drug Interdiction Environments

DOD's principal CD mission is D&M, and the desired end result of successful D&M is drug interdiction and apprehension by LEAs. Drug interdiction can take place

in the air, at sea, or on land. These area interdictions often include overlapping activities of interagency partners. CD PNs participate in air, maritime, and land drug interdiction. The differentiation of drug interdiction by physical domain is to illustrate the type of assets used by smugglers and those assets integrated by CD forces.

Support to Other Nations

Illicit drug trafficking is a national security issue, and the US supports the security, stability, and well-being of US allies and other nations friendly to US interests. Assisting PNs in this effort generally requires the full range of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of US national power. Supporting other nations' CD efforts is US policy and part of the US CD strategy, as is helping build capabilities and capacity for some PNs.

Planning Support to Law Enforcement Agencies

Providing planning support to US LEAs should take into account the following factors: background, mission, and interagency planning.

Logistics

DOD can make a substantial contribution in logistic support of LEAs, including their international operations, and with the assistance of DOS to foreign authorities when required. Logistic support should be structured to achieve unity of effort; visibility of requirements, resources, and capabilities; and rapid and precise response. Logistic support should be designed with the right capacity, scalability, agility, control, and time-assurance qualities to effectively support LEA authorities. For the most part, costs incurred in DOD logistic support of LEAs are reimbursable.

Reconnaissance Support

DOD provides reconnaissance support to CD operations in various ways. Aerial-based reconnaissance uses a variety of sensors, such as forward-looking infrared, side-looking airborne radar, photographic devices, and aerial observers employed on rotary-wing aircraft, tilt-rotor aircraft, fixed-wing aircraft, or unmanned aircraft systems. Satellite imagery is also available.

Combatant Command Counterdrug Operations

United States Northern Command

United States Northern Command's (USNORTHCOM's) responsibilities include homeland defense and support of civil authorities. Its CD mission is authorized under Title 10, USC, Section 124. USNORTHCOM supports D&M

operations and operational support to DLEAs (e.g., training, transportation, and engineering support) and other federal, state, territorial, tribal, and local agencies to interdict and counter the flow of illicit drugs into the US.

United States Indo-Pacific Command

The general mission of United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) is to maintain the security of the USINDOPACOM area of responsibility (AOR), shape the theater, and defend the US against attack through the Pacific Ocean. The CD mission is to provide intelligence and other CD support to PNs and US LEAs and security cooperation and support to PNs within the AOR and to provide DOD support to counter TOC, as directed.

United States Southern Command

United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) leverages rapid response capabilities, PN collaboration, and regional cooperation within the AOR to support US national security objectives, defend the southern approaches of the US, and promote regional security and stability. The main line of effort in the USSOUTHCOM AOR is countering threat networks. The goal of the approach is to ensure the friendly networks degrade threat network capabilities and their operations and affect the underlying conditions allowing them to flourish. The CD program is a means to achieve countering threat networks strategic objectives by supporting USG departments and agencies and committed allies with operational support, training, and equipment.

United States Central Command

US Central Command directs and enables military operations and activities with allies and partners to increase regional security and stability in support of enduring US interests.

United States European Command

United States European Command (USEUCOM) prepares ready forces, ensures strategic access, deters conflict, enables the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, strengthens partnerships, and counters transnational threats to protect and defend the US. Its CD role is to support the USEUCOM CCMD campaign plan tasks that counter transnational threats and support US law enforcement operations that disrupt trafficking routes and organizations that traverse the seams between AORs.

***United States Africa
Command***

United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) is responsible for military relations with African nations; the African Union; African regional security organizations; and all DOD operations, exercises, and security cooperation on the African continent, its island nations, and surrounding waters. Working with PNs, USAFRICOM disrupts and neutralizes transnational threats, including smuggled drugs, weapons trafficking, and illicit goods (such as wildlife and other natural resource products). These transnational threats are aided by porous borders, limited security capabilities to deter smuggling, and various levels of corruption that combine to allow illicit trafficking, piracy, and other maritime crime to flourish.

***United States Special
Operations Command***

USSOCOM's mission is to lead, plan, synchronize, and, as directed, execute global operations against terrorist networks in coordination with the geographic CCMDs. USSOCOM trains, organizes, equips, and provides combat-ready special operations forces (SOF) to CCMDs. When directed to support CD operations, SOF can operate as part of a joint-, interagency-, or multinational-led force. SOF include elements from the US Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force units, as well as civil affairs and military information support units.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides doctrine to plan, execute, and assess US military support for CD operations.

CHAPTER I OVERVIEW

"It shall be the policy of the United States to use all lawful means to combat the drug demand and opioid crisis currently afflicting our country.... Heads of executive departments and agencies shall exercise all appropriate emergency authorities."

**Presidential Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments,
Combatting the National Drug Demand and Opioid Crisis, October 26, 2017**

1. General

a. **Department of Defense (DOD) Support to Counterdrug (CD) Operations.** DOD supports federal, state, and local (including territorial and tribal) law enforcement agencies (LEAs) in their efforts to disrupt the transport and transfer of illicit drugs and drug-related materials, such as precursor chemicals, into the US. The Armed Forces of the United States, as part of a whole-of-government effort, also assists our partner nations (PNs) in their CD efforts. Illicit drug trafficking, maritime smuggling, and the regional and global movement of violent extremists are closely linked financially, politically, and operationally. The scope of illicit drug trafficking encompasses state and non-state illicit drug trafficking. Current national intelligence estimates describe the extent of the problem as a national security threat due to the rising power of transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and their connection with violent extremist organizations (VEOs), insurgency movements, and terrorist groups.

b. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Global Threats (DASD[CN>]) oversees DOD policies and activities using statutory CD responsibilities and the President's *National Drug Control Strategy* (NDCS). Although DOD manages only a small portion of the overall federal CD effort, DOD's responsibilities encompass a broad array of support activities. DOD policy supporting the NDCS recognizes that illicit drug traffickers, insurgents, and terrorists use the same methods to smuggle money, people, information, weapons, and substances. Often, illicit drug traffickers and terrorists are one and the same. Looking beyond terrorism, the illicit drug industry is fueling violence and corruption to levels which are overwhelming governments, threatening the stability of countries, or creating ungoverned spaces.

2. Background and History

a. The US role in CD initiatives has evolved from independent actions to one of joint military and civilian cooperation. In the past century, the US CD effort has changed in response to the drug abuse and drug trafficking problem. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and its predecessor agencies have had primary federal-level responsibility for enforcing US drug laws since 1914. However, significant expansion in illicit drug activities has required additional federal, state, territorial, tribal, and local agencies to join the CD effort.

b. **National Task Forces.** The National Interdiction Command and Control Plan (NICCP) provides guidance to interagency centers focused on interdicting drug traffickers and severing the connections between drug trafficking and terrorism. The NICCP describes the area of operations (AO) for each of the three centers and explains that these nationally designated centers' areas of operations do not align with the geographic combatant commanders' (GCCs') areas of responsibility (AORs). These centers are designated "national" task forces and should be staffed by personnel from DOD, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Justice, and other United States Government (USG) departments and agencies as required. The national task force construct enables close coordination and cooperation among government departments and agencies by staffing US and PN personnel to carry out drug interdiction missions. Other USG departments and agencies, the Services, or organizations provide liaisons if they have an interest in or could be affected by task force operations. Joint interagency task forces (JIATFs) or joint task forces (JTFs) are typically DOD organizations that provide operational- and tactical-level interagency coordination. They plan and conduct operations to detect, monitor, disrupt, and dismantle illicit drug-related threats. The following are considered USG national task forces under the NICCP:

(1) **Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S).** Commander, United States Southern Command (CDRUSSOUTHCOM), exercises combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) of JIATF-S. JIATF-S executes detection and monitoring (D&M) of illicit trafficking and facilitates international and interagency drug interdiction to enable the disruption and dismantlement of illicit and converging threat networks in support of national and hemispheric security.

(2) **Joint Interagency Task Force-West (JIATF-W).** Commander, United States Indo-Pacific Command (CDRUSINDOPACOM), exercises COCOM of JIATF-W. JIATF-W is CDRUSINDOPACOM's executive agent for DOD CD activities in the United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) AOR. JIATF-W conducts D&M operations to combat drug-related transnational organized crime (TOC) and facilitate drug interdiction through D&M and other means and conduct PN capacity-building programs and information sharing initiatives. JIATF-W coordinates with US and PN LEAs to ensure successful hand-off of air and maritime targets to appropriate interdiction and apprehension forces.

(3) **Joint Task Force-East (JTF-E).** JTF-E is a DHS JTF supported by interagency partners, reporting directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security. The JTF-E joint operations area (JOA), defined in DHS's *Southern Border and Approaches Campaign Plan* (SBACP) as the "area of land, sea, and airspace which defines the primary operational area for specific joint task forces," includes Puerto Rico, the US Virgin Islands, the coastline along the Gulf of Mexico and Florida (excluding the littorals within the Joint Task Force-West [JTF-W] JOA), international waters of the Caribbean Sea and eastern Pacific Ocean southward to the north coast of South America, the airspace spanning the US territorial land and waters, and international airspace spanning the approaches.

(4) **JTF-W.** JTF-W is a DHS JTF supported by interagency partners, reporting directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security. The JTF-W JOA includes the land border

with Mexico from California to the Gulf of Mexico and the land approaches to this border, in the littorals in the Gulf of Mexico off Texas and Pacific Ocean off California, the airspace spanning the US territorial land and waters, and international airspace spanning the approaches.

(5) **Joint Task Force-Investigations (JTF-I).** JTF-I is a DHS JTF supported by interagency partners, reporting directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security. The JTF-I spans the entire SBACP JOA and beyond as necessary to achieve objectives. JTF-I is a functional JTF that is not limited to geographical boundaries but is based upon the function or activities it integrates, coordinates, and supports; in this case, DHS investigations and investigative activity related to or affecting the SBACP JOA. JTF-I integrates, coordinates, and supports homeland security investigations and operations that involve or affect the US southern border's security.

(6) **Joint Task Force-North (JTF-N).** JTF-N is tasked to support federal LEAs in the identification and interdiction of suspected TCO activities conducted within and along the approaches to the continental United States (CONUS). JTF-N provides support within United States Northern Command's (USNORTHCOM's) AOR, which encompasses the North American continent, the Bahamas and Turks Caicos Islands, Puerto Rico, and the US Virgin Islands, including the air, land, and sea approaches.

c. **Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC).** As the nation's only federal agency law enforcement center tasked to coordinate drug interdiction operations in the Western Hemisphere, AMOC's operations, which support DHS's JTF-W, JTF-E, and JTF-I, are focused on the approaches to the US border, Mexico, Canada, and the Bahamas and criminal activity internal to the US. AMOC provides D&M, intelligence fusion, and drug interdiction and apprehension support to US and PN law enforcement and other forces with interdiction responsibilities and provides investigative activities in support of criminal prosecutions. AMOC's sub-unit, the Caribbean Air and Marine Operations Center (CAMOC), has operational responsibility in and around Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands. The AMOC operational area includes, but is not limited to, all of CONUS and the area extending 100 nautical miles (nm) outward from CONUS. The CAMOC operational area includes, but is not limited to, Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands and the area extending 150 nm outward from Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands.

3. Counterdrug Approaches

Whether in the US, overseas, or in a declared theater of conflict, the operational themes of a CD strategy are generally the same and most often go together in tandem. The two key themes are demand reduction and supply reduction. In some cases, a third alternative, harm reduction, is stressed. This information is passed through the commander's communication synchronization process, in conjunction with law enforcement and educational or medical institutions at local, state, or national levels (to include host nations [HNs] or PNs).

a. Demand reduction deals with diminishing the population's desire and demand for using drugs. While the most cost-effective measure, it can be hard to quantify success. It

targets vulnerable populations with key messages about the harm of drugs on the body, how drug use might go against cultural or religious norms, or how it could limit the possibility of employment. In many cases, the joint force commander (JFC) will be operating across the conflict continuum in an environment where significant portions of the population, and even HN security forces, are addicted to drugs. If not addressed, this could stymie efforts to build effective security forces or a durable, safe, and secure environment. The high rate of drug addiction in the Afghan population is an example of how the desire and demand for drugs negatively affected the capability of some Afghan security forces.

b. Supply reduction deals with any activity or program that is intended to reduce the availability of illegal drugs in the US or abroad. This is the most costly measure, yet it will generally not succeed as a standalone strategy; rather, it requires a mix of demand reduction activities to complement its success. Activities could include interdicting drugs in transit from the source to market; interdicting precursor chemicals used to process drugs into a final product; or conducting eradication of plants used to make drugs, such as poppies for opium/heroin or marijuana. Eradication can be done manually or by mechanical means, such as aerial or ground sprayers. In many cases, eradication needs to consider how the drug economy fits into the societal norms and other means of making a living. Crop substitution programs can help ameliorate negative financial hardships to those who depend on cultivation of those plants that are used for illegal means.

c. Harm reduction deals with activities that limit the harmful effects of drug use or addiction. The history of harm reduction infers that, while it can bring down blood-borne illnesses, it almost never reduces drug use or addiction and the crimes that are associated with each. Activities could include clean needle exchange's to limit blood-borne illnesses obtained by repeated use of syringes for intravenous drug use and Methadone treatment (or other medicines) that reduces the craving for heroin and other drugs. Harm reduction activities can also include instituting policies or laws that reduce the negative effects of drug use or addiction, such as lenient incarceration rules for drug offenders. It is important to note that some cultures view drug use as a positive element and might prefer to use harm reduction activities instead of demand and supply reduction measures.

4. Statutory Limitations and Policy Guidance

a. **General.** DOD is the lead federal agency (LFA) of the USG for D&M of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs and drug-related materials, such as precursor chemicals, into the US. DOD has the authority to provide support for CD activities and activities to counter TOC of any state, local, tribal, territorial, or foreign LEA. DOD may also conduct or support a program or programs to provide training and equipment to national security forces of one or more foreign countries for the purpose of building the capacity of such forces to counter illicit drug trafficking, conduct maritime or border security operations, or counter TOC operations.

For more information on DOD CD support activities, see Title 10, United States Code (USC), Section 284 (support for counterdrug activities and activities to counter transnational organized crime), Section 124 (detection and monitoring of aerial and

maritime transit of illegal drugs), and Section 333 (foreign security forces: authority to build capacity).

b. The supported JFC requires all commanders tasked for CD and countering TOC operations to have the requisite shared understanding of the authorities and statutory limitations under which they are to be tasked, including standing rules of engagement (ROE) and standing rules for the use of force (RUF). The staff judge advocate (SJA) at each level of command should review orders and authorities and so advise the commander to ensure compliance with all statutory limitations, policy guidance, and other applicable law.

c. DOD policy for CD and counter TOC support must be consistent with legal and regulatory limitations imposed by law, including the following:

(1) **Posse Comitatus Act (PCA)**

(a) Title 18, USC, Section 1385, enacted in 1878, is a criminal statute, known as the PCA, which prohibits the willful use of the United States Army (USA) or the United States Air Force (USAF) in the enforcement of the laws of the US. However, in 1981, Congress passed Title 10, USC, Section 275, which directed the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) to extend the prohibition of direct participation in civilian law enforcement activities, such as searches, seizures, arrests, or similar activities, to the United States Marine Corps (USMC), United States Navy (USN), USA, and USAF. SecDef subsequently prohibited these types of activities in Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 3025.21, *Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies*. This issuance also prohibits DOD from using military personnel for surveillance or pursuit of individuals, or as undercover agents, informants, investigators, or interrogators, and other activities that are fundamentally civilian law enforcement operations.

(b) The PCA or the PCA-like restrictions of DODI 3025.21 apply to reserve members of the USA, USN, USAF, or USMC who are on active duty, active duty for training, or inactive duty training in a Title 10, USC, status. Members of the National Guard (NG) are not subject to the PCA while performing operational support duties, active duty for training, or inactive duty training in a Title 32, USC, status. Likewise, the PCA and PCA-like restrictions of DODI 3025.21 do not apply to NG members acting in a state active duty status. Finally, in accordance with Title 14, USC, the PCA and PCA-like restrictions of DODI 3025.21 do not apply to the United States Coast Guard (USCG).

(c) The PCA; DOD issuances; and Title 10, USC, Section 275, do not prohibit all military involvement with civilian LEAs. In fact, a considerable amount of direct and indirect support is authorized under DODI 3025.21 and Title 10, USC, Section 124 and Sections 271-283.

(2) **DODI 3025.21.** Implementing policy upholds the PCA and states that the prohibitions on direct civilian law enforcement assistance apply to all actions of DOD personnel worldwide. However, this issuance also enumerates several permissible instances of assistance to LEAs that does not violate the PCA or the restrictions found in

Title 10, USC, Section 275. Permissible direct assistance includes: actions taken for the primary purpose of furthering a military or foreign affairs function of the US; investigations and other actions related to the enforcement of the Uniform Code of Military Justice; investigations and other actions that are likely to result in administrative proceedings by DOD; investigations and other actions related to the commander's inherent authority to maintain law and order on a military installation or facility; protection of classified military information or equipment; protection of DOD personnel, equipment, and official guests of DOD; and such other actions that are undertaken primarily for a military or foreign affairs purpose.

(3) **Title 10, USC, Section 124.** Per Title 10, USC, Section 124, "The Department of Defense shall serve as the single lead agency of the Federal Government for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States." DOD personnel are authorized to operate DOD equipment to intercept a vessel or an aircraft detected outside the land area of the US to:

(a) Identify and communicate with that vessel or aircraft and

(b) Direct that vessel or aircraft to a location designated by appropriate civilian officials. In cases in which a vessel or aircraft is detected outside the land area of the US, DOD personnel may begin or continue pursuit of that vessel or aircraft over the land area of the US or its commonwealths or territories.

(4) **Title 10, USC, Sections 271-284.** Additionally, Chapter 15 (Military Support for Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies) of Title 10, USC, Sections 271-284, allows DOD to conduct a number of activities for LEAs, so long as they do not adversely impact the military preparedness of the US. In accordance with Title 10, USC, Sections 271-284, SecDef may:

(a) Make available any equipment (including associated supplies or spare parts) to any federal, state, or local civilian law enforcement official for law enforcement purposes. Law regarding reimbursement for DOD support is covered in Title 10, USC, Section 277.

(b) Make DOD personnel available to train LEAs on the operation and maintenance of equipment made available under Title 10, USC, Section 273.

(c) Make military personnel available to operate equipment for the detection, monitoring, and communication of the movement of air and sea traffic.

(d) Provide expert advice relevant to the purposes of Chapter 15, Title 10, USC.

(e) Make DOD personnel available, under Title 10, USC, Sections 271 and 279, to:

1. Promptly provide relevant drug interdiction intelligence, discovered during the normal course of military training or operations, to civilian LEA officials or the USCG and

2. Ensure there are assigned USCG personnel trained in law enforcement on board every appropriate surface naval vessel at sea in a drug interdiction area who have powers under Title 14, USC, including the power to make arrests and to carry out searches and seizures.

(5) **Title 32, USC, Sections 112 and 502(f).** SecDef may provide funds to a state for the implementation of a drug interdiction program in accordance with Title 32, USC, Section 112. Under this section, SecDef may grant funding to the governor of a state who submits a drug interdiction and CD activities plan that satisfies certain statutory requirements. Under regulations prescribed by SecDef, personnel of the NG of a state may, in accordance with the state drug interdiction and CD activities plan, be ordered to perform full-time NG duty under Title 32, USC, Section 502(f), for the purpose of carrying out drug interdiction and CD activities. Section 502(f) of Title 32, USC, has been used to expand the operational scope of the NG beyond its specified duties. PCA does not apply to NG CD missions performed under Title 32, USC, Section 112, even though these units are performing missions using federal funds and operating under federal fiscal oversight because they are commanded and controlled by the state's governor through the adjutant general.

(6) Foreign Assistance Act

(a) Title 22, USC, Section 2291(c)(1), states that no officer or employee of the US may directly affect an arrest in any foreign country as part of any foreign police action with respect to narcotics control efforts, notwithstanding any other provision of law. Additional subparagraphs of Section 2291(c) also state an officer or employee of the USG, with the approval of the US chief of mission (COM), may be present when foreign officers are affecting an arrest or assist foreign officers who are affecting an arrest. An officer or employee may take action to protect life or safety if exigent circumstances arise that are unanticipated and which pose an immediate threat to US officers or employees, officers or employees of a foreign government, or members of the public. Additionally, maritime law enforcement personnel, with the consent of a foreign country, may conduct an arrest in the territorial sea or archipelagic waters of that country. Finally, Title 22, USC, Section 2291(c)(1), does not apply to the activities of the US Armed Forces in carrying out their responsibilities under applicable status-of-forces agreements.

(b) Title 22, USC, Section 2291(a)(2), of the Foreign Assistance Act permits the President to conclude agreements, including reciprocal maritime agreements, with other countries to facilitate control of the production, processing, transportation, and distribution of narcotics analgesics, including opium and its derivatives, other narcotic and psychotropic drugs, and other controlled substances. Title 22, USC, Section 2291(b)(1), states that, consistent with chapter one of the National Narcotics Leadership Act of 1988, the Secretary of State (SECSTATE) is responsible for coordinating all assistance provided

by the USG to support international efforts to combat illicit narcotics production or trafficking.

(c) Generally, DOD may only obligate appropriated operation and maintenance and procurement funds when the primary purpose is to benefit the US Armed Forces directly under the following two exceptions: training or instruction of foreign forces with the primary purpose of interoperability, safety, and/or familiarization and specific appropriation or authorization from Congress for DOD to conduct foreign assistance.

(d) Under Title 22, USC, Section 2304(a)(2), the US may not provide foreign assistance funds to foreign governments with a consistent pattern of gross human rights violations. Finally, Title 22, USC, Section 2420, prohibits the use of the funds made available to carry out the Foreign Assistance Act to provide training or advice or provide any financial support for police, prisons, or other law enforcement forces for any foreign government or any program of internal intelligence or surveillance on behalf of any foreign government within the US or abroad.

(e) The Foreign Assistance Act and foreign operations appropriations provide legal authorities to the Department of State (DOS) Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) to provide CD and anticrime assistance to foreign partners. Many of these assistance programs are implemented in cooperation with the US LEAs or other partners, such as courts or bar associations.

(7) Statutes Authorizing Interdepartmental Support

(a) The Economy Act of 1932, Title 31, USC, Section 1535, authorizes interagency orders of goods or services if: amounts are available, the head of the ordering agency or unit decides the order is in the best interest of the USG, the agency or unit to fill the order is able to provide or get by contract the ordered goods or services, and the head of the agency decides ordered goods or services cannot be provided by contract as conveniently or cheaply by a commercial enterprise. Under Title 31, USC, Section 1536, the servicing agency should credit monies received from the ordering agency to the “appropriation or fund against which charges were made to fill the order.”

(b) Title 10, USC, Section 277, requires a civilian LEA to which support is provided under Chapter 15 of Title 10, USC, to reimburse DOD for that support. SecDef, in accordance with DODI 3025.21, *Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies*, may waive reimbursement if such support is provided in the normal course of military training or operations or results in a benefit to the element of DOD or personnel of the NG providing the support that is substantially equivalent to that which would otherwise be obtained from military operations or training.

(8) National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and Appropriation Act. The NDAA and appropriation act, passed each year to authorize or appropriate funds to DOD, often contain provisions relating to the CD effort. These acts may also impose generally applicable requirements, such as a prohibition on providing training, equipment, or other support to persons or units that have committed a gross violation of human rights.

Money is allotted to the central transfer account each year for the execution of CD activities. Absent specific legal authority, this money may not be used for any non-CD purpose. Per Title 10, USC, Section 284, SecDef may provide support for CD activities or activities to counter TOC of any other department or agency of the federal government or of any state, local, tribal, or foreign LEA providing certain conditions are met to include the following activities:

(a) The transportation of personnel of the US and foreign countries (including per diem expenses associated with such transportation), and the transportation of supplies and equipment, for the purpose of facilitating CD activities or activities to counter TOC within or outside the US.

(b) The establishment (including unspecified minor military construction projects) and operation of bases of operations or training facilities for the purpose of facilitating CD activities or activities to counter TOC of DOD or any federal, state, local, or tribal LEA within or outside the US or CD activities of a foreign LEA outside the US.

(c) CD- or counter TOC-related training of law enforcement personnel of the USG and state, local, and tribal governments, including associated support expenses for trainees and the provision of materials necessary to carry out such training.

(d) Construction of roads and fences and installation of lighting to block drug smuggling corridors across international boundaries of the US.

(e) Establishment of command, control, communications, and computer networks for improved integration of law enforcement, active military, and NG activities.

(f) Linguistic and intelligence analysis services.

(g) Aerial and ground reconnaissance.

(h) The detection, monitoring, and communication of the movement of air and sea traffic within 25 miles of and outside the geographic boundaries of the US and surface traffic outside the geographic boundary of the US and within the US not to exceed 25 miles of the boundary if the initial detection occurred outside of the boundary.

(i) The maintenance and repair of equipment that has been made available to any department or agency of the USG or to any state, local, or tribal government by DOD for the purposes of preserving the potential future utility of such equipment for DOD and upgrading such equipment to ensure compatibility of that equipment with other equipment used by DOD.

(j) The maintenance, repair, or upgrading of equipment (including computer software), other than equipment referred to in the preceding paragraph, for the purpose of ensuring the equipment being maintained or repaired is compatible with equipment used by DOD and upgrading such equipment to ensure the compatibility of that equipment with equipment used by DOD.

For more information on DOD CD authorities, see Title 10, USC, Section 284.

(k) Conduct or support a program or programs to provide training and equipment to the national security forces of one or more foreign countries for the purpose of building capacity of such forces to conduct counter illicit drug trafficking operations, counter TOC operations, and conduct maritime and border security operations.

For more information on DOD CD authorities for capacity building, see Title 10, USC, Section 333.

(9) **Fiscal Law.** All funds must be used for the purpose for which they are appropriated. Additionally, funds may also have specific limitations as to which CD activities they can support. Failure to correctly apply fiscal law and principles to federal activities can lead to the unauthorized expenditure of funds and potential criminal or administrative sanctions against those responsible. After-the-fact audits by the Government Accountability Office and other federal agencies are common.

(10) **Collecting, Storing, and Disseminating Information About US Persons.** Executive Order (EO) 12333, *United States Intelligence Activities*, as amended, regulates the use of national intelligence assets. Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5240.01, *DOD Intelligence Activities*; Department of Defense Manual (DODM) 5240.01, *Procedures Governing the Conduct of DOD Intelligence Activities*; and DOD 5240.1-R, *Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components That Affect United States Persons*, implement the provisions of EO 12333 and set forth the conditions under which DOD can conduct intelligence activities, including when DOD intelligence assets may collect and retain information on US persons. Within the limits of the law, DOD may collect and retain information on US persons reasonably believed to be engaged in foreign intelligence or terrorist activities, among other reasons set forth in DODM 5240.01 and DOD 5240.1-R. DODD 5200.27, *Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations Not Affiliated with DOD*, prohibits collecting, reporting, processing, or storing information on individuals or organizations not affiliated with DOD and applies to non-intelligence components of DOD. DODD 5200.27 contains further guidance on limited circumstances that allows such activity where the information is essential to the accomplishment of certain DOD missions. Because of the numerous legal restrictions placed on the collection of intelligence against US persons, all intelligence activities must be coordinated with the servicing SJA before execution.

(11) **Presidential Determinations.** To assist/share interdiction data with PNs conducting CD aircraft drug interdiction operations requires a presidential determination.

(12) **International Agreements.** A number of international agreements exist that affect CD operations, including status-of-forces agreements, multilateral conventions, and bilateral agreements. The US is party to numerous bilateral agreements with international partners that provide authorization to stop, board, and search vessels suspected of illicit traffic; authorize pursuit and entry into the PN's territorial sea; or provide streamlined communication procedures to quickly obtain such authorizations. The USCG works to negotiate, conclude, and maintain agreements with the nations that make

up major transit and source zone countries, flag states of common noncommercial maritime conveyances, and countries with whom partnership offers significant logistical benefits in relation to maritime operations.

(13) **Use of Force.** Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3121.01, *(U) Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces*, provides guidance on ROE and RUF and for DOD operations worldwide. The supported combatant commander (CCDR) may request supplemental ROE/RUF for a given phase of an operation/activity based on JFC requirements. ROE/RUF are dynamic and normally based on mission requirements, and they are typically approved by SecDef and the CCDR. Specific guidance for CD support operations is shown in CJCSI 3121.01, *(U) Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces*. The Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-293), which amended Title 14, USC, Section 637, authorizes persons in command of an authorized vessel or aircraft operating in a drug interdiction area to use warning shots and disabling fire against noncompliant vessels. A vessel or aircraft is authorized if it is a USCG vessel or aircraft; it is a surface naval vessel or military aircraft on which one or more members of the USCG are assigned pursuant to Title 10, USC, Section 279; or it is any other vessel or aircraft on government noncommercial service when the vessel or aircraft is under the control of the USCG and at least one member of the USCG is assigned and conducting a USCG mission on the vessel or aircraft. In 2005, the USN and USCG signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that defined responsibilities and relationships regarding the employment of airborne use of force (AUF) from USN helicopters. The intent of the MOU is to enable USN helicopter units to train to agreed tasks, conditions, and standards and tactics, techniques, and procedures to support CD missions. To stop noncompliant vessels with minimal risk of injury or loss of life, USN helicopters are permitted to use AUF (warning shots and disabling fire) when a USCG AUF controller and USCG precision marksman-aviation team are onboard the aircraft. When force is used from either USN ships or rotary-wing aircraft under USCG tactical control (TACON), the use of warning shots and disabling fire is governed by current USCG policy. If force is required, the use of nonlethal weapons is authorized and may be used to control a situation and accomplish the mission or to provide self-defense of DOD forces, defense of non-DOD persons in the vicinity if directly related to the assigned mission, or in defense of the protected property, when doing so is reasonable under the circumstances.

5. Counterdrug Policy and Guidance

a. **General.** CJCSI 3710.01, *DOD Counterdrug Support*, establishes policies and guidelines for international CD policy implementation, criteria for approval of requests for international support, department international CD support, and approval procedures for departmental international CD support. These policies and guidelines will require SJA review to align with new law and authorities outlined in Title 10, USC, Sections 284 and 333.

b. **Delegation of Authority.** SecDef has delegated authority to GCCs to approve certain requests for DOD CD support. This authority only applies to DOD CD support specifically requested by LEAs provided by or involving DOD personnel in connection

with foreign and domestic CD missions, including training and associated technical and administrative support. This guidance is provided in CJCSI 3710.01.

c. **Specific CD Mission Categories.** Title 10, USC, Section 284, outlines the type of military support for CD activities provided to US and foreign LEAs. GCC-authorized CD support specifically requested by LEAs includes the following and should be referenced for numerous limitations and considerations and considerations based on CJCSI 3710.01 as applicable under current laws:

(1) Maintenance and repair of loaned defense equipment to preserve the potential future utility or to upgrade to ensure compatibility of that equipment.

(2) Transportation support. Such transportation requests must be coordinated with the Attorney General and, if the transportation is to or from foreign locations, SECSTATE. However, the GCC may not approve CD missions that involve direct tactical support to ongoing LEA or foreign LEAs, imminent CD-related hostilities, or extradition requests.

(3) Establish and/or operate bases or training facilities (includes engineer support).

(4) Domestic and foreign CD-related training of law enforcement personnel may be conducted domestically and overseas, but the statutory authorities and limitation are complex.

(5) Detect, monitor, and communicate the movement of air and sea traffic within 25 miles of and outside US borders.

(6) Detect, monitor, and communicate the movement of surface traffic detected outside US borders for up to 25 miles within the US.

(7) Engineering support (roads, fences, and lights) at US borders. Military engineering support is limited, as prescribed by US law (see Title 10, USC, Section 284).

(8) Command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence network support.

(9) Linguist support and intelligence and analyst support. This does not include cryptologic support, real-time translation of oral or wire intercepts, direct participation in interrogation activities, or the use of counterintelligence assets for CD purposes. Intelligence analyst support may be provided to US ambassadors using theater assigned forces when the DOD component general counsel concurs.

(10) Aerial reconnaissance support to include the use of radar and sensors, unmanned aircraft systems (UASs), and aerial visual and photographic reconnaissance and national overhead and aerial imagery, some of which may be limited or prohibited from domestic use by statutes or DOD policy.

(11) Ground reconnaissance support, to include unattended ground sensors and ground surveillance radar (GSR). Initial detection and reporting of the presence or movement of buildings, vehicles, vessels, or persons within surface areas is permitted.

(12) Diver support to inspect and report to LEAs any unusual physical hull configurations. However, divers may not attempt entry or search or alter features detected.

(13) Tunnel detection support, so long as DOD personnel do not search, enter, or otherwise participate directly in law enforcement operations.

(14) Use of military vessels for LEA operating bases by USCG personnel. All other use of military vessels as a base of operations for LEAs requires SecDef's and the Attorney General's approval.

(15) Technology demonstrations may be conducted in coordination with the DOD Counter-Narcoterrorism Technology Program Office, per Title 10, USC, Section 280.

d. Approval Authority and Tasks

(1) **Approval Authority.** CJCSI 3710.01, *DOD Counterdrug Support*, and the current *Global Force Management Allocation Plan* provide instructions on authorized types of DOD CD support to LEAs, other USG departments and agencies, and foreign nations. They also promulgate SecDef delegation of authority to selected GCCs to approve certain CD operational support missions and deploy assigned/attached forces. These policies and guidelines will require SJA review to align with law and authorities outlined in Title 10, USC, Sections 284 and 333.

(2) Command Relationships

(a) Transfer of forces under the operational control of a supporting CCDR or under command of a Service to a supported CCDR requires SecDef approval and a deployment order issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).

(b) SecDef normally authorizes the Joint Staff J-3 [Operations Directorate], in coordination with the Military Departments' force providers; CDRUSINDOPACOM; and Commander, United States Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM), to allocate forces to be attached under TACON to Commander, United States Northern Command (CDRUSNORTHCOM), and/or CDRUSSOUTHCOM to conduct approved CD support to US LEAs.

(3) **GCC CD Tasks.** GCCs, subject to the limitations provided in DODD 5240.01, *DOD Intelligence Activities*; DODM 5240.01, *Procedures Governing the Conduct of DOD Intelligence Activities*; DOD 5240.1-R, *Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components That Affect United States Persons*; DODI 3025.21, *Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies*; and CJCSI 3710.01, *DOD Counterdrug Support*, are authorized to:

(a) Plan and conduct D&M of the aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs and drug-related materials, such as precursor chemicals, in support of the drug interdiction continuum. GCCs are delegated the authority to conduct D&M under Title 10, USC, Section 124, within their respective AORs with assigned forces, but using forces not assigned to the GCC requires separate execution deployment orders.

(b) Provide assets to support drug interdiction agencies and task force CD activities, with emphasis on those operations planned for execution in high intensity drug trafficking areas.

(c) Plan, schedule, and provide direct support to LEAs and participating PNs.

(d) Conduct intelligence collection (consistent with the law) against illicit drug trafficking originating in or transiting through their respective AORs to support cueing of foreign and domestic LEAs.

(e) Collect (consistent with the law), process, and disseminate all-source, drug-related intelligence.

(f) Incorporate law enforcement information into all-source drug-related intelligence (consistent with the law).

(g) Provide counterintelligence and operations security (OPSEC) support.

(h) Support programs concerning eradication of illicit drug crops and disruption of other illicit drug production processes in source and transshipment countries through bilateral and multilateral exercises, training, personnel exchanges, and security assistance (SA) programs.

(i) Coordinate with other USG departments and agencies to suppress illicit drug activities in production, processing, and transshipment countries.

(j) Establish and maintain selected connectivity in the CD communications system.

(k) Coordinate CD activities with USG departments and agencies and cooperating PNs.

(l) Analyze intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance needs for support of CD operations and conduct long-range planning. GCCs should identify areas with the highest potential for CD success and identify to SecDef those areas requiring a higher priority.

(m) Coordinate logistic support to US LEAs and agencies operating in PNs as established in appropriate agreements.

(n) Coordinate with other USG agencies to support anti-money laundering efforts to detect and interdict the financial flows facilitating the trade in illicit drugs.

6. The Threats

a. **General.** The strategic environment is uncertain and complex and evolves rapidly. It is fluid, with changing alliances, partnerships, and national and transnational threats that rapidly emerge, disaggregate, and reemerge. These factors significantly affect how CD operations are conducted. The operational environment (OE) and the threats it presents are increasingly transregional, multi-domain, and multifunctional (TMM) in nature. CD operations and TOC will increasingly operate in a TMM environment, which cuts across combatant commands (CCMDs) and throughout OEs. Those who contribute to the production, transport, sale, and use of illicit drugs and laundering of drug money present a threat to the national security of the US. Illicit drug traffickers operate throughout the OE. Their operations include cultivation, production, storage, shipment, transshipment, electronic money transfers, and distribution of illicit drugs. The growing nexus of illicit drug trafficking with TCOs, insurgent movements, VEOs, and other threat networks increases the complexities of the threat. Characteristic actions of this adversary include:

- (1) Moving illicit drugs and money through a distributed network vice a concentrated funnel, which would increase potential loss.
- (2) Unconstrained by law, custom, policy, or process.
- (3) Evolving to exploit more sophisticated vessels, modes of conveyance, and money laundering methods.
- (4) Using multiple licit and illicit logistic supply chains.
- (5) Actively and often aggressively collecting intelligence and exploiting ways of countering detection by friendly assets.
- (6) Exploiting delays, deception, and speed to operate at periods of low risk.
- (7) Exploiting territorial zones to prevent D&M.
- (8) Exploiting political and legal limitations in source and transit zone countries.

b. The majority of the drugs entering the US from the Western Hemisphere arrive via land conveyance, but maritime and air modes are initially used to move drugs from the source to different locations in the transit area where drugs can then be moved toward the arrival zone in the US.

c. Drug Connections to Terrorism and Insurgencies

(1) **Narcoterrorism** can be described as either narcotics networks or traffickers who use terrorism against civilians to advance their agenda or terrorists who use drug money to further their cause (also known as “narco-driven terrorism”).

(2) US security strategy recognizes that some of the billions of dollars generated yearly by the global illicit drug trade goes toward funding VEOs. Sanctuaries may be

created by drug organizations, other criminals, terrorists, or insurgents. In some parts of the world, such as Colombia and Afghanistan, connections between drug producers and terrorists can be very significant. In other circumstances, connections between drug criminals and terrorists may be “transactional,” involving payment for specific goods and services. Such transactions may provide weapons, false identities and travel documents, money laundering and movement, armed protection, and intelligence and/or clandestine communications. Drug organizations may, for example, seek to stop the government from interfering in their drug operations through bribery and other corruption, and sometimes that environment can be exploited by terrorists or insurgents. Because narcoterrorists seek to ward off those who would impede their illicit drug activities, they also conduct attacks that include assassinations, extortion, hijackings, bombings, and kidnappings directed against judges, prosecutors, elected officials, and law enforcement agents. These attacks allow drug criminals to operate with a reduced presence of law enforcement and governance. Some insurgents have been known to force local populations into narcotics-related farming to economically and psychologically separate the local population from the government.

(3) Criminals also use drug money, routes, and methods to move people, weapons, money, and other commodities to conduct terrorist activities that are politically or religiously motivated and have nothing to do with furthering drug trafficking. An objective of the international effort against terrorism is to stop drug funding for terrorist operations and insurgencies.

(4) Drug money is also used to fund insurgencies. Insurgencies have historically utilized various forms of funding from state sponsors, diasporas, and illicit drug traffickers or other criminal organizations. Recent examples of drug money in support of insurgent activity include actions in Peru, Afghanistan, and select regions of South America and Asia. Insurgencies are normally directed, supported, and sustained through networks of key individuals, including the leadership, underground, and the auxiliary. Insurgencies will link with financiers and, if appropriate, individuals who produce and smuggle illicit drugs and precursor chemicals for making drugs. To counter a threat network, there must be an understanding of the network, to include the network nodes of drug trade and insurgents. Counterinsurgency forces, military, and law enforcement may be required to conduct CD activities against an illicit drug network that is either part of the insurgency or a separate, but supporting, faction. As in Afghanistan, CD operations may provide another tool to remove threats from the operational area and disrupt, if not defeat, support from drug money.

(5) Drug networks have a global reach, becoming transregional threat networks which can operate and influence events and have impacts beyond the AOR of any joint force. For example, revenue from drug smuggling in the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) AOR may fund terrorist or insurgent groups in the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) AOR. JFCs should be aware of the transregional linkages and interdependencies of threat networks that may be operating in their operational areas and incorporate them into planning.

(6) As the linkages between drug trafficking networks and other threat networks have grown, so has the prevalence of common enablers. Multiple or all threat networks in an AOR may benefit from relatively permissive environments and/or utilize the same enablers to facilitate their activities. Environments of lax law enforcement or corruption, online trade, criminal finance document fraud (money laundering), countermeasures against law enforcement, and violence and extortion may all support a variety of threat networks beyond just drug trafficking. For the JFC, this means multiple authorities, or different authorities, may be applied against enablers of multiple threat networks. This could affect JFC planning and capabilities that could be employed to counter drug networks or the capabilities of partners that may be employed.

d. Drugs

(1) **Categories of Controlled Substances.** The Controlled Substances Act identifies five major categories of controlled substances as narcotics, depressants, stimulants, hallucinogens, and anabolic steroids.

(2) **Major Drugs of Abuse.** The Controlled Substances Act (Title 21, USC, Section 812) identifies five schedules at the federal level (I-V) that are used to classify drugs based upon their abuse potential, accepted medical application in the US, and safety and potential for addiction. This, in turn, provides laws under which the manufacture, importation, possession, use, and distribution of certain narcotics, stimulants, depressants, hallucinogens, anabolic steroids, and other chemicals are regulated. In the US, the major drugs of abuse are cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, opioids (including fentanyl), marijuana, ecstasy (also known as MDMA [methylenedioxymethamphetamine]), and synthetic analogs.

e. Components of a Drug Trafficking Network

(1) **Growers and producers** include those who grow the crops, ranging from very small patches using simple farming methods to highly sophisticated cultivators with tracts of hundreds of acres spread throughout a country.

(2) **Smugglers** represent that part of trafficking organizations that specialize in shipping drugs. They transport drugs from one place to another by a variety of means (e.g., commercial passenger aircraft, cargo aircraft, commercial cargo ships, sailing vessels, motor boats, self-propelled semi-submersibles, motor vehicles, animals, express package, and people).

(3) **Smuggler intelligence systems** represent that part of trafficking organizations or independent groups that specialize in providing traffickers with operational intelligence and warning about enforcement capabilities, intentions, and current activities to detect, sort, classify, track, and intercept smugglers.

(4) **Couriers** are individuals or groups who physically carry or transport a quantity of drugs. They use a variety of drug transport methods such as swallowing them, concealing drugs on person, concealing them in various body cavities, taping them to their bodies, or hiding drugs in their luggage. Couriers usually work for the smugglers.

(5) **Distributors** are the wholesalers or middlemen. Distributors can also be retailers. They either have direct contacts with one or more producers or with another distributor. The distributor frequently arranges for the smugglers to move the drugs.

(6) **Dealers** are usually individuals on the streets commonly selling less than one kilogram of drugs. Dealers work for the distributor and may have other dealers working for them.

(7) **Financiers** are individuals who provide funds or resources to establish or maintain a drug trafficking organization (DTO), normally without direct involvement in trafficking operations.

(8) **Kingpins** are heads of international trafficking organizations (or parts of a drug consortium or cartel) who are responsible for directing one or more phases of unlawful production, transportation, wholesale distribution of bulk quantities of illicit drugs or directing the financial operations. To qualify as a kingpin, the individual's role in all aspects of that organization's drug trafficking is such that the neutralization of the kingpin and his leadership would result in the collapse and the dismantling of the organization's infrastructure, resulting in a significant impact on the drug traffic in the US.

(9) **Money launderers** are those individuals involved in the exchange or investment of money in such a way as to conceal the fact that it comes from an illicit source. Various items of value such as precious metals or gems, bank drafts, cashier checks, deposits, cryptocurrency, and transfers to foreign banks are a few of the items exchanged for illicit cash.

(10) **Narcoterrorists** are illicit drug traffickers that use terrorism against civilians to further their agenda. Narco-driven terrorists are terrorists that use drug money to further their cause.

(11) **Insurgents** are those in revolt against civil authority but who are not recognized under international law as having the legal status of belligerents. Insurgents may have entered into cooperative agreements with drug traffickers for mutual benefit.

(12) **Drug cartels** are partnerships or associations of criminal groups formed to undertake an illicit drug enterprise beyond the capabilities of any one member.

(13) **TCOs** are self-perpetuating associations of individuals and groups that operate across national boundaries for the purpose of obtaining financial or material benefits, wholly or in part by illegal means. TCOs protect their activities through a pattern of corruption or violence, exploiting global commerce, and communication mechanisms. TCOs may vary from hierarchies to clans, networks, and cells and may evolve to other structures. TCOs impact citizen safety, subvert government institutions, destabilize nations, and threaten US national security interests. They may participate in drug trafficking and other illicit enterprises.

f. Characteristics of Drug Operations. The production, transportation, and marketing of illegal substances are supported by systems similar in character but often

uniquely different for each type of drug because of geographical considerations, processing requirements, and the weight and volume of the product itself. A common denominator of the major drug industries is transportation, which, as previously mentioned, drug smugglers use many types of to transport drugs. Certain trafficker profiles and common tactics and techniques have been observed.

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CHAPTER II

ORGANIZATIONAL AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

"Reliable, secure, and synchronized information sharing among joint forces, multinational forces, and with non-Department of Defense agencies is essential for effective command and control in today's network-enabled environment."

Joint Publication 6-0, *Joint Communications System*

1. Command Relationships

a. **General.** The command relationships established for CD operations will vary based on the operational areas in which they are conducted. Considering most CD operations are in support of either PNs or US LEAs, it is important to remember that, even though command of US military forces will remain within DOD, the overall control of the mission may be determined by other USG departments and agencies and agreements with PN authorities. Two primary considerations are integrated communications and sufficient liaison to support operational coordination, the effective sharing of information, and efficient use of assets.

b. **Command and Control (C2).** Operational control of military forces conducting CD operations is vested in the GCCs and may be delegated by the GCCs to subordinate commanders.

c. **DOD-LEA C2.** Drug interdiction operations are the primary operations for which DOD and LEA require that C2 systems are able to interface effectively with each other. DOD D&M is a major contribution to drug interdiction, and military C2 is consequently closely linked with LEA C2. The major organizations that provide C2 for aerial and maritime drug interdiction are the AMOC, under DHS; JIATF-S, under the C2 of CDRUSSOUTHCOM; and JIATF-W, under C2 CDRUSINDOPACOM. In maritime CD operations, a JIATF is normally assigned TACON of USCG cutters and USN ships with attached law enforcement detachment (LEDET). When the nature of the CD operation transitions from D&M to law enforcement functions such as drug interdiction and apprehension, the appropriate USCG operational commander assumes TACON over the surface unit (and LEDET, if embarked). Regardless of command and/or support relationship, DOD forces remain under military C2 (DOD or USCG) at all times (see Appendix G, "Law Enforcement Detachments"). Specific C2 arrangements should be determined during planning meetings and liaison sessions for specific CD operations. This is an important portion of any CD operation's planning effort and should be thoroughly understood by all forces involved in the operation.

d. **US and PN C2.** US and PN military forces and LEAs will often work under the C2 of their respective national task forces. The US military, LEAs, and PNs command their respective units and normally work in cooperation for unity of effort, rather than under unity of command of one or the other. The degree of C2 that US forces could exercise over

PN forces (and vice versa) depends on the location, tactical situation, political environment, and existing US-PN agreements.

e. **JIATFs and JTFs.** USSOUTHCOM and USINDOPACOM exercise day-to-day operations through JIATFs that conduct D&M and other CD operations within their respective operational areas. These task forces comprise federal, state, and local (including tribal as applicable) LEAs and foreign liaison personnel. CDRUSNORTHCOM exercises COCOM over JTF-N, the operational headquarters commander providing C2 of military forces in support of drug law enforcement agencies (DLEAs).

f. **Transregional Coordination in Defense of the Homeland.** USNORTHCOM operates an Information Analysis Center at the US Embassy in Mexico City that includes representation from USNORTHCOM, USSOUTHCOM (JIATF-S), and USINDOPACOM (JIATF-W). The Information Analysis Center coordinates with other CCMDs, with US country teams in Mexico and other countries in the region, and with Mexican law enforcement to counter all illicit trafficking that directly affects the homeland.

2. Interagency Relationships

a. DOS is the LFA for the coordination of US international illicit drug supply reduction strategies. Through US ambassadors, DOS executes programs designed to increase the PN's CD resolve and capabilities. The INL is the organization within DOS responsible for developing and implementing international initiatives in support of the NDCS.

b. DEA is the lead DLEA for coordinating all US and their multinational counterparts' efforts in conjunction with US elements.

c. Other USG departments and agencies are also involved in CD-related operations and activities. For unified action, other USG departments and agencies support to or from DOD assets should be coordinated through the country team and/or the interagency task force if representation is available.

d. GCCs are responsible for planning, training, and executing DOD CD operations training within their AORs. The basis of this planning effort is the specific drug-related threats in the AOR. Planners are expected to meld the objectives outlined in the *DOD Counternarcotics and Global Threats Strategy* with the CCCR's objectives as described in the combatant command campaign plan (CCP) to develop a coherent plan to deal with the threats in the theater. Extensive collaboration with embassies is required to adequately address country-specific issues and to create a plan that is acceptable to both the PNs and the various USG departments and agencies that are affected or will be involved in the overall process. The importance of a cohesive and collaborative approach that takes into account—as much as possible—the varying, and sometimes competing, interests of the various players cannot be overstated.

SECTION A. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

3. Department of Homeland Security

Homeland security and counterterrorism capabilities and activities complement many of those used for international drug control. The intelligence community (IC), working with foreign intelligence services and US and international LEAs, provides capabilities for homeland security and counterterrorism that also affect international CD efforts.

a. **US Customs and Border Protection (CBP).** CBP's mission is to safeguard America's borders, thereby protecting the public from dangerous people and materials while enhancing the nation's global economic competitiveness through sustainment of legitimate trade and travel. An important strategic objective is to counter terrorism and transnational crime. Its traditional border enforcement missions are designed to prevent illegal entry and immigration into the US and prevent the importation into the US of illegal or prohibited substances and items such as illicit drugs and counterfeit merchandise. The strategic goals of the US Border Patrol, the Office of Field Operations, and the Office of Air and Marine Operations are to maintain control of the US border.

b. **Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).** ICE focuses on the enforcement of immigration and customs law. Homeland security investigations within ICE conducts transnational criminal investigations that protect the US against threats to its national security, including smuggling of narcotics and associated activities, such as illegal weapons; financial crime and export enforcement issues; cybercrime; immigration crime; human rights violations; and human trafficking and smuggling.

c. **USCG.** The USCG is the LFA for maritime law enforcement and exercises federal jurisdiction in US territorial waters, the exclusive economic zone, on the high seas, and (as authorized by bilateral agreements) in PN's territorial waters. The USCG shares the lead for drug interdiction within the US contiguous zone (within 24 nm) with CBP's Office of Air and Marine Operations. When authorized, the USCG supports DOD with personnel as subject matter experts in support of professional exchanges. USCG efforts support the NDCS across all US regions and within all CCMD regions around the globe. Their overall strategy is to employ a layered approach to maritime security by forward deploying cutters and aircraft close to the source zone of contraband and near our maritime borders in the US. In addition, subject to international agreements, the USCG may patrol or conduct pursuit, entry, and boarding operations in the territorial waters of other countries. USN and allied nation ships provide support to the USCG to enhance presence and to expand drug interdiction opportunities by embarking LEDETs on these platforms.

4. Department of Defense

a. **CJCS.** Performing the role of global integrator, the CJCS advises the President and SecDef on ongoing operations and the allocation of forces between CCMDs and provides strategic guidance to the CCDRs for the conduct of CD operations. Based on the *National Defense Strategy, Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF)*, and strategic guidance statements from SecDef, the CJCS provides the *National Military Strategy*;

CJCSI 3110.01, (U) 2015 Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP) (more commonly referred to as the JSCP); strategic guidance statements; and planning orders as key products of the Joint Strategic Planning System. Within the Joint Staff, the Joint Staff J-3 and Joint Staff J-5 [Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate] perform key CD functions.

(1) Joint Staff J-3

(a) Serves as the Joint Staff office of primary responsibility for all matters associated with military support to the NDCS.

(b) Coordinates CJCS guidance on operational aspects for implementing the DOD mission as lead agency for D&M.

(c) Serves as the coordinator for CD operational matters on all LEA requests for military support.

(2) Joint Staff J-5. Joint Staff J-5 serves as the Joint Staff focal point and office of primary responsibility for all matters associated with military support to the national drug interdiction effort pursuant to the *National Security Strategy*, *National Defense Strategy*, *National Military Strategy*, and NDCS. Specifically, the Joint Staff J-5:

(a) Reviews operations, plans, and procedures relating to DOD CD efforts worldwide.

(b) Provides Joint Staff representation to interagency CD meetings and coordination groups as required.

(c) Prepares CD strategy, planning guidance, and policy for operations, organizational issues, political-military affairs, and international negotiations in coordination with the CCMDs, the Services, Office of the Secretary of Defense, other USG departments and agencies, and international organizations.

(d) Collaborates with Joint Staff J-3 on policy and political-military aspects of US policy and operations in CD efforts.

b. CCDRs. The *Unified Command Plan* establishes the missions and responsibilities for CCDRs and establishes their geographic AORs and global responsibilities. SecDef has delegated authority to specific CCDRs to approve CD missions and to deploy assigned forces. CDRUSINDOPACOM, CDRUSSOUTHCOM, and CDRUSNORTHCOM have delegated authority to approve certain types of domestic CD support, while all of the GCCs have delegated authority to approve CD support outside of the US. Additionally, the Military Departments (through the Services), CDRUSINDOPACOM, and CDRUSSOCOM are DOD force providers for supporting CDRUSNORTHCOM (e.g., JTF-N) CD operations. Details are provided in *CJCSI 3710.01, DOD Counterdrug Support*.

c. National Guard Counterdrug Program-State (NGCDP-State). An NGCDP-State is established throughout the 50 states, US territories, and the District of Columbia.

An NGCDP-State is closely tied to both the Office of National Drug Control Policy and DOD strategies. An NGCDP-State is designed to employ available military capabilities to assist LEAs in detecting, disrupting, interdicting, and curtailing illicit drug trafficking and related TOC threats to national security. An NGCDP-State can employ NG personnel, resources, expertise, and capabilities to LEAs and community-based organizations to achieve the overall objective of reducing illicit drug use and abuse.

d. The National Guard Bureau (NGB) J-32 [Counterdrug Division] falls under the NGB J-3/7 [Director of Domestic Operations and Force Development Directorate]. This directorate provides operational policy and guidance for the employment and management of NG resources, personnel, and equipment. NGB J-32 coordinates the submission of governor CD plans for SecDef approval and prepares reports for the Chief, NGB; DASD(CN>); and Congress. National Guard joint force headquarters-state (NG JFHQ-State) may accept missions from SecDef to support CCMD responses to domestic federal agency support requests. Federal LEA requests for NG support will be routed to the Joint Staff J-3 and DASD(CN>) for staffing and approval.

e. In accordance with DOD policy, the NG can support domestic law enforcement activities within the US boundaries. State and local LEAs may direct their support requests to the respective NG JFHQ-State representative for approval. Federal LEA requests should be routed to the appropriate CCMD for staffing and support. If the CCMD does not have the proper authorities or adequate assigned capabilities to support the federal LEA request, the requirement is submitted to the Joint Staff J-3 for sourcing. The Joint Staff J-3 determines the best sourcing solution and submits the recommendation to DASD(CN>) for approval. NG JFHQ-State may accept tasks and missions from the Joint Staff J-3 as approved by DASD(CN>) to support domestic federal law enforcement activities within US boundaries.

For more detailed information on NG CD operations, see Chief, National Guard Bureau Instruction (CNGBI) 3100.01, National Guard Counterdrug Support.

f. **Narcotics and Transnational Crime Support Center** is a joint DOD-LEA fusion center, funded by DOD, to support LEAs in conducting complex investigations and multinational operations with interagency and HN counterparts to counter TOC with an illicit drug trafficking or terrorism nexus. The Narcotics and Transnational Crime Support Center provides the framework for interorganizational coordination and collaboration in support of LEA activities against those TCOs whose networks and activities pose the greatest threat to US national and international security.

g. **Regional Narcotics Interagency Fusion Cell (RNIFC)**. The RNIFC is a joint DOD and law enforcement cell, funded through DOD, and subordinate to USCENTCOM. RNIFC's primary responsibility is to analyze, fuse, develop, and disseminate all-source military intelligence and LEA information to support CD and counter TOC activities in Southwest Asia, the Middle East, and East Africa in support of DOD and LEA objectives. The RNIFC works closely with the US Naval Forces, Central Command; the combined maritime forces; and LEA partners to support maritime and land drug interdiction

operations. The RNIFC partners with other regional CD task forces and fusion cells to coordinate and collaborate on a common intelligence picture.

h. **Other DOD Organizations.** While not categorized as CD organizations, a number of DOD counterterrorism-related organizations develop and field technical capabilities especially suited to CD missions and activities. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency is cognizant of dual-use devices for detection of both explosives and narcotics.

5. Department of Justice

a. **DEA.** The mission of the DEA is to enforce the controlled substances laws and regulations of the US and bring to the criminal and civil justice system of the US, or any other competent jurisdiction, those organizations and principal members of organizations involved in the growing, manufacture, or distribution of controlled substances appearing in or destined for illicit traffic in the US and to recommend and support nonenforcement programs aimed at reducing the availability of illicit controlled substances on the domestic and international markets.

b. **Federal Bureau of Investigation.** The Federal Bureau of Investigation's drug program targets major DTOs through long-term investigations aimed at dismantling major national and international DTOs. Dismantlement means the targeted organization is rendered permanently incapable of being involved in the distribution of illicit drugs, the organization's leaders have been completely incapacitated, its financial base has been thoroughly destroyed, and its drug-supply connection/network have been irreparably disrupted.

6. Department of State

DOS contributes significantly to CD operations. The INL has major policy and program responsibilities. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is an independent agency that takes policy direction from SECSTATE and administers nonmilitary assistance programs. US embassy country teams are responsible for US CD activities within the HN, and the Bureau of International Information Programs advances US foreign policy goals directly with foreign audiences in support of US embassies, consulates, and missions abroad.

a. **USAID.** USAID is the US lead in civilian assistance policy and program management. USAID provides inclusive development leadership and expertise across the USG, working with the White House and DOS to frame and coordinate US nonmilitary assistance to developing countries around the world. USAID programs that directly or indirectly advance counternarcotics objectives may include alternative agricultural and business development, consolidation of municipal and national government basic services in ungoverned areas, community policing, rule of law capacity and institutional strengthening, and more. USAID is a decentralized agency providing a mission in each country in which it operates. Each mission is an autonomous procurement and accounting station with the authority and flexibility to coordinate with the US country team on the most appropriate counternarcotics role for civilian development assistance. US military

elements are required to notify USAID mission directors of US military civil action and other assistance and programs in countries with a USAID mission. The USAID mission director is the embassy's advisor on development policy and a member of the country team.

b. **US Embassies.** The COM heads the mission's country team of USG personnel. The COM (normally the ambassador) represents the President but takes policy guidance from SECSTATE. The COM is responsible for US CD activities within the HN but not personnel or facilities under the command of a US military area commander. The ambassador interprets US national drug policy and strategy and oversees its application. The country team construct denotes the process of in-country, interdepartmental coordination among key members of the diplomatic mission. The ambassador uses the country team to assist in translating strategy or policy into operational direction for USG departments and agencies cooperating with the HN. The deputy COM is often tasked as the narcotics control coordinator to chair the country team meetings that concern CD matters. The composition of a country team varies widely, depending on the desires of the COM, the in-country situation, and the number and levels of the USG departments and agencies present. Although US military commanders are not members of diplomatic missions, they often participate in meetings and coordination sessions concerning CD and SA matters that are in support of the HN.

7. Department of the Treasury

a. CD responsibilities of the department are carried out, in part, by the Internal Revenue Service, which is responsible for the administration and enforcement of the internal revenue laws and related statutes. Individuals owe taxes on all income, including income from illicit drug-related activities. The attempt to launder illegal revenues through legitimate businesses (without reporting the income), willfully attempting to conceal income, or simply failing to pay taxes on reported income are all violations of the Internal Revenue Code. This often gives the Internal Revenue Service jurisdiction in drug-related cases.

b. **Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).** The Department of the Treasury established the OFAC and kingpin designations to improve the countering threat networks (CTN) approach to transnational drug organizations and their supporting infrastructure. OFAC administers and enforces economic and trade sanctions based on US foreign policy and national security goals. OFAC implements programs against targeted foreign countries and regimes; terrorists; international narcotics traffickers; proliferators of weapons of mass destruction; and other entities who threaten the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the US. OFAC acts under presidential national emergency powers, as well as authority granted by specific legislation, to impose controls on transactions and freeze assets under US jurisdiction. Many of the sanctions are based on United Nations and other international mandates, are multilateral in scope, and involve close cooperation with allied governments. Although OFAC addresses more than CD networks, it is a powerful tool to apply against TOC and illicit drug networks.

A matrix of domestic and international CD organizations can be found in Appendix C, "Counterdrug Organizations."

SECTION B. DOMESTIC COUNTERDRUG ORGANIZATIONS

8. General

There are two types of CD organizations: domestic and international. The domestic type includes federal, state, and local organizations and exists to coordinate and focus the efforts of all levels of government on the identification and investigation of drug traffickers. International organizations involve US and PN CD elements that carry out multinational operations focused on specific source and transit zones.

9. National Guard

The National Guard Counterdrug Program (NGCDP) is funded under Title 32, USC, and administered nationally by NGB J-3/7. It is executed at the state level under the control of the state governor or territorial government. Each state or territory's NG JFHQ-State exercises operational control of their CD activities and is responsible for the oversight of the federally funded NG support to civilian agencies. The NG JFHQ-State appoints a CD coordinator in every state and territory who is responsible for overseeing the execution of the state NG's CD supply drug interdiction and demand reduction missions in accordance with applicable state law. The NGCDP provides skilled personnel, specialized equipment, and facilities to support LEAs and community-based organizations in response to the changing drug threat. The CD role is consistent with the NG's traditional state mission of providing military support to civilian authorities and can include support to federal LEA, CCMD, and combat support agency counternarcotics activities when those activities are on-going in the state or territory and included in the state CD activities plan. The NG CD support missions include:

a. **Program Management.** Plan and coordinate state CD supply and demand reduction support, establish liaison with supported LEAs and other community organizations, resource and manage personnel and equipment requirements for CD support operations, and prepare operational or financial reports and briefings as required.

b. **Technical Support**

(1) **Linguist Support.** Transcription and/or translation of audio, video tapes, seized documents, and other information media.

(2) **Intelligence Analyst Support.** Provides analytical support to LEAs through the development of investigations for cases and prosecution. This mission focuses on four core competencies: link analysis, document and media exploitation, financial analysis, and case construction.

(3) **Communications Support.** Provide personnel to establish, operate, and maintain communications stations, bases, and equipment in support of organization communications or technical issues.

(4) **Engineer Support.** Provide engineer support to LEAs and community organizations where the project has a CD nexus. This excludes operations concerning drug laboratories or hazardous materials.

(5) **Subsurface or Diver Support.** Subsurface inspections of commercial vessel hulls within US territorial waters or US maritime ports of entry (POEs) through the use of side scan sonar or divers to detect alien devices or containers attached to the vessel hulls or other underwater activities.

(6) **Imagery/Map Production and Analysis.** This mission assists agencies by providing counternarcotics imagery and map production analysis. This includes the utilization of various geographic information systems to analyze raw criminal information and develop products.

c. General Support

(1) **Domestic Cannabis Suppression and Eradication Operations Support.** This mission encompasses all efforts that lead up to, but excludes, the actual suppression and/or eradication of illicit marijuana cultivation.

(2) **Transportation Support.** This mission provides transportation and controlled deliveries (aerial, ground, or maritime) of LEA personnel and equipment in LEA custody or seized property or contraband as part of ongoing time-sensitive CD.

d. CD-Related Training and Training of LEA/Military Personnel. Train military, LEAs, community-based organizations, and educational and government institutions in subjects and skills useful in the conduct of CD operations or in the operation of military equipment used in CD operations

e. Reconnaissance and Observation

(1) **Surface Reconnaissance.** Reconnoiter or perform area observation by land or water to detect and document illicit drug activities that include, but are not limited to: cultivated marijuana; suspected isolated drug trafficking airstrips; drug drop zones; drug trafficking corridors; illicit drug laboratories; suspicious aircraft, watercraft, or motor vehicles.

(2) **Aerial Reconnaissance.** Conduct reconnaissance and observation of airspace, maritime, or surface areas (land and internal waterways of the US and US territories) for illicit drug activities.

f. Civil Operations and Community Coalition Development. Provide unique military skills to enhance community coalition efforts to reduce local drug and substance abuse threats. Support can be direct or indirect to coalitions through local prevention agencies, state agencies, and government organizations that support community coalitions with a substance abuse prevention nexus.

For more detailed information on NG CD operations, see CNGBI 3100.01, National Guard Counterdrug Support.

CHAPTER III PLANNING

“Stable, friendly, and prosperous states in the Western Hemisphere enhance our security and benefit our economy. Democratic states connected by shared values and economic interests will reduce the violence, drug trafficking, and illegal immigration that threaten our common security, and will limit opportunities for adversaries to operate from areas of close proximity to us.”

National Security Strategy, May 2010

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. Strategic Context

a. Strategic guidance and objectives provide context and the basis for the military’s support and participation in CD operations. The Office of the National Drug Control Policy develops, and the President signs, the NDCS, which provides broad, strategic direction and establishes the administration’s CD strategy, policy, objectives, and priorities. The US interdiction coordinator develops the supporting NICCP, which outlines the USG’s strategy for drug interdiction and states specific roles and responsibilities for relevant federal agencies that execute that strategy. Other CD-related elements of strategic guidance may be found in presidential directives, the *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, and other national department-level statements of CD policy. For DOD, SecDef provides the *National Defense Strategy*, GEF, and other guidance statements, and the CJCS provides strategic guidance for conducting CD operations to CCDRs in the *National Military Strategy*, JSCP, and, when applicable, planning orders.

b. CCDRs plan based on strategic guidance, and GCCs develop their theater strategies for supporting CD operations. GCCs typically include theater CD objectives in their CCPs and in other plans that link US national strategy to operational-level activities. Some CCDRs must develop operation plans (OPLANs) for specific CD-related contingencies as required by the GEF, JSCP, and other directives. They will also identify and plan for CD contingencies not specifically assigned by the President, SecDef, or CJCS.

c. Denying the funds generated by illicit DTOs is an effective strategy to counter threat networks. Establishing an effective counter threat finance (CTF) strategy is one key aspect to building a capability to disrupt criminal financial activities, which are critical to supporting that threat network. Effective CTF strategies integrate multiple agencies with their respective authorities and capabilities to synchronize their individual efforts to disrupt threat networks. These coordinated efforts deny the threat actors the ability to freely operate in poorly regulated financial environments or to exploit weaknesses in regulated financial systems. In the *DOD Counternarcotics and Global Threats Strategy*, DASD(CN>) coordinates within DOD for the authority to train PN forces on CTF and threat finance intelligence to establish and operate bases of operations or training facilities and to provide financial analysts, linguists, and other analytic services in support of CD or

counter TOC activities. CTF programs include providing information, training, and advisory services that can enable the PN forces to prepare their plans for CTF and counter TOC operations.

Refer to Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Planning, for details on planning, especially the application of guidance, and the development and review of plans directed by the JSCP or other issuances.

2. Planning

a. Within the context provided by strategic guidance and objectives, joint planning for specific CD operations occurs using two closely related, integrated, collaborative, and adaptive processes: the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) enterprise and the joint planning process (JPP). The combination of the APEX enterprise and the JPP promotes coherent planning across all levels of warfare and command echelons, whether the requirement is for a limited, single-phase drug interdiction operation or for a multiphase CD operation that requires a variety of capabilities and participation by many agencies and multinational partners.

b. The consolidated counterdrug database (CCDB) is a comprehensive database that supports CD planning by capturing the details surrounding drug-related events submitted and approved by CD agencies participating in the CCDB working group. Details include where, when, and how individual drug trafficking events took place; the response of forces to those events; the outcome of the event; and the type and quantity of drugs involved. It is used as an analysis and planning tool. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) manages the CCDB for all interagency partners and delegates oversight of specific drug modules to other DOD organizations. JIATF-S manages the cocaine module, which includes tracking marijuana; JIATF-W manages the amphetamine module, which includes tracking precursor chemicals for methamphetamine production; and USCENTCOM manages the heroin module. For example, in 2011, the Interdiction Committee chartered the CCDB working group to document all known and suspected cocaine movement occurring worldwide and the known and suspected movement of other illicit drugs trafficked in the Western Hemisphere with a nexus to the US such as opiates and amphetamine-type stimulants. The CCDB working group produces quarterly, classified reports that document cocaine trafficking trends from source zones through arrival zones. These classified reports are utilized in the planning process for drug interdiction and disruption operations.

c. Joint planning occurs within the APEX enterprise, which is the department-level system of joint policies, processes, procedures, and reporting structures. The APEX enterprise formally integrates the planning activities of military organizations during the initial planning and plan refinement that occurs both in peacetime and when faced with an imminent crisis. While APEX enterprise activities span many organizational levels, the focus is on the interaction, which ultimately helps the President and SecDef decide when, where, and how to commit US military capabilities in response to a foreseen contingency or an unforeseen crisis. The majority of APEX enterprise activities and products occur prior to the point when the CJCS approves and issues an execute order, which initiates the employment of military capabilities to accomplish a specific mission. When a military

organization planning for CD operations must meet specific APEX enterprise requirements, it should refer to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.01, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume I, Planning Policies and Procedures*; CJCSM 3122.02, *Joint Operation and Planning Execution System (JOPES), Volume III, Time Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment Execution*; and CJCSM 3130.03, *Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance*, for specific procedures and formats.

d. The JPP, as described in JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*, is a less formal but proven analytical process that provides a methodical approach to planning at any organizational level and at any point before and during joint operations. Most planning below the strategic level for the employment of military capabilities in CD operations will occur using the JPP. The focus of the JPP is on the interaction between an organization's commander, staff, the commanders and staffs of the next higher and lower commands, and supporting commanders and their staffs. Although the ultimate product is an OPLAN or operation order (OPORD) for a specific mission, the process is continuous throughout an operation. Even during execution, the JPP produces plans and orders for future operations, as well as fragmentary orders that drive immediate adjustments to the current operation. The JPP provides an orderly framework for planning in general, particularly for organizations that have no formal APEX requirements. The JPP consists of seven steps, depicted in Figure III-1. Organizations that plan CD operations should refer to JP 5-0 for a detailed discussion of JPP steps and associated products, such as mission statement, commander's intent, and concept of operations (CONOPS).

e. Plan Review and Approval

The Joint Planning Process

Step 1	Initiation
Step 2	Mission Analysis
Step 3	Course of Action (COA) Development
Step 4	COA Analysis and Wargaming
Step 5	COA Comparison
Step 6	COA Approval
Step 7	Plan or Order Development

Figure III-1. The Joint Planning Process

(1) A CCDR may direct the development of OPLANs for potential CD contingencies that are not discussed in the JSCP, GEF, or other directives. These plans require approval by the CCDR or a designated approval authority. There are five general plan review criteria: adequacy, feasibility, acceptability, completeness, and compliance with joint doctrine.

(2) Supporting commanders prepare plans that encompass their role in the CD operation. The supported commander normally reviews and approves supporting plans.

(3) As part of the approval process, the servicing SJA reviews all OPLANs, OPORDs, and other similar documents in accordance with DODD 2311.01, *DOD Law of War Program*.

f. **Assessment.** Planners should establish an assessment process or mechanisms early in the planning process to ensure any necessary adjustments to the operation are supported by assessment data. It is critical to determine the success of CD operations to make adjustments to the conduct of operations. The assessment process should be included early in the planning process. As an assessment measure of effectiveness (MOE) indicator for illicit drug flows in their AOR, a GCC can measure the interagency and PN narcotics removals from within their AOR quarterly and compare those to the historic flow estimates developed using the consolidated CD database. This will result in a percent of flow that was removed as a result of interagency and partner action and can be used to assess success or failure in the CD mission.

(1) Early in the JPP, CD-related products from a continuous joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) analytic process should be used to initiate CD operation assessment planning, establish an OE baseline, and support mission analysis. By understanding the CD-related current and desired conditions of the OE, the CD operation assessment planners can develop measure of performance (MOP) indicators for CD task accomplishment and MOE indicators for impact on the OE toward achieving CD objectives. To be effective, these indicators should be relevant, observable, and measurable. These intelligence requirements are incorporated for planners as priority intelligence requirements, which the intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2) uses to direct collection, as well as continuous JIPOE analysis and production to enable planners to compare the present OE with the initial planning OE baseline. In this manner, relevant and measurable indicators are determined during planning and revised, observed, and analyzed during execution to assess progress or regression relative to desired effects indicating success or failure of actions. When planning for the relevant effects, measures, and indicators, it is important for the planner to think in terms of the entire OE and capabilities of both friendly and enemy forces. By focusing on the relevant capabilities, resources, and vulnerabilities, planners can build useful MOP and MOE indicators that anticipate the likelihood of achieving objectives.

(2) Finally, planners must identify feedback mechanisms through which reporting can be accomplished. Feedback is the tool through which the operation communicates successful actions or the need to deviate/refocus assets to create the desired effect.

g. **Network Engagement in Planning.** Network engagement are interactions with friendly, neutral, and threat networks, conducted continuously and simultaneously at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, to help achieve the commander's objectives within an OE. Network engagement may provide a framework for JFCs to understand and effectively counter drug-trafficking networks or other threat networks through partnering with friendly networks and engaging neutral networks. To effectively counter threat networks, the joint force must seek to support and link with friendly networks and engage neutral networks through the building of mutual trust and cooperation through network engagement. Network engagement consists of three components: partnering with friendly networks, engaging neutral networks, and CTN to support the commander's desired end state.

(1) When planning to partner with friendly elements, the JFC should consider building relationships with PNs to enact efforts in both demand reduction and supply reductions efforts. Teaming with local HN educational elements can assist in demand reduction, and partnering with HN law enforcement (by foreign internal defense [FID]) or security cooperation) can help increase the effectiveness of supply reduction/interdictions efforts. For CD operations, it is critical for the JFC to understand partner priorities and the strengths and limits of friendly network members' authorities and capabilities in engaging neutral networks and CTN. The JFC may need to consider strategies to enable partners who have authority to counter drug networks the JFC lacks but do not have sufficient resources.

(2) When planning to engage the neutral population or networks, demand reduction will often be the main effort. Public service announcements or information activities can assist in preventing or curtailing the population from using illicit narcotics or abusing licit narcotics. Neutral networks could include those individuals, groups, or organizations that are not directly part of the trafficking networks but which enable or potentially impact drug networks. This could be through doing business with drug networks, either knowingly or with an unspoken or tacit understanding of their activities. This might involve transportation networks that facilitate smuggling or other criminal groups that provide services to drug networks. Other actors could be connected to drug networks without their knowledge. This could involve commercial providers of goods or services who are generally unaware of who the end users are but whose products inadvertently enable drug networks. In a CD context, this could be commodities sold on the open market, such as precursor chemicals, communications equipment, or weapons and ammunition. Neutral networks would even include affected populations who may be able to provide information or tips about local drug network activities. Engaging neutral networks often involves applying information to turn neutral networks away from supporting threat networks and/or toward supporting friendly networks.

(3) While the drug trafficking network would be the primary threat network, there may also be related insurgent, terrorist, or other criminal threat networks. Drug networks are composed of a variety of personnel, leadership, specialists, communications, transportation, and other elements that are critical to their functioning. Further, as criminal enterprises, they may obtain resources from a number of illicit activities. Network analysis can be used to understand threat network relationships and interdependencies, as well as

network critical factors that can be targeted. In most circumstances outside of US combat operations, the JFC does not directly act against drug networks but supports the actions of HN security forces. When planning to counter threat networks, supply reduction will often be the main effort. Supply reduction activities can include FID and security cooperation in operations short of armed conflict. In traditional armed conflict, examples of supply reduction could include efforts to train HN law enforcement to interdict illicit drugs, precursors, illicit finances, and illicit crop spraying and border controls.

Refer to JP 3-25, Countering Threat Networks, for more information on network engagement, critical factors analysis, and targeting threat networks.

For more information on the JPP assessment, or planning in general, see JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

3. Interagency and Multinational Considerations

a. CD operations are inherently law enforcement in nature and therefore involve interagency partners and/or PNs. When authorized by law to support LEA CD operations, DOD will normally support the USG lead agency for both domestic and international CD operations. Military planning should anticipate unified action with relevant agencies and PNs. This helps effectively integrate military capabilities, including forces and equipment that support law enforcement activities of the other partners. Military planners should understand unity of effort, because some of the agencies, PNs, and multinational organizations that lead or might be involved in CD operations will have different goals, capabilities, limitations (such as policy and resource restraints), standards, and operational philosophies. Similarly, military planners should understand and be able to articulate the constraints placed on DOD in providing CD support. Despite these differences, the CD planning for unified action must bring together the capabilities of disparate organizations in the pursuit of national and theater CD objectives.

b. Early integration of the efforts of military, civilian agency, and multinational planners in the planning process should facilitate the planning relationships required for effective coordination and collaboration. Commanders supporting CD operations must ensure interagency and multinational planners clearly understand military capabilities, sustainment requirements, operational limitations, liaison, and legal considerations and that military planners understand the nature of the interagency relationship and the limitations on the types of support to provide. Robust liaison facilitates understanding, coordination, and mission accomplishment. A CCMD's joint interagency coordination group (JIACG), or an equivalent organization, is an interagency staff group that can facilitate this process. During joint operations, a JIACG provides the CCCR with an increased capability to coordinate with other USG agencies and departments and may facilitate such coordination for subordinate JFCs. The JIACG, an element of a CCCR's staff, establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Composed of USG civilian and military experts assigned to CCCRs and tailored to meet the CCCR's specific needs, the JIACG provides a CCCR with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other USG civilian agencies and departments and participate in all planning. JIACG members provide a collaborative conduit back to their

parent organizations to help synchronize joint operations with the efforts of nonmilitary organizations.

c. Planners need to consider recovery and evacuation for those personnel who become isolated, captured, or injured during CD operations. Personnel recovery (PR) and casualty evacuation, especially in a COM-led environment, will require the synchronized capabilities and authorities of interagency, DOD, multinational, and HN partners. PR and casualty evacuation often require an immediate response; therefore, it behooves planners to establish collaboration and planning procedures well in advance of an event occurring.

JP 5-0, Joint Planning, provides more information on interagency and multinational considerations related to joint planning. Also refer to JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation, and JP 3-16, Multinational Operations, for additional details regarding considerations for coordination and collaboration among organizations and multinational partners.

JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery, provides a foundation for understanding PR and developing a PR plan. JP 4-02, Joint Health Services, addresses issues relative to casualty evacuation.

SECTION B. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SUPPORT

4. Detection and Monitoring

D&M provides early notification to LEAs, enabling interception and drug interdiction operations, and facilitates searches for contraband, which may lead to drug seizures and arrests. DOD, in consonance with the NICCP, utilizes national task forces to conduct D&M operations. Drug smugglers are innovative and continuously use the tactic of misdirection with law enforcement and military CD forces, knowing they cannot be everywhere at all times. Limited CD assets should be located to optimize D&M and the potential for drug interdiction. Therefore, the cueing, detecting, identifying, and monitoring become essential to successful D&M for drug interdiction.

a. **Cueing.** Whether over the expanse of open ocean sea lanes or airspace, or on roadside checkpoints, some form of CD cueing is required. This cueing may be specific intelligence “tipping” from myriad sources that enable D&M assets to be properly positioned and ready to detect the target. Also, drug smugglers try to operate and be lost among the populace and may use deceptions to overwhelm D&M capabilities. In addition to the cueing assets, there must be sufficient capability to detect and identify the target so that monitoring (tracking) is possible to an advantageous point or time of CD interdiction. In many cases, human intelligence is a principle source of information to cue D&M efforts.

b. **Detection.** Whatever the manner of cueing, the target must be detected or cued by pre-positioned D&M assets, whether fixed site, movable, or mobile. In the case of aerial and some maritime targets transiting over water, there are a number of types of assets that can affect initial detection: air assets such as airborne early warning or modified maritime patrol aircraft, submarines, and surface patrol assets such as naval combatants and USCG cutters or ground- or sea-based radars. In the case of land targets, cueing and detection

may be at the same point and time, or cueing leads to detection at a separate location such as an airfield, roadside checkpoint, or border crossing.

c. **Identification and Monitoring.** Following initial detection, the target must then be identified and monitored until it can be handed off to LEA or PN forces for interception. When possible, a common operational picture (COP), created through the integration of the data from various intelligence sources and sensor systems, is used for situational awareness and decision making after cueing to continue the drug interdiction process. Land targets may require increased support and coordination due to larger-scale, ground, unit-type activities.

d. **OPSEC.** Smugglers, especially drug cartels, employ their own well-organized security and intelligence systems and use various security measures and deceptions to avoid detection and interception. They also rely on a form of human intelligence, some of which is obtained through corruption and bribes and others through intimidation and fear of extreme violence, including kidnapping and murder. DOD and LEAs should employ OPSEC measures and military deception tactics at the operational and tactical levels to disrupt smuggler/cartel intelligence gathering and increase the likelihood of successful D&M and subsequent drug interdiction. PNs may have OPSEC challenges and require assistance in safeguarding sensitive but unclassified material.

e. **Operational Limitations and ROE/RUF.** Per CJCSI 3710.01, *DOD Counterdrug Support*, DOD personnel are not authorized to provide assistance to LEAs when CD-related hostilities are imminent. Additionally, DODI 3025.21, *Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies*, states that DOD personnel should not directly participate in a search or seizure, interdiction of vehicles or vessels, or the pursuit of individuals. However, despite DOD personnel's compliance with these restrictions, there may be occasions when they find themselves in complex situations such as supporting LEDET vessel boarding that may necessitate the use of force. Additionally, similar precautions should be taken during combined operations with a PN. There needs to be an informed, mutual understanding of the governing policies, ROE/RUF (or PN equivalents) and other operational limitations for the activities/operation for both the US and PN participants.

For additional discussion regarding operational limitations and application of ROE and RUF, see JP 1-04, Legal Support for Military Operations, and JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, respectively; for detailed ROE/RUF discussion, see CJCSI 3121.01, (U) Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces.

5. Drug Interdiction Environments

DOD's principal CD mission is D&M, and the desired end result of successful D&M is drug interdiction and apprehension by LEAs. Drug interdiction can take place in the air, at sea, or on land. These area interdictions often include overlapping activities of interagency partners. CD PNs participate in air, maritime, and land drug interdiction. The differentiation of drug interdiction by physical domain is to illustrate the type of assets used by smugglers and those assets integrated by CD forces. For example, an air interception would continue until the aircraft lands and is seized, or the contraband is air dropped, so

surface interception support (maritime or land) may also play a part in a drug interdiction process.

a. **Air Drug Interdiction.** Drug smuggling by general aviation type aircraft (i.e., private plane) is one means by which illicit drugs are brought directly into the US from a source country. The principal objective of air drug interdiction operations is to deter drug smuggling by seizing the drugs, aircraft, and the smugglers and to deny smugglers safe, direct, and economical routes. Air drug interdiction activities in international airspace are conducted by the USCG and CBP, as co-leads, with occasional assistance from other agencies. DOD typically supports D&M for air drug interdiction with airborne and surface sensors and tracking. For a specific mission, PN forces are typically integrated into the combined air drug interdiction force structure of the participating national task forces. Of note, US air drug interdiction does not include shooting down the suspect aircraft but rather facilitating surface interception of the aircraft or its illicit cargo upon landing or of the illicit cargo if airdropped.

b. **Maritime CD Operations.** Maritime CD interdiction may occur on both sea and land, including the littorals. CBP is the lead agency for CD operations at US POEs and on land between POEs. The USCG is the LFA for maritime drug interdiction operations on the high seas and shares this responsibility within the exclusive economic zone outside of 24 nm and contiguous waters with CBP. USN and PN/multinational vessels, with embarked LEDETs, provide assistance to the USCG when authorized. Maritime CD operations focus efforts principally on deterring drug smuggling by identifying seaborne smuggling routes; detecting, monitoring, and boarding vessels; seizing contraband and vessels; and detaining suspects. Over the years, maritime smuggling methods have grown increasingly sophisticated to counter the improving enforcement efforts.

See Appendix G, "Law Enforcement Detachments," for additional details.

c. Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is managed through DOS and DOD. PSI is a global effort that aims to stop trafficking of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. However, PSI is also used for narcotrafficking, since the means of delivery and distribution networks are similar. CCDRs' programs use the PSI activities for early warning of sea and air interdiction, intercept, and search and seizures in support of maritime operations. CCDRs in the JIACG activate the PSI activities in real time to provide D&M coordination with DOS and PN. The USCG and USN assets are used for maritime operations, boarding, and seizures; coordination with the PN is the same under PSI.

For additional information regarding PSI, see CJCSI 3520.02, Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Activity Program.

d. **Land Drug Interdiction.** Drug smuggling involves a land source and a land destination, and land drug interdiction may include D&M through other domains and the information environment. The primary objective of land drug interdiction is to seize illegal drugs, drug-related money, illegal weapons and munitions, and chemicals as they enter or

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD SEIZURES, A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE FOR 2017

In 2017, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) removed over 223 metric tons of cocaine and 31,190 pounds of marijuana worth an estimated \$6.6 billion in wholesale value, while detaining 708 suspected smugglers for prosecution in the US or partner nations. Despite this success, the Service's overall removal rate only rose slightly to 8.2%, below the target of 11.5%. There was a 3% decrease in estimated noncommercial maritime cocaine flow, from 2,833 MT [metric tons] in 2016 to 2,738.4 MT [2017]. Sustained high cocaine production factors include the Colombian peace talks with various insurgent groups that resulted in a reduction or cessation of eradication efforts in Colombia. However, an increase in the quantity of intelligence reporting and information captured generated better awareness of maritime flow of cocaine. At the same time, maritime smuggling methods have grown increasingly sophisticated to counter the improving enforcement efforts. The USCG continues its increased commitment of ships, aviation use of force-capable helicopters, and maritime patrol aircraft to the Western Hemisphere Transit Zone.

Source: USCG Annual Performance Report Fiscal Year 2017

leave the US. Apprehensions at POEs, along the border, and inside the US, including clandestine smuggler landing and airdrop sites, are accomplished primarily by CBP. PNs also conduct drug interdiction on land, including targeting airfields, illicit drug production facilities, and transshipment sites, all of which may require D&M support.

e. **CTF.** Illicit drug trafficking networks are challenges for CTN. A key aspect for countering illicit drug trafficking networks is to negate funding and logistics that support them. CTF has emerged as a whole-of-government approach to disrupt and deplete the funding of illicit drug traffickers and their supporting networks.

6. Support to Other Nations

a. **General.** Illicit drug trafficking is a national security issue, and the US supports the security, stability, and well-being of US allies and other nations friendly to US interests. Assisting PNs in this effort generally requires the full range of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of US national power. Supporting other nations' CD efforts is US policy and part of the US CD strategy, as is helping build capabilities and capacity for some PNs.

b. **Types of Support.** Some DOD CD efforts may also support US FID initiatives when drug trafficking threatens a nation's security and stability. DOD assistance provided for PN CD efforts may be provided through SA and joint and multinational exercises and PN counter narcoterrorism training activities. Direct support (not involving US combat operations) may involve US forces focused on civil-military operations (CMO) (primarily the provision of services to a local populace), communications and intelligence

cooperation, or logistic support. CD initiatives to support other nations are discussed below.

More information about US FID programs is available in JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense.

c. **SA Programs.** As a subset of security cooperation, SA encompasses a group of programs, authorized by law, through which DOD or commercial contractors provide defense articles and services in support of national policies and objectives. SA programs authorize the transfer of defense articles and services to international organizations and friendly foreign governments via sales, grants, leases, or loans to help friendly nations and allies deter and defend against aggression, promote the sharing of common defense burdens, and help foster regional stability. SA includes such diverse efforts as the delivery of defense weapon systems to foreign governments, US Service school training to international students, US personnel advice to other governments on ways to improve their internal defense capabilities, and US personnel guidance and assistance in establishing infrastructures and economic bases to achieve and maintain regional stability. When the US assists other nations in meeting their defense requirements, it contributes to its own security. SA is funded and authorized by, and under the supervision and general direction of, DOS. The military portion is administered by DOD under the direction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. GCCs have the responsibility for supporting certain SA programs and conducting some security cooperation activities and planning FID operations for nations in their AORs, and they interface directly into the SA process through the security cooperation organization located in the PN. This action is coordinated with the US COM (normally the ambassador) in the affected HN. GCCs are active in the SA process by advising the security cooperation organization and by coordinating and monitoring ongoing SA efforts in their AOR. SA support to PNs for CD operations include equipment, services, and training, some of which may be governed by statutory limitations and qualifications.

For more information on SA, see JP 3-20, Security Cooperation, and JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense.

d. **CMO.** CMO are activities supporting military operations that embrace the relationship between military forces, civilian authorities, and the indigenous population. CMO contribute significantly to an HN's internal defense and development, generally facilitate US operations abroad, and can enhance US CD activities with the PN. CMO conducted by civil affairs (CA) forces and complemented by information-related activities, especially military information support operations (MISO), should be used to create positive effects for achieving objectives of CD operations. CMO may also support foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA), and military civic action (MCA) in conjunction with CD operations.

For more information on CMO, see JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

e. **Information Integration.** The information function encompasses the management and application of information to change or maintain relevant actor perceptions, attitudes, and other elements that drive desired behaviors and to support human and automated decision making. The information function helps commanders and staffs understand and leverage the pervasive nature of information, its military uses, and its application during all military operations. This function provides JFCs the ability to integrate the generation and preservation of friendly information while leveraging the inherent informational aspects of military activities to achieve the commander's objectives and attain the end state.

For additional information, see JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

f. **MISO.** MISO support achievement of US national and JFC objectives, DOS goals, and any supported embassy's mission performance plans. US MISO can be overt and, at the same time, be tailored so that the emphasis is placed on PN capability and execution. MISO, at a minimum, can provide information support and training in CD operations but cannot develop programs or products that target US citizens either inside or outside the US. DODI O-3607.02, *(U) Military Information Support Operations (MISO)*, tasks each CCMD to implement a MISO program and identifies the approval procedures. MISO have potential to support and enable US and PN CD operations abroad. CJCSI 3110.05, *Military Information Support Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*, also provides broad MISO guidance. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy-approved MISO programs, when combined with a SecDef-directed mission, provide the execution authority for the conduct of missions. Additional guidance on objectives (by program), potential target audiences, themes to stress and avoid, approval process, and means of dissemination and attribution methods is provided. CCDRs are authorized to execute the above pre-approved MISO programs in support of SecDef-approved missions or operations and *Unified Command Plan* activities.

For more information on MISO, see JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations.

g. **MCA.** MCA programs help build a PN's infrastructure and strengthen its governments while enhancing the legitimacy and popular support of the national government and military. This is accomplished by using mostly indigenous military personnel to conduct construction projects, support missions, and provide services useful to the local population. These missions may involve US supervision and advice but will always be conducted by the local military. MCA projects are designed to improve the PN in areas such as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others that contribute to its economic and social development. These programs are especially helpful where gaining public acceptance of the PN's military is important to the long-term success of CD operations.

For further detail on MCA, see JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, and JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense.

h. **FHA.** FHA employs US military personnel to promote urgent, nonmilitary objectives. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Affairs) manages and approves all FHA programs for DOD. FHA can be included in the

CCDR's overall FID plan, but it is most often provided in response to unforeseen disaster situations. Properly coordinated and responsive FHA, incorporating active MISO and CA activities, can be instrumental in bolstering a PN's internal defense and development, especially when stability is threatened by an overpowering criminal drug organization.

i. **HCA.** HCA is assistance to a local populace authorized in accordance with Title 10, USC, Section 401, and DODI 2205.02, *Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Activities*. Per Title 10, USC, Section 401(e), HCA includes medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary care provided in areas of a country that are rural or are underserved by medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary professionals, respectively, including education, training, and technical assistance related to the care provided; well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; rudimentary construction of surface transportation systems; and rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. Under Title 10, USC, Section 401, HCA may not be provided to any foreign country unless SECSTATE specifically approves the provision of such assistance. Additionally, HCA activities should be distinguished from similar types of projects that US forces may undertake to accomplish a military operation and that result in incidental benefits to the local population. Coordination with USAID and the HN is also very important to avoid duplicating efforts of social or economic assistance by multiple USG departments or agencies.

7. Logistics Support

a. **Types of Support.** Host-nation support (HNS) to US forces is normally based on agreements that commit a HN to provide specific support according to prescribed conditions. Shortfalls in HNS may be overcome through additional sustainment efforts, including contracted support, which can be a significant force multiplier to the joint force. Types of support that can be provided include:

(1) **Government Agency Support.** HN government agencies that provide services can directly or indirectly provide support. Support such as communications, refueling, electrical supplies, security, and HN law enforcement similar to the CBP police are some examples.

(2) **HN Facilities.** This could include the use of buildings and facilities for headquarters, billeting, maintenance shops, or other activities.

b. **Contracted Support.** This could include supplies and services supporting transportation, laundry, and hygiene requirements, as well as non-logistics support such as communications services and linguists. Theater support contracts are awarded by contracting officers in the operational area serving under the direct contracting authority of the Service component or designated senior contracting official for the contingency operation. During contingency operations, these contracts are normally executed under expedited contracting authority and provide supplies, services, and minor construction from commercial sources generally within the operational area. Theater support contracts can range from small, local contracts for a single unit or operational, area-wide contracts in support of the entire force. Also of importance, from the contractor management perspective, is that local national personnel commonly make up the bulk of the theater

support contractor employees in operations outside the US. DOD contracting officers must check the lists of entities and individuals subject to economic sanctions that are available on OFAC's Website at <http://www.treas.gov/ofac> and may not acquire from such entities and individuals.

See JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support, for further information.

c. Factors to Consider in HNS. HNS may be appropriate in some CD operations. However, extreme care should be exercised to avoid negative impacts on the local economy and environment. Consultation with HN officials and the US COM is recommended to ensure all pertinent information is provided to US forces present in the HN. Counterintelligence concerns stemming from employment of local-hire domestics and support personnel must be carefully weighed. Foreign personnel must also be vetted prior to training to ensure no members of the training audience have violated human rights. Title 22, USC, Section 2304 (Leahy Amendment), prohibits the USG from providing funds to a foreign country if DOS has credible evidence the foreign country or its agents have engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, unless SECSTATE determines and reports the government of such country is taking effective measures to bring the responsible foreign security forces to justice. To comply with the requirements of Title 22, USC, Section 2304, prior to training, foreign security forces trainees must be vetted through the affected COM and DOS human rights compliance mechanisms. Once a unit or a group of individuals has been identified to be trained, a request for human rights vetting will be submitted to the appropriate country's US embassy.

8. Communications

a. General. CD operations depend on a responsive communications system—one that enables commanders, LEA directors, and their staffs to initiate, direct, monitor, and react to drug interdiction operations. CD communication systems consist of the facilities, equipment, procedures, and personnel essential for commanders or directors to plan, direct, and control operations of forces pursuant to the mission. The purpose of these systems is to pass information (commands, data, and reports) and intelligence to and from operational forces.

b. Communication Systems. No single suite of communication systems supports the entire CD range of operations. Instead, CD communication systems architecture draws from multiple agency systems that are integrated between commands and agencies to facilitate the intelligence, operations, and administrative or logistic requirements of the users. Secure communications should be used to the maximum extent possible in support of CD operations. Employment of secure communication systems reduces the effectiveness of drug traffickers in gaining intelligence resulting from monitoring CD operations radio and telephone systems. Nonsecure communications provide drug traffickers with invaluable tactical information that may enable them to evade or circumvent D&M, as well as friendly forces.

c. JP 6-0, *Joint Communications System*, contains approved doctrine for communications system support and outlines the responsibilities of the Services, joint

commands, and DOD agencies, with respect to communications system support. In addition, the Joint Staff J-6 [Command, Control, Communications, and Computers/Cyber Directorate] sponsors publications for the intelligence communications architecture for the CCMDs and JTFs to provide classified C2 information. The anti-drug network provides an effective communications network for CD operations. A JFC, through the communications system directorate of a joint staff, validates communications requirements. For CD operations, Service components should establish a validated requirement for access to the anti-drug network through their supported JFC.

9. Intelligence

CD operations require timely and focused intelligence to tactical forces involved in D&M and LEA drug interdiction efforts and for supporting USG programs for developing CD capabilities of PN's. Supported JFCs determine specific intelligence requirements for their theaters and operational areas. CD operations require a different type of intelligence than traditional military operations due to fundamentally different mission requirements. Adversaries in CD operations are criminal enterprises with an organizational structure, objectives, and tactics often distinct from nation state militaries. CD operations require intelligence support products and assessments to be written for release to foster maximum utility.

a. Intelligence Planning

(1) Counterdrug intelligence preparation for operations (CDIPO) is an intellectual process of analysis and evaluation that is modified from traditional military JIPOE. CDIPO identifies likely trafficking routes and the most efficient allocation of scarce resources to detect, track, and apprehend drug traffickers. CDIPO is a cyclic, five-step process consisting of operational area evaluation, terrain analysis, weather analysis, threat evaluation, and threat integration, with all steps being performed continuously and simultaneously. Figure III-2 depicts the CDIPO process.

For additional details regarding intelligence estimates and examples, refer to JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.

(2) **Operational Area Evaluation.** Operational area evaluation involves the assessment of the drug trafficking area with regard to the overall nature of the PN's relative populations, friendly forces, threat, and the OE. This evaluation will assist the CDIPO analyst in identifying what additional information and support will be required to complete the CDIPO. In later steps of the process, terrain and weather within the area are evaluated to determine how they will affect CD operations in general. Drug traffickers expected to operate in the areas are then evaluated to assess their capabilities in relation to the terrain, weather, and the mission of CD forces. The CD OE consists of the AO and the area of interest (AOI). These are viewed in terms of width, depth, and time. The AO is the geographic area where CD forces have been assigned both the authority and responsibility to conduct CD operations. The AOI extends beyond the AO and consists of areas in which information on smuggling may be developed or in which activity affecting the operation may occur.




Figure III-2. Counterdrug Intelligence Preparation for Operations Process

(3) **Terrain Analysis.** Terrain analysis functions are performed to reduce the uncertainty regarding the effects of terrain on drug trafficking activities. Determining how the terrain will influence drug traffickers will assist the analyst in predicting where smugglers will move. Terrain factors will affect each mode of travel used by the traffickers differently. Therefore, each mode of transport must be independently evaluated. Terrain analysis in CDIPO focuses on the drug trafficking aspects of the terrain.

(a) **Observation.** Observation involves the influence of the terrain on the reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities of both drug traffickers and CD forces. In CDIPO, it refers to visual and electronic line of sight. Traffickers will attempt to exploit the natural features of the terrain to minimize the effectiveness of visual observation and that of communications and electronic monitoring equipment.

(b) **Concealment.** Concealment is protection from air and ground observation. For drug traffickers, it is vital to avoid detection and drug interdiction. The analyst determines the amount of concealment afforded by the terrain and vegetation and considers observation from both the ground and air. Drug traffickers can be expected to

move where the vegetation and terrain offer the best concealment. Air traffickers use both traditional and unconventional concealment techniques. Traditional techniques are used to avoid detection. These include using high terrain to avoid ground-based radar detection and changing course to break over-the-horizon radar lock. Conversely, unconventional techniques are not used to avoid detection. Instead, these techniques are employed to blend with legitimate air traffic and include switching tail numbers and filing flight plans or cargo manifests with false routes or destinations.

(c) **Obstacles.** Obstacles are natural or man-made features that stop, impede, or divert the movement of traffickers or CD forces. Obstacles are an important analytical factor during terrain analysis. The analyst should determine the location of obstacles to foot, horse, mule, vehicular, and air movement, as well as what effects removing, overcoming, or bypassing these obstacles will have on trafficking operations.

(d) **Key Terrain.** Key terrain is an area that provides a marked advantage to the controlling or occupying force. The most important aspect of the terrain to drug traffickers will be locations that facilitate logistic support and security.

(e) **Avenue of Approach (AA).** AAs are analyzed from the perspective of both the drug traffickers and CD forces. An AA is an air or ground route of an attacking force of a given size leading to its objective or to key terrain in its path. In CD operations, AAs may be a trail in the jungle, a stream, river, the ocean, flight corridors, or routes the drug traffickers use to transport their products in and out of a country. CDIPO assist in identifying AAs while using terrain, weather, history, and other elements of the AO and AOI. AAs are air, maritime, and ground routes available for trafficking or movement of CD forces. The factors used to analyze AAs are based on terrain, intelligence, and statistical history.

1. Trafficker terrain considerations include:

a. Alternate routes. Traffickers will seek alternate routes to provide a range of options to avoid CD forces.

b. Escape routes. Traffickers will attempt to use routes that provide rapid withdrawal from crossing or stash sites.

c. Security. Traffickers will select routes that offer them the greatest security and freedom of action.

d. Crossing sites. Obstacles such as rivers and open areas with no concealment constitute danger areas for traffickers.

2. Factors indicating possible trafficking activity include:

a. Evidence of electronic surveillance or communications equipment. Traffickers routinely use electronic surveillance equipment to monitor law enforcement activity. Communications equipment is also used to coordinate smuggling

operations. Trafficker use of surveillance and communications equipment correlates to trafficking activity.

b. Visual signs of trafficking activity. Visual indicators of smuggling include the discovery of abandoned or stashed loads, drug packing or waterproofing debris, and vehicle or foot tracks crossing the border between POEs or in other areas where legitimate traffic is unlikely.

c. Logistic support factors. As with any activity involving the transport of personnel and materials, drug trafficking requires a system of logistic support. Some of the logistic support factors that correlate to drug trafficking are:

(1) Transportation networks, such as rivers, railroads, and public and private roads to which the traffickers have access.

(2) Known or suspected property (structures or land) controlled by trafficking organizations that may facilitate the storage and movement of drug loads.

(3) Known or suspected stash sites and staging areas for drug shipments.

(4) **Weather Analysis.** Weather in an area is analyzed to determine its effect on trafficking activity and CD operations. Analysis of terrain and weather together shows the ease or difficulty of movement through an area.

(5) **Threat Evaluation.** An essential element to threat evaluation is the development of a drug trafficker database. Database information should include organizational structure, modes of operations, and personal data on known smugglers. A completed database will provide a tool to assess trafficking organizations, their operating area, capabilities, and operational trends or patterns. After analysis, this information transforms into knowledge about the relative intensity of drug trafficking in specific areas, the amount of support the traffickers receive from the local population, and potential areas for future activity.

(6) **Threat Integration.** Threat integration relates the drug traffickers' mode of operation, established trends, and patterns to the terrain and weather to predict where and when drug traffickers will move. During threat integration, the intelligence analyst develops two important decision-making aids: the named area of interest (NAI) and the drug trafficking event template.

(a) NAIs are areas where drug trafficking is expected to occur. Activity or lack of activity within an NAI will help confirm or deny a particular drug trafficking route. NAIs facilitate intelligence collection and analysis and help:

1. Focus attention on areas where trafficking forces must appear if they have selected a particular route.

2. Identify when and where drug traffickers will employ their reconnaissance, surveillance, and counter-reconnaissance assets.

3. Frame drug trafficking significant events by time and location.

(b) Event templating analyzes significant drug trafficking activity and expected smuggling events to provide indicators to the traffickers' intentions. By recognizing what the traffickers can do, and comparing it with what they are doing, predictions can be made about what they will do next. Event templating is critical to proactive CD operations. The event templating process can be expanded to include actions that traffickers might take to avoid CD forces. It can also be used to predict changes in trafficking patterns and future operations. Event templating:

1. Enables the intelligence collection manager to develop precise, prioritized collection requirements based on probable drug trafficking behavior.

2. Provides the basis for the final product of the CDIPO process, the decision support template.

3. Identifies those areas in the CD AO where significant events and trafficking activities will occur and where drug interdiction targets will appear.

4. Identifies decision points where drug trafficking events require decisions in support of drug interdiction and show the deadline for making those decisions.

b. Intelligence Estimate. The intelligence estimate is a written summary of the terrain and weather analysis and enemy evaluation developed during the CDIPO. It provides a narrative study of drug trafficker capabilities, limitations, and most likely courses of action. While the CDIPO process and its products provide decision-making aids for the CD force commander and guidance to the staff in preparing the joint OPLAN, the intelligence estimate provides this essential information to the organizations and personnel who will execute the plan. CDIPO is the mechanism for conducting the collection and evaluation, collation, and analysis steps of the intelligence process; the estimate is the primary means of accomplishing the dissemination of intelligence during joint CD operation planning.

c. CD Intelligence Picture

(1) DOD, through its intelligence function, conducts D&M operations, and the results are disseminated to interested LEAs and posted on appropriate DOD Websites. This is done through several organizations, to include CCMDs, JIATFs, national IC agencies, USCG maritime intelligence fusion centers (MIFCs), CBP AMOC, and the DEA El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), all providing an integrated, interagency approach to CD efforts that has proven successful. Analysis is also produced and coordinated by DIA with other IC agencies. DOD and other USG departments and agencies share intelligence and other information on drug threats with foreign authorities through a variety of agreements and mechanisms. USG departments and agencies also increasingly assist foreign countries in building their capacity to collect, analyze, share, and exploit CD intelligence and other information.

(2) Developing the intelligence picture within the AO itself is accomplished from two perspectives. First, from a multinational and/or joint perspective, the CCMD J-2 is responsible for developing the CD intelligence picture. For example, the USSOUTHCOM J-2 would be responsible for developing the CD intelligence picture within the USSOUTHCOM AOR. Second, from an interagency perspective, the responsibilities lie with the respective embassy country teams. The CD country teams could, for example, include the DEA country attaché, DOS INL representative, JIATF-S tactical analysis team (TAT) (where assigned) to country team breakout, DOD CD personnel, and additional interested or responsible agencies. The US country team would also provide analysis of other countries' CD intentions and capabilities. In specific regions, JIATFs were established to approach the CD problem set from a regional perspective. JIATF-S is an interagency task force with responsibilities, in part, for developing the CD intelligence picture for the region between 27 degrees West and 120 degrees West, and 30 degrees North and Antarctica. The JIATFs increasingly include foreign liaison officers for developing the CD intelligence picture for Latin America. JIATF-W JOA mirrors the USINDOPACOM AOR less the JIATF-S JOA in the Eastern Pacific Ocean, east of 120 degrees West.

For an example of how intelligence analysts would apply a systems visualization to a CD scenario, see JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.

d. **CD Classification.** There are specific requirements for marking information used to support the CD mission. CJCSM 3701.01, *(U) Classification Guide for Counterdrug Information*, should be consulted for detailed, authoritative guidance. CJCSM 3701.01 provides instructions and guidance on the classification, protection, marking, and handling of information involved in the joint CD program. Enclosures also provide guidance on marking and classifying information pertaining to CD operations and guidance on marking and classifying information considered to be derived from CD intelligence, as well as CD operations. Use of CJCSM 3701.01 will limit the tendency to incorporate LEAs' unclassified sensitive information into DOD products at classifications up to SECRET. The DOD objective is to provide information and intelligence to LEAs at unclassified levels, when possible. DOD components will not upgrade classification of LEA information merely because it is included in a classified DOD intelligence product.

10. Planning Support to Law Enforcement Agencies

Providing planning support to US LEAs should take into account the following factors:

a. **Background.** The amount of experience senior law enforcement officials have with military operations and procedures varies with each agency. Military planners should consider the varied experiences of all personnel involved with planning the operation.

b. **Mission.** Different agencies have different legal mandates and thus areas of emphasis and operating methods. Arresting suspects and seizing assets requires substantial investment in time and resources but is only one step in a lengthy and complicated legal process. Somewhat like post-combat CA and military police operations after a military campaign, long-range planning must take into account the support requirements necessary

to capitalize on initial investigative successes in the field. An important factor in understanding an agency's mission, and why it operates the way it does, is the method by which it defines its success. Definitions of success likely vary among agencies, affecting their operating philosophies, and in some ways their operational goals, in the drug war. However disparate their individual goals may appear, and while no single set of measures of success is acceptable to all agencies, planners should seek those overarching objectives that can be identified for unity of effort.

c. Interagency Planning. At the federal level, the agencies involved differ significantly in how they organize to execute their missions. The military planner must understand how the interagency partners' organizational elements support the overall mission. Some agencies have little experience in long-range planning, and that experience may be spread among a number of offices. The senior management's focus may be on operations at the expense of supporting activities (i.e., the intelligence, technical, logistic, contracting, or administrative elements). DOD personnel assigned to planning with other interagency partners (including LEAs) should be prepared to educate, and in turn be educated by, their counterparts in a continuous give-and-take process. The military planner typically understands the planning process, and the interagency partner has the operational knowledge. Normally, this environment is routine during the planning effort, requiring flexibility, diplomacy, and an ability to converse in the supported agency's lexicon, which could include foreign language skills. There should be an adaptive spirit with a willingness to tailor prior experience and methodology to that organization.

11. Logistics

DOD can make a substantial contribution in logistic support of LEAs, including their international operations, and with the assistance of DOS to foreign authorities when required. Logistic support should be structured to achieve unity of effort; visibility of requirements, resources, and capabilities; and rapid and precise response. Logistic support should be designed with the right capacity, scalability, agility, control, and time-assurance qualities to effectively support LEA authorities. For the most part, costs incurred in DOD logistic support of LEAs are reimbursable. Nonfederal LEAs should provide the supporting activity with a fund advance based on the estimated cost of equipment and services. The system used to account for the cost of DOD support to civilian LEAs need not be different from existing data collection systems (e.g., Vehicle Interactive Management System). For airlift services, the Transportation Working Capital Fund accounting procedures apply.

a. Deployment and Distribution Support. Surface transportation assets are usually wheeled vehicles of various types. Air transportation of LEA personnel, equipment, and apprehended suspects is available and can be provided by aviation assets. When air transportation to a drug apprehension site is required, the mission requires advance approval by the US Attorney General. Further information on airlift support is available in JP 3-17, *Air Mobility Operations*. Maritime transportation of LEA personnel, supplies, and equipment is available and may be provided by US Transportation Command, the USN, or commercial shipping.

b. **Maintenance Support.** The use of DOD personnel to operate, maintain, or assist in operating or maintaining equipment is limited to situations when the training of non-DOD personnel would be infeasible or impractical from a cost or time perspective and would not otherwise compromise national security or military preparedness. LEAs may request DOD personnel to operate, maintain, or assist in operating or maintaining equipment for their agencies. Such assistance may not involve DOD personnel in a direct role in a LEA operation.

c. **Operational Contract Support (OCS).** OCS is the process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in support of joint operations. The US uses contracted support in military operations at various levels of scope and scale. GCCs, subordinate commanders, and their staffs should be familiar with how to plan for and integrate OCS during military operations.

See JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support, for further information.

d. **Engineering Support.** Engineer support varies from advice on area denial to general engineering operations. This support can be used to improve training facilities that enhance law enforcement drug interdiction efficiency, as well as upgrade US border roads, fencing, security lighting, and tunnel detection support that reduce the availability of illicit drugs. The supported LEA should provide any required material and comply with legal, environmental, and cultural documentation requirements.

JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations, provides additional information on engineering support.

e. **Facilities Support.** DOD may make base facilities available to federal, state, or local LEAs. These include such facilities as buildings, training areas, and firing ranges. These facilities are generally needed either in conjunction with training being conducted by the LEAs or by DOD forces providing training support to the requester(s).

f. **Military Working Dog (MWD) Support.** MWDs and their handlers can be provided to conduct limited support to LEAs. The provisions of support are provided in detail in DODD 5200.31, *DOD Military Working Dog (MWD) Program*. Requests to utilize this detection capability will be requested through the DOD Military Working Dog Program Manager. While MWDs detect, LEAs confirm and establish the chain of custody of evidence or individual(s) if effecting an apprehension. The patrol drug detection dogs may be operationally limited due priority operational requirements.

g. **Threat Finance Intelligence Support.** Threat finance intelligence are those DOD intelligence activities, including those undertaken with other USG departments and agencies and/or multinational partners, that involve the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, interpretation, production, and dissemination of intelligence products in support of DOD CTF activities and capabilities.

12. Personnel

a. **General.** DOD can provide a variety of skilled CD individuals, units, or special operations forces (SOF) elements in support of PN and interagency CD efforts. This section provides descriptions of many, but not necessarily all, types of support that may be provided. Although several of the major restrictions concerning the use of DOD personnel have been included with the description of each category, others may exist, and consultation with legal personnel is imperative.

b. Personnel Support Categories

(1) **Eradication Support.** Eradication is the physical removal of growing plants (usually marijuana in the US and Canada), their growing mediums, and the associated infrastructure (e.g., watering systems) or the dismantling of drug laboratories. In the US, LEA officers must conduct the eradication operations, searches, seizures, and arrests and process evidence. The US military can only provide support and will not enter into the chain of custody except in exigent circumstances. This support is normally only provided by NG forces in a Title 32, USC, status in the US.

(2) **Legal Support.** SJAs may be contacted to provide liaison with US and foreign government legal officials concerning military support to LEAs for CD operations. The Department of Justice and the Department of the Treasury have primary responsibility for prosecuting drug crimes and management of asset forfeitures, respectively.

(3) **Accounting Support.** Accounting specialists help keep track of the property seized and assist criminal justice representatives in processing it.

(4) **Diver Support.** Divers from the USN, USA, USMC, other USG departments and agencies, and some state agencies may assist LEAs for subsurface hull inspections. Divers may visually inspect only and cannot attempt to enter, search, or alter features that are detected.

(5) **Linguist Support.** This category includes translator and interpreter support. DOD personnel are not permitted to conduct real-time translations of oral or wire intercepts or to directly participate in interrogation activities.

(6) **Liaison Officers to LEAs.** DOD personnel have been assigned to positions or billets within LEAs and other agencies to primarily perform liaison functions. They can also assist these organizations in the training and planning functions, as appropriate.

(7) **Criminal Investigative Support.** This support assists LEAs in major case development. DOD investigators contribute their criminal investigative skills to the analysis of gathered, but not yet processed, evidence.

(8) **Military Police Support.** Military police personnel can assist with supervising and coordinating activities for LEA activities such as temporary task forces. Serving in such positions as operations officers, these personnel can serve as the link between DOD and LEA elements.

(9) **Intelligence Analysts.** These personnel can receive and process incoming reports from multiple sources in accordance with established LEA procedures. They would assist in evaluating the information, analyzing trafficking group composition, disposition, strengths, and weaknesses. They can also help evaluate current intelligence holdings and identify intelligence gaps and additional requirements. Therefore, DOD personnel must work closely with US LEA to properly pass intelligence when dealing with US entities.

13. Reconnaissance Support

a. DOD provides reconnaissance support to CD operations in various ways. Aerial-based reconnaissance uses a variety of sensors, such as forward-looking infrared, side-looking airborne radar, photographic devices, and aerial observers employed on rotary-wing aircraft, tilt-rotor aircraft, fixed-wing aircraft, or UASs. Satellite imagery is also available. Ground-based reconnaissance can reconnoiter an area (private land, abandoned property, and public land) for cultivated drug plants, laboratories, or other drug operations. This reconnaissance can be accomplished by using listening or observation posts, patrols, GSR, or remote sensors. Maritime reconnaissance uses ships, submarines, and aircraft.

b. **Domestic Use of UASs.** Unless specifically provided for in policy, law, or other guidance, SecDef approval is required for all domestic UAS operations (e.g., homeland defense; defense support of civil authorities; CD; and NG state support operations, including DOD UAS operated by NG personnel in Title 32, USC, or state active duty status). Domestic use of UAS requires consultation with the Federal Aviation Administration and must be consistent with applicable laws, regulations, and memorandums of agreement (MOAs) concerning the operations of UAS in the National Airspace System.

For more details regarding domestic use of UAS, refer to Deputy Secretary of Defense Policy Memorandum 15-002, Guidance for the Domestic Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems.

c. **Domestic Use of Satellite Imagery.** Military use of satellite imagery collected over the US, from either commercial or government platforms, requires a proper use memorandum signed by an organization's certifying government official. The proper use memorandum authorizes the use of imagery under legal and policy limitations derived from EO 12333, *United States Intelligence Activities* (as amended), the National Security Act of 1947 (as amended), and other applicable law and policy directives (National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency [NGA] National System for Geospatial-Intelligence Interim Instruction 1806, *Domestic Imagery*). Satellite imagery is capable of generating panchromatic, multispectral, hyperspectral, and overhead persistent infrared images to produce information on vegetation, bathymetry, and other indicators in the targeted area.

CHAPTER IV

COMBATANT COMMAND COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS

"I made a promise to the American people to take action to keep drugs from pouring into our country and to help those who have been so badly affected by them. This is an epidemic that knows no boundaries and shows no mercy, and we will show great compassion and resolve as we work together on this important issue."

President Donald J. Trump, 29 March 2017
Signing of Executive Order establishing the President's Commission on
Combating Drug Addiction and the Opioid Crisis

1. United States Northern Command

a. **Missions.** USNORTHCOM's responsibilities include homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities. Its CD mission is authorized under Title 10, USC, Section 124. USNORTHCOM supports D&M operations and operational support to DLEAs (e.g., training, transportation, and engineering support) and other federal, state, territorial, tribal, and local agencies to interdict and counter the flow of illicit drugs into the US. USNORTHCOM also conducts security cooperation with PNs to stimulate opposition to the illegal production, transit, and sale of drugs and build the CD capacity of certain PNs. USNORTHCOM, through its components, coordinates the employment of DOD forces (Active Component [AC] and Reserve Component [RC]) in a Title 10, USC, status and NG in Title 32, USC, status in operational support of LEA activities within North America and support the AMOC's CD D&M mission.

b. **Threat.** Smuggling drugs into and within USNORTHCOM's AOR constitutes a national security threat to the US. The southern border between Mexico and the US extends from the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific coast and is nearly 2,000 miles long. The northern border between Canada and the US is even longer at 5,000 miles (land and water). The Eastern Caribbean Corridor encompasses over 300,000 square miles. The Southwest border is the principal corridor for moving illicit drugs by land into the US, although more and more drugs are being smuggled in from Canada. Typical modes of ground transportation through legitimate POEs include large loads in tractor-trailer trucks, smaller loads in passenger vehicles, and people concealing drugs on their person. Drug trafficking across borders also poses a substantial threat, as traffickers continue to search for open points along the southwest or northern borders and employ novel methods, such as tunnels and other underground facilities, to transport drugs across the border.

c. **Operations.** USNORTHCOM's CD objectives are designed to support DLEA efforts to counter the flow of illicit drugs across US borders. Cooperation among nations to oppose the illegal production, transport, and sale of drugs is emphasized. Fostering interagency cooperation is integral to operations. USNORTHCOM provides CD D&M assets and operational support to US LEAs, as well as to CD forces from PNs that are combating drug production and export. USNORTHCOM's CONOPS is driven by mission, threat, and force available. JTF-N is the operational headquarters for USNORTHCOM

responsible for the planning, coordination, and employment of DOD support to DLEAs to counter transnational threats in the approaches and crossing the border to CDRUSNORTHCOM's AOR. JIATF-S, in consonance with the NICCP, is responsible for D&M of air and maritime approaches to the US in the Gulf of Mexico and in the Eastern Pacific south of the US/Mexico border. The objective of this military support to CD operations is to assist LEAs in their mission to detect, deter, and disrupt illicit drug trafficking. Capability is provided using support packages drawn from a variety of sources, to include AC and RC forces. All military operations in the operational area are conducted in support of a lead LEA.

(1) United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) provides input to USNORTHCOM's CD training plan in the form of training, C2, and liaison.

(2) North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is a bi-national (US and Canada) organization. CDRUSNORTHCOM is normally designated the commander of NORAD. NORAD's general military mission is to provide aerospace and maritime warning and aerospace control for North America. Its CD mission, based on a 1991 exchange of notes to the NORAD Agreement, is to include the surveillance and monitoring of aircraft suspected of smuggling illicit drugs into North America. Because the use of illicit drugs constitutes a long-term threat to North American society, the governments of Canada and the US have directed military organizations to assist civilian agencies in reducing the international flow of illicit drugs into both countries. In this context, NORAD's objective is to stop undetected, unchallenged air trafficking of illicit drugs into North America through D&M operations. These operations serve as a part of NORAD's overall air sovereignty mission and are consistent with the NDCS. NORAD coordinates information with the Federal Aviation Administration and the AMOC.

(3) Relationships With Other CD Agencies

(a) The Integrated Cross-border Maritime Law Enforcement Operations, more commonly known as Shiprider, represent a cooperative approach to combating cross-border crime on Canada and US shared waterways. The Integrated Cross-border Maritime Law Enforcement Operations program was established in 2012 when the US signed a framework agreement with Canada authorizing integrated cross-border operations to prevent, detect, suppress, investigate, and prosecute criminal offenses or violations of law. As it provides a legal mechanism for the cross-designation of US and Canadian law enforcement officers, this agreement virtually erased the border as an impediment to law enforcement officers from both nations, empowering them to enforce the laws of both countries along the shared maritime border.

(b) **Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs).** Canada and the US cooperate through 15 IBET geographical regions along the northern border. IBET operational drug interdiction teams are composed of CBP, ICE, USCG, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and Canadian Border Services Agency and operate in 24 locations along the Northern border, including four locations where Canadian and American intelligence analysts are co-located. IBETs work in an integrated land, air, and marine environment

within their authorities at and along the border and complement the authorities of other US LEA. The Shiprider program is designed to be the maritime operational arm of the IBETs.

(c) **Border Enforcement Security Task Forces (BESTs).** US and Canada integrated investigations occur in part through the 22 ICE-led BESTs. The three northern border BESTs incorporate personnel from ICE; CBP; USCG; Canadian Border Services Agency; Royal Canadian Mounted Police; and other key US and Canadian federal, state, provincial, local, and tribal agencies. Their mission is to identify, investigate, disrupt, and dismantle TCOs that pose significant threats to border security.

(d) EPIC is a DEA center that includes personnel from 15 federal agencies, plus Canadian and Texas state law enforcement officials. It is a full-service intelligence center, which provides information related to trafficking in illicit drugs, weapons, and illegal aliens. EPIC provides operational-level data on foreign TCOs' trends and patterns, drug seizure data, and related data on international drug smuggling into the US. EPIC is one of the USG's principal tactical intelligence centers.

(e) CBP conducts aerial D&M operations of drug trafficking within the USNORTHCOM AOR. It shares air drug interdiction operations within the AOR with the USCG. AMOC coordinates the interception and apprehension of traffickers attempting to enter the US.

(f) The Information Analysis Center, coordinating through the US Embassy in Mexico City, facilitates information and intelligence exchange between US and PN militaries and LEAs to disrupt and interdict illicit air, maritime, and land drug shipments destined for the US.

2. United States Indo-Pacific Command

a. **Missions.** The general mission of USINDOPACOM is to maintain the security of the USINDOPACOM AOR, shape the theater, and defend the US against attack through the Pacific Ocean. The CD mission is to provide intelligence and other CD support to PNs and US LEAs and security cooperation and support to PNs within the AOR and to provide DOD support to counter TOC, as directed.

b. **Threat.** There are a number of transnational criminal threats in the USINDOPACOM AOR. The illicit diversion and trafficking of drug precursor chemicals from China and India that support Mexican drug cartel production of methamphetamine represents the most significant drug threat to the US from the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Amphetamine-type stimulants are the greatest threat to the region, and widespread methamphetamine production and consumption are key sources of instability. Cocaine trafficking from the Western Hemisphere into the AOR remains an LEA and public health concern, particularly in countries with growing affluence. Heroin production, trafficking, and consumption remains a primary drug of concern, particularly in South and Southeast Asia. The diversion of Asian-sourced heroin precursors plays a critical role in the production of Afghanistan heroin. The emergence of new drug-related TCOs from Mexico, Eurasia, Iran, and African countries presents new security challenges for law

enforcement throughout the Indo-Asia, Pacific region. China's production and distribution of synthetic opioid analogs (fentanyl) continue to fuel the opioid epidemic in the US.

c. **Operations.** CD operations are integrated into the USINDOPACOM Theater Campaign Order and coordinated with other component commands to counter transnational threats to the US homeland and further stabilize the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. As USINDOPACOM's lead agent for counternarcotics, JIATF-W counters the flow of illicit drug precursor chemicals bound for the Western Hemisphere, interdicts illicit drugs transiting throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, and enhances the capacity of foreign counterparts to combat narcotics trafficking in the AOR. JIATF-W carries out USINDOPACOM CD operations through two lines of operation: disrupt the organization and harden the environment.

3. United States Southern Command

a. **Missions.** USSOUTHCOM leverages rapid response capabilities, PN collaboration, and regional cooperation within the AOR to support US national security objectives, defend the southern approaches of the US, and promote regional security and stability. The main line of effort in the USSOUTHCOM AOR is CTN. The goal of the approach is to ensure the friendly networks degrade threat network capabilities and their operations and affect the underlying conditions allowing them to flourish. The CD program is a means to achieve CTN strategic objectives by supporting USG departments and agencies and committed allies with operational support, training, and equipment.

b. **Threat.** The illicit flow of goods and people, and the violence and corruption they fuel at home and abroad, are the visible manifestations of complex, adaptive, and networked threats. Transregional and transnational threat networks are now the principal threat to regional security and stability. These networks operate unconstrained by national and geographic boundaries, unimpeded by rule of law, and fueled by enormous profits. Their interests, influence, capabilities, and reach undercut US and PN interests globally. They prey on weak institutions and exploit the interconnected nature of our modern financial, transportation, and technological systems and the seams in our organizational boundaries. Transregional and transnational threat networks extend beyond TCOs and gangs to ideologically motivated VEOs. The drug trafficking transregional and transnational threat networks in South and Central America have developed the production, transportation, and distribution into an extremely well-organized business, which includes the illegal commodities of cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and opiates. The main transportation network is accomplished by land, sea, and air.

c. **Operations.** CTN operations, actions, and investments that are resourced by the counternarcotics program fall into three main categories based on authority:

(1) D&M (Title 10, USC, Section 124). DOD is the designated LFA for D&M of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the US.

(2) DOD Support to US and PN LEA CD and Counter TOC Operations (Title 10, USC, Section 284). DOD support may include maintenance, repair, and upgrade of certain

equipment; transportation; establishment and operation of bases; training; detection; monitoring; establishment of command, control, and communications networks; linguist and intelligence analyst services; and aerial and ground reconnaissance.

(3) DOD Support for Foreign Security Forces: Authority to Build Capacity (Title 10, USC, Section 333). DOD support to provide training and equipment to the national security forces of a PN.

d. JIATF-S has the authority and responsibility to conduct CD operations in a JOA covering portions of the USNORTHCOM AOR. JIATF-S is responsible for D&M of the southern approaches to the US (less Mexico) to 100 nm from CONUS for aircraft and 12 nm for maritime traffic. This responsibility requires extensive sharing of an aerial and maritime COP, as well as coordinated operations and hand-offs between USSOUTHCOM and USNORTHCOM.

4. United States Central Command

a. **Missions.** USCENTCOM directs and enables military operations and activities with allies and partners to increase regional security and stability in support of enduring US interests.

b. **Threat.** Afghanistan continues to dominate the global opiate supply by producing the vast majority of the world's illicit opium. In 2017, an estimated 328,304 hectares of poppy was cultivated in Afghanistan. This produced an estimated 9,000 metric tons of opium, some of which was consumed locally, some stockpiled, some seized, but most was processed into heroin. Over the past decade, the global trade in illicit Afghan opiates has been one of the world's greatest transnational drug and crime threats and has funded both terrorist networks and TCOs. Afghanistan's narcotics industry continues to hinder efforts to establish security, governance, and a legitimate economy throughout the country.

c. **Operations.** The USCENTCOM CCP has a transition Afghanistan line of effort, an associated military objective, and an interagency action for operations against narcotics-funded insurgents as the foundation for USCENTCOM CD operational support. USCENTCOM CD operational support is in concert with NDCS guidance and instructions and SecDef CD directives and guidance. USCENTCOM, through its Security Cooperation Division, Interagency Action Group's Counternarcotics Funding Division, and USCENTCOM J-3 [Plans], coordinates for military-to-military training equipping and building support to PN CD forces with each embassy and US country team to ensure national CD strategies are employed in PNs to combat illicit narcotics trafficking, promote regional stability, and build partner capacity to counter threats in their countries. USCENTCOM operations include support to programs that build and sustain the counternarcotics capabilities and capacities of Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Central Asian states, and other regional partners to confront drug-trafficking and other illicit threats, with the goal of prosecuting cases through judicial systems. Additionally, USCENTCOM operations support the integration of interagency and international lines of effort to respond to the rising threat of drugs and other illicit trafficking; support intelligence and evidence-

driven operations; and support activities to CTF and TCOs, particularly those that direct profits toward the funding of insurgent and terrorist networks and activities.

5. United States European Command

a. **Mission.** United States European Command (USEUCOM) prepares ready forces, ensures strategic access, deters conflict, enables the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, strengthens partnerships, and counters transnational threats to protect and defend the US. Its CD role is to support the USEUCOM CCP tasks that counter transnational threats and support US law enforcement operations that disrupt trafficking routes and organizations that traverse the seams between AORs.

b. **Threat.** The primary drug threats in the USEUCOM AOR are in the eastern Mediterranean Ocean. Particularly noteworthy threats include the increase of cocaine flow across the Atlantic from South America, an increase in the heroin flow from Afghanistan through Turkey and the Balkans, and the use of locally/indigenously grown cannabis sales to support terrorism. Drug use, seizures, and availability continue to increase. The illicit drug trafficking situation continues to worsen as new routes are being developed, new markets and production areas are formed, and borders become more porous. Additionally, several known terrorist organizations use money raised from illicit drug trafficking, either directly or indirectly, to fund their activities. A collateral threat is the growing amount of official corruption within drug trafficking countries resulting in an increase in the probability that these countries could become narco-states and adding to regional instability.

c. **Operations.** CD missions employ the following objectives:

(1) Conduct CD and counterterrorism activities in priority narcotics areas while building PN capacities to counter the threat.

(2) Develop CD and counterterrorism intelligence support plans for USEUCOM AOR.

(3) Develop the capability to pass CD and counterterrorism information and intelligence between USG departments and agencies and PNs.

(4) Increase support to US and PN DLEAs and PN military units with CD and counterterrorism responsibilities. Develop and strengthen CCMD, interagency, and international relationships to deconflict and complement CD and counterterrorism efforts in USEUCOM's AOR.

d. USEUCOM, through its J-9 [Interagency Partnering Directorate]/Joint Interagency Counter Trafficking Center (Counternarcotics Division), coordinates for DOD-to-national police training and equipping support for PN counternarcotics security forces, focusing on the Balkans, Eastern Mediterranean, and Black Sea countries and their respective US country teams, to ensure the US, USEUCOM, and the country teams integrated country strategies are employed in PNs to combat illicit narcotics trafficking, promote regional stability, and build partner capacity to counter threats in their countries.

6. United States Africa Command

a. **Missions.** United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) is responsible for military relations with African nations; the African Union; African regional security organizations; and all DOD operations, exercises, and security cooperation on the African continent, its island nations, and surrounding waters. Working with PNs, USAFRICOM disrupts and neutralizes transnational threats, including smuggled drugs, weapons trafficking, and illicit goods (such as wildlife and other natural resource products). These transnational threats are aided by porous borders, limited security capabilities to deter smuggling, and various levels of corruption that combine to allow illicit trafficking, piracy, and other maritime crime to flourish.

b. **Threats.** Due to Africa's geographic size and extensive coastline, the primary drug threat in the USAFRICOM AOR is the illicit trafficking of drugs from South America through West African countries. Traditionally, drug smuggling routes track through North Africa, in conjunction with heroin trafficking from the Middle East that transits PNs in East Africa. Many partners in Africa have porous borders, limited security capabilities to deter smuggling and various levels of corruption that all combine to allow illicit trafficking, piracy, and other maritime crime to flourish. TOC networks and/or VEOs exploit these factors and receive revenue from the drugs, illicit goods (including wildlife and other natural resource products sourced from the African interior), and weapons.

c. **Operations.** The USAFRICOM CCP identifies lines of effort and the desired effects that provide the direction for CD operations. The USAFRICOM J-59 [Counternarcotics and Transnational Threats Program Division] designs, coordinates, programs, and executes CD projects in support of the commander's decisive effort to build partner capacity and strengthening partnerships with law enforcement authorities on the continent in support of these lines of effort. This is done primarily through the delivery of security force assistance, through Title 10, USC, Section 333, programs, which increase the capability and capacity of African partners to counter illicit trafficking and address maritime and land security challenges themselves. Working in conjunction with US LEAs, building partner capacity projects are designed to assist PN police or military organizations that have a counternarcotics or organized crime mission. USAFRICOM J-59 also provides direct operational support to US and PN LEAs through Title 10, USC, Section 284, and other programs to utilize available capability to detect, monitor, interdict, apprehend, and prosecute illicit traffickers and TOC networks. In addition, USAFRICOM supports CTF activities to help weak financial institutions in Africa "follow the money" from counter illicit trafficking and TOC. The end state is that African states and regional organizations are willing and able to address transnational threats and the desired effect is African partners are able and do interdict illicit flows of arms, drugs, money, natural resources, weapons of mass destruction material, and persons that pose a threat to regional stability or fund TCO and/or VEO activities.

7. United States Special Operations Command

a. **Mission.** USSOCOM's mission is to lead, plan, synchronize, and, as directed, execute global operations against terrorist networks in coordination with the geographic

CCMDs. USSOCOM trains, organizes, equips, and provides combat-ready SOF to CCMDs. When directed to support CD operations, SOF can operate as part of a joint-, interagency-, or multinational-led force. SOF include elements from USA, USMC, USN, and USAF units, as well as CA and military information support units.

b. **Threat.** USSOCOM can support all CCMDs with CD missions, so the narcoterrorist threats in those AORs and other significant TCOs are part of the threat-nexus. In some theaters, the threat-nexus includes significant transnational VEOs.

c. **Operations.** In support of CD operations, USSOCOM can provide training to vetted PN LEA, security, or military forces. SOF also provides mobile training teams that can be funded as security cooperation for PN security forces or through other means for LEA. Supporting CD and counter TOC operations and conducting counter threat operations includes counter threat financing and CTN.

For more information on CTF and CTN, see JP 3-25, Countering Threat Networks.

APPENDIX A

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS SUPPORTING THE COUNTERDRUG EFFORT

1. General

The illicit drug trade is a worldwide problem of supply and demand. Continued progress in reducing the demand for drugs in the US depends in part on reducing the supply of drugs entering the country. International cooperation in systemically attacking the drug problem depends upon a shared understanding that drug production, trafficking, and consumption threaten the well-being of the entire community of nations. Accordingly, the US works with other nations and international organizations to combat the illicit drug trade at each segment to collectively reduce the threat to the national security of the US and its PNs.

2. European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation

a. Established in 1992, the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) is the European Union (EU) law enforcement organization that handles criminal intelligence. Based in The Hague, The Netherlands, Europol's aim is to improve the effectiveness and cooperation between the competent authorities of the 28 EU member states and in other non-EU partner states such as Australia, Canada, the US, and Norway in preventing and combating serious international organized crime and to support the law enforcement activities of the member states.

b. Europol focuses on crimes where an organized structure is involved and two or more member states are affected. Examples of crimes investigated by Europol include:

- (1) International drug trafficking.
- (2) Organized fraud.
- (3) Terrorism.
- (4) Human trafficking.
- (5) Counterfeiting of the Euro currency.
- (6) Money laundering.

c. Europol maintains a liaison office in Washington, DC.

d. Europol has signed bilateral agreements with non-EU states and international organizations.

3. Maritime Analysis and Operations Center-Narcotics

a. The Maritime Analysis and Operations Center-Narcotics (MAOC-N) is a British-French initiative involving the following countries: Ireland, Italy, Spain, The Netherlands, United Kingdom, France, and Portugal. Germany, Denmark, and Belgium have joined as observers. The MAOC-N is headquartered in Lisbon, Portugal.

b. The mission of the MAOC-N is to enhance criminal intelligence collection, conduct analysis, and coordinate police actions on the high seas with a view to intercepting vessels carrying cocaine and cannabis.

c. The MAOC-N focuses on the following functional areas:

(1) Collect and analyze operational information to assist in determining best drug interdiction outcomes in relation to illicit traffic by sea and air towards the Atlantic European and Western Africa seaboard.

(2) Enhance intelligence through information sharing and intelligence exchange with participants and, where appropriate, with Europol, which will store and analyze the information.

(3) Coordinate the available means of the participants to facilitate boarding operations aimed to suppress illicit trafficking by sea or by air.

4. The European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction

The European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction is the central reference point for drug information in the EU. Set up in 1993, and based in Lisbon, its role is to provide the EU and its member states with objective, reliable, and comparable information on drugs and drug addiction. It is one of the EU's decentralized agencies.

5. The World Customs Organization

Established in 1952 as the Customs Co-operation Council, and headquartered in Brussels, Belgium, the World Customs Organization is an independent intergovernmental body whose mission is to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of customs administrations. With over 180 member governments, it is the only intergovernmental, worldwide organization dedicated to customs matters. To fulfill this mission, the World Customs Organization:

a. Establishes, maintains, supports, and promotes international instruments for the harmonization and uniform application of simplified and effective customs systems and procedures governing the movement of commodities, people, and conveyances across customs frontiers.

b. Reinforces members' efforts to secure compliance with their legislation, by endeavoring to maximize the level of effectiveness of members' cooperation with each other

and with international organizations to combat customs and other transnational offenses such as illicit drug trafficking, counterfeiting, money laundering, and terrorist financing.

c. Assists members in their efforts to meet the challenges of the modern business environment and adapt to changing circumstances by promoting communication and cooperation among members and other international organizations, by fostering integrity, human resource development, transparency, improvements in the management and working methods of customs administrations, and the sharing of best practices.

6. The International Criminal Police Organization

The International Criminal Police Organization-International Police (known as ICPO-INTERPOL) is an international organization that facilitates international police cooperation. The organization's headquarters is in Lyon, France. It is the second largest political organization after the United Nations in terms of international representation. Its work focuses primarily on public safety and battling terrorism, crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes, organized crime, piracy, illicit traffic in works of art, illicit drug production, drug trafficking, weapons smuggling, human trafficking, money laundering, white collar crime, computer crime, intellectual property, and corruption.

7. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) mobilizes and promotes regional and transnational cooperation to confront the drug menace. Specific efforts are made to target the world's most vulnerable regions, where the convergence of drugs, crime, corruption, and terrorism threatens regional and global security. UNODC works directly with governments, international organizations, other United Nations entities, and civil society to develop and implement programs that meet national and regional needs. UNODC focuses on the following areas:

- a. Countering TOC and illicit drug trafficking.
- b. Prevention, treatment and reintegration, and alternative development.
- c. Countering corruption.
- d. Terrorism prevention.
- e. Justice.
- f. Research and trend analysis.
- g. Policy support.
- h. Technical cooperation and field support.
- i. Provision of secretariat services and substantive support to the governing bodies and the International Narcotic Control Board.

8. Southeast European Law Enforcement Center

The objective of the Southeast European Law Enforcement Center (SELEC), within the framework of cooperation among competent authorities, is to provide support for member states and enhance coordination in preventing and combating crime, including serious and organized crime, where such crime involves or appears to involve an element of trans-border activity.

a. The member states include the Republic of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of Bulgaria, Republic of Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Hellenic Republic, Hungary, Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Republic of Serbia, and Republic of Turkey.

b. **Tasks of SELEC.** The new convention provides for SELEC to:

(1) Coordinate regional operations and support investigations and crime prevention activities of the member states in trans-border cases.

(2) Provide the member states with the opportunity to exchange information and criminal intelligence and offer operational assistance in a quick and timely manner.

(3) Collect, collate, analyze, process, and disseminate information and criminal intelligence.

(4) Produce strategic analysis and threat assessments related to its objective.

(5) Establish, operate, and maintain a computerized information system, which implies also to ensure the protection of personal data.

APPENDIX B

REQUESTING DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SUPPORT

1. General

For current procedures for requesting DOD support, both foreign and domestic, refer to CJCSI 3710.01, *DOD Counterdrug Support*, and CNGBI 3100.01, *National Guard Counterdrug Support*.

2. Domestic Counterdrug Support

a. Per CJCSI 3710.01, approval authority for certain domestic DOD CD support has been delegated to CDRUSNORTHCOM, CDRUSSOUTHCOM, and CDRUSINDOPACOM. NG CD support is authorized in accordance with the approved state governor's CD plan.

b. Requests for DOD CD support to USG departments or agencies must come from the department or agency with official responsibility for CD activities. Requests for support to a state or local government must come from an appropriate official of the state or local agency.

c. Supporting CCMDs and Services will approve the use of their assets in accordance with DOD policy.

3. Foreign Counterdrug Support

a. Approval authority for certain CD support outside the US has been delegated to GCCs. With certain specified restrictions, GCCs may conduct planning and coordinating visits to US embassies, provide intelligence analyst support to COM and LEAs, provide linguists, conduct training of foreign LEA personnel, and provide transportation support.

b. Requests for support to a foreign LEA must come from an appropriate official of a department or agency of the USG, in coordination with SECSTATE, that has CD responsibilities or responsibilities for countering TOC. Requests for assistance of foreign governments must be coordinated with country teams and supported by the COM of the PN. Supported requirements should be aligned with CCDR's CCPs and the COM's integrated country strategy. Concurrence by senior leadership of the PN CD organization supported is vital to the ultimate success of any type of support. More broadly, it is important to conduct an analysis on doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities of the capability of the PN to absorb, and ultimately utilize, the provided support.

4. Types of Department of Defense Counterdrug Support

a. **D&M.** GCCs conduct D&M missions within their assigned AOR with theater assigned forces. While not conducted at the request of federal, state, local, and foreign LEAs, independent GCC D&M operations support CD enforcement efforts.

b. Support Requested by LEAs. Support provided to LEAs by or involving DOD personnel in connection with CD missions includes the below categories. All of these activities are subject to specific provisions of US law/DOD regulations, and some require explicit approval by designated officials.

- (1) Equipment maintenance.
- (2) Transportation support.
- (3) PN capacity building, including establishment or operation of bases or training facilities.
- (4) CD-related training of LEA personnel.
- (5) Detecting, monitoring, and communicating the movement of air, sea, and surface traffic detected outside US borders for up to 25 miles within US borders.
- (6) Engineering support at US borders.
- (7) Communication system and network support.
- (8) Linguist support.
- (9) Intelligence analyst support.
- (10) Information and intelligence sharing.
- (11) Aerial and ground reconnaissance support.
- (12) Tunnel detection support.
- (13) Use of military vessels for LEA operating bases.
- (14) Special operations and conventional CD training of foreign security forces to counter illicit trafficking, counter TOC, conduct land border security, conduct D&M, conduct interdiction, and defeat narcoterrorism and narco-driven terrorism.
- (15) MISO.
- (16) Foreign CA community resiliency activities related to CD.

APPENDIX C COUNTERDRUG ORGANIZATIONS

As depicted in Figure C-1, the following is a breakdown of CD organizations and their notional capabilities.

Counterdrug Organizations							
Organization	Criminal Justice	Drug Treatment	Education Community Action; Workplace	International Initiatives	Drug Interdictions	Research and Development	Intelligence and Information Management
Executive Office of the President							
National Security Council	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
Office of National Drug Control Policy	P	P	P	M	S	S	S
Department of Defense	A	A	A	A	L(3), M(3)	S	S(1), M(3)
Department of Homeland Security							
Customs and Border Protection	M		A	A	M(4)		A
US Coast Guard	L(1), M(2)		A	S	L(4), L(5)		M
US Coast Guard, Research and Development						A	
Immigration and Customs Enforcement	M		A	A	M(4)		A
Secret Service	S		A	A	A		A
Transportation Security Administration	S		A	A	S		
Border Intelligence Fusion Section							S
Department of Justice							
Drug Enforcement Administration	L(1), M(2)		A	M	M		L
Federal Bureau of Investigation	L(1), M(2)		A	S	S		M
US Attorneys	L(1), M(1)		A	L(2)	S		M
US Marshals Service	S		A	S	S		A
Bureau of Prisons	S	A	A				A
US National Center Bureau	S		A	M	S		S
Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration	S		A	A	S		M
Department of State							
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement	A		A	L	A		A

Figure C-1. Counterdrug Organizations

Counterdrug Organizations (cont.)							
Organization	Criminal Justice	Drug Treatment	Education Community Action; Workplace	International Initiatives	Drug Interdictions	Research and Development	Intelligence and Information Management
US Agency for International Development		A	A	M			
Country teams	A		A	M	S		S
US Information Agency			S	S			
Department of the Treasury							
Internal Revenue Service	S		A	A	S		A
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives	S		A	A	S		A
Department of Agriculture, US Forest Service	A		A		S		A
Department of the Interior							
Bureau of Indian Affairs			A		A		A
Bureau of Land Management			A		A		A
National Park Service	A		A		S		A
Department of Education	A	M	M			S	A
Department of Health and Human Services		L	M	A		M	A
Composite/Regionals							
High Drug Trafficking Areas	M		A	S	M		S
Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces	M(1), M(2)		A	L(2)	A		M(2)
Project North Star	M(1)		A	M	M		S
State National Guard	S		A		M		S
International Counterdrug Organizations							
ICPO-INTERPOL [International Criminal Police Organization-International Police] Lyon, France Focuses on illicit drugs, money laundering, and terrorism. Has a Washington, DC, office. https://www.interpol.int/							
EUROPOL [European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation] The Hague, Netherlands Focuses on illicit drugs, money laundering, and terrorism. https://www.europol.europa.eu/							
Maritime Analysis and Operation Centre-Narcotics Lisbon, Portugal Focuses on illicit drug suppression on the Atlantic seaboard of Europe and West Africa.							
World Customs Organization Brussels, Belgium Focuses on customs administration and enforcement for 169 member countries. http://www.wcoomd.org							

Figure C-1. Counterdrug Organizations (Cont.)

Counterdrug Organizations (cont.)**Legend**

A	ancillary role	M	major responsibilities
L	lead agency	M(1)	major responsibilities, investigations
L(1)	lead agency, investigations	M(2)	major responsibilities, prosecutions
L(2)	lead agency, prosecutions	M(3)	major responsibilities, command, control, and communications
L(3)	lead agency, detection and monitoring	M(4)	major responsibilities; border interdiction
L(4)	shared lead agency, air interdiction	P	primary agency
L(5)	lead agency, maritime interception	S	significant support role
L(6)	lead agency, land interdiction	S(1)	significant support role, intelligence

Figure C-1. Counterdrug Organizations (Cont.)

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APPENDIX D

COUNTERDRUG PLANS AND REPORTS

The following is a guide to assist CD planners when developing plans in support of CD operations.

Annex A	Plan Format
B	Reports

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ANNEX A TO APPENDIX D PLAN FORMAT

(SECURITY CLASSIFICATION)

Copy No.

Issuing Headquarters

Place of Issue

Date/Time Group of

Signature

COUNTERDRUG PLAN: (NUMBER or CODE NAME) References: Maps, charts, and other relevant documents.

1. Situation

Briefly describe the situation that the plan addresses.

a. **Strategic Guidance.** Provide a summary of directives, letters of instructions, memoranda, and strategic plans, including plans from higher authority, that apply to the plan:

- (1) Relate the strategic direction to the local situation.
- (2) List strategic objectives and tasks assigned.
- (3) Constraints and restraints: List actions that are required or prohibited by higher authority (ROE, RUF, legal, jurisdictional).

b. **Criminal Forces (Threat).** Provide a summary of intelligence data:

- (1) Composition, location, disposition, weapons or other armament, equipment movements, and strengths of drug traffickers that could influence the strategic situation.
- (2) Strategic concept. Describe the intentions of the criminal forces.
- (3) Major objectives.
- (4) Idiosyncrasies and operating patterns of key personalities and organizations.
- (5) Operational and sustainment capabilities.
- (6) Centers of gravity (describe the main source of power).
- (7) Critical vulnerabilities.

c. **Friendly Forces.** Identify and describe friendly LEAs or supporting military forces that may directly affect the operation:

- (1) Mission and intent of higher, adjacent, and supporting US forces.
- (2) Mission and intent of higher, adjacent, and supporting foreign forces.

d. **Assumptions.** State the assumptions that are applicable to the plan as a whole.

e. **Legal Considerations.**

2. Mission

The mission statement should be a clear, concise statement of the task or tasks to be accomplished by the friendly forces and the purpose of the operation. The mission statement should be stated in terms of the “who, what, when, where, and why” of the operation.

3. Execution

a. **Overall Concept.** State the broad concept (how) for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of participating elements during the operation as a whole:

- (1) Area organization (where will each organization operate).
- (2) Objectives of the overall plan.
- (3) Description of the phases or the major events of the plan (Examples: Phase I Deploy, Phase II Execute, Phase III Redeploy) and the desired end states.
- (4) Timing. Indicate the expected time periods of each phase. (Examples: Phase I, D-Day, D+45, or Phase I, March 29-May 15).

b. Phase I (Timing for Phase)

(1) **Operational Concept.** How participating organizations and supporting activities accomplish the objectives of this phase. Include operational objectives and detailed scheme of operations (actions) for the phase. Indicate lead and supporting LEAs required to do the job. Consider the role of supporting DOD forces and PN LEAs.

(2) **Tasks** of LEAs and other units participating in this phase (list each organization separately and list its tasks for this phase).

(3) **Forces Held in Reserve.** Location and composition. Explain any “be prepared” missions.

(4) **OPSEC.** Identify critical information, analyze enemy capabilities, analyze operational vulnerabilities, determine acceptable level of risk, and apply appropriate OPSEC countermeasures. Ensure foreign LEAs are considered in the analysis of enemy

capabilities as a potential insider threat capability. Use the JIPOE process to produce intelligence assessments, estimates, and other intelligence products.

(5) **Deception.** The purpose of deception is to induce enemy decision makers to take operational or tactical actions that are favorable to friendly objectives and exploitable by friendly forces. This paragraph should outline a concept of deception actions to induce adversaries to derive the desired appreciation and a supporting OPSEC concept. Also list intelligence, counterintelligence personnel, operational reports, and security monitoring feedback requirements and indicate the tasks to execute the concept. Again, the presence of foreign LEAs should be considered in crafting the deception plan.

(6) **MISO.** Describe any MISO that might support the objectives (outside the US homeland) in relation to the CD plan. Include current, refined, and approved MISO objectives (by program); potential target audiences; themes to stress and avoid; approval process; means of dissemination; and attribution methods.

c. **Phases II through Subsequent Phases.** Cite information as stated in subparagraph 3b above for each of the subsequent phases. Provide a separate phase for each step that may require a major reorganization of forces or another significant action.

d. **Coordinating Instructions.** General instructions applicable to two or more phases or multiple elements of the organization should be stated here.

4. Administration and Logistics

Draft a brief, broad paragraph describing how supplies, services, and other support will be provided. State the overall logistic objectives and priorities.

a. **Phase I** (Timing-same as Paragraph 3). Consider providing the following information:

(1) Logistic objectives and priorities for this phase of the plan.

(2) Supply aspects (include role of each LEA in providing supplies; consider any foreign participating LEAs).

(3) Contracted support (i.e., OCS).

(4) Base development (develop a base from which to provide supplies and services if required).

(5) Transportation. Include procedures for the detainment, security, and transportation of vessels, aircraft, contraband, crewmembers, and other detainees captured during the operation.

(6) Maintenance of equipment.

(7) Medical services.

(8) Personnel management (common procedure for staffing, accounting, reporting, and addressing other relevant issues).

(9) Administration (describe any administrative management procedures that impact the plan).

b. **Phases II through Subsequent Phases.** Cite information stated in subparagraph 4a above for each subsequent phase.

5. Command and Communications

a. **Command Relationships.** If using a lead agency concept, state the lead agency by phase. Give an overview of the command and coordination relationships for the entire plan, or for each phase, as appropriate. Indicate any shifts of command or lead agency contemplated during the plan, indicating the timing of the expected shift. These changes should be consistent with the operational phasing in paragraph 3. Give the location of commander and command posts. Provide information on succession procedures to be used if the commander or lead agency is out of action.

b. **Communications.** Provide a brief but comprehensive communications plan. (The communications plan may be contained in an annex.) Include the time zone or zones to be used; rendezvous, recognition, and identification instructions; and plans for using radio, telephone, and computer networks.

ANNEXES: As required

DISTRIBUTION:

(SECURITY CLASSIFICATION)

ANNEX B TO APPENDIX D REPORTS

1. General

Reports and reporting procedures standardize the flow of information needed to manage the CD effort. This annex provides information concerning report types and reporting procedures.

2. Types of Reports

a. **Spot Reports.** Spot (or law enforcement Alpha) reports inform designated organizations of emergent activities as quickly as possible to facilitate decision making. Information regarding a high interest vessel, its location, current physical description, and activities are important to operational and tactical commanders to determine a proper and efficient response based on a complete description of the on-scene situation. This is information that cannot be held until the next regular summary report and should lead to the generation of a spot report. Information contained in spot reports may be abbreviated and included in summary reports.

b. **Ad Hoc Reports.** Less formal, nonroutine reports are sometimes generated for quick tactical analytical or coordination purposes and may be sent by telephone, operator notes, or recorded messages.

c. **Serious Incident Reports.** A serious incident report should be sent in the event of the death or serious injury of a civilian or military participant in CD operations.

d. **After Action Reports and Lessons Learned.** CCMDs and other DOD organizations involved in CD operations should collect, analyze, and identify key observations, issues, and lessons learned and provide recommendations to improve ongoing and future operations. After action reports and approved observations, issues, and lessons learned should be submitted for inclusion in the Joint Lessons Learned Information System in accordance with the provisions of CJCSI 3150.25, *Joint Lessons Learned Program*.

3. Track of Interest Reporting Procedures

Within DOD, drug-related tracks of interest are entered into the Global Command and Control System, using a naming convention that identifies them as such, and become part of the COP. Regional coordinators (JIATF-S, JTF-N, or USNORTHCOM) assign the track identifier. The track identifier does not change if the track of interest moves through different regions.

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APPENDIX E

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS

1. General

a. CD operations require a cooperative approach to intelligence. As the national drug control effort has evolved, an increasing number of intelligence functions and activities have been established to support CD operations. Existing drug intelligence capabilities have been improved, and extensive DOD and foreign intelligence resources have been brought to bear on the problem.

b. DOD components and many LEAs have internal intelligence components that are structured and authorized to support their own missions and operations. There are also a number of national, theater, and law enforcement intelligence analysis centers with CD missions. Familiarity with these organizations is useful to understanding how intelligence support is provided to operators, planners, and policymakers. The principal CD intelligence organizations are described below.

2. National-Level Intelligence Organizations and Centers

a. **NGA.** NGA is a combat support agency, as well as a national intelligence organization. NGA is the primary source for geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) analysis and products at the national level. GEOINT is the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth. In addition to the GEOINT support identified in JP 2-03, *Geospatial Intelligence in Joint Operations*, NGA's mission supports national and homeland security, defense policy and force structure, and advanced weapons and systems development. Since NGA disseminates data and makes it available in repositories, GEOINT-trained personnel throughout much of the IC, including military intelligence personnel in the field, can access the data to develop their own GEOINT analysis and products. NGA works with commercial imagery vendors to procure diverse, unclassified imagery to better support its customers. This effort facilitates NGA's support to and collaborative efforts with multinational partners, other IC agencies, DOD organizations, and other civil and government entities.

b. The **Crime and Narcotics Center** was established by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to render analytical and operational support to the national CD effort. Its mission is to collect and analyze information on international CD trafficking and organized crime for policymakers and the law enforcement community. Strategic analysts focus on long-term trends and keep US policymakers up to speed on fast-breaking events. Targeting analysts use sophisticated tools to identify key individuals, organizations, trends, and components in criminal organizations. Operational support specialists and program managers provide fast-paced operational research, management, and support to colleagues overseas. The Crime and Narcotics Center is located at Central Intelligence Agency Headquarters in Langley, Virginia.

c. **DIA.** DIA provides timely, objective, and cogent military intelligence to warfighters, defense planners, and defense and national security policy makers.

(1) **DIA's Counter-Narcotics Trafficking Office** produces all-source intelligence analysis on worldwide drug issues, including DTOs; drug flow trends; and CD forces, policies, strategies, and performance. The office provides operational CD intelligence support to DOD elements performing drug D&M missions and to federal LEAs involved in drug interdiction operations. Other functional responsibilities include monitoring and supervising the accomplishment of all CD intelligence requirements, managing DOD support to the CD community's "Dragon Eye" document exploitation program, coordinating interagency assessment of cocaine movement, and providing functional oversight for CD collection management.

(2) **US defense attaché offices** are located within most embassies worldwide. The attachés within these offices provide valuable information on current IC collection requirements, including CD requirements. They also serve as the US military liaisons to their HN counterparts.

d. **DHS.** The Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) provides national-level intelligence support to DHS, as well as to state, local, and tribal governments and the private sector. The I&A also serves as the primary interface between state, local, and tribal governments, in addition to interfacing with the private sector and the national IC. In addition, the I&A provides direct intelligence support to the Border Security Initiative, including CD intelligence.

e. **National Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office.** The Director of National Intelligence created the National Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office to advance maritime intelligence integration, information sharing, and maritime domain awareness to foster unity of effort for decision advantage that protects the US, its allies, and partners against threats in or emanating from the global maritime domain.

f. **Office of Naval Intelligence.** The Transnational Threat Department provides fleet and national decision makers with in-depth knowledge of the maritime domain and the unique issues associated with it. Overlaying extensive maritime industry experience with cutting-edge operational intelligence analytic capabilities, department analysts are the community leaders in maritime counterproliferation, global maritime environment awareness, and counternarcotics analysis. Analysis of maritime strategic trade, infrastructure, cargo, and the Arctic environment enable decision making. Responsible for maintaining the nation's databases on merchant shipping, the department supports the USN, its partners, and the IC on all issues related to the positional data, physical characteristics, and history of more than 100,000 merchant ships operating worldwide.

g. **National Security Agency.** National Security Agency provides intelligence, secure communications, and cybersecurity advice to authorized military and drug LEAs. The National Security Agency headquarters is located at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland.

3. Theater Intelligence Centers

a. **The Joint Intelligence Operations Center, Pacific** is a joint military intelligence center responsible for theater intelligence support within the USINDOPACOM AOR. It provides all-source operational intelligence to USINDOPACOM, its military Service components, and JIATF-W. The Joint Intelligence Operations Center, Pacific is located at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii.

b. **The Joint Intelligence Operations Center, South** is a joint military intelligence center, located in Miami, Florida, responsible for theater intelligence support within the USSOUTHCOM AOR. The Joint Intelligence Operations Center, South provides all-source operational intelligence to USSOUTHCOM, its Service components, and JIATF-S.

c. Other unified and major commands involved with CD efforts will also leverage their respective joint intelligence operation centers for intelligence support. This support will be linked to the CD effort specific to the architecture in place for the command.

4. Joint and Interagency Support

a. The Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force Operation Panama Express is a continuing criminal investigation of cocaine trafficking and transportation organizations that operate out of Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela in South America; Panama, Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Guatemala in Central America; and Jamaica in the Caribbean. The operation is divided into two task forces with distinct responsibilities. Panama Express South focuses on maritime cocaine trafficking that transits the Eastern Pacific Ocean. Panama Express North concentrates on cocaine trafficking that transits the Caribbean Sea. Both of the Panama Express task forces provide actionable information to the JIATF-S and the entire CD community.

b. USSOUTHCOM, USINDOPACOM, and USNORTHCOM oversee regional JIATFs and JTFs that conduct CD operations within their respective AORs. Intelligence directorates within each JIATF and JTF are the focal points for tactical and operational intelligence support for DOD and LEA CD operations within the AOR.

(1) **JIATF-S (USSOUTHCOM).** The JIATF-S J-2 maintains a 24-hour intelligence watch in the joint operations command center, which provides real-time tactical intelligence to both DOD- and LEA-deployed D&M assets. The JIATF-S J-2 also operates an intelligence fusion center that provides indications and warning (predictive) and targeting intelligence in support of DOD D&M and LEA drug interdiction operations in the JIATF-S JOA. JIATF-S is located in Key West, Florida.

(2) **JIATF-W (USINDOPACOM).** The JIATF-W J-2 conducts strategic to tactical intelligence activities to promote interagency intelligence fusion, PN capacity development, and support to law enforcement. The JIATF-W J-2 operates an intelligence fusion center that provides monitors, indications and warnings (predictive), and targeting intelligence in support of DOD D&M and LEA interdiction operations. In addition, the J-2 identifies DTO and TCO vulnerabilities to assist US LEAs in targeting them for disruption and dismantlement. At the request of LEAs, JIATF-W also deploys intelligence

analysis to support US and PN LEAs for extended periods to counter drug-related activity in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region and the US. JIATF-W is located at Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii.

(3) **JTF-N (USNORTHCOM)** is tasked with supporting CD land operations in North America. The JTF-N J-2 operates a joint tactical intelligence center that provides all-source tactical and operational intelligence to LEA, DOD, and NG elements. JTF-N is located at Fort Bliss in El Paso, Texas. USNORTHCOM provides personnel to support Information Analysis Center at the US Embassy in Mexico City and other locations in Mexico.

(4) **TATs.** As part of the COM's country team, where assigned, TATs are the focal point of DOD CD intelligence support to the country team and PN CD forces. Their mission is to support the US country team and PN CD operations by providing tactical intelligence advice and assistance, targeting support, collection management, automated data processing support (including database management), and signals intelligence advice and assistance. TATs further assist the DEA by producing all-source intelligence analysis. TATs provide a direct link between the CD team operating within the PN and the D&M capability of DOD.

5. Law Enforcement Intelligence Organizations

a. **DEA, Office of Intelligence.** The DEA Office of Intelligence has both strategic and tactical intelligence capability, providing direct analytical support to DEA enforcement operations.

(1) DEA intelligence analysts are assigned to field division offices, selected domestic offices, and several foreign offices. These personnel support investigations, conduct strategic studies, and provide other intelligence services to DEA operations.

(2) **EPIC.** DEA established EPIC to provide operational and tactical drug interdiction intelligence to the law enforcement community. Its primary mission is to provide tactical operational intelligence to federal, state, and local LEAs in areas that relate to trafficking in drugs, weapons, aliens, and counterterrorism efforts. Surveillance and drug interdiction operations against drug shipments into the US are also supported by EPIC. It has its own proprietary database, as well as access to a variety of other law enforcement databases, thus functioning as a clearinghouse and conduit for law enforcement information. Only accredited representatives of state police agencies can access the EPIC database directly.

b. **USCG.** The USCG operates several intelligence centers that have CD missions.

(1) **Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center (CGICC).** The CGICC supports USCG CD programs with long-range, strategic, and operational intelligence production. It is the USCG's principal intelligence liaison element with other national and law enforcement intelligence centers and is collocated at the National Maritime Intelligence Center in Suitland, Maryland.

(2) **USCG Atlantic and Pacific Area Intelligence Staffs.** These staffs provide operational intelligence support to CD detection, monitoring, and drug interdiction operations in their respective operational areas. They are located in Portsmouth, Virginia, and Alameda, California.

(3) **USCG Atlantic and Pacific Area MIFCs.** The MIFCs collect and fuse information and intelligence from multiple sources and provide timely, accurate, and relevant intelligence to USCG operational and tactical commanders in support of all mission areas within their AOs. They complement the CGICC's strategic focus and support each USCG district intelligence officer, sector intelligence officer, and unit command intelligence officers', or collateral duty intelligence officers' (CDIOs') efforts, with the ultimate goal to support the National Strategy for Homeland Security.

(4) **USCG District Intelligence Staffs.** Under the leadership of the district chief of intelligence (also known as district intelligence officer), district intelligence staff members perform all phases of the intelligence process but emphasize planning and direction, analysis, and dissemination along with oversight of intelligence activities within their district. District intelligence staffs interact directly with regional intelligence and law enforcement elements and leverage national and regional interagency intelligence capabilities to support law enforcement field activities. The district chief of intelligence is the CGICC regional representative to coordinate and manage all intelligence activities within their district, including USCG interaction with DHS I&A intelligence staff at state and local fusion centers.

(5) **USCG Sector Intelligence Staffs.** Sector intelligence staff members perform all phases of the intelligence process but particularly emphasize collection, analysis, and dissemination. Sector intelligence staffs interact directly with local intelligence and law enforcement elements and also leverage national and regional interagency intelligence capabilities via the district intelligence staff. The sector intelligence staff capitalizes on the USCG's unique maritime access to obtain information of potential intelligence value. They draft and compile maritime-related intelligence collection requirements, collect on them, and brief them to response, prevention, planning, and other sector personnel. In addition, the staff members, as part of the law enforcement intelligence element, collect information during law enforcement and regulatory activities, as well as through conducting site exploitation.

(6) **USCG CDIOs.** CDIOs are the CGICC's direct representatives at units without an assigned command intelligence officer and are responsible for all the intelligence tasks within the command, with a primary focus on collection and dissemination. CDIOs receive guidance and direction from the servicing district or sector intelligence staff; however, they report directly to the commanding officer or officer-in-charge, who is ultimately responsible for the unit's intelligence efforts, for unit-specific intelligence matters. The CDIO's primary responsibility is to ensure the command and crews have the intelligence products readily available to conduct operations at the unit level and to facilitate the collection and reporting of information that may be of intelligence value to that command and the CGICC.

(7) **Coast Guard Counterintelligence Service (CGCIS).** CGCIS serves as the USCG's full-spectrum counterintelligence and human intelligence organization. As part of its mission, CGCIS counters the intelligence collection efforts of TCOs, as well as leveraging their collection capabilities in support of USCG CD efforts. Headquartered in Washington, DC, CGCIS has agents in each USCG district.

(8) **Center for Interagency Maritime Intelligence.** The Seventh USCG District operates an intelligence center in its Miami, Florida, headquarters. It is manned by USCG personnel with liaison personnel from several agencies including DOD, CBP, ICE, Florida Department of Law Enforcement, and Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission. The Center for Interagency Maritime Intelligence serves as a fusion center for current, all-source tactical law enforcement intelligence that is provided to the DOD and LEA operational units.

c. **DHS.** DHS operates multiple intelligence centers that support CD missions.

(1) **CBP Office of Intelligence and Investigative Liaison.** The CBP Office of Intelligence and Investigative Liaison is responsible for supporting the investigation and inspection requirements of the agency and produces operational and tactical intelligence that supports CBP drug interdiction and apprehension efforts.

(2) The DHS I&A's Border Intelligence Fusion Section (BIFS) provides US law enforcement, border enforcement, and investigative agencies with multi-source intelligence and law enforcement information to support investigations, drug interdictions, and other law enforcement operations related to the Southwest border. BIFS is a joint, collaborative effort of DHS, the Department of Justice, DOD, and partners in the IC and as a multi-source/all-threats intelligence section at EPIC. BIFS accesses and analyzes intelligence and information received by and developed at EPIC to produce a common intelligence picture and COP.

APPENDIX F

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

1. General

This appendix provides guidance for DOD public affairs (PA) support for CD operations. As a matter of policy, and consistent with the security requirements necessary to minimize operational risks, DOD PA efforts should keep DOD personnel and the public informed about its CD mission. Well-coordinated command messages and effectively executed PA plans minimize risks associated with the release of sensitive information or misinformation about CD operations. Communication activities should be fully integrated in command operational planning and execution processes, so there is consistency in intent or effect between command actions and information disseminated about those actions. While audiences and intent may at times differ, the LFA, through communication synchronization, should ensure planning for PA is coordinated to make certain consistent themes and messages are communicated that support the overall USG objectives.

2. Organization

The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ATSD[PA]) provides overall PA guidance for CD operations and coordinates DOD PA actions affecting other countries and international organizations. Close coordination must be maintained at all levels with the US embassy concerned when operating in HNs. At the local and regional level, CD JIATF or JTF public affairs offices (PAOs) (or their equivalents) coordinate PA actions with the appropriate CCCR PAOs, which will in turn maintain contact with their ATSD(PA) counterparts.

3. Guidance

The following guidance is provided for CD operations:

- a. ATSD(PA) approves all invitations for news media to participate with operational CD missions.
- b. Requests received by Service component PA organizations should be referred to the appropriate CCMD PAO to develop the request for approval consideration by ATSD(PA).
- c. For specific CD deployments requiring CJCS deployment orders, the supported CCCR proposes specific PA guidance as part of the request for deployment order. Topics to be covered include:
 - (1) Proposed public announcement of deployment.
 - (2) Proposed questions and answers.
 - (3) PA point of contact and phone number at all levels in the chain of command.

d. All PA actions will be in accordance with applicable DOD and CCDR directives, unless specifically stated otherwise.

e. Specific units participating in CD operations should not be identified.

f. The agency or organization that actually accomplishes the seizure or arrest will normally make the announcement of the investigation, seizure, or arrest. Such announcements will indicate that the operation was a “coordinated federal effort” and will list participation of the agencies, units, and organizations following coordination with each. DOD components should not unilaterally make announcements of investigations, seizures, or arrests. PA officers from the various agencies that make up the JIATF and other federal agency PA officers must make a concerted effort to work together and create joint communications plans designed to keep the media and American public informed about the current state of the CD mission. In the event of a conflict between lead agency and PA doctrine, PA officers should defer to the policies of the designated “lead” agency or agency that made the arrest and seizure.

g. Certain training mission activities may be covered by the media. Media requests to cover training activities should be referred to the appropriate commander’s PAO. Prior to coverage, the PAO should coordinate with other agencies involved and address any existing security considerations.

h. Interviews with the media may be granted by the supported CCDR or a subordinate JFC when the following criteria are met:

(1) All interviews should be with the commander or his designated representative.

(2) All interviews should be on the record.

(3) Interviewees should discuss information within their personal purviews and experience. The discussion of additional subjects should be in accordance with published guidance.

(4) The PAO will coordinate with the OPSEC program manager to ensure the information program addresses OPSEC and ground rules for the release of information. Information given to media representatives must be consistent with national security and OPSEC and must respect the privacy of the LEAs.

(5) The commander’s PAO should be included in the planning and conduct of all interviews.

(6) Interviewees should not answer hypothetical questions and should not comment on matters pertaining to other US federal, state, and local organizations and agencies or the military, police, or security forces of other nations.

(7) A summary of controversial interview discussions and notification of interview results that might require ATSD(PA) response should be provided through appropriate command channels to ATSD(PA).

i. DOD components should not release information about investigations, seizures, or arrests prior to the announcement by the agency or organization that actually made the seizure or arrest. After the initial announcement, release of information will be coordinated with ATSD(PA) through the chain of command.

j. Release of information concerning accidents and incidents involving DOD units participating in CD operations should be coordinated through the supported CCDR's JIATF PA officer, and ATSD(PA).

k. Joint press conferences may be organized by federal, state, and local LEAs following a drug seizure or arrest where DOD was involved. Criteria for participation in such a press conference are the same as that for interviews listed in paragraph 3.h.

l. Internal release of information is subject to the same strict guidelines as material being considered for public release. Moreover, if it is later decided to publicly release the tape or tapes, they will first be cleared by the US attorney handling the case. Videotapes are considered evidence by the US attorney.

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APPENDIX G

LAW ENFORCEMENT DETACHMENTS

1. General

USN ships contribute to D&M operations, as they are frequently in a position to intercept maritime drug smugglers. Because DOD does not directly participate in maritime law enforcement boardings, USCG personnel are frequently embarked on USN and allied ships as prescribed in Title 10 USC, Section 279.

2. Command Relationships

Existing MOAs between USN fleet commanders and Commander, USCG, Atlantic, area govern LEDET procedures. Under these MOAs, the USN fleet commanders and the USCG area commanders provide ships and cutters to operate under TACON of JIATFs in support of their D&M mission. The USCG deploys LEDET aboard USN ships to perform law enforcement activities. JIATF holds periodic scheduling conferences to match D&M requirements and schedule USN ships with USCG LEDET and USCG cutters. JIATFs to which USN vessels and USCG cutters are allocated for D&M operation coordinate the shift of TACON to the USCG when required for the conduct of drug interdiction and apprehension. Boarding actions that involve LEAs are conducted in accordance with USCG law enforcement procedures and policy, including use of force policy. USN visit, board, search, and seizure personnel may augment a USCG boarding team under the direction of the boarding officer and LEDET team leader. When carrying a LEDET, USN ships display the USCG ensign when conducting law enforcement operations under TACON of the USCG. The USCG ensign should be illuminated at night.

3. Availability of Ships

GCCs make USN ships available in support of USCG law enforcement operations. These ships are categorized as either “specially designated” or “ships of opportunity.”

a. **Specially Designated.** Specially designated (or dedicated) ships are under TACON of the JIATF in direct support of CD operations and shift to TACON under the USCG to conduct law enforcement interceptions and apprehensions.

b. **Ships of Opportunity.** USN ships of opportunity are not predesignated for CD operations and are not under the control of a JIATF or USCG command but are operating in or transiting through possible drug trafficking areas. These ships may be diverted to conduct D&M operations under the TACON of the JIATF and then switch TACON to the USCG for the drug interdiction and apprehension.

4. Assignments

A LEDET is normally an 8- to 10-person team assigned on a temporary basis to US or foreign military vessels. The LEDET consists of a deployable team leader (DTL), who is an E-7 through O-3 assigned to serve as the command maritime law enforcement advisor for the host commanding officer, a boarding officer (E-4 or above), and boarding team

members. While assigned to a USN or allied ship, LEDET activities are governed by the MOAs signed between the USCG and the respective USN fleet commander and allied governments.

a. **DTL.** The DTL advises the USN commanding officer on USCG policies, maritime law enforcement procedures, and monitoring and drug interdiction maneuvering and should be considered the onboard authority on maritime law enforcement. During boardings, the DTL directs all searches and makes all enforcement decisions. The DTL advises on which vessels to board, makes law enforcement decisions, coordinates USN vessel support for the boarding party during boarding operations, provides guidance to the boarding officer, and is responsible for all law enforcement message traffic. The DTL is also a qualified boarding officer who possesses at least a SECRET clearance.

b. **Boarding Officer.** The duties of a LEDET boarding officer are the same as any other USCG boarding officer. Boarding officers are responsible to the DTL for the safety and conduct of the boarding party and will be guided by current USCG policies in executing these responsibilities. The boarding officer is certified by their USCG commanding officer who has at least a SECRET clearance.

c. **Boarding Team Members.** The remainder of the LEDET should consist of five certified boarding team members.

d. **Specialty Billets.** Each LEDET should have at least one person designated as an interpreter and at least two personnel qualified in accordance with current naval air training operating procedures standardization requirements as helicopter special-mission passengers (including 9D5 multiple egress Navy "Dunker" training). When USN AUF-capable helicopters are embarked, each LEDET shall have at least one person qualified as an AUF controller and one person qualified as a precision marksman-aviation.

More detailed guidance is found in the Commandant Instruction (COMDTINST) M16247.1, Coast Guard Maritime Law Enforcement Manual, and Navy Warfare Publication 3-07.4/COMDTINST M16247.4, Counterdrug and Alien Migration Interdiction Operations.

APPENDIX H POINTS OF CONTACT

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Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC)

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E-mail: nwdc_nrfk_fleet_pubs@navy.mil

APPENDIX J REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-07.4 is based upon the following references:

1. General

- a. *National Drug Control Strategy*.
- b. National Security Presidential Directive-25, *International Drug Control Policy*.
- c. EO 12978, *Blocking Assets and Prohibiting Transactions with Significant Narcotics Traffickers*.
- d. EO 12333, *United States Intelligence Activities*.
- e. *National Interdiction Command and Control Plan*.
- f. Title 10, USC.
- g. Title 14, USC.
- h. Title 18, USC.
- i. Title 22, USC
- j. Title 31, USC, Sections 1535 and 1536 (Economy Act).
- k. Title 32, USC.
- l. *Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime*.
- m. NGA National System for Geospatial-Intelligence Manual Feasibility Assessment 1806, *Domestic Imagery*, May 2011.

2. Department of Defense Publications

- a. DODD 4500.09E, *Transportation and Traffic Management*.
- b. DODD 5132.03, *DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation*.
- c. DODD 5200.27, *Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations Not Affiliated with the Department of Defense*.
- d. DODD 5200.31E, *DOD Military Working Dog (MWD) Program*.
- e. DODD 5205.02E, *DOD Operations Security (OPSEC) Program*.

- f. DODD 5205.14, *DOD Counter Threat Finance (CTF) Policy*.
- g. DODD 5230.09, *Clearance of DOD Information for Public Release*.
- h. DODD 5230.11, *Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations*.
- i. DODD 5240.01, *DOD Intelligence Activities*.
- j. DODI 1000.17, *Detail of DOD Personnel To Duty Outside the Department of Defense*.
- k. DODI 1304.23, *Acquisition and Use of Criminal History Record Information for Military Recruiting Purposes*.
- l. DODI 2000.12, *DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Program*.
- m. DODI 2205.02, *Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Activities*.
- n. DODI 3025.21, *Defense Support of Civil Law Enforcement Agencies*.
- o. DODI O-3607.02, *Military Information Support Operations (MISO)*.
- p. DODI 5210.02, *Access to and Dissemination of Restricted Data and Formerly Restricted Data*.
- q. DODI 5240.04, *Counterintelligence (CI) Investigations*.
- r. DODI 8523.01, *Communications Security (COMSEC)*.
- s. DODM 5200.01, Volume 1, *DOD Information Security Program: Overview, Classification, and Declassification*.
- t. DODM 5240.01, *Procedures Governing the Conduct of DOD Intelligence Activities*.
- u. DOD 5240.1-R, *Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons*.
- v. Deputy Secretary of Defense Policy Memorandum 15-002, *Guidance for the Domestic Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems*.

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications

- a. CJCSI 3110.05F, *Military Information Support Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*.
- b. CJCSI 3121.01B, (U) *Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces*.

- c. CJCSI 3150.25F, *Joint Lessons Learned Program*.
- d. CJCSI 3210.06A, *Irregular Warfare*.
- e. CJCSI 3710.01B, *DOD Counterdrug Support*.
- f. CJCSI 3920.02B, *Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Activity Program*.
- g. CJCSM 3130.03, *Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) System, Planning Formats and Guidance*.
- h. CJCSM 3701.01C, *(U) Classification Guide for Counterdrug Information*.
- i. CJCSM 4301.01, *Planning Operational Contract Support*.
- j. JP 1-0, *Joint Personnel Support*.
- k. JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence*.
- l. JP 2-01, *Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations*.
- m. JP 2-01.2, *Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence in Joint Operations (U)*.
- n. JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*.
- o. JP 3-03, *Joint Interdiction*.
- p. JP 3-05, *Special Operations*.
- q. JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Cooperation*
- r. JP 3-13.2, *Military Information Support Operations*.
- s. JP 3-13, *Information Operations*
- t. JP 3-13.3, *Operations Security*.
- u. JP 3-13.4, *Military Deception*.
- v. JP 3-17, *Air Mobility Operations*.
- w. JP 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense*.
- x. JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*.
- y. JP 3-25, *Countering Threat Networks*.
- z. JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*.
- aa. JP 3-34, *Joint Engineer Operations*.

- bb. JP 3-50, *Personnel Recovery*.
- cc. JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*.
- dd. JP 4-0, *Joint Logistics*.
- ee. JP 4-01, *The Defense Transportation System*.
- ff. JP 4-02, *Joint Health Services*.
- gg. JP 4-10, *Operational Contract Support*.
- hh. JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*.
- ii. JP 6-0, *Joint Communications System*.

4. Service Publications

- a. COMDTINST M16240.1, *Law Enforcement Detachment (LEDET) Administrative and Operating Guidelines*.
- b. COMDTINST M16247.1, *Maritime Law Enforcement Manual*.
- c. COMDTINST M16247.4/Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 3-07.4M, *Maritime Counterdrug and Alien Migrant Interdiction Operations*.
- d. NTTP 3-07.11M/Coast Guard Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-93.3/Marine Corps Interim Publication 3-33.04, *Visit, Board, Search and Seizure Operations*.
- e. Marine Corps Tactical Publication 3-02A, *Marine Air, Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Network Engagement Activities*.
- f. Army Techniques Publication 5-0.6, *Network Engagement*.

5. Other

- CNGBI 3100.01A, *National Guard Counterdrug Support*.

APPENDIX K

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication using the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at: https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mail it to: js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

a. The lead agent for this publication is the US Coast Guard Office of Counter Terrorism & Defense Operations Policy (CG-ODO). The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3).

b. The following staff, in conjunction with the joint doctrine development community, made a valuable contribution to the revision of this joint publication: lead agent, Mr. Peter Fejeran, US Coast Guard; Joint Staff doctrine sponsor, LtCol Stanley Medykowski, Joint Staff J-35; Joint Doctrine Analysis Division action officer, LtCol Brian Mullery, Joint Staff J-7; and Joint Doctrine action officer, Lt Col Mark Newell, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Doctrine Division.

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-07.4, *Counterdrug Operations*, 14 August 2013.

4. Change Recommendations

a. To provide recommendations for urgent and/or routine changes to this publication, please complete the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at: https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mail it to: js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

5. Lessons Learned

The Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) primary objective is to enhance joint force readiness and effectiveness by contributing to improvements in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy. The Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) is the DOD system of record for lessons learned and facilitates the collection, tracking, management, sharing, collaborative resolution, and dissemination of lessons learned to improve the development and readiness

of the joint force. The JLLP integrates with joint doctrine through the joint doctrine development process by providing lessons and lessons learned derived from operations, events, and exercises. As these inputs are incorporated into joint doctrine, they become institutionalized for future use, a major goal of the JLLP. Lessons and lessons learned are routinely sought and incorporated into draft JPs throughout formal staffing of the development process. The JLLIS Website can be found at <https://www.jllis.mil> (NIPRNET) or <http://www.jllis.smil.mil> (SIPRNET).

6. Distribution of Publications

Local reproduction is authorized, and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must be IAW DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 1, *DOD Information Security Program: Overview, Classification, and Declassification*, and DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 3, *DOD Information Security Program: Protection of Classified Information*.

7. Distribution of Electronic Publications

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are available on JDEIS Joint Electronic Library Plus (JEL+) at <https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp> (NIPRNET) and <https://jdeis.js.smil.mil/jdeis/index.jsp> (SIPRNET), and on the JEL at <http://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/> (NIPRNET).

b. Only approved JPs are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Defense attachés may request classified JPs by sending written requests to Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, Washington, DC 20340-5100.

c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs. This JEL CD-ROM will be updated not less than semi-annually and when received can be locally reproduced for use within the combatant commands, Services, and combat support agencies.

GLOSSARY

PART I—ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND INITIALISMS

AA	avenue of approach
AC	Active Component
AMOC	Air and Marine Operations Center (DHS)
AO	area of operations
AOI	area of interest
AOR	area of responsibility
APEX	Adaptive Planning and Execution
ATSD(PA)	Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
AUF	airborne use of force
BEST	border enforcement security task force
BIFS	Border Intelligence Fusion Section (DHS)
C2	command and control
CA	civil affairs
CAMOC	Caribbean Air and Marine Operations Center
CBP	Customs and Border Protection (DHS)
CCDB	consolidated counterdrug database
CCDR	combatant commander
CCMD	combatant command
CCP	combatant command campaign plan
CD	counterdrug
CDIO	collateral duty intelligence officer
CDIPO	counterdrug intelligence preparation for operations
CDRUSINDOPACOM	Commander, United States Indo-Pacific Command
CDRUSNORTHCOM	Commander, United States Northern Command
CDRUSSOCOM	Commander, United States Special Operations Command
CDRUSSOUTHCOM	Commander, United States Southern Command
CGCIS	Coast Guard Counterintelligence Service
CGICC	Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
CJCSM	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
CMO	civil-military operations
CNGBI	Chief, National Guard Bureau instruction
COCOM	combatant command (command authority)
COM	chief of mission
COMDTINST	Commandant instruction (USCG)
CONOPS	concept of operations
CONUS	continental United States
COP	common operational picture
CTF	counter threat finance
CTN	countering threat networks

Glossary

D&M	detection and monitoring
DASD(CN>)	Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Global Threats
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration (DOJ)
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DLEA	drug law enforcement agency
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense directive
DODI	Department of Defense instruction
DODM	Department of Defense manual
DOS	Department of State
DTL	deployable team leader
DTO	drug trafficking organization
EO	executive order
EPIC	El Paso Intelligence Center
EU	European Union
Europol	European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation
FHA	foreign humanitarian assistance
FID	foreign internal defense
GCC	geographic combatant commander
GEF	Guidance for Employment of the Force
GEOINT	geospatial intelligence
GSR	ground surveillance radar
HCA	humanitarian and civic assistance
HN	host nation
HNS	host-nation support
I&A	Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS)
IBET	integrated border enforcement team
IC	intelligence community
ICE	Immigration and Customs Enforcement (DHS)
INL	Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (DOS)
J-2	intelligence directorate of a joint staff
JFC	joint force commander
JIACG	joint interagency coordination group
JIATF	joint interagency task force

JIATF-S	Joint Interagency Task Force-South
JIATF-W	Joint Interagency Task Force-West
JIPOE	joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment
JOA	joint operations area
JP	joint publication
JPP	joint planning process
JTF	joint task force
JTF-E	Joint Task Force-East (DHS)
JTF-I	Joint Task Force-Investigations (DHS)
JTF-N	Joint Task Force-North
JTF-W	Joint Task Force-West (DHS)
LEA	law enforcement agency
LEDET	law enforcement detachment (USCG)
LFA	lead federal agency
MAOC-N	Maritime Analysis and Operations Center-Narcotics
MCA	military civic action
MIFC	maritime intelligence fusion center (USCG)
MISO	military information support operations
MOA	memorandum of agreement
MOE	measure of effectiveness
MOP	measure of performance
MOU	memorandum of understanding
MWD	military working dog
NAI	named area of interest
NDAA	national defense authorization act
NDCS	National Drug Control Strategy
NG	National Guard
NGA	National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NGB	National Guard Bureau
NGCDP	National Guard Counterdrug Program
NGCDP-State	National Guard Counterdrug Program-state
NG JFHQ-State	National Guard joint force headquarters-state
NICCP	National Interdiction Command and Control Plan
nm	nautical mile
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defense Command
NTTP	Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures
OCS	operational contract support
OE	operational environment
OFAC	Office of Foreign Assets Control (Treasury)

Glossary

OPLAN	operation plan
OPORD	operation order
OPSEC	operations security
PA	public affairs
PAO	public affairs office
PCA	Posse Comitatus Act
PN	partner nation
POE	port of entry
PR	personnel recovery
PSI	Proliferation Security Initiative
RC	Reserve Component
RNIFC	Regional Narcotics Interagency Fusion Cell (USCENTCOM)
ROE	rules of engagement
RUF	rules for the use of force
SA	security assistance
SBACP	Southern Border and Approaches Campaign Plan (DHS)
SecDef	Secretary of Defense
SECSTATE	Secretary of State
SELEC	Southeast European Law Enforcement Center
SJA	staff judge advocate
SOF	special operations forces
TACON	tactical control
TAT	tactical analysis team
TCO	transnational criminal organization
TMM	transregional, multi-domain, and multifunctional
TOC	transnational organized crime
UAS	unmanned aircraft system
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USA	United States Army
USAF	United States Air Force
USAFRICOM	United States Africa Command
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USC	United States Code
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USEUCOM	United States European Command
USG	United States Government
USINDOPACOM	United States Indo-Pacific Command
USMC	United States Marine Corps

USN	United States Navy
USNORTHCOM	United States Northern Command
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
USSOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command
VEO	violent extremist organization

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

arrival zone. In counterdrug operations, the area in or adjacent to the United States where smuggling concludes and domestic distribution begins (by air, an airstrip; by sea, an offload point on land or transfer to small boats). (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

controlled substance. A drug or other substance, or immediate precursor, included in Schedule I, II, III, IV, or V of the Controlled Substances Act. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

counterdrug. Those active measures taken to detect, monitor, and counter the production, trafficking, and use of illicit drugs. Also called **CD**. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

counterdrug activities. Those measures taken to detect, interdict, disrupt, or curtail any activity that is reasonably related to illicit drug trafficking. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-07.4)

counterdrug operational support. Support to host nations and drug law enforcement agencies involving military personnel and their associated equipment, provided by the geographic combatant commanders from forces assigned to them or made available to them by the Services for this purpose. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-07.4)

counterdrug operations. Civil or military actions taken to reduce or eliminate illicit drug trafficking. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-07.4)

country team. The senior, in-country, United States coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the United States diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented United States department or agency, as desired by the chief of the United States diplomatic mission. Also called **CT**. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-07.4)

Department of Defense support to counterdrug operations. Support provided by the Department of Defense to law enforcement agencies to detect, monitor, and counter the production, trafficking, and use of illicit drugs. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

drug interdiction. A continuum of events focused on interrupting illicit drugs smuggled by air, sea, or land. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

narcoterrorism. Terrorism that is linked to illicit drug trafficking. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-07.4)

Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force. The network of regional task forces that coordinates federal law enforcement efforts to combat the national and international organizations that cultivate, process, and distribute illicit drugs. Also called **OCDETF**. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-07.4)

seizures. In counterdrug operations, includes drugs and conveyances seized by law enforcement authorities and drug-related assets confiscated based on evidence that they have been derived from or used in illicit narcotics activities. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

source zone. In counterdrug operations, an identified geographic area for growing and/or the primary processing of the agricultural/synthetic components for illicit drugs, and where the trafficking process begins. (Approved for inclusion in the DOD Dictionary.)

suspect. 1. In counterdrug operations, a track of interest where correlating information actually ties the track of interest to alleged illicit drug operations. 2. An identity applied to a track that is potentially hostile because of its characteristics, behavior, origin, or nationality. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)


tracking. Precise and continuous position-finding of targets by radar, optical, or other means. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-07.4)

track of interest. In counterdrug operations, contacts that meet the initial identification criteria applicable in the area where the contacts are detected. Also called **TOI**. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-07.4)


transit zone. In illicit trafficking, the path taken by smugglers between the source and the arrival zones, and does not include distribution. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

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JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY



All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. **Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.4** is in the **Operations** series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:







DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION DIVISION
1155 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1155

FEB 07 2020

Ref: 19-F-0782

Steven Aftergood
Federation of American Scientists
1112 16th Street NW
Suite 400
Washington, DC 20036

Dear Mr. Aftergood:

This is the final response to your February 15, 2019 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, a copy of which is enclosed for your convenience. We received your request on February 15, 2019 and assigned it case number 19-F-0782. We ask that you use this number when referring to your request.

The Joint Staff, a component of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), conducted a search of their records systems and provided the enclosed documents, totaling 126 pages, determined to be responsive to your request. These records are appropriate for release in their entirety, without excision.

This constitutes a full grant of your request, and closes your case file in this office. There are no assessable fees associated with this response.

If you have any questions or concerns about the foregoing or about the processing of your request, please do not hesitate to contact Michael Coen at Michael.e.coen2.civ@mail.mil or (571) 372-0413.

Sincerely,


Stephanie L. Carr
Chief

Enclosures:
As stated