1. Purpose

This chapter incorporates intelligence theory, concepts, and operating experience into principles that will contribute to effective and successful joint operations. The principles are offered as guidelines for developing intelligence and using it in determining, planning, and conducting joint warfare. The principles also have implications for the preparation and readiness for operations other than war. They highlight the importance of interoperability among C4I technical capabilities, procedures, and information. Joint operations demand composite views of ongoing activity in or on land, sea, air, and space.

2. The Central Principle--Know the Adversary

a. The fundamental responsibility of intelligence is to provide decisionmakers at all levels of command the fullest possible understanding of the adversary. This understanding includes a sophisticated knowledge of the adversary's goals, objectives, strategy, intentions, capabilities, methods of operation, vulnerabilities, and sense of value and loss. The J-2 must understand the adversary's character, culture, social norms, customs and traditions, language, and history. Understanding how an adversary will conceptualize the situation, the options to be considered, and how the adversary will react to our actions should be an inextricable part of a continuing interaction of the intelligence staff with the JFC and other staff elements. This comprehensive understanding is essential to (1) recognizing challenges to our national security interest; (2) establishing security policy; (3) when appropriate, formulating relevant and attainable military objectives and strategy; (4) determining, planning, and conducting operations that will help attain US policy objectives, and (5) identifying the adversary's strategic and operational centers of gravity.

b. The J-2 and intelligence staff must develop and continuously refine their ability to think like the adversary. They must offer this particular expertise for the maximum benefit f the JFC, joint staff elements, and joint force components. The JFC should require the J-2 to assess all proposed actions from this perspective, "How will the adversary likely perceive this action, and what are the adversary's probable responses?" Carrying out these intelligence responsibilities calls for sound judgment as well as expertise.

Julius Caesar (101-44 BC) describes the intelligence gathering process he employed in preparation for his first landing in Britain in 55 BC:

Summer was now drawing to a close, and winter sets in rather early in these parts, as Gaul lies wholly in northern latitudes. Nevertheless I hurried on preparations for an expedition to Britain, knowing that Britain had rendered assistance to the enemy in nearly all my Gallic campaigns. Although it was too late in the year for military operations I thought it would be a great advantage merely to have visited the island, to have seen what kind of people the inhabitants were, and to have learned something about the country with its harbours and landing places. Of all this the Gauls knew virtually nothing; for no one except traders makes the journey with any regularity, and even their knowledge is limited to the sea coast immediately facing Gaul. Interviews with numerous merchants elicited nothing as to the size of the island, the names and strength of the native tribes, their military and civil organization, or the harbours which might accommodate a large fleet. Nevertheless it seemed essential to obtain this information before risking an expedition, and Caius Volusenus appeared to me the best man for the job. He traveled in a warship with orders to make a general reconnaissance and report back as early as possible. Meanwhile the whole army moved into Artois, where the mainland is nearest to the coast of Britain; and ships were ordered to assemble there from all neighbouring districts, including the fleet which had been built last year for the Venetian campaign. Meanwhile, however, some traders revealed our plans to the Britons, and a number of tribes sent envoys promising hostages and offering their submission. They were received in audience, promised generous terms, and urged to abide by their undertaking. They were accompanied on their return journey by Commius, whom I had appointed ruler of the Atrebates after the subjugation of that people, and of whose honour, discretion, and loyalty I had received abundant proof. Commius was greatly respected in Britain, and his orders were to visit all the states he could, impressing on them the advantages of Roman protection, and to announce my impending arrival. Volusenus completed his survey as far as e was able without disembarking and risking a hostile reception from the natives. Five days later he returned and made his report....

3. JFC is Responsible for Intelligence Support to Operations

See Figure IV-1.

The JFC determines the strategic and operational objectives for the theater of operations. The J-2 determines the intelligence requirements and direction of the intelligence effort in support of the JFC's objectives. The intelligence effort is critical to the mission. Its nature, orientation, and scope depend on the commander's decision on the relative importance of intelligence in accomplishing the mission. The J-2 should refine the concept of intelligence operations to reflect changes in the commander's mission, estimate of the situation, and objectives. JFCs, with their J-2s, must ensure that intelligence objectives are correct, adequately stated, understood, synchronized, prioritized, and translated into actions that will provide the intelligence needed to accomplish the mission. Intelligence actions must be synchronized with other warfare disciplines to ensure integrated and responsive support throughout all phases of the operation. Acquiring intelligence is the responsibility of the commander. Commanders, J-3s, J-2s, and intelligence staffs developing strategy and operations and assigning mission responsibilities have the earliest view of intelligence requirements and the intelligence efforts that must commence at the inception of operations and missions. The determination of strategy and operations becomes the beginning point for intelligence needed to attain military objectives. It is at these earliest determinations that senior intelligence staffs must understand the combat intelligence requirements both for their commands and their subordinate commands, identify the commands and forces' organic intelligence capabilities and shortfalls, access theater and/or national systems to cover shortfalls, and ensure intelligence is provided or available to those who need it. This command responsibility also includes planning for logistic support to C4I, intelligence personnel, and equipment. Assignment of appropriate movement priority within the TPFDL is essential to ensuring that required intelligence support will be available when needed to support joint operations.

Figure IV-1. Basic Ingelligence Princples

4. Synchronize Intelligence With Operations

The commander should require, and the J-2 should ensure, that all intelligence activities, assets, and disciplines are applied in time, space, and purpose to support optimally the JFC's operation plan. This synchronization process occurs across the range of military operations to provide timely, objective, tailored, complete, accurate, and relevant intelligence to achieve assigned operational objectives. This integration of intelligence and operations ensures the totality of effort against the adversary's centers of gravity (see Joint Pub 1, "Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States," Joint Pub 2-01, "Joint Intelligence Support to Operations," and Joint Pub 2-02, "National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations"). The product of effective synchronization is maximum use of every resource, including intelligence assets, where and when it will make the greatest contribution to success. Appendix A "Intelligence Synchronization," contains an illustrative example of intelligence synchronization with operations.

5. Use the Same Approach for Operations Other Than War and War

Military intelligence systems should be single structures for warfighting support and be able to provide intelligence support for any military operation throughout the range of military operations. Warfighting intelligence structures of resources, methodologies, and products should be established, viable, exercised, and operational in peacetime to be available in any type of conflict and for any form of operation. Although it is recognized that intelligence organizations, particularly JICs and JISEs, will expand according to need, the concept of dual peacetime and wartime structures does not support the principle of "readiness" for all potential operations. Dual intelligence structures for peace and war require difficult and time-consuming transitions in critical situations.

6. The J-2 Should Participate From the Outset

The J-2 should participate in decision and planning processe from the initial point when operations are contemplated or directed. Effective intelligence support requires a two-way flow of essential information. The J-2 should be collocated with the JFC and function as a full member of the staff to provide the commander with the best possible view of the situation and adversary and to identify, develop, and disseminate the intelligence needed to support operations. The J-2 should apprise the JFC whether adequate intelligence can be made available for the campaigns, operations, and courses of action being considered.

7. Ensure Unity of Intelligence Effort

a. For a particular area of interest, there should be unity of intelligence effort to ensure complete, accurate, and current intelligence to develop the best possible understanding of the adversary and the situation, and to reduce unnecessary redundancy and duplication.

b. JFCs have the responsibility and authority to determine, direct, and coordinate all mission-related collection and analysis through centralized or apportioned collection and production management efforts. When liaison personnel are provided by national intelligence and/or combat support agencies, the J-2 should integrate their efforts with the JIC/JISE. These liaison personnel are normally organized into a national intelligence support team (NIST) and support the JFC as an integral part of the J-2 organization (see Joint Pub 2-02, "National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations," for NIST details). Access to intelligence capabilities to support mission responsibilities must be without regard to organization or command configurations. This approach allows the commander and J-2 to orchestrate pertinent intelligence activities to meet joint force intelligence requirements.

c. The JFC should have assured access to all necessary national and theater intelligence capabilities. If higher priority or competing tasks preclude optimum support to the JFC, that commander and the senior commander assigning the mission must be informed so they may make timely and alternative provision for intelligence or assess the effects of gaps in intelligence to the operation.

d. Subordinate commanders employ organic intelligence capabilities to support their assigned missions. At the same time, those capabilities must be available to assist the joint effort under the J-2's concept of synchronizing all forces' intelligence requirements. The J-2 must establish a flexible and tailored architecture of procedures, organizations, and equipment focused on the joint commander's needs. This intelligence system of systems complements and reinforces the organic capabilities at each echelon and, when necessary, provides direct support to subordinate commanders whose organic capabilities cannot be brought to bear.

e. The keys to unity of intelligence effort for joint operations are ensured access to any needed mission-related intelligence capablity and coordination of all intelligence efforts in or about the area of interest. Cooperation of intelligence organizations is important, but it is not a substitute for a unified and coordinated effort.

f. The JFC should ensure that the subordinate commands assist each other in collecting and evaluating intelligence needed to the maximum extent compatible with the requirements of their respective commands and the joint force. This includes sharing intelligence sources, collection assets and operations, collection management, data bases, intelligence analysis, production, and communications. This principle of sharing also applies to other forces and to intelligence organizations that support the joint force. Sharing is an affirmative responsibility of commands and organizations that have the ability to support joint operations. Sharing and mutual support are essential to integrating all resources and capabilities into a unified system that will best fulfill the prioritized intelligence needs for joint operations. The JFC will establish the command relationships for all assigned forces, including intelligence assets. Normally, components having organic intelligence staffs and forces will remain the assets of that component commander. If the JFC wants organic intelligence assets of a component to support other units, the JFC will usually assign that intelligence support mission to the component commander. Separate intelligence units and organizations assigned to the joint force will receive one of the four standard support missions from the JFC. Support relationships are explained in Joint Pub 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces," and are shown in Figure IV-2.

8. Recognize CI as a Source of Information

CI is a discipline that is separate and distinct from foreign intelligence and supports military commanders, operational planners, and the traditional intelligence disciplines. CI supports military operations and planning during peacetime operations and at all levels of operations other than war and war. The type and methods of CI support differ at various organizational levels within the DOD. CI develops information on the threat posed to plans, strategies, resources, programs, operations, and systems by foreign intelligence services and intelligence collection by foreign groups, including terrorists and drug traffickers. CI is responsible for the identification, neutralization, and/or exploitation of this threat. CI also determines the ability and willingness of host-nation forces to protect DOD resources and personnel. CI consists of four functions: operations, investigations, collection, and analysis. As such, CI plays a significant force protection role as well as conducting functions complementing intelligence such as analysis and collection.

9. Prioritize Component Intelligence Requirements

The joint force J-2 should carefully manage the flow of intelligence to the joint warfighter. Critical, time-sensitive component RFI should be expeditiously answered at the lowest command level possible.

SECTION C. SUPPORTING PRINCIPLES

Supporting intelligence principles are shown in Figure IV-3.

"Tell me what you know . . . tell me what you don't know . . . tell me what you think . . . always distinguish which is which."

General Colin Powell, USA,
Chairman of the Joint, Chiefs of Staff

10. Constitute a Joint Intelligence Staff

The joint intelligence staff should have intelligence experts from each of the components. The joint intelligence staff must provide the commander and J-2 an understanding of each component's intelligence capabilities, limitations, and requirements. The JFC through the J-2 normally establishes a JIC/JISE to centrally manage the joint intelligence effort.

11. View the Adversary as Joint or Unified

A joint force is potentially faced with adversary capabilities and operations of a joint nature. It is, therefore, essential that intelligence on the adversary be jointly constructed and considered in its entirety, not separately in its air, space, naval, and ground force aspects. Only by complete integration and analysis can the J-2 determine or estimate the whole of the adversary situation.

12. Establish Intelligence Capability Early

Intelligence capabilities and skills should be established in peacetime to be available for contingencies. This applies to all intelligence disciplines, but is especially true for HUMINT. HUMINT is not surged easily or with certainty. Relatively long leadtimes are required to establish human intelligence resources and systems. If HUMINT access to denied areas is to be available when needed, then the resources should be developed and operated in advance of anticipated operations. Also, language capabilities are an example of skills that should be developed in peacetime to be available for contingencies.

a. Intelligence infrastructures must be constituted as soon as possible to allow for the preparation of intelligence for commanders and forces. Intelligence for decisionmaking, operational planning, and conducting operations may not be adequate if intelligence activities are delayed until organic intelligence resources are available to fully constituted commands and forces. Theater and national intelligence resources can bridge the gap. The joint force C4I requirements must be developed during the predeployment phase to support the commander's concept of operations.

b. Where missions and objectives are contemplated for joint commands and forces yet to be constituted or still assembling, intelligence staffs should be formed to coordinate the identification and fulfillment of the longer leadtime intelligence requirements as well as the intelligence needed for initial planning. The Joint Staff J-2 and combatant command J-2 should orchestrate the efforts of existing intelligence organizations to provide essential support while the newly constituted joint command assembles an intelligence staff. Deliberate planning can facilitate a smooth transfer of responsibilities. In developing the concept of intelligence operations for each CINC's operation and concept plans, the combatant command J-2 should address in detail the support desired during the initial stages of a crisis from national, theater, and supporting intelligence organizations. The intelligence annex for these plans should also identify specific criteria to be met before designated intelligence staffs assume responsibility for intelligence support initially provided by other organizations.

Figure IV-3 Supporting Principles

Figure IV-3. Supporting Principles

13. Ensure JFC Intelligence Requirements Are Completely Understood by the J-2

The J-2 should resolve discrepancies between the JFC's requirements and intelligence capabilities. If the J-2 does not understand fully how a stated intelligence requirement relates to the commander's objectives, intent, or plans, the J-2 should ask the commander for clarification. In combat and other critical situations, the JFC's intelligence needs should outweigh otherwise valid intelligence management efficiencies. Although it may later be found that an operation received duplicate or more intelligence than was needed, for an operation to receive less than is needed, when available, is an intelligence failure. If it is not possible to meet a commander's stated requirements, the commander must be notified immediately so that alternative intelligence requirements can be developed or the risks to operations of not havig pertinent intelligence can be assessed.

14. Use Operating Forces for Combat Reporting

Information from reconnaissance and surveillance units and elements in contact with the adversary should be integrated with intelligence from other sources. Forward and engaged combat forces must be tasked to collect and report information. They have unique opportunities to collect significant information. A lack of contact with the adversary may be just as significant as positive intelligence.

15. Analyze Intelligence in Context of Operations

Intelligence analysis is est done in a context of understanding the relative friendly-adversary situation. The commander and J-2 must provide the intelligence staff, all-source watch teams, and supporting intelligence organizations with a clear understanding of (1) the commander's mission, intent, objectives, and plans and (2) the unfolding conduct of operations. The exchange of information and intelligence among commanders, J-3s, intelligence staffs, and supporting intelligence organizations must be continuous. JFCs must weigh the pros and cons of providing this information and intelligence to supporting intelligence organizations outside the joint force area of operations (AOR)/joint operations area (JOA). Although OPSEC is a concern at all command levels, well-informed intelligence support organizations will be able to provide more tailored, timely, and operationally relevant intelligence.

16. Use the Chain of Command to Satisfy Requests for Information

a. JFCs and their J-2s should use the chain of command to obtain intelligence required to support operations. Using the joint intelligence architecture (see Chapter VII, "The Joint Intelligence Architecture,") which facilitates rapid, time-sensitive flow of intelligence throughout the chain of command, RFI should be answered at the lowest possible echelon of the joint force or supporting joint intelligence infrastructure, and then vertically and horizontally shared.

b. Senior commanders should authorize skip-echelon direct intelligence support when necessary to provide timely critical intelligence for operating forces being constituted, in transit, or engaged. Analyst-to-analyst exchange is a form of skip- echelon support. Intelligence analysts at all levels can contribute important perspectives to other intelligence organizations collecting, processing, and producing intelligence. Command authorization of skip-echelon intelligence support does not alleviate the requirement to provide the same intelligence to intermediate commands through the chain of command and to supporting commands and organizations.

17. Structure for Continuous Operations

Intelligence organizations should be structured for continuous day-night and all-weather operations. JFCs need this support to rapidly determine and exploit adversary vulnerabilities, to apply coherent and unrelenting force, and to protect operations and forces. The J-2 and J-3 should establish an around-the-clock, all-source watch team with appropriate intelligence and operations skills. The J-2's concept of intelligence operations should provide for continuity of support even if communications are severely stressed or temporarily lost. The J-2 should (1) develop concepts of intelligence operations for remote terminal access that incorporate prepositioned standard graphic data bases; and (2) designate backups for forward-deployed command elements and fusion centers, which should include procedures and means for the backup to monitor transactions, ensure the backup understands the supported commander's objectives, and is prepared to provide support when continuity is lost. Supporting intelligence organizations responsible for managing collections, exploiting sensor data, and analyzing and disseminating intelligence must also be postured to provide 24-hour-a-day services. Near-continuous surveillance may be effected by synchronizing the integrated use of different and complementary national, theater, and organic collection assets. Overlapping coverage by different collection resources and sensor types can operate against hostile denial and deception measures. Intelligence resources, activities, and communications must be structured and operated to be sufficiently survivable to ensure required intelligence support is available to commanders and forces. An important component of survivability is redundancy in critical C4I capabilities.

18. Maintain Flexibility

Intelligence structures, methodologies, data bases, and products need to be flexible to meet changing operational situations, needs, priorities, and opportunities. They should support all possible strategies and tactics. JFCs need timely intelligence products to identify, influence, and exploit opportunities. Intelligence organizations must be able to rapidly adapt to unforeseen events.

19. Make All Organic Intelligence Capabilities Available to the Entire Joint Force

All intelligence collection, production, and dissemination capabilities of the components and elements of the joint force should be employable for any requirement of either the JFC or any force component or element. The J-2 manages the employment of all organic intelligence assets for the JFC.

PICTURE:
Ultralite satelite communications link joint forces to the world- wide intelligence systems

20. National and Theater Intelligence Organizations Support for Joint Operations

a. National and theater intelligence organizations should support joint operations. They may make operations feasible that could not be accomplished without their access, capability, capacity, or expertise. They must be responsive to military requirements by providing rapid access to pertinent data bases, reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities, analysis, and products (see Joint Pub 2-02, "National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations".

b. National and theater organizations should be prepared to commit sufficient and appropriate resources to ensure timely, complete, and accurate development and dissemination of required intelligence. They should be prepared to place the resources or liaison well forward, commensurate with requirements for security, to assist in the identification and development of intelligence requirements and the use of intelligence products.

21. Keep Intelligence Current

Intelligence must be kept current for all mission responsibilities, including ongoing, planned, and contingency operations. New information must be correlated with what is already known. The nature, purposes, content, location, and availability of intelligence data bases must be systematically evaluated for currency. EEI and other statements of intelligence requirements must be continually reviewed and evaluated against mission responsibilities.

22. Ensure Accessibility of Intelligence

a. Intelligence must be readily accessible by those who need it, while still adhering to security standards of need-to-know and protection of classified information and intelligence sources and methods. The JFC must have access to all intelligence available in the JFC's AOR/JOA.

b. Whenever possible, the types of intelligence needed must be anticipated and arrangements made for personnel involved, including the J-3 and other key staff personnel, to have the appropriate clearances and access. This should be done as a matter of routine before operations begin. Although some intelligence will require extraordinary protection (e.g., to protect sensitive sources and methods or the fact that certain knowledge is held), all efforts should be made to ensure access to required intelligence. Also, intelligence should always be produced at the lowest possible classification consistent with security to ensure the widest dissemination.

c. Intelligence should be sanitized when personnel who need it cannot be cleared for knowledge of its sources and methods, cannot meet the security requirements for that category of intelligence material, or the timeliness for application is jeopardized. Security by sanitizing is attained by effectively separating intelligence from its sources and methods.

d. The policy for sanitizing intelligence must ensure timely access and application to operations. The interpretation of this policy should be accomplished by the JFC who, with the J-2, has the best appreciation of the criticality, utility, and time sensitivity of the intelligence. Establishment of sanitization policy should be accomplished by the chain of command prior to, or at the outset of, joint operations. This is of particular importance for JFCs who will be operating with multinational forces.

e. The reasoning used in developing and applying the policies and guidelines for intelligence security and accessibility should include consideration of the value of intended and potential uses of the intelligence, future value of intelligence sources and methods in light of national and theater military strategies and operational objectives, and situations of threat and opportunity.

f. Where the sources and methods of critical information cannot be protected (i.e., the intelligence cannot be sanitized), the senior commander assigned the military objective or mission and the J-2 should be apprised. When the protection of the information sources and methods is paramount, the commander can then make a reevaluation of objectives in light of the probable outcome of operations without the intelligence.

23. Use an All-Source Approach

a. Information and intelligence from all sources, including CI, (Figure II-1 ) must be evaluated, correlated, and integrated into products that present the most complete, accurate, and objective views possible. Joint operations in particular require complete and composite views of the situation and an adversary's land, sea, air, and space forces.

b. Having access to and using all sources of information and intelligence is essential to understanding the actual situation. Single-source intelligence analysis may lead to incomplete assessments. Use of the all-source concept and methodology will reduce the risks of deception. It will also become the basis for the nomination and development of countermeasures against hostile intelligence and operations.

c. All-source intelligence fusion must begin with collection and production planning. Each source can provide useful information and cues for collection and exploitation through other sources.

24. Distinguish Between Knowledge and Assumptions

a. The J-2 should distinguish between what is known with confidence based on the facts of the situation and the adversary and what are untested assumptions. Intelligence can be facts that have been observed, or it can be a conclusion based on facts of such certainty that it is considered to be knowledge. Intelligence can also be conclusions and estimates deduced from incomplete sets of facts or induced from potentially related facts. Where intelligence is used for operations, these distinctions should be made and maintained. The commander's determination of appropriate objectives and operations may rest on knowing whether intelligence is "fact" or "assumption," and knowing the particular logic used to develop an intelligence estimate, as well as knowing the confidence level the J-2 places on the provided intelligence.

b. The J-2's confidence-level scale (Figure IV-4 ) should be used as often as necessary by all levels of command to present intelligence analysis and conclusions to decisionmakers in a uniform, consistent manner. Because these conclusions rely on both all-source input and the analyst's experience, judgment, and intuition, the confidence-level scale gives both a verbal and numerical value to be used as a shorthand assessment for the JFC. The numerical side of the scale should prove more useful in a multinational operations situation. The confidence level "doubtful" is included to permit reporting of all information gathered, even if the reporter has a low opinion of its accuracy.

25. Use Liaison

Intelligence liaison personnel should be employed on a basis designed to acquaint each force or element of the joint command with the intelligence requirements, responsibilities, capabilities, and operations of their intelligence units, and to help exchange or share fully all significant intelligence and information between commands.

26. Use Intelligence Lessons Learned

Intelligence and operations doctrines, architectures, plans, and activities should ensure a systematic identification, evaluation, and application of intelligence lessons learned. An important function of all intelligence echelons is to benefit from significant operations, training, and intelligence experience. The Joint Universal Lessons Learned System should be used fully to document intelligence lessons learned.

Figure IV-4 Confidence Levels

Attributes of intelligence quality, as shown in Figure IV-5, offer qualitative objectives for intelligence used to support joint operations and standards against which intelligence activities and products are evaluated. A failure to achieve any one of these fundamental attributes may contribute to a failure of operations.

28. Timeliness

Intelligence must be available in time to be effective. Timely intelligence enables the commander to make sound decisions, use the principles of war, and to act decisively. Timeliness is influenced by the intelligence process of developing EEI, identifying and stating requirements, and collecting and producing intelligence. The commander must inform the J-2 of intent and the J-2 must identify intelligence requirements to supporting intelligence organizations in a timely manner.

29. Objectivity

For intelligence to be objective, it should be unbiased, undistorted, and free from political or other constraints. The methodology, product, and use of intelligence must not be directed or manipulated to conform to a desired result, preconceptions of a situation or an adversary, institutional position, predetermined objective, operation, or method of operations. Intelligence concerning a situation is one of the factors in determining policy, but policy must not determine the intelligence.

30. Usability

The form in which intelligence is provided to the JFC should be tailored for particular applications or be suitable for general use without additional analysis or manipulation. As much as practicable, intelligence must be in a form suitable for application when it is received. Intelligence production and the tailoring of particular materials for operational and tactical commanders must be done in the perspective of the JFC's need for timely application. Dissemination must be direct and concise with the command mission and the intelligence purpose in mind. The commander should be able to quickly identify and apply relevant intelligence. Common terminology and multimedia methods must be employed in the communication of intelligence so that it is understandable and useful given the capabilities and time constraints of the commander. Provision of useful intelligence requires producers to understand the circumstances under which their products are used, and implies the JFC's responsibility to communicate his operational intent or situation and any particular requirements of content, form, medium, or presentation.

Figure IV-5 Attributes of Intelligence Quality

31. Readiness

Intelligence structures, data bases, and products must be responsive to the existing and contingent requirements of commanders, staffs, and forces at all command levels. Intelligence assets and resources oriented to areas where there is a high probability of operations must be maintained in a high state of readiness, understand potential adversaries, and be capable of producing and disseminating intelligence usable by all joint force elements.

32. Completeness

JFCs should realize complete intelligence (e.g., the answers to all questions of adversary intent and capabilities) is not possible. Commanders, staffs, and forces should receive all intelligence needed to accomplish their missions and to protect their forces and operations. Supporting intelligence organizations should provide all available relevant and essential intelligence to those who need it and concentrate collection, production, and dissemination efforts on unsatisfied critical requirements. Intelligence requirements must be prioritized, and intelligence collection and production should reflect the JFC's prioritization of intelligence needs.

33. Accuracy

a. Intelligence must be factually correct, convey an appreciation for facts and the situation as they exist, and estimate future situations and courses of adversary action based on those facts and sound judgment.

b. It is not enough that intelligence is true; to be accurate it should also describe what is known of the situation. The attributes of complete, timely, and relevant intelligence bear on accuracy. If requirements are not accurately developed, intelligence products will probably be unsuitable for the operation.

c. Objectivity of intelligence also bears on accuracy. If the intelligence product is skewed by institutional or personal bias in collection, analysis, or dissemination, the resulting erroneous or incomplete portrayals of situations may foster erroneous operational decisions. Although the intelligence presented may be true or accurate in an absolute factual sense, it may fail the accuracy test by the omission of data and perspectives necessary for a complete understanding of the situation.

34. Relevance

a. For intelligence to be truly relevant, it must also meet the qualitative criteria of being complete, accurate, timely, objective, and usable.

b. Intelligence should be relevant to determining, planning, conducting, and evaluating operations. It must contribute to the JFC's understanding of the adversary and the JFC's own situation relative to the adversary. Intelligence must be appropriate to the purposes for which it is needed and how it will be applied for the operation.

07-16-1996; 10:36:17