1. Introduction

This chapter defines intelligence and sources of intelligence and describes the processes of the intelligence cycle. Principles associated with each step of the intelligence cycle are also identified.

2. Definitions

a. Strategic intelligence is intelligence that is required for the formulation of strategy, policy, and military plans and operations at national and theater levels.

b. Operational intelligence is intelligence required for planning and conducting campaigns and major operations to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations.

c. Tactical intelligence is intelligence that is required for planning and conducting tactical operations.

3. Intelligence Sources

Intelligence sources are the means or systems sed to observe, sense, and record or convey information of conditions, situations, and events. As shown in Figure II-1 , there are seven primary source types: imagery intelligence (IMINT), human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT), open source intelligence (OSINT), technical intelligence (TECHINT), and counterintelligence (CI).

Figure II-1Intelligence Sources

4. The Intelligence Cycle

The intelligence cycle (Figure II-2 ) is the process by which information is converted into intelligence and made available to users. DOD users include the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), combatant commanders (CINCs), and all other commanders and forces. The US intelligence cycle has the following five steps: planning and direction, collection, processing, production, and dissemination. The intelligence cycle is a highly simplified model of intelligence operations in terms of processes. As a model, it is important to note that intelligence actions do not always follow sequentially through the cycle. For instance, a request for imagery causes activity in the planning and direction step but may not involve new collection, going instead to a production facility where imagery is drawn from an archive. The intelligence cycle, however, presents intelligence activities as a structure for the discussion of intelligence doctrine. To better understand intelligence and its cycle, it is important to recognize the clear and critical distinction between information and intelligence. Information is data that have been collected but not further developed through analysis, interpretation, or correlation with other data and intelligence. The application of analysis transforms information into intelligence.

Figure II-2 The Intelligence Cycle

Both information and intelligence are important, and both may exist together in some form. They are not, however, the same thing, and thus they have different connotations, applicability, and credibility.

a. Planning and Direction

• Planning and direction involve establishing the command relationships between all intelligence elements within the joint force and identifying, prioritizing, and validating intelligence and intelligence system requirements. This step also includes preparing a collection plan, deterining essential elements of information (EEI), issuing requests for information (RFI) collection and production, and continuously monitoring the availability of collected data.

• Collection planning is normally conducted through the Collection Requirements Management (CRM) process. CRM registers, validates, and prioritizes collection, exploitation, and dissemination requirements to meet the information needs of joint and component force commanders. Through the development of a comprehensive collection plan or strategy, CRM tasks requirements to appropriate organic, attached, and supporting external organizations and agencies (Figure II-3 ). CRM also monitors the overal satisfaction of these requirements and assesses the effectiveness of the collection strategy to satisfy the original and evolving intelligence needs.

• Planning and direction also includes identifying: intelligence personnel augmentation requirements to the J-1, key logistical requirements to the J-4, lift and transportation requirements in the time-phased force and deployment list (TPFDL) to the J-5, and communications requirements for intelligence operations to the J-6. This step also includes establishing and coordinating intelligence dissemination procedures and systems with subordinate, lateral, and higher intelligence organizations and commands, and identifying national-level support requirements.

• Collection Management Principles
  • Joint force collection management must be able to task any joint force collection asset and obtain the aid of external resources (e.g., theater and national) in acquiring needed intelligence.

  • Economies realized from centralization must not diminish the collection management element's responsiveness to the requirements of the joint force.

  Figure II-3. Types of Intelligence Support

• Collection Guidelines
  • Intelligence Collection Activities. Collection resources supporting military operations should be allocated or tasked to satisfy anticipated and potential operational and tactical intelligence requirements of all command levels and elements of the joint force. Different types of collection capabilities may be needed so information from one source type can be tested or confirmed by others in order to subject the full range of enemy activity to observation. The collection system also needs some redundancy so the loss or failure of one collection asset can be compensated for by duplicate or different assets capable of answering the intelligence need. To function effectively at the start of joint or multinational operations, responsibilities and procedures to optimize intelligence collection must be in existence and practiced during peacetime.

  • EEI and Intelligence Requirements. The JFC is responsible for identifying and determining the EEI for the mission. In turn, the J-2 is responsible for identifying the intelligence shortfalls, stating them in terms of intelligence requirements, and then tasking collection assets, conducting exploitation/production, and ensuring dissemination. Identification of pre-planned EEI greatly enhances intelligence support to the joint force.

  • Intelligence Requirements. At each level of command, senior intelligence officers must be aware of their command's intelligence requirements, as well as those of the next higher, adjacent, and subordinate commands. The collection or production capabilities of one component of a joint force may be able to satisfy another's requirements. Acting for the JFC, the J-2 (collection management) can task resources to collect, process, and exploit the information to fulfill the most important requirements of the joint force based on assigned or potential missions. See Joint Pub 2-01, "Joint Intelligence Support to Operations," and Joint Pub 2-02, "National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations," for requirements management detais.

  • The J-2 Must be Knowledgeable of Available Collection Resources. A corollary to the above is that the J-2 must be aware of the abilities, limitations, and leadtime required for tasking intelligence collection and production.

  • Coordination of Collection Sources. Collection operations (including data exchange) of all collection sources should be synchronized and coordinated to allow cross-cuing and tipoff among collectors. The data collected should be integrated and correlated in all-source analysis, as appropriate. Resulting overlapping, multisource collection capabilities should be used to reduce the effects of enemy denial and deception measures and to improve the accuracy and completeness of intelligence.

  • Collection Opportunity and Command and Control Warfare Tradeoffs. When determining intelligence operations, the JFC's staff and the components should identify and compare the longer term value of continued intelligence collection against enemy elements, with the immediate tactical value of destroying or countering a source of intelligence. The J-2 and J-2 staff should monitor collection results and provide feedback to the JFC to assist in determining when specific targets can be nominated for attack. The J-2, in conjunction with national intelligence organizations and the components, should nominate a "no strike" target list to the J-3 and keep it updated. The JFC will determine when and if these targets are to be attacked.

• Collection Operations Management (COM) Responsibilities. COM activities are driven by collection requirements. COM provides authoritative and coordinated direction and tasking of the broad array of technical sensor operations and HUMINT collection operations and their associated processing and dissemination resources.

d. Production. Intelligence production is the integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of information from single or multiple sources into finished intelligence for known or anticipated military and related national security consumer requirements. A term associated with production is "intelligence application." Intelligence application is the direct extraction and tailoring of information from an existing foundation of intelligence and near-real-time reporting. It is focused on and meets specific requirements, normally on demand. Examples are provided in Figure II-4 .

Figure II-4. Examples of Intelligence Applications

• Production Guidelines
  • Focus on the Purpose and Use of Intelligence. To better understand the exact needs of the consumerand the best way of answering the requirements, the producer needs to know who will use the intelligence at what level(s) of command, the user's mission, the general intelligence requirements and responsibilities, and purpose of the intelligence products.

  • Objectivity. Producers must be objective, unbiased, and avoid any tendency toward preconceived ideas. When conflicting information exists, efforts should be made to resolve the difference. If time or resources are inadequate to provide unambiguous intelligence, the JFC should be made aware of the ambiguity or uncertainty. Commanders need all available pertinent intelligence, including conflicting or contradicting information and opinion.
  • Provide Integrated Products. Intelligence analysts at JICs and other fusion centers should use information available from multiple sources, integrate it, and provide the decisionmaker with a clear picture.

  • Coordinate Production Among Echelons. Intelligence production should be coordinated from national through tactical levels. These production activities should be directed and coordinated by the J-2 so they are mutually supporting and nonduplicative. (1) Intelligence production for joint operations is accomplished by units and organizations at every echelon. It includes Service-unique products at the component commands and operating forces. (2) Intelligence produced at higher echelons is derived from both collection assets organic to that echelon or higher and a refinement and compilation of intelligence received from subordinate units and external organizations. Subordinate units, in turn, use the intelligence products sent to them by the senior command to determine or adjust their mission and/or strategy.

• Production Responsibilities. Higher echelons are responsible for ensuring subordinates are provided any required intelligence exceeding the subordinate's organic production capability. Toward this end, higher echelon commanders and J-2s should identify organizations able to contribute, and take necessary actions to provide JFCs with required intelligence products and services.

• Production Management. Production management is a critical element in ensuring effective and efficient military intelligence production in support of joint operations. Within each production agency, production managers receive, review, validate, prioritize, and coordinate production requirements to determine the producer and schedule, the task, and editing requirements for intelligence products. Automated data processing (ADP) on-line updates are controlled by the production manager. Strict controls should be applied to changing information in ADP systems that can be accessed by other organizations. There must be a designated approving authority for such changes. Routinely, only one organization will have the authority to change a specific item (e.g., a data field in a record in an official data base).

Figure II-5. Forms of Ingellignece Dissemination

• Joint intelligence dissemination should be consistent with the C4I for the Warrior concept that allows the warfighter to obtain functionally integrated or fused intelligence based on the warrior's requirements for intelligence exchange. This concept allows intelligence organizations external to the joint force to satisfy joint force intelligence needs to the maximum extent possible if they: (1) have sufficient knowledge of the joint force requirements through preplanned EEI (which involves tailoring data bases); (2) emphasize pushing intelligence to the warfighter (through over-the-air updates); and (3) accommodate warrior pull on demand (allowing automated access to theater and national data bases through such systems as the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS)). This concept results in timely intelligence, makes maximum use of automation, and minimizes the flow of RFI messages and intelligence reports. Broadcasts such as the tactical information broadcast service and the tactical related applications (TRAP) are examples of over-the-air updates that provide time-sensitive intelligence to tactical commanders. Chapter VII, "The Joint Intelligence Architecture," povides a more comprehensive discussion of the joint intelligence architecture.

• An important consideration in the dissemination process is management of information transmitted over communications systems. JFCs should ensure for provision of critical, time-sensitive intelligence for force protection and operations, using the "push-pull" system to receive finished intelligence products from higher or adjacent commanders and intelligence producers. JFCs should manage information dissemination in terms of the product, available communications paths through dynamic bandwidth management, and time sensitivity to ensure the joint force receives what is required to support joint operations. Intelligence dissemination should be continuously reviewed throughout the joint operation.

07-16-1996; 09:33:15