SORT: 5215.02
DOCI: DODI 5215.2
DATE: 19860902
TITL: DODI 5215.2 Computer Security Technical Vulnerability Reporting Program
(CSTVRP), September 2, 1986, ASD(C3l)

References:  (a) National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 145,
                 "National Policy on Telecommunications and Automated
                 Information Systems Security," September 17, 1984
             (b) DoD Directive 5200.28, "Security Requirements for
                 Automatic Data Processing (ADP) Systems,"
                 December 18, 1972
             (c) DoD Directive 5215.1, "Computer Security Evaluation
                 Center," October 25, 1982
             (d) through (f) see enclosure 1.


This Instruction:

1.  Establishes a Computer Security Technical Vulnerability Reporting
Program (CSTVRP) under the direction of the National Security Agency,
National Information Security Assessment Center (NISAC), reference (a).

2.  Establishes procedures for reporting all demonstrable and
repeatable technical vulnerabilities of Automated Information Systems

3.  Provides for the collection, consolidation, analysis, reporting or
notification of generic technical vulnerabilities and corrective measures
in support of the DoD Computer Security requirements in reference (b).

4.  Establishes methodologies for dissemination of vulnerability


1.  This Instruction applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD), the Military Departments, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (OJCS), the Unified and Specified Commands, and Defense Agencies
(hereafter referred to collectively as "Components").

2.  The program shall be focused on technical vulnerabilities in
commercially available hardware, firmware and software products acquired
by Department of Defense and those altered commercial products supporting
standard military applications.  Research prototypes and reproduction
commercial products are excluded from the program.  Correction of site-
specific vulnerabilities are primarily the responsibility of the affected

3.  These reporting procedures are in addition to any existing
reporting requirements on technical AIS vulnerabilities.  Copies of
reports prepared in accordance with existing reporting requirements may be
provided to satisfy the requirements of Section F and Enclosure 2.

4.  The reporting portion of the program is also available on a
voluntary basis for the non-DoD AIS community.


The following definitions are applicable for this Instruction:

1.  AIS Resource Manager:  The individual with direct operational
control of the AIS hardware, firmware, and/or software, or individuals who
are in a position to identify and report the technical vulnerability.

2.  Automated Information System (AIS):  A system which creates,
prepares or manipulates information in electronic form and includes
computers, word processing systems and other electronic information
handling systems and associated equipment (reference (c)).

3.  Evaluated Products List (EPL):  A documented inventory of
equipment and hardware, software or firmware systems that have been
evaluated against and certified to be technically compliant with the
Department of Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria
(reference (d)) by the National Computer Security Center (NCSC) (reference

4.  Focal Point:  The computer security contact within the OSD
Components, Military Departments, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Unified and Specified commands, Defense Agencies, the intelligence
community, and other Government organizations involved in the processing
of sensitive or classified information.

5.  Technical Vulnerability:  A hardware, firmware, or software
weakness or design deficiency that leaves an automated information system
open to potential exploitation either externally or internally, thereby
resulting in risk or compromise of information, alteration of information,
or denial of service.  Technical vulnerability information, if made
available to unauthorized persons, may allow an AIS to be exploited,
resulting in potentially serious damage to national security.


It is DoD policy that:

1.  All DoD Components shall contribute to the NISAC, through their
Focal Points, information concerning technical vulnerabilities.  This will
constitute a technical reporting channel for the purposes of the CSTVRP.

2.  The NISAC shall maintain a central repository of computer
vulnerability information.

3.  Information on the technical vulnerabilities of AIS's shall be
protected from unauthorized disclosure while ensuring it is disseminated
to individuals responsible for the security of an AIS.

4.  Generic vulnerability information may be released to support DoD
AIS acquisition processes.

5.  Technical vulnerabilities will be evaluated on a case-by-case
basis on behalf of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence) (ASD(C3I)) to determine the extent of
their impact.


1.  The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control,
Communications and Intelligence) (ASD(C3I)) has staff supervision and
shall oversee and review implementation of this Instruction.

2.  The Heads of DoD Components shall:

a.  Appoint a Focal Point to ensure the execution of the
responsibilities and procedures specified.

b.  Develop procedures for the reporting of technical
vulnerabilities, establish classification guidance for national security
information (reference (e)), and establish procedures for the
dissemination and protection of technical vulnerability information
consistent with forms and guidance developed by the NISAC and in
accordance with reference' (e).

3.  The National Information Security Assessment Center shall be
responsible for implementing and maintaining a CSTVRP.  The NISAC shall:

a.  Review reported vulnerabilities to assess the possible impact
within the Department of Defense and to evaluate the requirement for and
extent of further dissemination.

b.  Act as the clearinghouse for all DoD AIS technical
vulnerability information, collecting it from and disseminating it to the
Component Focal Points.

c.  Establish procedures to encourage the voluntary submission of
technical vulnerability information from non-DoD Automated Information
System users.

d.  Establish and maintain a data base of technical vulnerability
information having security commensurate with its sensitivity.

e.  Establish procedures for transmitting technical vulnerability
information to affected manufacturers for corrective action.

f.  Collect, analyze, catalogue and disseminate vulnerability
information from periodicals, newspaper articles, trade papers, research
papers, field research, etc.

4.  The National Computer Security Center shall:

a.  Perform technical analysis of computer security
vulnerabilities on a case-by-case basis.

b.  Evaluate reported computer security technical vulnerabilities
in products on the EPL to determine the impact on the products trusted
system rating.

5.  The DoD Component Focal Points shall:

a.  Receive technical vulnerability reports and information from
their AIS Resource Managers in accordance with the procedures of section
F, below.

b.  Review and analyze the vulnerability report.  In conformance
with DoDD 5200.28, assess the impact of the vulnerability on system
accreditation, and assess potential technical solutions.

c.  Report technical vulnerabilities and potential solutions to
the NISAC under the procedures stated in section F, below.

d.  Disseminate technical vulnerability reports within the
Component, on a valid need-to-know basis, receive and process all
Component requests for vulnerability information, and, when necessary,
request additional information from the NISAC.

e.  The Component Focal Point will, in coordination with the
Designated Approving Authority (DAA), implement a course of action to
reduce the risk, pending a detailed technical evaluation of the
vulnerability by the NCSC, in conformance with DoDD 5200.28.

6.  The AIS Resource Manager shall:

a.  Report identified vulnerabilities to the respective agency
Focal Point in accordance with enclosure 2.

b.  Recognize that compliance with this Instruction does not
preclude the responsibility to take any necessary and prudent action to
reduce all risk presented by the vulnerability.


1.  Technical vulnerabilities shall be reported by the responsible AIS
Resource Manager to the cognizant Focal Point in accordance with
procedures established by the Focal Point for the organization.  Reports
of technical vulnerabilities should be in sufficient detail so the
vulnerability can be demonstrated and repeated (enclosure 2).

2.  The Component Focal Point shall ensure that the reported
vulnerability is screened for technical validity and determine to the best
of available capabilities the extent of risk presented by the technical
vulnerability to the operation of the activity or other activities.

3.  The Component Focal Point shall, within four weeks of receipt of a
valid vulnerability, forward a copy of the report to the NISAC with a
summary of the reported vulnerability, the analysis of the risk involved,
and any recommended solutions to correct the vulnerability commensurate
with established Component programs.  This summary shall be in narrative
form in accordance with enclosure 2 and shall be transmitted in accordance
with reference (e).  The outer envelope will be addressed to:

National Security Agency
Ft.  George G. Meade, MD   20755-6000
ATTN:  Chief, 52

The inner envelope will be marked:


Vulnerability reports requiring transmission via the Armed Forces Courier
Service will be addressed to:

National Security Agency
Ft.  George G. Meade
ATTN:  52

4.  Technical vulnerabilities in products on the NCSC Evaluated
Product List shall be reported by the Component Focal Point to the NISAC
within two days of receipt.  A follow-up report will be submitted in
conformance with subsection F.3 above.  The NCSC will evaluate the risk to
the EPL item and make a specific determination as to whether or not to
retain, reduce, or rescind its current trusted system rating.

5.  While the intent of the CSTVRP is not to task the NISAC with
correcting reported technical vulnerabilities, the NISAC may use such
resources as are available to resolve any vulnerabilities forwarded by the
Component Focal Points.  The NISAC may request that the responsible vendor
correct the vulnerability.  Any technical vulnerabilities in products
appearing on the EPL will be referred to the responsible vendor for
correction.  Appropriate warnings will be disseminated.

6.  The NISAC shall maintain the technical vulnerability data base for
DoD. DoD activities may request information from this data base through
their Component Focal Points.  The Focal Point must verify the activity's
clearance and need to know.

7.  Dissemination of Technical Vulnerability Information:

a.  Technical vulnerability information will be disseminated by
the NISAC to the Component Focal Points.  Technical vulnerabilities
affecting more than one Component, as identified by the Automated Resource
Management System (ARMS) or equivalent systems, shall be disseminated by
the NISAC to the appropriate Component Focal Points, consistent with
dissemination protection policies.

b.  The Component Focal Point shall disseminate information about
valid vulnerabilities to activities within its own Component.  The
Component Focal Point will ensure that dissemination is strictly limited
to those activities and individuals with necessary clearance and a valid
need to know.

8.  Protection and Handling of Vulnerability Information:

a.  A technical vulnerability reported under this Instruction from
DoD sources shall be classified at least CONFIDENTIAL.  It may be
classified higher if so determined by the original classification

b.  A technical vulnerability reported under this Instruction from
non-DoD sources within the Federal Government and/or from non-government
sources shall be classified at least CONFIDENTIAL.  It may be classified
higher if so determined by the original classification authority.  If
there is no authority to classify or to handle classified information, a
vulnerability report shall be marked as unclassified sensitive national
security related information.  Such a report shall be protected from
public disclosure in accordance with applicable statutes, directives,
executive orders and regulations.

c.  Vendors may be provided the technical details of reported
vulnerabilities to make corrections, but shall not be provided
information about the specific site(s) concerned, methods of discovery, or
other information which could lead to increased site vulnerability without
the express written approval of the Head of the DoD Component or the DAA.
Release of this information will be approved on a case-by-case basis and
in accordance with this Instruction and appropriate Directives.


The procedures described in section F have been assigned Report
Control Symbol NSA/CSS-1057.


This Instruction is effective immediately.  Forward one copy of
implementing documents to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command,
Control, Communications, and Intelligence) (ASD(C3I)) within 120 days.

              Donald C. Latham
              Assistant Secretary of Defense
              (Command, Control, Communications
              and Intelligence)
Enclosures - 3
1.  References
2.  Reporting Format
3.  Vulnerability Report Sample

   REFERENCES, (continued)

(d) DoD 5200.28 STD, Department of Defense Standard, "Department of
Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria," December 1985
(e) DoD Regulation 5200.1-R, "DoD Information Security Program
Regulation," August 1982, authorized by DoD Directive 5200.1, June 7,
1982. (f) DoD Directive 5230.24, `Distribution Statements on Technical
Documents," November 20, 1984.


The following format should be used for reporting technical
vulnerabilities.  A format example with sample data is attached to this
reporting format.

    Vulnerability Report

Classification markings/Distribution statements

A.  Required Information

1.  Report Date

2.  Contact

a.  Name

b.  Organization

c.  Mailing address

d.  Phone number

e.  Position

3.  Hardware/Software

a.  List hardware and system configuration

b.  Software description

(1)   Operating system (include release number).

(2)   Describe any unique attributes - i.e., locally modified
special security properties.

B.  Executive Summary of Vulnerability.

A description of the nature and effect of the vulnerability in as general
terms as possible.

C.  Description of Technical Vulnerability.

1.  A scenario that describes specific conditions to demonstrate the
weakness or design deficiency.  The description should sufficiently
describe the conditions so that the weakness or design deficiency can be
repeated without further information.  This scenario may include source or
object code.

2.  Describe the specific impact or effect of the weakness or design
deficiency in terms of the following:  (1) denial of service, (2)
alteration of information, and/or (3) compromising of data.  Cite specific
examples as appropriate.

3.    Indicate whether or not the affected vendor has been notified.

D.  Suggested Fixes - Describe any code or procedures you may have
discovered that when implemented may reduce the impact of the defined
technical vulnerability.

E.  Additional Information.

1.  System Specifics

a.  Location

b.  Owner

c.  Network connections

d.  Security attributes

2.  System use and highest classification of data on system.

3.  Additional clarifying information.


Classification Marking/Distribution statement

A.  1.  YYMMDD

2.  a.  Dave Bowman, LTC, USAF

b.  US. Space Command (USSPACECOM)

c.  Colorado Springs, CO 11111-1111

d.  AV 111-1111, comm (303) JCN-6325

e.  Senior Astronaut

3.  a.  HAL 9000
512 GB memory
2 360 MB fixed head disk drives
1 card reader
45 teleprinters
1 lineprinter

b.  (1)  Clarke, Version 20.10

(2)   Locally modified to increase positive auditing.

B.  The Clarke version 20.10 operating system permits one process to gain
unauthorized access to the data area of another process.  This flaw could
allow a user to gain full access to any data on the system.

C.  1.  Assume two coordinating processes.  Process 1 attempts to access a
piece of data it has full access rights to.  In doing this, process 1 is
causing access attributes (data area, name of user attempting the access)
to be passed to a procedure "check-access."

The procedure check-access takes the attributes, makes appropriate
comparisons, and finds that process 1 has full access to the data.  Before
check-access completes execution and returns, process 2 gains the
attention of the CPU (using priority interrupts).

While process 2 is executing it overwrites an area in process 1.
This area was the location in which process 1 had stored the name of the
data area it was attempting to access (a parameter).  This caused the data
area that the procedure check-access wad "sing to determine process 1's
access rights to be overwritten.

Process 2 then terminates its own execution and allows process 1
to resume.  Since check-access granted access to process 1 for the
original data area, check-access will inform process 1 that it is allowed
access to a data area other than the one that was originally in question.

The reasons for this problem are:

a Process the was allowed to interrupt check-access without causing

(2) Input parameters were allowed to remain in user space between
the time the parameters were checked and the time the parameters were sent
back to the calling procedure.

2.  This design deficiency allows a user process to gain full access
to any data on the system.  Since no change is made to existing access
rules, there is no evidence that the unauthorized use took place.  The
audit log will only pick up this access if positive auditing is taking

3.  The vendor, High order Artificial Reasoning, Deduction, and
Intelligence Engineering Corp., has been informed and is currently
preparing a fix to be distributed as soon as possible.

D.  One remedy to this problem would have check-access (as well as some
other procedures) copy input parameters into system space before using
them.  This would prevent processes from changing parameters during a
system procedure call.

E.  1.  a.  US. Space Command Computer operations Center Colorado
Springs, CO.

b.   U. S. Space Command.

c.   Defense Data Network (DDN), NILNET.

d.  GUARD DOG" commercial security software package for HAL 9000
installed.  Remote user access is mediated through use of passwords and
"CALL GUARD" call-back devices.

2.  System operates in System High security mode.  Highest
classification of data on system is SECRET.

3.  System is available through the MILNET to researchers at fifteen
universities and research institutes.