SORT: 5200.30

DOCI: DODD 5200.30

DATE: 19830321

TITL: DODD 5200.30 Guidelines for Systematic Declassification Review of

Classified Information in Permanently Valuable DoD Records, March 21,

1983, USD(P)

Refs:(a) DoD Directive 5200.30, "Guidelines for Systematic Review of 20-

Year-Old Classified Information in Permanently Valuable DoD Records,"

September 9, 1981 (hereby canceled)

(b) Executive Order 12356, "National Security Information," April 2, 1982

(c) Information Security Oversight Office Directive No. 1 Concerning

National Security Information, June 23, 1982

(d) through (g), see enclosure 1


This Directive reissues reference (a); establishes procedures and assigns

responsibilities for the systematic declassification review of information

classified under references (b) and (c), DoD Directive 5200.1 and DoD

5200.1-R (references (d) and (e)), and prior orders, directives, and

regulations governing security classification; and implements section 3.3

of reference (b).


1. This Directive applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)

and to activities assigned to the OSD for administrative support, the

Military Departments, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the

Unified and Specified Commands, and the Defense Agencies (hereafter

referred to collectively as "DoD Components").

2. This Directive applies to the systematic review of permanently valuable

classified information, developed by or for the Department of Defense and

its Components, or its predecessor components and activities, that is

under the exclusive or final original classification jurisdiction of the

Department of Defense.

3. Its provisions do not cover Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data

under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (reference (f)) or information in

nonpermanent records.

4. Systematic declassification review of records pertaining to

intelligence activities (including special activities) or intelligence

sources or methods shall be in accordance with special procedures issued

by the Director of Central Intelligence.


1. Cryptologic Information.  Information pertaining to or resulting from

the activities and operations involved in the production of signals

intelligence (SIGINT) or to the maintenance of communications security


2. Foreign Government Information.  Information that is provided to the

United States by a foreign government or governments, an international

organization of governments, or any element thereof with the expectation,

expressed or implied, that the information, the source of the information,

or both are to be held in confidence; or produced by the United States

pursuant to or as a result of a joint arrangement with a foreign

government or governments, an international organization of governments,

or any element thereof requiring that the information, the arrangement, or

both are to be held in confidence*

3. Intelligence Method.  Any process, mode of analysis, means of gathering

data, or processing system or equipment used to produce intelligence.

4. Intelligence Source.  A person or technical means that provides



It is the policy of the Department of Defense to assure that information

that warrants protection against unauthorized disclosure is properly

classified and safeguarded as well as to facilitate the flow of

unclassified information about DoD operations to the public.


1. DoD classified information that is permanently valuable, as defined by

44 U.S.C. 2103 (reference (g)), that has been accessioned into the

National Archives of the United States, will be reviewed systematically

for declassification by the Archivist of the United States, with the

assistance of the DoD personnel designated for that purpose, as it becomes

30 years old; however, file series concerning intelligence activities

(including special activities) created after 1945, intelligence sources or

methods created after 1945, and cryptology records created after 1945 will

be reviewed as they become 50 years old.

2. All other DoD classified information and foreign government information

that is permanently valuable and in the possession or control of DoD

Components, including that held in federal records centers or other

storage areas, may be reviewed systematically for declassification by the

DoD Component exercising control of such information.

3. DoD classified information and foreign government information in the

possession or control of DoD Components shall be declassified when they

become 30 years old, or 50 years old in the case of DoD intelligence

activities (including special activities) created after 1945, intelligence

sources or methods created after 1945, or cryptology created after 1945,

if they are not within one of the categories specified in enclosure 2 or


4. Systematic review for declassification shall be in accordance with

procedures contained in DoD 5200.1-R (reference (e)). Information that

falls within any of the categories in enclosures 2 and 3 shall be

declassified if the designated DoD reviewer determines, in light of the

declassification considerations contained in enclosure 4, that

classification no longer is required.  In the absence of such a

declassification determination, the classification of the information

shall continue as long as required by national security considerations.

5. Before any declassification or downgrading action, DoD information

under review should be coordinated with the Department of State on

subjects cited in enclosure 5, and with the Central intelligence Agency

(CIA) on subjects cited in enclosure 6.


1. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy shall:

a.  Exercise oversight and policy supervision over the implementation of

this Directive.

b.  Request DoD Components to review enclosures 2 and 4 of this Directive

every 5 years.

c.  Revise enclosures 2 and 4 to ensure they meet DoD needs.

d.  Authorize, when appropriate, other federal agencies to apply this

Directive to DoD information in their possession.

2. The Head of each DoD Component shall:

a.  Recommend changes to the enclosures of this Directive.

b.  Propose, with respect to specific programs, projects, and systems

under his or her classification jurisdiction, supplements to enclosures 2

and 4 of this Directive.

c.  Provide advice and designate experienced personnel to provide timely

assistance to the Archivist of the United States in the systematic review

of records under this Directive.

3. The Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service

(NSA/CSS), shall develop, for approval by the Secretary of Defense,

special procedures for systematic review and declassification of

classified cryptologic information.

4. The Archivist of the United States is authorized to apply this

Directive when reviewing DoD classified information that has been

accessioned into the Archives of the United States.


This Directive is effective immediately.

PAUL THAYER Deputy Secretary of Defense

Enclosures - 6 I. References 2. Categories of Information That Require

Review Before Declassification 3. General Guidelines for Systematic

Declassification Review of Foreign Government Information 4.

Declassification Considerations 5. Department of State Areas of Interest

6. Central Intelligence Agency Areas of Interest

REFERENCES, continued

(d) DoD Directive 5200.1, "DoD Information Security Program," June 7, 1982

(e) DoD 5200.1-R, "Information Security Program Regulation," August 1982,

authorized by DoD Directive 5200.1, June 7, 1982

(f) Public Law 83-703, Atomic Energy Act of 1954

(g) Title 44, United States Code, Section 2103


The following categories of information shall be reviewed systematically

for declassification by designated DoD reviewers in accordance with this


1. Nuclear propulsion information.

2. Information concerning the establishment, operation, and support of the

U.S. Atomic Energy Detection System.

3. Information concerning the safeguarding of nuclear materials or


4. Information that could affect the conduct of current or future U.S.

foreign relations. (Also see enclosure 5.)

5. Information that could affect the current or future military usefulness

of policies, programs, weapon systems, operations, or plans when such

information would reveal courses of action, concepts, tactics, or

techniques that are used in current operations plans.

6. Research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) of chemical and

biological weapons and defensive systems; specific identification of

chemical and biological agents and munitions; chemical and biological

warfare plans; and U.S. vulnerability to chemical or biological warfare


7. Information about capabilities, installations, exercises, research,

development, testing and evaluation, plans, operations, procedures,

techniques, organization, training, sensitive liaison and relationships,

and equipment concerning psychological operations; escape, evasion, rescue

and recovery, insertion, and infiltration and exfiltration; cover and

support; deception; unconventional warfare and special operations; and the

personnel assigned to or engaged in these activities.

8. Information that reveals sources or methods of intelligence or

counterintelligence, counterintelligence activities, special activities,

identities of clandestine human agents, methods of special operations,

analytical techniques for the interpretation of intelligence data, and

foreign intelligence reporting.  This includes information that reveals theoverall scope, processing rates, timeliness, and accuracy of intelligence

systems and networks, including the means of interconnecting such systems

and networks and their vulnerabilities.

9. Information that relates to intelligence activities conducted jointly

by the Department of Defense with other federal agencies or to

intelligence activities conducted by other federal agencies in which the

Department of Defense has provided support. (Also see enclosure 6.)

10. Airborne radar and infrared imagery.

11. Information that reveals space system:

a.  Design features, capabilities, and limitations (such as antijam

characteristics, physical survivability features, command and control

design details, design vulnerabilities, or vital parameters).

b.  Concepts of operation, orbital characteristics, orbital support

methods, network configurations, deployments, ground support facility

locations, and force structure.

12. Information that reveals operational communications equipment and


a.  Electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) design features or

performance capabilities.

b.  Vulnerability and susceptibility to any or all types of electronic


13. Information concerning electronic intelligence, telemetry

intelligence, and electronic warfare (electronic warfare support measures,

electronic countermeasures (ECM), and ECCM) or related activities,


a.  Information concerning or revealing nomenclatures, functions, technicalcharacteristics, or descriptions of foreign communications and electronic

equipment, its employment or deployment, and its association with weapon

systems or military operations.

b.  Information concerning or revealing the processes, techniques,

operations, or scope of activities involved in acquiring, analyzing, and

evaluating the above information, and the degree of success obtained.

14. Information concerning Department of the Army systems listed in

attachment 1.

15. Information concerning Department of the Navy systems listed in

attachment 2.

16. Information concerning Department of the Air Force systems listed in

attachment 3.

17. Cryptologic information (including cryptologic sources and methods).

This includes information concerning or revealing the processes,

techniques, operations, and scope of SIGINT comprising communications

intelligence, electronics intelligence, and telemetry intelligence; and

the cryptosecurity and emission security components of COMSEC, including

the communications portion of cover and deception plans.

a.  Recognition of cryptologic information may not always be an easy task.

There are several broad classes of cryptologic information, as follows:

(1) Those that relate to COMSEC. In documentary form, they provide COMSEC

guidance or information.  Many COMSEC documents and materials are

accountable under the Communications Security Material Control System.

Examples are items bearing transmission security (TSEC) nomenclature and

crypto keying material for use in enciphering communications and other

COMSEC documentation such as National COMSEC Instructions, National

COMSEC/Emanations Security (EMSEC) Information Memoranda, National COMSEC

Committee Policies, COMSEC Resources Program documents, COMSEC Equipment

Engineering Bulletins, COMSEC Equipment System Descriptions, and COMSEC

Technical Bulletins.

(2) Those that relate to SIGINT. These appear as reports in various

formats that bear security classifications, sometimes followed by five-

letter codewords (World War II's ULTRA, for example) and often carrying

warning caveats such as "This document contains codeword material" and

"Utmost secrecy is necessary.. ." Formats may appear as messages having

addressees, "from" and "to" sections, and as summaries with SIGINT content

with or without other kinds of intelligence and comment.

(3) RDT&E reports and information that relate to either COMSEC or SIGINT.

b.  Commonly used words that may help in identification of cryptologic

documents and materials are "cipher," "code," "codeword," "communications

intelligence" or "COMINT," "communications security" or "COMSEC,"

"cryptanalysis," "crypto," "cryptography," "cryptosystem," "decipher,"

"decode," "decrypt," "direction finding," "electronic intelligence" or

"ELINT," "electronic security," "encipher," "encode," "encrypt,"

"intercept," "key book," "signals intelligence" or "SIGINT," "signal

security," and "TEMPEST."

Attachments - 3 1. Department of the Army Systems 2. Department of the

Navy Systems 3. Department of the Air Force Systems



The following categories of Army information shall be reviewed

systematically for declassification by designated DoD reviewers in

accordance with this Directive.

l.  Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) missile information, including the

principle of operation of warheads (fuzing, arming, firing, and destruct

operations); quality or reliability requirements; threat data;

vulnerability; ECM and ECCM; details of design, assembly, and

construction; and principle of operations.

2. BMD systems data, including the concept definition (tentative roles,

threat definition, and analysis and effectiveness); detailed quantitative

technical system description-revealing capabilities or unique weaknesses

that are exploitable; overall assessment of specific threat-revealing

vulnerability or capability; discrimination technology; and details of

operational concepts.

3. BMD optics information that may provide signature characteristics of

U.S. and United Kingdom ballistic weapons.

4. Shaped-charge technology.

5. Fleshettes.

6. M380 Beehive round.

7. Electromagnetic propulsion technology.

8. Space weapons concepts.

9. Radar-fuzing programs.

10. Guided projectiles technology.

11. ECM and ECCM to weapons systems.

12. Armor materials concepts, designs, or research.

13. 2.75-inch Rocket System.

14. Air Defense Command and Coordination System (AN/TSQ-51).

IS. Airborne Target Acquisition and Fire Control System.

16. Chaparral Missile System.

17. Dragon Guided Missile System Surface Attack, M47.

18. Forward Area Alerting Radar (FAAR) System.

19. Ground laser designators.

20. Hawk Guided Missile System.

21. Heliborne, Laser, Air Defense Suppression and Fire and Forget Guided

Missile System (HELLFIRE).

22. Honest John Missile System.

23. Lance Field Artillery Missile System.

24. Land Combat Support System (LCSS).

25. M22 (55-11 ) Guided Missile System, Helicopter Armament Subsystem.

26. Guided Missile System, Air Defense (NIKE HERCULES with Improved

Capabilities with HIPAR and ANTIJAM Improvement).

27. Patriot Air Defense Missile System.

28. Pershing IA Guided Missile System.

29. Pershing II Guided Missile System.

30. Guided Missile System, Intercept Aerial, M41 (REDEYE) and Associated


31. U.S. Roland Missile System.

32. Sergeant Missile System (less warhead) (as pertains to electronics and

penetration aids only).

33. Shillelagh Missile System.

34. Stinger/Stinger-Post Guided Missile System (FIM-92A).

35. Terminally Guided Warhead (TWG) for Multiple Launch Rocket System


36. TOW Heavy Antitank Weapon System.

37. Viper Light Antitank/Assault Weapon System.



The following categories of Navy information shall be reviewed

systematically for declassification by designated DoD reviewers in

accordance with this Directive.

I. Naval nuclear propulsion information.

2. Conventional surface ship information:

a.  Vulnerabilities of protective systems, specifically:

(1) Passive protection information concerning ballistic torpedo and

underbottom protective systems.

(2) Weapon protection requirement levels for conventional, nuclear,

biological, or chemical weapons.

(3) General arrangements, drawings, and booklets of general plans

(applicable to carriers only).

b.  Ship-silencing information relative to:

(1) Signatures (acoustic, seismic, infrared, magnetic (including

alternating magnetic (AM)), pressure, and underwater electric potential


(2) Procedures and techniques for noise reduction pertaining to an

individual ship's component.

(3) Vibration data relating to hull and machinery.

c.  Operational characteristics related to performance as follows:

(1) Endurance or total fuel capacity.

(2) Tactical information, such as times for ship turning, zero to maximum

speed, and maximum to zero speed.

3. All information that is uniquely applicable to nuclear-powered surface

ships or submarines.

4. Information concerning diesel submarines as follows:

a.  Ship-silencing data or acoustic warfare systems relative to:

(1) Overside, platform, and sonar noise signature.

(2) Radiated noise and echo response.

(3) All vibration data.

(4) Seismic, magnetic (including AM), pressure, and UEP signature data.

b.  Details of operational assignments, that is, war plans, antisubmarine

warfare (ASW), and surveillance tasks.

c.  General arrangements, drawings, and plans of SS563 class submarine


5. Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) data.

6. Information concerning mine warfare, mine sweeping, and mine


7. ECM or ECCM features and capabilities of any electronic equipment.

8. Torpedo information as follows:

a.  Torpedo countermeasures devices: T-MK6 (FANFARE) and NAE beacons.

b.  Tactical performance, tactical doctrine, and vulnerability to

countermeasures *

9. Design performance and functional characteristics of guided missiles,

guided projectiles, sonars, radars, acoustic equipments, and fire control




The Department of the Air Force has determined that the categories

identified in enclosure 2 of this Directive shall apply to Air Force




1. Technological developments; widespread public knowledge of the subject

matter; changes in military plans, operations, systems, or equipment;

changes in the foreign relations or defense commitments of the United

States; and similar events may bear upon the determination of whether

information should be declassified.  If the responsible DoD reviewer

decides that, in view of such circumstances, the public disclosure of the

information being reviewed no longer would result in damage to the

national security, the information shall be declassified.

2. The following are examples of considerations that may be appropriate in

deciding whether information in the categories listed in enclosure 2 may

be declassified when it is reviewed:

a.  The information no longer provides the United States a scientific,

engineering, technical, operational, intelligence, strategic, or tactical

advantage over other nations.

b.  The operational military capability of the United States revealed by

the information no longer constitutes a limitation on the effectiveness of

the Armed Forces.

c.  The information is pertinent to a system that no longer is used or

relied on for the defense of the United States or its allies and does not

disclose the capabilities or vulnerabilities of existing operational


d.  The program, project, or system information no longer reveals a currentweakness or vulnerability.

e.  The information pertains to an intelligence objective or diplomatic

initiative that has been abandoned or achieved and will no longer damage

the foreign relations of the United States.

f.  The information reveals the fact or identity of a U.S. intelligence

source, method, or capability that no longer is employed and that relates

to no current source, method, or capability that upon disclosure could

cause damage to national security or place a person in immediate jeopardy.

g.  The information concerns foreign relations matters whose disclosure canno longer be expected to cause or increase international tension to the

detriment of the national security of the United States.

3. Declassification of information that reveals the identities of

clandestine human agents shall be accomplished only in accordance with

procedures established by the Director of Central Intelligence for that


4. The NSA/CSS is the sole authority for the review and declassification

of classified cryptologic information.  The procedures established by the

NSA/CSS to facilitate the review and declassification of classified

cryptologic information are:

a.  COMSEC Documents and Materials

(1) If records or materials in this category are found in agency files

that are not under COMSEC control, refer them to the senior COMSEC

authority of the agency concerned or by appropriate channels to the

following address:

Director National Security Agency ATTN: Director of Policy (Q4) Fort

George G. Meade, Maryland 20755

(2) If the COMSEC information has been incorporated into other documents

by the receiving agency, referral to the NSA/CSS is necessary before


b.  SIGINT Information

(1) If the SIGINT information is contained in a document or record

originated by a DoD cryptologic organization, such as the NSA/CSS, and is

in the files of a noncryptologic agency, such material will not be

declassified if retained in accordance with an approved records

disposition schedule.  If the material must be retained, it shall be

referred to the NSA/CSS for systematic review for declassification.

(2) If the SIGINT information has been incorporated by the receiving

agency into documents it produces, referral to the NSA/CSS is necessary

before any declassification.


1. Statements of U.S. intent to defend, or not to defend, identifiable

areas, or along identifiable lines, in any foreign country or region.

2. Statements of U.S. intent militarily to attack in stated contingencies

identifiable areas in any foreign country or region.

3. Statements of U.S. policies or initiatives within collective security

organizations (for example, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and

Organization of American States (OAS)).

4. Agreements with foreign countries for the use of, or access to,

military facilities.

5. Contingency plans insofar as they involve other countries, the use of

foreign bases, territory or airspace, or the use of chemical, biological,

or nuclear weapons.

6. Defense surveys of foreign territories for purposes of basing or use in


7. Reports documenting conversations with foreign officials, that is,

foreign government information.


1. Cryptologic, cryptographic, or STGINT. (Information in this category

shall continue to be forwarded to the NSA/CSS in accordance with enclosure

4, paragraph 4. The NSA/CSS shall arrange for necessary coordination.)

2. Counterintelligence.

3. Special access programs.

4. Information that identifies clandestine organizations, agents, sources,

or methods.

5. Information on personnel under official or nonofficial cover or

revelation of a cover arrangement.

6. Covertly obtained intelligence reports and the derivative information

that would divulge intelligence sources or methods.

7. Methods or procedures used to acquire, produce, or support intelligence

activities *

3. CIA structure, size, installations, security, objectives, and budget.

9. Information that would divulge intelligence interests, value, or extent

of knowledge on a subject.

10. Training provided to or by the CIA that would indicate its capability

or identify personnel.

11. Personnel recruiting, hiring, training, assignment, and evaluation


12. Information that could lead to foreign political, economic, or

military action against the United States or its allies.

13. Events leading to international tension that would affect U.S. foreign


14. Diplomatic or economic activities affecting national security or

international security negotiations.

15. Information affecting U.S. plans to meet diplomatic contingencies

affecting national security.

16. Nonattributable activities conducted abroad in support of U.S. foreign


17. U.S. surreptitious collection in a foreign nation that would affect

relations with the country.

18. Covert relationships with international organizations or foreign


19. Information related to political or economic instabilities in a

foreign country threatening American lives and installations therein.

20. Information divulging U.S. intelligence collection and assessment


21. U.S. and allies' defense plans and capabilities that enable a foreign

entity to develop countermeasures.

22. Information disclosing U.S. systems and weapons capabilities or


23. Information on research, development, and engineering that enables the

United States to maintain an advantage of value to national security.

24. Information on technical systems for collection and production of

intelligence, and their use.

25. U.S. nuclear programs and facilities.

26. Foreign nuclear programs, facilities, and intentions.

27. Contractual relationships that reveal the specific interest and

expertise of the CIA.

28. Information that could result in action placing an individual in


29. Information on secret writing when it relates to specific chemicals,

reagents, developers, and microdots.

30. Reports of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) (--

Branch, -- Division) between July 31, 1946, and December 31, 1950, marked


31. Reports of the Foreign Documents Division between 1946 and 1950 marked

RESTRICTED or above.

32. Q information reports.

33. FDD translations.

34. U reports.