SORT: 5230.11
DOCI: DODD 5230.11
DATE: 19920616
TITL: DODD 5230.11, Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign
Governments and International Organizations, June 16, 1992, USD(P)

Refs: (a) DoD Directive 5230.11, "Disclosure of Classified Military
Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations,"
December 31, 1984 (hereby canceled)
(b) DoD Instruction 5230.17, "Procedures for Disclosure of Classified
Military Information to Foreign Governments and International
Organizations," February 17, 1985 (hereby canceled)
(c) National Disclosure Policy-1, "National Policy and Procedures for the
Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and
International Organizations," (short title: National Disclosure Policy
(NDP-1)), October 1, 1988
(d) through (t), see enclosure 1


This Directive reissues reference (a), replaces reference (b), implements
reference (c), and updates policy, responsibilities, and procedures
governing proposed disclosures of classified military information to
foreign governments and international organizations (hereafter referred to
as "foreign governments").


This Directive applies to:

1. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Unified and
Specified Commands, the Defense Agencies, and the DoD Field Activities
(hereafter referred to collectively as "the DoD Components").

2. All disclosures of classified military information defined in enclosure
2. Disclosures of military intelligence information, however, also must be
in compliance with DoD Directive C-5230.23 (reference (d)).

Provided to designated disclosure authorities on a need-to-know basis from
the Office of the Director for International Security Programs, Office of
the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Security Policy (ODUSD(SP)).

3. Classified information involved in munitions license applications
processed under DoD Directive 2040.2 and the ITAR (references (e) and


Terms used in this Directive are defined in enclosure 2.


It is U.S. national and DoD policy under NDP-1 (reference (c)) that:

1. Classified military information is a national security asset that shall
be protected and shall be shared with foreign governments only when there
is a clearly defined benefit to the United States.  Disclosures of such
information shall be made only when authorized by officials designated
under this Directive and then only when all requirements of this Directive
are met.

2. An official who has been specifically delegated disclosure authority
under section E., below, may authorize disclosures of classified military
information to foreign governments in support of a lawful and authorized
U.S. Government purpose if the:

a.  Official represents the DoD Component that originated the information.

b.  Level of classified information to be disclosed does not exceed the
classification level delegated by Annex A of reference (c).

c.  Criteria and conditions in enclosure 3 are satisfied.

3. The Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense are the
only DoD officials who have original authority to grant exceptions to the
policy contained in this Directive.  The Secretary of Defense has delegatedauthority to the National Military Information Disclosure Policy Committee
(NDPC) to consider and grant requests for exceptions to policy in
compliance with reference (c).

4. Classified military information shall not be disclosed to foreign
nationals until the appropriate designated disclosure authority receives a
security assurance from the recipient foreign government on the
individuals who are to receive the information.

5. In accordance with reference (c), it is U.S. policy to avoid creating
false impressions of U.S. readiness to make available classified military
information, materiel, or technology.  Accordingly, designated disclosure
authorities of the originating DoD Component, or, when an exception to
policy is required, the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of
Defense or the NDPC must authorize, in advance, proposals to be made to
foreign governments that could lead to the eventual disclosure of
classified military materiel, technology, or information.  Commitments
shall not be expressed or implied, and no disclosures shall be made
pending the required disclosure decision.

6. Disclosure planning shall include the following:

a.  Planning for possible foreign involvement should start at the beginningof the weapon system acquisition process and other programs, to facilitate
decisions on the disclosure of classified and controlled unclassified
information in support of cooperative programs, foreign participation in
the DoD procurement activities, and foreign sales.  The planning shall
include consideration of the requirements set forth in DoD Instruction
5000.2, Part 5, Section F (reference (g)).

b.  The DoD Components shall use the Technology Assessment/Control Plan in
DoD Directive 5530.3 (reference (h)) as the basis for making the stated
disclosure decisions in paragraph D.6.a., above, on weapon system

c.  A delegation of disclosure authority lefter (DDL) similar to that in
enclosure 4 shall be used to provide disclosure guidance to subordinate
commands and Agencies and, when applicable, to the DoD contractors.

7. All disclosures and denials of classified military information shall be
reported in the Foreign Disclosure and Technical Information System
(FORDTIS), in accordance with DoD Instruction 5230.18 (reference (i)). For
denials, disclosure authorities must take special care to record a concise
summary of the analysis that led to the denial.

8. Under conditions of actual or imminent hostilities, any Unified or
Specified Commander may disclose classified military information through
TOP SECRET to an actively participating allied force when support of
combined combat operations requires the disclosure of that information.
The appropriate U.S. Commander shall notify the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff of such disclosures.  The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, in turn, shall notify the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy, ATTN: Chairman, NDPC, who shall determine any limitations that
should be imposed on continuing disclosure of the information.  The U.S.
Commander shall be informed of any limitations through the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

9. The classified military information that is approved for foreign
disclosure shall be transmitted to the intended foreign recipient through
government-to-government channels, in accordance with DoD 5200. 1-R,
chapter 8 (reference (j)).


1. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy shall:

a.  Ensure effective implementation of the National Disclosure Policy and
operation of the NDPC under NDP-1 (reference (c)).

c.  System Countermeasures.  Withhold specific information on system counte-measures susceptibilities or vulnerabilities and counter-countermeasures
capabilities, until the sale, lease, loan, or grant is consummated.

d.  Operation.  Employment. Maintenance. and Training. Mter consummation ofa sale, lease, loan, or grant, classified military information may be
disclosed up to the level necessary for operation, eniployment,
maintenance, and training.

e.  Data Packages.  Edit or rewrite data packages to exclude information
that is beyond that which has been authorized for disclosure.

(1) The disclosure of technical data for production purposes shall be
limited to data that is necessary to produce a specific item that is
approved for release to the country that is to receive the data.

(2) The disclosure of technical data for maintenance purposes shall be
limited to data that is necessary to perform the level of maintenance that
has been authorized for the country that is to receive the data.

5. Foreign Test and Evaluation

& Foreign test and evaluation of the U.S. classified equipment may be
authorized when the tests:

(1) Are on an item approved for foreign disclosure by the appropriate
disclosure authority. (2) Can be performed at a U.S. installation or under
other strict U.S. control that guarantees appropriate safeguards for
classified information and classified or unclassified critical technology.
b.  Exceptions to subparagraph F.5.a.(2), above, such as the transfer of a
single classified military item for test and evaluation under foreign
security control, may be authorized only when all of the following
conditions are fulfilled: (1) There is no transfer of, and the test will
not reveal, technology that the United States would not license for
manufacture in the foreign country. (2) There is no release of equipment
that would not be approved for foreign sale or export to the foreign
country, if requested. (3) The release will result in a clearly defined
advantage to the United States; for example: (a) Specifically defined
avoidance of significant costs or acceleration of programs in development
efforts by the United States and its allies.

(b) Advance the objectives of standardization with and among U.S. allies
by promoting cooperation in research and development.

(c) Exchange technical and scientific information of common interest on a
mutually beneficial basis.

(4) The Secretary of the Military Department concerned, in coordination
with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition), approves
the exception as meeting the described conditions in paragraph F.5.b.,
above.  The Chair of the NDPC shall be informed of each exception; the
Chair shall notify the NDPC members.

(5) The test is performed under a test and evaluation agreement negotiated
under DoD Directive 5530.3 (reference (h)), or a lease arrangement or
sales contract containing requisite security controls.

(6) The releases are reported to the FORDS.

6. Foreign Participation in DoD Component Classified Training Activities

a.  Receiving Training on U.S. Equipment.  A foreign national may receive
training on U.S. equipment that is classified or involves classified
information, if the equipment is in the inventory of or is to be acquired
by the trainee's government after the following:

(1) The prospective trainee's government has concluded an international
agreement or signed a purchase agreement with the United States to acquire
the equipment and training; or

(2) The Defense Security Assistance Agency has issued an International
Military Education and Training (IMET) order for the training.

b.  Conducting Training on U.S. Equipment.  A foreign national may conduct
training on U.S. equipment that is classified or involves classified
information, if the item has been sold or otherwise provided to the
foreign national's government and the U.S. Government has specifically
approved the provisions of such training to any third party that is

c.  Third-Country Equipment.  Foreign nationals may receive or conduct
training on equipment provided by a third-country that is classified or
involves third-country classified information only with the prior written
consent of the government that provided the equipment.

7. Requests for Classified Documents

a.  Disclosure Review.  Requests for classified documents by a foreign
representative shall be forwarded to the applicable designated disclosure
authority of the originating DoD Component for review and approval or
denial.  The requests shall be processed using the FORDTIS, when

b.  Report to the FORDS. The designated disclosure authority that renders
the decision shall report it to the FORDS under DoD Instruction 5230.18

c.  Reference Lists and Bibliographic Material.  To avoid false impressionsand to avoid proliferation of requests for classified military information
that is not releasable to the requestor, the DoD Components shall:

(1) When practical, excise references to nonreleasable documents and
information from material that may be otherwise released.

(2) Discourage release of documents that are reference lists or are
bibliographic.  To react favorably to justified foreign requests for
information, identify the requestor's specific requirements and provide
only the U.S. information that satisfies that requirement and is
determined to be releasable.

8. Foreign Access to Information When Participating in U.S. Procurement
Programs.  Participation consistent with applicable U.S. laws, regulations,and security requirements in DoD procurement initiatives by contractors
from countries with which the Department of Defense has agreements that
encourage reciprocal participation in defense procurement may include
access to classified information consistent with this Directive as

a.  Access to Technical Data.  Qualified government and industry
representatives from those countries shall be given appropriate access to
technical data, consistent with this Directive and the ITAR (reference
(f)), necessary to bid on the DoD contracts.

b.  Disclosure Decisions.  Disclosure decisions involving those countries
shall be made before the announcement of the procurement (see subsection
D.6., above), and the announcement shall describe any restrictions on
foreign participation.

c.  Participation as Subcontractor.  When it is determined that foreign
contractors are not authorized to participate in the classified or other
sensitive aspects of a potential contract, consideration should be given
to their requests for participation in unclassified or less sensitive
aspects of the contract as a subcontractor.

d.  Requests for Documentation.  Requests by foreign entities for classifieor controlled unclassified documentation must be submitted through
government channels.

9. NDPC Operations.  The following procedures apply to the activities

a.  Exceptions to NDP-1

(1) Exceptions to NDP-1 (reference (c)), other than those granted by the
Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense, shall be granted
only by the NDPC.

(2) All proposed disclosure actions that require decisions by the
Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense shall contain the
views of the originating DoD Component or Agency and shall be coordinated
with the Chair of the NDPC.

(3) When the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense
grants an exception to policy, the DoD Component originating or
participating in the determination shall notify the Chair of the NDPC so
that the exception may be recorded properly and reported promptly to the
NDPC members and the National Security Council and recorded in the FORDS.

(4) All other requests for exception to policy shall:

(a) Be forwarded through channels to the designated disclosure authority
who represents the requestor's organization on the NDPC.

(b) At a minimum, include the information in enclosure 5.

b.  Reporting to the NDPC of Compromises of U.S. Classified Military
Information Furnished to Foreign Governments.  The DoD Components having
knowledge of compromises of U.S. classified information by foreign
governments promptly shall inform the originating DoD Component.  The
originating DoD Component shall conduct a damage assessment and shall
provide copies of the completed case report and damage assessment to the
Chair of the NDPC. If the originating DoD Component is not known, the
Chair of the NDPC shall conduct the damage assessment and prepare the case
report.  In either situation, the Chair of the NDPC shall provide the NDPC
with an evaluation to serve as a basis for determining whether the nature
of the compromise requires a change in reference (c).

c.  Operation of the NDPC

(1) NDP-1, NDPC Record of Action 001.7/70 (references
(c) and (o)), and this Directive govern the DoD Component participation in
the NDPC operations.

(2) The DoD Components shall provide qualified personnel to participate on
the NDPC security survey teams, when requested.  The parent DoD Component
shall bear travel and per diem expenses for participants.

(3) The DoD members of NDPC security survey teams shall participate in pre
-departure briefings, all scheduled team activities, and the preparation
of all reports and briefings resulting from the security survey.

d.  Cooperation with the NDPC. Under the NDP-1 (reference (c)), the Chair
of the NDPC acts for and in the name of the Secretary of Defense in
carrying out the decisions of the NDPC. All of the DoD Components shall
support the Chair's requests for assistance in disclosure matters.

10. Classification Requirements.  DoD 5200. 1-R (reference (j))governs
classification and safeguarding of classified information.  The DoD
Components also shall follow the security classification guide for NDP
matters in enclosure 6.


The reports referenced in this Directive are exempt from licensing in
accordance with paragraph E.4.b. of DoD 7750.5-M (reference (p)).


This Directive is effective immediately.  Forward one copy of implementing
documents to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy within 120 days.

Donald J. Atwood Deputy Secretary of Defense

Enclosures - 6 1. References 2. Definitions 3. NDP-1 Disclosure Criteria,
Conditions, and Limitations 4. The DDL 5. Requests for Exception to Policy
6. Security Classification Guide for NDP (DATA OMITTED)

REFERENCES. continued

(d) DoD Directive C-5230.23, "Intelligence Disclosure Policy. (u),"
November 18, 1983
(e) DoD Directive 2040.2, "International Transfers of Technology, Goods,
Services, and Munitions," January 17, 1984
(f) Title 22, Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 120-130, "International
Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)"
(g) DoD Instruction 5000.2, "Defense Acquisition Management Policies and
Procedures," February 23, 1991
(h) DoD Directive 5530.3, "International Agreements," June 11, 1987
(i) DoD Instruction 5230.18, "The DoD Foreign Disclosure and Technical
Information System (FORDTIS)," November 6, 1984
(j) DoD 5200. 1-R, "Information Security Program Regulation," June 1986,
authorized by DoD Directive 5200.1, June 7, 1982
(k) Public Law 83-703, "Atomic Energy Act of 1954," August 30, 1954, as
amended (Sections 2121, 2153, and 2164 of title 42, United States Code)
(l) DoD 7110. 1-M, "Department of Defense Budget Guidance Manual," May
1990, authorized by DoD Instruction 7110.1, October 30, 1980
(m) DoD Directive 5200.12, "Conduct of Classified Meetings," May 16, 1988
(n) DoD Directive 5230.20, "Control of Foreign Representatives," June 25,
1984 (o) National Military Information Disclosure Policy Committee Record
of Action 001.7/70, "NDPC Detailed Operating Procedures," September 15,
(p) DoD 7750.5-M, "DoD Procedures for Management of Information
Requirements," November 1986, authorized by DoD Directive 7750.5, August
7, 1986
(q) Executive Order 12356, "National Security Information," April 2, 1982
(r) DoD Directive 5230.25, "Withholding of Unclassified Technical Data
from Public Disclosure," November 6, 1984
(s) DoD Directive 5400.7, "DoD Freedom of Information Act Program," May
13, 1988
(t) Title 15, Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 730-799, "Export
Administration Regulations (EAR)"


1. Classified Military Equipment.  Military equipment that is itself
classified; contains classified information that may be derived from or
revealed by its operation or testing; or will require the disclosure of
classified information for operation, employment, maintenance, or

2. Classified Military Information.  Information originated by or for the
Department of Defense or its Agencies or is under their jurisdiction or
control and that requires protection in the interests of national
security.  It is designated TOP SECRET, SECRET, and CONFIDENTIAL, as
described in E.O. 12356 (reference (q)). Classified military information
may be in oral, visual, or material form and has been subdivided further
into the eight categories described below:

a.  Category 1 - Organization.  Training. and Employment of Military ForcesInformation of a general nature pertaining to tactics, techniques,
tactical doctrine, and intelligence and counterintelligence doctrine and
techniques.  Excluded is information necessary for the operation, training,and maintenance on specific equipment covered under Categories 2 and 3,

b.  Category 2 - Military Materiel and Munitions.  Information on specific
items of equipment already in production, or in service, and the
information necessary for the operation, maintenance, and training.  Items
on the U.S. Munitions List fall within this category.  This category does
not pertain to equipment that is in research and development.

c.  Category 3 - Applied Research and Development Information and Materiel
Information related to fundamental theories, design, and experimental
investigation into possible military applications; it includes engineering
data, operational requirements, concepts, and military characteristics
required to adopt the item for production.  Development ceases when the
equipment has completed suitability testing and has been adopted for use
or production.

d.  Category 4 - Production Information.  Information related to designs,
specifications, manufacturing techniques, and such related information
necessary to manufacture materiel and munitions.

e.  Category 5 - Combined Military Operations.  Planning. and Readiness
Information necessary to plan, ensure readiness for, and provide support
to the achievement of mutual force development goals or participation in
specific combined tactical operations and exercises.  It does not include
strategic plans and guidance or North American defense information.

f.  Category 6 - U.S. Order of Battle.  Information pertaining to U.S.
forces in a specific are& In general, disclosures of this information are
limited to those countries in which U.S. forces are stationed or are in
adjacent geographical areas.

g.  Category 7 - North American Defense.  Information related to plans,
operations, programs, and projects, to include data and equipment,
directly related to North American defense.

h.  Category 8 - Military Intelligence.  Information of a military charactepertaining to foreign nations.  This category of information does not
include national intelligence or sensitive compartmented information under
the purview of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).

3. Controlled Unclassified Information.  Unclassified information to which
access or distribution limitations have been applied in accordance with
national laws, policies, and regulations of the originating country.  It
includes U.S. information that is determined to be exempt from public
disclosure in accordance with DoD Directives 5230.25 and 5400.7
(references (r) and (s)) or that is subject to export controls in
accordance with the ITAR (reference (f)) or the EAR (reference (t)).

4. Delegation of Disclosure Authority Letter (DDL). A letter issued by the
appropriate designated disclosure authority explaining classification
levels, categories, scope, and limitations of information under a DoD
Component's disclosure jurisdiction that may be disclosed to a foreign
recipient.  It is used to delegate disclosure authority to subordinate
disclosure authorities.

5. Designated Disclosure Authority.  An official, at subordinate component
level, designated by the Head of a DoD Component or the Component's
Principal Disclosure Authority to control disclosures of classified
military information by his or her organization

6. Disclosure.  Conveying classified information, in any manner, to an
authorized representative of a foreign government.

7. Foreign Disclosure and Technical Information System (FORDTIS). An
automated system to assist decision makers and analysts in reviewing,
coordinating, and reaching decisions concerning proposals to release
classified military information, materiel, and technology to foreign

8. Government-to-Government Channels.  The principle that classified
information and materiel will be transferred by government officials
through official channels or through other channels expressly agreed upon
by the governments involved.  In either case, the information or materiel
may be transferred only to a person specifically designated in writing by
the foreign government as its representative for that purpose.

9. Intelligence.  The product resulting from the collection, processing,
integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available
information concerning foreign countries or areas.

10. International Organization.  An entity established by recognized
governments pursuant to an international agreement which, by charter or
otherwise, is able to acquire and transfer property, make contracts and
agreements, obligate its members, and pursue legal remedies.

11. Joint Information.  Military information over which two or more DoD
Components, or two or more Federal Departments or Agencies, exercise
control, jurisdiction, or security awareness.

12. Meeting.  A conference, seminar, symposium, exhibit, convention,
training course, or other gathering during which classified or controlled
unclassified information is disclosed.

13. Originating DoD Component.  The DoD Agency that exercises original
classification jurisdiction for classified information.

14. Security Assurance.  The written confirmation, requested by and
exchanged between governments, of the security clearance level or
eligibility for clearance, of their employees, contractors, and citizens.
It includes a statement by a responsible official of a foreign government
that the original recipient of U.S. classified military information
possesses the requisite security clearance and is approved by his or her
government for access to information of the security classification
involved on behalf of the foreign government and that the recipient will
comply with any security requirements specified by the United States.  In
the case of industrial facilities, the security assurance should include a
statement concerning the level of storage capability.

15. Sensitive Compartmented Information.  Information and material that
requires special controls for restricted handling within compartmented
intelligence systems and for which compartmentation is established.

16. Strategic War Plan.  A plan for the overall conduct of a war.


A. Disclosure Criteria.  Disclosures of classified military information in
Categories 1 through 8 defined in item 2 of enclosure 2 may be made only
when all of the criteria listed in subsections A-I. through 5., below, are
satisfied.  Disclosures in Category 8 also must be in compliance with DoD
Directive C-5230.23 (reference (d)).

1. Disclosure is consistent with U.S. foreign policy and national security
objectives concerning the proposed recipient foreign government.  For

a.  The recipient government cooperates with the United States in pursuanceof military and political objectives that are compatible with those of the
United States.

b.  A specific U.S. national purpose, diplomatic or military, will be

c.  The information will be used in support of mutual defense and security

2. Disclosure is consistent with U.S. military and security objectives.
For example:

a.  Disclosures of advanced technology, if compromised, will not constitutean unreasonable risk to the U.S. position in military technology and
operational capabilities, regardless of the intended recipient.

b.  The proposed disclosure reflects the need for striking a proper balancebetween pursuit of our mutual defense and foreign policy objectives on the
one hand and the preservation of the security of our military secrets on
the other.

3. The foreign recipient of the information will afford it substantially
the same degree of security protection given to it by the United States.
(The intent of a foreign government to protect U.S. classified military
information is established in part by the negotiation of a General
Security of Information Agreement or other similar security arrangement.  Aforeign government's capability to protect U.S. classified military
information normally is determined by the evaluation of embassy security
assessments, Central Intelligence Agency risk assessments, National
Military Information Disclosure Policy Committee (NDPC) Security Survey
Reports, and/or historical precedence.)

4. Disclosures will result in benefits to the United States at least
equivalent to the value of the information disclosed.  For example:

a.  The United States obtains information from the recipient nation on a
quid pro quo basis. information about strategic war plans.  Requests for
such disclosure shall be submitted through the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.

2. Specifically Prohibited Disclosures.  The following types of classified
information are specifically prohibited from disclosure:

a.  Classified information officially obtained from a foreign government,
except when the information has been conveyed by the government with
express written consent to its further disclosure.

b.  Combined information without prior agreement of all parties.

c.  Joint information without prior agreement of all Departments or
Agencies having control or jurisdiction.

d.  Information originated by or for another Department or Agency, unless
that Department or Agency consents to the disclosure.

e.  Intelligence information described in section I, subparagraph 5.c.(2)
and section ll, subparagraph 5.b.(7) of NDP-1 (reference (c)).


The following DDL format should be used by the DoD Components: (While all
elements identified should be provided in the general order shown,
information should be presented in the clearest and easiest-to-use manner.
For example, the usefulness of the DDL for complex systems will be
enhanced if items 5 and 6 are broken out by major subsystems and software
and disclosures are discussed separately.)


1. CLASSIFICATION: Identify highest classification of information to be

2. DISCLOSURE METHODS: E.g., oral, visual, or documentary.

3. CATEGORIES PERMITTED: Specify National Disclosure Policy categories to
be disclosed.

4. SCOPE: Specify who is authorized to release material or information,
and to whom disclosure is authorized.

information that can be released or disclosed.

information that cannot be released or disclosed. (In addition to
providing specific descriptions of releasable and restricted materiel and
information, items 5 and 6 will also specify any conditions or limitations
to be imposed; e.g., time-phasing of release, allowable forms for
software, identification of items releasable only as finished, tested
assemblies, etc.)

7. PROCEDURES: Specify review and release procedures, special security
procedures, or protective measures to be imposed.

8. REDELEGATION: Specify the extent of redelegation of authority (if any)
permitted to subordinate activities.


Requests for an exception to policy shall contain the following elements
of information:

1. A concise statement of the action proposed.  Include security
classification and categories of U.S. classified military information to
be disclosed. (For example: "The OUSD(A) member, National Disclosure
Policy Committee (NDPC), requests an exception to the National Disclosure
Policy to permit the disclosure of SECRET Category 3 (Applied Research and
Development Information and Materiel) information to the Government of
___________ in support of the negotiation of a Data Exchange Agreement
pertaining to surface-to-air missiles.")

2. A precise statement of why an exception to policy is required. (For
example: An exception is required because (a) the level of classified
information involved exceeds the classification level delegated in Annex A
of NDP-1; or (b) the proposed action is not in consonance with policy
currently established in Annex B or C of NDP-1; or (c) certain (identify
which) of the disclosure criteria or conditions listed in section ll. of
NDP-1 are not fully met; or
(d) any or all of the above in combination.)

3. An assessment of how each of the disclosure criteria and conditions in
section ll. of NDP-1 shall be met:

a. "Disclosure is consistent with the foreign policy of the United States
toward the Government of ___________." (A further detailed discussion
shall be included to substantiate this statement.  Reference shall be made
to Presidential, National Security Council, or other high-level policy
decisions to support the justification provided.  A simple statement such
as "the recipient cooperates with the United States in pursuance of
military and political objectives" is not sufficient.)

b. "The military security of the United States permits disclosure." (If
equipment or technology is involved, there must be a discussion on the
result of a compromise on U.S. operational capability or the U.S. position
in military technology.  This discussion shall include an analysis of the
state of the art regarding the technology involved, the susceptibility of
the item to reverse engineering, the capability of the foreign recipient
to reverse engineer the item, the foreign availability of the technology
or equipment involved, and other governments to whom similar equipment or
technology has been released.)

c. "The foreign recipient will afford the information substantially the
same degree of security protection given to it by the United States." (If
there has been an NDPC Security Survey for the proposed recipient, the
conclusion reached therein shall be discussed.  In the absence of an NDPC
Security Survey, efforts shall be made to obtain, through intelligence
channels, a counterintelligence risk assessment or security analysis of
the foreign government's security capabilities.  The mere statement that
"classified information has been released previously to this government
and there is no indication that such information has been compromised" is
not sufficient.)

d. "Disclosures will result in benefits to the United States at least
equivalent to the value of the information disclosed." (For example: (1)
if the United States obtains information from the proposed recipient on a
quid-pro-quo basis, describe the information and the value to the United
States; (2) explain how the exchange of military information for
participation in a cooperative project will be advantageous to the United
States from a technical or military capability viewpoint; (3) if the
development or maintenance of a high degree of military strength and
effectiveness on the part of the recipient government will be advantageous
to the United States, explain how.)

e. "The disclosure is limited to information necessary to the purpose for
which disclosure is made." (For example, if the purpose of the request is
for the sale of equipment only, it shall be indicated clearly that
research and development data or production know-how is not to be divulged
or that documentation will be sanitized.)

4. Any limitations placed on the proposed disclosure in terms of
information to be disclosed, disclosure schedules, or other pertinent
caveats that may affect NDPC approval or denial of the request. (If
disclosures are to be phased or if certain information is not to be
released, the phasing or nonreleasable information shall be specified.)

5. A statement that the requested exception is to be either a continuing
exception, subject to annual review, or a one-time exception. (A
continuing exception usually is associated with a long-term project, such
as a coproduction program or military sale when the United States will be
obligated to provide life-cycle support.  A one-time exception typically isused for a briefing or demonstration or short-term training.)

6. The names and titles of U.S. officials accredited to the requesting
foreign government or international organization with whom the proposed
exception has been coordinated, as well as the views of the Theater
Commander. (Sufficient time shall be allowed to obtain an opinion from
U.S. Embassy personnel in-country and the responsible Theater Commander
before submitting the request for approval.  Many cases are delayed becausea U.S. Embassy or Theater Commander opinion has not been obtained.) 7. The
opinion of other interested Departments or Agencies if joint Service or
shared information is involved. (If the information or item of equipment
is of shared or joint interest, such as an air-to-air missile used by two
Services or containing technology of concern to another Service, the views
of the other party will be included.) 8. Any information not mentioned
above that would assist the NDPC members, the Secretary of Defense, or the
Deputy Secretary of Defense in evaluating the proposal.

9. The name and telephone number of a knowledgeable individual within the
requesting organization who can provide additional technical detail or
clarification concerning the case at issue.

10. The date a response is desired on the case.  Ten full working days for
NDPC case deliberations should be allowed.  The suspense date (10 full
working days) is computed starting from the first full working day after
the date of the request.

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