Along with combinations of intelligence disciplines, we'll seek synergy through combining joint and combined collectors, and we'll combine collection assets and efforts at the tactical, theater, and national levels of command. We'll use theater exercises and situational training exercises (STX) to develop our expertise to tip, cue and develop combinations sufficient to create synergy.

• INTERACT WITH CONSUMERS OF OUR INFORMATION. People who run our collection system will constantly consult with consumers of our information. Our system will possess the means to determine if the collection system is responding with the timeliness, accuracy, and specificity consumers need, formally and informally.

Our system will have an active dialog to exchange information for the times when the intelligence system is incapable of doing what consumers want. It will be absolutely necessary to keep our consumers in the loop of intelligence collection, requirements management, and satisfaction of requirements.

Our system will be governed by daily I&W requirements on-peninsula and support to TPFDL units joining us in crisis and war. We'll exercise our channels of communication and information flows continuously -- our collection management personnel will always know off-peninsula forces' information requirements because of continuous dialog by telephone, computer, message, or in-person.

• INTELLIGENCE SYNCHRONIZATION. Our collection managers will develop and use intelligence synchronization matrices to support a commander's decision-support templates, attack-guidance matrices, or other schema designed to synchronize information with commanders' battle rhythm requirements. These matrices will come from decision support templates (DSTs) or attack guidance matrices planners develop and from intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) where we break the battlefield into meaningful pieces and confirm or deny enemy activity at named areas of interest (NAIs), target areas of interest (TAIs), decision points (DPs). Intelligence synchronization will complement and support plan, decide, execute (PDE), integrated tasking order (ITO), and combined targeting-board (CTB) activities.
• COUPLING INFORMATION WITH KILLING SYSTEMS. In our intelligence system, the sine qua non will be the effective coupling of information with combat killing systems. Our collection efforts must relate to and complement commanders' efforts to shape battlefield conditions, destroy the enemy, or dominate his will. As such, our collection management organization will maintain close relations with deep battle and estimates to provide information for future battle and decision making in the battle rhythm cycle.
• RESPOND TO FAST CHANGING CONDITIONS. Our collection management system will be responsive to fast changing conditions of the battlefield. Because we'll always have resource constraints, we'll establish priorities, live with them, but be capable of adjusting priorities and focus with changing variables. Our collection priorities will come from the CINC, DCINC, CG EUSA, and other warfighters. Our system will be responsive to tactical and operational conditions, e.g., we'll task collectors to provide fine-grained tactical intelligence along with broader information requirements prevalent at the operational level of war.
• EXERCISE AND TRAIN THE COLLECTION-MANAGEMENT SYSTEM. Because of complexity and turnover, we'll exercise collection management and train personnel who work with collection at every opportunity to ensure we can always accomplish wartime tasks and improve what we do in armistice. We'll use peninsula exercises and information situational training exercises (STXs) as training vehicles. Collection management training will focus on creating combinations of collection capabilities, accomplishing critical tasks, collective and individual, developing and executing intelligence synchronization matrices, and working with preplanned and ad hoc collection missions to enable us to be responsive.
• GUARD AGAINST COMPLACENCY. Our collection management system will constantly be on the lookout for complacency -- for the possibility we may be overlooking a piece of key evidence, be missing something such as a key piece of information, or be confusing minimally valuable information with valuable information. To this end, our collection-management effort will have procedures in place to review and study collection statistics produced by collection agencies and activities systematically to discern trends and aggregates and to feed results of the analysis back into the I&W system via tweaking and steerage. This effort will involve analysts of IP and component fusion centers.

Capable Operations System -- Crisis and War

Our operations system will operate capably in armistice and war.

• WEIGHT BATTLEFIELD WITH INFORMATION. Our operations system will weight the battlefield with information by using and deploying processors and intelligence communications systems around the battlefield.
  • Our operations people will know precisely what systems and people arrive for force deployment options (FDO) and 5027, and where they will go.
  • Our operations people will ensure organizations identified in plans know essentials, e.g., who gets what, where, and when.
  • Our operations people will understand the 501st MI Brigade's deployable intelligence support element (DISE) and off-peninsula DISE's arriving during war.
  • Our operations system will acknowledge and know how to use other mobile systems potentially offering the capability to weight the battlefield with information including TROJAN SPIRIT, JMICS, STICS, Critical Source, and mini-DISE.

Incumbent on our operations personnel though, will be an absolute requirement to understand exactly what it takes to move people and machinery around a cluttered battlefield populated by friendly and enemy soldiers and civilian personnel.

• TRACKING ARRIVING INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL, ORGANIZATIONS, ASSETS, AND MAINTAINING RSRS. Our operations organization will accurately track arriving TPFDL units and parts of force-deployment options FDOs relevant to the intelligence system. Our operations section will and keep track of subordinate resource status reports (RSRs), in particular collection and processing equipment, and advise decision makers how systems status affect our efforts to acquire information.
• INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIVITY LINKS. Our intelligence system will connect through links; through this connectivity, our system will be seamless. Links are hubs where automation, collection, communications, and intellect merge. We have processors and communications devices in links throughout the peninsula. Intelligence processes occur in these links, e.g., collection, IPB, intelligence support to targeting, BDA, C2W, dissemination, future planning, prediction.

Currently, our links are in place and work every day. Maintaining our links in war, however, will always place extra stress on our system. To ensure our links work in war as well as armistice, we'll always pay very close ATTENTION TO DETAIL -- routers, protocols, crypto, segments, uplinks, downlinks, bandwidth, net control, net discipline, maintenance.

Links are analogous to muscles: We must exercise them for maximum capability. Without exercise, our links will atrophy. Thus, we must exercise our links in armistice as we shall use them in war. Since maintenance of systems in links will be so critical, we'll have priorities of contractor maintenance for supporting the theater's critical nodes.

• TIPPING AND CUEING. Tipping and cueing is one of the critical aspects of creating combinations to promote synergy. To promote tipping and cueing on- and off-peninsula, we must work with CONUS forces during armistice. As such, we'll identify intelligence needs and requirements in armistice for when we go to war. Plus, we'll coordinate with and know the requirements of off-peninsula units -- Marines, Navy, and Army. We'll define and fragment these off-peninsula links to determine what communications and automation are in them, what processes they perform, and what information and requirements come from the links.
• ACCESS TO INFORMATION. Because information is of such value and so necessary to commanders, we must ensure its availability without hindrance from having to operate with lethargic layers of bureaucracy. We'll continuously operate a seamless intelligence system in which information complements other information horizontally and vertically, joint and combined, tactical to national.

Seams in our intelligence system will be transparent to users. We'll have a system in which we can easily PUSH information to consumers over multiple routes. Plus, our system will facilitate consumers PULLING information from us. We'll also employ broadcast information to enable the widest dissemination of information across levels of command. We'll practice pushing and pulling information, following link fragmentation with on-and off-peninsular units on a daily basis. Intelligence will be on-line and interactive, offering all echelons near-instantaneous access to information. We'll operate in armistice as we'll operate in war.

Effective Intelligence Dissemination System -- Works in Armistice and War

Our dissemination system will work effectively in armistice and war. By the phrase "work effectively," I mean information reaches consumers in the form, timeliness, and degree of specificity they need.

• MULTIPLE PATHS TO REACH CONSUMERS OF INFORMATION. Our graphic and imagery products will often require large amounts of bandwidth. Thus, our system will have multiple paths flexible enough to handle products with large or small bandwidths. Our systems managers will possess sufficient knowledge to know what information to send over what route and associated time and bandwidth costs. Images, for example, will move over large bandwidth pipes. Text will move over small bandwidth paths.

If the backbone goes out for any reason, our intelligence system will use alternative routes to provide information to consumers. Our operations section will maintain sufficient contact with Signal officials for the capability to send information by primary plus at least three alternative routes. Our intelligence system will boast redundant communications with necessary and available bandwidth to move any type of information we deem necessary, plus alternative routes if a primary route fails.

• ALTERNATIVE ROUTES FOR MOVING INFORMATION. Alternative routes will include SATCOM, TRITAC terrestrial, UHF SATCOM and terrestrial, microwave, and FM/HF. Our system will routinely practice ALL PRIMARY AND ALTERNATIVE ROUTES for sending information.

Automation and communications

Our system will have an aggressive, far-reaching, and meaningful plan for moving into the future and leveraging new technologies. This plan will comply with legacy and migration policies of DoD. This plan will seek every opportunity to work with new technologies and apply information these technologies produce to execute combat power and setting conditions for successful planning and execution of combat power effects.

• STRIVE FOR IMPROVEMENT. Our intelligence system will push forward into the 21st century, always improving, fueled by a coherent strategy for upgrading, expanding, and improving. Our dissemination system strategy will correlate nicely with plans of peninsula communications expansion strategy and PACOM communications strategy for the Pacific.

Our intelligence system of the future will operate in armistice as well as war over a local area network (LAN) as well as a wide-area network (WAN) on- and off-peninsula. Members of our LAN and WAN will be linked through video-teleconferencing. Our system of the future will take advantage of emerging technologies, such as integrated service data network (ISDN) and asynchronous transfer mode (ATM). Our goal of the future will be to have access to T-1 to T-4 communications paths when and where we need it

• EASE OF USE. Our system will be easy to use, enabling ROK and U.S. users the comfort of their language. Our machines will be state of the art with respect to processing speed and memory.
• SYSTEM COMMONALITY. Our systems will operate in a DoD common operating environment (COE) and will be totally adaptive to new technologies without having to buy new hardware with every new advancement in technology.
• INTERACTIVITY. Our machines will be totally interactive among U.S. joint services and with our ROK counterparts. Our machines will be able to send automatic data feeds into the machines of coalition partners or among joint services.
• GRAPHIC AWARENESS. Our automation and communications system will allow for graphic situational awareness (visualization) of the battlefield and virtual reality to allow wargaming through simulation. Our automation and communications will allow us to use video to gain knowledge of the battlefield and to plan courses of action we've heretofore never had. Video will come from a combination of simulation and imagery.
• SUFFICIENT BANDWIDTH. Our automation and communications system will have bandwidth sufficient for moving video and imagery to those who need it. At the same time, our system will have the means to manage bandwidth intelligently by using large pipes for pithy products and small pipes for text and updates or less time-sensitive information.
• DIAL-UP BROADCAST. Our system will evolve to a dial-up broadcast dissemination schema much akin to dialing a television. People will be able to input screens and mats into their computers that identify types of information they need and broadcast systems will provide what they ask for when they want it.
• AUTOMATION TRAINING. Intellectual energy coming from modern learning programs will fuel our automation and communications systems. Operators and analysts will use distance learning complete with interactive video that couples learners with mentors, on- and off-peninsula.
• REDUNDANCY. Our automation and communications system will be redundant, minimizing single points of failure. Our servers will be semi-autonomous, capable of seeking or receiving automatically database updates and accessing databases on- and off-peninsula with ease.

Intel Support To Targeting -- Responsive to Warfighter Requirements

As one of the critical functions of any effective intelligence system, providing timely, specific, and accurate information to targeteers will be one of our critical functions. This information comes from tools we call collection systems. We have some highly accurate tools now. We'll sharpen existing procedures and be on the lookout for new procedures for integrating information these collection tools provide with killing systems and practice such linkages in a wide variety of conditions.

• THE PROBLEM. Targeting is hard work; we have to orchestrate collection, automation, and communications, focusing them with good analysis and synthesis. Moreover, we face an interactive foe so our efforts become a duel of sorts because we are attempting to influence something he's protecting and he is attempting to influence something we're protecting. Additionally, targeting takes precision and timeliness difficult to achieve from theater and national sensors. Thus, to achieve our desired level of precision, we'll have to develop combinations of collection to achieve synergy. With synergy, where the whole is greater or more valuable than the sum of its parts, we can achieve the precision of time and space we need to be totally effective in our targeting efforts. Targeting also takes degrees of timeliness that become more demanding, unforgiving, and imperative the lower we go in levels of war and to meet vagaries inherent in any fast-changing situation.
• RELATIONSHIPS. Our support to targeting depends on up-front analysis, focused, complementary collection, processing, and meaningful information -- meaningful defined as timely, specific, accurate. Much competition will exist in armistice or war for scarce collection assets. Thus, our system will focus collection efforts on what's meaningful to those we serve. Of particular importance, we'll establish a strong correlation among PIR, centers of gravity, and high payoff targets (HPTs). Centers of gravity and high payoff targets should be part of the PIR and should correlate with the overall targeting effort. In our system, commanders will focus our priority efforts; they will do so through discussions of and statements about PIR, centers of gravity, and high payoff targets.
• BATTLE RHYTHM. Our planning-decide-execute (PDE) cycle will be an essential ingredient in winning quickly in a fight on the peninsula. We call this cycle BATTLE RHYTHM. Information at the right time, in right form will be increasingly critical to winning on the modern battlefield quickly and decisively with minimal casualties.

Targeting is an essential part of any commander's battle rhythm -- targeting kills people, breaks their things, and affects their will. Effective targeting can't exist without useful information. Thus, our intelligence system will closely intertwine with the commander's battle rhythm. Our system will proactively and aggressively structure combinations of collection and analytic/synthesis efforts to anticipate and produce information the commander needs to fuel decisions in anticipating, shaping the battlefield, and creating effects necessary to establish conditions to defeat our foes decisively.

Our support will draw its rationale from predictive estimates, interaction with joint and combined forces on the combined targeting board, and GCC deep operations coordination cell (DOCC). Our system will be extremely proficient at relating collection and production efforts to information requirements of the commander when and in what form he needs it. Our system shall orchestrate efforts of peninsula fusion centers and national collectors to satisfy information requirements coming from theater battle rhythm.

Theater missile defense (TMD)

Our theater missile defense system will capture the good work already done and move into the future with even better analyses, tied to the quick capture of information from collection systems. Our TMD efforts will tie into other theater efforts and national intelligence agencies. Our system will exploit strengths inherent to each level of command and minimize weaknesses of each. Our system will comprise many elements, some seemingly disparate, but all will relate and, in fact will become a tapestry of effort stretching across command and levels of war boundaries. In a theoretical sense, our system will be an interaction of ACTIVE effort seeking before the event, and a PASSIVE effort seeking after the event. We'll have a TMD effort that is focused by analysis. Analysis will be fueled by inputs from myriad sensors concentrating on direct sensor feeds to enhance timeliness. Collection will come from all sources including HUMINT SOF with NRT communications and laser designators. The TMD effort, focused into meaning through synthesis, will be an all-source effort to achieve sensor to shooter precision in timeliness and accuracy.

Active, System-wide Armistice and War Intelligence Security System

Our system will have an interacting web of information for force protection during armistice. This web will include U.S. counterintelligence, U.S. Military Police, ROK counterintelligence, embassy, DoDSA-K, ROK police, and off-peninsula personnel involved in keeping track of force-protection problems and anticipating future problems. Information force-protection personnel provide will be accurate, timely, and specific. This information will move quickly around the peninsula providing timely warning of impending activities to commanders.

• STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL TERRORISM. Our intelligence and security system will be attuned to potential acts of terrorism, strategic and tactical in armistice and war. As such, we shall perform vulnerability analyses applicable to armistice, crisis, and war, and will design countermeasures. Additionally, we'll gain access for U.S. counterintelligence personnel to Defense Information Terrorist Database System (DITDS) run by DIA, to assist in our force-protection business.
• GTW HUMINT ARCHITECTURE. We'll have a viable go-to-war HUMINT architecture; it shall include HUMINT communications, critical nodes, personnel, and activities on- and off-peninsula. In particular, we'll define ROLES AND MISSIONS, TASKING, COORDINATION, REPORTING, and COMMUNICATIONS for all agencies and people involved in a fight on the peninsula. We'll practice our GTW architecture at every opportunity. Additionally, we'll codify and promulgate our architecture so those participating in crisis or war, and those following us in service on the peninsula, know the system and its stringent, unforgiving requirements.
• LONG-RANGE SURVEILLANCE PLAN. Our theater intelligence system will have a workable plan for long-range surveillance at the tactical and operational levels of war. The plan will include procedures for TASKING, COORDINATING, PROCESSING, and REPORTING. The end-state for this element of the vision will be timely, accurate, and specific information coming to GCC and ACC fusion centers being included in screen capture updates and graphic fusion INTSUMs. This effort will cut across many disciplines and will involve ROK Army participation. Along with identifying and codifying the process of tasking, coordinating, and reporting, we must practice in armistice what we say we can do in war. We must also work hard to determine, then satisfy, information requirements of those who will perform these information collecting activities.
• ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR PLAN. We'll develop, promulgate, and practice a combined enemy prisoner of war plan. In this plan, we'll develop locations, communications, automation, and manning for combined interrogation facilities (CIFs). We'll focus our efforts on three things.
  • FIRST, we'll design multi-discipline teams (CI, analysts, interrogators) to deploy to ROKA collection cages early in a crisis or the opening days of war to obtain information from EPWs, refugees, agents, saboteurs, and line-crossers. These teams will provide timely information to warfighters using TRRIP and INMARSAT.
  • SECOND, we'll plan for ways to interrogate high-level, sensitive, or important enemy prisoners of war. Information from these sources will be critical to the CINC's war planning.
  • THIRD, we'll design plans to interrogate EPWs at CIF's well to the rear farther from the front lines than the ROK Army collection cages.
• COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO FORCE PROTECTION. We'll sustain an armistice state-of-the-art force protection operation. We'll also have such a system in place for crisis and for wartime operations. In crisis and war, rear areas will be dangerous; we can anticipate heavy nK SOF operations to include terrorism, attacks on critical nodes, sabotage, and efforts to create terror and chaos throughout the rear. Along with designing the system, we must design and implement training to work through the type of activities our CI personnel will have to work with. Moreover, we'll have to brief and prepare TPFDL units to operate in this environment if a crisis erupts or war occurs.

Environment Conducive to Intellectual Growth and Development

In our intelligence system, people will always be our most treasured assets. People can improve their knowledge and thinking. Leaders owe it to their subordinates to help them improve intellectually. It follows that leaders in our intelligence system will be totally involved in enabling their subordinates to grow intellectually. Intellectual energy, growth, and development will characterize our intelligence system. Analysts and technicians will work in an environment where the senior leadership addresses issues and solves problems.

• DEVELOPMENT OF SUBORDINATES. In our intelligence system, leaders will take an active role in developing their subordinates' intellects. The means to do so will come through OPDs, NCOPDs, seminars, brown-bag lunches and discussions, councils of elders, analyst mysteries program, and consistent interaction among all people in the system. Leaders in our system will make a concerted effort to enable analysts and technicians to know and understand the entirety of the system, not just the piece an individual works in. Leaders in our intelligence system will actively teach synthesis, holistic thinking, tipping and cueing, combinations, synergy, and fundamentals of enemy, weather, and terrain.
  • MYSTERIES. All analysts in the organization will have a mystery involving North Korea or communications/automation to work on. In fact, the organization, as an entity, will have several large mysteries to think about, work on, and solve, if possible. Analysts, by definition, are inquisitive and often creative people. It follows that J-2 leadership should help them pursue their search for knowledge and understanding of their opponent or something they don't know about automation or communications.

This program will involve leadership working with their subordinates, subordinates with each other, J-2 people with ACC, GCC, NCC people and ROK analysts, and elements supporting the CINC, e.g., SUSLAK, 501^st MI Brigade. It will also involve our people interacting with analysts in JICPAC and Washington agencies.

This program will help our people understand how they fit with the larger whole and how the larger whole fits within an even larger whole. Additionally, the program will enable leaders to teach synergy, synthesis, holistic thinking, and planning. We'll hold mystery conferences once a quarter in which the best analyst briefings will come to the J-2 and senior leadership of the organization.

• CREATIVITY. People in the organization will have freedom to try different ways of doing things and new ideas without fear of failing. Leaders at all levels will seek creative ideas and ways of doing things. In this environment, the ideas of all people, regardless of rank, will find reverence among organizational leaders.
• COMPUTER LITERACY. All people in the organization will be computer literate. In particular, ground, air, and naval analysts shall know the basics of ASAS Warrior and PASS-K. All people will know how to access and use the various applications resident on PASS-K, including ASAS-W, INTELINK, JDISS, and calling up and printing graphic displays of information that come from the GCC, NCC, and ACC fusion centers on- and off-peninsula.

Operators and analysts in outlying areas, such as FROKA and TROKA, will be proficient in using the tools inherent to PASS-K.

Within J-2, all people will be computer literate in the Microsoft Office suite of software before leaving Korea.

• COUNCIL OF ELDERS. Within J-2, we'll have a council of elders. The council of elders is a leadership technique to improve communications, capture the ideas of senior officers and civilians, develop creative ways to solve problems, and improve teamwork. Additionally, our council of elders will provide a forum for me to provide development sessions for senior personnel in the J-2. We'll have these sessions once a quarter and will involve Majors and above in military ranks and GS-13 and above in civilian ranks.

Useable Intel Support to Information Operations

Information operations will become increasingly important as we approach, then move into, the 21st century. USFK J2, as an organization, will play a significant role in information operations. We shall be intimately involved in all information operations and all aspects of command and control warfare (C2W) but specifically in C2 ATTACK, C2 EXPLOIT, and C2 PROTECT.

Although information operations exist at all levels of war, our efforts will focus on the enemy's operational level-of-war units, corps and above, while the GCC-ACE and KCOIC will concentrate on service peculiar, tactical level-of-war information operations, corps and below for the GCC. Through interaction with units working at the tactical level of war, our system will create a symbiosis, of sorts, in which intelligence operations at levels of war complement each other (centers of gravity relate, critical nodes relate, activities and things in battlefield operating systems relate).

• SUPPORT TO C2 ATTACK. Our intelligence system will identify critical nodes for attacking with lethal and non-lethal means of attack. Our intelligence system will have sufficient knowledge and understanding gained through C2 exploit to guide artillery, aircraft with ordnance, or jamming aircraft to affect the enemy's information system to the extent combat commanders desire.

Our intelligence system will be sufficiently fine-grained to identify critical nodes and protecting air defense weapons, template them on the battlefield in context with situation, weather, and terrain, and identify frequencies of operation and horizontal and vertical connectivity.

Our intelligence system will be a partner in deciding whether we should attack enemy critical nodes with artillery, bombs, electrons, or words/themes. Similarly, our system will be able to predict the effects of such attacks on these nodes.

• Our intelligence system will provide fine-grained analysis and synthesis to know and understand how the enemy processes information, makes decisions, moves the results of those decisions to higher and lower headquarters, and receives feedback to make new decisions.
  • Our system will use our powerful automation to template enemy fixed and mobile communications. These modeling efforts will focus on moving and stationary targets and on division, corps, and corps levels of nK battle command.
  • Our system will work extensive net diagrams and show vertical and horizontal linkages.
  • Our system will know what processes occur in each node and how.
  • Our system will be capable of modeling the effect of affecting key nodes on the entire system.
  • Our collection-management system will provide the fine-grain resolution collection sufficient to support C2W.
  • Our collection web will use fusion centers at Camp Humphreys and Osan to help in the C2W collection effort.

At a minimum, these centers will coordinate their efforts to develop detailed SIGINT templating and automated aids to assist in focusing intelligence collection on critical command and control nodes. Moreover, they will possess requisite expertise to guide the collection system on enemy command and control nodes to include orchestrating databases and sharing information among nodes and other intelligence entities on- and off-peninsula.

• SUPPORT TO C2 PROTECT. Our system will recognize there are INFORMATION CENTERS OF GRAVITY on the modern battlefield. We'll go after the adversary's and they will come after ours. Information centers of gravity are those critical hubs of power where automation, communications, collection, and intellect merge, enabling these nodes to achieve sufficient value to be HUBS OF POWER AROUND WHICH ALL ELSE REVOLVES.
  • Our system will recognize, with surety, the basic fact our adversaries will come after these nodes to destroy or affect our operations with guile, energy, and fury. Our system will have anticipated these attacks and prepared physical protection with rings of protection and abstract rings of protection with information webs overlayed on top of the concentric rings of protection.
  • Our system will anticipate how the opponent will attempt to gain information about these centers of gravity and how he will attempt to influence operations inside, whether the effort be physical attack on structure or virus attack on automation.
  • Our system will be an active participant in efforts to protect these critical hubs of power.
• SUPPORT TO OTHER ASPECTS OF C2W - OPSEC, DECEPTION, PSYOP. Our support to these aspects of C2W require an immense knowledge of the opponent and a detailed understanding of how he makes decisions. We shall need to leverage the expertise that comes only with years of study of the North Koreans - that expertise lies resident in the minds of analysts in U.S. and ROK Army analytical centers, national intelligence agencies, and places such as JICPAC.

Nonetheless, peninsula practitioners of C2W will come to us to help them address the intelligence-related questions of these very complicated areas. We need to anticipate their information requirements, and we need to accomplish what homework we have time to do to further our knowledge in these areas. We shall need to be very familiar with how to obtain more information to fuel these C2W processes.

Relevant Intelligence Production -- Armistice and War

Our intelligence system will produce relevant, fused (where possible), timely information and intelligence.

• CONDUCT INDICATIONS AND WARNING OPERATIONS. Intelligence Production (IP) will run an indications and warning (I&W) system second to none. Our I&W system will watch the nKs closely and know joint and combined collection, communications, and automation systems extremely well.

Personnel who work in the I&W system will know the theater's fusion centers in great depth and their capabilities and limitations very well. These people will know how to leverage J-2 CINCPAC and JICPAC, along with national agencies, to obtain information and follow-up information they need to make informed decisions. Of critical importance, people who work in our I&W system will know very well WATCHCON, DEFCON, THREATCON status and be capable of providing cogent advice to senior leaders about the possible need to change status.

• FOCUS OF PRODUCTION. Relevance comes from information requirements of warfighters we support. Warfighters define "presentation" of information. Success of our efforts will relate to the relevance of what we produce. Our system production efforts will come from commanders' needs and feedback from intelligence consumers. Our production efforts will have a twin focus: armistice and preparation for war.

Decision makers and other consumers will guide our production efforts; people in the business of producing intelligence will have a definite scheme for interacting with consumers of our information, obtaining their thoughts, and using those thoughts to develop intelligence products that make a difference.

• TYPE OF EFFORT. Our intelligence production efforts will be a federated, coordinated, cooperative effort. Our system will capitalize on the expertise of combined and joint analysts into a holistic appraisal, meaningful and relevant to all. Moreover, our system will be fully capable of providing usable information to consumers during crisis and war, and during deployment from CONUS.

Our intelligence system will have clear "lanes in the road" for production roles and missions - nobody has the resources to perform duplicative efforts for the sake of production turf. Who is responsible for what will be clearly delineated and followed.

The system will depend on services to provide air, ground, and naval analyses. Additionally, our system will rely upon JICPAC and national intelligence agencies to provide intelligence products they have agreed to. Our system will use the expertise of ROK MND analytical talents to help in the federated production efforts.

While we don't want redundancy in production, we won't allow for group-think either. Because analysis and synthesis deal with the unknown and with probabilities, virtually everyone has an opinion and most of the opinions won't experience a perfect match. We need disagreement among ourselves to avoid complacency and to promote good, disciplined, and creative thinking.

• DATABASE WORK AND ORDER OF BATTLE. Good intelligence analysis, along with good thinking, comes from several things.
  • First, we must have inquisitive minds seeking answers to commander's questions.
  • Second, analysis must focus on priority intelligence requirements, centers of gravity, high payoff targets, and seek and find enemy vulnerabilities while anticipating his view of ours.
  • Third, our analysts need good hardware and software to aid their work. The machines must be fast, have lots of memory, and large hard disk drives. Software must correlate (relate things) rapidly, trigger alarms, categorize, and search and sort temporal events rapidly, distance, locations, activities, physical events and so forth.
  • Fourth, analysts need to know the basics of enemy order of battle, weather, and terrain. Our system's analysts will learn order of battle and weather and terrain in section training, sergeant's time, and NCOPD/OPD programs in the J-2. We must have people well-grounded in basics before we can get into the more fun levels of thinking.
  • Fifth, analysts need a good database that has up-to-date, accurate locations plus a historical database for comparative analysis. In our system of the future, our analysts will use automation to track changes in enemy order of battle and to build problem sets in the automation they work with every day.

We'll also have a warfighting database that all services and national agencies agree to with respect to division of labor and responsibilities. Our system's database will have its fields populated automatically, with minimal amounts of physical data entry. We will divide our labor among joint services and combined agencies providing input first to MIIPS then to MIDB starting in the Spring of 1997.

• BATTLEFIELD-DAMAGE ASSESSMENT (BDA). BDA will be an important battlefield function. During any fight, the struggle for scarce resources such as killing systems or collection systems will approximate the ferocity of our struggle with the adversary. Thus, we'll have to husband and use scarce resources wisely. We undoubtedly won't have the luxury of hitting targets repeatedly even after they are destroyed or damaged. Additionally, the cost of modern weapons systems is exorbitant. Thus, to avoid wasting money and putting friendly lives at risk, we must know what we've done to the adversary.

Our system will use all-source intelligence analysis to guide our efforts in BDA. We'll use single source BDA only when all-source BDA isn't possible. Our BDA efforts will count enemy things killed, determine extent of damage, assess functionality and effects of strikes on systems, and assess effects of weapons systems on the adversary's psychology. Much by way of resources will go into our BDA effort; therefore, we shall have a trained, well-thought-through process for executing BDA. Our BDA system will be a thoroughly joint and combined effort.

• SPECIFICS OF BATTLEFIELD-DAMAGE ASSESSMENT VISION. BDA will focus on physical damage and functional/psychological effects. Our BDA system will require prediction and anticipation for programming scarce collection assets. Our BDA system will also involve virtual-reality simulations and weapons effectiveness overlaid on imagery or line drawings.
• Along with traditional imagery products to support BDA, we'll use UAV video and gun camera tapes (delayed and near-real-time). SIGINT and HUMINT will also be valuable sources of information involving damage or destruction to enemy systems. Again, these sources will fit with computer modeling, virtual reality, and simulations. BDA analysts will have such tools at their fingertips to contribute to solving the problem set.
• No one entity will perform all BDA. While KCOIC is executive agent of the BDA problem as a subset of combat assessment, they will depend on interaction with and inputs from front-line units, national intelligence organizations and collection systems, JICPAC, and naval and ground component assessments, inputs, and collectors. BDA will come from a tapestry of inputs and analysis carefully orchestrated by CFC C2 and KCOIC.
• BDA will require collection resources to confirm or deny kills or function effects. Thus collection to support BDA has to complement battle rhythm, specifically the combined targeting board and ITO process.

• SINE QUA NON OF INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION. During ARMISTICE, our efforts will help decision makers and other consumers of our information become wiser and enable information to become more understandable. Our intelligence system will always produce reasoned information that attempts to answer the questions -- So what? What does it mean? How does it relate to our basic functions? During WAR, our system's intelligence output will be relevant, timely, and it will MAKE A DIFFERENCE in determining the outcome of hostilities -- engagements, battles, and campaigns.
  • METHOD OF PRODUCTION. The mechanics of our intelligence production will see HEAVY INTERACTION among analyst and collection personnel. Analysts will provide guidance to the collection system through requests for information (RFIs) coming from PIR indicator analysis and analytical mysteries. Our system's PIR will always tie to warfighter information requirements that spring from VISION, CONCEPT OF OPERATION (SITUATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, TARGETING, and SHAPING THE BATTLEFIELD)., HIGH-PAYOFF TARGETS, CENTER OF GRAVITY ANALYSES.

We shall view intelligence production not as an end-state but as a state-of-continuity in which we're always revising, updating, closing out old mysteries, and trying to answer new ones. Our intelligence production efforts will recognize that tactical units are producing intelligence as well as national agencies. We'll support those efforts to the best of our capabilities.

Our analysts will maintain electronic connectivity with production centers at the tactical level of war as well as with analysts at the strategic level of war. Analysts at all levels will exchange ideas and leverage associated production efforts to provide maximum benefit at minimum costs. Intelligence Production will provide guidance and steerage to GCC-ACE and ACC analytic centers as complementary satellites to the CINC's main intelligence effort. Our IP personnel will interact with, exchange ideas with, and depend upon these two analytic centers to produce the fine-grained information and intelligence ground and air component commanders require.

• REAR AREA. Our intelligence system will be capable of working effectively against the rear area SOF threat should war occur. Our preparation work will include very detailed IPB of areas and routes adjacent to or surrounding centers of gravity, traditional and informational. Through analysis of types of enemy activity, times, and intent, we'll have a viable rear area collection plan in which ROK and U.S forces work together to deny the enemy their goals as a second front. The intelligence product that will guide our system will be a combination of analysis and synthesis that guides collection. Our preparation for war in the second front will be a truly combined effort in planning and execution.