USFK J2 Vision


Peninsula intelligence system totally prepared to execute armistice and wartime missions; all elements working harmoniously, people working creatively.

Vision Description

The peninsula intelligence system is fundamental and essential to South Korea's defense. It provides timely and accurate indications and warning (I&W) information on north Korea's military, social, political, and economic activities, and effectively and efficiently transitions to a wartime footing on a moment's notice.

The system produces consumer-driven, usable information. Ground and air fusion centers pull information from mechanical sensors and human collectors, synthesize this information, and turn it into all-source intelligence. All-source intelligence and single-source information move through communications pipes via broadcast systems, wide-area networks, and point-to-point communications in time to make a difference to warfighters; moreover, intelligence and information come to warfighters in the form (presentation) they desire. In the peninsula's intelligence system, intelligence is a full partner with operations, not a by-product or afterthought.

The peninsula intelligence system routinely creates synergy, where the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, through interaction among U.S. joint services, interaction with our ROK military counterparts, interaction with U.S. governmental supporting agencies, and heavy daily involvement with USPACOM and national intelligence agencies.

The peninsula intelligence system capitalizes on its most prized asset - its people - to operate a creative, developing, caring environment, and performs a fundamentally competent series of activities, routinely accomplishing tasks to high standards. The intelligence system aggressively seeks better and more innovative ways to provide informational support to warfighters. The peninsula intelligence system helps all people, regardless of rank, nationality, or service improve their minds, become more proficient in their work, and prepare for supporting national defenses of South Korea and the United States.

Elements of the peninsula intelligence system work together, in a mechanical sense, by collapsing communications, collection, automation, and analysis/synthesis into an operating whole, routinely creating informational synergy. From knowing functions and purposes of the whole, essential characteristics of parts become crystal clear, even in great detail. From knowledge of essential characteristics, the intelligence system rejuvenates, seeks improvement, and continuously evolves.

The peninsula's intelligence system possesses redundancies ensuring we don't depend on one collector, a single source of automation, or one communications system. People in the intelligence system understand communications and automation system linkages, know elements of automation and communications in each critical node in great depth, and routinely practice connectivity from armistice and wartime locations.

The peninsula intelligence system practices complex go to-war-tasks, regardless of difficulty, so it can optimize its performance regardless of a war, crisis, or armistice context.

Vision Analysis

Effective and responsive collection-management system

Effective and responsive collection management is imperative. A high-performing intelligence system must have the means to obtain information effectively and efficiently.

We face an interactive foe whose society is the most secretive in the world. Collection against the government and armed forces of nK is challenging because of their OPSEC, paranoia, and inward-looking, isolationist focus of society. Plus, our foe has proved elusive over the years; the enemy masks well what he does or intends to do. Compounding an already difficult collection problem, terrain and weather accentuate our challenges.

Organized and responsive collection-management system

Our collection system will be organized and responsive. With respect to an ORGANIZED collection system, our collection management system will determine quickly if existing information can satisfy requests for information (RFIs). If we can't satisfy the request, our collection manager will determine the most effective and efficient way of satisfying the information requirement.

With respect to RESPONSIVENESS, our consumer's information needs will be of paramount importance in any collection effort. Our system must be flexible for responding to changing sets of information requirements. Our system must have a formal mechanism for interacting with and keeping our consumers informed on request for information (RFI/RFIs) status. Close-out of RFIs will come with consumer satisfaction or recognition that nothing more can be done to obtain information they desire.

Along with combinations of intelligence disciplines, we'll seek synergy through combining joint and combined collectors, and we'll combine collection assets and efforts at the tactical, theater, and national levels of command. We'll use theater exercises and situational training exercises (STX) to develop our expertise to tip, cue and develop combinations sufficient to create synergy.

Our system will have an active dialog to exchange information for the times when the intelligence system is incapable of doing what consumers want. It will be absolutely necessary to keep our consumers in the loop of intelligence collection, requirements management, and satisfaction of requirements.

Our system will be governed by daily I&W requirements on-peninsula and support to TPFDL units joining us in crisis and war. We'll exercise our channels of communication and information flows continuously -- our collection management personnel will always know off-peninsula forces' information requirements because of continuous dialog by telephone, computer, message, or in-person.

Capable Operations System -- Crisis and War

Our operations system will operate capably in armistice and war.

Incumbent on our operations personnel though, will be an absolute requirement to understand exactly what it takes to move people and machinery around a cluttered battlefield populated by friendly and enemy soldiers and civilian personnel.

Currently, our links are in place and work every day. Maintaining our links in war, however, will always place extra stress on our system. To ensure our links work in war as well as armistice, we'll always pay very close ATTENTION TO DETAIL -- routers, protocols, crypto, segments, uplinks, downlinks, bandwidth, net control, net discipline, maintenance.

Links are analogous to muscles: We must exercise them for maximum capability. Without exercise, our links will atrophy. Thus, we must exercise our links in armistice as we shall use them in war. Since maintenance of systems in links will be so critical, we'll have priorities of contractor maintenance for supporting the theater's critical nodes.

Seams in our intelligence system will be transparent to users. We'll have a system in which we can easily PUSH information to consumers over multiple routes. Plus, our system will facilitate consumers PULLING information from us. We'll also employ broadcast information to enable the widest dissemination of information across levels of command. We'll practice pushing and pulling information, following link fragmentation with on-and off-peninsular units on a daily basis. Intelligence will be on-line and interactive, offering all echelons near-instantaneous access to information. We'll operate in armistice as we'll operate in war.

Effective Intelligence Dissemination System -- Works in Armistice and War

Our dissemination system will work effectively in armistice and war. By the phrase "work effectively," I mean information reaches consumers in the form, timeliness, and degree of specificity they need.

If the backbone goes out for any reason, our intelligence system will use alternative routes to provide information to consumers. Our operations section will maintain sufficient contact with Signal officials for the capability to send information by primary plus at least three alternative routes. Our intelligence system will boast redundant communications with necessary and available bandwidth to move any type of information we deem necessary, plus alternative routes if a primary route fails.

Automation and communications

Our system will have an aggressive, far-reaching, and meaningful plan for moving into the future and leveraging new technologies. This plan will comply with legacy and migration policies of DoD. This plan will seek every opportunity to work with new technologies and apply information these technologies produce to execute combat power and setting conditions for successful planning and execution of combat power effects.

Our intelligence system of the future will operate in armistice as well as war over a local area network (LAN) as well as a wide-area network (WAN) on- and off-peninsula. Members of our LAN and WAN will be linked through video-teleconferencing. Our system of the future will take advantage of emerging technologies, such as integrated service data network (ISDN) and asynchronous transfer mode (ATM). Our goal of the future will be to have access to T-1 to T-4 communications paths when and where we need it

Intel Support To Targeting -- Responsive to Warfighter Requirements

As one of the critical functions of any effective intelligence system, providing timely, specific, and accurate information to targeteers will be one of our critical functions. This information comes from tools we call collection systems. We have some highly accurate tools now. We'll sharpen existing procedures and be on the lookout for new procedures for integrating information these collection tools provide with killing systems and practice such linkages in a wide variety of conditions.

Targeting is an essential part of any commander's battle rhythm -- targeting kills people, breaks their things, and affects their will. Effective targeting can't exist without useful information. Thus, our intelligence system will closely intertwine with the commander's battle rhythm. Our system will proactively and aggressively structure combinations of collection and analytic/synthesis efforts to anticipate and produce information the commander needs to fuel decisions in anticipating, shaping the battlefield, and creating effects necessary to establish conditions to defeat our foes decisively.

Our support will draw its rationale from predictive estimates, interaction with joint and combined forces on the combined targeting board, and GCC deep operations coordination cell (DOCC). Our system will be extremely proficient at relating collection and production efforts to information requirements of the commander when and in what form he needs it. Our system shall orchestrate efforts of peninsula fusion centers and national collectors to satisfy information requirements coming from theater battle rhythm.

Theater missile defense (TMD)

Our theater missile defense system will capture the good work already done and move into the future with even better analyses, tied to the quick capture of information from collection systems. Our TMD efforts will tie into other theater efforts and national intelligence agencies. Our system will exploit strengths inherent to each level of command and minimize weaknesses of each. Our system will comprise many elements, some seemingly disparate, but all will relate and, in fact will become a tapestry of effort stretching across command and levels of war boundaries. In a theoretical sense, our system will be an interaction of ACTIVE effort seeking before the event, and a PASSIVE effort seeking after the event. We'll have a TMD effort that is focused by analysis. Analysis will be fueled by inputs from myriad sensors concentrating on direct sensor feeds to enhance timeliness. Collection will come from all sources including HUMINT SOF with NRT communications and laser designators. The TMD effort, focused into meaning through synthesis, will be an all-source effort to achieve sensor to shooter precision in timeliness and accuracy.

Active, System-wide Armistice and War Intelligence Security System

Our system will have an interacting web of information for force protection during armistice. This web will include U.S. counterintelligence, U.S. Military Police, ROK counterintelligence, embassy, DoDSA-K, ROK police, and off-peninsula personnel involved in keeping track of force-protection problems and anticipating future problems. Information force-protection personnel provide will be accurate, timely, and specific. This information will move quickly around the peninsula providing timely warning of impending activities to commanders.

Environment Conducive to Intellectual Growth and Development

In our intelligence system, people will always be our most treasured assets. People can improve their knowledge and thinking. Leaders owe it to their subordinates to help them improve intellectually. It follows that leaders in our intelligence system will be totally involved in enabling their subordinates to grow intellectually. Intellectual energy, growth, and development will characterize our intelligence system. Analysts and technicians will work in an environment where the senior leadership addresses issues and solves problems.

This program will involve leadership working with their subordinates, subordinates with each other, J-2 people with ACC, GCC, NCC people and ROK analysts, and elements supporting the CINC, e.g., SUSLAK, 501st MI Brigade. It will also involve our people interacting with analysts in JICPAC and Washington agencies.

This program will help our people understand how they fit with the larger whole and how the larger whole fits within an even larger whole. Additionally, the program will enable leaders to teach synergy, synthesis, holistic thinking, and planning. We'll hold mystery conferences once a quarter in which the best analyst briefings will come to the J-2 and senior leadership of the organization.

Operators and analysts in outlying areas, such as FROKA and TROKA, will be proficient in using the tools inherent to PASS-K.

Within J-2, all people will be computer literate in the Microsoft Office suite of software before leaving Korea.

Useable Intel Support to Information Operations

Information operations will become increasingly important as we approach, then move into, the 21st century. USFK J2, as an organization, will play a significant role in information operations. We shall be intimately involved in all information operations and all aspects of command and control warfare (C2W) but specifically in C2 ATTACK, C2 EXPLOIT, and C2 PROTECT.

Although information operations exist at all levels of war, our efforts will focus on the enemy's operational level-of-war units, corps and above, while the GCC-ACE and KCOIC will concentrate on service peculiar, tactical level-of-war information operations, corps and below for the GCC. Through interaction with units working at the tactical level of war, our system will create a symbiosis, of sorts, in which intelligence operations at levels of war complement each other (centers of gravity relate, critical nodes relate, activities and things in battlefield operating systems relate).

Our intelligence system will be sufficiently fine-grained to identify critical nodes and protecting air defense weapons, template them on the battlefield in context with situation, weather, and terrain, and identify frequencies of operation and horizontal and vertical connectivity.

Our intelligence system will be a partner in deciding whether we should attack enemy critical nodes with artillery, bombs, electrons, or words/themes. Similarly, our system will be able to predict the effects of such attacks on these nodes.

At a minimum, these centers will coordinate their efforts to develop detailed SIGINT templating and automated aids to assist in focusing intelligence collection on critical command and control nodes. Moreover, they will possess requisite expertise to guide the collection system on enemy command and control nodes to include orchestrating databases and sharing information among nodes and other intelligence entities on- and off-peninsula.

Nonetheless, peninsula practitioners of C2W will come to us to help them address the intelligence-related questions of these very complicated areas. We need to anticipate their information requirements, and we need to accomplish what homework we have time to do to further our knowledge in these areas. We shall need to be very familiar with how to obtain more information to fuel these C2W processes.

Relevant Intelligence Production -- Armistice and War

Our intelligence system will produce relevant, fused (where possible), timely information and intelligence.

Personnel who work in the I&W system will know the theater's fusion centers in great depth and their capabilities and limitations very well. These people will know how to leverage J-2 CINCPAC and JICPAC, along with national agencies, to obtain information and follow-up information they need to make informed decisions. Of critical importance, people who work in our I&W system will know very well WATCHCON, DEFCON, THREATCON status and be capable of providing cogent advice to senior leaders about the possible need to change status.

Decision makers and other consumers will guide our production efforts; people in the business of producing intelligence will have a definite scheme for interacting with consumers of our information, obtaining their thoughts, and using those thoughts to develop intelligence products that make a difference.

Our intelligence system will have clear "lanes in the road" for production roles and missions - nobody has the resources to perform duplicative efforts for the sake of production turf. Who is responsible for what will be clearly delineated and followed.

The system will depend on services to provide air, ground, and naval analyses. Additionally, our system will rely upon JICPAC and national intelligence agencies to provide intelligence products they have agreed to. Our system will use the expertise of ROK MND analytical talents to help in the federated production efforts.

While we don't want redundancy in production, we won't allow for group-think either. Because analysis and synthesis deal with the unknown and with probabilities, virtually everyone has an opinion and most of the opinions won't experience a perfect match. We need disagreement among ourselves to avoid complacency and to promote good, disciplined, and creative thinking.

We'll also have a warfighting database that all services and national agencies agree to with respect to division of labor and responsibilities. Our system's database will have its fields populated automatically, with minimal amounts of physical data entry. We will divide our labor among joint services and combined agencies providing input first to MIIPS then to MIDB starting in the Spring of 1997.

Our system will use all-source intelligence analysis to guide our efforts in BDA. We'll use single source BDA only when all-source BDA isn't possible. Our BDA efforts will count enemy things killed, determine extent of damage, assess functionality and effects of strikes on systems, and assess effects of weapons systems on the adversary's psychology. Much by way of resources will go into our BDA effort; therefore, we shall have a trained, well-thought-through process for executing BDA. Our BDA system will be a thoroughly joint and combined effort.

We shall view intelligence production not as an end-state but as a state-of-continuity in which we're always revising, updating, closing out old mysteries, and trying to answer new ones. Our intelligence production efforts will recognize that tactical units are producing intelligence as well as national agencies. We'll support those efforts to the best of our capabilities.

Our analysts will maintain electronic connectivity with production centers at the tactical level of war as well as with analysts at the strategic level of war. Analysts at all levels will exchange ideas and leverage associated production efforts to provide maximum benefit at minimum costs. Intelligence Production will provide guidance and steerage to GCC-ACE and ACC analytic centers as complementary satellites to the CINC's main intelligence effort. Our IP personnel will interact with, exchange ideas with, and depend upon these two analytic centers to produce the fine-grained information and intelligence ground and air component commanders require.