Part Two

Vision, Training Imperatives, and Goals

Part One described the broad concepts that will drive training development for the 21st century. Part Two will describe how the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School must evolve to provide training within the context of those concepts.

The end-state envisioned for Intelligence Training XXI is the development, implementation, and sustainment of training and an intelligence training system at individual, collective, and institutional levels that will for:

Leaders and Soldiers (Individual)

Produce a joint information age warrior who is "Ready Now!" and who is able to perform across the spectrum of Army XXI missions and operations— technically, tactically, and as a leader.

 

Produce combined arms commanders and warfighter staffs who understand U.S. intelligence capabilities—Army, joint, national—and who are proficient in the integrated, synchronized application of the non-lethal combat power afforded by those capabilities across the full range of Army XXI missions and operational settings.

 

MI Units (Collective)

Enable MI units to regularly train to proficiency under realistic conditions so that they are "Ready Now!"

 

Provide effective, integrated, and synchronized non-lethal combat power and support to the combined arms commander and the entire warfighting team across the full spectrum of Army XXI missions, operations, and environments.

 

Intelligence Center (Institutional)

Yield a "Schoolhouse Without Walls" that is capable of and committed to seamless support of individual and collective intelligence readiness under realistic conditions across the force, be it in intelligence or combined arms units.

 

Yield a "Schoolhouse Without Walls" that is current operationally, technically, and educationally and that is recognized Armywide as a center of excellence in the areas of distance learning, training simulation, and embedded system training.

 

 

The implications of Army XXI and Intelligence XXI operations for training the 21st century intelligence force are many and varied. Those implications demand that the Intelligence Center and School establish certain training imperatives and core competencies, and that the imperatives drive all training and training development. The three training imperatives are a seamless training architecture, realism, and proficiency. These training imperatives must be evident in the OPLANs developed to support each of the specific training objectives which will be introduced in Part Three.

Seamless Training Architecture

The effectiveness of training and training development at the Intelligence Center has direct and substantial impact on intelligence training and readiness in the larger force. Therefore, the intelligence training system must recognize both the need to embed realism into intelligence training and the need to demonstrate observed proficiency in the core competencies.

In addition to the demands placed on intelligence training by Army XXI operations are the separate set of requirements placed on the training system by the prevalence of technology in the Intelligence BOS as well the velocity of change associated with that technology. The Intelligence Center must be committed to developing training at a pace that matches that of evolving and emerging technology to provide soldiers and units with the training tools they need.

The result must be a seamless training architecture. The Intelligence Center must develop and maintain a training architecture that provides a seamless connection between individual and collective training, and between training conducted at the Intelligence School and in the field.

Realism

To be "Ready Now," the intelligence training system must acknowledge realism as a primary requirement. Intelligence training must replicate reality as much as possible, in terms of both frequency and scope. This requirement is non-negotiable.

Each type of Army XXI operation will demand different training for the intelligence force. In fact, the norm will be that no two deploying forces will look the same. Intelligence professionals must be trained to leverage unique, tailorable processing, communications, collection, and dissemination capabilities; and to operate against various types of threat. The litmus test for good intelligence will be the ability of the intelligence system to satisfy the commander’s time, precision, and synchronization requirements. These factors must be replicated and stressed in realistic training to ensure that the commander’s expectations are met.

Proficiency

Army XXI and Intelligence XXI operations require an intelligence force that is truly proficient—one that "can do" versus one that is merely competent and understands only in abstract terms what needs to be done. Intelligence soldiers, leaders, and units must be proficient within the context of the complex, information-based operations described earlier. This will require proficiency in many of the same areas as 20 years ago, but intelligence professionals will have to demonstrate their proficiency under new, more difficult conditions.

To that end, we must devote time, money, and energy to building new core competencies and revitalizing the training of other long-standing core competencies. The core competencies envisioned as essential for the future intelligence soldier and leader—the Intelligence Warrior and Intelligence Battle Captain of Army XXI—are as follows:

Be an expert on friendly operations. The nature of Army XXI operations places a premium on information operations, shaping the battlespace, obtaining and maintaining information dominance, and, as noted earlier, concentrating combat power only when and where it is needed. Clearly, synchronizing the efforts of all battlefield operating systems will be critical. So intelligence leaders and soldiers must be as proficient with the operational doctrine as the operators.

Be an expert on the Intelligence BOS. The need to be an expert on collection systems, supporting communications, processors, analysis, and dissemination is nothing new. What is new is that Army XXI operations require that these functions be performed dynamically. This is a significant requirement. The new reality is that intelligence professionals and units are considered proficient only after demonstrating the ability to perform these "old" tasks under the "new" set of Army XXI conditions. Hence, demonstrating proficiency will be a function of realism achieved in training.

Have technological proficiency appropriate to the leader’s or soldier’s job. Intelligence leaders, soldiers, and units must be proficient in providing relevant, useful information to the battle commander using the technological tools and techniques that have been provided. Every leader and soldier in the Intelligence XXI force must be proficient on the "family" of MI flagship systems and be able to demonstrate an appropriate level of all-source analysis system (ASAS) proficiency. They must also be proficient in accessing and navigating the numerous networks that make up the global or military information environments to get information required by the battle commander; or that must be used or countered in conducting information operations. In short, the training system must train intelligence leaders and operators to access, leverage, integrate, and synchronize information from higher, lower, adjacent, joint, and multinational sources.

Be a proficient analyst. The essence of effective intelligence is providing timely, relevant, precise analysis that enables coordinated, synchronized battlefield operations. This requires proficiency in synthesizing information, including some information while excluding other; drawing conclusions from what is available; and developing insights from what is not available. Analysts can expect some assistance from the use of artificial intelligence, event alarms, and a myriad of other tools that are embedded into computers. However, we are decades away from being able to reach into the "bit bucket" to get an answer to every question that the battle commander might have. What is required is a pool of analysts who have demonstrated expert skills in critical, creative thinking: analysts who can pull information together into common sense, correct, and relevant bottom-line judgments for the commander. The Army’s intelligence training system for Army XXI must energetically embrace the development of analysts to the same degree devoted to the pursuit of technological proficiency on its systems.

Be a proficient maintainer. While the focus of this discussion about proficiency is on operations, the assured availability of "systems" is fundamental to effective intelligence support to Army XXI operations. Systems that do not work or maintenance personnel who cannot fix broken equipment have the potential to become the Achilles’ heel of Intelligence XXI. Thus, the frequently low profile, skilled maintainer is as critical to Intelligence XXI as is the good analyst.

Maintain proficiency in soldier skills. Although this document deals primarily with the challenge of obtaining individual and collective proficiency in the intelligence arena, soldiers must still maintain their basic soldier skills to be an effective member of the unit. Soldiers who are not fit, for instance, eventually will be a detriment to their unit when called upon to serve in an operational environment.

Continuously seek to be a better leader. MI leaders have a unique challenge. They must understand combat operations as well as intelligence operations. They must work with combined arms commanders and the rest of the warfighter staff to keep current on what they need to know about intelligence to effectively leverage and integrate it into the combined arms operation. They must be technically proficient in areas ranging from automation to communications to maintenance to flight operations to information networks. They must even be proficient at thinking in a way that leads to judgments and analytical bottom lines that influence their commanders’ operational decisions.

In addition to the host of intelligence-unique challenges are the normal leadership duties that face all leaders: leading in the face of ethical and moral dilemmas, troop leading, team building, family support, and the like. Yet, the challenge for MI leaders is worth special mention because of the scope of responsibility and complexity of operations confronted by junior MI leaders—MI company commanders and S2s; as well as the more senior leaders—battalion and brigade commanders and G2s. In these positions and others as well, effective leadership frequently will spell the difference between success and failure. MI leaders therefore must be innovative; they must anticipate; and they must be able to make things happen.

Perhaps most importantly, MI leaders must be comfortable leading in the face of dramatic technological, system, and organizational changes. While intangible, effective leadership for results is no less a real contributor to mission success than is good PIR from the commander, good communication, or a good database. Seeking results through innovation, striving for improvement, staying on top of change, and conducting realistic training will be particular challenges for the MI leader in the transition to Army XXI.

Implications

Thus, taken collectively, the Army XXI and Intelligence XXI training imperatives as they apply to the U.S. Army Intelligence Center are to—

Pursue training and training development that has realism as its goal. This will be achieved in various ways, but a single event must be the development of a family of robust, flexible, realistic intelligence simulations that can be employed equally by intelligence soldiers and units at combat training centers (CTCs), battle command training programs (BCTPs), and during more routine training in the schoolhouse and the field.

 

Pursue training and training development that results in proficient intelligence units, soldiers, and leaders. This means that training development should be done once: for use in the school and at the unit. To keep pace with changing technology and to make unit and institutional training as mutually supportable as possible, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center must take steps to rapidly prototype training with the assistance of the field, and it must seek to export the resultant products using modern technology. In effect, the Center must champion and become a center of excellence for distance learning, system-embedded training, and other related initiatives. These efforts will have the combined effect of creating seamless training between the schoolhouse and the MI unit in the field.

 

Reengineer the Intelligence School to better enable training and training development as described above.

 

 

 

The Intelligence Training XXI Vision drew from Army XXI, Intelligence XXI, and Army Training XXI discussed in Part One. The Vision described the desired end-state for development, implementation, and sustainment of intelligence training throughout the force. The Training Imperatives established training development principles and core competencies that must be integral parts of all training development and outcomes.

Pg20.gif

The over-arching Goals of the Intelligence Training XXI effort complement the Intelligence Training XXI Vision and Training Imperatives. They set the immediate course for accomplishing the intended training outcomes of Army XXI, Intelligence XXI, and Army Training XXI. Each goal and its objectives will be restated in Part Three.

Goal 1:

Construct training and a training environment which will produce Joint Information Age Warriors — Intelligence Leaders of the 21st century.

Goal 2:

Develop an MI "Schoolhouse Without Walls" to facilitate seamless training between the school and the field.

Goal 3:

Develop, field, and sustain flexible, realistic, and robust intelligence training materials, simulations, and devices.

Goal 4:

Improve intelligence training provided to combined arms soldiers, staffs, and commanders.

Return to the Cover Page

Advance to Part Three