1-2. References. See Appendix A, References.
1-3. Abbreviations and Terms. See Appendix B, Glossary.
1-4. Background.This concept has been developed from an analysis of future requirements as defined in TRADOC Pam 525-5, related publications, and on going Force XXI activities. It was reviewed during the Intel Center-hosted 21st Century Technology Symposium and World Wide Intelligence Conference held in January and February 1995, respectively. In May 1995 the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence published the Army's Vision for intelligence support to Force XXI - INTEL XXI...Strategy for the 21st Century. Further refinements have been made from lessons learned from the series of Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWE) and Advanced Technology Concept Demonstrations (ATCD) completed in 1995. Results of TRADOC's Force XXI redesign analysis, its series of Division XXI "How to Fight" Seminars, and the Information Operations Wargame conducted in November 1995 have also contributed to the development of this concept.
1-5. The Future Environment
a. Today's Army is undergoing an unprecedented evolution in its operational thinking, caused in large part by an on-going technological revolution in collection, processing, analysis, presentation and dissemination systems development. The highly complex strategic environment being created by these events and in which commanders will operate has significant implications for future military operations and the intelligence system that will support them. The National Military Strategy focuses us now and into the future on regional conflicts; crisis response; power projection; joint, coalition, and interagency operations; and a
wide variety of ambiguous threats. Other factors influencing the development of the intelligence force over the next two decades include: reduced defense spending, significant growth in information technologies and digitization, reduced forward presence, stability and support missions (peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, etc.), and the proliferation of weapons and technology, which could make our potential adversaries more lethal and dangerous then ever before.
b. Recent operations in Southwest Asia, Panama, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, and Bosnia have given us a preview of the challenges that lie ahead and the wide range of mission our 21st century army must be capable of accomplishing. They illustrate the complexity of force projection operations in both mid-intensity conflict and non-traditional settings and amplify the critical role technology will play in the future. Finally, they reinforce the premise that conducting information operations to gain information dominance will be critical to the successful conduct of future decisive operations.
a. The current Army intelligence system is designed to provide critical capabilities for America's Force Projection Army and to serve as the basis for the evolutionary development of a 21st Century intelligence force. Successful completion of the following on-going actions is key to the "fielding" of the Intel XXI force.
b. Current Doctrine Intel XXI is also being built upon the solid foundation of our current doctrine which includes the following five key tenets (see figure 3).
(1) The first tenet of MI doctrine, The Commander Drives Intelligence, is critical to ensuring that the commander and his force focus the intelligence effort to enable them to receive the intelligence and targeting information to be successful across the operational continuum. Commanders must define their priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and high payoff targets (HPT) in sufficiently specific terms to focus the intelligence system at all echelons. They must understand their intelligence system, its capabilities and limitations, as thoroughly as their fire and maneuver systems.
(2) Intelligence Synchronization entails managing the entire intelligence cycle to provide commanders what they need, when they need it within the context of the commander's operational concept. Intelligence leaders and operators therefore must thoroughly understand the operational context in which they plan and execute intelligence operations. They must understand when the commander needs specific intelligence to attack specific targets to be successful. They must also understand the capabilities and limitations of the intelligence force, as well as those of other reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA) systems to support their commander's requirements, and how they are best integrated to support the rapidly changing requirements of the modern battlefield. Agility is key and the intelligence system must be able to "re-sync" rapidly.
(3) Split-based Operations is the third tenet of MI doctrine. In force projection operations, speed is essential, lift is always at a premium, and commanders must front-load tailored intelligence capabilities in their force flow. Intelligence organizations must be flexible and scaleable, ready to go in with the first lift, and capable of being digitally connected in real time to their source(s) of support in sanctuary. Intelligence organizations and agencies operating in sanctuary, will provide focused intelligence support to the deploying force by accessing and leveraging all available resources, national to tactical.
(4) Tactical Tailoring is a deployment concept based on tiered, modular packages which enable the commander to package a balanced intelligence team with the inherent capability to change in size and composition over the duration of an operation. The initial element in the flow of tailored intelligence capabilities is doctrinally called a Deployable Intelligence Support Element (DISE) and will often include non-organic specialized augmentation teams as well as organic resources.
(5) Broadcast Intelligence, the fifth tenet, incorporates two key capabilities: a) the directed downlink and broadcast of raw collected data from multiple sensors, organic, theater and national, and the "smart push" of analyzed intelligence products to satisfy commanders articulated requirements; and b) access to intelligence products and databases in a "smart pull" mode. Broadcast intelligence data and products come from multiple sensors and organizations and can be transmitted to multiple echelons simultaneously. "Smart pull and push" requires properly trained and equipped teams supported by robust assured communications and capable automation.