U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER & FH TS4LBI Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613-7000 February 1995 INDICATORS IN OOTW 1. OBJECTIVES: On completion of this block of instruction you will be able to: a. Describe the role of and employ the Indications and Warning (I&W) system in indicator development. b. Identify the role of the S-2 in indicator and specific information requirements (SIR) development. c. Develop the three types of Operations Other Than War (OOTW) indicators. d. Develop specific information requirements (SIR) from generic indicators. e. Identify and apply basic rules of indicator analysis. 2. NATIONAL INDICATIONS AND WARNING SYSTEM: Indications and Warning (I&W) involves the strategic monitoring of world military, economic and political events to ensure that they are not the precursor to hostile or other activities which are contrary to US interests. With the new US focus worldwide, the National I&W system will be responding to OOTW situations. This Global focus will put regional issues into perspective. The National system will be able to monitor inter-regional activities such a weapons and technology transfer, personnel movement between states, money transfers and drug trade, to name a few. 3. INDICATORS: Indicators are observable or discernible actions that confirm or deny enemy capabilities and intentions. The ability to find and interpret these indicators will directly affect the analysts' predictions of threat intent. It is this key, prediction, which distinguishes from just reporting the facts to assisting the commander in the decision making process. Indicators are not fool-proof, however, and in OOTW, have been refined into three types in order to better collect and analyze them. They are: a. IMMINENT/IMMEDIATE THREAT INDICATORS: (1) Imminent indicators. are those which reflect threat actions of an immediate nature, both violent and non-violent. These are highly perishable and the emphasis on force protection makes finding and interpreting imminent indicators critical to the intelligence analyst so that he can warn the commander of impending threats to his troops. Examples of imminent indicators can include the following: (a) VIOLENT: Heavily armed reconnaissance; weapons caches near targets; insurgents near rally points in the vicinity of targets; infiltration of target areas. (b) NON-VIOLENT: Demonstrations, propaganda posters, radio/TV announcements. (2) It is very likely that imminent threat indicators can also be categorized as preparatory or secondary in nature. Categorizing after the fact is not necessary in OOTW indicator analysis. What is important is deciding before what reflects an immediate, sudden threat to US interests (including US personnel) in order to avoid harm and in order to plan for quick reaction. b. PREPARATORY THREAT INDICATORS: Preparatory indicators are those which reflect threat planning which must be done before executing an attack (or other mission). They usually include training, logistics compilation,. recruiting, movement to an assembly area, planning and coordination meetings and communications activities. Preparatory indicators not only tell the analysts that the threat is up to something, but by knowing specifically what is being trained or what equipment the threat is being trained to use, the analyst can predict the threat targets, timetables, capabilities and vulnerabilities. The national system is excellent for examining training and logistics support across international lines and can link related developments in different parts of the world, for example, weapons sales. c. SECONDARY THREAT INDICATORS: Secondary or circumstantial threat indicators are those which reflect threat activity among the population or the environment. This includes such actions as the disappearance of males from the population in a given area to unexplained affluence among the population to man made pollution of streams. Secondary indicators are also intangibles such as fear or joy among the population. However, the major problem with the analysis of secondary indicators is that it requires in-depth knowledge of the local culture, habits and customs and must also take into consideration history, society, geography and climate to fully understand their importance or value. For example, a sudden increase of wealth among the population could be from illegal or legal sources such as mining for gems. A loss of food among the population could be due to famine as well an pillaging by the threat. Patterns over time also will help in evaluating secondary indicators. With the increase in threats which are not human in nature, i.e. natural disasters, secondary indicators will come from nature, climate, weather, geographic and wildlife as well as from the population. 4. SPECIFIC INTELLIGENCE/INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS: a. SIRs to translate general and generic indicators into orders for collection agencies to follow. Intelligence analysts at all echelons face declining resources and capabilities due to sheer volume of needs. In order to focus these assets most efficiently in time and space, analysts take indicators and decide the most likely time and place of occurrence so that they aren't wasting collection efforts. NAIs are then determined based on SIRS. For example: PIR: Will insurgent forces conduct terrorist attacks against targets at Culican air base in the next three months? Indicator: Large cache of explosives and mines located in mosques in city near air base. SIR: Is there increased movement of insurgent mule convoys into the southern insurgent held villages near air base during increased air campaign operations (June-July-August). NAI: Mari Habi villages 35370ON453500E, 01 June 1993-31 August 1993; mule and camel convoys moving on the trail from the border east to villages/convoys with 10-20 mules. PIR: Will North Korean elements conduct terrorist operations in the ROK during the August nuclear discussions? Indicators: Unusual foreign travel by Korean personnel. SIR: Are there any Koreans traveling on non-Korean passports on US or ROK owned airlines in the next six weeks? NAI: Middle East, Far East during periods preceeding diplomatic exchanges between North Korea and the ROK. b. The above examples show how to narrow down in order to concentrate collection and analytical efforts to the most likely periods for the indicators to occur. They also eliminate collecting indicators which are circumstantial, such as reporting all travel of Koreans which could be due to tourism or movement of mule convoys during periods of harvest or nomadic migration in an agricultural society. c. In some cases, SIRs will have to be further defined and refined for specific intelligence collection agencies and collection disciplines. For example, a radio intercept unit could be directed to monitor and report on traffic emanating from emitters in a geographic area centered on a training camp, while IMINT could be directed to report tracks of wheeled vehicles or government building mock-ups in the training camp. NOTE: PIR -Must ask one question -Be situational (contain where and when) -Provide intel which enables Cdr to make a single decision SIR -Incorporates indicator -In the form of a question -Very specific SOR -In the form of a directive -Incorporates NAI -A bit more general than an SIR 5. RULES FOR INDICATOR ANALYSIS: Once you have developed your indicators and tasked the appropriate agency and source, you must then analyze the results. You must evaluate the results of you SIRs and adjust them if necessary. Here are several rules which should guide your mental processes: a. Always consider all possible threat courses of action when developing indicators. b. Consider all available indicators and current intelligence before making a determination as to their significance. c. Never attempt to predict threat activity based solely on past activity. d. Always look at every possible examination or meaning for each individual indicators such as cultural factors. e. Do not forget to use investigative technology to detect indicators. A simple water test for example can be used to determine if pollution is part of nature or if it is a chemical precursor for drug manufacture. f. Make your best estimate. You will never have all the data but must make a call and continue to refine it as time goes on and more information is obtained. 6. INDICATOR MATRICES: Generic indicators can be developed prior to deployment or even prior to receiving a mission. An example of such a list is attached. It is an extract from a OOTW instability indicators study done by the Army-Air Force Center for OOTW. The purpose was to give analysts not familiar with what happens in OOTW environments an idea of what they might see. 547 generic indicators were developed and placed on a matrix which graphically illustrates during which type of operations a particular indicator might or might not be found. It is essentially an initial scrub of indicators to help the analyst begin his search for the most likely indicators. Generic Indicator Sampling 1. INFORMANTS FAIL TO PASS ACCURATE INFORMATION 2. ATTACKS ON MISSION FORCE (E.G., RAIDS/AMBUSHES) 3. HARASSMENT OF MISSION FORCE PERSONNEL 4. JAILING/EXPULSION OF MISSION FORCE PERSONNEL 5. OPPOSITION FORCES TARGET GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL 6. MEMBERS OF GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY ATTEMPT TO SABOTAGE OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT POLICIES OR PROGRAMS 7. ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS OF LEADING OPPOSITION PARTY CANDIDATES 8. ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS AGAINST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS 9. ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS AGAINST PROMINENT, NON-GOVERNMENT LEADER 10. ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS ON MILITARY LEADERS 11. KIDNAPING OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS 12. EXECUTION OF PROMINENT, NON-GOVERNMENT LEADERS/OFFICIALS 13. KIDNAPING OF PROMINENT BUSINESSMEN/NON-GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS/LEADERS 14. KILLING OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS 15. KILLING OF PROMINENT, NON-GOVERNMENT LEADERS 16. ASSAULTS ON POLICE AND MILITARY PERSONNEL 17. ASSAULTS ON MISSION FORCE PERSONNEL, (E.G., MUGGING) 18. ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS 19. HOSTAGE TAKING 20. USE OF FEAR TACTICS TO COERCE SUPPORT FOR OPPOSITION FORCE 21. USE OF FEAR TACTICS TO CONTROL LOCAL POPULACE 22. USE OF FEAR TACTICS TO CONTROL GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY 23. LABOR STRIKES 24. THEFT OR ALTERATION OF GOVERNMENT IDENTIFICATION CARDS 25. EVIDENCE OF FORGED PASSPORTS 26. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 27. USE OF MILITARY/GOVERNMENT EQUIPMENT IN ILLICIT OPERATIONS 28. EVACUATION OF CIVILIAN POPULATION FROM REGION OR AREA OF CONFLICT 29. MASS URBAN-RURAL MIGRATION OR VICE VERSA 30. EXODUS/MIGRATION FROM CONTESTED AREAS 31. ARMED CONFRONTATION BY OPPOSITION FORCE WITHIN THE COUNTRY 32. MASSING OF OPPOSITION COMBATANTS 33. MEASURES TAKEN TO REMOVE GOVERNMENT LEADERS 34. REPEATED INCURSIONS OF OPPOSITION FORCE PERSONNEL INTO MISSION FORCE AREA 35. RETALIATORY ACTIONS BY LOCAL POPULACE IN RESPONSE TO ACTUAL/PERCEIVED MISSION FORCE TRANSGRESSIONS 36. WITHDRAWAL OF SPONSOR SUPPORT FOR MISSION FORCE REQUIREMENTS 37. CHANGES IN OPPOSITION FORCE OPERATING AREAS 38. SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN OPERATIONAL ROUTINE AMONG OPPOSITION FORCE 39. GENERAL NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD MISSION FORCE PRESENCE 40. ACTIONS DESIGNED TO FORCE GOVERNMENT INTO TAKING MEASURES TO DESTABILIZE THE SECURITY SITUATION 41. LOOTING 42. MASS DEMONSTRATIONS 43. RIOTING 44. EFFORTS TO INCITE RIOTS 45. RALLIES TO HONOR MARTYRED OPPOSITION LEADER OR REVOLUTIONARY HEROES 46. PAID AND/OR ARMED DEMONSTRATORS IN RIOTS