U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER & FH TS4LBI
Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613-7000 February 1995
INDICATORS IN OOTW
1. OBJECTIVES: On completion of this block of instruction you will
be able to:
a. Describe the role of and employ the Indications and Warning
(I&W) system in indicator development.
b. Identify the role of the S-2 in indicator and specific
information requirements (SIR) development.
c. Develop the three types of Operations Other Than War (OOTW)
indicators.
d. Develop specific information requirements (SIR) from generic
indicators.
e. Identify and apply basic rules of indicator analysis.
2. NATIONAL INDICATIONS AND WARNING SYSTEM: Indications and
Warning (I&W) involves the strategic monitoring of world military,
economic and political events to ensure that they are not the
precursor to hostile or other activities which are contrary to US
interests. With the new US focus worldwide, the National I&W system
will be responding to OOTW situations. This Global focus will put
regional issues into perspective. The National system will be able
to monitor inter-regional activities such a weapons and technology
transfer, personnel movement between states, money transfers and
drug trade, to name a few.
3. INDICATORS: Indicators are observable or discernible actions
that confirm or deny enemy capabilities and intentions. The ability
to find and interpret these indicators will directly affect the
analysts' predictions of threat intent. It is this key, prediction,
which distinguishes from just reporting the facts to assisting the
commander in the decision making process. Indicators are not
fool-proof, however, and in OOTW, have been refined into three types
in order to better collect and analyze them. They are:
a. IMMINENT/IMMEDIATE THREAT INDICATORS:
(1) Imminent indicators. are those which reflect threat
actions of an immediate nature, both violent and non-violent. These
are highly perishable and the emphasis on force protection makes
finding and interpreting imminent indicators critical to the
intelligence analyst so that he can warn the commander of impending
threats to his troops. Examples of imminent indicators can include
the following:
(a) VIOLENT: Heavily armed reconnaissance; weapons
caches near targets; insurgents near rally points in the vicinity of
targets; infiltration of target areas.
(b) NON-VIOLENT: Demonstrations, propaganda posters,
radio/TV announcements.
(2) It is very likely that imminent threat indicators can
also be categorized as preparatory or secondary in nature.
Categorizing after the fact is not necessary in OOTW indicator
analysis. What is important is deciding before what reflects an
immediate, sudden threat to US interests (including US personnel) in
order to avoid harm and in order to plan for quick reaction.
b. PREPARATORY THREAT INDICATORS: Preparatory indicators are
those which reflect threat planning which must be done before
executing an attack (or other mission). They usually include
training, logistics compilation,. recruiting, movement to an
assembly area, planning and coordination meetings and communications
activities. Preparatory indicators not only tell the analysts that
the threat is up to something, but by knowing specifically what is
being trained or what equipment the threat is being trained to use,
the analyst can predict the threat targets, timetables, capabilities
and vulnerabilities. The national system is excellent for examining
training and logistics support across international lines and can
link related developments in different parts of the world, for
example, weapons sales.
c. SECONDARY THREAT INDICATORS: Secondary or circumstantial
threat indicators are those which reflect threat activity among the
population or the environment. This includes such actions as the
disappearance of males from the population in a given area to
unexplained affluence among the population to man made pollution of
streams. Secondary indicators are also intangibles such as fear or
joy among the population. However, the major problem with the
analysis of secondary indicators is that it requires in-depth
knowledge of the local culture, habits and customs and must also
take into consideration history, society, geography and climate to
fully understand their importance or value. For example, a sudden
increase of wealth among the population could be from illegal or
legal sources such as mining for gems. A loss of food among the
population could be due to famine as well an pillaging by the
threat. Patterns over time also will help in evaluating secondary
indicators. With the increase in threats which are not human in
nature, i.e. natural disasters, secondary indicators will come from
nature, climate, weather, geographic and wildlife as well as from
the population.
4. SPECIFIC INTELLIGENCE/INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS:
a. SIRs to translate general and generic indicators into orders
for collection agencies to follow. Intelligence analysts at all
echelons face declining resources and capabilities due to sheer
volume of needs. In order to focus these assets most efficiently in
time and space, analysts take indicators and decide the most likely
time and place of occurrence so that they aren't wasting collection
efforts. NAIs are then determined based on SIRS. For example:
PIR: Will insurgent forces conduct terrorist attacks
against targets at Culican air base in the next three months?
Indicator: Large cache of explosives and mines located in
mosques in city near air base.
SIR: Is there increased movement of insurgent mule convoys
into the southern insurgent held villages near air base during
increased air campaign operations (June-July-August).
NAI: Mari Habi villages 35370ON453500E, 01 June 1993-31
August 1993; mule and camel convoys moving on the trail from the
border east to villages/convoys with 10-20 mules.
PIR: Will North Korean elements conduct terrorist
operations in the ROK during the August nuclear discussions?
Indicators: Unusual foreign travel by Korean personnel.
SIR: Are there any Koreans traveling on non-Korean
passports on US or ROK owned airlines in the next six weeks?
NAI: Middle East, Far East during periods preceeding
diplomatic exchanges between North Korea and the ROK.
b. The above examples show how to narrow down in order to
concentrate collection and analytical efforts to the most likely
periods for the indicators to occur. They also eliminate collecting
indicators which are circumstantial, such as reporting all travel of
Koreans which could be due to tourism or movement of mule convoys
during periods of harvest or nomadic migration in an agricultural
society.
c. In some cases, SIRs will have to be further defined and
refined for specific intelligence collection agencies and collection
disciplines. For example, a radio intercept unit could be directed
to monitor and report on traffic emanating from emitters in a
geographic area centered on a training camp, while IMINT could be
directed to report tracks of wheeled vehicles or government building
mock-ups in the training camp.
NOTE:
PIR
-Must ask one question
-Be situational (contain where and when)
-Provide intel which enables Cdr to make a single decision
SIR
-Incorporates indicator
-In the form of a question
-Very specific
SOR
-In the form of a directive
-Incorporates NAI
-A bit more general than an SIR
5. RULES FOR INDICATOR ANALYSIS: Once you have developed your
indicators and tasked the appropriate agency and source, you must
then analyze the results. You must evaluate the results of you SIRs
and adjust them if necessary. Here are several rules which should
guide your mental processes:
a. Always consider all possible threat courses of action when
developing indicators.
b. Consider all available indicators and current intelligence
before making a determination as to their significance.
c. Never attempt to predict threat activity based solely on
past activity.
d. Always look at every possible examination or meaning for each
individual indicators such as cultural factors.
e. Do not forget to use investigative technology to detect
indicators. A simple water test for example can be used to
determine if pollution is part of nature or if it is a chemical
precursor for drug manufacture.
f. Make your best estimate. You will never have all the data
but must make a call and continue to refine it as time goes on and
more information is obtained.
6. INDICATOR MATRICES: Generic indicators can be developed prior
to deployment or even prior to receiving a mission. An example of
such a list is attached. It is an extract from a OOTW instability
indicators study done by the Army-Air Force Center for OOTW. The
purpose was to give analysts not familiar with what happens in OOTW
environments an idea of what they might see. 547 generic indicators
were developed and placed on a matrix which graphically illustrates
during which type of operations a particular indicator might or
might not be found. It is essentially an initial scrub of
indicators to help the analyst begin his search for the most likely
indicators.
Generic Indicator Sampling
1. INFORMANTS FAIL TO PASS ACCURATE INFORMATION
2. ATTACKS ON MISSION FORCE (E.G., RAIDS/AMBUSHES)
3. HARASSMENT OF MISSION FORCE PERSONNEL
4. JAILING/EXPULSION OF MISSION FORCE PERSONNEL
5. OPPOSITION FORCES TARGET GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL
6. MEMBERS OF GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY ATTEMPT TO SABOTAGE OFFICIAL
GOVERNMENT POLICIES OR PROGRAMS
7. ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS OF LEADING OPPOSITION PARTY CANDIDATES
8. ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS AGAINST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
9. ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS AGAINST PROMINENT, NON-GOVERNMENT LEADER
10. ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS ON MILITARY LEADERS
11. KIDNAPING OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
12. EXECUTION OF PROMINENT, NON-GOVERNMENT LEADERS/OFFICIALS
13. KIDNAPING OF PROMINENT BUSINESSMEN/NON-GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS/LEADERS
14. KILLING OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
15. KILLING OF PROMINENT, NON-GOVERNMENT LEADERS
16. ASSAULTS ON POLICE AND MILITARY PERSONNEL
17. ASSAULTS ON MISSION FORCE PERSONNEL, (E.G., MUGGING)
18. ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS
19. HOSTAGE TAKING
20. USE OF FEAR TACTICS TO COERCE SUPPORT FOR OPPOSITION FORCE
21. USE OF FEAR TACTICS TO CONTROL LOCAL POPULACE
22. USE OF FEAR TACTICS TO CONTROL GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY
23. LABOR STRIKES
24. THEFT OR ALTERATION OF GOVERNMENT IDENTIFICATION CARDS
25. EVIDENCE OF FORGED PASSPORTS
26. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
27. USE OF MILITARY/GOVERNMENT EQUIPMENT IN ILLICIT OPERATIONS
28. EVACUATION OF CIVILIAN POPULATION FROM REGION OR AREA OF
CONFLICT
29. MASS URBAN-RURAL MIGRATION OR VICE VERSA
30. EXODUS/MIGRATION FROM CONTESTED AREAS
31. ARMED CONFRONTATION BY OPPOSITION FORCE WITHIN THE COUNTRY
32. MASSING OF OPPOSITION COMBATANTS
33. MEASURES TAKEN TO REMOVE GOVERNMENT LEADERS
34. REPEATED INCURSIONS OF OPPOSITION FORCE PERSONNEL INTO MISSION
FORCE AREA
35. RETALIATORY ACTIONS BY LOCAL POPULACE IN RESPONSE TO
ACTUAL/PERCEIVED MISSION FORCE TRANSGRESSIONS
36. WITHDRAWAL OF SPONSOR SUPPORT FOR MISSION FORCE REQUIREMENTS
37. CHANGES IN OPPOSITION FORCE OPERATING AREAS
38. SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN OPERATIONAL ROUTINE AMONG OPPOSITION FORCE
39. GENERAL NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD MISSION FORCE PRESENCE
40. ACTIONS DESIGNED TO FORCE GOVERNMENT INTO TAKING MEASURES TO
DESTABILIZE THE SECURITY SITUATION
41. LOOTING
42. MASS DEMONSTRATIONS
43. RIOTING
44. EFFORTS TO INCITE RIOTS
45. RALLIES TO HONOR MARTYRED OPPOSITION LEADER OR REVOLUTIONARY
HEROES
46. PAID AND/OR ARMED DEMONSTRATORS IN RIOTS