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1. INTRODUCTION:
a. Lesson Tie-in: Throughout your previous instruction here at the Intelligence Center and School you have received training on the basic duties and responsibilities of an officer, on the overall operation of the military intelligence system, and on the enemy threat. This instruction will be your first, and most important step into the primary function o the intelligence officer; analysis. IPB integrates information on the enemy, weather and terrain, and provides the basis for situation development, target value analysis, collection and reconnaissance and surveillance planning and battlefield decision-making.
b. Objective: As a result of this instruction, students will, in an all-source intelligence environment, be able to perform the four functions of the IPB process, and to develop the written and graphic products produced during IPB. Students will also be able to apply the IPB process to collection and reconnaissance and surveillance planning, IAW the current graduation criteria.
c. Safety Considerations: There are no specific safety consideration for this block of instruction.
d. Purpose: The US Army must be prepared to fight and win on the modern battlefield, a battlefield characterized by large numbers of highly modernized forces utilizing nuclear, chemical, and biological (NBC) weapons in addition to more lethal conventional weapons and electronic warfare (EW) systems. The intensity, density, and lethality of the battle will make BATTLE COMMAND even more difficult at a time when highly mobile combat and combat support forces require more effective control in order to exploit enemy vulnerabilities. Intelligence personnel and their systems must be able to provide the commander with information concerning the threat, and the environment (weather, and terrain) and the effects of each on the accomplishment of the commander's mission. IPB provides a mode that ensures uniformity in how intelligence personnel within each echelon of command are to analyze environment and evaluate the effects of each on threat and friendly courses of action.
Note: Use assistant
instructors to assist
with PES and to take
briefings.
e. Procedure: You will be given detailed instruction on all phases of the IPB process. After instruction on each phase, you will complete a detailed practical exercise which demonstrates your grasp of the instruction. Upon completion of each practical exercise, selected students will brief their
solution to the entire class. The instructor and other students will critique the effort and provide constructive comments. At the end of the instruction, students will complete an examination consisting of written, multi-leg-choice and practical, hands-on questions.
Begin Instructional
Conference
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2. DEVELOPMENT:
a. The book definition of IPB is as shown.
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b. In plain English, IPB is combining the battlefield environment and the enemy's doctrine to determine how he will complete his mission.
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c. IPB is done during the first phase (Plan and Direct) of the intelligence cycle.
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d. The first step of the IPB Process is DEFINE THE BATTLEFIELD ENVIRONMENT.
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e. It involves establishing the limits of the battlefield by identifying the Area of Operations (AO), Battlespace and Area of Interest (AI). During this function, the overall nature of the situation and the operating environment is evaluated. The G2/S2 should identify significant requirements, gaps in intelligence, threat and friendly capabilities and the environmental features that must be considered during the IPB effort. It assists the analysts in determining what information, products, and support will be required to complete the IPB. The battlefield consists of the area of operations, battlespace and area of interest. These areas are analyzed in terms of width, depth, height (air-space), electronics, and time, with time being the most critical dimension.
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(1) The area of operations is defined as that portion of a geographical area where the commander is assigned responsibility and authority to conduct military operations. The assigned Area of Operations is based on the factors of METT-T and must be of sufficient size to allow completion of the assigned mission. Commanders at each level are normally assigned areas of operations which extend beyond the FLOT or attack objectives a distance commensurate with their unit capabilities. You, the S2 evaluates the Area of Operations and mission, and along with the rest of the staff, recommend the area of operations for the subordinate units. The commander's area of operation is assigned by higher headquarters.
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(2) The area of interest includes the geographic area and airspace where the threat, and environment (weather and terrain) could impact on the successful conduct of the command's operation. (Usually larger than the Area of operation and Battlespace). It is based on the mission, threat situation, terrain, time, and troops or assets available. It is an area of concern to the commander that includes areas adjacent, forward, behind, and including the area of operations. The intelligence officer recommends the area of interest to the commander based on METT-T, the commander's operational intent, and information needs in the form of gaps/uncertainties in intelligence information. The commander then approves the area of interest.
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(3) The Battlespace is a physical volume that expands or contracts in relation to the ability to acquire and engage the threat. Limits of the command's battlespace are determined by the maximum capabilities of a unit to acquire targets and physically dominate the threat. It includes the breadth, depth and height in which the commander positions and moves assets over time.
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f. The next function of the IPB Process is still a "homework" function. The new IPB process streamlines terrain and weather into one function. First let's look at terrain. Terrain analysis reduces the uncertainties regarding the effects of terrain on operations. In order to accomplish this step of this function, the intelligence staff at division and higher receives support from a direct support engineer terrain team or detachment. The terrain team performs a technical evaluation of the topographic considerations of:
Relief and drainage, vegetation, hydrology, and the cultural and political aspects of terrain. Their products support the analysis of the military aspects of terrain performed by the intelligence staff:
-- Observation and Fields of Fire
-- Cover and Concealment
-- Obstacles (man made and natural)
-- Key Terrain
-- Ground Avenues of Approach and Mobility
Corridors
-- Air Avenues of Approach
The graphic product of the composite of the topographical considerations is the Combined Obstacles Overlay which we will cover in more detail later.
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(1) The military significance of the terrain is analyzed in detail to determine how it affects friendly and threat capabilities, vulnerabilities, and courses of action. Through careful terrain analysis, we determine those areas on the battlefield which hinder and those which facilitate friendly and threat abilities to move, shoot, and communicate.
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(2) The terrain is analyzed in terms of its five military aspects which can be remembered easily by using the acronym "OCOKA." This stands for "observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach." These must be analyzed in light of the mission of the unit, the type operation, the level of command, the composition of forces involved, and the weapons and equipment expected to be encountered.
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(3) Observation is the ability to see over a particular area to acquire targets. The words observation and visibility are often used interchangeably by some people. This is imprecise. Visibility is weather dependent or is a temporary phenomena. Observation, on the other hand, is terrain dependent and is relatively permanent. Generally, the best observation is obtained from the highest terrain in an area.
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(4) Fields of fire refers to the area a weapon can cover effectively from a given point. Fires can be of two basic types--direct and indirect. Direct fire weapons are machine guns, rifles, and things like TOW weapon systems which require direct line of sight to their targets. Indirect fire weapons such as mortars and artillery are primarily affected by terrain conditions within the target area which may influence the terminal effect of the projectile. A key thing to remember is that observation and fields of fire do not always equate to each other. You may be able to see 25 km, but if all you see are armed with a rifle, then your fields of fire will probably be limited to something like 500 meters. Always, brief observation and fields of fire in terms of weapons ranges.
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(5) The second OCOKA factor concerns cover and concealment. Cover is the protection from the effects of weapons fires, direct, indirect, and air to ground. Certain aspects of the terrain may provide good cover from some fires, while some may provide cover from only one of these types. (Ask students for an example).
(6) So remember that cover can be used to protect a force from the effects of direct and indirect fires. Also it can, in some cases, be used to protect a force from observation. If this is the case, then the object providing cover is also providing concealment. But cover and concealment do not always equate. {Ask for examples of when you can have concealment but no cover (hidden in a bush) and when you can have cover but no concealment (use the example of the viewing bunkers in artillery ranges impact areas)}.
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(7) We touched upon concealment in the previous slides. Basically, concealment is protection from observation, either from the air or from the ground. Examples can be slope, vegetation, built up areas, etc. Concealment is vital to OPSEC and deception operations. Certain features of the terrain will provide concealment from both ground and aerial observation, while other features may provide concealment from only one of these. When you describe the military aspects of the terrain you need to be precise as to what type of concealment you are talking about.
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(8) The third OCOKA factor deals with obstacles. an obstacle is any natural or manmade terrain feature that stops, impedes, slows, or diverts movement. Before a terrain feature can be called an obstacle, you need to know the organization of the unit which will move through the area, how it is equipped, and its movement doctrine. There are many aspects of the terrain which could act as obstacles.
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(9) If a terrain feature is an obstacle, there are specific aspects of that terrain feature which make it so. For example, a river may be an obstacle to tracked and vehicular movement for many reasons: steep banks, soft bottom, deep water, swift current, etc. An urban area
is an obstacle to fast paced cross-country tracked movement because the close spacing of the building restrict movement. It is the duty of the analyst to tell why terrain features are obstacles what they are obstacles to.
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(10) The fourth OCOKA factor concerns key terrain. Key terrain is some terrain feature (natural or manmade) which, if controlled, will give a marked advantage to whoever controls it. Be prepared to justify WHY it is key. It is echelon of command, mission, enemy, and situation dependent.
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(11) The commander may designate certain key terrain as decisive terrain if it will have an extraordinary impact on the mission. To designate terrain as decisive to recognize that the mission depends on seizing or retaining it.
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(12) Key or decisive terrain must be controlled, not necessarily occupied. It may be controlled by either fires or maneuver.
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(13) The last of the OCOKA factors concerns avenues of approach in the area of interest. To determine an avenue of approach you first determine where the force wants to get to (immediate and subsequent OBJ). Then, based upon all the previous terrain analysis, you determine how the terrain will allow maneuver to these objectives. When the friendly force is in the defense, the avenues of approach show how the threat will probably maneuver into the friendly force's defense sector. Identify threat avenues of approach for a force one size larger than your own from the AI to their subsequent objectives. Identify the friendly counterattack avenues of approach for a force one size smaller than your unit's. Aircraft, like ground forces, employ avenues of approach. Rotary wing aircraft, which closely support ground forces, have different requirements than high performance fixed-wing aircraft. Helicopters use terrain to mask movement while high performance aircraft tend to fly using the most direct route.
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(14) Mobility corridors can be thought of as subsets of avenues of approach. They are totally terrain dependent. They are those areas within the avenue of where the component parts of a larger unit will actually maneuver due to terrain restrictions caused by severely restricted terrain, obstacles and unit unrestricted areas. The size of the mobility corridor will be dependent upon the size of force which can maneuver in it using its doctrinal tactical formation.
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(15) This chart shows the minimum width of mobility corridors for mechanized units. These figures apply to both friendly and threat units. WRITE THESE DOWN!
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(16) Mobility corridors are graphically depicted as shown. Red is used for threat MCS and blue for friendly MCs.
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(17) AAs should be determined after mobility corridors and depicted as shown.
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(18) There are two types of mobility, cross country and maneuvering along lines of communication. Although tactical units can and do maneuver cross country, they will usually try to move over road networks as much as possible to keep up the momentum of their operation and to make resupply of their own forces easier. A slope of 45% or greater makes maneuver impractical. Individual vehicles such as tanks can negotiate slopes in excess of 45%, but cannot maneuver for combat while doing so. So, forces will exploit existing lines of communication for maneuver.
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(19) Cross-country movement is affected by the factors shown on this slide. When terrain is analyzed as to how it supports cross-country mobility it is classified using the terms of unrestricted, restricted and severely restricted. These are some general guidelines to use, but remember, each case is equipment, doctrine, and situation dependent. Unrestricted terrain is terrain which will support a particular size force to maneuver in accordance with its doctrine. Restricted terrain will permit this maneuver with slight modification to the forces doctrine. Severely restricted terrain will not permit a particular size force to maneuver without extreme modification to its doctrine. When analyzing terrain to classify it as restricted, severely restricted, it is important to consider the size and type force that is expected to maneuver through it. For example, if you are concerned about what a light infantry platoon can maneuver through, you may classify the same terrain differently than you would if you were analyzing that terrain as to how it would support a mechanized company's maneuver.
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(20) Trafficability mostly affects cross country maneuver (CCM). The trafficability of the terrain can also prove to be an obstacle at times. As an example, around this area when it is dry (as it normally is most of the year) the ground is very hard and can support tracked movement. The same ground, however, when it rains becomes extremely soft and in many areas it becomes even hard to walk through.
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(21) Let's back up for a minute. Remember we have been talking about the military aspects of terrain as identified by the OCOKA factors. We're currently talking about the last of these factors, or avenues of approach.
Avenues of approach concern mobility, of which there are two basic types. We have discussed cross-country mobility. The other basic type of mobility concerns exploiting lines of communication. Lines of communication can involve shipping lanes, railroads, etc. The primary type we will discuss is the line of communication defined by road networks.
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(26) After examining the terrain or topographic considerations, we must consider the cumulative effects of all factors. In doing this we begin to graphically identify areas that will most likely and least likely be used for maneuver. We use the symbology shown on the slide to graphically depict the types and effects of terrain. We begin to apply analysis to the terrain factors to determine areas of possible economy of force areas as well as the critical aspects of terrain that will be useful to friendly and threat commanders. An example of what to look for in examining the cumulative effects of terrain factors would include analysis of slope and vegetation combined. Restricted terrain for slope combined with restricted terrain for tree spacing would most likely identify severely restricted terrain for the cumulative effect. Another example would include examination of soil types with hydrology to determine if the terrain can be used for maneuver. Generally, the following guidelines are followed for determining maneuver categories of slope:
- Unrestricted: Maneuver unrestricted -
0-30% slope
- Restricted: Maneuver restricted - 30-45%
- Severely Restricted: Maneuver restricted to where terrain will probably not be used for mounted operations greater than 45% slope.
Note: 45 degrees = 100% slope.
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(27) When analyzing the total effects of terrain on specific operations, the analyst uses the graphic tools, the Combined Obstacles Overlay (COO) and the Modified Combined Obstacles Overlay (MCOO). These overlays are a total graphic representation of critical effects of terrain and supports the intelligence estimate process by highlighting the military aspects of terrain. Identification of avenues of approach and mobility corridors, which appear on the MCOO, provide a refined focus of our collection effort and intelligence analysis.
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g. The next step of function 2 is weather analysis. This function is performed continuously and is integrated fully with terrain analysis. Climate and weather are analyzed to determine their effects on operations.
When performing weather analysis, the intelligence staff has the support of weather experts in the form of the Staff Weather Officer (SWO) provided by the Air Force. The SWO collates weather information collected throughout the battlefield, combines this information with weather data received from his collectors/forecasters and higher headquarters, and provides weather forecasts. The SWO is additionally responsible for determining weather affects on weapons systems. However, the G2/S2 still maintains overall responsibility for assessing how these effects impact both friendly and threat operations and weapon systems. As the Army's weapons systems become more and more technically driven, good, accurate weather information becomes more critical to successful employment of systems. In determining the military aspects of weather, the SWO and analyst examine temperature and humidity, precipitation effects, winds, clouds, visibility, density altitude, pressure, windchill, trafficability, and light data.
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(1) The five military aspects of the weather that concern intelligence support to operation planning are: temperature and humidity, precipitation, winds, clouds, and visibility. The tactical significance of these aspects, and the risks or opportunities they present, depend upon knowledge of weather data acquired and the significance of the effects of weather elements on Army user operations.
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(a) Poor visibility is beneficial to offensive and retrograde operations. (Ask a student why this is so.) Generally, restricted visibility hinders defensive operations because reconnaissance and surveillance are impeded and target acquisition is less accurate and is restricted to shorter ranges.
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(1) A traditional hard-copy product is the light data table. This includes, for a general geographic area, the times for sunset, sunrise, moon set, moon rise, percent of moon illumination, and other times related to these events. This is an example of a light data table. We'll cover each of these factors individually.
(b) Wind speed and direction play an important part in the tactical scheme. Wind of sufficient speed reduces the effectiveness of the down-wind military force by blowing dust, smoke, rain, or snow on personnel and equipment. Wind plays a dramatic role in the employment of chemical and biological weapons. Additionally, the wind speed and direction will determine the extent of downwind hazards resulting from the effects of nuclear explosions. Winds, by enhancing evaporation, increase the rate at which the body loses heat. It is the rate of relative air movement that counts and the cooling effect is the same whether you are moving through the air or the air is blowing past you. The wind chill factor can increase the likelihood of cold injuries.
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(c) Precipitation affects the state of the ground, visibility, personnel effectiveness, and the functioning of some equipment. A heavy rain may make some unsurfaced roads and off road areas impassible. Generally, precipitation in excess of 1/10 inch per hour or 2 inches in 12 hours is considered to be critical for tactical operations. Snowfall exceeding 2 inches in 12 hours, 6 inches accumulation on the ground, or 2-foot drifts also have a significant effect on operations. (Elicit examples of effects of precipitation from the student.)
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(d) The type and amount of cloud cover as well as the height of the cloud base and tops, influence both friendly and threat air operations. Extensive cloud cover reduces the effectiveness of close air support. This effect becomes more pronounced as cloud cover increases, as cloud bases lower, and as conditions associated with clouds (icing, turbulence, and poor
visibility aloft) increase. The ceiling is the height of the lowest layer of clouds covering 6/10ths of the sky or more. Ceilings can affect temperature and the effect of nuclear weapons.
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(e) Temperature and humidity affect the operation of equipment and the efficiency of personnel. Extreme temperatures, both high and low, can cause numerous problems such as a constant need for heated shelters, necessity for special clothing, equipment, and combat skills. (Have students give examples of how temperature can affect equipment or personnel.)
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(1) Thermal crossover is a condition which can negatively impact the effectiveness of thermal sights. It occurs when the ground temperature is nearly equal to the temperature of the target. This does not always occur and the best way to determine if it will is to test it at your unit using your sights and vehicles.
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h. The third function of IPB, is Evaluate the Threat. Evaluate the Threat is conducted at the same time as the previous functions and really is the first in-depth look at the enemy. The intelligence office examines all available information about the threat and tries to think like a threat commander. In doing so, he will identify capabilities, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities about the threat that commanders need to know. Commanders know a great deal about their own forces and how to best use them. It is equally important that the intelligence community keep the commander informed about the threat and his strengths, weaknesses, and methods of operation. To adequately evaluate the threat, the analyst must think like the threat commander, that is, to see the battle from within the threat war plan.
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(1) OB is the identification, strength, command structure, and disposition of the personnel, units and equipment of any military force. OB data itself is not normally furnished the commander. Instead, he is provided conclusions, estimates or analyses of threat probable courses of action based on collated OB information. In determining threat capabilities and probable courses of action, the intelligence officer must consider OB intelligence together with other intelligence pertaining to the environment.
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(a) Composition is the identification and organization of units. It applies to specific units or commands as opposed to type units. Unit identification is
often called the key to OB because it leads to the answers to many questions concerning the threat. Through identification, the OB analyst is able to develop a history of the composition, training, tactics, and combat effectiveness of a threat unit.
Organization is the structure of a unit and the relationship of the various echelons within the structure. Threat capabilities are difficult to assess accurately without knowledge of the current organization.
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(b) Disposition consists of the location of threat units and the manner in which these units are tactically (or administratively in time of peace) deployed. In addition, disposition includes the recent, current, and proposed movement of threat units. Location is the geographical area or position occupied by a unit. Tactical deployment is the relative position of units with respect to one another or to the terrain. Tactical formations are designed for executing certain maneuvers. If this deployment can be predetermined, it may lead to an accurate appraisal of probable threat courses of action.
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(c) The term strength covers the description of a unit or force in terms of man, weapons, and equipment. Information concerning strength provides the commander with an indication of threat capabilities, and assists him in determining the probable courses of action or options open to the threat commander.
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(d) Tactics include tactical doctrine as well as tactics employed by specific units. From a knowledge of tactical doctrine, the analyst knows how the threat may employ his forces under various conditions and in certain type situations. There are established principles and patterns for the employment of infantry, mechanized, armor, and artillery in the offense and defense. Any predetermination of the probable patterns of employment and threat action or reaction is extremely important in the planning phase of an operation.
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(e) Individual and unit training can significantly contribute to the combat effectiveness of any military organization. Each type or phase of training accomplished by a unit adds to its capabilities and effectiveness. Therefore, the combat effectiveness of an threat unit is more easily appraised when the degree and quality of its training are known.
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(f) Logistics is also related to combat effectiveness. The adoption of a course of action is influenced by the ability of the logistical system to support that action. Some types of logistic information include:
- All classes and types of supplies
- Requirements.
- Procurements.
- Distribution.
- Transportation.
- Maintenance.
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(g) Combat effectiveness is a term used to describe the abilities and fighting quality of a threat unit. Combat effectiveness affects the capabilities of unit and may be predicted by analyzing such factors as:
- Personnel strength.
- Amount and condition of weapons and equipment
- Status of training.
- Past performance.
- Personality traits of key personnel.
- Geographical area in which committed.
- Morale, health, discipline, and political reliability.
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(h) Tech Data includes all of the technical information requires by MI units to exploit SIGINT targets.
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(i) Miscellaneous data include various types of supporting information needed by an analyst to contribute to the development of the other OB element.
Personality files contain information on certain characteristics and attributes which describe individual members of a threat military force. This is valuable because the tactics and combat efficiency of particular units are closely related to key individuals.
Unit history includes information and intelligence on component elements of a unit; on present and past parent units; and other details such as past performance and activities. Development of unit history is important because it aids in determining the capabilities and limitations of a unit.
Some units use systems of code numbers and names. These code number/name systems are valuable sources of information related to composition and disposition.
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(2) A template is merely a graphic representation of a threat's capability drawn to scale as a map overlay. It provides a basis for seeing the battlefield and a sound basis for command judgement and decisions affecting resource allocation. It is used as a comparative data base to integrate what we know about the threat with an environmental scenario.
Templates may portray a variety of threat characteristics such as the disposition of forces, weapons, equipment, and fortifications. Functional systems, such as artillery or engineers, also may be templated. The nature of templates is such that they can be added to, changed, or deleted as needs and the situation dictates.
A doctrinal template depicts the threat doctrinal deployment for various types of operations without the constraints imposed by weather and terrain. Threat doctrinal templates depict doctrinal deployment for various types of operations without constraints imposed by the environment. Composition, formation, frontages, depths, equipment, and high value targets are types of information displayed. What is templated depends upon the needs of the analyst.
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(a) These are the types of activities you could template. But remember, exactly what is templated is dependent upon the unique needs of each units mission requirements.
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(b) Doctrinal templates help confirm suspected threat locations by helping you decide where to look with your limited collection assets. They assist in identifying gaps in OB just as a line and block chart of the threat would. You can see what's missing. They will be used in Processing to ID threat boundaries and intentions. They are a graphic depiction of indicators so you can spot deviations from doctrine and anticipate threat actions.
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(3) While you evaluate the threat, you also identify targets for the commander. During Target Value analysis threat high value targets are identified that will be critical to the commander's mission success.
High Value Targets are assets that are important to the threat commander for successful accomplishment of his mission. HVTs are recommended by the S2 and approved by the commander.
High Payoff Targets are HVTs which are important to the friendly commander. These targets must be destroyed, neutralized, or suppressed using our targeting capabilities (including EW) to successfully accomplish the friendly mission. These are developed and recommended by the staff and approved by the commander during wargaming and development of the Decision Support Template.
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(i) The final function of the IPB Process is Determine Threat Courses of Action (COA). This function puts all previous functions together to provide a more clear picture of threat intent and to provide graphic decision aids to the command and staff. The Intelligence Officer starts the process by thinking through the threat war plan (THINK RED) and hypothesizing the various threat courses of action. These actions are graphically portrayed in the:
-- Situation Template - A Doctrinal Template designed to reflect the effects of the environment.
-- Event Template - A graphic portrayal of likely threat events and critical nodes. This equates to a collection and reconnaissance and surveillance plan in graphic form.
-- PIR: Are these intelligence requirements which a commander has anticipated and has stated a priority during planning and decision making. They are those critical gaps/uncertainties he requires answers to in order to accomplish his mission.
--IR: Are items of information referring to the threat, or the environment, which need to be collected and processed in order to meet the commander's information needs.
--PIR and IR must be assigned to each threat COA.
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(1) Through the use of situational templating, the threat's doctrine is integrated into the constraints created by the environment for a specific geographical area. The situation template is basically a doctrinal template with environmental constraints applied. It is produced by placing a doctrinal template over a selected mobility corridor or specific terrain configuration and noting how the threat force must modify its doctrinal configuration to account for environmental constraints. The analyst uses
military logic to fit the threat force to the terrain as closely as possible. As an threat force moves along a particular area of the battlefield, it will be required to do certain things at certain places which are dictated by the environment and tactical doctrine.
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(a) This slide shows how the situation template is developed. First the situation template utilizes the Doctrinal Template depicted considering environmental constraints. That means we plot threat units on a map based on logical use of terrain while maintaining doctrinal frontages and depths where possible. The logical location to place Situation Templates is along avenues of approach and/or mobility corridors since this is where we can most reasonably expect the threat to operate. This helps us predict what the threat will look like at the instant he arrives at that point on the battlefield.
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(b) As threat forces move, their actions continue to be influenced by the environment, and the tactical situation. Since this movement is sequential, Situation Templates are sequential snapshots of how the threat force might appear as it moves. Situation Templates should be developed for each critical event identified on the battlefield. For example, river crossings are critical events as are initial development positions, actions at the
FLOT or FEBA, or passage of lines.
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(2) The event template is created based upon situation templates. Each situation template will depict certain activities associated with a particular course of action. the analyst can choose among these activities for those which will provide the most reliable information and for those that will provide answers to his information needs (i.e. PIR, IR). These will become his NAIs. The event template is nothing more than a series of NAIs. The event template serves as the basis for the collection plan. Event Templating identifies and analyzes significant battlefield events and activities which provide indicators of threat courses of action. It is a projection of what will probably occur if the threat adopts a particular course of action. By recognizing what the threat can do, and by comparing it with what he is doing, we can predict what he will do next. If we compare various Snapshot Situation Templates at critical times and places on the battlefield, we will come up with a time phased picture of the threat's actions. Examining this carefully, we will be
able to more accurately select threat courses of action and verify our hypothesis about his intentions. We will also more accurately pin-point areas of expected critical
activity.
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(a) A named area of interest is a point or area along an avenue of approach or mobility corridor where activity will confirm or deny a particular course of action. Named areas of interest can be a specific point on the ground, a specific movement route, or an area. When possible, named areas of interest are placed in numbered sequence along an avenue of approach or mobility corridor. This facilitates the calculation of movement times between specific NAI, and limits confusion as to the specific avenue or corridor under consideration. NAIs may also be significant terrain features which are unknown to the commander (i.e. fords).
Named areas of interest facilitate intelligence collection, reconnaissance, and surveillance asset employment and intelligence analysis because:
-- They focus attention on areas where the threat force must appear if it has selected particular mobility corridor.
-- They delineate when and where the enemy will employ his collection, reconnaissance and surveillance, fire support, and counterattack elements during friendly offensive operations.
-- They frame militarily significant events by time and location.
-- Events or activities in one named area of interest can be compared with events occurring at NAI in other mobility corridors to provide a basis for determining threat intentions.
-- Events within NAI can be analyzed for indicators against which intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance, and target acquisition assets can be directed.
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(b) Time Phase Lines (TPL) assist in tracking threat movements, and assist the collection manager in directing collection assets. They provide a graphic means of comparing the threat's mobility capability along separate avenues of approach and mobility corridors.
Time Phase Lines can be computed for all types of threat movement and operations, and can be utilized in the deep battle area to monitor movement along lines of communication, in the close-in battle to monitor actual threat operations, and in the rear battle to monitor the movement of enemy airborne/air assault or operational maneuver group forces towards their objectives. Time Phase Lines are based on doctrinal rates of movement. These rates of movement are based upon actual experience with the threat, his doctrinal writings, or on peacetime wargaming. Movement rates are adjusted to compensate for the effects of weather and terrain and for friendly actions. During actual operations, Time Phase Lines are adjusted to conform to actual threat rates of movement.
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(c) The Event Template depicts named areas of interest along each avenue of approach and mobility corridor and the relationship of events between separate avenues of approach and mobility corridors. It provides a means of analyzing the sequence of activities and events that should occur for each potential threat course of action and how they relate to one another. The Event Template is developed by wargaming each potential threat course of action from the point where friendly or threat activity begins to the final objective(s). As forces move along avenues of approach and mobility corridors, critical areas become apparent. These areas are critical because they are where significant events and activities will take place. It is within these areas that targets will appear.
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(3) The Event Matrix (EM) is associated with the event template. It is a technique which enables the analyst to more precisely correlate an expected threat activity with a specific geographic area and time of occurrence. The EM allows the analyst to determine specific time "windows" of the expected threat activity. These time windows are expressed in terms of no earlier than (NET) and no later than (NLT) times.
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(a) This is an example of an event matrix. Note how a specific event, occurring at a specific time and place is linked to a particular enemy COA.
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3. CONCLUSION.
a. Review of Main Points. This concludes our review of the IPB Process. Remember that this four step process is designed to enable you to analyze the effects of weather and terrain on both friendly and enemy courses of action and, ultimately, to make predictions to the commander on enemy actions.
b. Questions and Comments. Any questions?
c. Tie-in. You will use the IPB process in all of the practical exercises you will do during MIOAC. Furthermore, your commanders, peers and soldiers throughout the Army will expect you to be the Subject Matter Expert in IPB.