a. Lesson Tie-in: In order for you to leverage those IEW assets and organizations found at Corps you must understand where the Corps MI Bde was and where it is going in the next few years. Through the restructure of individual units and the introduction of new systems the Corps MI Bde will not look anything like its current structure. As future collection managers, ACE Battle captains, and company commanders within this organization this overview will give you a working knowledge of what this organizaiton looks like, how it operates and the equipment organic to it.
b. Objective: With the information provided about the Corps MI Bde the students will be able to identify the units, assets and activities within the MI Bde. Additionally the students will be able to identify the intelligene production responsibilities of this Bde.
c. Safety: Low IV.
During the Cold War the majority of the intelligence effort was focused upon the SIGINT threat and the Great Red Army. In the post-Cold War, and post-Desert Storm army the intelligence community has been committed to a complete restructure of its units at all echelons. This class will focus on the restructure of the MI Bde at Corps and some initiatives to provide more timely intelligence to Divisional and Brigade commanders.
Some of the ongoing imperatives include the refocusing of our assets, from tactical to national, to the needs of the maneuver commander. This focus has keyed on the following items:
-Requirements: What does the maneuver Cdr realy need, how timely must the data be to be of use to this Cdr, how do we get it to him/her?
-Interoperability: The army will always operate in a Joint and Combined enviroment. Can we push-to-talk (FM); do we have E-mail or modems on our computers that can talk, if not how do we do it?
-Doctrinal Crosswalks: Are we training the right way? How can we adjust our doctrine to new communications, IEW systems and fewer personnel to man them?
-Training Opportunities: Fewer dollars, less deployment abilities. Greater dependance on Local Training Areas, communications networks and shared training.
-See Over the Next Hill: Give subordinate Cdr's assets that provide them timely and accurate intelligence outside the 5-10Km zone.
-Pull: intelligence from higher echelons through Broadcast Dissemination networks such as Trap/TIBS/Intellink.
Balance the MI Force: Shift the focus from the national to tactical level. Ensure each echelon is aware of their responsibilites to the tactical Cdr and train them in the intelligence processes this Cdr needs. Use Joint and TDA, such as FT Huachuca assets to assist in developing and or supporting tactical MI units. Finally actively involve the Active and Reserve component units in training, deployments, and contingency operations.
How do we get there? Through technologically proven processors and state of the art communications networks. By ensuring that we can communicate and operate with our Coalition partners and through the upgrade of our pre-processors, processors, and sensor packages at all levels.
One of the easist and quickest ways to leverage intelligence from all echelons is through Broadcast Dissemination networks. If you look at our sensor capabilities from National to Tactical level you soon realize that we have had a huge vacuum cleaner sucking in all this excellent data but no real way to process the huge volumns in a timely manner for the tactical Cdr. Through the use of automation and the purchase of processors at all echelons we can now collect, report, analyze, and disseminate in Near Real Time (NRT) to the Brigade level. The means of dissemination are very much dependant on the national communicaitons architecture of JDISS and JWICS and through the TROJAN network. The intelligence is there but how to get to the Cdr. Through the Pull method the S2 at any echelon has the ability, with the correct hard and software to pull intelligence products from national agencies and systems for his Cdr. This capability enables Cdr's at all echelons to see the enemy in the same light, every time, every where. Additionally the S2 is able to tailor intelligence for his Cdr.
How do we keep that Corps, Division and Brigade Cdr informed? Through the Seamless intelligence architecture. Is the system currently seamless? NO, it is not. But if your Bde or Division has a JDISS, Warrior or Trojan capabilities you can reach out and receive Strategic and National level intelligence in a very timely manner.
In this restructure of the Intelligence Architecture the EAC Bde's have been refocused to assist the Corps MI Bde with real-world, daily intelligence products. Through the introduction of the CORPS MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SUPPORE ELEMENT, (CMISE). This organization provides support to the Operations Battalion during crisis, deployments, and wartime. Their missions include leveraging national assets through Collection Management, providing imagery and all-source intelligence products. Additionally when the Corps deploys they remain at home station providing continual, noninterrupted intelligence to the Cdr.
The Corps MI Bde has assets and communications links which allow it to receive National level products, both raw data and finished intelligence products NRT.
The Bn at division has been issued processors such as Warrior and ASAS to assist in the timely production of intelligence to the division.
Finally, the reorganization of the MI Company in DS to the Bde will provide NRT and RT targetable intelligence to the bullet launchers almost as fast as it is collected. Additionally with the fielding of the Warrior system at this level the Bde will be able to leverage intelligence at all echelons.
Through the imperative of tactical tailoring the Force Cdr is able to leverage his systems and put on the ground those assets needed at the critical times. As a force deploys from home-station to its lodgement area it may only need a very small HUMINT and SIGINT package to begin operations in theater while the Sanctuary (home-station) unit feeds it intelligence through one of the DSNET communicaitons paths. As the force structure builds in theater more of the intelligence structure is deployed to theater, complete with its own communications and maintenance packages. Ensuring the Force Cdr of continual, uninterrupted intelligence.
At the final stage during full military operations the CMISE remains at home station providing national and theater intelligence to the deployed forces with the deployed intelligence unit fully capable of sustained operations.
Key points to remember when building this force:
-HUMINT or SIGINT?
During the conduct of Split-based operations the deployed Cdr has the ability to Pull intelligence from all echelons. The intelligence structure remaining in sanctuary is responsible for providing continual intelligence to the deployed forces. The DISE element deployed with the maneuver forces can be organized with one (three systems) from the Single Source Enclave of the ACE. This SSE along with a Communications Control Set, (CCS) and a Trojan Spirit allow the commander to receive real-time intelligence from deployed sensors. Thereby providing the current intelligence picture to the Cdr.
The deployed element is tailored for the mission, HUMINT, SIGINT heavy, organic maintenance, organic communications and power generation capabilities. The element must also be flexible for the mission(s) and scalable for future missions.
During Operation Desert Capture II, digitally and manually equipped units were deployed to NTC. To illustrate the effectivness of the future of our intelligence structure the deployed Bde was linked to its parent,(divisional) DTOCSE (ACE) and Corps intelligence units. Digital links enabled the Cdrs to pass real-time intelligence to all echelons therby exercising split-based, and downward focused intelligence to the Cdr on the move. The exercise was deemed an enormous success dispite some difficulties. Difficulties like overwhelming the non-digital maneuver battalion with information, the failure of IVIS talking to MCS and ASAS. However dispite these small problems, the Cdr's from Bn to Corps all had a common picture of the battlefield, enabling them to timely put steel on target.
This slide comes to the forefront of the restructure of the MI Bde and MI Bn at Corps and Division. Through the retirement of many of the systems that we all used as LT's and the introduction of newer, fewer systems we are gaining better, more targetable systems than the mass quantities that we had this decade and past decades.
Prior to FY94 we had 21 processors and communications platforms; 5 seperate airborne collectors and 8 ground based SIGINT and IMINT systems. During the army draw-down years of FY94-99 MI is going to 16, 5, and 4 systems respectively. I will cover those systems indivdually in the next few slides. The 21st century intelligence organization should only have 2, 1, and 2 systems respectively.
Through the restructure and fielding of new systems we in MI will get to the point where collected data will be targetable to within 10 meters. Connectivity will be such that we will be able to go from Sensor to Shooter. In the interium the ASAS processor will lessen our Sensor to Shooter times by half.
Our flagship systems are listed here. Basic capablities and numbers are as follows:
-JSTARS: wide area surveillance sstem that provides balltel management and targeting information. The platform is and Air Force E8C which collects MTI and SAR radar data using a multi-mode radar. It downlinks to the Ground Station Module (GSM), an Army system. It receives and analyzes processed radar imagery from the E8C. It is also capable of receiving data from the OV-1D and UAV. If equipped with the CTT it can display preprocessed SIGINT. There are currently 2 x JSTARS. Each division will receive 6 GSM; MI Bde x 2, Corps Arty, Arty Bde, Avn Bde x 1; ACR, Sep Bde x 1.
-UAV CR: will be organic to the Corps Aerial Exploitation Battalion. It can fly day or night in limited adverse weather providing Cdrs with NRT intelligence, target acquisition, BDA, reconnaissance and battlefield surveillance. Payloads include: EO/FLIR and data relay. Issue is 8 x A/C per divison, 16 x A/C per Corps and EAC MI Bde.
-Trojan Spirit II: transmits and receiveson 14 channels digital, voice, data, or FAX. Operates in "C", "Ku" or "X" bands. Has LAN and Secondary Imagery capabilities. Back-up communicaitons include MSE (DSVT), and HF radio. Communications paths include: DSNET I/III, MSE and Tactical Packet Network (TPN). This system is intended to agument EAC and ECB in-theater communications.
-GRCS: replaces Quicklook II and Guardrail V A/C in the AE Bn. The basis of issue is 1 system of 12 x RC-12 A/C per Corps. Targets include communications emitters, noncommunicaitons emitters and jammers. Sensors are: AQL ELINT collection and DF; COMINT colleciton and DF; CHAALS High Accuracy Locaiton System. Information is downlinked to the Integrated Processing Facility (IPF) for processing.
-ASAS: all source analysis system, consisting of 6 x all-source workstations, 6 x single sourse workstations, 2 x communications control sets, and 2 x data processing systems. This system allows for the immediate parsing of traffic into an all source correllated database for immediate use by analysts at division and corps.
-Advance Quickfix: precision DF when operating with another AQF or GBCS. Quickfire channel through ACE or CGS. Provides signal acquisition, targeting, processing, and reporting for COMINT/ELINT node ID, smart "Stealth" (frequency hopping) jamming. Basis of issue 3 x div/ACR.
-Ground Based Common Sensor (GBCS): will integrate COMINT and ELINT on the same platform at the division. The EA module includes smart jamming capabilities. Mission components and capabilities are the same as the AQF. Basis of issue 4 x div, ACR.
-TENCAP is nothing more than (Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities) support to Army Modernization Objectives. An example is the Enhanced Tactical Users Terminal (ETUT).
-E-Trackwolf: is an EAC high frequency (HF) skywave COMINT collection and DF system.
This slide portrays the evolution of the Aerial Exploitation Battalion at Corps. Originally equipped with 6 x Mohawk (SLAR/IMINT); 6 x Quicklook (ELINT) and 9 x IGRV (COMINT) A/C. The Bn will be restructured to 3 x companies: HHSC, AS and UAV consisting of 1 x set (12ea) GRCS and 2 x sets of UAV-CR (16ea) A/C. The division will retain only 3 x Quickfix II or ACF A/C.
The reduction in systems will allow us to focus our maintenance capabilites on only three platforms maximizing airborne collection times. Additionally the accuarcy of the new sensors will allow that Sensor to Shooter link to develop as Field Artillery realizes and accepts our data as targetable. The new sensor capabilites will enable not only to find the enemy but to point the killers to it for destruction.
The Tactical Exploitation (TE) Battalion at Corps has also undergone a complete restructure. The Bn had HHS, EW, CI/IPW and LRSU companies. Through the restructure the Bn now has no ground based SIGINT capability and has an HHS; CI (12 teams); IPW (8 - 12 teams) and LRSU (18 teams) companies. This lack of ground based SIGINT will hamper and limit the light divisions. As they do not have sufficient organic SIGINT capabilites. Currently some TE Bn's have PRD-11/12s and TRQ-32s. At the division the future will reside in one common system the GBCS. Again the platforms capabilties will enable us to pass data from the SENSOR to the SHOOTER.
Our present processors are 1970s technology. The FAISS and TCAC were fielded as all-source and SIGINT capable systems to offset the limitations of the human processor. Modern technology and the low-cost of acquisition has enabled the army to pull itself from the grease pencil and acetate to a self-parsing database via the ASAS system. Throught the current fielding of ASAS Block I, Warrior and other TENCAP systems we have evolved to the ACE structure at all echelons. The future holds an almost immediate time frame from collection to proccessed intelligence through a lively and interactive database and communicaitons network. The ease and speed of these systems will enable the intelligence community to process data at a faster rate and in a more accurate manner thus allowing us to put steel on target quicker.
As we discussed previously tactical tailoring is nothing more than building a force to suit the situation and the needs of the deploying unit and Cdr. Through the CMISE and the sanctuaried unit the deployed unit will continue to use its organic communications networks to Push and Pull intelligence for the Cdr.
The active component Corps MI Bde restructure looks like this. As previously discussed the Bde has or had an HHD at Bde, and 3 x active duty Bn's and a RC Bn. The units were:
-HHD: C2 for the Bde Cdr and Staff.
-OPS: CTOCSE, G2 support, TENCAP. The intelligence processing unit for the Corps Cdr. Composed of the TOCSE (A Co), TCAE (B Co); and an HHSC.
-TE: HHSC, CI/IPW, EW, and LRSU. The HUMINT source for the Corps G2, augmentation for the divisions via HUMINT and SIGINT (TRQ-32s) is GS.
-AE: HHSC, AS (GR V), AE (Quicklook), and the IPF.
-TE(RC): Very ground based SIGINT heavy.
The Bde will restructure to this organization at the end of the drawdown:
-HHD: remains the same or is rolled into the Operations Bn.
-OPS: HHSC, ACE (A Co), and possible a TENCAP (B Co).
-TE: HHSC, CI (12 teams), IPW (8 or 12 teams), LRSU (18 teams).
-AE: HHSC, AS (12 x GRCS) and Surveillance (16 x UAV-CR).
-TE(RC): it is not known at this time if this unit will survive the drawdown. If it does it will most likely mirror the AC TE Bn and lose all its ground based SIGINT assets.
Here is a symbolic portrayal of how the Corps MI Bde assets should be deployed within a Corps' AO.
In addition to the 4 x Corps MI Bde a restructure of the EAC Bde's is underway. There will be a Power Projection Bde-West established in Hawaii. Its focus will be on the Pacific Rim nations. Their intelligence will be tailored for the tactical Cdr and provided to all echelons. Many TDA units will be absorbed within this organization.
There will also be a Power Projection Bde-East stationed within CONUS, most likely at Fort Gordon, GA. This Bde will also focus on the tactical Cdr. Its missions will include the Middle East, Europe, Eurasia, and Africa. Again many TDA units will be merged to build this one of a kind Bde.
For those of you not believing that many units, both tactical and INSCOM, have been inactivated take a look at this chart. One error is the 501st Bde, still well and on station in Korea.
The reorganization of the MI Bn at Division will only briefly be covered in this class as you will receive a full block of instruction later in IBOS. Each Bn will be reorganized into the DS/GS company concept. This concept places mainly HUMINT assets DS and SIGINT assets GS. Additionally the ACE concept has placed all the old DTOCSE (CM and ASPS) personnel within the HHOC. These personnel are OPCON or attached to the HHC/Division during mission and wartime. The ACE platoon personnel work directly for the division G2, not the Bn Cdr.
Here is a graphic portrayal of how the divisional assets should be arrayed within the division area of operations.
Even though this class focuses on the MI Bde at Corps one cannot look at the restructure without seeing the impact on the maneuver brigade Cdr. If all was a perfect world this Cdr should have the assets shown here:
-Common Ground Station
-Warrior (ASAS WS)
-DS MI assets
This enormous amount of intelligence should enable this Cdr to make timely and accurate decisons. However not every Bde is so equipped as you will see in the next slides.
Currently that Cdr receives limited intelligence productes, finished or raw, at his TOC. He has no way to digitally transmit this data and for the most part must rely on MCS. The assets provided to him do not have adequate organic communications or digital links. He cannot see over the next hill, 6-10 kms.
In Fy 95 this Cdr's ability to receive, correlate, and process the vast amounts of data fed to him from division will not change much. Some Bde's, if not already done, will be fielded with Warrior terminals for direct communications to the division G2s Collateral Enclave.
By FY96 the Bde Cdr should be able to pass digital information to and from the MI Bn sensors and the ACE. His new sensors should allow him, at times to see over the next hill.
The final objective is for this Cdr not only to see over the hill but to have the ability to enter into the Broadcast Dissemination networks to Pull intelligence products he needs. His S2 should be able to tailor his collection plan to all echelon of platforms so as to provide the most timely and accurate intelligence to his Cdr. This fully automated TOC should have digital interfaces with most of the future common platforms.
So how do we do this? We do it by leveraging all systems, national to tactical. By exploiting the national databases and pulling that intelligence needed by the tactical Cdr. We use the concepts of Push and Pull at every possible moment. Through the use of the Broadcast Dissemination network you use your organic terminal to enter into other agencies and components databases and get the intelligence you need, when you need it!
At the Theater/tactical level we must be able to enter into those same Broadcast dissemination networks and pass products to one another. No echelon will be left out of the loop in porviding timely, accurate, and targetable information and intelligence to the Warfighters. We must be trained and prepared to exploit all aspects of intelligence available to us whatever the echelon.
Does this mean that each echelon will be duplicating the effort with scare resources? Absolutely not! This chart shows the division of labor.
-National: very broad, political structures, national military stratagies, safe estimates, not linked intelligence to the Cdr for current operations.
-Theater: more capable or responding to the tactical Cdr. Greater flexability in the sensor platforms. Not linked to the tactical operation so the tactical Cdr will not be assured of asset availability.
-Tactical: Balanced coverage of the INTs. Focused on the operation of the Tactical Cdr. Very responsive. Intelligence cueing weapons to targets.
Again, no echelon can provide all the needed intelligence to the tactical Cdr by themselves. The Sanctuary will provide full scale intelligence to the DISE element when deployed. The JTF Cdr will be able to receive intelligence from all branches of the service and national agencies. Sensors and analysts at all echelons will have to cross-cue for greater definition on targets. Tactical sensors have greater flexibilty and are more timely than national systems. We will have to know how to plan for this.
This next to final slide shows the most current fielding schedule for all these new systems.
-JSTARS: 2x A/C, 2 more funded.
-UAV: 15th MI BN/504th MI Bde at Fort Hood will receive the first set this fall.
-CTT: fielding completed.
-ASAS: Complete by July 95. Units currently being fielded: 101st (AASLT) Div, 2ID. 24th ID (M) and possibly 10th (MTN) Div next summer.
-TENCAP systems as shown.
During this block of instruction we have focused on the extreme changes going on throughout the echelons of MI units. No unit can be solely dependant upon themselves for intelligence. We must learn the sensors, communications networds, processors and capabilities of each echelon to be successful in our profession. We can no longer afford to remain in the grease pencil realm and must pull ourselves into the 21st Century or be left behind. This class has given you an overview of the capabilites and responsibilites of each echelon.
He who can win the information war will be successful, the concept has abeen proven in ODC I and II. Units are transitioning as we speak to new MTOEs and new equipment. You must understand the total concept to be able to win in the information age.
For further information see FM34-10-2, IEW Equipment Handbook.
What are your questions?