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The focus of this manual is on the MI brigades (EAC). These brigades are found in, or are focused upon, operational theaters worldwide where US forces may be employed to support or protect US national security interests and/or those of our Allies. In order to recognize the important role MI brigades (EAC) play in these theaters, one must first understand other factors which influence and shape military policy within the theaters.
AirLand Battle Doctrine requires that the IEW system provide timely and accurate multidiscipline intelligence, electronic warfare (EW), and counterintelligence (CI) to all echelons. To ensure victory on the battlefield, the campaign plan in a theater of operations calls for the achievement of the theater's strategic goals. The success of the IEW mission to support attaining these goals depends on detailed planning and execution of all phases of IEW operations.
National strategy is the plan or expression of the coordinated use of national power which includes political, economic, psychological, and military power during peace, crisis, or war to secure national objectives. It is based on both national capabilities and threats to the nation and on a thorough assessment of potential enemies.
Military power in support of national strategy is based on deterring and, if this fails, successfully executing assigned missions. Unified Commanders in Chief (CINCs) execute the use of military power in support of US national strategy. Their strategic guidance is expressed in terms of--
Military strategy is the combination of military objectives (ends), military concepts (ways), and military force (means) to achieve national security policy objectives. Effective military strategy includes all aspects of preparing military power for its most effective application on a global or regional scale to achieve or secure national objectives. The CINC's mission, then, is to translate the strategic guidance received into operational terms so that he and subordinate commanders can apply military power through deterrence or, failing that, the conduct of combat operations.
For the Army, military strategy, operational art, and tactics are the broad divisions of activity used to describe the operational continuum of warfare. A successful strategy achieves national and alliance political objectives with minimal cost in lives and money.
These three activities, in the context of AirLand Battle Doctrine, have been described as perspectives of the operational continuum. (The concept of "levels" has become synonymous with that of "perspective.") Each of these levels generates its own implications for IEW planning. Additional details on the levels of warfare are in FM 100-5 and FM 100-20.
The strategic level includes US national strategy to deter nuclear attack against the US and its Allies; the conventional defense of all allies; the defense of continental United States (CONUS); and the ability to deal with other contingencies at the lower end of the operational continuum (for example, low-intensity conflicts [LICs]).
The operational level creates the link between national and military strategy; hence, the application of combat to defeat an enemy. It--
The tactical level includes the tactics and techniques used by maneuver units (corps and below) to destroy the enemy or seize objectives during battles and engagements.
The operational activities described above create the backdrop for understanding Army IEW support to EAC. The Army, as the land-based component of AirLand Battle Doctrine, is forward deployed into the unified theaters around the world. The Army force is tailored according to the nature of the military threat, as well as political, economic, psychological, and geographic factors. These five "factors of power" affect the conduct of warfare and mold the CINC's military strategy for the theater. Hence, they have a direct effect on the theater Army component commander's mission planning.
By definition, IEW EAC organizations perform their functions at the operational level. In executing intelligence operational responsibilities, the IEW organization must support both the CINC's operational planning and the intelligence requirements of Army forces charged with conducting those operations. The CINC and component theater commanders must consider the above factors into their military strategy to identify enemy centers of gravity and targets that, when attacked, will impact on these centers. They must also be considered to protect friendly centers of gravity. IEW support to the theater must concentrate on identifying these centers of gravity.
The NCA, through the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)--
The military strategy, force structure, and intelligence requirements of each theater are unique. Differences within each theater of war include--
Campaign planning defines the organization of resources required to defeat enemy centers of gravity. It is based on a thorough understanding of the political, economic, geographic, and demographic features of a region.
Figure 1-1 shows how the Army IEW system focuses support on the Army's operational force structures. The diminishing length of the lines indicates the relative value of the intelligence to the different levels of the structure of warfare. The figure shows that the greatest amount of both tactical and strategic intelligence occurs at the operational level. It is here that the integration process has the most influence on military strategy.
Tactical intelligence is formed from combat information and analytical processes of units involved in tactical operations. Strategic intelligence is generated by national intelligence agencies and is sent down to operational forces. The IEW system connects strategic and tactical intelligence activities, supporting the combat forces at all echelons.
Operational level intelligence is required for planning and conducting campaigns within a theater. At the operational level, intelligence concentrates on collecting and analyzing information that identifies and locates strategic and operational centers of gravity. Successful attack of these centers achieves friendly political and theater military-strategic objectives. Also , intelligence activities are focused on analyzing enemy military capabilities, probable intentions, vulnerabilities, weaknesses, and political and military interests in the region.
The IEW system's doctrine for EAC IEW organizations applies to every echelon, regardless of where they operate. The IEW system provides for specific IEW structures, beginning at the armored cavalry regiment (ACR) or separate brigade level and ending at the departmental or national level. The IEW structure at each echelon is designed primarily to support the combat commander at that echelon. The IEW structure at successively higher echelons is also designed to support IEW units at echelons below it.
The IEW architecture has been developed as a mutually supporting system providing connectivity, cooperation, and coordination among IEW structures at all echelons. It recognizes that IEW operations at each echelon are not independent. IEW operations at higher echelons assist lower echelons in meeting their mission objectives.
The IEW principles that guide mutual support are--
The dependence each echelon's IEW organization has on higher commands and each echelon's responsibility to subordinate commands is best explained by how a commander views the battlefield. All commanders view the battlefield in terms of time, space, and area. These factors influence a commander's information requirements.
The battlefield commander's area of operation (AO) includes all the territory he can presently attack or defend. The commander's area of interest (AI) extends beyond the AO to include areas in which enemy forces capable of affecting future operations are found. These areas have influenced how IEW structures at different echelons are organized. The IEW organizations which are organic to force echelons concentrate their resources on providing intelligence regarding their AO. It then requests from and depends on the IEW organization at the next higher echelon for intelligence regarding its AI.
The AO and AI of a theater will be defined according to the guidelines above and the missions assigned to the theater commander. In a non-linear battlefield situation, these guidelines might more appropriately translate into circles; the radii of which would correspond to the guidelines.
At EAC intelligence support for the theater AI comes from department level, other services, and national agencies. The EAC IEW structure is organized to manage this vast coordination effort. The result is getting the right intelligence into the hands of the commander to support his decision-making process.
Successful AirLand Battle warfare is intelligence dependent. Intelligence is one of the seven battlefield operating systems discussed in FM 71-100 and FM 100-15.
Intelligence is vital to the CINC's operational design. Commanders must orient on decisive objectives (which may be centers of gravity), conduct precise planning, and remain flexible enough to aggressively exploit dynamic opportunities on the battlefield. The IEW structure at EAC supports all four tenets of AirLand Battle (see FM 100-5).
Success at the operational level will depend on the Army's ability to fight in accordance with the basic tenets of the AirLand Battle Doctrine. IEW operations must orient on identifying where on the battlefield the Army commander can commit his forces to achieve decisive results. Effective IEW operations support each AirLand Battle tenet and help the commander gain control of time.
Innovative plans and operations are executed by leaders using IEW information to force the enemy to react to the friendly battle plan.
Risks are minimized through accurate and complete intelligence, which clearly distinguishes facts from assumptions and estimates. IEW operations determine likely enemy courses of action which allow commanders to aggressively exploit battlefield opportunities within the framework of the mission. IEW operations support retention of the initiative by anticipating future events.
Battles are accepted or declined because intelligence identifies where an enemy is vulnerable. IEW operations seek to eliminate battlefield uncertainties and to provide commanders the intelligence they require to "read the battlefield" and make quick decisions. Based on intelligence and the friendly campaign plan, commanders rapidly maneuver their forces, mass for operations, and disperse for protection. This keeps the enemy off balance.
The commander uses IEW to plan and bring combat power to bear at each phase of the operation. IEW operations support future friendly operations by gathering intelligence beyond the immediate battle area. Intelligence supports the execution of the commander's campaign plan, throughout the depth of offensive or defensive operations.
Intelligence helps create a unity of effort in effective staff planning, reflecting clear understanding of the commander's intentions. It is reflected in integrated staff actions and supports the synchronized activities of maneuver units. IEW operations support the commander's ability to achieve relative combat power at the decisive point. They provide intelligence on the time-space relationships which impact on his decisions and information on the relation between friendly and enemy capabilities.
Effective IEW operations provide the commander with one of the most important factors affecting military operations--time. Time affects every facet of battle (for example, interdiction and maneuver) at the operational level. It can be the decisive factor necessary for a commander to defeat an enemy force. Intelligence helps the commander gain control of time.
IEW operations at EAC are aimed at accomplishing five tasks to produce operational level intelligence: situation development, target development, EW, security and deception, and indications and warning (I&W). See FM 34-3 for more information about situation development.
Situation development is a continuing estimate of the situation that projects enemy intentions and the effects of the weather and terrain. Situation development begins with intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). IPB starts well before any combat operations begin. It enables the supported commander to see the entire theater AO, including the communications zone (COMMZ), in sufficient time and detail to generate the appropriate forces to execute the theater commander's campaign plan. This task also provides warning to the corps of follow-on elements entering the corps AI and warning to the Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM) on the level of threat to the COMMZ. IPB is discussed fully in FM 34-130.
Target development provides combat information, targeting data, and correlated target information which supports the commander's campaign plan. Target development at EAC focuses on significant events and activities, military-strategic and political issues, alliance relationships, and campaign styles of enemy commanders to yield centers of gravity. The analysis of these factors could yield operational level targets for the theater commander. Target development can be oriented on the identification of enemy special weapon systems, including nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC); command and control (Cē) systems; and other high-value targets (HVTs) or high-payoff targets (HPTs). See FM 34-3 for more information about target development.
EW is military action to determine, exploit, disrupt, or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum and protect friendly use of it. EW includes--
EAC IEW operations help focus the EW resource allocation process for intelligence forces in the theater AO. The operational commander must direct the limited EW effort toward targets vulnerable to EW, which have the highest payoff and are within the commander's capability to attack. See FM 34-40 for more information about EW.
The realm of security operations is focused on protecting the force, regardless of size or theater. It involves preventing or hindering the intelligence collection activities of an enemy force directed at friendly forces on the battlefield. It also includes countering the various foreign intelligence services (FISs) whose peacetime collection activities continue during military operations. Deception operations are important combat multipliers during military operations. IEW support furnishes the information about an enemy force that deception planners require to implement these operations. Effective deceptions and tight operations security (OPSEC) enhance combat power by confusing the enemy and reducing his foreknowledge of friendly actions. See FM 34-60 for more information about security operations and FM 90-2 for more information about battlefield deception. See FM 90-2A(S) for information about electronic deception.
I&W information is used to develop and refine regional indicator lists of enemy activities and possible intentions. It is derived from intelligence activities that detect and report time-sensitive intelligence information of foreign developments. These developments could pose threats to US or Allied military, political, or economic interest, or to US citizens abroad. See FM 34-1 for information about I&W.
Effective IEW operations require substantial communications to support the technical interface required between all echelons in the IEW structure. To establish this interface, tasking and reporting channels are established between EAC and ECB . The theater G2 disseminates all-source intelligence products and passes collection requirements to corps G2s over these channels. Conversely, the corps G2s request intelligence information from the theater G2 who includes tactical intelligence requirements in the EAC collection plans.
Separate signals intelligence (SIGINT) channels, as provided by Army technical control and analysis element (TCAE) centers, also support the intelligence interface between EAC and ECB. This interface requires dedicated communications channels separate from Cē and operational channels. They are used to--
Operations in a theater of war are invariably multiservice (joint) in character. However, operational direction may be exercised through an alliance structure. When this occurs, US forces would be controlled by a combined command. The Cē elements of the theater IEW force must be capable of supporting joint and combined operations. Likewise, the senior intelligence officer (SIO) directing theater IEW operations may be a J2, from another service, or from an alliance.
The MI brigades (EAC) must also be prepared to provide IEW support to joint and combined commands. Likewise, Army intelligence organizations may depend upon these commands for all or part of their intelligence requirements. The implication for MI brigades is a complete understanding of other US services, host nation, and alliance intelligence systems. Key to that understanding are--
The MI brigade (EAC) participates in the tactical exploitation of national capabilities (TENCAP) and the national exploitation of tactical capabilities (NETCAP) programs. Typically, strategic collection means are among the most sensitive of national assets, especially those sources most likely to reveal probable enemy intentions. Providing such information risks loss of the source. Sanitization does not always eliminate the problem. It extends to protecting the capabilities of technologically superior intelligence or other battlefield operational systems.
In combined or coalition warfare, Allies may doubt the reliability of one another's internal security, making information sharing difficult. Procedures for the release of classified information must be established and clearly understood. These procedures must cover information and sources developed at a combined captured materiel exploitation center (CMEC) or a joint interrogation facility (JIF).
These types of problems may be unique to the individual theaters. The conduct and responsibilities of the MI brigade (EAC) supporting joint and combined operations or host nations must be determined prior to the start of hostile activities within the theater. The need to share intelligence information will be influenced by the nature of the threat and the existence or absence of political and military alliances and agreements. CINCs must develop and direct specific theater intelligence guidelines based on guidance from the NCA.