This chapter describes the doctrinal principles for employing IEW resources in support of various combat operations. It uses the l0th US Corps, the 208th ACR, and the 312th Separate Brigade as examples. It describes, in scenario format, how IEW assets deploy in these operations, how they focus their efforts, and how they integrate their operations with unit operations.
Elements of the IEW system join with other combat and support elements to form the combined arms team. Employing IEW resources as part of that team multiplies the combat power of the unit. These assets allow the ACR or separate brigade to use fire and maneuver effectively, determine enemy intentions, disrupt enemy C2 , and protect the unit and its operations from enemy intelligence collectors. The commander integrates IEW with the scheme of fire and maneuver to support all phases of the battle.
The employment of IEW assets depends on METT-T, the commander's concept of the operation, and the missions specified in OPLANs and OPORDs. To support the maneuver commander properly, the MI commander and staff officers must understand the purpose and conduct of combat operations.
There are three types of security missions: screen, guard, and cover. The ACR conducts all three on behalf of the parent corps. The separate brigade may also conduct these operations, but its structure is best suited to the guard and cover missions.
The purpose of screening missions is to provide early warning to the main body. IEW assets rarely conduct detailed operations because of the size of the AO in a screen, the time available, and the mission. By the time the screening operation starts, most of the situation development work should be done.
When screening a stationary friendly force, the commander designates a phase line (PL) along or near the planned OPs. The commander also designates a PL designating the rear of the screen area. The area between these two PLs is the responsibility of the screen commander. MI assets belonging to the screen commander occupy positions between these two PLs or coordinate with the commander of the main body for permission to be in the main force's area.
The MI commander makes sure MI assets do not occupy areas the screening force designates as OPs. He also makes sure MI assets are told as far in advance as possible of anticipated friendly movement. One technique is to locate a platoon headquarters near a squadron or battalion TOC and to assign the MI platoon leader to liaise with the screening commander's staff. Because MI assets need more time to prepare to move than screening forces, they must have advance notice if they are to stay with the forces and still maintain battlefield coverage. Thus, to properly support a screening force operation, MI assets must be mobile. MI assets must be able to move all of their equipment and systems quickly and efficiently with organic IEW equipment.
The commander conducts a moving force screen the same way he conducts a stationary screening operation; with screening forces leapfrogging to successive OPs. However, when the main body is moving quickly, constantly moving patrols may be substituted for leapfrogging OPs. In a moving screen, MI assets must consider both the speed of the main body and locations suitable for collection along the route.
Aerial assets are substituted when ground assets cannot tear down, displace, set up, and resume operations and still keep pace with the main body. Of all the security missions, the moving screen is the most difficult. This is because the screening force must provide security for the main body while also conducting zone and route reconnaissance along its path.
A guard force performs all the tasks a screening force performs. Guard missions require units to fight the lead enemy regiments at ACR or separate brigade level, and the enemy advance guard battalions at squadron or battalion level. The ACR may be assigned a guard mission to support corps operations. Squadrons also frequently perform guard operations, as do separate brigades. A guard force--
A unit conducting a guard mission is usually deployed in a series of battle positions. They launch attacks or defend from these positions as the commander directs. Not all subordinate units need to occupy battle positions. It is possible that portions of the unit will conduct screens in areas where the likelihood of contact is slight. Like the screen, a guard may be for either a stationary or a moving main body. These missions include advance, flank, or rear guard actions. The names of these actions indicate the location of the guard force in relation to the main body.
The advance guard supporting stationary forces is similar to a covering force operation. Advance guards for stationary forces are discussed later in this chapter.
Advance guards for moving forces engage the enemy and develop the situation through fire and maneuver. They destroy the enemy's reconnaissance forces and discover weak areas in the enemy formation for the main body to exploit.
Flank guards protect the flank of a force, whether the force is moving or stationary. They occupy a series of battle positions, either parallel to the mute of the moving force or parallel to the stationary force's boundary. They are also responsible for protecting the area between the main body and the guard force.
Rear guards protect the rear of a force when that force is moving.
IEW support to a guard requires more effort and preparation than to a screen because the guard force is expected to engage the enemy, if required. IEW assets also have more time to prepare and act. The MI commander coordinates with maneuver commanders to place IEW assets just as in the attack or defense. IEW assets may occupy locations close to battle positions of the supported force, assuming that these IEW sites do not hinder the commander's concept of the operation. The advantage for IEW assets who collocate with combat troops is the protection the combat troops provide. Jammers, of course, must never conduct ECM operations from locations near friendly battle positions because their electromagnetic signature makes them easy to detect and attracts enemy fire.
Covering force missions include all the tasks performed in screening and guard missions. The covering force operates independently from the main body. The purpose of covering force operations is to develop the situation early and deceive, disorganize, and destroy enemy forcing. However, unlike screening and guard forces, a covering force is tactically self-contained and often seeks to become decisively engaged with the enemy. Cover operations are performed in the offense or defense and can be conducted by either the ACR or separate brigade.
There is no clear line between the covering force battle and the main battle. Covering forces continue to operate in some areas, while the main battle is pursued in others. Throughout the operation, battles shift from defensive action in one locale to offensive action. That is why the ACR or separate brigade conducting a covering force mission must be prepared for either mission.
When a covering force action begins, the main body generally is not engaged. Depending on how much warning it gets, and the mission of the main body, the covering force can be heavily augmented with engineers, MI, and artillery before the battle begins. With less warning, support arrives with the battle already underway. In any event, the covering force is expected to continue resistance until the corps has had time to deploy. Because it operates independently from the corps main body, the MI company must be able to move all of its personnel, systems, and equipment with its own organic assets.
In the offense, a cavalry unit serves as the covering force and deploys in advance of the main body. The difference between an advance guard and an advance covering force is scope. The covering force operates further from the main body, for longer periods, and engages larger forms than the advance guard. However, IEW support is the same for both missions.
When the offensive covering force has advanced as far as possible, it assumes a defensive posture until the main body conducts a passage of lines through it. Throughout the mission, the MI company closely coordinates with forward moving units, providing them with the technical data, combat information, and intelligence they need when they need it.
During screen and guard missions, the S2 relies on the information developed during situation development to locate probable enemy avenues of approach. Throughout these missions, the S2 constantly informs the commander as the enemy situation changes so that the commander has sufficient time to act. As the S2 answers the commander's PIR and IR, he makes sure this combat information and intelligence are quickly disseminated to the other users who need it and that new PIR and IR are addressed.
During the covering force mission, situation development is critical. This is true in both offense and defense. During the offense, the ACR attempts to develop the situation for the parent corps. Intelligence must mirror and support this effort. Throughout the mission, the S2 carefully analyzes the enemy's plan to discover weak flanks or seams between units that the covering force can exploit. The S2 focuses collection activities on the areas of greatest concern to the commander. Beginning with IPB, the S2 section carefully analyzes information and reports received from all sources. The estimate of the enemy's actions is updated continually so that the ACR commander and the corps commander can decide where to focus their efforts.
During the screening mission the S2 conducts limited target development. He uses previously developed HVT and HPT lists directed towards finding enemy reconnaissance elements and their controlling headquarters. The screening force commander wants to destroy these elements because this will strip away enemy reconnaissance and impede the main force from deploying.
OPs and patrols are the primary source of targeting information about enemy reconnaissance assets. Using indirect fire to destroy these enemy assets, OPs and patrols are able to conceal their own locations. This is important because OPs and patrols do not have the combat power to engage a large force directly.
In guard missions, target development is conducted the same way it is done in the offense or defense. The major difference is in the number and type of assets that are available to support these operations. For example, squadrons or battalions are seldom allocated all the MI company assets to support them when they are assigned a guard mission. If they need more IEW support, it must come from main body assets.
In covering missions, target development supports the covering force mission; that is, the destruction of enemy reconnaissance and first echelon forces. The S2 normally has more target development systems available during covering operations than in other operations. These systems include extra DF equipment, dedicated aerial systems, and TA radar. That is why the S2 must know the characteristics of, and how to use, a variety of target development assets.
It is also common for large amounts of fire support to be dedicated to the covering force, especially when the covering force is in the defense. To use these systems to the best advantage, the S2 must consider targets well beyond the range of usual regimental assets and support systems. While the S2 does not determine the method for engaging a target, he is responsible for letting fire support and air liaison personnel know about lucrative targets as they are located and identified.
ESM assets help locate possible targets by cueing scouts towards a particular area on the ground. Since there are insufficient ESM ground positions to attempt DF against enemy reconnaissance, the MI company and the S2 work together to narrow the area of search. They do this by comparing L0Bs obtained from the ESM positions to IPB products that show avenues of approach (AAs) and areas of interest (AIs) to enemy reconnaissance.
Areas that do not support movement, like bodies of water and steep slopes, are eliminated. Then ground or air patrols can concentrate on the remaining areas. Speed is the key to success in this operation. Enemy reconnaissance moves quickly and usually presents a small target. These enemy patrols must be found before they have the chance to slip through the screen and report on the activities of the main body.
QUICKFIX also supports this counterreconnaissance effort by seeking two targets. The first target is enemy reconnaissance patrols. The second target is the controlling headquarters of the reconnaissance force. In most cases, this CP is close enough to the reconnaissance patrol for QUICKFIX to locate. The headquarters is targeted according to the commander's plan. This is usually through a combination of lethal or nonlethal means.
ECM are integrated into the overall effort with ECM equipment normally employed first in an ESM role and then in an ECM role. ECM cannot target every net used by the enemy because there are more communications links than jammers. Some lines are beyond the effective range of the systems and some of these nets can be exploited for intelligence. That is why, after contact is made with the enemy, ECM are employed in combination with fires to enhance their effect. Typical ECM targets are enemy reconnaissance, C2 , and fire direction nets.
EW is conducted the same way in an R&S mission as it is conducted in offense or defense. Because the screen or guard mission is not the main effort, little or no augmentation is expected from higher headquarters. Even fewer assets may be allocated if the unit is tasked to conduct operations on both flanks of the parent unit. That is why combat information and intelligence must be obtained and transmitted quickly.
ECM give the commander another attack option. However, for ECM to be effective in security missions, it must be integrated with the fire support plan. Because ECM equipment is spread over a comparatively large front, it is more effective if it is used to support deception operations rather than used as jammers. Whether these deception operations are imitative or manipulative, they must be cleared through higher headquarters before they are initiated to avoid damage to the main body.
EW efforts reflect the high intensity of cover operations. ESM normally are augmented for the covering force operation. With the addition of voice intercept assets, the MI company can sometimes conduct DF operations. However, this depends on the type of terrain and the amount of frontage to be covered. If there are insufficient assets to properly cover the entire frontage, the MI commander makes recommendations to the maneuver commander so he can weight the IEW effort.
ESM and ECM assets are focused on the most probable enemy positions or AA. This makes the jamming support more effective and supports a more detailed intelligence gathering effort. Where the commander's plan allows for decisive engagement, ESM and ECM assets are placed farther forward, relying on the strength of the covering force for protection and warning.
The major MDCI contribution across the operational continuum is force protection. MDCI accomplishes this mission through investigations, operations, collection operations, analysis, and production. MDCI activities are performed at all levels of war and during all types of operations across the operational continuum. However, MDCI activities are most productive prior to and after tactical operations.
Specific MDCI activities vary depending on METT-T. During the cover and other security missions, MDCI focuses on disseminating foreign intelligence threat briefings to the maneuver commander and the staff. Data for these briefings come from the corps through the MDCI estimate and summaries. This information is used to recommend countermeasures which protect EEFI.
MDCI activity also focuses on obtaining early warning about enemy intelligence, sabotage, and unconventional warfare (UW) threats to the friendly force. This warning may come through liaison with friendly police and intelligence agencies or through low-level source operations (LLSO) conducted by MDCI personnel.
In the following example, the l0th US Corps has deployed to defensive positions along the Inter-German border (IGB). The 208th ACR is the covering for while the main body prepares the MBA. The 312th Separate Brigade is the corps reserve. Figure 4-1 is an example of an OPORD prepared by the 208th ACR staff. Figure 4-2 shows the AO.
The MI company commander analyzes the unit's mission by looking at implied and specified tasks in the ACR OPORD. By looking at the maneuver commander's intent, the MI company commander determines how the battlefield should look as a result of the operation.
All leaders are responsible for understanding the commander's intent two echelons up. In this example, this is the corps commander. In this mission the corps commander calls for the ACR to deny access to PL Paris (Figure 4-2). Information collection and processing focuses on the ACR commander's PIR. Priorities of collection, jamming, and effort are all in the ACR OPORD, as is the company's organization for combat. Since the MI company commander provides input to the OPORD, there should be no surprises here.
The company commander knows that the enemy will probably employ three motorized rifle divisions (MRDs): two to the north and one to the south of Fulda. There are also two tank divisions (TDs), but the commander realizes that the regiment is not concerned with them during the covering force battle. This information is in the intelligence annex and estimate.
A map reconnaissance and the intelligence annex and estimate show that the terrain favors the defender. It is also favorable to the MI company. There is enough high ground to provide radio LOS across the IGB, at least at the onset of hostilities. The greatest problem is the difficulty in moving assets from one sector to another. There is a well developed secondary road network in the AO. The company commander will use this to shift MI assets without using main supply routes (MSRs). The secondary roads will also allow the assets to avoid most enemy forces, which will use routes more suited to large units.
To help compensate for the wide frontage, and because MI assets are never held in reserve, the corps commander attaches the B/210th MI Bn (Tactical Exploitation (TE)) and the VHF jamming and voice collection platoons from the 312th MI Company of 312th Separate Brigade to the 208th ACR. These are subattached by the ACR to the MI company. The commander decides to keep these units concentrated in relatively narrow sectors. This will allow for easier transfer of control when they are returned to their parent units. This type of attachment and subattachment will be common on the modern battlefield. The MI commander must be prepared to accept nonorganic units or to be detached from his parent unit.
B/210th MI Bn (TE) will be used to weight the main effort in the north. Its assets include 3xMLQ-34, 3xTRQ-32, and 3xTRQ-30. The assets from the 312th Separate Brigade will be used in the south. The MI commander is accepting some risk here because the corps commander can commit the reserve, and these platoons will revert to the 312th Separate Brigade. If this happens, the ACR's organic platoons are too far away to provide support. The commander will use QUICKFIX to fill any gaps in coverage.
Tasking and reporting will be through the TCAE, just as with the MI company's organic platoons. These units will require careful coordination for terrain use and reporting combat information, since they probably have no habitual association with the ACR. The commander notices that no interrogation or CI teams have been allocated from corps. This represents a potentially serious problem.
The date-time group (DTG) is now 021500. There should be no time constraints in establishing the CFA.
The commander locates the headquarters up to 5 km from the regimental TOC. This ensures that communications can be maintained, by messenger if necessary. The TCAE is located with the company CP. It ensures continuous technical control of assets and reporting to the ACR and corps. The commander gives instructions to the TCAE to carefully monitor the friendly situation. Constant reports are sent to deployed assets, including nonorganic units. In a fast moving covering force battle, the commander cannot afford to have IEW assets cut off from friendly lines.
The EW platoon deploys where it can best achieve radio LOS. The platoon usually stays within the bundaries of a maneuver squadron for ease of coordination. However, if the required terrain is in another squadron's sector, the platoon may deploy across boundaries as long as proper liaison is done. Normally, the platoon leader deploys the headquarters, T&A team, and voice collection team to the same location. If RATTs are fielded, one will be present at the platoon headquarters. This grouping increases local security. It also drastically reduces the platoon's radio signature since the voice collectors can give verbal reports.
Voice Collection Teams
The company commander deploys one organic platoon in 1/208th ACR AO, and one in 2/208th AO. B/210th MI Bn (TE) operates throughout both sectors. The platoons from the 312th Separate Brigade are deployed in the 3/208th AO. Using the same boundaries as maneuver squadrons makes coordination for support easier but does not mean that the platoon is dedicated to that squadron. The commander is responsible for site selection and asset placement. The TCAE coordinates through the regimental S3, and the commander designates a single point of contact (POC) to confirm locations with the appropriate squadron S3. The company commander and the TCAE will closely manage this because of the number of nonorganic assets operating in the CFA.
The voice collection teams intercept RISTA and regimental to battalion command nets. The ACR will exploit these nets for combat information. The TCAE will forward technical data to the corps and division TCAEs to develop data bases. DF may be possible in l/208th and 2/208th sectors, but not in the south, where 3/208th is operating. This is because there are not enough collectors operating there.
VHF and HF/VHF ECM Teams
These teams deploy with their parent platoons. If the TCAE has a well developed data base, it may conduct ECM missions from the beginning of hostilities. If this is the case, the company commander coordinates closely with the FSO while the fire plan is being developed. This ensures that the jammers are used to their full capability.
If the data base is less well developed, the jammers initially conduct the ESM mission. The commander uses the MLQ-34's greater mobility, higher power, and faster displacement time to the best advantage. Because of its liner power, the TLQ-17A must operate closer to the enemy to be effective. Since it lacks mobility, it takes longer to displace and prepare for follow-on missions. Therefore, the commander decides to use the TLQ-17 to provide coverage when MLQ-34s are displacing and only conduct short operations with them. At other times, they will be used to conduct ESM operations.
Noncommunications Intercept Teams
There are no noncommunications intercept teams organic to the ACR. However, there are three of them in the B/210th MI Bn (TE), which has been attached to the ACR. The MI company commander can suballocate these collectors, but does not, based on the factors of METT-T. Because of the frontage the ACR is occupying, it is better to concentrate these assets in the main effort. This will also allow better transfer back to the B/210th MI Bn (TE) after the covering force battle. The TCAE tasks them to locate surveillance radar associated with reconnaissance units, counterbattery radar, and air defense radar.
The operations support platoon may deploy anywhere in the ACR's sector, depending on the mission. Where additional assets are provided by corps, the headquarters will centrally locate, usually with the company CP. The entire platoon may also locate with a single squadron, if that is where the priority of effort is to be. The platoon relies on the maneuver squadrons and corps MP support to process, transport and guard EPW.
Interrogation in screen, guard, or rover operations should be decentralized to the lowest level possible, often the troop. This requires additional DS interrogation teams from corps. Since none have been provided under the current OPORD, the company commander begins immediate coordination for support. The company commander contacts the MI brigade S3 and specifies the number of teams when they are needed. Until the teams arrive, organic interrogation teams are located at the regimental EFW point. They conduct brief interrogations to obtain information of immediate tactical value.
The CI teams at the regiment are capable of varied operations. These include LLSO in areas directly adjacent to the CFA; liaison with friendly units, police, and intelligence agencies; and limited investigations or interviews as directed by higher headquarters. However, the number of MDCI personnel assigned to the unit preclude conducting more than a few operations at one time. Based on METT-T, the commander will decide where the greatest payoff lies. Corps will almost always need to provide additional assets to the unit. In addition, corps always provides MDCI estimates, summaries, and data bases.
The normal command relationship for GSRs is to attach them to maneuver squadrons. The MI company commander will still be responsible for repairing the actual GSR, because the MI company has the only available repair personnel in the regiment. In the squadron, the S2 is normally responsible for employing and tasking GSR. They are used to search AAs, choke points, or named areas of interest (NAIs) during times of limited visibility to detect or locate enemy activity.
The commander coordinates the use of the flight platoon with ground assets in order to provide continuous coverage. These assets can operate where ground equipment would suffer from LOS or mobility problems caused by the terrain. In addition to ESM and jamming, the flight platoon provides aerial observation of the rear area. The aircraft are used to DF, intercept, and jam communications nets at longer ranges than ground assets. Tasking and reporting are the same as for ground assets.
The battle has gone fairly well. The 208th ACR has held PL Paris for over 24 hours, destroying the lead regiments and identifying the enemy's main attack. As the 208th ACR conducted battle hand-over, it released its attachments back to its parent units.
The MI company refuels and resupplies. Any possible repairs are made to its equipment. While the ACR moves into AA SHILOH, the MI company is GS-R to an MI battalion in the MBA. The assets are controlled by the MI company. The commander is careful to keep the assets as close as possible to AA SHILOH. In case the ACR is committed, the MI company can rejoin the ACR. The company commander of the 312th MI Company places those assets GS-R to the 523d MI Battalion.
In the MBA, the 23d AD and 52d ID (Mech) have inflicted serious losses on the combined arms army (CAA). The corps commander gives 312th Heavy Separate Brigade (Mech) a warning order to execute a counterattack in the Hessian Corridor. At this time, the 312th MI Company ends its GS-R role and begins to operate GS to the 312th Heavy Separate Brigade (Mech).
The primary purpose of offensive operations is to destroy the enemy. The ACR and separate brigade receive IEW support in offensive missions in the same manner as a divisional brigade. The major types of offensive operations are the movement to contact, hasty and deliberate attacks, exploitation, and pursuit.
In all operations, counterreconnaissance is critical. The enemy retains reserves at all levels which can devastate movement to contact, an attack, or pursuit. These reserves, though, are only effective if the enemy commander knows where and when to employ them. Destroying enemy reconnaissance and destroying or disabling C2 reduces, if not eliminates, the chance for effective employment of the reserve.
Movement to contact is designed to gain or regain contact with the enemy. While normally associated with mobile operations where both sides are contesting the initiative, movement to contact occurs at some level in virtually all attacks where forces are not in immediate proximity. It is characterized by rapid movement along multiple axes, decentralized control, and rapid deployment of combined arms formations from the march to attack or to defend. The critical elements of the movement to contact are security to the front and flanks, smooth and rapid deployment into the attack when contact is made, and prior coordination of supporting fires.
The primary difference between the hasty and the deliberate attack is the amount of time available to plan and prepare. Hasty attacks are conducted with the forces on hand without extensive reconnaissance. They are used to seize or retain the initiative. Deliberate attacks are well planned, usually against a strong enemy defense. They require complete reconnaissance, with detailed situation and target development.
Both the ACR and the separate brigade can conduct such attacks. However, because of its structure, the ACR is not well suited to a deliberate attack. The normal function of the ACR when the corps conducts a deliberate attack is to serve as the reconnaissance element and to maintain contact with the enemy before the attack. The ACR also provides advance, flank, and rear security during the attack.
Exploitation occurs after a successful penetration of the enemy's lines. It creates as much havoc as possible, destroying the enemy's rear services and second echelons. If the enemy begins a withdrawal, exploitation develops into a pursuit.
Pursuits are characterized by an exceptionally rapid tempo, often covering hundreds of kilometers over days or weeks. In the pursuit, the enemy is relentlessly attacked, with the objective of causing complete collapse. Air insertions are used extensively to cut off the enemy's escape routes. High-speed forces parallel the enemy, attacking exposed flanks and isolated units. Because of their structure, both the ACR and the separate brigade are well suited to pursuit operations. They have the necessary mobility and self-contained logistics systems to allow them to function with minimal augmentation.
The ACR or separate brigade may either conduct an exploitation independent of outside assistance or spearhead a pursuit conducted by a corps.
Situation development in the offense is an ongoing process. From reconnaisance reports and knowledge of the enemy's doctrine, likely defensive positions are plotted. As much as possible, this is further refined with additional reconnaissance patrols or flights. In the hasty attack, for example, situation development is basic, relying on extensive templating. In the deliberate attack, a more concrete picture of the enemy's composition, disposition, and intent is developed, along with contingencies.
In any event, situation development seeks to determine the enemy's most probable course of action. There are occasions when either the entire separate brigade or the ACR is used for situation development on behalf of the parent corps. This is when the separate brigade or ACR conducts a reconnaissance in force; that is, seizes a limited objective to force the enemy to react. Here, the ACR or separate brigade S2 is looking to see with what forces the enemy reacts to the limited attack. The object is to report the enemy's reaction completely and quickly to the corps. The end result is that the corps commander is provided either detailed information about the enemy or, if the enemy does not react, with an opportunity to expand the reconnaissance in force into a full-scale attack.
Target development is focused on destroying or disabling the most lucrative targets on the battlefield. The process is the same as in any other situation. HVT and HPT lists are developed and the targets are attacked according to the commander's intent. The staff avoids the temptation to search for or develop the definitive HVT or HPT list. These lists are always situation dependent. Even in similar tactical situations, facing different enemy forces results in different HPT lists and means of attack.
For example, if an enemy commander is known to be weak or susceptible to deception efforts, that commander should not be targeted by lethal means. Instead, the commander should be left in place, where perhaps a strong commander would be targeted by air or artillery. Similarly, if the enemy has a great deal of artillery, but is short on logistics, targeting the logistics better serves friendly goals than attacking the artillery directly.
SIGINT or ESM assets assist in this target development process, just as they did in the reconnaissance and security missions. Of importance here is the interface between the S2 and the FSO. The speed at which targeting information is passed determines the efficiency with which targets are serviced. Also, the S2 can receive valuable information from the reports of forward observers (FOs) and TA assets, where available, and units already in contact.
EW is an important combat multiplier. However, it alone is not capable of disabling the enemy. To be truly effective, EW is integrated into the overall plan and used in conjunction with lethal forms of attack. In the offense, EW assets are used to weight the main attack. Voice collection is somewhat degraded if the enemy is in the defense, because of the use of landline and other alternate forms of communication. Still, some communications use radio, particularly those associated with a counterattack force, and these can be exploited.
Jamming during offensive operations must be tightly controlled. This aids OPSEC by not revealing friendly areas of concentration and allows the most important targets to be serviced first. As with target development, there is no master list of nets to be attacked with either jamming or deception.
For instance, if a joint air attack team is planned, enemy ADA nets assume primary importance. In the early stages of a deliberate attack, enemy reconnaissance nets may be attacked as part of the counterreconnaissance effort. The MI company commander coordinates closely with the S3 and ensures that the company's personnel fully understand the friendly scheme of maneuver.
Jammers must be in position early enough to support the attack, and operations are nearly continuous. The EW planners cannot be satisfied when they have denied the enemy their primary frequencies. To truly deny or degrade communications, alternate frequencies must also be attacked. Requirements for EW become complicated in the pursuit. If the MI company is unable to keep pace with the combat forces, its EW equipment becomes useless. In those cases, the MI commander reacts with the skillful use of the QUICKFIX, using it to satisfy all EW requirements.
The importance of MDCI varies greatly in the offense. In the ACR and separate brigade, given the high tempo of operations and the small size of MDCI support, MDCI personnel are often restricted to a few vital missions. As an attack progresses, MDCI personnel work to identify collaborators, possible enemy agents, and the enemy's political infrastructure which could present a future threat to the rear area.
The brigade staff prepares an initial order which sets forth counterattack contingencies. This order will be as detailed as time permits. Figure 4-3 is an example of an OPORD prepared by the 312th Heavy Separate Brigade (Mech).
The MI commander performs a mission analysis just as in the cover. The MI commander decides on the scheme of support after considering METT-T, implied and specified tasks, and the contents of OPORDs and OPLANs. After completing this process, OPORDs are issued to subordinates. Support to offensive operations for ACRs or separate brigades is generally the same as support to a divisional brigade (see FM 34-80).
The headquarters must be mobile and displace frequently to remain near the maneuver CP. It does not displace while the TOC is displacing, unless necessary. This helps ensure continuous intelligence flow from deployed assets to subordinate commanders and staffs.
During movement, this platoon is used primarily to identify and collect technical data on enemy emitters. DF operations will be extremely limited during movement, though some support may come from airborne assets. The actual amount of information collected will depend primarily on the enemy's posture. If the enemy is developing a defense, most communications will be with wire and are not vulnerable to intercept.
This platoon will be as far forward as possible in the attack. Initially, the platoon will be used to conduct ESM operations, so it will not compromise the unit OPLAN. When the actual attack begins, the as directed against HVTs as determined in the OPLAN. Normal priorities include C2, fire support, and intelligence nets. The actual targets are based on METT-T and normally change with the phases of the operation.
The maneuver commander normally attaches GSR to the maneuver battalions. They will be weighted towards the front and vulnerable flanks of the unit. If the attack is conducted at night or under conditions of reduced visibility, the GSRs may be used to vector friendly forces on azimuths of advance.
When the commander studied the factors of METT-T, he realized that the brigade would cover a great deal of ground quickly. Therefore, the subordinate battalions would be hard pressed to evacuate EFWs quickly. To gain the maximum information from EFWs, the commander places the interrogation teams in DS of the lead battalion. Additional teams, if obtained from corps, will be used to support other battalions and the brigade itself. The organic CI teams are placed in the company CP. They make contact with corps and provide updates about the enemy intelligence collection threat to the commander. As needed, the commander directs one or both of these teams to meet with friendly police and intelligence agencies.
There is no organic flight platoon in the separate brigade. However, since the ACR is in corps reserve, the flight platoon may be under the OPCON of the brigade. If so, it is tasked through the TCAE, as are organic assets.
The 312th Separate Brigade has been stopped by the division it attacked, inflicting and sustaining heavy losses. The l0th Corps commander orders the 208th ACR to take up defensive positions just behind the remnants of the 312th Sep Bde, to reinforce the sector. The ACR transitions from reserve to the defense in a manner similar to the separate brigade's transition from reserve to the counterattack. The MI company's efforts switch from OPSEC to collection of the information it needs to conduct a defense. A unit defends for one of the following reasons:
Regardless of the reason, the ultimate purpose of the defense is to destroy the enemy and regain the initiative. The IEW system identifies weaknesses and exploits vulnerabilities of the attacking enemy so the maneuver commander can maintain or regain the initiative.
Both the ACR and the separate brigade can defend, but the ACR must be augmented with extra infantry or armor to be successful. If attached to a division for economy of force operations, the ACR and separate brigade may surrender control of the MI company to the division. This depends on the division commander's concept of the operation. The MI company reports through the division's tasking and reporting channels. Tactics and techniques are generally the same as for a divisional brigade.
Situation development in the defense answers the same basic questions as in any other mission: "What is the enemy's most likely course of action? Where, when, and with what forces will the course of action be pursued?" To answer these questions, the S2 focuses collection assets at specific NAIs at specific times. Neither the ACR nor the separate brigade has sufficient assets to cover all NAIs at all times. Therefore, during the IPB process, the S2 develops event P templates which show the expected enemy actions at specific times on the battlefield. Any asset which can collect required information is identified and enough assets are tasked to ensure redundancy of coverage. (For details on collection management, see FM 34-2.)
Target development supports the requirement to strip the enemy of the initiative. The targets which are attacked are those which the enemy most needs to continue the attack. For example, if crossing rivers, the enemy requires extensive engineer support; if committing the second echelon, the enemy requires clear communications and functioning C2 . HPTs are determined not only by the enemy's operation but also by the phase of that operation.
Target development in the prepared defense is usually easier than in the offense because there is more time available to the defender. This allows for detailed surveillance of target areas of interest (TAIs).
If the situation warrants, observers may even be placed where they are bypassed by the enemy, so that they may accurately direct fire against the enemy's follow-up forces. Through all of this, the S2 recommends necessary changes to the constantly reviews the HPT list and S3, based on the changing enemy situation.
EW focuses where it is most needed, not on the entire ACR or separate brigade frontage. The area of need depends on the commander's concept of the operation. It may be where the commander plans to conduct a counterattack; it may be where the main defensive effort is planned; or it may be in a weaker sector, where a combat multiplier is needed for the defense to succeed.
ESM assets are positioned where they can best support the operation. They remain active as long as possible before they need to displace. ECM assets should be used in the ESM mode until jamming is authorized by the commander or a designated representative.
Coordination of jamming becomes an issue in the defense, as it will require more information to execute successfully than in the offense. When attacking, the enemy moves through TAIs established by friendly forces. To achieve maximum with fires and directed against the effectiveness, jamming is combined enemy in the TAI. This requires precise timing and knowledge of the enemy's location.
To be successful, MDCI activities need time. Therefore, they cannot begin on short notice and still be expected to bear fruit during a defensive battle. MDCI in the defense, or any MDCI activity, is a continuation of earlier operations. Liaison begun in the offense or covering battle may only begin to pay dividends in the defense. However, it is probable that the EEFI has changed and MDCI personnel will need to redirect their efforts. This is one of the reasons that MDCI personnel must be constantly apprised of objectives in and changes to the friendly plan.
MDCI personnel support the defense by conducting aggressive operations to reduce or eliminate the rear area Level I threat and to gain warning of Level II and Level III threats. They may also recommend OPSEC and deception measures. The S3 then makes any changes desired to OPSEC or deception measures.
The commander deploys MI systems in accordance with METT-T. Initially, IPB and the commander's concept of the operation guide the MI commander. However, the employment scheme changes with the situation. IPB will aid the MI commander in determining where radio LOS is best, so that the enemy can be detected and jammed as far forward as possible.
AAs also influence placement of assets. If there is only one major avenue into the defensive sector, IEW assets can be concentrated there. If there are a number of approaches, the MI commander uses aerial assets to cover them (see FM 34-80).
As in cover, the company headquarters is placed within 5 km of the TOC. If the situation is static, the commander uses a great deal of wire for communications. In a fluid situation, radio is the preferred method.
The EW platoons deploy with their assets forward. The company commander will usually task the platoon leader to coordinate with the squadron S3 for asset placement. The platoon leader also establishes liaison with the squadron TOC to provide combat information. During the battle, the priority of EW is focused on the enemy's lead C2 , reconnaissance, and fire support. The intent is to find the enemy's main effort in the regimental sector.
After the main effort is identified, priorities shift to the enemy's fire support and AD systems. As these systems are located, they are passed to the FSO who processes them in accordance with the targeting plan. Because there are only two organic platoons and three maneuver squadrons, boundaries and AOs may not be consistent.
The commander attaches the GSRs to the maneuver squadrons according to the number of AAs into their sectors. They are used and report just as they were in the cover.
Based on the data received from corps, the CI teams assess the enemy's collection abilities and recommend countermeasures. They are not responsible for the OPSEC plan; this is a command responsibility under the supervision of the S3.
They may also conduct limited investigations in the defensive sector when tasked by corps. Liaison with local agencies is important to the success of the MDCI effort, due to the small number of agents in the ACR and separate brigade. Interrogators operate at the regimental EPW collection point. This is because there is usually more time available to evacuate prisoners during a defensive operation. If corps provides additional team, they may be placed in the squadron area.
The MI company commander receives OPCON of the flight platoon as in all other operations. It is controlled through the TCAE. There are no significant differences between defensive operations and operations in the covering force.