Table of Contents

Chapter 5

OPERATIONS

The MI Corps, like the Army it supports, is largely based in CONUS with a relatively small forward presence in selected areas of the world. During peacetime, MI uses ASAS to maintain intelligence readiness by supporting contingency planning, mission-essential task list (METL) based training, and real-world intelligence operations. In war and OOTW, MI uses the ASAS to support force projection operations, defeat of the enemy in war, and accomplishment of OOTW.

INTELLIGENCE READINESS

In garrison, the G2 (S2) and ACE maintain intelligence readiness in part by using the ASAS to support exercises, real-world intelligence operations, and contingency planning. These actions in turn support the development of the METL and battle-focused training for combat, combat support (CS), and CSS units. In addition, the intelligence databases developed by Active Component (AC) units for contingency areas aids training and mobilization of RC units with similar or supporting contingency missions. When a crisis arises, these databases and relationships established during their development will facilitate effective intelligence support of the force projection operation.

The G2 (S2) and ACE use the ASAS daily in garrison to develop contingency specific intelligence databases, IPB products, working aids, and operational procedures. The commander directs the intelligence effort through his PIR and IR on his most likely contingency operations. The G2 (S2) uses his ASAS equipment to develop and distribute intelligence estimates, plans, and other products which support contingency planning, wargaming, and decision making. Based on the commander's guidance and G2 (S2) direction, the ACE establishes databases, intelligence support relationships, access to higher echelon databases, and internal ASAS procedures for each potential contingency. The MI unit commander uses the guidance and products mentioned above to examine his force, requirements for each contingency, and to execute battle-focused training.

SITE SELECTION

Mission, support relationships, communications, logistics, and security are some of the factors which must be considered when determining the location, configuration, and connectivity requirements of ASAS equipment. When not part of a larger command post, ACE leaders must ensure the site provides concealment, cover, and security for ACE personnel and equipment. When possible, the ACE should optimize the use of existing structures such as warehouses, hangers, bunkers, and barns. Some specific site selection considerations for the ACE and its ASAS equipment include--

• Type of operation (conventional offensive, forcible entry, humanitarian assistance, etc).

• Tactical situation (hostile OOTW environments like that in Somalia or a full-scale military operation such as Operation DESERT STORM).

• Terrain (drainage, slope, trafficability, vegetation, and routes of ingress and egress).

• Connectivity with IEW sensors and communications systems (transmitter LOS and access to MSE nodes).

• Sources of reliable tactical and commercial power.

PREDEPLOYMENT

Prior to deployment, G2 (S2) and ACE personnel must ensure that the ASAS databases contain up-to-date and relevant information. Analysts and database managers should continuously update and refine contingency databases while in garrison. This effort must include close coordination and an in-depth database deconfliction at all levels. Database maintenance should also ensure sufficient space on electronic storage media to handle the volume of information that will be generated during the operation. Backup files should be available in case of a system failure or the operational loss of an ASAS component during deployment.

G2 (S2) and ACE must plan and, if possible, test communications connectivity before deploying. The level of predeployment coordination should include information on the distribution of IP addresses, router allocations, message addresses, database passwords, and frequencies, to name just a few. In a force projection operation, this would include determining how the intelligence support base will communicate with forces enroute and the DISE from predeployment through completion of the initial entry operation. In conventional offensive operations, G2 (S2) and ACE planning would identify how to maintain contact with the tactical command post and forward deployed IEW assets. The end state of this planning and coordination should be seamless, uninterrupted intelligence support to the commander.

DEPLOYMENT

After securing the site, the ACE advance party uses the site sketch to identify and mark the location of ASAS equipment prior to the arrival of the ACE into the site. Upon arrival of the ACE main body, the advance team first positions the CCS, DPS, and additional communications systems such as the TROJAN SPIRIT II to immediately establish external communications.

Next, the team positions the vehicles or tentage in which the ASAS workstations are operated. ACE personnel then establish ASAS workstations configuration, internal connectivity between the ASAS components, and physical security using triple strand concertina wire. When positioning the ASAS, ACE personnel must keep in mind the limits imposed on the location of workstations, CCS, DPS, and SEE by power distribution requirements and communications cable lengths. Figure 5-1 is an example of an armored or mechanized division ACE. The final responsibility of the advance party is to identify the location of the life support area to ACE leaders for subsequent occupation. The ACE personnel continue to improve the site throughout its occupation. These improvements include--

• Incorporating non-ASAS terminals and systems into the ACE.

• Constructing fighting positions for both individual and crew-served weapons.

• Sandbagging generators to improve noise discipline.

• Burying power and communications cables.

WORKSTATION CONFIGURATION

The ASAS workstations are configured based on the factors of METT-T. Tactical tailoring takes into account both the configuration of SCI ASAS and non-ASAS workstations in the ACE and the allocation of the ASAS-RWSs. There is no single "right way" to configure the ASAS. However, the ACE chief must determine and specify the configuration to the G2, ACE, and other staff personnel before deployment. The ACE chief should base the configuration on a specific methodology. A hedge-podge mix of configurations, poorly explained to those concerned, risks intelligence failure and compromise of effective battle command.

REMOTE WORKSTATION:

The ASAS-SSW processes the bulk of single discipline combat information and intelligence entering the ACE. The technical control and processing section organizes the ASAS-SSWs to support single discipline analysis, workstation configuration is therefore driven by the mission and nature of the threat rather than a fixed organizationally based allocation of processors. In a SIGINT intensive environment, this may require the section to increase the number of workstations performing communications intelligence (COMINT) and ELINT analysis. These COMINT and ELINT workstations can in turn be organized to look at activity within specific portions of the battlefield framework. This type of configuration helps the section process enormous amounts of message traffic while still providing timely intelligence support to decision making and targeting. Figure 5-2 and the lessons learned example at the end of this section illustrate the flexibility of the ASAS and one possible configuration.

COMINT. The COMINT workstation focuses on the analysis of COMINT reports and maintenance of supporting technical databases. This workstation can also receive tactical electronic intelligence (TACELINT) data and correlate these products for a complete SIGINT product. The results of COMINT analysis are forwarded to the all-source intelligence section as input to all-source analysis and targeting.

ELINT. The ELINT workstation is responsible for assembling the electronic order of battle (EOB) and maintaining the ELINT database. The operator provides results of ELINT analysis to the COMINT workstation and the all-source intelligence section.

SIGINT. The SIGINT workstation supports SIGINT fusion analysis and reporting. It can serve an additional function as a SIGINT or single discipline targeting workstation. In this role, the SIGINT workstation analyst works closely with the target nomination team to ensure timely analysis and reporting of targeting information. The workstation uses COMINT and ELINT reporting to develop EOB and C² node overlays. These products support C²W and the targeting effort of the all-source intelligence section.

IMINT. The IMINT workstation processes narrative IMINT products such as reconnaissance exploitation report (RECCEXREP). Narrative imagery products are automatically parsed and placed in the ASCDB. The IMINT analyst works with the operators of intermediate processing systems like the MITT, GSM, and UAV GCS to provide imagery support to targeting and IPB. If equipped with a JDISS, the IMINT workstation can interface directly with theater and national imagery sources. The TROJAN SPIRIT II also can be used to access theater and national level sources. The IMINT analyst maintains the IMINT database for use by the ACE in producing all-source intelligence and targeting products.

HUMINT and MDCI. This workstation is responsible for analyzing and reporting HUMINT and MDCI. The analysts produce a fused SCI product that supports all-source intelligence production, force protection, and target development. Most HUMINT data will be provided via hardcopy reports which are handcarried to the HUMINT workstation. This information can development. Most HUMINT data will be provided via hardcopy reports which are handcarried to the HUMINT workstation. This information can also be provided via of the collateral interface to subordinate units that have the capability to report electronically. Size, activity, location, unit, time, and enemy (SALUTE) report data from subordinate units are the most frequently generated HUMINT and will be the primary source of information used for this production mission. CI and SALUTE reports can be received and disseminated automatically.

Lessons Learned ASAS Single-Source Workstation Configuration 82d Airborne Division Warfighter Exercise Battle Command Training Program 94-05 6 to 10 March 1994 Based on a Warfighter scenario of OOTW in a high SIGINT environment, the technical control and processing section organized its six Block I ASAS-SSWs to facilitate coverage of the battlefield framework and control MI battalion assets. The resulting configuration consisted of workstations for system supervisor, targeting or deep COMINT, ELINT, close battle COMINT, rear area COMINT, and HUMINT and CI workstations. The targeting or deep COMINT workstation simultaneously supported targeting and monitored deep battle COMINT activity. It was positioned adjacent to the ELINT workstation. The ELINT workstation covered the entire AO and AI. The deep battle was a critical fight and, consequently, occupied most of the focus for the ACE, The targeting and ELINT analysts developed techniques to cross-analyze data between work-stations. Based on the "pictures" on their ASAS-SSW screens, these analysts conducted EOB analysis. They associated ELINT reporting with COMINT reporting to identify and validate HPTs for the FAIO. The close battle COMINT workstation monitored the area from the corps deep battle hand-over line to the division close battle area. The rear area COMINT workstation covered the close battle area to the division rear boundary, The overlapping coverage of the workstations ensured continuity of coverage and effective hand off of targets. It also forced analysts to exchange analytic conclusions and validate their analysis. The remaining ASAS-SSW was dedicated to HUMINT and CI. The HUMINT and CI workstation supported MDCI analysis and the counter-reconnaissance fight, ASAS alarms set for the HUMINT and CI workstation were specific to the counterreconnaissance HPT list developed by the FAIO and the FSE. In summary, the COMINT and ELINT workstations provided the division commander with indicators of enemy actions. They also gave the commander an idea of the effectiveness of the division deception plans. The division FSE had direct access to SIGINT via the FAIO and the single discipline targeting NCO. The division's Air Force liaison officer, aviation officer, and aviation brigade S2 could coordinate with the ELINT workstation NCO for analyzed EOB radar data for deep attacks, They also received information on remnant and stay-behind forces from the close and rear battle COMINT workstations. The HUMINT and CI team along with information from the division support command (DISCOM) S2 and the rear command post greatly assisted the division in its rear area fight. The commander personally reviewed ASAS-SSW products and grilled analysts for Interpretation. The commander was able to interpret these products on his own and grew to trust the capabilities of both ASAS and the ACE.

OPERATIONS

The ACE uses the ASAS to support the commander's plan and direct operations during war and OOTW. The ASAS supports both target and situation development in the deep battle by using ASAS time-saving processing functions. ASAS supports the close battle by developing the enemy situation portion of the common picture of the battlefield for use in the planning, preparation, and execution of missions. This common picture and integration of both the friendly and enemy situation in ASAS assists analysts in assessing friendly vulnerabilities and potential enemy targets. Intelligence collection requirements and indicators of enemy activity in the rear area, developed through a thorough IPB of the rear area, are entered into ASAS in the same way as requirements for the deep and close battle. The six IEW tasks described below are the basis for the ACE support in deep, close, and rear area battles.

INDICATIONS AND WARNINGS:

From IPB products and participation in the battle staff wargaming process, the ACE develops the collection plan and intelligence synchronization matrix (ISM). These products focus on the commander's PIR and targeting priorities within the AO and AI. Using the ASAS, the ACE records and transmits collection management data electronically to appropriate agencies and assets. Individual ACE analysts develop alarms, and database queries to filter information needed to answer these PIR. These filters and the ASAS capability to automatically correlate reports assist in the analysis and synthesis of large volumes of information. As information is received, ASAS automatically posts, logs, and correlates reports. From this information, the ACE develops a picture of the enemy situation derived from multiple sources and disciplines. The G2 (S2) can then use his ASAS-RWS to rapidly distribute this picture of the enemy situation to subordinate, adjacent, and higher units. Figure 5-3 shows the information flow between the ACE and the G2.

Development. Situation development begins at the situation workstation in the all-source intelligence section. Using the ASAS-ASW, the analyst develops the enemy situation by querying and displaying the requested ASCDB holdings on an electronic SITMAP overlay. The information displayed on the SITMAP is sanitized then disseminated to the ASAS-RWS as an external database coordination (EDC) message. This EDC represents a sanitized version of the holdings of the ASCDB. The ACE analyst creates the sanitized EDC message and coordinates with the CCS or CAMPS operator for its release to the G2 (S2) ASAS-RWS. The ASAS-RWS can then display the same situation data as it appears on the situation workstation. The situation analyst uses the latest information developed by ACE single-discipline analysts and reporting from IEW assets to keep the enemy situation graphics updated.

Graphic Production and Dissemination. The ACE situation analyst can create collateral text and graphic intelligence summaries (INTSUMs) of the current situation. The analyst compares this picture with the SCI-level electronic SITMAP and modifies features of the picture to create the most informative INTSUM. Using his ASAS-RWS, the G2 (S2) can modify the INTSUM to reflect the latest friendly situation or tailor it to specific user information requirement. The G2 (S2) then disseminates the graphic INTSUM via LAN to elements within the command post and WAN to subordinate units.

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD:

The IPB process and resultant products are the foundation of the decision making process and wargaming. The G2 (S2) improves his ability to perform IPB by integrating the automation capabilities of the ASAS system into IPB development. Optimal use of ASAS depends heavily on the analyst automating the IPB process through the use of database queries. The analyst uses these applications to develop templates, record information, and support IPB products. OB information can be stored in shared databases and electronically updated. Digitized terrain and elevation data in the ASAS-SSW assist in developing and refining electronic templates. Figure 5-4 illustrates the information flow within the ACE for all-source intelligence production.

Development. Essential to providing IPB input to the decision making process is an understanding of how manual production techniques are integrated and interpreted by ASAS. For example, the event template graphically portrays named areas of interest (NAIs). In order for ASAS to key on these areas, analysts must interpret and then establish database queries. These actions provide the analyst with confirmation of the threat's present COA and indications of future plans. Taking this collated data, the G2 (S2) can then project the adversaries' future COAs and make adjustments to the event template or other IPB overlay products. Adjustments and recommendations to the HPT list and attack guidance matrix (AGM) are also made.

Dissemination. The ACE is connected to the G2 (S2) and the G2 plans section through the ASAS-RWS. This allows the ACE to electronically transfer databases to the G2 (S2) for planning. The G2 plans officer can use the electronic templates, overlays, and supporting text to determine threat COAs and plan future IEW operations. The ASAS-RWS allows the G2 plans analyst to modify IPB products based on the latest planning information from higher echelon intelligence organizations. The G2 (S2) cell can distribute collateral IPB, wargaming, and planning material within the command post via LAN or to subordinates over MSE. The following provides an example of how ASAS supports the decision making process.

See FM 101-5 and FM 34-130 for information on decision making and IPB.

Lessons Learned ASAS-RWS and the Decision Making Process 2d AD Warfighter Exercise Battle Command Training Program Rotation 94-06, 27 to 31 March 1994 Normally, in wargaming, the G2 plans officer maneuvers enemy icons down the avenue of approach, or puts them into the defense. The G2 plans officer identifies various phases of threat fire support and locations of reconnaissance, first and second echelon forces, and reserve forces at different H-hours Simultaneously, the G3 plans officer maneuvers friendly icons. Representatives from fire support, aviation, chemical, service support, engineers, EW, PSYOP, deception, air defense, and MP identify their probable activities at various hours. The scribe tries to capture this information plus the outcome of each engagement on a BOS synchronization matrix. The BOS matrix is valuable, but not perfect, Previously, the G3 plans section said that after wargaming, when they attempted to build the COA decision briefing. It was hard to recall how they maneuvered icons during the wargame. They pointed out that the BOS synchronization matrix did not provide enough detail to reconstruct the fight. Using ASAS workstations helps solve this problem. During the Warfighter Exercise, the wargaming worked about the same as during earner exercises, The analyst posted the map board with the projected locations of enemy and friendly units. The G2 and G3 stood at the map and conducted engagements between their icons. Representatives from various BOSs waited to contribute to the wargaming. The scribe recorded the results on the synchronization matrix. There was, however, one difference. Sitting off to one side of the map was an ASAS-RWS that also contained the templated initial locations of enemy and friendly units. As G2 and G3 plans officers moved their icons on the map; the ASAS-RWS operator moved the icons on the computer screen. As each side destroyed units, the operator deleted the icon while the G2 and G3 plans officers removed them from the map. One advantage of the ASAS-RWS over the map was the ability to save a screen as an overlay. When G2 and G3 plans officers finished wargaming an H-hour, the ASAS-RWS operator labeled the hour on the screen and displayed the major activities, The operator saved the overlay to show the situation at that point. The operator removed the labels from the screen and continued the process until the G2 and G3 plans officers established the final set of locations for the next hour. When the wargame was over, the operator could go to the overlays list and recall any hour of the battle. On the workstation, the operator saved the icons exactly where they were at that point in the wargame; whereas, the map merely displayed the end state. Without the ASAS-RWS, the flow of the battle at each critical event was lost in the pile of removed enemy and friendly stickers. The ASAS-RWS operator further helped the planning process by printing a hardcopy of each H-hour. This allowed the G3 plans officer to examine each hour or critical wargame event and use the prints as snapshots in the COA decision brief. The G2 plans officer used the hard copies to help create a timeline of enemy activities The operator could also recall each overlay in the database and create a digitized slide from the screen, Once the operator created the slides, he animated them chronologically. This resulted in a moving picture of the battle as icons moved and engagements occurred. This provided a clear, concise picture of how the G2 and G plans officers executed the battle. The workstation operators then sent the digitized slides to subordinate units electronically. This allowed planners at all levels to call them up and discuss planning assumptions. The ASAS-RWS was valuable in the G2 plans section during the division Warfighter Exercise. It increased efficiency and effectiveness, allowed the G2 and the ACE to focus on analysis, and most important, developed a common picture of the battlefield for every level.

SUPPORT TO TARGETING AND TARGET DEVELOPMENT:

The ACE uses the ASAS to identify, track, and report targets developed during the targeting process. The ACE targeting nomination team can produce and compare target overlays to IPB templates and incoming reports. The analyst can develop target alarm criteria to ensure incoming reports are prioritized based on the targeting priority. Targets determined to be valid, accurate, and timely are sent electronically to the FSE using a target intelligence data (TIDAT) report. Figure 5-5 shows the information flow between the ACE and the FSE.

Development. The ASAS is an important tool for support to targeting and target development. The ACE targeting analyst can load IPB, maneuver, and fire support products into the ASAS targeting workstation and display them graphically when needed. The analyst uses products developed during the DECIDE phase of the targeting process to assist identifying, tracking, and nominating targets. Some examples of these targeting products are HVT and HPT lists, AGM, and the EW target list. The AGM is a key product for determining priorities and targets for engagement. The targeting analyst, for example, can move a report regarding HPTs to the top of a message cue, even if it was the last report received, according to priorities set in the AGM. The analyst cannot, however, decide when to change priorities. These decisions must come from the FSE, G2 (S2), and ACE leaders who are thoroughly familiar with both enemy and friendly situations as well as the commander's targeting requirements.

Dissemination. The targeting workstation analyst sends a TIDAT message to the CCS or CAMPS. The TIDAT is then forwarded to the AFATDS for action.

See FM 6-20 and FM 6-20-10 for additional information on targeting and target development.

FORCE PROTECTION:

Automated access to databases and collectors aids the ACE in identifying, assessing, and developing countermeasures for threats throughout the AO. CI information can be disseminated and specific CI tasks issued from ASAS. Indicators of unconventional warfare activity can be entered into ASAS as threat alerts and alarms. The integration of multidiscipline collection management and analysis in the ACE facilitates MDCI analysis.

See FM 34-1 and FM 34-60 for additional information on CI support to force protection.

BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT:

The ACE links collection management, targeting, and situation development into a single synchronized intelligence effort. ASAS supports tracking of requirements, technical control, analysis, and dynamic tasking of IEW assets. These capabilities allow the ACE to provide both immediate feedback on BDA-related PIR and conduct long-term threat assessments.

See FM 34-1, FM 34-2 and FM 6-20-10 for additional information on BDA and intelligence support to BDA.

DEGRADED OPERATIONS

The ASAS, like any other system, is subject to hardware and software failures that impact on its ability to execute some or all of the operations it is designed to perform. ASAS may also be unavailable due to deployment, enemy action, accident, or redeployment. The system has no redundant equipment to allow for continued fully automated operations in the event of a major system failure or loss. ACE supervisors and analysts must be prepared to use the ASAS in a degraded operational state that may require a mixture of manual and automated IEW operations for a limited time. Because of the systems complexity and the diverse missions of the ACE, there are no set solutions for any specific degraded condition.

It is essential that units train personnel to identify and perform critical tasks under difficult or degraded conditions in order to complete the mission. Manual procedures must be incorporated into unit METL and standing operating procedures (SOPs) as well as practiced in exercises and training. Once ASAS operators identify a defective component or software process, the ACE chief or section supervisor must decide whether to continue the mission with degraded automation capability or implement manual procedures. ACE personnel should consult unit maintenance personnel and system technical manuals to determine the extent of system reconfiguration and limitations during the degraded state.

REDEPLOYMENT

During redeployment of the ACE, one or two ASAS-SSWs and one ASAS CCS must remain operational and connected to an MSE node or other data communications means. The remainder of the ACE moves, including the second CCS; the first CCS remains stationary and continues to receive automated message traffic. The first CCS operator monitors message traffic to identify and report critical intelligence. These reports can be printed in hardcopy and verbally disseminated via MSE, SINCGARS, or messenger. Once the ACE is in place and the second CCS is operational, the first CCS transmits its stored data to the new location. The first CCS moves to join the ACE and updates its databases. The download and update choices are last in, first out (LIFO); first in, first out (FIFO); or by precedence (FLASH, PRIORITY).