Table of Contents

During analysis and comparison of friendly COAs (staff wargaming), the staff identifies a set of intelligence requirements for each potential friendly COA. Each requirement supports a friendly decision expected to occur during execution of a COA. This is the basis of the command's list of intelligence requirements.

To this list are added those received from higher units, in the form of intelligence acquisition tasks, and lower units, in the form of requests for intelligence. After arranging the list of requirements in priority order, the collection manager recommends the most important to the commander as PIR.

PIR are intelligence requirements which are critical to accomplishing the mission. They are usually related to the command's COA, becoming apparent during mission analysis and wargaming. They may, however, come from the intelligence requirements of higher or lower units.

The commander approves the prioritized list of intelligence requirements and designates some of them as PIR. Only the commander can approve PIR.

Each PIR should corm from the original list of intelligence requirements developed during wargarning. Hence, each should be focused, specfic, and directly related to a friendly decision expected to occur during execution of the COA.

Examples of Poor PIR

An often seen, but very poor, PIR is:

"Will the enemy attack? If so, where, when, and in what strength?"

• This PIR is obviously not a result of staff wargaming. There are several specific criticisms we can make.

• This PIR actually contains four significantly different questions. Which of these four questions is the priority? Unless given more guidance, collection assets must decide for themselves which part of this PIR to collect against.

• It assumes the intelligence staff know absolutely nothing about the enemy situation. Actually, they probably know more about the situation than "the enemy might attack sometime, somewhere, and in some strength." Using the IPB process, they can provide a more focused PIR than this.

• Finally, when wargaming potential friendly and enemy COAs, the staff should find some aspects of this PIR to be irrelevant to the friendly COA. For example, your defense may be fully capable of defeating the enemy regardless of when they actually attack. Perhaps the focus need be only where they will attack, supporting a decision on employment of the friendly reserve.

Examples of Good PIR

Just as there are no standard situation templates or friendly COAs that will serve in all situations, there is no standard set of PIR. Good PIR, however, have some things in common:

• They ask only one question.

• They focus on a specific fact, event, or activity.

• They provide intelligence required to support a single decision.

Examples:

• "Will the enemy use chemical agents on our reserve force before it leaves AA JEAN-MARIE?"

• "Will the enemy defend OBJ KEVIN using a forward-slope defense?"

• "Will the enemy reserve tank battalion reach PL FUSS before 270900 MAY 99?"

• "Will the 43d Division send its main attack along AA 2?"

• "What size force is defending OBJ LEO?"

• "Which bridges over the Katie River are intact?"

Common Excuses For Doing It The Easy Way

"If I make my intelligence requirements, and subsequently my PIR, that specific, I will generate too many PIR. The increased number of PIR and IR will overload my collection system."

Yes, there are more PIR and IR, but each of them is clear and specific, and therefore more likely to be answered. Their more specific focus makes it easier to develop SIRs and SORs to support them. And, in the end, the number of SORs will remain more or less constant; the "bad" PIR that asks four questions will need about as many SORs as four specific PIRs.

"There is no way our staff can situation template and wargame all of the IR we are going to need."

Once the ASPS develops the basic threat COA models, and accompanying situation templates, they can be quickly refined or used as the starting point for specialized templates.

For example, the division engineer may have a requirement such as "What kind of obstacle system will the 2d Brigade encounter at OBJ LUCKAU" in order to plan the amount and type of breaching equipment 2d Brigade will need.

The basic COA models show the enemy's templated defensive positions, giving the engineer a starting point for where he might expect to find the obstacle systems at OBJ LUCKAU. After identifying the four types of systems the enemy is likely to use on OBJ LUCKAU, he evaluates the differences between these four systems and decides that only enemy use of obstacle system type C will change his normal mix of engineer equipment.

Accordingly, he rewrites his IR as: "Will the enemy use obstacle system type C on OBJ LUCKAU?" With this new focus, ASPS develops SIRs that focus on the signature items indicating enemy use of obstacle system type C at OBJ LUCKAU.

"This system of wargaming intelligence requirements will not work because there are PIR and IR that need to be answered, but which cannot be linked to a friendly action. For example, enemy use of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons."

If enemy use of NBC weapons really is important to your commander, then the staff should template and wargame out how, where, and when the enemy will use NBC weapons. They should also wargame what your command's response or reaction will be if the enemy should use NBC weapons. For example: Will you shift main supply routes? Deploy decontamination units to previously identified sites? Deliver retaliatory fires? All of these require wargaming and are indeed linked to friendly actions and decisions.