DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE & SECURITY COMMAND
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY OFFICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-5995

MAY 2 6 2021

Freedom of Information/
Privacy Office

Mr. Steven Aftergood
Federation of American Scientists
1112 16th Street NW, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20036

Dear Mr. Aftergood:

This is in further response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of February 19, 2019, and supplements our response of November 20, 2019.

As noted in our letter, coordination has been completed with another government agency and a field manual has been returned to this office for our review and direct response to you.

We have completed a review of the field manual in accordance with Executive Order (EO) 13526. As a result of this review, information has been sanitized from the public disclosure provisions of the FOIA pursuant to Title U.S. Code 552 § (b)(3) which applies to information exempt from disclosure by statute. The statute invoked under Title 5 U.S. Code 552 § (b)(3) is 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i), which allows for the protection of intelligence sources and methods. The field manual is partially releasable and is enclosed for your perusal.

Since the release of the information deleted from the manual would result in an unwarranted invasion of the privacy rights of the individual concerned, the information is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 § (b)(6).

The withholding of the information described above is a partial denial of your request. This denial is made on behalf of Major General Gary W. Johnston, Commanding, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, who is the Initial Denial Authority for Army intelligence investigative and security records under the FOIA. You have the right to appeal this decision to the Secretary of the Army. Your appeal must be postmarked no later than 90 calendar days from the date of this letter. After the 90-day period, the case may be considered closed; however, such closure does not preclude you from filing litigation in the courts. You should state the basis of your disagreement with the response and provide justification for a reconsideration of the denial. An appeal may not serve as a request for additional or new information. An appeal may only address information denied in this response. Your appeal is to be made to this office to the below listed address for forwarding, as appropriate, to the Secretary of the Army, Office of the General Counsel.

Commander
U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command
Freedom of Information/Privacy Act Office
2600 Ernie Pyle Street, Room 3S02-B
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland 20755-5910

Additionally, we have been informed by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence & Security (USD(I&S), a component of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Staff (OSD/JS) that their information is exempt from public disclosure pursuant to 5 U.S. Code § 552 (b)(3), which pertains to information specifically exempted by a statute establishing particular criteria for withholding, applying Section 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(i)(1), which protects intelligence sources and methods.

The withholding of the information by the USD(I&S), OSD/JS constitutes a partial denial of your request and you have the right to appeal this decision. If you decide to file an appeal, you should write to the appellate authority, Ms. Joo Chung, Director of Oversight and compliance, Office of the Secretary of Defense, by writing directly to the following address: 4800 Mark Center Drive, ATTN: DPCLTD, FOIA Appeals, Mailbox# 24, Alexandria, VA 22350-1700. Your appeal must be received within 90 days from the date of this letter. Please cite reference 20-FC-0068 assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

If you have any questions regarding this action, feel free to contact this office at 1-866-548-5651 or email the INSCOM FOIA office at: usarmy.meade.902-mi-grp-mbx.inscom-foia-service-center@mail.mil and refer to case #0069F-20. Please note that you now have the ability to check the status of your request online via the U.S. Army Records Management and Declassification Agency (RMDA) website: https://www.foia.army.mil/FACTS/CaseStatus.aspx. Please refer to FOIA Control Number: FP-20-003252. You may also contact the INSCOM FOIA Public Liaison, Mrs. Joanne Benear, for any further assistance and to discuss any aspect of your request at 301-677-7856. Additionally, you may contact the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) at the National Archives and Records Administration to inquire about the FOIA mediation services they offer. The contact information for OGIS is as follows: Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS, College Park, Maryland 20740-6001, email at ogis@nara.gov, telephone at 202-741-5770; toll free at 1-877-684-6448; or facsimile at 202-741-5769.

Sincerely,

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Date: 2021.05.26 10:41:48 -04'00'

Michael T. Heaton
Director
Freedom of Information/Privacy Office
Investigative Records Repository

Enclosure

FM 2-0
INTELLIGENCE



JULY 2018

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This publication supersedes FM 2-0, dated 15 April 2014

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

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Field Manual
No. 2-0

Headquarters
Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 6 July 2018

Intelligence (U)

Contents (U)

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Preface (U)

(U) FM 2-0 represents an important step toward changing the Army culture and improving Army readiness by addressing the fundamentals and tactics associated with intelligence during large-scale combat operations. This publication describes the role of the commander and staff in intelligence, intelligence staff activities, and how military intelligence (MI) units conduct intelligence operations as part of information collection across the Army's strategic roles. FM 2-0 also contains the descriptions of the Army tactical tasks included in the intelligence warfighting function, doctrine on force projection, and doctrine on language support. This manual is designed to be used with ADPs/ADRPs 2-0, 3-0, 3-07, 3-28, 3-90, and 5-0, and with FMs 3-0, 3-55, 3-94, 6-0, and 27-10.

(U) The principal audience for FM 2-0 is every Soldier and Department of the Army Civilian who participate in or with the intelligence warfighting function. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as joint task force or multinational headquarters should also refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning joint intelligence. FM 2-0 also serves as a reference for personnel who are developing doctrine, leader development, material and force structure, and institutional and unit training for intelligence operations.

(U) Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable United States (U.S.), international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 27-10.)

(U) FM 2-0 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. For definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized, and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition. This publication is not the proponent for any Army terms.

(U) FM 2-0 applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the U.S. Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

(U) The proponent of FM 2-0 is the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence. The preparing agency is the Directorate of Doctrine and Intelligence Systems Training, U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence. Send written comments and recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence, ATTN: ATZS-DST-D (FM 2-0), 550 Cibeque Street, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-7017; by e-mail to usarmy.huachuca.icoe.mbx.doctrine@mail.mil; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.

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Introduction (U)

(U) The Army must reorient on large-scale ground combat while simultaneously conducting other types of operations worldwide to prevent peer threats from gaining positions of strategic advantage. Many of the considerations necessary to achieve military success in the current operational environment remain fundamentally unchanged, but what has changed is important. Army forces cannot focus solely on large-scale ground combat operations at the expense of the other missions, but they also cannot afford to be unprepared for large-scale combat operations in an increasingly unstable world. Being prepared for large-scale ground combat generates credible deterrence and contributes to worldwide stability. The future requires the lethal theater armies, corps, divisions, and brigades necessary to conduct operations with the right mix of forces necessary to execute tactical tasks to achieve operations and strategic goals.

(U) FM 2-0 provides doctrine for how Army forces, as a part of a joint team and in conjunction with unified action partners, develop intelligence to support operations. It describes intelligence and intelligence operations using current Army capabilities and formations in today's operational environment. Intelligence is critical in a complex operational environment against a peer threat.

(U) Intelligence drives operations and operations enable intelligence. Commanders and staffs need timely, accurate, relevant, and predictive intelligence to understand threat characteristics, goals and objectives, and courses of action to successfully execute offensive and defensive tasks in large-scale combat operations. Precise intelligence is also critical to target threat capabilities at the right time and place and to open windows of opportunity across domains, particularly during large-scale combat operations. Commanders and staffs must have detailed knowledge of threat strengths, vulnerabilities, organizations, equipment, capabilities, and tactics to plan for and execute unified land operations.

(U) The introductory figure on pages viii is the FM 2-0 logic chart. The chart depicts FM 3-0 doctrinal constructs on the left side and supporting intelligence warfighting function doctrinal constructs on the right side of the chart. The figure begins by showing the criticality of intelligence in a complex operational environment, which includes considerations during large-scale combat operations against peer threats. Intelligence is networked, synchronized, and collaborative from national to tactical echelons. Intelligence supports the Army operational concept of unified land operations and the conduct of operations. Intelligence supports commanders and decision makers by leveraging national-level to tactical-level capabilities to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Intelligence and the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process assist in developing an in-depth understanding of relevant aspects of the operational environment and the threat. Based on IPB results, commanders visualize the desired end state and a broad concept of how to shape current conditions into that end state.

(U) During large-scale combat operations, Army forces will have to fight for intelligence. Intelligence is complex, and a peer threat can counter Army forces' intelligence efforts. To achieve situational understanding against a threat, friendly forces must strive to identify or open windows of opportunity across domains. Staff integration is difficult but crucial; the staff must work together to overcome challenges and mitigate information collection capability and system limitations by developing an integrated information collection plan. A successful information collection effort is key to achieving and exploiting positions of relative advantage. The intelligence staff can then analyze information collection results and provide products, updates, and predictive assessments that support targeting, decision making, and the execution of branches and/or sequels. These complexities place a significant demand on intelligence professionals to enable mission command, facilitate initiative, and support commanders and staffs in executing tailored solutions for complex problems.

(U) The final and most crucial aspect of intelligence is the role of the commander. The commander owns the intelligence effort. To successfully direct the intelligence effort, the commander and staff must understand many aspects of intelligence, including the intelligence core competencies, the intelligence process, and the Army's intelligence capabilities. This requires close interaction between the commander and the G-2/S-2. The commander directs the intelligence warfighting function through constant engagement with the G-2/S-2 and the relationship they develop.



Introductory figure. (U) FM 2-0 logic chart



Introductory figure. (U) FM 2-0 logic chart (*continued*)

(U) FM 2-0 describes the tactics all echelons use to conduct intelligence operations:

- **Chapter 1** presents the fundamentals of Army intelligence doctrinal constructs. Additionally, it describes the roles of the commander and staff in intelligence.
- **Chapter 2** provides the G-2/S-2 responsibilities that support the conduct of operations across all echelons. It also describes how the intelligence staff supports the commander.
- **Chapter 3** addresses intelligence operations with an emphasis on the mission command of MI units. Intelligence operations conducted by MI units follow the Army's framework for exercising mission command—the operations process. The operations process describes the activities performed by any military unit to accomplish a mission. The same activities describe what MI unit actions do to accomplish the tasks assigned to them to support the commander. Additionally, chapter 3 provides intelligence operations guidelines and a detailed discussion of task-organizing considerations.
- **Chapter 4** discusses intelligence staffs and units from theater army to the battalion level, as well as their intelligence collection and all-source intelligence capabilities.
- **Chapter 5** discusses intelligence within the Army's strategic roles.
- **Chapter 6** discusses fighting for intelligence during large-scale combat operations. The chapter emphasizes the intelligence challenge, intelligence analysis support, different information requirements, how to overcome some of the challenges of information collection, and the continuous nature of information collection.
- **Appendix A** discusses the employment of national-level to battalion-level intelligence collection capabilities.
- **Appendix B** lists the Army tactical tasks associated with the intelligence warfighting function. Task descriptions have been revised to incorporate doctrine on information collection and other changes made by ADRP 1-03.
- **Appendix C** addresses considerations that G-2/S-2s must address when operating as part of a joint task force or multinational force.
- **Appendix D** describes force projection operations and the required intelligence support to address the specific nuances of mobilization, deployment, employment, sustaining intelligence capabilities, and redeployment.
- **Appendix E** discusses intelligence provisions and authorities.
- **Appendix F** discusses the considerations for language support.

(U) This publication uses the term *threat*, which includes all enemies and adversaries that are a part of the operational environment.

(U) FM 2-0 uses the word *theater* to indicate *theater of operations*.

(U) FM 2-0 refers to elements of intelligence staff organizations by the name used for them in tables of organization and equipment. When task-organized in a command post, these organizations fulfill the role of staff elements as described in FM 6-0.

(U) Acronyms are introduced at their first use in the front matter of this publication (preface and introduction), and again in the body of the publication (chapters and appendixes).

(U) FM 2-0 introduces G-*X*, S-*X*, and J-*X* (such as G-2, S-2, and J-2) acronyms at their first use without defining them as it hinders readability. Definitions for these acronyms can be found in the glossary of this publication.

Chapter 1
Fundamentals (U)

SECTION I – INTELLIGENCE OVERVIEW (U)

1-1. (U) Commanders and staffs require accurate, relevant, and predictive intelligence to understand threat characteristics, goals and objectives, and courses of action (COAs). Precise intelligence is also critical to target threat capabilities at the right time and place and to open windows of opportunity across domains, particularly during large-scale combat operations. Commanders and staffs must have detailed knowledge of threat strengths, vulnerabilities, organizations, equipment, capabilities, and tactics to plan for and execute unified land operations.

1-2. (U) The purpose of intelligence is to provide commanders and staffs with timely, accurate, relevant, predictive, and tailored intelligence about the enemy and other aspects of the operational environment. Intelligence supports the conduct—planning, preparing, executing, and assessing—of operations.

1-3. (U) Intelligence drives the conduct of operations and operations enable intelligence, making intelligence and operations inseparable. Therefore, G-2/S-2s ensure the intelligence warfighting function operates effectively and efficiently. G-2/S-2s are not simply managers; they are commanders' primary advisors on employing information collection assets and driving information collection.

1-4. (U) Additionally, G-2/S-2s support commanders with analysis and production of timely, accurate, relevant, and predictive intelligence tailored to commanders' specific needs. Intelligence professionals consistently strive to provide intelligence that facilitates the commander's situational understanding and supports operations.

1-5. (U) The integration and synchronization of the overall intelligence effort are especially challenging. To be successful, G-2/S-2s must have a deep understanding of a number of intelligence doctrinal constructs:

- Categories of intelligence products.
- Characteristics of effective intelligence.
- The intelligence warfighting function.
- The intelligence process.
- National to tactical intelligence.

CATEGORIES OF INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS (U)

1-6. (U) Intelligence products are generally placed in one of eight production categories (see JP 2-0):

- **Warning intelligence.** *Warning intelligence* are those intelligence activities intended to detect and report time-sensitive intelligence information on foreign developments that forewarn of hostile actions or intention against United States entities, partners, or interests (JP 2-0).
- **Current intelligence.** This intelligence provides updated support for ongoing operations. It involves the integration of time-sensitive, all-source intelligence and information into concise, accurate, and objective reporting on the area of operations (AO) and current threat situation.
- **General military intelligence.** *General military intelligence* is intelligence concerning the military capabilities of foreign countries or organizations, or topics affecting potential United States or multinational military operations (JP 2-0).
- **Target intelligence.** *Target intelligence* is intelligence that portrays and locates the components of a target or target complex and indicates its vulnerability and relative importance (JP 3-60).

- **Scientific and technical intelligence.** *Scientific and technical intelligence* is the product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of foreign scientific and technical information that covers: a. foreign developments in basic and applied research and in applied engineering techniques; and b. scientific and technical characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of all foreign military systems, weapons, weapon systems, and materiel; the research and development related thereto; and the production methods employed for their manufacture (JP 2-01).
- **Counterintelligence.** *Counterintelligence* is information gathered and activities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons or their agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities (JP 2-01.2).
- **Estimative intelligence.** *Estimative intelligence* is intelligence that identifies, describes, and forecasts adversary capabilities and the implications for planning and executing military operations (JP 2-0).
- **Identity intelligence.** *Identity intelligence* is the intelligence resulting from the processing of identity attributes concerning individuals, groups, networks, or populations of interest (JP 2-0).

CHARACTERISTICS OF EFFECTIVE INTELLIGENCE (U)

1-7. (U) The effectiveness of intelligence is measured against the relevant information quality criteria:

- **Accuracy.** To the extent possible, intelligence should accurately identify threat intentions, capabilities, limitations, and dispositions. It should be derived from multiple sources and disciplines to minimize the possibility of deception or misinterpretation. Alternative or contradictory assessments should be presented, when necessary, to ensure balance and unbiased intelligence.
- **Timeliness.** Intelligence, provided early, supports operations and prevents surprise from threat actions. It must flow continuously to the commander before, during, and after an operation. Intelligence organizations, databases, and products must be available to develop estimates, make decisions, and plan operations.
- **Usability.** Intelligence must be in the correct data-file specifications for databasing and display. Usability facilitates further analysis, production of intelligence, integration of the product across the staff, and use within operations.
- **Completeness.** Intelligence briefings and products convey all of the necessary components to be as complete as possible.
- **Precision.** Intelligence briefings and products provide the required level of detail and complexity to answer the requirements.
- **Reliability.** Intelligence evaluates and determines the extent to which the collected information and the information being used in intelligence briefings and products are trustworthy, uncorrupted, and undistorted. Any concerns with the reliability of intelligence must be stated up front.U) Intelligence must also meet three additional criteria:
- **Relevant.** Intelligence supports the commander's requirements.
- **Predictive.** Intelligence informs the commander about what the threat can do (threat capabilities, emphasizing the most dangerous threat COA) and is most likely to do (the most likely threat COA). The intelligence staff should anticipate the commander's intelligence needs.
- **Tailored.** Intelligence is shared and disseminated in the format requested by the commander, subordinate commanders, and staffs. It should support and satisfy the commander's priorities. The intelligence staff presents clear, concise intelligence that meets the commander's preferences, facilitates situational understanding, and is usable for decision making or other actions.

THE INTELLIGENCE WARFIGHTING FUNCTION (U)

1-8. (U) *Intelligence* is (1) the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations; (2) the activities that result in the product; and (3) the organizations engaged in such activities (JP 2-0). Intelligence is both a function and a process that enables the Army to conduct operations.

1-9. (U) The *intelligence warfighting function* is the related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding the enemy, terrain, weather, civil considerations, and other significant aspects of the operational environment (ADRP 3-0). Specifically, other significant aspects of the operational environment include threats, adversaries, the operational variables (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time [PMESII-PT]), and other aspects depending on the nature of operations. (See ADRP 2-0 for more information on the intelligence warfighting function.)

1-10. (U) The intelligence warfighting function is the Army's contribution to the intelligence effort. It executes the intelligence process by employing intelligence capabilities. (See appendix A for more on the employment of intelligence capabilities.) The intelligence warfighting function facilitates support to the commander and staff through supporting tasks, which are interrelated, require the participation of the commander and staff, and are often conducted simultaneously. (See appendix B for a detailed description of the intelligence warfighting function tasks.)

Intelligence warfighting function tasks (U)
- (U) Provide intelligence support to force generation.
- (U) Provide support to situational understanding.
- (U) Conduct information collection.
- (U) Provide intelligence support to targeting and information operations.

THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS (U)

1-11. (U) The design and structure of the intelligence process support commanders by providing intelligence needed to enhance their situational understanding and thereby the effective exercise of mission command. The Army's intelligence process consists of four steps (*plan and direct*, *collect and process*, *produce*, and *disseminate*) and two continuing activities (analyze and assess). (See ADRP 2-0 for a detailed discussion of the steps and continuing activities of the intelligence process.)

1-12. (U) The Army views the intelligence process as a model that describes how the intelligence warfighting function develops intelligence that facilitates situational understanding and supports decision making. This process provides a common framework to guide Army professionals in their thoughts, discussions, plans, and assessments pertaining to intelligence.

1-13. (U) Commanders drive the intelligence process. The intelligence process supports all activities of the operations process (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) and is performed continuously to support each activity. Although the intelligence process includes unique aspects and activities, it is designed similarly to the operations process:

- The *plan and direct* step of the intelligence process closely corresponds with the *plan* activity of the operations process.
- The *collect and process*, *produce*, and *disseminate* steps and the *analysis* activity of the intelligence process together correspond to the *execute* activity of the operations process.
- *Assess*, which is continuous, is part of the overall *assessment* activity of the operations process.

NATIONAL TO TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE (U)

1-14. (U) The national to tactical intelligence effort consists of the sum total of all of the intelligence capabilities of the entire United States (U.S.) intelligence community and those of other unified action partners. National to tactical intelligence assets include all U.S. intelligence professionals, sensors, systems, federated organizations, information, and processes supported by a network-enabled architecture. The most important element is the people who make it work. (See appendix A for more on intelligence capabilities.)

Note. (U) *Intelligence community* is all departments or agencies of a government that are concerned with intelligence activity, either in an oversight, managerial, support, or participatory role (JP 2-0).

1-15. (U) The value provided to the commander is the ability to leverage—

- Specialized collection capabilities.
- Large volumes of nonintelligence-related information.
- Unique intelligence databases.
- Specialized analysis and analytic products.

1-16. (U) Collaboration is the central principle of conducting analysis across intelligence organizations. Army tactical units provide accurate and detailed intelligence about the threats and relevant aspects of the operational environment (especially those related to Army activities), while other intelligence organizations provide expertise and access not readily available to the Army at the tactical level. Additionally, national-level intelligence organizations provide governance over certain intelligence methods and activities. Cooperation can benefit every echelon. (See appendix C for joint task force [JTF] and unified action partner considerations.)

1-17. (U) Analysts leverage all available intelligence to create a more comprehensive and detailed assessment of threats and relevant aspects of the operational environment (such as terrain, weather, and civil and cultural considerations) to facilitate mission command. An example of achieving greater efficiency between the intelligence warfighting function and mission command is the creation of fusion centers. Fusion centers are ad hoc cells designed to enable targeting, facilitate current or future operations, and inform decision making. (See appendix C for more information on fusion centers.)

Intelligence Architecture (U)

1-18. (U) National to tactical intelligence is enabled by the communications network. Specifically, the intelligence architecture is based on communications that transmit intelligence and information to and from various collection elements, units, and agencies by means of different technologies and systems, as well as to and from intelligence analysts to use organic processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) data from various collection platforms and sources. With the continued development of sensors, processors, and communications systems, it is increasingly important to understand the requirements of establishing an effective communications architecture. Adequate communications that facilitate access to national intelligence organizations is often the most critical enabler for the intelligence warfighting function. The intelligence staff must identify the specific intelligence warfighting function requirements to the unit's overall communications architecture. (See ADRP 2-0 and MI Publication 2-01.2 for more information on establishing the intelligence architecture.)

Note. (U) MI Publication 2-01.2, *Establishing the Intelligence Architecture*, is an intelligence proponent publication approved by Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence. The primary audience for MI publications includes MI officers, noncommissioned officers, and staffs from theater army to company levels (including personnel serving in military intelligence brigades-theater [MIB-Ts], expeditionary-military intelligence brigades [E-MIBs], MI battalions, and MI companies).

Leveraging Intelligence (U)

1-19. (U) The effectiveness of the intelligence warfighting function hinges directly on access to the intelligence community and unified action partners. It also provides units the ability to leverage information and capabilities. This includes access to national capabilities, larger volumes of information and intelligence, and specialized analysis. The ability to leverage all national to tactical intelligence organizations allows

analysts to collaborate with other analysts throughout the theater and intelligence community and to federate analytic support when necessary. Some of the most important activities that facilitate collaboration include—

- Developing initial data files.
- Intelligence reach.
- Granting access.
- Sharing.
- Posting.
- Updating the intelligence portions of the common operational picture (COP).
- Knowledge management.

Developing Initial Data Files (U)

1-20. (U) When generating intelligence knowledge, unit intelligence personnel should begin by determining the information they need to collect on the operational environment. As units begin to collect data on the operational environment, the data should be organized into baseline data files in accordance with the commander's guidance. These files must be compatible with the unit's mission command information systems. Generally, tactical echelons create primary data files based on the threat, terrain and weather, and civil considerations. Strategic and operational echelons create data files based on the commander's operational requirements.

1-21. (U) Intelligence professionals ensure relevant information is incorporated into the common database and analog data files as threat capabilities may limit digital communications. This information becomes the basis for providing intelligence support to mission planning and for developing deployment readiness training on the operational environment. This information is used to—

- Develop Soldier predeployment packages.
- Assist in identifying the specific types of threats; threat equipment (including vehicles and weapons); threat tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); and civil considerations that Soldiers can expect to encounter when deployed.
- Incorporate simulations or replications of these factors into predeployment training exercises or mission rehearsal exercises to provide the most realistic and relevant training possible.

1-22. (U) Many factors can drive the requirement to update the baseline knowledge. These factors can include enemy or adversary current operations, higher echelon operations, and intelligence analyses or assessments. Additional considerations include factors such as updates based on elections or key local leadership changes in the projected AO, changes to local infrastructure, and events outside the unit's projected AO that may impact operations within the projected AO. After the data files are created, the data, information, intelligence, products, and material obtained are organized and refined to support planning based on the commander's guidance.

1-23. (U) The generate intelligence knowledge task is also the basis for developing a unit's initial intelligence architecture. By performing this task, intelligence staffs continue to collect, categorize, and analyze information on relevant aspects of the projected AO, continually adding new information and updating and refining their understanding of the projected AO.

1-24. (U) During and after deployment, the generate intelligence knowledge task also supports tactical overwatch. While executing operations, a unit's information database becomes a source of information for the theater army to enable follow-on force situational understanding. (See appendix D.)

Intelligence Reach (U)

1-25. (U) Intelligence reach allows commanders and staffs to access the resources of national, joint, foreign, and other military organizations and units. Requestors can acquire information through the push and pull of information, databases, homepages, collaborative tools, and broadcast services. (See figure 1-1.)

Intelligence reach (U)
(U) The activity by which intelligence organizations proactively and rapidly access information from, receive support from, and conduct direct collaboration and information sharing with other units and agencies, both within and outside the area of operations, unconstrained by geographic proximity, echelon, or command (ADRP 2-0).

(b)(3)

1-28. (U) The intelligence staff must determine how best to support the unit's mission with intelligence reach capabilities. Detailed planning and training are critical to the success of intelligence reach operations. Intelligence reach supports distributed analysis and reach PED operations to answer the commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs) and other requirements. Reach PED refers to PED capabilities at centralized locations where sensor data is disseminated for intelligence PED support.

1-29. (U) Intelligence reach allows intelligence analysts to retrieve existing information, intelligence products, and data that can support answering CCIRs and other requirements from outside the unit in a timely manner without waiting for an answer to a request for information (RFI) or an information collection task. The information, intelligence products, or data retrieved can then be evaluated for use in the unit's intelligence products or analysis. Procedures to gain and maintain access and permissions are an important part of intelligence reach. Three important aspects of intelligence reach are—

- Searches and queries.
- Data mining.
- Collaboration.

(b)(3)

Searches and Queries (U)

1-30. (U) The ability to search networks and query databases is an essential skill for intelligence professionals. The basic search techniques used on the unclassified internet also apply to secret/collateral and top secret classified networks such as the SIPRNET and JWICS. To conduct a search or query, intelligence professionals must plan the search, conduct the search, refine the search, and record the results.

Note. (U) Army intelligence professionals who research or collect open-source information must pay careful attention and comply with operations security requirements defined in AR 530-1 to prevent disclosure of critical and sensitive DOD information in any public domain.

1-31. (U) Intelligence professionals use their understanding of the supported unit's mission, specific information requirements, and available sources of information and intelligence to plan and execute their search. Because classified intelligence networks and systems are very compartmentalized, intelligence analysts should first determine which networks or databases most likely have the required information. Classified networks usually have specific access requirements, and intelligence professionals must coordinate for access to classified networks. (For more information on open-source intelligence [OSINT] search techniques, see ATP 2-22.9 and U.S. Army Directive 2016-37.)

Data Mining (U)

1-32. (U) Data mining is finding key pieces of information that may be buried in the mass of data available. Data mining uses automated statistical analysis techniques to search for specific data parameters that intelligence professionals predetermine will answer their information requirements. Data mining can assist in organizing the mass of collected data.

Collaboration (U)

1-33. (U) Intelligence professionals work in an environment enhanced by collaboration. Collaboration facilitates parallel planning and enhances all aspects of the intelligence process by enriching analysis, incorporating different points of view, and broadening situational understanding. Intelligence professionals develop the ability to work effectively with others on a common task, respect the contributions of others, and contribute to consensus when warranted.

Granting Access (U)

1-34. (U) Properly managing access to databases, information, or intelligence ensures personnel, units, or organizations that need all or part of the information can obtain the information they need. Information resides in classified and unclassified databases, programs, networks, systems, and other web-based collaborative environments maintained by unified action partners. Granting access is governed by—

- Applicable national agencies.
- Multinational, joint, and Army regulations, policies, and procedures.
- Individual system accreditation.
- Specialized training for systems or database usage.
- Special security procedures and enforcement.

1-35. (U) The intelligence staff—

- Must identify users who will require access to protected unit intelligence websites, web postings, data files, and databases.
- Processes requests from individuals, organizations, or agencies outside the unit who may require access.
- Ensures all accesses granted conform to the appropriate U.S. law, DOD regulations, classification guidelines, and security protocols. (See AR 380-28.)

Sharing (U)

1-36. (U) Sharing allows analysts, other intelligence professionals, and other subject matter experts to freely exchange information and intelligence. It is most effectively accomplished through a web-based collaborative environment, such as the use of cloud technology. Collaboration includes the sharing of knowledge, expertise, and information, and it may take many forms. Collaborative tools include computer-based tools that assist individuals in working together and sharing information. They allow for virtual online meetings and data sharing.

1-37. (U) The intelligence staff must identify the most effective methods of sharing intelligence with all required users, as some users may require hardcopies of new or updated intelligence, some may need to access the unit intelligence web page, and some may require access to specific unit databases. Sharing applies to multinational partners who may be unable to access U.S. information systems or data files. Intelligence professionals must actively work with the foreign disclosure officer to ensure the sharing of information, which is enhanced by the proper use of the caveat *not releasable to foreign nationals* (also called NOFORN) and its limited uses authorized within DOD. This may require developing special intelligence architectures, systems, networks, or procedures to facilitate sharing.

Posting (U)

1-38. (U) Information may be posted to military websites for the widest possible dissemination. This makes the information available to personnel and units who are interested in the information or intelligence that are not part of the normal dissemination group for a unit or organization. When posting information to the web or updating information on their website, it is critical for units or organizations to inform higher, subordinate, and lateral units or organizations that may require this information. A unit rarely has enough personnel to dedicate a Soldier to continuously search websites for new or updated information of possible use to that unit. The intelligence staff must regularly review posted information to ensure it remains valid, relevant, and current.

Updating the Intelligence Portions of the Common Operational Picture (U)

1-39. (U) The intelligence staff inputs new or updated intelligence and information into the COP to assist the commander and staff in visualizing the operational environment. The *common operational picture* is a single display of relevant information within a commander's area of interest tailored to the user's requirements and based on common data and information shared by more than one command (ADRP 6-0). This display is the result of reports, automatic updates, and overlays common to all echelons and often digitally stored in a common database.

1-40. (U) The COP facilitates mission command through collaborative interaction and real-time sharing of information between commanders and staffs. This convergence of intelligence and the other warfighting functions is critical to operations. The intelligence portions of the COP are those messages and overlays relating to threats, terrain and weather, and civil considerations in the common database. This intelligence and information originate from intelligence organizations at various echelons and from combat information. The G-2/S-2 ensures the common database reflects the most current information and intelligence available in order to maintain the integrity of the intelligence portion of the COP.

1-41. (U) The threat situation and civil considerations portions of the COP, while updated continuously, are currently limited to displaying the locations and dispositions of threat forces at that point in time. The threat situation portion of the COP requires analysis to provide the required level of detail.

1-42. (U) With the complexity of the operational environment, the intelligence staff must be prepared to—

- Validate and maintain the threat portions of the COP in a timely and flexible manner.
- Collaborate with the rest of the staff to ensure the appropriate mission variables (expressed as METT-TC [mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations]) and operational variables (PMESII-PT) are displayed.
- Effectively display the multiple types and layers of information the commander requires.
- Coordinate with the operations staff to ensure the following are available for use within the COP:
  - Information collected to support the commander's decision points.
  - Information collection assets and sensor availability.
  - Arrangement and locations of friendly forces.
  - Fields of view/coverage areas.

Knowledge Management (U)

1-43. (U) *Knowledge management* is the process of enabling knowledge flow to enhance shared understanding, learning, and decision making (ADRP 6-0). The intelligence warfighting function uses the intelligence process as the management tool to ensure the right information gets to the right users at the right time in a useable format without inundating users. Intelligence leaders must also ensure users do not receive the same information from the same original source multiple times. Circular reporting can result in erroneous analysis by intelligence professionals or negatively impact commanders' decision making.

SECTION II – THE ROLE OF THE COMMANDER AND STAFF (U)

1-44. (U) Commanders and staffs at all levels synchronize intelligence with the other warfighting functions to maximize their ability to simultaneously visualize the operational environment and accomplish the required tactical tasks throughout the AO. The distribution of specific intelligence assets enhances the capability of the combined arms team to concentrate combat power and minimize risk.

THE COMMANDER (U)

1-45. (U) The commander, based on recommendations from the intelligence staff, tailors intelligence capabilities and intelligence operations to support the mission. The general force-tailoring and specific task organization establish an ordered command and support structure with technical channels for intelligence operations. Commanders provide the staff and subordinate units guidance and continuous feedback throughout operations by—

- Providing direction.
- Providing their understanding, visualization, and description of the problem.
- Directing through clearly stated CCIRs and priorities.
- Leading and making decisions.
- Continuously assessing the operation through collaboration with the G-2/S-2 during the execution of operations.

1-46. (U) The commander's involvement and interaction enable the operations and intelligence staffs to more effectively assess how well the intelligence produced is meeting the commander's requirements. Commander involvement also assists the staff in keeping the command's information collection efforts, including intelligence operations, synchronized with the overall operation. The commander drives intelligence, intelligence facilitates operations, and operations are supportive of intelligence; this relationship is continuous.

INTELLIGENCE CONSIDERATIONS (U)

1-47. (U) Commanders' considerations for the intelligence warfighting function include—

- Reducing operational uncertainty. Intelligence does not eliminate uncertainty entirely, and to succeed, commanders must take risks. Commanders determine the necessary risks inherent in any operation.
- Determining the appropriate balance between the time allotted for collection and operational necessity. It takes time to collect information and then develop that information into detailed and precise intelligence products. Information collection must be continuous and started as early in the operations process as feasible.
- Prioritizing finite resources and capabilities. Focus collection on the key decisions the commander must make.
- Resourcing and prioritizing the intelligence warfighting function appropriately to have enough network capability and access to meet commanders' needs.
- Maximizing organic collection and processing capabilities while leveraging supporting collection assets, along with required expeditionary-PED resources by planning, coordinating, and requesting support from PED and analysis centers and national-level intelligence organizations.

INTEGRATION OF INTELLIGENCE INTO THE OPERATIONS PROCESS (U)

1-48. (U) Close interaction between the commander and the G-2/S-2 is essential as the staff supports unit planning and preparation through the integrating processes and continuing activities. The G-2/S-2 supports the commander's ability to understand the operational environment and visualize operations by leading the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process and portraying the enemy throughout the military decision-making process (MDMP), developing the information collection plan (in coordination with the G-3/S-3), updating the intelligence running estimate, and developing intelligence products and reports. Commanders direct the intelligence warfighting function through their relationship with the G-2/S-2.

1-49. (U) Commanders use the operations process to continuously design and conduct operations. Integrating intelligence into the operations process provides the information and intelligence needed to conduct (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) operations.

1-50. (U) During **planning**, the commander—

- Builds an effective staff team and fosters a collaborative environment that encourages critical thinking, candor, and cooperation, all of which empower the entire staff.
- Accepts necessary risks and some operational uncertainty. Intelligence cannot eliminate uncertainty.
- Prioritizes resources and capabilities to support information collection. The commander must resource the intelligence architecture sufficiently to provide adequate network capability (for example, bandwidth) and access. Network access and effective unit communications are especially critical.
- Allocates adequate time for information collection or determines the appropriate balance between the time allotted for collection and operational necessity. It takes time and tactical patience to collect information and then develop effective intelligence products.
- Provides initial guidance, and then intent and the concept of the operations to the staff. It is important for the G-2/S-2 to understand the commander's guidance and to share both the same perspective of the operation and the operational environment.
- Must own the priority intelligence requirement (PIR). The commander personally engages in the development and approval of PIRs that are clear, answerable, focused on a single question, and necessary to drive an operational decision.
- Ensures information collection and intelligence activities are integrated fully into plans and operations.
- Ensures the staff exploits information and intelligence from higher echelons, other units, and unified action partners. Intelligence sharing is an important factor that facilitates cooperation and access to critical reinforcing intelligence capabilities during operations.
- Ensures the G-2/S-2 leads the rest of the staff (who must actively contribute to the process) through IPB. The commander must assist in shaping the focus and scope of IPB to drive the rest of the MDMP effectively. (See ATP 2-01.3 for doctrine on IPB.)
- Ensures the G-2/S-2 focuses on managing, directing, and coordinating the intelligence effort while the MI commander focuses on commanding the unit and conducting intelligence operations.
- Ensures the G-3/S-3, in coordination with the G-2/S-2, develops the information collection plan, which includes how organic assets will answer the PIR. The information collection plan should include contingency plans and meet the principles of cueing, redundancy, and mix. (See ATP 2-01.)
- Ensures the G-6/S-6 is integral to planning adequate network access during the operation as a critical enabler to operations and the intelligence warfighting function. Therefore, the G-2/S-2 and G-6/S-6 must coordinate closely throughout all planning activities.
- Ensures the G-2/S-2, in coordination with the staff, especially the G-6/S-6, develops a thorough intelligence architecture that describes how each intelligence discipline, complementary intelligence capability, intelligence PED capability, and multinational partner provides support to intelligence operations.

- Ensures the G-2/S-2 is actively involved with all integrating processes, continuing activities, and the MDMP. For example, the G-2/S-2 must actively participate in the targeting process with IPB products, especially with event template and matrix, high-value target (HVT), and target area of interest (TAI) recommendations. The G-2/S-2 thoroughly integrates battle damage assessment and targeting requirements with the other requirements in the information collection plan.

1-51. (U) During **preparation**, the commander—

- Ensures the G-2/S-2 is actively involved in all rehearsals and portrays a sophisticated, capable, and realistic enemy.
- Ensures the G-3/S-3, in coordination with the G-2/S-2, has issued all information collection orders in a timely manner, tracked the preparation of all information collection assets, coordinated airspace and other key control measures, and resynchronized ongoing collection and PED requirements as needed.
- Ensures the G-2/S-2 and G-6/S-6 coordinate to verify the network is operational and responsive.
- Ensures the G-2/S-2 has completed information sharing coordination with unified action partners, and ongoing processes are in place for subsequent phases of the operation.

1-52. (U) During **execution** and **assessment**, the commander—

- Ensures the G-2/S-2 and G-3/S-3 can assess ongoing operations against IPB products and information collection plan. As the situation dictates, the G-2/S-2 and G-3/S-3 modify the information collection plan, prompt the commander's decisions, and recommend branches or sequels as necessary.
- Ensures the G-2/S-2 continually assesses the enemy and operational environment, answers PIRs, and updates the running estimate.
- Ensures the United States Air Force (USAF) staff weather officer (SWO) continually assesses weather effects on the warfighting function capabilities in the operational environment, answers PIRs, and updates the weather portion of the running estimate.
- Ensures the G-2/S-2 and fire support coordinator are tracking battle damage assessment and providing operational context based on the battle damage assessment.
- Ensures the G-2/S-2 and G-3/S-3 allow adequate time to plan for the next operation based on the results of the current operation.
- Ensures the G-2/S-2 and G-6/S-6 continually assess ongoing operations to modify intelligence architecture requirements and system interoperability.

THE STAFF (U)

1-53. (U) The staff is a key component of the mission command system. In addition to executing the mission command staff tasks, the staff's primary responsibilities include—

- Supporting the commander.
- Assisting subordinate commanders, staffs, and units.
- Informing units and organizations outside the headquarters.

SUPPORT THE COMMANDER (U)

1-54. (U) Staffs support the commander—

- To understand, visualize, and describe the operational environment; make and articulate decisions; and direct, lead, and assess military operations.
- By making recommendations and preparing plans and orders for the commander.
- By producing timely and relevant information and analysis, and vy using knowledge management to extract that information from the vast amount of available information.
- By battle tracking the ongoing operation to ensure information collection tasks are executed or adjusted as the situation dictates.

- By seeing and understanding when windows of opportunity will open and close, and by alerting and providing recommendations to the commander when decision criteria are met.
- By monitoring and providing recommendations to adjust the plan or tasks when the situation changes and the anticipated decisions are no longer relevant.

Assist Subordinate Commanders, Staffs, and Units (U)

1-55. (U) Effective staffs establish and maintain a high degree of coordination and cooperation with staffs of higher, lower, supporting, supported, and adjacent units. Staffs assist subordinate headquarters in understanding the larger context of operations.

Inform Units and Organizations Outside the Headquarters (U)

1-56. (U) Staffs keep higher and lateral units well informed. They receive information, determine its relevancy, and disseminate that information to the appropriate headquarters. The key is relevance and timeliness, not volume.

OPERATIONAL ART (U)

1-57. (U) Army commanders and staffs employ operational art to determine what tactics best achieve a strategic purpose. *Operational art* is the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs - supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means (JP 3-0). Through operational art, commanders and staffs combine art and science to develop plans and orders that describe how (ways) the force employs its capabilities (means) to achieve the desired end state (ends) while considering risk.

1-58. (U) In applying operational art, commanders and their staffs use a set of intellectual tools to assist them in understanding their operational environment, visualizing their operational approach, and describing the operation's end state. Collectively, this set of tools is known as the elements of operational art. These tools assist commanders in understanding, visualizing, and describing operations and in formulating their commander's intent and planning guidance. Commanders selectively use these tools in any operation.

1-59. (U) Systematic thinking informs a situational template that puts a threat into perspective. Not all elements of operational art apply at all levels of war. The application of the elements of operational art is situation- and echelon-dependent. (See FM 3-0 for a detailed discussion of operational art.)

OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK (U)

1-60. (U) An *operational framework* is a cognitive tool used to assist commanders and staffs in clearly visualizing and describing the application of combat power in time, space, purpose, and resources in the concept of operations (ADP 1-01). The operational framework considerations (physical, temporal, virtual, and cognitive) provide commanders and staffs a way to look at multiple domains and the information environment within the context of land operations. The G-2/S-2 assists the commander and staff in understanding and accounting for these considerations through a number of processes and different types of intelligence products.

Operational Framework Considerations (U)

1-61. (U) Intelligence is inherent in all staff planning activities. The IPB process provides information for most of the operational framework considerations to support long-term and short-term operational planning. During IPB, the intelligence staff leads the rest of the staff through the IPB process to thoroughly identify significant aspects of the operational environment, analyze how these aspects affect operations, and identify enemy COAs. Table 1-1 on page 1-14 lists the operational framework considerations, as described in FM 3-0, and how IPB and subsequent intelligence analysis support each consideration.

1-62. (U) A thorough IPB and intelligence analysis assist each echelon in focusing operations on all significant aspects of the operational environment in time and space across multiple domains. This prevents each echelon from focusing only on the close fight and current operations. A broad focus across the operational framework considerations assists commanders and staffs in better identifying friendly windows of opportunity and threat windows of vulnerabilities within and across each domain and the information environment. This illustrates one way that intelligence is critical to operational planning.

Table 1-1. (U) IPB and intelligence analysis support to operational framework considerations

UNCLASSIFIED	
Operational framework considerations	***IPB and intelligence analysis support***
Physical considerations include geography, terrain, infrastructure, populations, distance, weapons ranges and effects, and known enemy locations.	• Intelligence support begins well before the deployment of forces, through the generate intelligence knowledge intelligence warfighting task, which addresses the operational variables (PMESII-PT). Information gained during generate intelligence knowledge is used by commanders and staffs to assist in framing the operational environment during the Army design methodology. • IPB provides detailed analysis of the mission variables of enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations to determine their effects on operations. • IPB and intelligence analysis assist in determining relevant aspects within an area of operations—such as civil considerations characteristics (ASCOPE)—that are critical in determining how friendly operations may be impacted during the consolidation of gains. • Intelligence analysis is critical to the designation of a deep area, the fire support coordination line, and an engagement area.
Temporal considerations are related to time, including when capabilities can be used, how long they take to generate and employ, and how long they must be used to achieve desired effects.	• IPB is a process that is both geographically and temporally specific. • Developing threat courses of action during IPB is based on identifying threat objectives, goals, timelines, and end states. • IPB provides a temporal context using rates of movement, time phase lines, phases of enemy fires, and other templates to capture enemy timing.
Cognitive considerations relate to people and how they behave. They include information pertaining to enemy decision making, enemy will, the Nation's will, and the population's behavior.	• IPB accounts for aspects associated with the center of gravity and the enemy's morale and willingness to continue operations. • Intelligence support to continuous operational assessments considers many relevant aspects of the operational environment, including sociocultural factors. • IPB also considers all significant aspects of the operational environment associated with the various civil considerations.
Virtual considerations pertain to activities and entities, both friendly and threat, residing in cyberspace.	• IPB and intelligence analysis, in coordination with the cyberspace electromagnetic activities section, provide intelligence on the threat's likely activities within the information environment, which includes cyberspace.
ASCOPE areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield PMESII-PT political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time	
UNCLASSIFIED	

Operational Framework Components (U)

1-63. (U) The operational framework provides an organizing construct, visualizing and describing operations by echelon in time and space within the context of an AO, area of influence, and area of interest. It provides a logical way to determine the responsibilities, permissions, and restrictions for subordinate echelons, and by doing so it enables freedom of action and unity of effort. Figure 1-2 discusses and illustrates several key aspects of the operational framework. When used in conjunction with effective operational graphics, the operational framework enables commanders to provide intent, develop shared visualization, and ultimately create the shared understanding necessary for the exercise of informed initiative at every echelon. (See FM 3-0.) The operational framework has four components:

- Commanders are assigned an AO for the conduct of operations, from which, in turn, they assign AOs to subordinate units based on their visualization of the operation. Units should be assigned AOs commensurate with their ability to influence what happens within them.
- Within their assigned AO, commanders designate deep, close, support, and consolidation areas (as required) to describe the physical arrangement of forces in time, space, and purpose.
- Commanders establish decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations to further articulate an operation in terms of purpose.
- Commanders identify the main and supporting efforts to designate the shifting and prioritization of resources.



SECTION III – ANTICIPATED OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS AND THREATS (U)

1-64. (U) Factors that affect operations extend far beyond the boundaries of a commander's assigned AO. As such, commanders, supported by their staffs, seek to develop and maintain an understanding of their operational environment and other factors, including but not limited to adversary, enemy, friendly, and neutral actors that are relevant to a specific operation.

THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT (U)

1-65. (U) An *operational environment* is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). (See appendix A for more on the employment of intelligence capabilities.)

1-66. (U) An operational environment encompasses the air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains; the information environment; the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS); and other factors. Commanders and staffs analyze an operational environment using the eight operational variables (PMESII-PT). (See FM 6-0 for more information on the operational variables.)

1-67. (U) Within an operational environment, it is difficult to discern how the many entities will behave and interact with each other, as well as the differing circumstances that will result from these actions. No two operational environments are the same. Additionally, an operational environment is not static; it continually transforms. This transformation results from opposing forces and actors interacting and their abilities to learn and adapt. The complex and dynamic nature of an operational environment makes determining the relationship between cause and effect difficult and contributes to the uncertain nature of military operations.

MULTI-DOMAIN EXTENDED BATTLEFIELD AND OPERATIONS (U)

1-68. (U) The interrelationship of the air, land, maritime, space, cyberspace, the information environment, and the EMS requires cross-domain situational understanding of the operational environment. Commanders and staffs must understand friendly and enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities that reside in each domain. From this understanding, commanders can better identify windows of opportunity during operations to converge capabilities for the best effects. Since many capabilities are not organic to Army forces, commanders and staffs plan, coordinate for, and integrate joint and other unified action partner capabilities in a multi-domain approach to operations. Intelligence plays an important role in situational understanding across all domains.

1-69. (U) The Army conducts operations across all domains and the information environment. All Army operations are multi-domain operations and all battles are multi-domain battles. A multi-domain approach to operations is neither new to the Army nor to national to tactical intelligence. Rapid and continued advances in technologies and the military application of new technologies to the space domain, the EMS, and the information environment (particularly cyberspace) require special considerations in intelligence, planning, and converging effects from across all domains.

1-70. (U) Army operations and battles will invariably involve challenges across multiple domains. Examples of Army multi-domain operations and activities include airborne and air assault operations, air and missile defense, fires, aviation, cyberspace electromagnetic activities (CEMA), information operations, space operations, military deception, and information collection. Key considerations for operating in multiple domains include—

- Mission command.
- Reconnaissance in depth.
- Mobility.
- Cross-domain fires.
- Tempo and convergence of effects.
- Protection.
- Sustainment.
- Information operations.
- CEMA.

1-71. (U) Army forces may be required to conduct operations across multiple domains to gain freedom of action for other members of the joint force. This is similar to other members of the joint force operating across multiple domains to assist in providing ground forces with a position of relative advantage. Examples of these operations include neutralizing enemy integrated air defenses, destroying long-range surface-to-surface fires systems, denying enemy access to an AO, disrupting enemy command and control, protecting friendly networks, conducting tactical deception, or disrupting an enemy's ability to conduct information warfare. All of these operations are enabled by precise and detailed intelligence on threat vulnerabilities.

1-72. (U) Every echelon is affected by the multi-domain extended battlefield; each should consider time, geography, decision making, the EMS, and the other domains differently. However, not every echelon is able to effectively conduct operations across multiple domains. Brigade combat teams (BCTs) and lower echelons focused on fighting in the close area generally lack the time and ability to effectively plan and employ multi-domain capabilities other than those already under their control. These echelons focus on fundamental operational aspects such as mobility, lethality, and protection. The division is the first echelon able to effectively plan and coordinate for the employment of all multi-domain capabilities across the operational framework. Theater army and corps echelons have a broader perspective, better focus, and far more capabilities to orchestrate and converge multi-domain activities and operations in time and space. Through these activities and operations, intelligence is critical in assisting friendly forces to effectively identify and exploit windows of opportunity across the domains to create and exploit temporary windows of superiority.

1-73. (U) Although there are many possible techniques for conducting operations in and across all of the domains, a multi-domain operation against a peer threat requires continuous situational understanding to see opportunities, seize the initiative, and exploit enemy vulnerabilities or windows of friendly superiority. Seeing and understanding when and how the joint force will isolate portions of the operational environment in one or more domains to allow a portion of the joint force to establish a decisive point for the cross-domain convergence of capabilities must be supported by continuous intelligence operations across the domains. During large-scale combat operations against a peer threat, ground-force commanders may be required to conduct tactical activities, such as a deliberate attack, to shape the environment to gain a position of relative advantage for activities, such as joint fires, within the other domains. Once that position is achieved, operations would continue to increase the position of advantage in order to create a longer window of superiority to facilitate follow-on missions and operations across the domains. Figure 1-3 on page 1-18 depicts a multi-domain extended battlefield in which friendly ground forces neutralized enemy integrated air defenses, thus creating a window of superiority for joint fires capabilities across multiple domains. They achieved this through aggressive information collection and focused intelligence analysis.

1-74. (U) During IPB, each staff element provides input, ensuring a holistic view of the operational environment. Subsequently, the IPB effort aids in identifying domain windows of opportunity to exploit threat vulnerabilities. For example, the air defense artillery staff element's input to IPB about enemy integrated air defense system (IADS) capabilities and vulnerabilities may present the friendly commander with recommended timeframes and locations to conduct suppression of enemy air defense or deep strike. Additionally, the gaps identified during mission analysis and IPB will drive information collection requirements. The results of information collection may also identify domain windows of opportunity. (See ATP 2-01.3 for more information on IPB.)



THREATS (U)

1-75. (U) A *threat* is any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm United States forces, United States national interests, or the homeland (ADRP 3-0). Threats may include individuals, groups of individuals, paramilitary or military forces, nation-states, or national alliances. In general, a threat can be categorized as an enemy or an adversary:

- An *enemy* is a party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized (ADRP 3-0). An enemy is also called a *combatant* and is treated as such under the law of war.
- An *adversary* is a party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged (JP 3-0).

1-76. (U) Peer threats, as described in ADRP 3-0, are adversaries or enemies with equal or superior capabilities and capacity to oppose U.S. forces across multiple domains worldwide or in a specific region where they enjoy a position of relative advantage. Some examples include Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. A peer threat may also have a cultural affinity to specific regions, providing them relative advantages in terms of time, space, and sanctuary.

1-77. (U) Some threat capabilities, particularly IADSs and long-range surface-to-surface fires, severely impede freedom of action in the air, maritime, and land domains, potentially hindering other Services from assisting in solving ground tactical problems. Army cannon and rocket artillery are likely to be both outranged and significantly outnumbered, which present a tactical problem even if friendly forces are not contested in the air domain. The potential combination of relative disadvantage in the land, maritime, and air domains will affect how Army forces conduct operations. Friendly forces will face enemy formations designed around long-range fires systems, which employ maneuver arms to support fires. Therefore, understanding the various methods (systems warfare, isolation, preclusion, information warfare, and sanctuary) employed by the Nation's adversaries and potential foes is critical to planning. (See ADRP 3-0 to understand the various threats across the range of military operations; see FM 3-0 to understand peer threats in large-scale combat operations.)

1-78. (U) Peer threats generate tactical, operational, and strategic challenges that are, in order of magnitude, more challenging militarily than those the Army has faced since the end of the Cold War. Peer threats, enemies, and adversaries employ strategies that capitalize on their capabilities to achieve their objectives. When these objectives are at odds with the interests of the United States and its allies, conflict becomes more likely. Peer threats prefer to achieve their goals without directly engaging U.S. forces in combat. They often employ information warfare in combination with conventional and irregular military capabilities to achieve their goals. During a conflict, peer threats will try to weaken the resolve of the United States and its partners to sustain conflict. They will exploit friendly sensitivity to world opinion and attempt to exploit American domestic opinion and sensitivity to friendly casualties. Peer threats believe they have a comparative advantage because of their willingness to endure greater hardship, casualties, and negative public opinion.

SECTION IV – INTELLIGENCE AND THE ARMY'S STRATEGIC ROLES (U)

1-79. (U) The Army's primary mission is to organize, train, and equip its forces to conduct prompt and sustained land combat to defeat enemy ground forces and to seize, occupy, and defend land areas. The Army accomplishes its mission by supporting the joint force through the Army's four strategic roles:

- Shape operational environments.
- Prevent conflict.
- Prevail in large-scale ground combat.
- Consolidate gains.

1-80. (U) The goal through all four roles is to win. To win, intelligence operations must provide threat warnings, identify threat capabilities, and describe how threat capabilities will be employed and how they will impact friendly operations. This intelligence support must occur across the conflict continuum and through the range of military operations. (See figure 1-4 on page 1-20.)



Figure 1-4. (U) Conflict continuum and the range of military operations

1-81. (U) The Army faces a number of challenges in order to successfully conduct large-scale combat operations. Foremost among those challenges are peer threats, who are highly adaptive, technologically advanced, and operate at a tempo and depth that greatly complicates Army forces' ability to respond to threat actions throughout the range of military operations. Therefore, competition with peer threats begins well in advance of the conduct of large-scale combat operations. Throughout the range of military operations, intelligence is critical to maintaining a trained and ready Army and setting the conditions for successful large-scale combat operations, should they be necessary.

1-82. (U) Friendly forces are likely to start large-scale combat operations from a position of relative disadvantage. However, friendly forces can mitigate these conditions as a part of the shape and prevent strategic roles. Intelligence, especially warning intelligence and support to setting and supporting the theater, is integral to these efforts as the theater army competes with peer threats below the level of armed conflict to maintain an enduring initiative. As friendly forces draw nearer to armed conflict, they must thoroughly plan to overcome the large-scale combat operations problem set. This operational problem set includes how to—

- Ensure adequate joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and Army information collection to enable operations.
- Disrupt the enemy's capability to conduct command and control.
- Destroy critical components of the enemy's antiaccess and area denial systems to enable friendly freedom of maneuver.
- Defeat the sensor-to-shooter link between the enemy's integrated fires complex and ISR assets.
- Establish redundant friendly mission command networks.
- Protect friendly forces from enemy information warfare, cyberspace operations, and electronic warfare (EW).
- Employ friendly CEMA capabilities.
- Ensure the minimum level of mobility necessary to support operations.
- Apply friendly combat power in time, space, and purpose to achieve the desired effects on the enemy.

1-83. (U) During large-scale combat operations, peer threats will mass effects across multiple domains at a speed that will significantly impact ongoing operations. Therefore, friendly forces must also be prepared to operate quickly across the physical domains and the information environment. These multi-domain efforts entail joint synchronization, Service interdependencies, and the cross-domain convergence of capabilities at a time and place to create an operational advantage.

1-84. (U) The likely first challenge during large-scale combat operations is defeating a network of sophisticated antiaccess and area denial systems. Enemy forces will attempt to deny U.S. and multinational forces access to the AO by contesting U.S. and multinational forces in each of the domains and the information environment. The joint force may even have to fight for intelligence to identify threat locations, strengths, and vulnerabilities and then to gain an initial lodgment. Once Army forces achieve initial access, those forces must be prepared to immediately conduct tactical operations. As a lodgment is formed, the threat will employ a variety of effective long-range fires and other capabilities to deny friendly forces freedom of maneuver—physically and virtually. Peer threats are likely to use EW, offensive cyberspace operations and counter-space measures to deny and degrade U.S. forces maneuver, communications, intelligence collection, and targeting capabilities. Developing effective collection plans and tasking information collection assets (in depth and with redundancy) is essential. This identifies windows of opportunity to counter the threat's capabilities and to enable the joint force to maintain freedom of action and gain positions of relative advantage—physically, temporally, virtually, and cognitively. (See appendix D for more on intelligence support to force projection operations.)

1-85. (U) Each strategic role presents a unique set of intelligence requirements, which are discussed in FM 3-0 and chapter 5 of this publication. Chapter 5 discusses intelligence from the theater army to the BCT across shape, prevent, prevail in large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains. Additionally, figure 1-5 lists some of the most important intelligence tasks for each strategic role.



Figure 1-5. (U) Intelligence and the Army's strategic roles

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Chapter 2

Intelligence Staff Activities (U)

SECTION I – GENERAL G-2/S-2 RESPONSIBILITIES (U)

2-1. (U) The intelligence staff has roles and responsibilities that support the conduct of operations across all echelons. The role of the G-2/S-2 is multifaceted and involves many tasks and responsibilities that provide the best possible intelligence to enable commanders to make timely and relevant decisions. This is especially the case with intelligence support to large-scale combat operations against peer threats.

(U) The primary role of the G-2/S-2 is to provide the commander the most complete and timely intelligence available.

2-2. (U) The G-2/S-2 coordinates activities and systems that facilitate understanding the threat, terrain and weather, and other relevant aspects of the operational environment (such as key populations, groups, and organizations). The unit's G-2/S-2 leads the intelligence cell. The intelligence cell requests, receives, and analyzes information from multiple sources to produce and distribute intelligence products. The intelligence cell consists of the majority of the intelligence staff and an attached USAF weather team.

2-3. (U) The intelligence staff supports the commander in exercising mission command throughout the operations process. The intelligence staff uses knowledge management and information management practices to provide commanders with the information they need to establish and maintain their understanding and to make effective decisions.

2-4. (U) Specific responsibilities of the G-2/S-2 include but are not limited to—

- Overseeing the intelligence cell, specifically situation development, target development, support to lethal and nonlethal targeting, support to warning intelligence, support to assessment, and support to protection.
- Providing the commander and staff with assessments of key groups and populations, including capabilities, intentions, and potential COAs.
- Identifying gaps in intelligence and developing collection strategies.
- Disseminating intelligence products throughout the unit (corps through battalion), as well as to higher and subordinate headquarters.
- Receiving, screening, and exploiting collected materiel, and forwarding to higher echelons those materiel requiring additional capabilities for further exploitation.
- Answering RFIs from subordinate commanders, staffs, and higher and adjacent units.
- Coordinating units' intelligence requirements with supporting higher, lateral, and subordinate echelons.
- Coordinating with the USAF SWO to provide weather effects on the warfighting function capabilities to support the operations process, integrating processes, and continuing activities.
- Overseeing the intelligence cell's contributions to collection management.
- Leading the staff in IPB and consolidating the staff's IPB products into a coherent and holistic IPB product.
- Monitoring intelligence operations.
- Ensuring ongoing intelligence operations are collecting information needed for anticipated decisions or other PIRs.
- Ensuring information concerning the PIRs is processed and analyzed first.

- Recommending changes to the information collection plan based on changes in the situation and weather.
- Establishing the intelligence architecture in collaboration with the G-6/S-6.
- Supporting security programs, which include—
  - Supervising command and personnel security programs.
  - Evaluating physical security vulnerabilities to support staff sections, particularly the operations and signal staffs.
  - Performing staff planning and supervising the special security office.

2-5. (U) The G-2/S-2, together with the G-3/S-3, assists the commander in coordinating, integrating, and supervising the execution of information collection plans and operations. The G-2/S-2 assists the commander in focusing and integrating these assets and resources to satisfy the corps through battalion intelligence requirements. Staff leaders consider intelligence operations guidelines. G-2/S-2s consider the following when planning, controlling, and assessing intelligence operations:

- **Commander's intent and guidance.** The commander's intent and guidance may include specific requirements for or constraints on intelligence operations. Conversely, they may allow subordinate commanders and staffs to make decisions more freely.
- **Nature of the mission and threat.** Offensive, defensive, and stability tasks differ in many ways, among them: information requirements, timeframes, and rules of engagement. The intelligence officer identifies both enemy and friendly strengths and weakness using a multi-domain approach. This approach is a path to victory.
- **Terrain, weather, and civil considerations.** The G-2/S-2, G-3/S-3, and engineers collaborate to ensure the terrain and environmental characterization (such as, urban, mountain, jungle, or desert) are considered during the IPB process, and to inform how MI collection assets are employed. Conditions may degrade sensor capabilities. (See FM 3-12 and ATP 2-01.3 for information on assessing key terrain in cyberspace.)
- **Troops and support available.** The availability of MI collection assets determines the possible intelligence operations. Capabilities from higher headquarters often augment organic assets. Command and support relationships may limit how supported units employ these assets.
- **Time available.** When planning intelligence operations, staffs consider both the time required to collect information and the time required to produce intelligence from that information. It makes no sense to collect information if there is not enough time to produce intelligence from it. Staffs pay particular attention to the time available before H-hour when considering whether to execute intelligence operations to support planning. *H-hour* is the specific hour on D-day at which a particular operation commences (JP 5-0).
- **Complexity of integrating and synchronizing intelligence operations.** Intelligence operations are conducted over a wide breadth and depth of the supported command's AO. Successful intelligence operations require coordination across multiple echelons and functions. For example, intelligence operations require airspace, terrain, and space deconfliction and coordination and adequate PED capabilities to ensure assets are able to cooperate efficiently and effectively. (See paragraph 3-12 for more information on intelligence PED capabilities.)
- **Integration of signals intelligence (SIGINT), EW, and cyberspace operations (often referred to as SIGINT/EW/Cyber).** Ensuring the effective integration of SIGINT, EW, and cyberspace operations capabilities is one of the most complex aspects of integrating and synchronizing intelligence operations with other functions. Effective integration extends well beyond simple coordination. SIGINT, EW, and cyberspace operations occur completely or partially within the same portion of the EMS and share many interrelated considerations. Effective integration not only requires deconfliction but also the identification of windows of opportunities between these three functions. Therefore, the integration of SIGINT, EW, and cyberspace operations requires close staff collaboration, detailed procedural controls, and the use of technical channels. The following includes some of the interrelated aspects of these three functions:

- Allocation of assets and bandwidth.
- Planning, tasking, and cross-cueing between functions.
- Conduct of collection and retasking assets.
- Use of technical channels.

SECTION II – INTELLIGENCE STAFF SUPPORT TO THE COMMANDER (U)

2-6. (U) Using information from all intelligence disciplines, complementary intelligence capabilities, and available sources, the intelligence staff conducts all-source analysis and produces timely, accurate, relevant, predictive, and tailored intelligence that satisfies the commander's requirements. Thorough and disciplined all-source analysis reduces the possibility of error, bias, and misinformation through the consideration of multiple sources of information and intelligence. Analysis also assists in providing a focused view of the operational environment and presents the commander with multiple options for employing multiple capabilities and gaining a position of relative advantage over the enemy.

Note. (U) Due to the nature and fluidity of large-scale combat operations, commanders will have to have to make decisions with imperfect intelligence. Intelligence that is too late for commanders to make timely decisions results in a loss of the initiative and lost battles and engagements.

2-7. (U) The commander depends on a skilled intelligence staff to answer PIRs and other requirements through the synchronization of the intelligence warfighting function with mission command. The intelligence staff does this by supporting the MDMP, providing IPB products, supporting the information collection effort, supporting the targeting effort, and providing all-source intelligence analysis (including conclusions and projections of future conditions or events).

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS (U)

2-8. (U) The *military decision-making process* is an iterative planning methodology to understand the situation and mission, develop a course of action, and produce an operation plan or order (ADP 5-0). The MDMP begins with the receipt of the mission and combines the conceptual and detailed components of planning. Commanders use the MDMP to visualize the operational environment and the threat, build plans and orders for extended operations, and develop orders for short-term operations within the framework of a long-range plan. (For more information, see FM 6-0.) During the MDMP, the intelligence staff is responsible for leading the IPB effort and for providing well-defined, specific all-source intelligence products and tools. The staff tailors the all-source products and tools to the commander's requirements and the operation. Table 2-1 on page 2-4 outlines the intelligence support provided to the MDMP. The commander and staff require the following products throughout the planning process:

- Line of communications overlays (including broadcast and communications).
- Hazards overlays (that accurately depict the affected areas).
- Modified combined obstacle overlays (also called MCOOs) and terrain effects matrices.
- Weather effects matrices and other weather tactical decision aids.
- Civil considerations overlays (such as population, religion, network diagrams, and link and node overlays).
- Threat characteristics.
- Threat templates and models.
- Threat situation templates (threat COAs).
- Event templates and matrices.
- High-value target lists (HVTLs), which facilitate or are used to develop high-payoff target lists.

Note. (U) Possible products are limited only by the intelligence staff's initiative and creativity.

Table 2-1. (U) Intelligence support to the military decision-making process

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Step 1—Receipt of mission	***Intelligence support to step 1***
• Alert the staff and other key participants. • Gather the tools. • Update running estimates. • Conduct the initial assessment. • Issue the commander's initial guidance. • Issue the initial warning order.	• Begin parallel planning and collaborate with higher, lower, and adjacent intelligence organizations to facilitate the IPB process. • Focus activities on the mission variables. • Identify gaps in intelligence holdings. • Use intelligence reach to collect updated or additional enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations data. • In coordination with the Air Force staff weather officer, update the weather estimate. • In coordination with the electronic warfare officer and CEMA section, update the effects of the EMS and cyberspace, including information from the cyber mission force such as products that portray the physical and logical layers. • Coordinate with the G-3/S-3, G-6/S-6, and the CEMA section to address the information environment and cyberspace. • Develop and submit initial requests for information based on intelligence gaps. • Continually update target packets and the enemy situation. • Update the intelligence running estimate.
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Table 2-1. (U) Intelligence support to the military decision-making process (*continued*)

UNCLASSIFIED	
Step 2—Mission analysis	***Intelligence support to step 2***
• Analyze the higher headquarters' plan or order. • Perform initial IPB. • Determine specified, implied, and essential tasks. • Review available assets and identify resource shortfalls. • Determine constraints. • Identify critical facts and develop assumptions. • Begin a risk assessment. • Develop initial CCIRs and EEFIs. • Develop the initial information collection plan. • Update plan for the use of available time. • Develop initial themes and messages. • Develop a proposed problem statement. • Develop a proposed mission statement. • Present the mission analysis briefing. • Develop and issue the initial commander's intent. • Develop and issue initial planning guidance • Develop COA evaluation criteria. • Issue a warning order.	• Identify gaps in the higher headquarters information collection plan and IPB. • Lead the staff through the IPB process. Consolidate the staff's IPB products into a set of coherent and holistic IPB products. • Begin collection management by identifying specified and implied intelligence tasks from the higher headquarters order. • Use pertinent intelligence from higher echelons. • Assist in determining the area of operations and area of interest. • Develop initial information requirements (with staff). • In coordination with the G-3/S-3, recommend initial PIRs to the commander. • Assist in developing initial operations security vulnerabilities and EEFIs. • Include weather (which includes space) and EMS effects on the enemy's warfighting function capabilities. • Include key considerations for threat cyberspace operations, including the identification of key aspects of the cyberspace domain. **MCOO and terrain (with engineer officer):** Does the overlay— • Identify restricted or severely restricted terrain? • Identify mobility corridors (air and ground)? • Identify infiltration lanes and landing and pickup zones? • Identify key or decisive terrain? • Define defensible terrain? • Identify terrain that supports survival and evasion of personnel executing their isolated soldier guidance? • Identify capabilities within the information environment, such as lines of communications (telephone, internet, cellular); radio stations, including range; newspapers; cyber cafes; threat and adversary narratives; threat and neutral actor vulnerabilities to information operations; and friendly vulnerabilities to threat information operations. **Situation templates:** Do the situation templates— • Include all committed and reinforcing forces as well as combat multipliers? • Focus at least two levels down in detail (or as command dictates), including all threat warfighting functions? • Graphically portray threat characteristics, weaknesses and peculiarities, activities, and capabilities for each COA? • **Event templates and matrices (unrefined):** Do the event templates identify and focus on NAIs, time phase lines, time distance analysis, critical actions, or threat DPs?
Step 3—COA development	***Intelligence support to step 3***
• Assess relative combat power. • Generate options. • Array forces. • Develop a broad concept. • Assign headquarters. • Develop COA statements and sketches. • Conduct COA briefing. • Select or modify COAs for continued analysis.	• Ensure IPB products are deliberately integrated into COA development. Critical products include the MCOO, civil considerations products, threat objectives, threat models (including HVTs), situation templates, and event templates. • Integrate information and intelligence received from the initial information collection effort. • Ensure weather and EMS effects on the warfighting function capabilities are deliberately integrated into COA development. • Refine and prioritize situation templates, event templates, and matrices. • Update HVTs for targeting by lethal and nonlethal methods. • Take an active part in analyzing combat power by providing all available information on current threat forces and the situation. • Provide information on threat vulnerabilities while analyzing relative combat power. • Consider as many possible COAs as time permits, starting with the most likely and including the worst case (most dangerous).
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Table 2-1. (U) Intelligence support to the military decision-making process (*continued*)

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Step 4—COA analysis (war game)	***Intelligence support to step 4***
• Gather the tools. • List all friendly forces. • List assumptions. • List known critical events and DPs. • Select the war-gaming method. • Select a technique to record and display results. • War-game the operations and assess the results. • Conduct a war-game briefing (optional).	**As the enemy commander—** • Use the enemy situation template as a starting point and the event template and matrix as guides to develop critical enemy DPs in relation to friendly COAs. • Project enemy reactions to friendly actions and project enemy losses. • Capture the results of each enemy action and counteraction as well as corresponding friendly and enemy strengths and vulnerabilities. **As the command's senior intelligence officer—** • Identify new information requirements. • Participate in targeting to select high-payoff targets and HVTs identified during IPB. • Recommend PIRs that correspond to DPs and refine PIRs with the latest time information is of value. • Redefine enemy COAs based on developed DPs and the situation template. • Develop critical enemy DPs in relation to friendly COAs. • Fight as an uncooperative enemy to develop DPs and project enemy losses. • Address all relevant enemy activities. • Assist in developing target selection standards and the attack guidance matrix from war-gamed COAs. • Recommend changes to the information collection plan. • Based on the war game, refine the situation and event templates with corresponding DPs, TAIs, and HVTs, including NAIs. • Refine the event matrix with TAIs and HVTs. • Participate in the targeting process. • Link NAIs to TAIs. • Display the scheme of information collection during the war game. • Assists the G-3/S-3 in developing the decision support template. • Consider the effects of enemy and friendly COAs on local population attitudes and behaviors.
Step 5—COA comparison	***Intelligence support to step 5***
• Conduct analysis of advantages and disadvantages. • Compare COAs. • Conduct a COA decision briefing.	• Ensure incorporation of the recommended PIRs in the tasking of subordinate units and the requests to higher and lateral echelons. • Coordinate with supporting information collection organizations and G-2/S-2s to ensure the information collection plan is understandable and executable. When executed, the plan should enable a rapid and seamless transition between current and future operations. • Modify the initial set of intelligence requirements developed during mission analysis to reflect war-gaming results. • Include weather and EMS effects on specific warfighting function capabilities' analysis of advantages and disadvantages for each COA. • Clearly delineate intelligence requirements. • Ensure the synchronization of all available collection assets.
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Table 2-1. (U) Intelligence support to the military decision-making (*continued*)

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Step 6—COA approval	***Intelligence support to step 6***
• Commander approves a COA.	• Recommend PIRs (including the latest time information is of value) and the supporting information collection plan. • Implement, refine, or rework the intelligence running estimate, Annex B (Intelligence), and the information collection plan based on the commander's acceptance, modification, or rejection of the staff's recommendation. • Upon COA approval, the G-2/S-2 and G-3/S-3 coordinate with supporting information collection resources to ensure the scheme of information collection supports the approved COA. • Refine the weather estimate. • Collaborate with the G-3/S-3 to ensure staffs at all levels understand the following: ▪ Scheme of information collection. ▪ EEFIs. ▪ Collection tasks. ▪ Analysis and production priorities. ▪ Intelligence control measures: target handover, reconnaissance handover, and reporting responsibilities. ▪ Procedures for tasking and reporting.
Step 7—Orders production, dissemination, and transition	***Intelligence support to step 7***
• Produce and disseminate orders. • Transition from planning to operations.	• The G-2/S-2 plans cell, assisted by the intelligence cell, develops Annex B (Intelligence) to the operation order and assists the G-3/S-3 in producing Annex L (Information Collection). • The G-2/S-2 plans cell assists other staff members in preparing the enemy or information collection aspects of their annexes. Paragraph 3 (Coordinating Instructions) of Annex B (Intelligence) explains measures for handling captured personnel, documents, and materiel. • The G-2/S-2 reviews the operation order and Annex B (Intelligence) for accuracy and completeness as well as compatibility with foreign disclosure policy or guidelines. • The G-2/S-2 forwards Annex B (Intelligence) to the G-3/S-3 for incorporation and dissemination into the operation order. • The collection manager, supported by the intelligence cell, develops requests for information (intelligence production); with G-2/S-2 approval, the manager forwards the requests to the next higher echelon and adjacent units.

CCIR	commander's critical information requirement	G-3/S-3	division or corps/battalion or brigade operations staff officer
COA	course of action	G-6/S-6	division or corps/battalion or brigade signal staff officer
DP	decision point	HVT	high-value target
EEFI	essential element of friendly information	IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlefield
EMS	electromagnetic spectrum	MCOO	modified combined obstacle overlay
CEMA	cyberspace electromagnetic activities	NAI	named area of interest
G-2/S-2	division or corps/battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer	PIR	priority intelligence requirement

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INTELLIGENCE AND THE INTEGRATING PROCESSES (U)

2-9. (U) Commanders and staffs use the integrating processes—IPB, targeting, and risk management—to synchronize specific functions throughout the operations process. The intelligence staff supports the integrating processes by providing detailed and relevant all-source intelligence on the various aspects of the threat, terrain and weather, and civil considerations. (See ADRP 5-0 for more on the integrating processes.)

PERFORM INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD (U)

2-10. (U) The G-2/S-2 leads the staff through the IPB process. The IPB process consists of the following four steps: define the operational environment, describe environmental effects on operations, evaluate the threat, and determine threat COAs. (See paragraphs B-23 through B-27.) The IPB process considers all threat

capabilities within and across each domain within the unit's AO and area of interest and the relevant aspects of the information environment. IPB starts immediately upon receipt of the mission, is refined throughout planning, and updated to support subsequent operational planning. The other staff sections assist the intelligence staff in developing the IPB products required for planning. Table 2-2 presents each staff section's input to IPB products (such as modified combined obstacle overlays, threat models, situation templates, HVTLs, high-payoff target lists, event templates/matrices). The staff input is mission-dependent and not all-inclusive. The following discussion provides aspects of IPB that support mission analysis. (For a detailed IPB discussion, see ATP 2-01.3.)

Table 2-2. (U) Staff input to IPB products

UNCLASSIFIED	
Staff section	***Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) input***
All staff sections: Provide their subject matter expertise to assist in determining but not limited to the following.	• Enemy objectives and desired end state. • Named areas of interest. • High-value targets. • High-payoff targets. • Decision points.
G-2/S-2: Leads the IPB effort and has staff responsibility for analyzing the mission variables of enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations.	• Threat doctrine, tactics, equipment, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intent. • Threat systems. • Identification of areas of interest and areas of influence. • Terrain analysis. • Determination of threat courses of action.
G-3/S-3: Provides subject matter expertise on the art and science of military operations. Evaluates IPB products to ensure they support friendly course of action development and analysis.	• Operational experience. • Assistance in determining— ▪ Target areas of interest. ▪ Engagement areas. ▪ Time phase lines. • Relative combat power matrices for friendly and enemy forces.
G-4/S-4: Provides subject matter expertise on sustainment operations.	• Threat logistics doctrine, tactics, equipment, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intent. • Threat supply/resupply routes/points.
G-6/S-6: Provides subject matter expertise on friendly communications systems and assists the G-2/S-2 in identifying and evaluating friendly communications systems' vulnerabilities to cyberspace and electronic attack.	• Threat employment of communications systems. • Threat communications networks and nodes. • Threat communications vulnerabilities. • Line of sight analysis.
G-9/S-9: Provides subject matter expertise on civil affairs operations.	• Evaluation of civil considerations on military operations. • ASCOPE (areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events) analysis. • PMESII-PT (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time) analysis. • Civil considerations overlays.
Chief of fires (division and above)/Fires support officer (brigade and below): Provides subject matter expertise on fires.	• Threat fires doctrine, tactics, equipment, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intent. • Assistance in selecting— ▪ Target areas of interest. ▪ Decision points. ▪ Electronic attack. ▪ Time phase lines.
Engineer officer: Provides subject matter expertise on mobility/countermobility and assists the G-2/S-2 in developing enemy obstacle plans for the enemy situation template.	• Threat engineer doctrine, tactics, equipment, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intent. • Terrain analysis. • Mobility corridors. • OAKOC (observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment) factors. • Obstacle locations.
UNCLASSIFIED	

Table 2-2. (U) Staff input to IPB products (*continued*)

UNCLASSIFIED	
Staff section	***Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) input***
Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) officer: Provides subject matter expertise on CBRN and assists the G-2/S-2 in determining the locations of CBRN assets and potential areas of employment.	• Threat CBRN doctrine, tactics, equipment, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intent. • Triggers for using CBRN. • Terrain and weather considerations for using CBRN.
Air defense artillery (ADA) officer: Provides subject matter expertise on ADA and assists the G-2/S-2 in determining the locations of ADA assets and potential areas of employment.	• Threat ADA doctrine, tactics, equipment, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intent. • Air avenues of approach.
Cyberspace electromagnetic activities section: Provides subject matter expertise on information pertaining to doctrine, tactics, and equipment of enemy cyberspace and electronic warfare (EW) forces, and access to cyberspace and EW capabilities for information collection.	• Threat cyberspace and EW doctrine, tactics, equipment, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intent. • Threat use of cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum.
EW officer: Provides subject matter expertise on ground-based, airborne, and functional EW employment considerations.	• Threat EW doctrine, tactics, equipment, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intent. • Line of sight analysis.
Information operations officer: Provides subject matter expertise on shaping operational activities in and through the information environment.	• Threat information warfare doctrine, tactics, equipment, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intent. • Threat themes and messaging. • Information overlays.
Staff weather officer: Provides subject matter expertise on weather effects on operations.	• Weather effects on terrain. • Weather forecast charts. • Light and illumination data tables. • Weather effects on systems and capabilities. • Tidal charts.
Space support team: Provides analysis of the space domain and its capabilities and effects within the operational environment.	• Threat space doctrine, tactics, equipment, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intent. • Space weather effects on operations.
UNCLASSIFIED	

Evaluate Military Aspects of the Terrain (U)

2-11. (U) The geospatial engineer team supports the commander and staff by conducting a detailed analysis of the terrain within the area of interest, and the team focuses on identifying natural and man-made features that may affect operations. The geospatial engineer team, in conjunction with the intelligence staff, briefs the commander and other staff on the effects the terrain may have on both friendly and threat forces, in terms of the military aspects of terrain (expressed as OAKOC [observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment]). Weather effects on terrain and operations are also briefed. (See ATP 2-01.3 and ATP 3-34.80 for a detailed discussion of terrain analysis and IPB products.)

Evaluate Weather Effects (U)

2-12. (U) The intelligence staff, with support from the USAF SWO, is responsible for providing the commander with a thorough understanding of terrestrial and solar weather effects on friendly and threat systems and operations, as well as on civil considerations. The intelligence staff provides this information during the planning process and incorporates significant weather effects into all of the primary intelligence products. (See paragraphs 2-42 through 2-53.) The intelligence staff analyzes weather effects based on the military aspects of weather (visibility, wind, precipitation, cloud cover, ceilings, thermal crossover, temperature, humidity, and, as required, atmospheric pressure).

2-13. (U) The intelligence staff is responsible for requesting weather effects on operations and other relevant environmental information from the USAF SWO, who is typically assigned to support corps, divisions, aviation brigades, and special operations forces. For all other units, the G-2/S-2 is responsible for coordinating with the USAF SWO assigned to the next higher headquarters or the appropriate local weather office. The G-2/S-2 or G-3/S-3 provides the USAF SWO weather sensitivity thresholds on friendly and threat forces systems and capabilities. (See ATP 2-01.3 for a detailed explanation of weather analysis.)

Evaluate Civil Considerations (U)

2-14. (U) Civil considerations characteristics, expressed as ASCOPE (areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events), are used to analyze and describe civil considerations that may affect operations. Included in civil considerations analysis are the effects urban centers may have on friendly and threat forces activities. There is no standard product resulting from this analysis. The G-2/S-2 generally develops products that fit the information needed to describe the situation and support the commander's situational understanding. This is especially critical when friendly forces are continuously consolidating gains during armed conflict and when the force transitions to primarily conducting stability tasks after large-scale combat operations. (See ATP 2-01.3 and ADRP 3-07 for discussions on analyzing civil considerations.)

Identify Threat Capabilities (U)

2-15. (U) In order to accurately predict threat activities in time and space, the intelligence staff must first understand threat capabilities. Accurately depicting how a threat commander might employ forces requires the intelligence staff to understand how the threat is organized and equipped, the threat's capabilities, and how the threat has employed capabilities in the past. An understanding of threat characteristics and detailed organizational charts assist in this analysis. This information and intelligence provide potential threat signatures for collection by friendly information collection units and systems. Maintaining accurate threat characteristics is also essential in conducting targeting and combat assessment. This applies to regular and irregular threats. (See ATP 2-01.3.)

Develop Threat Models (U)

2-16. (U) When feasible, the intelligence staff develops threat models for use during planning. Threat models can depict any number of regular, irregular, or hybrid threat activities (for example, how the threat may execute offensive, defensive, and unconventional tactics). Threat models include a text and graphic depiction of the threat's composition, disposition, objectives, goals, timelines, and end state. Threat models also explain the capabilities, strengths, and vulnerabilities of the threat. They can focus on the threat's intent for fires, information collection, information warfare, EW, and logistics. Threat models are presented during the mission analysis briefing. They should include a systems approach that depicts where friendly forces are most likely or best postured to disintegrate the threat system by striking a particular node or capability. The staff uses a systems approach against several threat methods, but the approach is most relevant when assessing threat TTP, such as the IADS or the integrated fires complex system of systems. (For more information on threat models and templates, see ATP 2-01.3.)

Develop High-Value Target Lists (U)

2-17. (U) Threat situation templates and threat COA statements are accompanied by HVTLs that describe and prioritize those assets that the threat requires to achieve threat objectives. A *high-value target* is a target the enemy commander requires for the successful completion of the mission (JP 3-60). The loss of HVTs is expected to seriously degrade important enemy functions. The intelligence staff develops HVTLs in coordination with the rest of the staff. HVTLs can include specific individuals (often referred to as high-value individuals) and organizations. High-payoff targets (HPTs) should identify key capabilities or nodes within the threat's larger system of systems, that if attacked, the friendly force can achieve one of the four defeat mechanisms—destroy, disintegrate, dislocate, or isolate.

Develop an Event Template and Matrix (U)

2-18. (U) The event template and matrix form the basis for planning collection strategies, synchronizing intelligence with friendly operations, and preparing the information collection plan. In some instances, the staff might disseminate the event template to expedite intelligence and information collection planning at subordinate units. Developed as the basis for the decision support template and the collection overlay, the event template and matrix are not briefed during mission analysis, but the staff must use them during COA development. These products aid the commander's visualization and situational understanding. (For more on the event template and matrix, see ATP 2-01.3.)

Provide Intelligence Support to Targeting (U)

2-19. (U) The intelligence staff is essential to targeting (both lethal and nonlethal actions). The targeting process uses the *decide, detect, deliver, assess* methodology. The intelligence staff ensures the information collection plan supports the finalized targeting plan (target detection). Table 2-3 lists the most important subtasks, products, and considerations associated with intelligence support to targeting. (See ATP 3-60 for more information on the targeting process; see ADRP 1-03 and ATP 2-01.3 for more on intelligence support to targeting.)

Table 2-3. (U) Intelligence support to targeting

UNCLASSIFIED		
Receive guidance on—	• Commander's intent • High-payoff targets • Attack criteria • Rules of engagement	• Lead time between decision points and target areas of interest • Combat assessment requirements
Develop—	• Modified combined obstacle overlay • Situation and event templates	• High-value targets • Information collection plan
Explain—	Threat courses of action, as part of war gaming, based on friendly courses of action: • Refine the event template • Assist in developing the high-payoff target list, target selection standard matrix, and attack guidance matrix	
Produce—	Collection management tools	
Collect—	Information for target nomination, validation, and combat assessment	
Disseminate—	• High-payoff target-related information and intelligence to the fires cell or appropriate location immediately • Pertinent information and battle damage assessment in accordance with standard operating procedures or other instructions	
UNCLASSIFIED		

Provide Intelligence Support to Target Development (U)

2-20. (U) Target development involves the systematic analysis of threat forces and operations to determine HVTs (people, organizations, or military units the threat commander requires for successful completion of the mission), HPTs (people, organizations, or military units whose loss to the enemy contributes significantly to the success of the friendly COA), and systems and system components for potential engagement through maneuver, fires, EW, or information operations.

Provide Intelligence Support to Target Detection (U)

2-21. (U) The intelligence officer establishes procedures for disseminating targeting information. The targeting team develops the sensor and attack guidance matrix to determine the sensors required to detect and locate targets. The intelligence officer places these requirements into the information collection synchronization tools for later incorporation into the information collection plan.

PROVIDE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO RISK MANAGEMENT (U)

2-22. (U) Risk management is the Army's primary process for identifying hazards and controlling risks during operations. *Risk management* is the process to identify, assess, and control risks and make decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits (JP 3-0). The chief of protection (or S-3 in units without a protection cell), in coordination with the safety officer, integrates risk management into the MDMP. The intelligence staff participates in the overall risk management process and integrates risk management into collection management when recommending tasks for information collection assets.

2-23. (U) Commanders must focus and use intelligence to explicitly understand the lethality of large-scale combat operations to preserve their combat power and take the appropriate operational risk to achieve the end state. Using intelligence to see and understand within each domain can reduce risk to the friendly force and enhance success in chaotic and high-tempo operations. The distribution of specific intelligence collection systems, personnel, and equipment enhances the capability of the combined arms team to concentrate combat power and reduce risk. Intelligence provides the commander the ability to detect adversary capabilities and activities, analyze enemy intentions, and track enemy capabilities across all domains to inform decisions and provide realistic assessments of operational and tactical risk. During situation development, analysts determine the significance of collected information and its significance relative to predicted threat COAs and. Through predictive analysis, the staff templates threat activity or trends that present opportunities or risks to the friendly force. This support assists the commander and staff in deciding when and where to concentrate sufficient combat power to defeat the threat while mitigating risk.

INFORMATION COLLECTION (U)

2-24. (U) Information collection tasks provide commanders with detailed and timely intelligence, enabling them to gain situational understanding of the threat and relevant aspects of the operational environment. Information collected from multiple sources and analyzed becomes intelligence that provides answers to CCIRs and other requirements. The intelligence staff supports information collection, as a continuing activity, by providing all-source analysis of threats, terrain and weather, and civil considerations. (For more on the continuing activities, see ADRP 5-0.)

2-25. (U) At the tactical level, reconnaissance, surveillance, security operations, and intelligence operations are the primary means by which a commander conducts information collection to answer CCIRs and to support operations. (See FM 3-55.) Information collection consists of the following tasks:

- Collection management.
- Direct information collection.
- Execute collection.
- Conduct intelligence-related missions and operations.

2-26. (U) In coordination with the G-3/S-3, the G-2/S-2 contributes to information collection, as illustrated through three of the four information collection tasks highlighted in figure 2-1. Chapter 3 of this publication includes a discussion of the execute collection task.



Figure 2-1. (U) G-2/S-2 staff activity support to information collection

COLLECTION MANAGEMENT (U)

2-27. (U) After receiving inputs from the commander and staff—the commander's intent, planning guidance, and intelligence requirements the intelligence staff, in close coordination with the operations staff, performs collection management tasks. These tasks are the basis for creating an information collection plan that enables the commander's visualization and situational understanding. Collection management tasks are—

- Develop requirements.
- Develop collection management tools.
- Assess collection.
- Update collection management tools.

Develop Requirements (U)

2-28. (U) The entire unit staff develops its information requirements and determines how best to satisfy them. The staff uses reconnaissance, surveillance, and MI collection assets to collect information. In coordination with the USAF SWO, the staff understands and mitigates the weather effects on collection assets (platforms and sensors) to inform the selection or employment of specific assets. Employing redundant collection assets in depth provides increased probability of collecting critical information during periods of inclement weather. The information collection plan must balance redundancy against available assets and intelligence priorities.

Develop Collection Management Tools (U)

2-29. (U) There are at least three collection management tools: the information collection matrix, information collection synchronization matrix, and information collection overlay. Collection management tools address all assets the operations officer can task or request, as well as the coordinating mechanisms needed to ensure adequate coverage of the area of interest. The operations officer uses these tools during the direct information collection task to develop the information collection plan. (See ATP 2-01.)

Assess Collection (U)

2-30. (U) The commander and staff continuously evaluate and update (when necessary) the information collection plan based on assessing results from reconnaissance missions, surveillance tasks, security operations, and intelligence operations. Assessing collection and updating the information collection effort are particularly important during execution because situations change rapidly. Together, commanders and staffs determine if requirements have been satisfied or are still relevant:

- If requirements have been satisfied or are no longer relevant, they are eliminated from the information collection plan.
- If requirements have not been satisfied but are still relevant, the intelligence staff coordinates with the operations staff during the operations and intelligence working group for additional assets and/or recommends adjustments to the current coverage.

Update Collection Management Tools (U)

2-31. (U) When updating collection management tools, the intelligence staff—

- Receives inputs from the commander and other staff sections.
- Eliminates satisfied requirements.
- Develops and adds new requirements.
- Transitions to the next operation.

DIRECT INFORMATION COLLECTION (U)

2-32. (U) The operations staff integrates collection assets through a deliberate and coordinated effort across all warfighting functions. Directing information collection is vital to control limited collection assets. During the direct information collection task, staffs recommend cueing, redundancy, and mix as appropriate. Staffs accomplish tasking information collection by issuing warning orders, fragmentary orders, and operation

orders. They verify that information collection assets are operating as directed by continuously monitoring the operation. Staffs conduct retasking to refine, update, or create new requirements. (See FM 3-55.) The direct information collection task includes two subtasks:

- Develop the information collection plan.
- Execute, evaluate, and update the information collection plan.

Develop the Information Collection Plan (U)

2-33. (U) The G-3/S-3 develops the information collection plan based on the analysis performed by the entire unit staff. Through analysis, the staff determines the best way to satisfy each requirement. The staff receives information collection tasks and RFIs from subordinate and adjacent units and higher headquarters. The information collection plan aligns assets to collection tasks for all of the assets that the G-3/S-3 can task or request. Additionally, the plan provides coordinating instructions to ensure adequate coverage within the area of interest.

Execute, Evaluate, and Update the Information Collection Plan (U)

2-34. (U) The evaluation of reporting, production, and dissemination identifies updates for the information collection plan. As the current tactical situation changes, staffs adjust the overall information collection plan to synchronize collection tasks. This optimizes collection and exploitation capabilities. The staff constantly updates requirements to ensure information collection efforts synchronize with current operations and support future operations planning. As collected information answers requirements, the staff updates the information collection plan.

Intelligence Staff Considerations to Achieve an Effective Information Collection Plan (U)

2-35. (U) When conducting information collection, the intelligence staff considers six criteria to achieve an effective and efficient information collection plan:

- **Anticipate.** The intelligence staff identifies new or refines existing requirements and presents them to commanders for approval. They recognize when and where to recommend to the operations staff a change in collection. Anticipating and developing new requirements are based on solid situational understanding, a thorough review of IPB products and existing intelligence, and an understanding of the concept of operations, including branches, sequels, and the need to transition to follow-on operations.
- **Coordinate.** The intelligence staff coordinates and collaborates with all staff sections and higher headquarters and subordinate and adjacent units in order to continuously synchronize the information collection plan with operations.
- **Prioritize.** The intelligence staff prioritizes each validated intelligence requirement based on its importance in supporting the commander's intent and decisions. Prioritization, based on the commander's guidance and the current situation, ensures limited information collection assets are directed towards the most critical requirements. Effective prioritization requires assessing the operation and changing situations.
- **Balance.** Balance is achieving maximum efficiency using an appropriate mix of information collection assets to satisfy as many competing intelligence requirements as possible. Balance involves using a combination of cueing, redundancy, and mix.
- **Reach.** Higher, lateral, subordinate, or other organizations may reliably answer the unit's requirements. The intelligence staff can use intelligence reach to answer initial information requirements without having to use organic and supporting information collection assets.
- **Control.** The object of control is influencing situations and providing guidance and direction to synchronize the force while allowing subordinate information collection units and assets freedom of action. Commanders use mission orders to assign information collection missions and issue guidance.

2-36. (U) The intelligence staff (in collaboration with the commander and staff) receives and validates requirements, prepares the collection management tools, recommends information collection assets and capabilities to the G-3/S-3, and maintains synchronization as operations progress.

CONDUCT INTELLIGENCE-RELATED MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS (U)

2-37. (U) Conducting normal, day-to-day intelligence tasks (for example, intelligence support to personnel recovery) facilitates the conduct of reconnaissance and surveillance. These tasks also include specialized missions (such as exploitation of a site) that provide intelligence and information outside the traditional information collection construct. The conduct intelligence-related missions and operations tasks are—

- Establish a mission intelligence briefing and debriefing program.
- Support site exploitation.
- Conduct explosive ordnance disposal support.
- Provide intelligence support to personnel recovery.

Establish a Mission Intelligence Briefing and Debriefing Program (U)

2-38. (U) Commanders establish, support, and allocate appropriate resources for a mission briefing and debriefing program. The intelligence staff develops a mission intelligence briefing plan and complementary debriefing plan to support the commander's program.

Support Site Exploitation (U)

2-39. (U) Intelligence organizations support site exploitation to ensure information, materiel, and personnel are discovered at the point of occurrence or event, gathered, and analyzed. Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) support to the site exploitation of weapons of mass destruction sites provides technical information of CBRN hazards that support the intelligence warfighting function. The unit and its higher headquarters can use the resulting facts, information, or intelligence to answer information requirements, protect the force, and produce an advantage to support strategic, operational, and tactical objectives.

Conduct Explosive Ordnance Disposal Support (U)

2-40. (U) Across the range of military operations, the explosive ordnance disposal (also called EOD) unit supports the intelligence warfighting function by collecting, processing, analyzing, and exploiting data and information pertaining to foreign ordnance and improvised explosive devices (also called IEDs). This task enables the synchronization of the information collection tasks conducted during site exploitation, thus developing intelligence based on collected information and distributing intelligence to support targeting and TTP adjustments. This specialized technical information, though not processed through traditional intelligence channels, informs the development of intelligence products, and the distribution of technical data, information, and intelligence to support operations.

Provide Intelligence Support to Personnel Recovery (U)

2-41. (U) Intelligence support to personnel recovery consists of intelligence activities and capabilities focused on collecting information to recover and reintegrate U.S. personnel—whether Soldier, Department of the Army Civilian, selected DOD contractor, or other personnel as determined by the Secretary of Defense—who are isolated in a specific AO. This support also includes developing thorough analysis, detailed products, and estimates to support integrated Army personnel recovery components.

TYPES OF INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS (U)

2-42. (U) The intelligence staff produces and maintains a variety of products tailored to its consumers. (See figure 2-2 on page 2-16.) Intelligence and operational products are mutually supportive; together, they enhance the commander's situational understanding. These products are developed and maintained in accordance with the commander's guidance.



Figure 2-2. (U) Intelligence product examples

2-43. (U) For all of these products, the primary focus of the intelligence staff's analysis is presenting predictive intelligence to support operations. Intelligence products include but are not limited to the—

- **Intelligence estimate.** The most detailed product developed for capturing the analysis and conclusions about threats and other relevant aspects of the operational environment.
- **Intelligence summary (INTSUM).** The current assessment of the threat situation and civil considerations. The information and intelligence used to develop the INTSUM are ultimately applied to develop and update the staff estimate.
- **Intelligence running estimate.** The intelligence running estimate details the ability of the intelligence staff to support current and future operations.

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE (U)

2-44. (U) An intelligence estimate is the appraisal, expressed in writing or orally, of available intelligence relating to a specific situation or condition with a view to determining the COAs open to the threat and the order of probability of their adoption. The intelligence staff develops and maintains the intelligence estimate. The primary purpose of the intelligence estimate is to—

- Determine the full set of COAs open to the threat and the probable order of their adoption.
- Disseminate information and intelligence.
- Determine requirements concerning threats and other relevant aspects of the operational environment.

2-45. (U) The intelligence estimate is a logical and orderly examination of intelligence factors affecting the accomplishment of a mission (threats, terrain and weather, and civil considerations). It provides commanders with an analysis of the area of interest and threat strengths and capabilities that can influence their mission. It is used as a basis for planning and disseminating intelligence.

2-46. (U) An intelligence estimate may be prepared at any level. It may be formal or informal and detailed or summarized. It is normally written at division and higher levels and briefed down to the battalion level. An intelligence estimate must follow the five-paragraph format. (See FM 6-0.) The following is not an example of the format but rather a sample of the basic information and intelligence that could be included within the intelligence estimate:

- **Mission.**
- **Analysis of the AO.** This analysis of the terrain is based on the following:
  - Military aspects of terrain (OAKOC).
  - Other significant characteristics.
  - Terrain effects on friendly and threat operations and civil considerations.
  - Weather effects on friendly and threat warfighting function capabilities in operations based on current and predictive weather conditions in the operational environment.
  - An analysis of the civil considerations and projected effects of civil considerations on friendly and threat operations, and vice versa.
- **Current threat situation.** This is based on threat characteristics (see ATP 2-01.3) and includes estimates of the strength of threat forces, recent significant threat activities and trends, and threat peculiarities and vulnerabilities.
- **Threat capabilities.** These are the broad COAs and supporting operations that threats can take to achieve their goals and objectives. The intelligence staff considers each threat's ability to conduct each operation based on the mission variables (METT-TC) related to the current situation.
- **Threat characteristics.** These provide a framework for the consistent evaluation of any force. The intelligence staff considers compositions, dispositions, strengths, vulnerabilities, combat effectiveness, doctrine and tactics, command and support relationships, electronic technical data, capabilities and limitations, current operations, and historical data when analyzing threat characteristics.
- **Summary of the most significant points.** This includes
  - The most significant terrain, weather, and civil considerations effects on operations.
  - Potential impacts of operations on terrain and civil considerations.
  - At a minimum, the most likely and most dangerous threat COAs.
  - The most significant threat strengths and vulnerabilities.

2-47. (U) The intelligence estimate also includes four tabs:

- **Tab A (Terrain).** Terrain is developed primarily by the engineer staff officer.
- **Tab B (Weather).** Weather is developed primarily by the USAF SWO.
- **Tab C (Civil Considerations).** Civil considerations products are developed primarily by the G-2/S-2 in coordination with the rest of the staff.
- **Tab D (IPB).** IPB products are developed primarily by the G-2/S-2 in coordination with the rest of the staff.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (U)

2-48. (U) The INTSUM provides the context for the commander's situational understanding. The INTSUM reflects the G-2/S-2's interpretation and conclusions regarding threats, terrain and weather, and civil considerations over a designated period of time. This time will vary based on the commander's desires and the situation's requirements. The INTSUM provides a summary of the threat situation, threat capabilities, characteristics of the terrain and weather and civil considerations, and COAs.

2-49. (U) The INTSUM assists in assessing the current situation and in updating other intelligence reports. It is disseminated to higher, lower, and adjacent units. The INTSUM has no prescribed format; it can be presented in written (figure 2-3), graphic, or oral format, as directed by the commander. The following is an example of the basic information and intelligence that should be included in an INTSUM:

- **Date-time group** (also called DTG) of the INTSUM and the period of time the INTSUM covers.
- **Weather effects** on friendly and threat warfighting function capabilities based on the weather threshold sensitivities of these capabilities, as well as the current and predictive weather conditions in the operational environment.
- **Significant threat activities** over the reporting period and a near-term analysis of threat intent and activity.
- **Significant impacts of civil considerations** on operations and vice versa.
- **Subunit assessments of significant threat activities and civil considerations** in the AO over the reporting period and a near-term analysis of threat intent and activity.
- **Notable trends in threat activity** over a designated period of time (such as the previous 14 days). This may be presented as an all-source analysis product, or it may be focused on specific threat activities of interest to the commander—or both. This portion of the INTSUM should highlight new or emerging threats and the level of impact that each threat may present to the unit's operations.
- **Combat damage assessment roll-up** includes known or estimated threat unit strengths, significant threat systems degraded or destroyed, and all known captured, wounded, or killed threat personnel during the reporting period.
- **Written threat situation or situation template** (as of a specific date-time group).
- **Assessments** include near-term and long-term assessments of threat activities, with as much detail as possible, based on available information and current intelligence analysis. INTSUMs are typically predictive. When specific intelligence or information is not available, INTSUMs must contain the G-2/S-2's best assessment of probabilities of threat actions based on experience and professional military judgment.
- **HVTLs** (in coordination with the targeting officer) may include high-value individuals, depending on the unit mission.
- **Current PIRs and projected PIRs** by phase.
- **Collection management tools and products** may include information collection, asset disposition, or asset allocation.
- **Special assessments** are developed for any unique circumstance that requires additional analysis.

UNCLASSIFIED

CLASSIFICATION

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER ____

DATE-TIME GROUP:

INFORMATION: Latest time information is of value

PERIOD COVERED:

1. HIGHLIGHTS:

a. Air: Highlights of the current air situation

b. Land: Highlights of the current ground situation, usually divided by area of operations

c. Maritime: Highlights of current maritime situation

d. Space: Highlights of current space situation

e. Cyberspace: Highlights of current cyberspace situation

f. Information Environment: Highlights of current information environment situation

g. Electromagnetic Spectrum: Highlights of current electromagnetic spectrum situation

2. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION: Each category should use the commander's related priority intelligence requirements and other information requirements as the basis for the analysis and assessment

a. Ground: Detailed analysis of the area of operations by area or sector with comments on projected activity in the next 12 hours. How terrain affects a functional area's capabilities

b. Air: Detailed analysis of the air and air defense situation with comments on projected activity in the next 12 hours

c. Maritime: Detailed analysis of the maritime and maritime defense (including waterways) with comments on projected activity in the next 12 hours

c. Other: May be used for detailed analysis of paramilitary, insurgent, terrorist, or other significant enemy categories not discussed elsewhere

3. UNIT ASSESSMENT:

a. Most Likely Course of Action:

b. Most Dangerous Course of Action:

c. Other:

4. ENEMY MOVEMENT DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD: Major enemy units (including at least two levels below that of the reporting command) and coordinates of the new position

5. PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS: The commander's priority intelligence requirements and current satisfaction assessment for each priority intelligence requirement

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Figure 2-3. (U) Written intelligence summary example

INTELLIGENCE RUNNING ESTIMATE (U)

2-50. (U) Effective plans and successful execution hinge on accurate and current running estimates. A *running estimate* is the continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander's intent and if the planned future operations are supportable (ADP 5-0). Failure to maintain accurate running estimates may lead to errors or omissions that result in flawed plans or bad decisions during execution.

2-51. (U) Running estimates are principal knowledge management tools used by the commander and staff throughout the operations process. In their running estimates, the commander and each staff section continuously consider the effect of new information and update the following:

- Facts/Assumptions.
- Weapons of mass destruction and CBRN hazards.
- Friend force status.
- Threat activities and capabilities.
- Civil considerations.
- Recommendations and conclusions.

2-52. (U) Each staff section builds and maintains running estimates. The running estimate assists the staff in tracking and recording pertinent information, as well as provides recommendations (especially for anticipated decisions) to commanders. Running estimates represent the analysis and expert opinion of each staff section by functional area. Staffs maintain running estimates throughout the operations process to assist in exercising mission command. The basic outline for the running estimate includes: situation and considerations, mission, COAs, analysis, comparison, and recommendations and conclusions. (See FM 6-0.)

2-53. (U) Unlike most other intelligence products, the intelligence running estimate, shown in figure 2-4, combines both an analysis of friendly force intelligence activities and the ability to support current and/or future operations with intelligence analysis of threats, terrain and weather, and civil considerations. Combining this analysis facilitates projections regarding the following:

- Effects of key terrain and weather on friendly and enemy operations.
- Impact of civil considerations on operations.
- Impact of friendly operations and threat activities on civil considerations.
- Significant cultural factors to consider during planning.
- Threat COAs.
- Threat intent, characteristics, and capabilities.
- Existing or potential CBRN or toxic industrial material hazard areas and required protection.
- Significant conclusions drawn from a thorough and complete analysis.

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INTELLIGENCE RUNNING ESTIMATE NUMBER ____

DATE-TIME GROUP:

REFERENCES: Maps, charts, or other documents

1. **MISSION:** The unit's mission determined by the commander.

2. **AREA OF OPERATIONS:** Describe the existing situation in the area of operations based on—

a. **Terrain.** How terrain affects a functional area's capabilities

b. **Civil Considerations.** Description of areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events

c. **Weather.** How weather affects friendly and adversary warfighting function capabilities

3. **ENEMY SITUATION:** Summary of each threat characteristic that can influence mission accomplishment

a. **Composition.**

b. **Disposition.** Geographic location of threat elements and how they are deployed or employed

c. **Strength.** Committed forces; reinforcements; air; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives weapons

d. **Tactics and Training.** Strategy, methods of operations, and doctrine, tactics, and training

e. **Sustainment.** Procurement, maintenance, distribution, and replacement of all types of material

f. **Operational Effectiveness.** Threat morale, weapons effectiveness, equipment readiness, leadership, and personnel

g. **Intelligence.** Estimate of the enemy's intelligence collection capability

h. **Communications.** Enemy's communications modes

i. **Other.**

4. **ENEMY CAPABILITIES:** (in conventional operations)

a. **State Enemy's Capabilities.** *What*, *where*, *when*, and in what *strength* for each capability

b. **State Enemy's Limitations.** Cause and effect for each limitation

c. **Analysis and Discussion.** Effect of capabilities on terrain, civil considerations, weather

5. **CONCLUSIONS:** Conclusions based on information and analysis about the total effects of the area of operations on threat operations

ACKNOWLEDGE: [Designated Staff Officer's Name and Designation]

OFFICIAL: [Authenticator's Name and Position]

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Figure 2-4. (U) Intelligence running estimate example

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Chapter 3

Intelligence Operations (U)

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE UNIT OPERATIONS (U)

3-1. (U) *Intelligence operations* are the tasks undertaken by military intelligence units through the intelligence disciplines to obtain information to satisfy validated requirements (ADRP 2-0). MI unit collection operations (intelligence operations) follow the Army's framework for exercising mission command—the operations process. The major mission command activities performed during operations are planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing the operation. Intelligence commanders, supported by their staffs, use the operations process to drive the conceptual and detailed planning necessary to direct, lead, and assess intelligence operations.

3-2. (U) Through intelligence operations, MI collection personnel and systems collect information about capabilities, activities, disposition, and all threat characteristics within the operational environment. Intelligence professionals follow the guidance outlined in the intelligence disciplines and complementary intelligence capabilities to ensure all tasks are accomplished successfully and in accordance with intelligence regulations and policies. (See ADRP 2-0 for a description of the intelligence disciplines and complementary intelligence capabilities.)

Intelligence disciplines (U)

- (U) Counterintelligence (CI).
- (U) Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT).
- (U) Human intelligence (HUMINT).
- (U) Measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT).
- (U) OSINT.
- (U) SIGINT.
- (U) Technical intelligence (TECHINT).

Complementary intelligence capabilities (U)

- (U) Biometrics-enabled intelligence.
- (U) Cyber-enabled intelligence.
- (U) Document and media exploitation.
- (U) Forensic-enabled intelligence.

3-3. (U) MI collection personnel are trained and certified. MI sensors, operated by MI personnel, can be directed to collect information. These MI collection capabilities are distinct from other Army information collection capabilities, such as reconnaissance or surveillance. The distinction is required because intelligence collection must comply with all applicable U.S. laws and policy. Appendix E of this publication lists some of the most important laws, policy documents, and other authoritative documentation. Additionally, certain intelligence disciplines require specific training and certifications to conduct intelligence operations.

INFORMATION COLLECTION AND INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS (U)

3-4. (U) To understand intelligence operations, intelligence professionals must understand information collection and how intelligence operations nest within it (under the execute collection task). *Information collection* is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations (FM 3-55). Information collection is the Army doctrinal construct for synchronizing and integrating the planning and employment of sensors and assets to collect information. Information collection also includes the G-2/S-2 task of collection management (see paragraph 2-27).

3-5. (U) Intelligence operations is one of the four primary tactical tasks and missions the Army conducts as part of information collection. The other three are reconnaissance, surveillance, and security operations:

- **Reconnaissance** produces information about the AO. Reconnaissance identifies terrain characteristics, enemy and friendly obstacles to movement, and the disposition of enemy forces and civilians so commanders can maneuver forces freely to gain and maintain the initiative. Successful and effective units combine three methods to perform reconnaissance: dismounted, mounted, and aerial. All units and personnel conduct reconnaissance. Units primarily tasked conduct reconnaissance with tailored and specialized capabilities include: air cavalry and attack helicopter units, ground cavalry and scout units, chemical reconnaissance elements, engineer reconnaissance units, and special operations forces. (See FM 3-55.)
- **Surveillance** involves observing an area to collect information. In observing a given area, the focus and tempo of the collection effort comes primarily from the commander's intent and guidance. Surveillance involves observing the threat and local populace in a named area of interest (NAI) or TAI. Surveillance may be a stand-alone mission or part of a reconnaissance mission (particularly area reconnaissance). Surveillance is tiered and layered with technical assets that collect information. It is passive and continuous. Surveillance tasks can be performed by a variety of assets (air, land, maritime, and space), means (Soldier and systems such as artillery and air defense radars), and mediums (throughout the EMS). (See FM 3-55.)
- **Security operations** are enabling operations that can occur during all operations. Commanders undertake these operations to provide early and accurate warning of enemy operations, to provide the force being protected with time and maneuver space to react to the enemy, and to develop the situation so commanders can favorably employ the protected force. Commanders may conduct security operations to the front, flanks, and rear of their forces, which may be moving or stationary. The ultimate goal is determining the enemy's COA and assisting the main body in defeating enemy forces. The security force will have a mixture of reconnaissance and surveillance assets to accomplish its mission. (See FM 3-55.)

Note. (U) When necessary, maneuver units conduct offensive tasks to collect information.

3-6. (U) Intelligence operations are driven by the need to answer questions crucial to the conduct of the overall operation of the supported force. Units conducting intelligence operations follow the operations process. Collection activities acquire information and provide that information to intelligence analytical elements. Using products developed for the commander and staff, the G-3/S-3 and G-2/S-2 develop the information collection plan based on the commander's intent and concept of operations. The information collection plan must be synchronized with current and future operations.

3-7. (U) After the supported unit staff develops information collection tasks and assigns a collection mission to an MI unit, and the collection manager develops the information collection plan, the MI unit begins intelligence operations to support information collection through the execute collection task. (See figure 3-1.) This effort is complex, and there is significant overlap between the supported unit intelligence staff and the MI unit. Therefore, the supported unit staff and the MI unit must collaborate closely and early-on during planning and throughout to the completion of operations.



Figure 3-1. (U) Intelligence operations support to information collection

3-8. (U) Executing collection focuses on requirements tied to the execution of tactical missions based on the CCIRs. Intelligence informs commanders and staffs of *where* and *when* to look for—

- **The way:** Reconnaissance, surveillance, security operations, and intelligence operations. (See figure 3-2.)
- **The means:** Ranges from national and joint collection capabilities to individual Soldier observations and reports.
- **The end:** Intelligence that supports the commander's decision making.
- **The result:** The successful execution and assessment of operations depend on the effective synchronization and integration of the information collection effort.

(b)(3)

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS AND THE SUPPORTED UNIT STAFF (U)

3-9. (U) The supported commander and staff plan and assess information collection at each echelon. Typically, an MI unit supports theater army, corps, division, and BCT echelons. In those cases, the MI unit works closely with the supported commander and staff to plan, prepare, execute, and assess intelligence operations. Additionally, the MI unit usually serves as the means of mission command for any attached or supporting intelligence capabilities at that echelon. This collaboration ensures each echelon integrates and synchronizes intelligence operations from the theater down to the tactical levels. For this reason, both the supported staff and MI unit staff members must thoroughly understand all aspects of the intelligence architecture, including—

- Collection capabilities.
- PED capabilities.
- Analytical capabilities.
- Technical channels.
- Procedures for intelligence and EW maintenance and other support.

3-10. (U) Joint ISR collection assets are important to Army tactical operations. In many cases, joint ISR collection is available to tactical units, providing they are not in movement and have connectivity, either through a broadcast dissemination system or within various intelligence databases. Although planning information collection starts with organic and supporting Army information collection assets, in some cases, Army units may receive a joint ISR asset through joint apportionment and allocation. The joint ISR process typically requires significant prior planning and approval. This is unlikely when the joint force is trying to gain access to an AO or within a highly contested operational environment. However, in certain cases when an Army unit is the main effort or is part of a decisive operation, joint apportionment and allocation are possible.

3-11. (U) In order to receive joint apportionment and allocation, the theater army and corps intelligence staff must determine what joint assets are available by conducting collaboration and coordination early in the joint planning process. The staff must also understand the various joint ISR scheduling and collection management tracking mechanisms, such as the air tasking order. Additionally, the staff must establish and integrate fire support coordination, air space coordinating measures, and other important coordination means, as well as plan the appropriate relationship and control means for the joint ISR assets. Figure 3-3 depicts the typical ISR collection in a joint environment.



3-12. (U) Intelligence operations are complex. The staff must know and consider practical capabilities and limitations of all unit organic and allocated assets. Capability considerations include the following:

- **Range.** Range deals with the collector's ability to provide target coverage. When considering an asset's range, it is important to consider mission range (duration and distance) and the sensor range (how close the collection asset must be to the target to collect against it). Additionally, intelligence staffs consider communications requirements from the asset to the command post. The staff determines the ability to maneuver, including transit and required collection time on specific NAIs and TAIs.
- **Day and night effectiveness.** Staffs consider factors such as available optics and any effects of thermal crossover.
- **Battery/Power source life.** Staffs consider how long the asset will be able to collect and how often the battery or power source will have to be replenished to continue collection.
- **Expendability of asset.** Staffs must consider if it is necessary to recover the collection asset or if it is expendable. What is the risk associated with emplacing and recovering the asset?

- **Technical characteristics.** Each asset must consider time factors (such as set-up and tear-down times) for task accomplishment. Other technical characteristics include the following:
  - Specific environmental threshold sensitivities for each collection asset that adversely affect or prohibit the effective use of both its platform and sensor (including factors such as terrain, weather, and soil composition).
  - Environmental effects on the collection asset (including factors such as urban or rural terrain and soil composition).
  - Whether the asset can continue to operate despite electronic attack.
- **Reporting timeliness.** Each asset is assigned an earliest time and a latest time information reporting is of value according to the information collection plan and its supporting matrix. Other timeliness factors include—
  - How the asset transmits data/information in near real time, or how the asset should be recovered to collect the data.
  - The established reporting criteria for each collection asset.
  - How long it takes to disseminate collected information to each requester.
- **Geolocation accuracy.** Accuracy implies reliability and precision. The asset must be capable of locating a target accurately enough to engage it with precision-guided munitions.
- **Durability.** Durability includes factors such as—
  - Weather effects on the employment of collection assets (platform and sensor payload).
  - EMS effects on the employment of collection assets.
  - Whether the prime mover can cross restricted terrain.
- **Detecting threat activity.** The staff considers whether the collection asset can detect the expected threat activity, and whether the threat can deceive the collection capability.
- **Performance history.** Experienced staff officers must know which information collection capabilities are typically reliable to meet the commander's information requirements. Readiness rates, responsiveness, and accuracy, over time, may raise one collector's reliability factor.
- **Intelligence PED capabilities.** The staff considers whether the unit has the intelligence PED capabilities, capacity, and architecture required to support planned and projected intelligence operations. Intelligence PED capabilities are required to perform responsive intelligence operations to support dynamic maneuver and fire support missions. Intelligence PED capabilities enhance a unit's ability to—
  - **Task.** Intelligence PED capabilities provide input to the tasking of MI collection systems. Understanding necessary and available PED capabilities improves the information flow and guidance through technical channels.
  - **Collect.** To accomplish the mission, PED units and elements must have the capability to receive collection from systems that are otherwise inaccessible.
  - **Process.** PED sensor processing and sensor data fusion capabilities transform a larger volume of data into information and convert that information into a useable format.
  - **Exploit.** Intelligence PED personnel quickly analyze the processed information to add operational context to the information and identify specific relevance to the mission.
  - **Disseminate.** PED reports and products provide combat information and related intelligence to commanders and operational elements. This reporting facilitates subsequent single-source and all-source intelligence, analysis, targeting, cueing of other collectors, and decision making.

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS GUIDELINES (U)

3-13. (U) There are guidelines for conducting successful intelligence operations. They are not a checklist; rather, they describe ways to effectively and efficiently employ MI collection assets and to develop the situation based on the commander's guidance. Mirroring the fundamentals of reconnaissance, these guidelines support efforts that result in timely collection and reporting of the accurate, relevant information needed to produce intelligence. The supported unit staff and MI unit staff must determine which guidelines to emphasize based on the situation. The following include the intelligence operations guidelines:

- Maintain readiness.
- Ensure continuous intelligence operations.
- Orient on requirements.
- Provide mixed and redundant coverage.
- Gain and maintain sensor contact.
- Report information rapidly and accurately.
- Provide early warning.
- Retain freedom of movement.

MAINTAIN READINESS (U)

3-14. (U) MI unit readiness is a continuous priority through predeployment, deployment, and post deployment. Readiness is a key element during planning. The readiness of MI unit personnel and equipment impacts how MI capabilities can be leveraged to support an operation during planning. MI unit readiness also impacts the collection of information required to refine plans and issue orders and for operational execution.

3-15. (U) As part of prepare, readiness focuses on—

- **Training.** MI commanders and leaders must establish a training plan focused on intelligence tasks and functions. This ensures MI personnel are prepared to conduct individual and collective tasks to support the unit's mission and are knowledgeable of equipment and other information collection assets and databases. During training, recognizing opportunities to prepare for conventional force and special operations force (as well as joint and interagency) interdependence, interoperability, and integration can produce great dividends during operations. MI commanders and leaders that seize opportunities to work with special operations and other intelligence organizations increase their understanding of each other's capabilities and facilitate interdependence, interoperability, and integration during operations.
- **Maintenance.** This recurring event ensures intelligence assets are properly maintained and prepared to conduct information collection. For example, during planning, MI leaders should consider the availability of equipment maintainers and facilities for table of organization and equipment-based and commercial-off-the-shelf systems that may require dedicated field service representatives to provide repair and maintenance.
- **Equipment status.** The status of collection assets must be monitored and reported to the appropriate staff elements.
- **Augmentation.** Whether in the reset-train-ready stage or preparing for a specific mission, it is necessary for MI units to identify and report any additional personnel or resources necessary to accomplish the mission. This often involves additional collection assets or specialized personnel such as linguists or technical experts.
- **Sustainment.** This involves the identification of outside resources, including logistics, fuel, and protection, necessary for mission success.

ENSURE CONTINUOUS INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS (U)

3-16. (U) Commanders direct the conduct of information collection activities before, during, and after the execution of all operations. Commanders depend on intelligence to know where, when, and how best to employ forces during all military operations. Typically, collection activities begin soon after receipt of the

mission and continue throughout preparation and execution of the overall operation. They do not cease after the operation concludes but continue as required:

- **Before execution** of the overall operation, intelligence operations focus on filling gaps in information about all relevant aspects of the operational environment.
- **During execution**, intelligence operations focus on providing commanders with updated information that verifies the threat's composition, disposition, and intention as the operation progresses. This allows commanders to verify which COA the threat is actually adopting and determine if the plan is still valid based on actual events in the AO. Commanders can then make decisions, as needed, including adjustment decisions (those that modify the order to respond to unanticipated opportunities or threats).
- **After execution**, intelligence operations focus on maintaining contact with threat forces to collect the information necessary for planning subsequent operations and protecting the friendly force. In stability tasks, intelligence operations often focus on relevant aspects of the AO and area of interest and on the civil considerations designated by the commander.

ORIENT ON REQUIREMENTS (U)

3-17. (U) Commanders prioritize intelligence operations primarily by providing their guidance and intent early in planning. G-2/S-2s assist commanders in—

- Identifying and updating their PIRs.
- Ensuring PIRs are tied directly to the concept of operations and decision points.
- Focusing PIRs on their most critical needs (because of limited information collection assets).
- Ensuring PIRs include the latest time information is of value or the event by which the information is required.
- Approving requests for intelligence collection requirements beyond a unit's capabilities.
- Aggressively seeking the results of higher echelon intelligence operations, as well as the answers to information requirements across all echelons through intelligence reach.

3-18. (U) Commanders assign information collection tasks based on a unit's collection capabilities. Therefore, commanders ensure the tasks they assign do not exceed the collection and analytical ability of their unit. When not using organic assets, commanders use previously established relationships to optimize effective operations as a combined arms team, when possible.

PROVIDE MIXED AND REDUNDANT COVERAGE (U)

3-19. (U) Commanders integrate the capabilities of their assets to provide mixed and redundant coverage of critical locations identified during planning. The layering of collection assets through cueing, redundancy, and mixing assists in successfully answering requirements. Maximum efficiency in information collection is achieved when all MI collection assets are carefully employed together. The appropriate mix of collection assets assists in satisfying as many different requirements as possible. It also reduces the likelihood the unit will favor or rely on one particular unit, discipline, or system. The intelligence and operations staffs collaborate to balance requirements, available capabilities, and areas to be covered. Commanders and staffs continuously assess results to determine any changes in critical locations requiring this level of coverage.

GAIN AND MAINTAIN SENSOR CONTACT (U)

3-20. (U) Once a unit conducting intelligence operations gains sensor contact, it maintains that contact unless directed otherwise or the survival of the unit is at risk. In intelligence operations, gaining and maintaining sensor contact occurs when the MI collection asset is capable of observing or receiving a signal or observable from a person or object. Sensor contact is critical in signals intercept and imagery collection missions.

Report Information Rapidly and Accurately (U)

3-21. (U) MI collection assets acquire and report timely and accurate information on all relevant aspects of the operational environment within the area of interest. The collection manager must establish a primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency communications plan for each collection asset, and ensure it has been tested as information may quickly lose its value. MI collection assets report exactly what they observe and, if appropriate, what they do not observe. Seemingly unimportant information may be extremely important when combined with other information. Negative reports may be as important as reports of threat activity. To ensure collection assets report information rapidly, the intelligence staff works with the signal staff to ensure communications plans incorporate MI collection asset communications requirements. Indicators and specific information requirements should be written such that they can be answered over the radio by a simple spot report in SALUTE (size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment) format from the collection asset.

Provide Early Warning (U)

3-22. (U) Commanders and staffs position MI collection assets to provide early warning of threat action. Commanders use intelligence operations as part of their information collection effort to ascertain the threat COA and timing. They then orient these assets to observe these locations for indicators of threat actions. Timely and complete reporting is essential to providing early warning.

Retain Freedom of Movement (U)

3-23. (U) MI collection assets require battlefield mobility to successfully accomplish their missions. These assets do not engage in close combat in the execution of their collection tasks. The criticality of MI collection assets makes their survival the utmost consideration. If these assets are decisively engaged, collection stops and personnel immediately execute necessary battle drills. The MI collection asset leader's initiative and knowledge of the terrain, weather, and threat reduce the likelihood of decisive engagement and assist in maintaining freedom of movement. The IPB process can identify anticipated areas of likely contact.

APPLYING THE OPERATIONS PROCESS IN INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS (U)

3-24. (U) The operations process describes the sequence of activities performed by any military unit to accomplish a mission. (See ADRP 5-0.) MI units conduct the same sequence of activities (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) to accomplish the tasks assigned to them. MI units follow the operations process to conduct intelligence operations the same way maneuver units do to conduct their operations. However, the conduct of intelligence operations requires collaboration and close coordination with the supported unit intelligence staff. (See figure 3-4 on page 3-10.)

3-25. (U) Intelligence unit planning begins with the receipt of mission, identifying information collection tasks within an order or plan. The unit then deliberately plans, prepares, and executes the mission in close coordination with the supported unit collection manager and other staff to satisfy specific requirements. During the execution of intelligence operations, MI collection assets and supporting PED elements process, exploit, and disseminate intelligence reports and combat information. The staff continually assesses the effectiveness of the information collection plan to support the operations process. Combat information identified by the G-2/S-2 is immediately passed to the commander.



Figure 3-4. (U) Intelligence support

PLAN (U)

3-26. (U) *Planning* is the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying out effective ways of bringing that future about (ADP 5-0). It results in a plan or order that communicates the commander's intent, understanding, and visualization of the operation to subordinates, focusing on desired results.

Mission Planning (U)

3-27. (U) Mission planning begins when the MI unit receives or anticipates a new mission. This can come from an order issued by higher headquarters or derived from an ongoing operation. The MI unit relies on established standard operating procedures (SOPs) to articulate individual and collective responsibilities during planning. The SOPs identify the participants, their responsibilities, and the tools or products required to produce intelligence.

3-28. (U) Upon mission receipt, the supported unit's order and annexes must be examined to avoid missing specified and implied tasks and constraints possibly contained in the order's annexes. The MI unit commander and leaders should review Annex B (Intelligence), Annex D (Fires), Annex F (Sustainment), Annex H (Protection), Annex L (Information Collection), and Annex S (Special Technical Operations) to the base operation order, as well as all supporting appendixes and tabs.

Military Intelligence Unit Commander (U)

3-29. (U) During planning, the MI unit commander uses specified and implied tasks, the supported unit's commander's guidance and staff assessments, and the information collection plan. This allows the MI unit commander to tailor planning considerations, which include but are not limited to—

- Determining the amount and type of equipment required and available for the mission.
- Determining and requesting the augmentation of personnel and equipment, including required PED support to exploit GEOINT, SIGINT, and MASINT collection.
- Determining communications (network and voice) and connectivity architecture, requirements, and limitations to support the mission.
- Coordinating with other units to support the MI unit's mission, including but not limited to—
  - Medical personnel to establish casualty evacuation procedures.
  - The fire support officer to coordinate fire support.
  - The airspace coordinator if using airborne intelligence systems.
  - Supported units to ensure the required mission, communications, logistics, and life support are available for the MI element/personnel.
  - Maneuver units to coordinate terrain management where MI personnel are expected to operate.
  - Adjacent MI unit commanders to identify threat information and coordinate and deconflict operations.
- Observing subordinate execution of troop leading procedures by section, platoon, and company leaders.
- Identifying language requirements and requesting augmentation as appropriate.
- Identifying intelligence contingency funds requirements. (See AR 381-141 [classified]).
- Identifying intelligence and EW maintenance support and procedures before deployment. During deployment, this requires continuous assessment, especially when there are few or no organic intelligence and EW technicians and facilities.

Troop Leading Procedures (U)

3-30. (U) During planning, MI unit leaders below the MI battalion level conduct troop leading procedures to prepare for intelligence operations. The *troop leading procedures* is a dynamic process used by small-unit leaders to analyze a mission, develop a plan, and prepare for an operation (ADP 5-0). These procedures enable leaders to maximize available planning time while developing effective plans and preparing their units for an operation. Troop leading procedures are also supported by risk management. It is important for MI unit leaders to work with both their higher MI unit (when applicable) and the supported unit throughout the entire troop leading procedures process.

3-31. (U) The troop leading procedures and MDMP and are similar but not identical. Commanders with a coordinating staff use the MDMP; company-level and smaller units use the troop leading procedures (see figure 3-5 on page 3-12). (See paragraph 2-8 for more on the MDMP.)



Figure 3-5. (U) Troop leading procedures sequenced to the military decision-making process

3-32. (U) Troop leading procedures consist of eight steps. The sequence of the troop leading procedures steps is not rigid. Leaders modify the sequence to meet the mission, situation, and available time. Some steps are performed concurrently while others may be performed continuously throughout the operation.

Step 1—Receive the Mission (U)

3-33. (U) MI leaders analyze mission objectives and current capabilities to accomplish the assigned mission, assess any possible issues (personnel, equipment, or maintenance) that could limit mission support, and raise any issues that could hinder mission accomplishment to the MI commander and supported unit.

Step 2—Issue a Warning Order (U)

3-34. (U) MI leaders of elements supporting a mission issue a warning order to participating elements and personnel as soon as possible (usually within an hour after receipt of the mission). This ensures subordinate leaders have key information needed to maximize preparation time. The MI unit may have to issue multiple warning orders due to additional information or changes to the supported unit's warning order. The initial

warning order should include a task organization (provides the detailed task organization for the mission: formation, personnel, and equipment) and timeline (provides a schedule of all preparatory tasks from receipt of mission to the start of collection).

Step 3—Make a Tentative Plan (U)

3-35. (U) MI leaders create a tentative plan based on the supported unit's warning order that attempts to meet mission requirements and remain within the framework of the commander's intent. MI leaders ensure—

- MI personnel and elements have all available information to complete the mission.
- Soldiers are prepared to execute any tasks assigned to them and their section/element.
- All equipment and vehicles are prepared for the mission, inventoried, and operational.

Step 4—Initiate Movement (U)

3-36. (U) MI leaders may need to initiate movement while they are still planning or conducting reconnaissance. This step can occur at any time during the troop leading procedures process.

Step 5—Conduct Reconnaissance (U)

3-37. (U) MI leaders, at a minimum, conduct a map reconnaissance and coordinate with the supported unit to review products (such as ground reconnaissance, geospatial information or imagery [including aerial photography], scout photographs, sketches) and to verify their terrain analysis, plan, and usability of routes. This step could occur any time during the troop leading procedures.

Step 6—Complete the Plan (U)

3-38. (U) MI leaders complete the plan based on reconnaissance and any changes in the situation, and confirm the mission as received from the supported unit's warning order. This ensures the plan meets mission requirements and remains within the framework of the commander's intent.

Step 7—Issue the Order (U)

3-39. (U) MI leaders give final direction to their Soldiers and other personnel regarding the mission. Subordinate leaders should give a backbrief or confirmation brief to the responsible MI leader at the conclusion of the order to ensure specific tasks and purposes are understood. Designated personnel attend the mission brief, usually led by the maneuver element's mission leader.

Step 8—Supervise and Refine (U)

3-40. (U) All MI personnel/elements supporting the mission must attend all rehearsals, precombat checks, precombat inspections, and critical events conducted during planning. MI leaders ensure all supporting personnel adhere to the guidance, and all equipment, personnel, and vehicles are prepared for the mission.

PREPARE (U)

3-41. (U) *Preparation* consists of those activities performed by units and Soldiers to improve their ability to execute an operation (ADP 5-0). The prepare activity begins upon receipt of a plan or order, including a warning order. Intelligence operations begin once an order containing information collection tasks is received. For MI collection assets conducting intelligence operations, preparation activities include but are not limited to—

- Conducting the necessary coordination, as the situation requires, including logistics (by class of supply), maps, and medical evacuation procedures.
- Verifying fire support, casualty evacuation, fratricide avoidance, airspace coordination, spectrum management, and other coordination measures and procedures.

- Coordinating with the USAF SWO to determine weather effects on collection assets (platforms and sensors) based on their specific weather threshold sensitivities and the current and predictive weather conditions in the operational environment.
- Refining plans, backbriefs, SOP reviews, and rehearsals, and coordinating products with various elements and organizations.

3-42. (U) MI leaders should reconfirm and verify existing intelligence discipline reports for the target and share them with the supported commander. MI leaders should also review signal surveys, including the required technical data and the appropriate encryption, and inventory and test the signal equipment.

Perform Inspections (U)

3-43. (U) After acquiring all required equipment and support materials, MI leaders must conduct inspections to ensure unit personnel and sections are prepared to conduct their mission. Subordinate leaders conduct precombat checks of their personnel supporting the mission. Participating MI element leaders conduct precombat inspections before mission execution. It is crucial for MI leaders to verify that TTP, personnel, equipment, and services are in place and ready for mission execution.

Conduct Rehearsals (U)

3-44. (U) Rehearsals assist units in preparing for operations by either verifying that provisions and procedures are in place and functioning, or by identifying inadequacies that leaders and the staff must remedy. They allow operation participants to become familiar with and translate the plan into specific actions that orient them to their environment and other units when executing the mission. Rehearsals allow the MI element to integrate with and become familiar to the supported unit. It also allows the MI element to understand its role and scheme of maneuver within the larger mission objectives.

3-45. (U) MI leaders conduct information collection rehearsals to ensure the correct information is collected, and Soldiers use the right techniques to support the mission. In a time-constrained environment, the information collection rehearsal may be combined with a combined-arms rehearsal or fires rehearsal.

EXECUTE (U)

3-46. (U) During execution, MI leaders ensure their unit—

- Is properly staged with the supported unit and in the right order of movement.
- Monitors asset locations and supports and ensures force protection of those elements.
- Is on the right communications network and conducts communications checks.
- Reports technical, threat, and administrative information through the appropriate communications network (intelligence and operations) as specified in reporting guidelines established in Annex B (Intelligence) and unit SOPs.

ASSESS (U)

3-47. (U) Assessing allows the MI commander to determine the existence and significance of variances in the operation as envisioned in the initial plan. During execution, assessing an operation is an essential and continuous task. It is a deliberate comparison of previously templated outcomes to actual events, using the commander's criteria for success to judge operational success at any point during the operation. The MI unit commander assesses probable outcomes of the ongoing operation to—

- Determine whether changes are required to accomplish and complete the mission.
- React to threats.
- Take advantage of opportunities.

3-48. (U) As the situation changes, MI leaders adjust the information collection plan to keep information collection tasks synchronized with the overall operation, optimize collection, and support future operational planning. MI leaders assess intelligence operations by—

- Collaborating with collection managers to—
  - Identify if information requirements have been satisfied.
  - Evaluate the quality and accuracy of reported information.
  - Adjust the information collection plan based on the remaining information gaps.
- Requesting feedback from technical authorities (such as the counterintelligence and human intelligence staff element [G-2X]) on the efficiency of information collection activities, and to identify the right collection activity to support the mission.
- Attending after action reviews with the supported commander and staff to assess how well the MI element integrated with and supported the unit during the mission. These after action reviews should cover the following:
  - Integration of MI element into the larger mission plan.
  - Effectiveness of supporting the commander's information requirements.
  - Identification of equipment or personnel deficiencies.
  - Identification of lessons learned and emerging TTP that could support the unit better in the future.

TASK-ORGANIZING (U)

3-49. (U) The staff carefully considers the appropriate command or support relationship needed for each situation. The staff balances responsive support to the augmented unit with flexibility to distribute the low-density, high-demand MI collection assets, as necessary, across the various echelons. The MI commander normally provides recommendations to the staff in matters of task-organizing MI collection assets and outlines the effects of the command and support relationships being considered. In coordination with supported units, the staff determines command and support relationships, as well as additional operational requirements (such as language support considerations [see appendix F]), along with the mission variables (METT-TC) when developing plans and orders. The following discussion addresses factors to consider for intelligence operations. (See ADRP 5-0 for doctrine on task-organizing.)

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS (U)

3-50. (U) Command relationships are used when the most responsive employment of augmenting MI units is required. Army command relationships are either designated as organic, assigned, attached, operational control (OPCON), or tactical control (TACON). Each relationship has inherent responsibilities associated with it. (See table 3-1 on page 3-16.) All relationships, other than assigned, temporarily associate the augmenting MI unit with the gaining unit. Augmenting units return to their MI parent unit at the end of the operation, as specified in the plan or order directing the relationship, or when directed by a fragmentary order.

3-51. (U) OPCON normally provides full authority to task-organize augmenting commands and forces and to employ those forces as the gaining commander considers necessary. It does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. A significant consideration in the OPCON relationship is that sustainment and other administrative control responsibilities remain with the parent MI unit unless the plan or order directing the relationship specifies otherwise. Normally, modifications to the inherent responsibilities are directed in the *Tasks to Subordinate Units* subparagraph of paragraph 3 (*Execution*) of the order.

3-52. (U) TACON limits the gaining commander's authority to the detailed direction and control of maneuver/movement necessary to accomplish the missions or tasks assigned. TACON does not provide authority to change the organizational structure of the augmenting asset or direct administrative or logistics support.

Table 3-1. (U) Army command relationships

UNCLASSIFIED

If the relationship is—	*The inherent responsibilities:*							
	Have command relationship with—	May be task-organized by—	Unless modified ADCON responsibility goes through—	Are assigned position or AO by—	Provide liaison to—	Establish and maintain communications with—	Have priorities established by—	Can impose on gained unit further command or support relationship of—
Organic	All organic forces organized with the HQ	Organic HQ	Army HQ specified in organizing document	Organic HQ	N/A	N/A	Organic HQ	Attached; OPCON; TACON; GS, GSR, R, DS
Assigned	Gaining unit	Gaining HQ	Gaining Army HQ	OPCON chain of command	As required by OPCON	As required by OPCON	ASCC or Service-assigned HQ	As required by OPCON HQ
Attached	Gaining unit	Gaining unit	Gaining Army HG	Gaining unit	As required by gaining unit	Unit to which attached	Gaining unit	OPCON; TACON; GS; GSR; R; DS
OPCON	Gaining unit	Parent unit and gaining unit; gaining unit may pass OPCON to lower HQ[1]	Parent unit	Gaining unit	As required by gaining unit	As required by gaining unit and parent unit	Gaining unit	OPCON; TACON; GS; GSR; R; DS
TACON	Gaining unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Gaining unit	As required by gaining unit	As required by gaining unit and parent unit	Gaining unit	TACON; GS; GSR; R; DS

Note.[1] In NATO, the gaining unit may not task-organize a multinational force. (See TACON.)

ADCON	administrative control	HQ	headquarters
AO	area of operations	N/A	not applicable
ASCC	Army Service component command	NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
DS	direct support	OPCON	operational control
GS	general support	R	reinforcing
GSR	general support-reinforcing	TACON	tactical control

UNCLASSIFIED

SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS (U)

3-53. (U) Commanders establish support relationships (table 3-2) when subordination of one unit to another is inappropriate, such as when limited MI collection capabilities must support multiple units. Support relationships provide the greatest flexibility to distribute MI collection assets across an AO. Support relationships are graduated from an exclusive supported and supporting relationship between two units—as in direct support—to a broad level of support extended to all units under the control of the higher headquarters—as in general support. Support relationships do not normally alter administrative control. Intelligence operations normally use two support relationships:

- *Direct support* is a support relationship requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force's request for assistance (FM 3-0).
- General support is that support which is given to the supported force as a whole.

Table 3-2. (U) Army support relationships

UNCLASSIFIED								
	The inherent responsibilities:							
If the relationship is—	Have command relationship with—	May be task-organized by—	Receive sustainment from—	Are assigned position or area of operations by—	Provide liaison to—	Establish and maintain communications with—	Have priorities established by—	Can impose on gained unit further support relationship of—
Direct support[1]	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Supported unit	Supported unit	Parent unit; supported unit	Supported unit	See note [1]
Reinforcing	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Reinforced unit	Reinforced unit	Parent unit; reinforced unit	Reinforced unit; then parent unit	Not applicable
General support-reinforcing	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Reinforced unit and as required by parent unit	Reinforced unit and as required by parent unit	Parent unit; then reinforced unit	Not applicable
General support	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	As required by parent unit	As required by parent unit	Parent unit	Not applicable
Note.[1] Commanders of units in direct support may further assign support relationships between their subordinate units and elements of the supported unit after coordination with the supported commander.								
UNCLASSIFIED								

3-54. (U) In all support relationships, the parent unit is responsible for sustainment. Conditions may exist in which sustainment by the parent unit is not possible because of time, distance, or threats. In these cases, the plan or order directing the support relationship can direct the supported unit to provide sustainment for the supporting unit, as described in paragraph 3-51.

TECHNICAL CHANNELS (U)

3-55. (U) Information moves throughout various echelons along specific transmission paths or channels. Establishing command and support relationships directs the flow of reported information during intelligence operations. Channels assist in streamlining information dissemination by ensuring the right information passes promptly to the right people. Commanders and staffs normally communicate through three channels: command, staff, and technical. (See ADRP 6-0 and FM 6-02.71.)

3-56. (U) Through technical channels, commanders and staffs ensure adherence to applicable laws and policies, including but not limited to those listed in appendix E of this publication. They also ensure the proper use of doctrinal techniques and provide technical support and guidance. For intelligence operations, technical channels are the transmission paths between intelligence units (including sections) performing a technical function requiring special expertise. Technical channels control the performance of technical functions. They neither constitute nor bypass command authorities; rather, they serve as the mechanism for ensuring the execution of clearly delineated technical tasks, functions, and capabilities to meet the dynamic requirements of unified land operations. (See figure 3-6 on page 3-18.)

3-57. (U) Establishing intelligence technical channels ensures oversight of and adherence to existing policies or regulations for information collection tasks contained within the information collection plan. In specific cases, regulatory authority is granted to national and DOD intelligence agencies for specific intelligence discipline collection and is passed through technical channels.



Figure 3-6. (U) Technical channels

3-58. (U) Commanders direct operations but often rely on MI technical expertise to plan portions of the unit's intelligence operations effort. This involves applying highly technical or legally sensitive aspects and specific parameters to each task. Information and requirements concerning these areas are passed over technical channels. Specifically, uses of technical channels include but are not limited to—

- Defining, managing, or prescribing techniques for employing specific MI collection assets.
- Identifying critical technical collection criteria such as technical indicators.
- Recommending collection techniques, procedures, or assets.
- Receiving and reviewing classified reporting from MI collection assets.
- Conducting operational reviews.
- Conducting operational coordination.
- Conducting specialized intelligence training.

Chapter 4

Intelligence Staffs and Units (U)

NATIONAL AND JOINT INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT (U)

4-1. (U) National intelligence organizations employ specialized resources and dedicated personnel to gain information about potential adversaries, events, and other worldwide intelligence requirements. National intelligence organizations routinely provide support to the joint force commander while continuing to support national decision makers. However, the focus of these national intelligence organizations is not evenly split among intelligence customers and varies according to the situation and competing requirements. During large-scale combat operations against a peer threat, intense competition for intelligence resources at every level requires efficient use and availability of Army information collection units and capabilities.

4-2. (U) The Army, in response to validated requirements, may provide the theater and joint force with intelligence capabilities resident within INSCOM. INSCOM is a direct reporting unit to the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence that conducts and synchronizes worldwide intelligence discipline and all-source intelligence operations. INSCOM also delivers linguist support and intelligence-related advanced skills training, acquisition support, logistics, communications, and other specialized capabilities to support Army, joint, unified action partners, and the U.S. intelligence community. INSCOM's functional brigades and groups may provide general support, general support reinforcing, or direct support to theaters through intelligence reach, or they may be force-tailored for deployment to support the joint force. INSCOM's functional brigades and groups include—

- An aerial intelligence brigade that provides aerial intelligence collection platforms, associated PED, and mission command at forward locations.
- A CI group that conducts the full range of CI functions (operations, investigations, collection, analysis and production, and technical services and support activities).
- An Army operations group that conducts global, full spectrum HUMINT operations.

(b) (3)

THEATER ARMY (U)

4-4. (U) The Army Service component command (ASCC) of a combatant command is called a theater army. The Army contributes organizational elements and capabilities to joint force commanders to conduct unified action across the range of military operations. Theater army headquarters, with their command posts and their associated theater-enabling commands and functional brigades, can control Army or joint forces for smaller scale contingency operations. (See ATP 3-93.)

4-5. (U) The theater army maintains an area of responsibility-wide focus, providing support to Army and joint forces across the region, in accordance with the geographic combatant command's priorities of support. Depending on the region and the geographic combatant command's priorities, the relative emphasis that the theater army places on its operational and administrative responsibilities can vary greatly. The theater army focuses on administrative duties that support those operational requirements supporting the operations to prevent, large-scale ground combat, and the operations to consolidate gains strategic roles. This frees the theater army to perform those functions that no other Army echelon can perform during those strategic roles:

- Shaping the area of responsibility to improve relative positions of advantage enjoyed by the United States and its allies.
- Protecting against threat actions outside of the operational area.
- Preventing the expansion of conflict unintended by friendly decision makers and senior commanders.
- Detecting and striking enemy capabilities that reside outside of a joint operations area. ***Note.*** During large-scale ground combat, theater army commanders and staffs must not overlook this important operational function.

4-6. (U) The theater army enables the combatant commander to employ landpower anywhere in the area of responsibility across the range of military operations. It commands all Army forces in the region until the combatant commander attaches selected Army forces to a joint forces commander. When that happens, the theater army divides its responsibility between the Army component in the joint operations area and Army forces operating in other parts of the area of responsibility. Each theater army supports the Army's strategic roles—shape, prevent, conduct large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains—and facilitates the use of landpower in the joint task force to win.

4-7. (U) Theater army intelligence operations are continually conducted to provide information and intelligence used to support land forces. Results from these operations are used to provide guidance on plans, policies, and strategic guidance. For the Army's corps, divisions, and BCTs, theater army intelligence operations provide information used in IPB, targeting, situation development, and protection, as well as provide warning intelligence.

4-8. (U) The theater army headquarters has a G-2 who assists the commander in processing, analyzing, and disseminating information and intelligence provided by subordinate, higher, and adjacent units. (For more information on the theater army, see ATP 2-19.1 [classified].)

THEATER ARMY G-2 (U)

4-9. (U) The theater army G-2 is the commander's principal assistant who advises, plans, and coordinates actions of the intelligence warfighting function. The theater army G-2 is the—

- Chief of the intelligence cell.
- Theater army's senior intelligence officer.
- Principal intelligence advisor to the theater army commander.

4-10. (U) The theater army G-2 is equipped with intelligence systems and processors that connect to all required networks. These systems are interoperable with the Army's mission command suite of systems and are able to share data with Army organizations at all echelons and organizations within the intelligence community.

4-11. (U) The theater army G-2 and its supporting analysis and control element (ACE) provide regionally focused intelligence overwatch. Regionally aligned, assigned, and designated forces must thoroughly coordinate with the supporting INSCOM MIB-T. (See paragraphs 4-15 through 4-18.) This allows regional forces to access theater intelligence, infrastructure, and training opportunities, as well as leverage expertise resident in the theater. Organizations can also interact with INSCOM functional commands to focus organic intelligence capabilities and enhance situational awareness and mission readiness.

THEATER ARMY INTELLIGENCE CELL (U)

4-12. (U) The theater army intelligence cell is responsible for synchronizing and integrating Army intelligence operations throughout the combatant command's area of responsibility. The cell's staff elements either embed or coordinate with other command post cells to facilitate this synchronization. Specifically, the theater army intelligence cell performs the following tasks:

- Plans, programs, budgets, manages, evaluates, oversees, and integrates all intelligence activities.
- Provides functional oversight of assigned or attached intelligence personnel and units.
- Manages theater army intelligence collection, production, dissemination, disclosure, and CI requirements.
- Coordinates for national intelligence support and executes intelligence engagement and theater security cooperation as required.

4-13. (U) The intelligence cell in the theater army command post provides regionally focused intelligence support to Army and joint forces operating in the combatant command's area of responsibility. It is organized as a planning staff that assists the theater army commander in developing the plans required to support the combatant command's operations.

4-14. (U) The theater army intelligence cell depends on the MIB-T for intelligence collection, single-source analysis, and all-source intelligence to meet the theater army's intelligence needs. With augmentation, the intelligence cell can conduct operational intelligence collection and analysis to support theater army operations or operate in direct support of a corps or other subordinate headquarters.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE-THEATER (U)

4-15. (U) MIB-Ts are assigned to combatant commands and may be attached, OPCON, or TACON to the theater army by the combatant commander. As the theater army's permanently assigned ground intelligence organization, the MIB-T can deploy scalable and tailorable intelligence capabilities to meet combatant command, ASCC, and JTF intelligence requirements. However, it is likely that MIB-Ts will be OPCON to the theater army; therefore, this publication discusses MIB-Ts as OPCON to the theater army.

4-16. (U) MIB-Ts provide regionally focused collection and analysis to support theater army daily operations requirements and specific joint operations in the area of responsibility. MIB-Ts provide the theater army with its foundational capabilities to set the theater for the intelligence warfighting function. As such, MIB-Ts serve as intelligence anchor points for deploying forces. As anchor points, they provide intelligence system and intelligence personnel support related to combatant command-specific operational environments. MIB-Ts also provide expertise on joint ISR and Army information collection, intelligence resources, cultural knowledge of the theater, and the threat, as well as access to theater and national intelligence architectures and data that support intelligence operations.

4-17. (U) Deployed MIB-T forces leverage secure communications networks to access nondeployed MIB-T, higher echelon Army, joint, and intelligence community capabilities through intelligence reach. MIB-Ts can provide or coordinate the following support and enabling services to ground forces deploying to, operating in, or otherwise supporting the theater:

- **Intelligence:**
  - Intelligence assessments.
  - COPs and intelligence graphic products.

- Persistent intelligence overwatch (for example cultural, language, area subject matter experts).
- Federated intelligence production and coordination on behalf of the ASCC G-2.

- **Integration:**
  - Information technology integration.
  - Data services (COPs and intelligence pictures, theater foundation geospatial data, data sharing, access to the combatant command's distributed integrated backbone [also called DIB], and knowledge management).
  - Data ingest services (data push and pull, data formatting, and Distributed Common Ground System-Army [DCGS-A]-to-mission command systems population).
  - Architecture management services (secret, sensitive compartmented information, and multinational communications networks; regionally aligned forces DCGS-A connectivity; theater geospatial data and services across all network classification domains; and data routing services provided or coordinated by Ground Intelligence Support Activity information technology operations).
- **Training:** Live environment training, mobile training teams, and subject matter expertise.

4-18. (U) The organization and capacity of each MIB-T differ in relation to enduring theater requirements and relative prioritization within the Defense Planning Guidance. Although tailored to the unique circumstances of the theater to which it is assigned, a MIB-T's standard baseline design is—

- A multicomponent brigade headquarters that includes Regular Army and Army Reserve elements.
- An operations battalion that serves as the theater army G-2's ACE. This battalion may also be task-organized as a theater intelligence center. The battalion may also send a task-organized intelligence support element as part of a forward deployment of a theater army headquarters command post/element and/or other ground intelligence forces.
- A forward collection battalion that may possess CI, HUMINT, and SIGINT capabilities.
- An Army Reserve MI battalion-theater support (known as MIBN-TS) that is assigned to the Military Intelligence Readiness Command but regionally aligned to the theater, which can mobilize to provide surge and an extension of intelligence capability and capacity to the MIB-T to support ground force requirements in theater.

Theater Army-Level Intelligence Collection Capabilities (U)

4-19. (U) Table 4-2 lists and describes theater army-level intelligence capabilities, which are divided into organic and supporting collection capabilities. However, since every theater and specific operation are different, the theater army G-2 will build an intelligence architecture, receive augmentation and higher-level support, and task-organize organic intelligence units based on the specific operation. The intelligence architecture will reflect how many MI capabilities are employed forward as well as the capabilities provided through reachback.

Note. (U) Generally, at each echelon there are more requirements than intelligence analytical and collection capacity.



THEATER ARMY-LEVEL ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES (U)

4-20. (U) All-source intelligence support at the theater army level consists of robust and sophisticated capabilities focused on analyzing a broad range of operational and mission variables across all domains. The analytical focus is at the strategic and operational levels. This all-source support occurs across all theater army command posts and is a key component of the intelligence architecture. All-source intelligence support includes the various elements of the theater army intelligence cell, the MIB-T operations battalion, and the regionally aligned Army Reserve theater support battalion.

4-21. (U) The primary all-source analytical element supporting the theater army is the ACE. Most theater army ACEs do not deploy forward. However, tailored analytical elements deploy forward to support the theater army command post structure. Table 4-3 on page 4-6 describes theater army-level all-source intelligence capabilities.



CORPS (U)

4-22. (U) The corps is a formation that employs organic and assigned units for operations. A corps headquarters is organized, trained, and equipped to control the operations of two to five divisions. The corps conducts large-scale combat operations as part of a joint campaign, employing divisions as its base. In addition to divisional units, the corps may command BCTs and several types of multifunctional and functional brigades. The corps is the most versatile echelon above brigade. It is organized, manned, and equipped for large-scale ground combat under two conditions. When serving under another echelon during multi-corps operations, the corps is an intermediate tactical command. In rare cases when it is the only Army corps assigned to a higher echelon, it may serve as the ARFOR. *ARFOR* is the Army component and senior Army headquarters of all Army forces assigned or attached to a combatant command, subordinate joint force command, joint functional command, or multinational command (FM 3-94). When operating independently during large-scale ground combat, the corps may serve as the ARFOR or as the joint force land component commander (JFLCC) but it requires significant augmentation from joint and multinational forces to perform the this role successfully.

4-23. (U) During operations to shape and prevent, the corps is capable of fulfilling the ARFOR role. It may also form the nucleus for a JTF or JFLCC to respond to situations exceeding a division's capability. This would require joint force augmentation to fulfill either role successfully. During operations to consolidate gains, the corps may initially serve as an intermediate tactical command if a field army is present; or it may constitute the ARFOR, JFLCC, or a JTF, depending on operational requirements. These two roles would also require joint force augmentation. Regardless of its role, the corps executes both operational and administrative responsibilities.

4-24. (U) A corps usually receives reinforcing capabilities and units from theater army, joint, or multinational echelon to conduct operations. There is no standard configuration for a corps, but it generally requires a maneuver enhancement brigade, a combat aviation brigade, an expeditionary sustainment command, a field artillery brigade, and an E-MIB to conduct large-scale combat operations. Corps commanders rely on E-MIBs, resources from higher echelons, and in some cases, units from subordinate units to conduct intelligence operations. (For detailed information on corps intelligence activities and intelligence operations, see ATP 2-19.3.)

CORPS G-2 (U)

4-25. (U) The intelligence warfighting function supports unified land operations by assisting the commander to understand how enemy forces and other threats, terrain, weather, and civil considerations can affect the mission of these commands. The corps G-2, supported by the intelligence cell, advises the commander on how to leverage the intelligence warfighting function to support operations.

4-26. (U) The corps G-2 advises the commander on intelligence, assists the commander in synchronizing intelligence operations, and supervises the intelligence cell. Corps G-2 key responsibilities include

- Acting as principal intelligence advisor to the corps commander.
- Ensuring the intelligence running estimate remains current.
- Ensuring intelligence products are published and intelligence cell support is completed according to the commander's stated requirements and the command's battle rhythm.
- Providing warning intelligence.
- Providing situation development.
- Providing unique intelligence support to other types of activities.
- Providing intelligence support to targeting for lethal and nonlethal effects.
- Providing staff supervision of the intelligence training program.
- Providing staff supervision of assigned command security programs.
- Assisting the commander in evaluating physical security vulnerabilities.
- Assisting the rest of the staff in developing assessment criteria.
- Identifying linguist requirements pertaining to intelligence support. (See appendix F.)
- Coordinating CI activities.
- Coordinating with the USAF SWO to—
  - Ensure the weather portion of the running estimate remains current.
  - Ensure weather products are published according to the commander's stated requirements and the command's battle rhythm.
  - Provide weather support to targeting and other activities.

CORPS INTELLIGENCE CELL (U)

4-27. (U) The corps intelligence cell facilitates understanding of the operational environment. The corps intelligence cell—

- Requests, receives, and analyzes information from all sources.
- Disseminates intelligence products to support corps operations and the commander's situational understanding.
- Manages all requirements for information collection and MI collection assets under corps control.
- Interfaces with the movement and maneuver cell to integrate intelligence products and intelligence operations activities into current operations.
- Ensures weather products and weather effects information are integrated into current operations.
- Recommends tasks to the corps G-3 for resources under corps control.

- Receives, processes, analyzes, and disseminates all-source intelligence to support current and future operations.
- Provides representatives to the current operations integration cell.

4-28. (U) Each corps intelligence cell provides policies and procedures for conducting intelligence operations to subordinate echelon intelligence cells. These policies and procedures allow lower echelon intelligence staffs the freedom to conduct intelligence staff activities and intelligence operations more efficiently, as routine tasks can be executed without obtaining approval from higher echelons.

4-29. (U) To support operations, the main command post intelligence cell—

- Receives, processes, and analyzes information from all sources, and disseminates intelligence.
- Provides relevant intelligence to support current and future operations.
- Participates in information collection planning.
- Participates in the targeting process.
- Provides foundational geospatial information and services to all headquarters mission command systems to support visualization through the geospatial engineer team resident in the GEOINT cell.

4-30. (U) The intelligence cell at the corps level consists of the three principal sections: intelligence operations, G-2 ACE, and G-2X.

Intelligence Operations Section (U)

4-31. (U) The intelligence operations section assists the G-2 in coordinating intelligence support to the main command post, tactical command post, mobile command group, higher headquarters, and subordinate units. It does this by managing input to the COP through the current operations integration cell. The intelligence operations section tracks the special security office (also called SSO), G-2 ACE, G-2X, and staff weather office production and support requirements.

G-2 Analysis and Control Element (U)

4-32. (U) The G-2 ACE is the G-2's principal organization for intelligence analysis, knowledge management, information management, collection management, and intelligence production. It is an all-source intelligence organization with the organic analysis, management, and information technology capabilities needed to perform these tasks in operations. The G-2 ACE produces and disseminates intelligence and focuses collection resources to provide information the commander needs to make decisions.

G-2X (U)

4-33. (U) The G-2X advises the commander and staff on employing CI and HUMINT collection assets. It interfaces with external organizations to synchronize and deconflict CI and HUMINT tasking and missions. The G-2X includes the following:

- **CI coordinating authority.** The CI coordinating authority (also called the CICA) provides technical control, oversight, and deconfliction for CI assets.
- **HUMINT operations cell.** This cell provides primary technical control and deconfliction for all HUMINT assets in the AO.
- **HUMINT analysis cell.** This cell serves as the single-source analysis point for HUMINT reporting and operational analysis. It answers RFIs related to HUMINT.

Expeditionary-Military Intelligence Brigade (U)

4-34. (U) The Army established three brigade-level units in the Regular Army and another four in the Reserve Components (two each in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve) to enhance the intelligence capability within each of the Army's three corps. These E-MIB units are designed to conduct intelligence operations to support decisive action. An E-MIB provides the following capabilities:

- CI collection and activities.
- HUMINT collection.
- GEOINT collection.
- SIGINT collection.
- PED.

4-35. (U) An E-MIB is the primary information collection asset assigned or attached to the corps. However, in large-scale combat operations, E-MIB assets are primarily task-organized down to the division level. During stability tasks, E-MIB assets may support BCTs with additional intelligence capabilities. E-MIBs are designed to perform in a variety of situations and be task-organized in multiple ways. An E-MIB comprises—

- One headquarters and headquarters company.
- Two MI battalions. Each consists of—
  - One headquarters and headquarters detachment.
  - One CI and HUMINT company.
  - One collection and exploitation company.

Corps-Level Intelligence Collection Capabilities (U)

4-36. (U) Table 4-4 lists corps-level intelligence collection capabilities, which are divided into organic and supporting collection capabilities. However, since every corps and specific operation are different, the corps G-2 will build an intelligence architecture, receive augmentation and higher-level support, and task-organize organic intelligence units based on the specific operation. The intelligence architecture will reflect how many MI capabilities are employed forward as well as the capabilities provided through reachback.

(b) (3)

Corps-Level All-Source Intelligence Capabilities (U)

4-37. (U) All-source intelligence support at the corps level consists of organic analytical capabilities focused on analyzing specific operational and mission variables across all domains within an assigned theater. The analytical focus executes operational-level and tactical-level intelligence analysis and production of enemy ground forces' intent and capability to conduct future military operations within an operational environment. This all-source support occurs at corps main and tactical forward command posts and is a critical part of the intelligence architecture to higher, adjacent, and subordinate units.

4-38. (U) The primary all-source analytic element supporting the corps is the ACE. The ACE supports situation development, the threat characteristics database, and targeting analysis. Generally, the corps ACE analytical capability deploys to support the corps main and forward command posts. Table 4-5 on page 4-10 describes corps-level all-source intelligence capabilities.



DIVISION (U)

4-39. (U) The division is a formation that employs organic and assigned units for operations. A division is the tactical unit of execution for a corps. A division's primary role is as a tactical headquarters commanding brigade in decisive action. A division combines offensive, defensive, and stability tasks in an AO assigned by its higher headquarters, normally a corps. It task-organizes its subordinate forces to accomplish its mission. During large-scale combat operations, a division operates not only as a headquarters but also as a centralized tactical force.

4-40. (U) During operations to shape and prevent of limited scope and duration, the division is capable of fulfilling the ARFOR role. Under such conditions, it may also form the nucleus for a small-scale JTF or JFLCC, although it would require joint force augmentation to fulfill either role successfully. During operations to consolidate gains, the division primarily serves as an intermediate tactical command. When the situation is consolidated such that a field army or corps is no longer required to command and control operations, a division could assume the ARFOR or JFLCC role. Either role would also require joint force augmentation.

4-41. (U) The division primarily focuses on operational responsibilities. Unless the division is serving as the ARFOR, a higher echelon normally retains administrative control for all but the division's organic, assigned, and attached units. However, when warranted, a higher echelon commander serving as the ARFOR may designate a division commander as the deputy ARFOR with prescribed responsibilities.

4-42. (U) A division may receive reinforcing capabilities and units from a theater army, joint, or multinational echelon to conduct operations. In addition to BCTs, a division may directly control several types of multifunctional and functional brigades. The standard organization for a division formation includes: a division artillery, a combat aviation brigade, a sustainment brigade, a maneuver enhancement brigade, and three to five BCTs. The corps may also downward reinforce the division with an MI battalion from the E-MIB as well as other functional and multifunctional brigades and battalions. The division may task-organize, as necessary, for specific operations. For example, during operations to shape and prevent, the G-3 may direct some or all of the collection and exploitation companies to support the division's shaping operations.

4-43. (U) The size, composition, and capabilities of the forces task-organized under a division may vary between divisions involved in the same campaign, and they may change from one operational phase to another. Operations during large-scale combat operations require a different mix of forces and capabilities from those required for the conduct of stability tasks.

4-44. (U) Division and higher-level intelligence operations collect information to support current and future operations. Detailed intelligence analysis drives information collection for the division and its higher headquarters. To collect the information needed for planning and decision making, the division staff integrates all tools at its disposal into a synchronized and integrated echelon information collection plan.

DIVISION G-2 (U)

4-45. (U) The intelligence warfighting function supports unified land operations by assisting the commander to understand how enemy forces and other threats, terrain, weather, and civil considerations can affect the mission of these commands. The division G-2, supported by the intelligence cell, advises the commander on how to leverage the intelligence warfighting function to support operations.

4-46. (U) The division G-2 advises the commander on intelligence, assists the commander in synchronizing intelligence operations, and supervises the intelligence cell. Division G-2 key responsibilities include—

- Acting as principal intelligence advisor to division commanders.
- Ensuring the intelligence running estimate remains current.
- Ensuring intelligence products are published and intelligence cell support is completed according to the commander's stated requirements and the command's battle rhythm.
- Providing warning intelligence.
- Providing situation development.
- Providing unique intelligence support to other types of activities.
- Providing intelligence support to targeting for lethal and nonlethal effects.
- Providing staff supervision of the intelligence training program.
- Providing staff supervision of assigned command security programs.
- Assisting the commander in evaluating physical security vulnerabilities.
- Assisting the rest of the staff in developing assessment criteria.
- Identifying linguist requirements pertaining to intelligence support. (See appendix F.)
- Coordinating CI activities.
- Coordinating with the USAF SWO to—
  - Ensure the weather portion of the running estimate remains current.
  - Ensure weather products are published according to the commander's stated requirements and the command's battle rhythm.
  - Provide weather support to targeting and other activities.

DIVISION INTELLIGENCE CELL (U)

4-47. (U) The division intelligence cell coordinates activities and systems that assist commanders to understand the enemy and other threats, terrain and weather, and civil considerations. Just like the corps intelligence cell, the division intelligence cell has three principal staff sections: the intelligence operations section, the G-2 ACE, and the G-2X. (See paragraphs 4-31 through 4-33.) Each staff section has several elements. The division intelligence cell provides an intelligence staff element to the current operations integration cell. (For more on division intelligence activities and intelligence operations, see ATP 2-19.3.)

4-48. (U) To support operations, the division intelligence cell—

- Receives, processes, and analyzes information from all sources to produce and disseminate intelligence.
- Provides intelligence to support current and future operation activities.
- Develops information collection requirements and synchronizes intelligence operations.

- Participates in the targeting process.
- Through the G-3, supports, tasks, and directs intelligence operations (for example, fire support and survivability coordination).
- Assesses information collection, including intelligence operations, and resynchronizes the information collection plan throughout operations.
- Plans, monitors, and analyzes CI and HUMINT activities.
- Provides weather information to support current and future operation activities, information collection management, the targeting process, fire support, and medical evacuation.
- Coordinates intelligence support with multifunctional brigade intelligence sections (aviation, intelligence, maneuver, fires, and division artillery).
- Provides foundational geospatial information and services to all headquarters mission command systems to support visualization.

DIVISION-LEVEL INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION CAPABILITIES (U)

4-49. (U) Table 4-6 lists division-level intelligence capabilities, which are divided into organic and supporting collection capabilities. Divisions have no organic intelligence collection capabilities, except limited information collection assets in the combat aviation brigade Gray Eagle company. The division G-2 will build an intelligence architecture, receive augmentation and higher-level support, and task-organize supporting intelligence units based on the specific operation. The intelligence architecture will reflect how many MI capabilities are employed forward as well as the capabilities provided through reachback.

(b) (3)

DIVISION-LEVEL ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES (U)

4-50. (U) All-source intelligence support at the division level consists of organic analytical capabilities focused on analyzing tactical enemy ground forces. The analytical focus is on enemy ground forces' intent and capability to conduct future military operations within a corps or division boundary. All-source support occurs at the division main and tactical command posts and is a critical part of the intelligence architecture to subordinate commands.

4-51. (U) The primary all-source analytical element supporting the division is the ACE. The ACE supports situation development, the threat characteristics database, and targeting analysis. Generally, the division analytical capability within the ACE deploys to support the division main and forward command posts. Table 4-7 describes division-level all-source intelligence capabilities.

(b) (3)

BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM (U)

4-52. (U) A BCT is the Army's primary combined arms, close-combat force. BCTs maneuver against, close with, and destroy the enemy. BCTs seize and retain key terrain, exert constant pressure, and break the enemy's will to fight. BCTs are the principal ground maneuver units of a division. All BCTs include the following capabilities:

- Maneuver.
- Fires.
- Reconnaissance.
- Sustainment.
- MI.
- Medical.
- Signal.
- Engineer.

4-53. (U) The organizational flexibility inherent within the BCT allows it to function across the range of military operations—armored BCTs have combined arms battalions and infantry and Stryker BCTs have infantry battalions.

4-54. (U) Intelligence operations are normally weighted to support the main effort. The BCT intelligence structure has the flexibility to tailor its capabilities to meet the requirements of various types of operations and adapt to changing operational needs during execution. For each operation, the commander and staff create and refine requirements and develop a scheme of information collection that positions MI and maneuver collection assets where they can best satisfy those requirements. (For detailed information on BCT intelligence activities and intelligence operations, see ATP 2-19.4.)

4-55. (U) BCT intelligence assets from the MI company are employed to support mission command by meeting the BCT commander's information collection tasks. The BCT staff develops a scheme of information collection that employs maneuver and MI units based on the BCT's mission, PIRs, concept of operations, and commander's intent. This scheme integrates intelligence operations with the BCT's overall operation. The MI company positions MI collection assets to—

- Satisfy specific information requirements.
- Expose threat vulnerabilities.
- Monitor key locations.

- Detect targets.
- Collect information for assessment of lethal and nonlethal effects.
- Identify opportunities as they arise.

BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM S-2 (U)

4-56. (U) The BCT S-2 is the principal intelligence advisor to the BCT commander. Additionally, the BCT S-2 supports security programs and oversees the BCT intelligence cell. Specific responsibilities of the BCT S-2 include but are not limited to—

- Situation development, target development, and support to lethal and nonlethal targeting, warning intelligence, assessment, and protection.
- Providing the commander and staff with assessments of enemy capabilities, intentions, and COAs as they relate to the mission.
- Identifying intelligence gaps and developing collection strategies.
- Disseminating intelligence products throughout the unit and to higher and subordinate headquarters.
- Answering RFIs from subordinate commanders, staffs, and higher and adjacent units.
- Coordinating the unit's information and intelligence requirements with supporting higher, lateral, and subordinate echelons.
- Overseeing BCT intelligence cell contributions to collection management.
- Leading the staff in performing IPB.
- Coordinating with the USAF SWO—
  - To include weather information gaps.
  - For weather information to support targeting.
  - To disseminate weather information and/or products throughout the unit, as well as to higher and subordinate headquarters.
  - To answer weather RFIs from subordinate commanders, staffs, and higher and adjacent units.

BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM INTELLIGENCE CELL (U)

4-57. (U) The BCT intelligence cell is the intelligence organization in the command post that answers directly to the BCT S-2. Higher headquarters may augment this cell with additional capabilities to meet mission requirements. The BCT intelligence cell requests, receives, and analyzes information from all sources to produce and distribute intelligence products. The intelligence cell's geospatial engineer team manages the foundational geospatial information and services for the BCT, supporting the entire BCT with analysis products. Although there are intelligence staff elements in other command post cells, most of the intelligence staff section resides in this cell. (See FM 6-0 for doctrine on command post organization; see ATP 2-19.4 for more information on the BCT intelligence cell.)

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COMPANY (U)

4-58. (U) Most intelligence personnel within the BCT are assigned to the MI company. The BCT commander and staff task-organize the MI company based on the mission variables (METT-TC). To offset capability shortfalls, the BCT intelligence staff integrates elements of the MI company and receives augmentation support from the E-MIB to accomplish the mission.

4-59. (U) The information collection platoon, intelligence and EW system integration platoon, and staff weather office section of the MI company are OPCON to the BCT headquarters and headquarters company. They are further detailed to the BCT S-2 to augment the BCT intelligence staff section and facilitate the establishment of the BCT intelligence cell. These elements of the MI company provide the BCT intelligence cell with automated intelligence PED, analysis, and dissemination capabilities, as well as access to intelligence products of higher and lower echelons.

4-60. (U) Soldiers from the MI company (minus) execute HUMINT, SIGINT, and tactical unmanned aircraft system (UAS) collection; document and media exploitation; and in certain instances, biometric and forensic collection. The MI company (minus) consists of a company headquarters, multifunction platoon, and tactical UAS platoon.

Note. (U) The MI company (minus) represents the Soldiers remaining after the information collection platoon, the intelligence and EW system integration platoon, and the staff weather office section of the MI company are OPCON to the BCT headquarters and headquarters company.

4-61. (U) There is the possibility of CI, HUMINT, and/or SIGINT augmentation from the E-MIB in many circumstances. The higher headquarters task-organizes any augmentation as part of the MI company (minus). Additionally, the higher headquarters may task-organize the tactical UAS platoon under OPCON to the combat aviation brigade based on UAS operational requirements or for other reasons. In some instances, such as operations in the consolidation area, collection teams or multifunction teams from the multifunction platoon may operate in general or direct support to a maneuver battalion, cavalry squadron, one of the other battalions, or to subordinate companies or troops.

Brigade Intelligence Support Element (U)

4-62. (U) A current technique used by BCTs is the establishment of a brigade intelligence support element (also called BISE) by task-organizing personnel from the BCT intelligence cell and MI company. The brigade intelligence support element is the BCT S-2's main analytical organization for all-source analysis and production. It receives collected enemy information, tracks enemy movement, assesses enemy combat effectiveness, and creates intelligence products derived from analysis. The brigade intelligence support element shares its information and conclusions through collaboration with the BCT and its subordinate element intelligence personnel and with higher- and lateral-echelon intelligence organizations.

Brigade Combat Team-Level Intelligence Collection Capabilities (U)

4-63. (U) Table 4-8 on page 4-16 lists BCT-level intelligence capabilities, which are divided into higher and organic and supporting collection capabilities. The organic intelligence collection capability is the MI company. MI company assets may provide downward reinforcement to maneuver battalions or maneuver companies. Since every BCT and specific operation are different, the BCT S-2 will build an intelligence architecture, receive augmentation and higher-level support, and task-organize organic intelligence units based on the specific operation. The intelligence architecture will reflect how many MI capabilities are employed forward as well as the capabilities provided through reachback.

(b) (3)

BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM-LEVEL ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES (U)

4-64. (U) All-source intelligence support at the BCT level is very basic and focuses on ground operations. The other domains are only addressed based on how they affect BCT operations. All-source support is organized to meet BCT requirements across main and tactical forward command posts. Table 4-9 describes BCT-level all-source intelligence capabilities.

(b) (3)

BATTALION (U)

4-65. (U) The role of a battalion is to close with and destroy enemy forces using fires, movement, and shock effect, or to repel the enemy's assault by fire and counterattack. The battalion combines the efforts of its companies to execute tactical missions as part of the BCT, or when augmenting another BCT. Amassing the combat power of these companies quickly, while integrating and synchronizing the supporting and sustaining multipliers, is the key to victory. Combined arms battalions are organized to fight and win, but they are equally capable of executing stability and defense support of civil authority tasks as part of a JTF.

4-66. (U) The manning of the intelligence staff and intelligence cell at the battalion level within the BCT varies with the type of battalion. The analytical and production capacity across the five types of battalions that are organic to BCTs varies according to the size of the intelligence staff and intelligence cell. For operational considerations, such as weighting the main effort, the BCT may task-organize intelligence support teams from the MI company, CI teams, HUMINT teams, SIGINT teams, or multifunction teams to support a battalion. Additionally, a battalion may use remote sensors for defense or information collection purposes. (For detailed information on battalion intelligence activities, see ATP 2-19.4.)

BATTALION S-2 (U)

4-67. (U) The battalion S-2 provides timely, accurate intelligence analysis and products to support the commander, staff, and subordinate units. The battalion S-2—

- Acts as the principal intelligence advisor to the battalion commander.
- In conjunction with the S-3, supervises and coordinates collection, processing, production, and dissemination of intelligence.
- Plans and manages information collection tasks in coordination with the S-3 and fires cell.
- Evaluates the enemy in terms of doctrine, threat characteristics, HVTs, capabilities, and vulnerabilities.
- In conjunction with the S-3, coordinates the battalion staff's recommendations for specific PIRs to be designated as CCIRs.

BATTALION INTELLIGENCE CELL (U)

4-68. (U) The battalion intelligence cell contains the battalion S-2, an assistant S-2, and one or more all-source intelligence analysts. The cell makes analytical predictions on when and where actions will occur. It also provides analysis on the effects of relevant aspects of the operational environment on friendly and enemy COAs and capabilities. The intelligence cell integrates staff input to IPB products for staff planning, decision making, targeting, and combat assessment.

4-69. (U) A battalion intelligence cell is also responsible for—

- Attending all MDMP and targeting meetings.
- Proposing new PIRs to the commander.
- Providing the staff with a detailed projection of possible enemy COAs for the next 24 to 72 hours, based on all enemy, terrain, and weather factors.
- Creating and maintaining the intelligence running estimate, which provides the commander and staff with current assessments of the situation in the AO, based on enemy activities and other relevant aspects within the AO.
- Integrating reporting into intelligence cell products.
- Leveraging the brigade GEOINT cell as appropriate.
- Coordinating with the USAF SWO assigned to the BCT to provide—
  - Weather effects on friendly and enemy warfighting capabilities and COAs, based on current and predictive weather conditions in the operational environment, for integration into the MDMP and targeting process.
  - The weather estimate, weather portion of the running estimate, or updated weather estimate.

BATTALION-LEVEL INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION CAPABILITIES (U)

4-70. (U) Table 4-10 lists maneuver battalion-level intelligence capabilities. Organic BCT MI company intelligence assets may downward reinforce maneuver battalions or maneuver companies. Close coordination and an adequate lead time are required to ensure the effective flow of information and intelligence.

(b) (3)

BATTALION-LEVEL ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES (U)

4-71. (U) All-source intelligence supports the commander's tactical requirements, which focus on enemy tactical forces operating within a short window of action. Table 4-11 describes maneuver battalion-level all-source intelligence capabilities.

(b) (3)

Chapter 5

Intelligence and the Army's Strategic Roles (U)

OVERVIEW (U)

5-1. (U) The Army is a globally engaged, regionally responsive force that provides a full range of capabilities to combatant commanders. The Army provides the joint force with the capability and capacity for the application of landpower. Army intelligence is an inherent part of any joint and multinational combined arms team. The Army also provides a broad array of intelligence organizations and capabilities to support theater operations. Combatant commanders develop theater campaign plans that rely on military engagement, operations, posture, security cooperation, and other activities that seek to achieve U.S. national objectives and prevent resorting to armed conflict while setting conditions to transition to deter operations when required.

5-2. (U) When a situation forces a branch to the campaign plan, it may eventually lead to large-scale combat operations. Large-scale combat operations are inherently lethal and complex. In these cases, the full capability of national to tactical intelligence supports the combination of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and to consolidate gains to ultimately return to shaping operations. Most of this chapter discusses intelligence across the Army strategic roles. However, since intelligence is inherently joint, it is important to also understand intelligence support across the joint phasing model. (See figure 5-1 on page 5-2.) Intelligence is required across all domains and drives joint operations across the range of military operations:

- **Shape (phase 0).** Joint, intergovernmental, interagency, and multinational operations and various interagency activities are performed to dissuade or deter adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with allies and partners.
- **Deter (phase 1).** The joint force seeks to deter undesirable adversary action by demonstrating its capabilities and resolve. This phase includes activities to prepare forces and set conditions for deployment and employment of forces in the event deterrence is not successful.
- **Seize initiative (phase 2).** Joint force commanders seek to seize the initiative through the application of appropriate capabilities.
- **Dominate (phase 3).** Joint force commanders focus on breaking the enemy's will for organized resistance, or in noncombat situations, controlling the operational environment.
- **Stabilize (phase 4).** The stabilize phase is required when there is no fully functional, legitimate civil governing authority present. The joint force may be required to perform limited local governance until legitimate local entities are functioning. The force may have to integrate the efforts of other supporting or contributing multinational, intergovernmental, nongovernmental, and U.S. Government department and agency participants.
- **Enable civil authority (phase 5).** Joint force support to legitimate civil governance in theater characterizes this phase. The joint force works to enable the viability of the civil authority and its provision of essential services to the largest number of people in the region.

5-3. (U) Supporting the Army's conduct of unified land operations across the conflict continuum requires the intelligence warfighting function to be adaptable and agile. The Army synchronizes its intelligence efforts with unified action partners to achieve unity of effort and to meet the commander's intent. Intelligence unity of effort is critical to accomplish the mission. There are unique requirements for intelligence during every operation. Some intelligence activities are specific to certain phases, while others span multiple phases. Commanders and leaders address the planning, collection, storage, PED, and analysis of intelligence and associated contextual data in each phase.

5-4. (U) Army intelligence units and capabilities usually have an important and consistent role in supporting shaping operations. Ideally, regionally aligned forces build on and enhance existing threat data and associated information during the shape phase. Within each theater, the development and validation of databases generally occur in a top-down manner, with significant support from regionally aligned forces and special operations forces. This allows units to maintain, populate, and continually update a thorough and accurate database during subsequent phases. However, there may be instances when regionally aligned forces must develop and populate an authoritative database of threat signatures and associated contextual information, in conjunction with joint forces and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), during the shape phase. This is particularly true when an area quickly transitions from the shape to the deter phase. As this transition occurs, different portions of the area of responsibility range from relative peace to increasing amounts of conflict to war. In all instances, each echelon below theater army must prepare to establish localized intelligence databases during any phase of an operation. It is critical for commands to update the intelligence database continually with actual and potential threat information to maximize the value of intelligence products and reports.



Figure 5-1. (U) Notional large-scale combat joint phasing model

5-5. (U) Army forces shape operational environments, prevent conflict, prevail in large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains through aggressive execution of information collection and intelligence production. Operations to shape, prevent, conduct large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains summarize the Army's strategic roles as part of a joint force.

SHAPE (U)

5-6. (U) Operations to shape occur as shaping activities across the joint phasing model. (See figure 5-1 on page 5-2.) They focus on—

- Promoting and protecting U.S. national interests and influence.
- Building partner capacity and partnerships.
- Recognizing and countering adversary attempts to gain positions of relative advantage.
- Setting conditions to win future conflicts.

5-7. (U) Shaping activities are continuous within an area of responsibility. Army forces participate in and conduct numerous other activities to support the combatant commander's theater campaign plan. These activities include developing intelligence, countering weapons of mass destruction, providing support to humanitarian efforts, conducting information operations, and organizing and participating in combined training and exercises. The combatant commander uses these activities to improve security within partner nations, enhance international legitimacy, gain multinational cooperation, and influence adversary decision making. This cooperation includes exchanging information and sharing intelligence, obtaining access for U.S. forces in peacetime and crisis, and mitigating conditions that could lead to a crisis.

5-8. (U) Operations to shape consist of various long-term military engagements, security cooperation, and deterrence missions, tasks, and actions. Typically, these operations also occur to support the geographic combatant commander's theater campaign plan or theater security cooperation plan. Combatant commanders use these plans as a tool to organize, integrate, and execute joint operations.

5-9. (U) Intelligence is integral in supporting operations to shape. During operations to shape, the intelligence staff must establish a baseline intelligence architecture to meet a broad range of requirements. Intelligence products assist the commander in countering actions by adversaries that challenge the stability of a nation or region and are contrary to U.S. interests. Intelligence provides the commander the ability to detect adversary warnings, analyze enemy intentions, and track enemy capabilities across all domains to inform decisions and realistic assessments of operational and tactical risk.

5-10. (U) Support to contingency plan development, which is treated as a branch to the campaign plan, is a vital activity during operations to shape. Different situations within an area of responsibility can cause a branch to the campaign plan to include regional instability, armed aggression, natural or man-made disasters, or humanitarian crises. Intelligence assists in identifying these potential situations and participates in developing plans to mitigate these scenarios.

Note. (U) National to tactical intelligence organizations and units must develop and maintain an authoritative database of threat signatures and associated contextual information to support all planning.

THEATER ARMY (U)

5-11. (U) All intelligence efforts during operations to shape are accomplished within a larger national, joint, and coalition context. The focus of theater intelligence efforts includes the following:

- Conduct all-source intelligence analysis to support the ASCC or combatant commander phase I PIR.
- Serve as the theater army ACE for single-source intelligence, all-source intelligence analysis, and intelligence collection management.
- Leverage the U.S. intelligence community and joint/allied intelligence enterprise, integrating regionally aligned forces and global response forces.
- Conduct continuous information collection activities and intelligence analysis to provide early and accurate warning intelligence.

5-12. (U) The theater army G-2 participates in operational planning processes to identify intelligence support requirements in order to support theater plans and determine gaps in information and knowledge. This drives the development of the information collection plan. The G-2 analyzes the collected data and uses it to refine IPB products. Additionally, the G-2 proposes PIRs for commander approval and identifies HVTs and HPTs for G-3 approval. Finally, the theater army G-2 conducts ISR synchronization with national, joint, and coalition partners to ensure adequate coverage of ISR assets to meet the theater's needs.

5-13. (U) The theater army G-2 builds relationships with partner nations through exercises and exchanges. Exercises strengthen relationships with

- The joint intelligence community, including the J-2 and combat support agencies (in particular, the (b) (3) regionally aligned units, and units apportioned against an operation plan.
- The Reserve Component, including the Military Intelligence Readiness Command (also called MIRC) and the MIB-T's Reserve Component theater support battalion.
- INSCOM, including reinforcing support beyond what the MIB-T provides (for example, intelligence discipline or all-source support from INSCOM's functional brigades, such as the National Ground Intelligence Center, CI group, and aerial intelligence brigade).

5-14. (U) MIB-Ts conduct MI mission command, single-source and all source analysis, and intelligence collection, and coordinate for reach PED as directed by the information collection plan. Additionally, MIB-Ts reach out to and coordinate with the assigned units—theater-assigned, rotational, regionally aligned, and units apportioned against operation plans (either temporarily or permanently) to their theaters' mission—and begin the process of integrating MI Soldiers and capabilities into theater operations before deployment. This is accomplished via a standing memorandum of understanding between INSCOM and assigned units rotationally aligned to the specific theater.

5-15. (U) The theater army G-2, in conjunction with the MIB-T, fulfills an important role in theater through CI and HUMINT operations. CI capabilities are integral to force protection operations outside the continental United States. Army forces permanently stationed outside the continental United States, such as those in the Republic of Korea and Europe, face a high threat from foreign intelligence entities; CI forces mitigate this threat.

Echelons Corps and Below (U)

5-16. (U) The primary focus of the corps, division, and BCT intelligence staffs during shaping operations is planning, along with individual, collective, and unit training and readiness. Echelons corps and below units participate in their assigned commands' training events, including mission rehearsal exercises, mission readiness exercises, and combat training center rotations; they also participate in annual theater events when directed. Additionally, MI Soldiers within echelons corps and below units leverage Project Foundry as well as other training opportunities (for example, live environment training) to maintain perishable technical skills and enhance tactical and technical proficiency.

5-17. (U) Once identified as part of the rotational force, echelons corps and below units coordinate with the designated MIB-T to begin their integration into theater intelligence operations. This includes predeployment leader, staff, and analyst coordination, as well as theater-specific qualifications and certifications. Some of these qualifications and certifications can be accomplished through Foundry while others may include live environment training opportunities. Finally, echelons corps and below units may establish intelligence reach operations to reduce their forward or deployed Soldier presence and maximize nondeployed MI capabilities or expertise (for example, linguists, federated PED, and contract or civilian analysts).

5-18. (U) BCT S-2s and MI companies collaborate to train the intelligence team across the BCT. Specifically, the BCT and MI company leadership work on developing individual Soldier skills, crew drills, battle drills, and refining tactical SOPs. Each set of tactical SOPs must be tailored to address theater-specific TTP and integrate new or additional capabilities required to operate in the designated joint operations area. New or additional capabilities can include materiel (quick reaction capabilities, system upgrades) and personnel (military or contract linguists, PED platoons, CI teams, additional HUMINT and SIGINT teams).

PREVENT (U)

5-19. (U) The intent of operations to prevent is to deter adversary actions and to de-escalate a situation. Prevent activities enable the joint force to gain positions of relative advantage before combat operations. Operations to prevent are characterized by actions to protect friendly forces and indicate the intent to execute subsequent phases of a planned operation. For this reason, it is critical for the theater army G-2, the MIB-T, and other regionally aligned forces to develop intelligence databases during shape activities. The theater army and subordinate Army forces perform the following major activities during operations to prevent:

- Execute flexible deterrent options and flexible response options.

- Set the theater.
- Tailor Army forces.
- Project the force. (See appendix D.)

5-20. (U) Operations during this phase of escalating conflict place increasing demands on the intelligence warfighting function. The intelligence staff increases its knowledge of the threat and the specific operational environment, and it expands various intelligence capabilities as part of the intelligence architecture. With the shift from shaping to deterrence, the theater army shifts to refining contingency plans and preparing estimates for increasing ground forces and capabilities.

THEATER ARMY (U)

5-21. (U) The theater intelligence effort focuses on—

- Maintaining situational awareness across the theater.
- Providing support to warning intelligence.
- Providing continual support to target development.
- Maintaining the intelligence portion of the COP.
- Providing updates to the information collection plan.

5-22. (U) Additionally, the theater army G-2—

- Prepares for theater openings, including the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of MI staffs and units on the time-phased force and deployment list (TPFDL) to the operation plan.
- Maintains, updates, and shares all information, including the enemy electronic threat characteristics overlay with TPFDL units to ensure a common and current understanding of the threat.

5-23. (U) The MIB-T continues to conduct MI mission command, single-source and all-source analysis, and intelligence collection, and to coordinate for reach PED as directed by the information collection plan. However, there is more emphasis on support to force protection, and on indications of how the theater is reacting to U.S. shaping operations.

5-24. (U) The MIB-T role in receiving TPFDL units includes ensuring those units can operate on theater-specific networks, such as the Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange (also called CENTRIX) System and the Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System (also called BICES). Furthermore, the Army SIGINT activities, either through MIB-T SIGINT elements or by reach from the Army Technical Control and Analysis Activity and Army Cryptologic Office, can assist tactical SIGINT/EW units in accessing theater-specific databases and entering theater-specific SIGINT networks. Similarly, the theater joint force CI and HUMINT staff element (also called J-2X) provides guidance on integrating TPFDL CI and HUMINT forces.

ECHELONS CORPS AND BELOW (U)

5-25. (U) Corps, divisions, and BCTs prepare for movement into theater and the accomplishment of reception, staging, onward movement, and integration. Corps and divisions integrate their Army Reserve and Army National Guard main command post operational detachments and fully integrate their activities into the theater army G-2 and MIB-T battle rhythm to participate in analysis and battle update briefs. The main command post operational detachments establish reach operations to maintain continuity and provide intelligence updates while the corps, division, and BCT headquarters are in movement. Corps, divisions, and BCTs send advanced parties forward, including G-2/S-2 representatives.

5-26. (U) Based on the time available, units may conduct certain theater-specific intelligence readiness training before deployment. This training is generally tasked through Army Forces Command orders based on theater guidance, and it is often driven by material fielding to support the deployment but can include subjects such as threat awareness and theater reporting procedures. Once in theater, units, under the direction of theater representatives, may conduct additional intelligence training as part of the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration process.

5-27. (U) BCTs further tailor tactical SOPs to address theater-specific TTP. The BCT intelligence leadership works closely with INSCOM and the national agencies to tailor capabilities to the specific operational environment and to integrate new or additional capabilities. New or additional capabilities can include materiel (for example, quick reaction capabilities, hardware or software upgrades) and additional personnel (for example, military or contract linguists, E-MIB-provided PED platoons, CI teams, additional HUMINT and SIGINT teams). BCTs also establish communications and liaisons as necessary.

CONDUCT LARGE-SCALE GROUND COMBAT (U)

5-28. (U) The Army provides the joint force commander significant and sustained landpower and intelligence capabilities. *Landpower* is the ability—by threat, force, or occupation—to gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people (ADRP 3-0). The Army supports the joint force by providing capability and capacity for the application of landpower through maneuver, fires, special operations, intelligence, cyberspace operations, EW, space operations, sustainment, and area security.

5-29. (U) The joint force commander applies Army capabilities to neutralize sophisticated enemy forces and capabilities by systematically destroying key nodes and capabilities essential to the enemy's ability to continue fighting. The joint force requires Army special operations forces and conventional Army units that are proficient in combined arms operations and capable of employing capabilities across multiple domains in complementary ways. By aggressively engaging the enemy, Army forces enable joint force freedom of action. Army intelligence capabilities are an integral part of ISR across all unified action partners. During large-scale combat, intelligence operations are continually conducted to provide commanders and staffs the detailed knowledge of threat strengths, vulnerabilities, organizations, equipment, capabilities, and tactics to plan for and execute unified land operations. This intelligence supports the unit's battle rhythm, such as commander update briefs and various staff processes. The demands of large-scale combat operations consume all staff elements.

5-30. (U) Large-scale combat operations introduce levels of complexity, lethality, and ambiguity, and an operating tempo not common in other operations. When operating against a peer threat, commanders aggressively conduct decisive action to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Army operations must orchestrate many simultaneous actions in the most demanding of operational environments. Intelligence supports the commander by visualizing the threat and detecting possible threat COAs. Army forces must integrate and synchronize these actions across multiple domains to create opportunities to dislocate, isolate, disintegrate, and destroy enemy forces. Army forces strive to use intelligence, mobility, protection, and firepower to strike the enemy unexpectedly in multiple domains and from multiple directions, denying the enemy freedom to maneuver by creating multiple dilemmas that the enemy commander cannot effectively address. Intelligence supports these operations by facilitating situational understanding and supporting decision making. Intelligence assists commanders in seeing through the fog and friction of war.

5-31. (U) Beyond facilitating the commander's situational understanding and decision making, intelligence provides warning intelligence and supports the MDMP, targeting, and protection. Many different intelligence products predict different enemy COAs and supporting actions, as well as various risks and opportunities. These products are integral to staff analysis of friendly plans and orders. When possible, the intelligence warfighting function leverages the intelligence architecture to use national to tactical intelligence for Army operations. However, during specific phases of large-scale combat operations, tactical units must depend on their own collection and analysis because of the operating tempo and requirement for significant movement and maneuver. Units must concentrate combat power rapidly from dispersed locations to attack critical enemy assets and exploit opportunities; then, they must disperse quickly enough to avoid becoming targets themselves.

5-32. (U) Since some important intelligence capabilities are not organic to Army forces, commanders and staffs plan, coordinate for, and integrate joint and other unified action partner intelligence capabilities to support a multi-domain approach to operations. Some of these capabilities include national overhead collection, theater aerial collection, cyberspace operations, and EW. Using intelligence to see and understand within each domain can reduce risk to the friendly force and enhance success in chaotic and high-tempo operations. When operating against a peer threat, the commander must rely heavily on intelligence to identify windows of opportunity. The understanding that is gained from or facilitated by intelligence products allows

joint force and Army commanders to employ the right capabilities at the right time and place. Timely, accurate, and predictive intelligence and weather effects allow commanders to employ coordinated indirect fires, air missile defense, joint fires, and attack aviation at the right place and time, putting the enemy in a position of disadvantage.

5-33. (U) Given the dynamic and lethal nature of large-scale combat operations, corps, division, and BCT intelligence Soldiers must be proficient in a number of areas to support the high-tempo operations required to create and exploit windows of opportunity. The following are tasks and skills that require continuous, repetitive training for proficiency:

- Field craft.
- Command post displacement.
- Intelligence and EW maintenance and sustainment.
- Operating in CBRN environments.
- Continuous information collection from the consolidation area to deep operations.
- Intelligence support to targeting.
- Airspace control and requesting allocation of aerial collection assets.

THEATER ARMY (U)

5-34. (U) The theater army may provide the core of a land component command or may have a subordinate field army. The MIB-T's operations battalion forms the theater ACE. The joint force J-2 federates production requirements with the theater ACE responsible for maintaining the enemy ground COP, which is used in various forums to update the joint force commander. In a combined environment, the theater ACE conducts the bulk of its operations in combined workspaces and on combined networks while maintaining some unique U.S.-only facilities or capabilities.

5-35. (U) The theater ACE plays an important role in assessing the effectiveness of friendly operations through combat assessments that enable the joint force commander's decision making at key points in the operation plan (such as the transition to decisive operations). Additionally, the theater ACE conducts target development for the land component to support both joint force commander and land component commander targeting priorities. The theater battlefield coordination detachment assists the G-3 and G-2 in coordinating input into the joint prioritized integrated target list.

5-36. (U) As a component of the joint force, the theater army represents subordinate Army forces in joint boards and planning cells. The most important of these for the G-2 is the joint collection management board, which enables the joint force commander's decision making on the apportionment and allocation of ISR assets. In turn, the theater army may establish a process to further allocate ISR assets to either a field army or subordinate corps headquarters to support daily combat operations. The battlefield coordination detachment maintains close coordination with the combined air operations center ISR directorate duty officer and can assist in deconflicting ISR coverage issues generated by maintenance, weather, or changes in priority.

5-37. (U) A key aspect of apportionment and allocation of ISR assets is the allocation of Army intelligence forces and Army special operations forces within the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD). This includes Reserve Component forces such as interrogation battalions that support a joint interrogation and debriefing center. Furthermore, the theater army, based on the theater army G-2's recommendation, incorporates additional nonstandard and quick reaction intelligence capabilities into the theater army G-2, the MIB-T, or other subordinate units.

5-38. (U) The theater army G-2 organizes the effort to ensure there is sufficient PED of all assigned or allocated ISR assets through a combination of organic forces and reachback capabilities. The theater G-2 also supports campaign planning to address major changes to the situation, such as the transition from large-scale combat operations to the consolidation of gains.

CORPS (U)

5-39. (U) The corps G-2 and intelligence staff have important roles in the planning and execution of various operations and Army decisive action tasks, such as forcible entry operations, corps and/or subordinate division attacks, joint suppression of enemy air defense, deep operations, and corps-level river crossings.

5-40. (U) The corps staff, led by the corps intelligence cell, performs IPB to support all operational planning. As a result of IPB, the staff produces a range of intelligence products, including the enemy situation template and the event template and its associated matrix. (See figure 5-2.) These products assist in accomplishing tasks, including but not limited to sharing information across the staff, driving certain aspects of the corps war game, and generating requirements to drive the information collection effort. The corps collection manager uses IPB products to develop and then submit requirements to higher headquarters through joint systems, such as the Planning Tool for Resource, Integration, Synchronization, and Management (also called PRISM), for validation at the theater level. Additionally, the collection manager works in conjunction with the G-3 to generate taskings for assigned or attached information collection assets, Army aviation, and maneuver formations responsible for reconnaissance and security missions.



Figure 5-2. (U) Enemy situation template example

5-41. (U) The corps establishes procedures to suballocate theater information collection capabilities down to the division level. Additionally, the corps task-organizes the E-MIB to support the corps and subordinate commanders. In some cases, the E-MIB receives an aerial ISR task force from the aerial intelligence brigade, generally structured around an aerial exploitation battalion. The corps also integrates nonstandard or quick reaction capabilities into intelligence units or staffs.

5-42. (U) The corps can conduct expeditionary PED with assets from the E-MIB and the operational intelligence ground station within the corps G-2. In most cases, the corps requires intelligence reach support for PED, but the expeditionary capability ensures some level of support when there is no network connectivity in either an austere or degraded/denied environment.

5-43. (U) The synchronization of the corps analytical effort with information collection and intelligence operations is critical to providing the corps commander with the timely and accurate intelligence required to make decisions regarding decisive operations. (See figure 5-3.) The sheer magnitude of large-scale combat operations necessitates precise timing. Triggers to initiate decisive operations require precise and detailed intelligence reporting and assessments.



5-44. (U) Corps shaping operations set conditions for division operations. Shaping operations through fires or information operations require a thorough understanding of threat systems and critical vulnerabilities. The corps G-2 and intelligence staff ensure the information collection effort—

- Generates targetable data on key enemy systems to support shaping operations.
- Supports combat assessments that provide the commander with the necessary intelligence to decide if conditions have been met to initiate decisive operations.

5-45. (U) An example of synchronization at the corps level is coordination for joint ISR capabilities (with associated PED) to detect a moving enemy force (via SIGINT or a moving target indicator) and support the analytic assessment that triggers a commander's decision point. In turn, the decision point is synchronized with operations and fires (for example, joint fires or Army aviation) linked to a TAI.

5-46. (U) The corps intelligence staff also supports corps campaign planning and future operations. The intelligence staff identifies changes in the situation that allow the commander to take advantage of windows of opportunity by making adjustments to the plan beyond current operations.

Division (U)

5-47. (U) The division G-2 and intelligence staff have important roles in the planning and execution of decisive action. The division employs organic and supporting information collection assets to gain and maintain enemy contact, develop the situation, generate targeting data, and assess the effectiveness of division operations.

5-48. (U) The corps task-organizes a portion of the E-MIB to support division operations and enable subordinate commanders. Further, the division supports subordinate operations by further allocating information collection capabilities or task-organizing information collection capabilities in direct support of a subordinate; information collection support is not limited to BCTs. It is very important to adequately resource division artillery and combat aviation brigade operations. Further, information collection support is required in consolidating gains to identify enemy observers, bypassed enemy units, and unconventional forces.

5-49. (U) The division intelligence staff must coordinate PED to support these efforts. The division has one tactical intelligence ground station at the division and BCT levels. When task-organized, the supporting E-MIB provides PED capabilities, to include a tactical ground station PED platoon. The tactical ground station enables sensor data receipt and PED tools when network connectivity is limited or negated.

5-50. (U) The division collection manager orchestrates the information collection effort. The collection manager generates the requirements necessary to support division operations. The division uses the same joint systems as the corps' to request theater or national ISR support. Those requests are validated at higher echelons. The collection manager, working in conjunction with the G-3, generates taskings for organic and allocated information collection systems and for those units assigned a reconnaissance or security mission.

5-51. (U) The division intelligence staff supports targeting and combat assessments to identify and exploit enemy vulnerabilities. This enables commander's decision making to support additional shaping operations, initiating decisive operations, or shifting the main effort.

5-52. (U) The division G-2 and intelligence staff synchronize information operations, information collection, and combat assessments in a fluid and complex environment characterized by multiple BCT attacks, supporting combat aviation brigade operations, joint fires, and operations in the consolidation area. This synchronization allows the staff to identify windows of opportunities. Synchronization across the staff ties information collection to commander decision points with Army aviation and joint fires linked to the TAI.

5-53. (U) Fleeting windows of opportunity are addressed by current operations within division command posts. Intelligence also supports future operations by identifying changes in the situation beyond the current operations that necessitate changes to the plan.

BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM (U)

5-54. (U) The BCT S-2 and intelligence staff support BCT operations from planning through execution. The BCT S-2 conducts basic IPB to support decisive operations, such as an attack to penetrate an enemy defensive belt, a river crossing, or an envelopment. The information collection effort—

- Confirms or denies templated obstacles and enemy fighting positions, enemy reserves, and enemy attack positions.
- Generates targeting data and supports target detection.
- Supports both physical and functional damage assessments when it is a specific PIR.

5-55. (U) The BCT S-2 or designated representative, working in conjunction with the S-3, generates taskings for assigned, attached, and supporting intelligence assets. Additionally, the S-2 develops NAIs or requirements tasked by the S-3 to units assigned a reconnaissance, surveillance, or security mission.

5-56. (U) The MI company is tasked-organized to support BCT operations. The MI company may receive and integrate E-MIB assets based on the situation. The MI company tactical ground station team provides limited PED capability to support the BCT Shadow UAS platoon or to receive a moving target indicator from the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (also called JSTARS) via the common data link. The S-2 coordinates additional PED requirements through the division. In addition to organic assets, the BCT integrates supporting assets into the information collection plan.

5-57. (U) The BCT S-2 and intelligence staff synchronize intelligence with operations to ensure overmatch in the close fight. (See figure 5-4.) For example, SIGINT or EW and Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System coverage is synchronized with a friendly attack to detect enemy repositioning or enemy counterattack through either the EMS or by a moving target indicator. This synchronization allows the commander to visualize windows of opportunity and take advantage of those windows before they close.



DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE TASKS IN LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS (U)

5-58. (U) Corps and division commanders are directly concerned with those enemy forces and capabilities that can affect their current and future operations. Successful corps and division operations may depend on intelligence and successful joint interdiction operations, including those operations to isolate the battle or weaken the enemy force before the battle is fully joined. (See figure 5-5.)

5-59. (U) Corps and divisions execute decisive action tasks, of which offensive and defensive tasks comprise most of the activities. Commanders must focus and use intelligence to explicitly understand the lethality of large-scale combat operations to preserve their combat power and manage risk. Commanders also use ground maneuver and other land-based capabilities to enable maneuver in the other domains.

5-60. (U) BCTs and subordinate echelons concentrate on performing offensive and defensive tasks and necessary tactical enabling tasks, such as reconnaissance, security, or passage of lines. During large-scale combat operations, they only perform those minimal essential stability tasks necessary to comply with the laws of land warfare. These requirements create an even greater challenge for the intelligence warfighting function. They do not conduct operationally significant consolidate gains activities unless assigned that mission in a consolidation area.



Figure 5-5. (U) Enemy and friendly forces

Intelligence in the Defense (U)

5-61. (U) Before a battle, commanders at all echelons require intelligence and combat information. Specifically, they need to know—

- The composition, equipment, intent, strengths, vulnerabilities, and scheme of maneuver of the attacking enemy force.
- The location, direction, and speed of enemy reconnaissance elements.
- The location and activities of enemy units and reserves.

- Enemy command and control and communications facilities.
- The location of enemy fire support and air defense systems with associated command and control networks.

5-62. (U) The G-2 uses the prepare activity of the operations process to complete information collection integration and synchronization. Corps and divisions rely on joint and national systems to detect and track targets beyond their limited organic capabilities. The corps headquarters employs available information collection assets to refine its knowledge of the terrain, weather, and civil considerations within the area of influence. Information collection assets identify friendly vulnerabilities and key defensible terrain. The division headquarters conducts periodic information collection of any unassigned areas to prevent the enemy from exploiting those areas to achieve surprise.

5-63. (U) Commanders continuously refine the enemy portion of the COP throughout their areas of interest as part of deep operations. They focus their information collection efforts on key geographical areas and enemy capabilities of particular concern using NAIs. (See figure 5-6.)



Figure 5-6. (U) Named area of interest overlay example

5-64. (U) Surveillance of the areas of interest and effective reconnaissance are necessary to acquire targets and to verify and evaluate potential enemy COAs and capabilities. Information collection efforts focus on validating when, where, and with what strength the enemy will attack. This allows commanders to identify opportune times to conduct spoiling attacks and reposition forces.

Intelligence in the Offense (U)

5-65. (U) The information collection effort assists commanders in deciding when and where to concentrate combat power. Information collection assets answer the corps or division commander's PIRs and other information requirements, which flow from IPB and the war-gaming process. Information required may include—

- Enemy centers of gravity or decisive points.
- Location, orientation, and strength of enemy defenses. (See figure 5-7 on page 5-14.)

- Location of enemy reserves, fire support, and other attack assets to support defensive positions.
- Enemy air avenues of approach and likely enemy engagement areas.
- Key terrain, avenues of approach, and obstacles.

5-66. (U) The G-2 identifies threats to corps and division support and consolidation areas, such as enemy special purpose forces, enemy bypassed conventional forces, and irregular activities that may interfere with corps or division support activities.

5-67. (U) The G-2 integrates and synchronizes unified action partner capabilities into the collection effort. The G-2 recommends specific reconnaissance tasks for corps- or division-controlled reconnaissance forces, realizing the commander may task these forces to conduct offensive or other tactical enabling tasks. A focused approach to allocating collection assets maximizes the capability of the limited number of assets available to corps or divisions.

5-68. (U) The G-3 synchronizes information collection operations with combat operations to ensure all corps and division information collection provides timely information to support operations. The G-3 tasks information collection assets to support the targeting process. Information collection assets locate targets identified in the attack guidance matrix and call for fires. The fires cell may engage targets to achieve lethal and nonlethal effects.

5-69. (U) MI units and systems conduct intelligence operations to locate enemy units and systems. SIGINT and EW systems usually operate with the covering force and flank guard. The covering force commander directs EW against enemy command and control and fire support networks. The commander may use electronic deception to deceive the enemy as to the location of the main body. Space-based and cyberspace systems and activities also support the security force in locating and determining the presence of enemy disruption forces, contact forces, and shielding forces.



CONSOLIDATION AREA DURING LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS (U)

5-70. (U) The *consolidation area* is the portion of the commander's area of operations that is designated to facilitate the security and stability tasks necessary for the freedom of action in the close area and to support the continuous consolidation of gains (ADRP 3-0). The consolidation area is designed to solve the security challenge associated with maintaining tempo in the close and deep areas. This challenge is particularly difficult during offensive tasks when the BCT rear boundaries shift forward and increase the size of the division support area. Commanders cannot allow the enemy time to reconstitute units and capabilities and undo friendly forces' initial battlefield gains.

5-71. (U) During large-scale combat operations, the commander and staff must plan for and employ not only the necessary combat power but also beyond what is required for the close and deep areas to consolidate gains. Corps and division commanders may designate a consolidation area to a subordinate echelon as an AO. Subordinating this mission and a separate AO facilitates freedom of action by freeing other units so they can focus on the support, close, and deep areas. A division executing operations typically requires an additional BCT for the division consolidation area. Additionally, a corps executing operations may require an additional division for the corps consolidation area. The theater army must account for these additional forces required to consolidate gains when participating in joint planning before the conduct of operations.

5-72. (U) Consolidation areas are dynamic. The units assigned to these areas initially conduct offensive, defensive, and the minimal stability tasks necessary to defeat bypassed forces, control key terrain and facilities, and secure population centers. Over time, as the situation matures, the mix of tactical tasks is likely to be equal parts security and stability in each consolidation area. However, security-related tasks always have first priority. Planning and execution to consolidate gains must account for all potential means of enemy resistance and be approached as a form of exploitation and pursuit in order to create enduring outcomes. It is critical to avoid giving enemies the time to reorganize for an insurgency or some other kind of fight.

5-73. (U) Intelligence during consolidate gains primarily supports maintaining the momentum of battle across the AO. Establishing security and a limited amount of stability within the consolidation area may necessitate the augmentation of existing information collection capabilities as well as unique solutions to answer difficult requirements. (See figure 5-8 on page 5-16.) Intelligence staffs in the consolidation area focus on existing and future forces, other threats, hazards, and, at times, key civil considerations in the consolidation area. Those threats may range from insurgent groups infiltrating rear areas to hybrid or proxy forces with technologically advanced systems used to exploit vulnerabilities behind close battle areas. MI units in the consolidation area conduct a multitude of tasks.

5-74. (U) The synchronization of information collection and operations is critical in gaining and maintaining contact with enemy forces, as well as maintaining the tempo of operations across all echelons. (See figure 5-9 on page 5-17.) Due to the multitude of tasks occurring throughout the consolidation area, the entire staff must develop an information collection plan. For example, the G-4/S-4 can provide information on routes that must be secured against enemy stay-behind forces. The chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive (also called CBRNE) staff can provide input on threat chemical capabilities, as well as when and where they may be employed to impact consolidation area operations. Additional considerations include but are not limited to the following:

- Civilians, such as displaced persons or refugees, moving through the consolidation area and information they may provide regarding enemy activities.
- Information collection in support of logistics operations.
- Re-allocation of information collection assets.
- Identification of additional areas to focus information collection.
- Enemy use of civilian infrastructure that may impact friendly operations.
- High-value individuals or high-ranking military officers attempting to flee friendly forces.
- HVTs not destroyed, thus remaining as threats.
- Abandoned or bypassed munitions, weapons, and industrial chemicals that may enable continued insurgent or proxy lethal activities.

5-75. (U) Some examples of information collection in the consolidation area include—

- Reconnaissance and/or security operations along important lines of communications.
- Combined arms battalion collection against bypassed, stay-behind, and/or newly infiltrated enemy forces.
- Using CI to assess possible threat collection.
- Using GEOINT, MASINT, and SIGINT to determine enemy activities and possible intentions.
- HUMINT teams debriefing displaced persons on locations of enemy forces.

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

CONSOLIDATE GAINS (U)

5-76. (U) *Consolidate gains* are activities to make enduring any temporary operational success and set the conditions for a stable environment allowing for a transition of control to legitimate authorities (ADRP 3-0). Commanders continually (through all phases of the operation) consider activities necessary to consolidate gains and achieve the end state. Operations to consolidate gains require a dynamic intelligence effort to conduct offensive and defensive tasks that do not create secondary impacts to consolidating gains (for example, destroying key infrastructure) while also supporting the execution of area security and stability tasks.

CONSOLIDATE GAINS CONCURRENT WITH LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS (U)

5-77. (U) Army forces must continuously consolidate gains to make temporary gains enduring. Concurrently, intelligence requirements often support locating bypassed enemy forces, bypassed or abandoned munitions and weapons, and stay-behind special purpose and proxy forces; relocating displaced civilians; reestablishing law and order; providing humanitarian assistance; and restoring key infrastructure. These activities can only be accomplished if the intelligence effort is carefully nested with operations.

5-78. (U) Army forces must deliberately plan and prepare for consolidating gains to capitalize on operational success. Planning considerations include transitioning operations, changes to task organization, modification of the intelligence architecture, and new or additional assets required to achieve the desired end state. To consolidate gains, Army forces take the following specific actions:

- **Consolidation.** Forces organize and strengthen their newly occupied positions, so commanders can use them for subsequent operations.
- **Area security.** Forces conduct security tasks to defeat enemy remnants and protect friendly forces, routes, critical infrastructure, and populations, as well as enable friendly actions.
- **Stability tasks.** Initially, forces execute minimum-essential stability tasks; then, by executing the primary stability tasks, they can start to provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.

- **Influence over local and regional audiences.** Commanders communicate credible narratives to specific audiences to prevent interference and to ultimately generate support for operations.
- **Security from external threats.** Commanders ensure sufficient combat power is employed to prevent physical disruption from threats across the various domains and the information environment.

5-79. (U) During operations to consolidate gains, intelligence plays an important role in assessing the environment to—

- Detect both positive and negative trends.
- Determine the effectiveness of friendly operations.
- Identify actions that could threaten hard won gains.

5-80. (U) Essentially, this focuses the intelligence effort on situational understanding, warning intelligence, and support to force protection, as well as assists in determining termination criteria or when it is operationally acceptable to transition from large-scale combat operations.

CONSOLIDATE GAINS THROUGH STABILITY TASKS (U)

5-81. (U) Extensive consolidate gains efforts begin after a careful transition from large-scale combat operations. Operations in the consolidation areas are eventually expanded to include extensive stability tasks. The transition from large-scale combat operations to stability tasks must be conducted while maintaining security and changing the nature of information collection. Based on the commander's requirements, units may be required to modify their task organizations, priorities, and command relationships to meet additional tasks associated with stability tasks. It may be necessary to augment the size, composition, and capabilities of the forces task-organized under the corps and division with additional collection capacity and capability to address the six stability tasks:

- Establish civil security.
- Establish civil control.
- Restore essential services.
- Support to governance.
- Support economic and infrastructure development.
- Conduct security cooperation.

5-82. (U) Intelligence operations support to the six stability tasks includes but is not limited to support to combat terrorism, assistance with arms control, support to counterinsurgency, support to counterdrug operations, and support to foreign internal defense. Intelligence supports these operations in conjunction with providing assistance to maintain security. Essential to intelligence operations during the transition to the enable civil authority phase of operations is determining how intelligence units can support enabling the sustainability of civil authority. Intelligence staff and units have a different focus, organize in a different manner, and perform unique tasks:

- Many unique aspects of the operational environment become important, such as sociocultural factors, regional and local politics, and financial intelligence.
- Special operations forces-conventional integration becomes critical.
- Fusion centers and other unique analytical centers are formed.
- Certain aspects of operations become more important, such as counter-improvised explosive devices, counterterrorism, and screening local hires.

THEATER ARMY (U)

5-83. (U) The theater army adjusts the theater intelligence architecture based on the changing situation. For example, during the consolidation of gains, additional HUMINT forces may be required to engage the population and to conduct liaison activities with host-nation forces. Additional CI forces may be required to identify enemy agents or sympathizers. The theater might require additional aerial ISR assets to better support stability tasks such as hyperspectral imagery.

5-84. (U) The consolidation area may not be contiguous, and Army forces will likely consolidate gains in some AOs while still conducting large-scale combat operations in others. The theater army may reapportion or secure additional capabilities requested within the joint operations area to support the transition to stability. Then, the G-2 must carefully assess which intelligence assets are required to support each effort.

CORPS (U)

5-85. (U) The corps must continue combat operations while simultaneously consolidating gains. A division assigned the mission of operating in the consolidation area to support the corps is required to conduct a multitude of operations to include identifying and destroying stay-behind forces, identifying and neutralizing enemy special purpose forces and intelligence personnel, and determining any groups that are sympathetic to the enemy. Figure 5-8 on page 5-16 depicts corps and division consolidation areas within a geographic framework of large-scale combat operations.

5-86. (U) Intelligence is integral to these operations. Thorough IPB assists in identifying likely locations of enemy stay-behind and special purpose forces. Additionally, IPB is critical in identifying populations that might be (or might become) sympathetic to the enemy.

5-87. (U) Information collection remains important during the consolidation of gains; however, the effort becomes more decentralized. Information collection assets will typically be pushed to the lowest level where they can be effectively employed to support decentralized operations.

5-88. (U) The G-2 and the intelligence staff must pay special attention to intelligence support to specialized units (for example, Army special operations forces, military police, engineers, and U.S. Government agencies) working in close contact with the local population. Conversely, the G-2 and the intelligence staff use OSINT and reports from these specialized units since they often contain information that answers requirements and provides context about the operational environment. For example, OSINT units and Army special operations forces often provide vital information used to determine local sentiments, emerging issues and trends, and other significant factors within the operational environment.

DIVISION (U)

5-89. (U) Although the division is conducting large-scale combat operations, an attached or organic BCT may be tasked to consolidate gains during continued division offensive or defensive tasks. Therefore, that BCT will require a full complement of capability enablers, including intelligence. This may necessitate a change to the E-MIB task organization. For example, a BCT consolidating gains may require additional HUMINT or CI assets. The BCT may also require long loiter UAS coverage, such as Gray Eagle UASs from division combat aviation brigades, to monitor likely hide locations of stay-behind forces or enemy unconventional forces.

5-90. (U) The division information collection effort must balance requirements for long-range sensing to support shaping and decisive operations, with the requirement for persistent surveillance (both aerial and ground capabilities) in the consolidation area.

5-91. (U) The division G-2 and the intelligence staff must provide intelligence support to psychological operations units, military information support operations efforts, and other friendly forces in close contact with the local population to assess the effectiveness of friendly messages and to detect any unintended consequences based on friendly actions. Although all intelligence disciplines may provide support, OSINT is uniquely positioned to contribute to this effort by collecting from publicly available information.

BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM (U)

5-92. (U) The BCT S-2 and intelligence staff develop the situation from the bottom-up during the consolidation of gains. For example, only the BCT can gauge local sentiments, indications of enemy attempts to subvert vulnerable groups, battle damage assessment, and other local factors. Therefore, the BCT and lower echelons become the most important portion of the intelligence architecture. The BCT and lower echelons use intelligence capabilities differently and structure intelligence units in a different manner:

- Companies may form company intelligence support teams.
- HUMINT and SIGINT teams received different equipment and are employed at lower echelons.
- Biometric and forensic information and intelligence become more important.
- Small unit interaction with the local population becomes more important.
- HUMINT and SIGINT personnel may be task-organized together as a multifunction team to support high-value individual targeting.
- Intelligence support to site exploitation becomes more important.
- Intelligence analysts have access to more intelligence networks and databases.

5-93. (U) IPB and intelligence analysis drive the BCT information collection plan. For example, HUMINT reporting on a suspected safe house, special purpose forces cueing UAS coverage, local patrols to develop patterns of life, templates and hyperspectral imagery/light detection to identify possible cache sites in the vicinity of a suspected safe house.

5-94. (U) IPB can identify enemy observers within the line of sight to friendly high-value assets. The S-2 identifies NAIs, and the S-3 tasks local security patrols, including task-organized intelligence capabilities, to assist in identifying enemy personnel and to exploit them upon their capture. Additionally, the BCT S-2 coordinates information collection overwatch while the S-3 ensures Army aviation is available in a reconnaissance and attack role.

WIN (U)

5-95. (U) Winning is the achievement of the purpose of an operation and the fulfillment of its objectives. The intelligence warfighting function is integral to winning. The Army wins when—

- It successfully performs its roles as part of the joint force during operations.
- It effectively shapes an operational environment for combatant commanders.
- It responds rapidly with enough combat power to prevent war through deterrence during crisis.
- An enemy is defeated to such an extent that it can no longer resist effectively, and it agrees to cease hostilities on U.S. terms.

5-96. (U) When required to fight, the Army's ability to prevail in ground combat at any scale becomes a decisive factor in breaking the enemy's will to continue fighting. Intelligence is an inherent aspect of all Army operations and activities. Army operations to defeat enemies during large-scale combat operations is fundamental to winning wars. Large-scale combat operations occur in the form of major operations and campaigns aimed at defeating an enemy's armed forces and military capabilities to support national objectives.

Chapter 6

Fighting for Intelligence During Large-Scale Combat Operations (U)

OVERVIEW (U)

6-1. (U) Operational success requires a successful intelligence effort. Fighting for intelligence encompasses the basics of establishing an effective intelligence architecture, synchronizing the intelligence warfighting function, and planning and conducting information collection. The commander and staff need to understand the doctrinal fundamentals of fighting for intelligence and maintain proficiency in integrating the intelligence warfighting function into operations.

6-2. (U) Conducting realistic training and building effective relationships are important to operational success. Staff integration, operational planning, and information collection plans are not foolproof and can become ineffective. Army forces compete with an adaptive enemy; therefore, perfect planning and information collection seldom occurs. Intelligence is not perfect, information collection is not easy, and a single collection capability is not persistent and accurate enough to provide all of the answers. Conducting information collection requires thorough and creative planning, aggressive execution, and adjustments based on the situation.

THE CHALLENGE (U)

6-3. (U) Producing intelligence and executing information collection differ significantly based on the Army strategic role. For example, intelligence operations conducted during shaping operations differ drastically from intelligence operations conducted during large-scale combat operations.

6-4. (U) Of the four Army strategic roles (shape, prevent, conduct large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains), the intelligence warfighting function is most challenged to meet the vast number of large-scale combat operation requirements. Large-scale combat operations are intense, lethal, and brutal—creating conditions, such as complexity, chaos, fear, violence, fatigue, and uncertainty. Battlefields will include noncombatants crowded in and around dense urban areas. To further complicate operations, enemies will employ conventional and unconventional tactics, terrorism, criminal activities, and information warfare. Activities in the information environment will often be inseparable from ground operations. The fluid and chaotic nature of large-scale combat operations will cause the greatest degree of fog, friction, and stress on the intelligence warfighting function.

6-5. (U) When fighting a peer threat during large-scale combat operations, units must be prepared to fight for intelligence against enemy formations, a range of sophisticated threat capabilities, and many unknown conditions within the operational environment. The challenges to information collection include IADSs, long-range fires, counterreconnaissance, cyberspace and EW operations, and camouflage, concealment, and deception.

6-6. (U) Key aspects of fighting for intelligence to support operations include the following:

- Commanders drive intelligence.
- Effective staff integration is crucial.
- Effective intelligence requires a comprehensive intelligence architecture.
- A thoroughly developed and flexible information collection plan is critical.

- A successful information collection plan begins with identifying the right requirements for reconnaissance, surveillance, security operations, and intelligence operations.
- Together, commanders, staffs, and subordinate units strive and constantly adjust to develop and execute a layered and aggressive information collection plan.

THE COMMANDER'S ROLE AND STAFF INTEGRATION (U)

6-7. (U) Commanders and staffs need timely, accurate, relevant, and predictive intelligence to understand threat characteristics, goals and objectives, and COAs. Precise intelligence is critical to targeting threat capabilities at the right time and place to open windows of opportunity across domains. Commanders and staffs receive effective intelligence when they direct and participate in intelligence warfighting function activities. As discussed in chapter 1, close interaction between the commander, G-2/S-2, G-3/S-3, and the rest of the staff is essential as the entire staff supports unit planning and preparation through the integrating processes and continuing activities.

6-8. (U) From the perspective of fighting for intelligence, the first aspect of supporting operations is developing good information requirements and designating PIRs as a result of IPB and the completion of the MDMP. Commanders and staffs must have detailed knowledge of threat strengths, vulnerabilities, organizations, equipment, capabilities, and tactics to plan for and execute friendly operations. Additionally, there are many unique requirements that support sustaining operations and friendly activities within the various consolidation areas.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS (U)

6-9. (U) There is far more to intelligence analysis than simply IPB. Intelligence analysis must support the commander's decisions, situational understanding, Army design methodology, MDMP, targeting, and force protection considerations and continuous operational assessments. In any operation, both friendly and enemy forces will endeavor to set conditions to develop a position of relative advantage. Setting these conditions begins with generate intelligence knowledge, which provides relevant knowledge about the operational environment that is incorporated into the Army design methodology and then used later during other intelligence analysis tasks. (See figure 6-1.)

6-10. (U) During the MDMP, the intelligence staff leads IPB and conducts continuous intelligence analysis to understand the operational environment and the options it presents to friendly and threat forces. For example, threat databases and signatures developed during generate intelligence knowledge assist in assessing threat capabilities and vulnerabilities during IPB. This information facilitates decision making during the MDMP and provides a common understanding on how friendly forces may gain a position of relative advantage across multiple domains. This is essential when determining how best to mitigate sophisticated threat antiaccess and area denial systems, IADSs, and long-range fires capabilities, as well as accounting for civil considerations in the operational environment.

6-11. (U) Based on relevant aspects of the operational environment (determined during IPB), the commander and staff continuously assess information, operations, and changes in the operational environment. Warning intelligence, situation development, and intelligence support to targeting assist them in further shaping the operational environment to facilitate mission success. The continuous assessment of collected information also mitigates risk to friendly forces while identifying opportunities to leverage friendly capabilities to open a window of opportunity.



Figure 6-1. (U) Setting conditions to develop a position of relative advantage

INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS (U)

6-12. (U) Continual assessments and updates to IPB products, enable commanders and staffs to develop a realistic and sufficiently flexible plan to account for enemy objectives, COAs, and capabilities. This also assists commanders and staffs in identifying warning intelligence, which indicates changes in the likelihood of threat actions against friendly forces or developments likely to cause harm to friendly forces—whether in support of defensive or offensive tasks. Information requirements differ significantly based on the defensive or offensive task, the specific situation, and unique requirements for concurrent supporting operations such as missions in the various consolidation areas. During both friendly defensive and offensive tasks, there are consolidation area requirements to detect enemy bypassed or stay-behind forces, special purpose forces, irregular forces, terrorists, and efforts to create an insurgency or conduct information warfare.

DEFENSIVE TASKS (U)

6-13. (U) A *defensive task* is a task conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability tasks (ADRP 3-0). The three basic friendly defensive tasks are area defense, mobile defense, and retrograde. During friendly defensive tasks, enemy forces employ precision fires, other long-range fires, and nonlethal capabilities (such as cyber and EW) to attack friendly mission command and key supporting and sustaining capabilities. Friendly forces aim to prepare defensive positions and set conditions while the enemy attempts to set the timing of, location of, and conditions for battle.

6-14. (U) Intelligence supports friendly force efforts to protect the force, disburse and reassemble the force as necessary, and answer requirements on when, where, and in what strength the enemy will attack. This intelligence supports decisions on setting the defense, employing various capabilities, repositioning forces, conducting counterattacks, and when possible, transitioning to offensive tasks. Table 6-1 depicts intelligence requirements generally associated with friendly defensive tasks.



Area Defense (U)

6-15. (U) The *area defense* is a defensive task that concentrates on denying enemy forces access to designated terrain for a specific time rather than destroying the enemy outright (ADRP 3-90). Area defense can take place at the tactical and operational levels of war. The area defense focuses on retaining terrain where the bulk of a defending force positions itself in mutually supporting, prepared positions. Units maintain their positions and control the terrain between these positions. The decisive operation focuses fires into engagement areas, possibly supplemented by a counterattack. Commanders can use their reserve to reinforce fires, add depth, block, or restore a position by counterattack; seize the initiative; and destroy enemy forces. Units at all echelons can conduct an area defense. (See FM 3-90-1 for the advantages and disadvantages of using a defense in depth and a forward defense during the conduct of an area defense.)

6-16. (U) The intelligence staff leads the rest of the staff in identifying when, where, with what strength, and how the enemy will attack. This allows the commander to identify opportune times to conduct spoiling attacks and reposition forces. The entire staff also identifies threats to support and to consolidation areas, such as enemy special purpose forces and irregular activities, which may interfere with control of the defense. In addition to the intelligence requirements identified in table 6-1, conducting an area defense operations includes consideration of the following intelligence requirements:

(b)(3)

Mobile Defense (U)

6-17. (U) The *mobile defense* is a defensive task that concentrates on the destruction or defeat of the enemy through a decisive attack by a striking force (ADRP 3-90). Mobile defense is more often associated with the operational level of war. The mobile defense focuses on defeating or destroying an enemy by allowing enemy forces to advance to a point where they are exposed to a decisive counterattack by a striking force. The *striking force* is a dedicated counterattack force in a mobile defense constituted with the bulk of available combat power (ADRP 3-90). A fixing force is a force designated to supplement the striking force by preventing the enemy from moving from a specific area for a specific time. A fixing force supplements the striking force by holding attacking enemy forces in position, to help channel attacking enemy forces into ambush areas, and to retain areas from which to launch the striking force. A mobile defense requires an AO with considerable depth. Commanders shape their battlefields, causing an enemy force to overextend its lines of communications, expose its flanks, and dissipate its combat power. Commanders move friendly forces around and behind an enemy force to cut off and destroy them. A division or higher echelon normally executes a mobile defense. BCTs and maneuver battalions participate in a mobile defense as part of a fixing force or a striking force.

6-18. (U) In addition to the intelligence requirements identified in table 6-1, conducting a mobile defense operations includes consideration of the following intelligence requirements:

(b)(3)

Retrograde (U)

6-19. (U) The *retrograde* is a defensive task that involves organized movement away from the enemy (ADRP 3-90). A retrograde can take place at the tactical or operational levels of war. An enemy may force these operations, or a commander may execute them voluntarily. The higher echelon commander of a force executing a retrograde must approve the retrograde before its initiation. A retrograde is a transitional operation. It is not conducted in isolation. It is always part of a larger scheme of maneuver designed to regain the initiative and defeat the enemy.

6-20. (U) The three forms of the retrograde are—

- **Delay.** A *delaying operation* is an operation in which a force under pressure trades space for time by slowing down the enemy's momentum and inflicting maximum damage on the enemy without, in principle, becoming decisively engaged (JP 3-04). In delays, units yield ground to gain time while retaining flexibility and freedom of action to inflict the maximum damage on an enemy.
- **Withdrawal.** A *withdrawal operation* is a planned retrograde operation in which a force in contact disengages from an enemy force and moves in a direction away from the enemy (JP 3-17). Withdrawing units, whether all or part of a committed force, voluntarily disengage from an enemy to preserve the force or release it for a new mission.
- **Retirement.** A *retirement* is a form of retrograde in which a force out of contact moves away from the enemy (ADRP 3-90).

6-21. (U) In each form of the retrograde, a force that is not in contact with an enemy moves to another location, normally by a tactical road march. In all retrograde operations, firm control of friendly maneuver elements is a prerequisite for success.

6-22. (U) The intelligence staff leads the rest of the staff in analyzing the terrain, including ground and air avenues of approach, to determine the best routes for both the friendly force retrograde and the likely enemy exploitation or pursuit operation. In addition to the intelligence requirements identified in table 6-1 on page 6-4, conducting a retrograde operation includes consideration of the following intelligence requirements:

(b)(3)

Offensive Tasks (U)

6-23. (U) An *offensive task* is a task conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain, resources, and population centers (ADRP 3-0). The four basic friendly offensive tasks are movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit. During friendly offensive tasks, enemy forces attempt to disrupt friendly activities by employing precision fires, other long-range fires, and nonlethal capabilities (like cyber and EW). Therefore, friendly forces strive to conduct the necessary movements, prepare logistical support, and set other conditions while the enemy attempts to prevent friendly forces from effectively synchronizing adequate combat power.

6-24. Intelligence determines when and where the enemy will concentrate combat power, find gaps and weaknesses in enemy defenses, and predict how the enemy will conduct any counterattacks. This intelligence supports decisions on conducting information collection, executing long-range fires, penetrating enemy security areas, overcoming obstacles, avoiding enemy strengths, defeating enemy counterattacks, and when possible, transitioning to exploitation or pursuit. Table 6-2 depicts intelligence requirements generally associated with the friendly offensive tasks.



Movement to Contact (U)

6-25. (U) *Movement to contact* is an offensive task designed to develop the situation and establish or regain contact (ADRP 3-90). Commanders conduct a movement to contact when an enemy situation is vague or not specific enough to conduct an attack. The goal of a movement to contact is to make initial contact with a small element while retaining enough combat power to develop the situation and mitigate the associated risk. A movement to contact employs purposeful and aggressive reconnaissance and security operations to gain contact with the enemy main body and develop the situation. The movement to contact force defeats enemy forces within its capability and creates favorable conditions for subsequent tactical actions. If the movement to contact force meets a superior force that it is unable to defeat, the movement to contact force conducts the security or defensive tasks necessary to develop the situation further. A movement to contact may result in a meeting engagement. Once an enemy force makes contact, the friendly commander has five options: attack, defend, bypass, delay, or withdraw. Subordinate forms of a movement to contact include search and attack, and cordon and search operations.

6-26. (U) A thorough IPB and war-gaming effort indicates areas where contact with the enemy is likely as well as friendly and enemy vulnerabilities by phase of the operation. In addition to the intelligence requirements identified in table 6-2 on page 6-7, movement to contact includes considering the following intelligence requirements:

(b)(3)

Attack (U)

6-27. (U) An *attack* is an offensive task that destroys or defeats enemy forces, seizes and secures terrain, or both (ADRP 3-90). Attacks incorporate coordinated movement supported by fires. They may be part of either decisive or shaping operations. A commander may describe an attack as hasty or deliberate, depending on the time available for assessing the situation, planning, and preparing. A commander may decide to conduct an attack using only fires (including EW, offensive cyberspace operations, and other information-related capabilities), based on an analysis of the mission variables (METT-TC). An attack differs from a movement to contact because in an attack, commanders know at least part of an enemy's dispositions. This knowledge enables commanders to better synchronize and more effectively employ combat power. Subordinate forms of the attack have special purposes. They include the tasks of ambush, counterattack, demonstration, feint, raid, and spoiling attack. The commander's intent and the mission variables determine which of these forms of attack to employ. Commanders conduct each of these forms of attack, except for a raid, as either a hasty or a deliberate operation.

6-28. (U) In addition to the intelligence requirements identified in table 6-2 on page 6-7, attack includes considering the following intelligence requirements:

(b)(3)

Exploitation (U)

6-29. (U) An *exploitation* is an offensive operation that usually follows a successful attack and is designed to disorganize the enemy in depth (JP 2-01.3). An exploitation seeks to disintegrate enemy forces, so they have no alternative but to surrender or retreat. Exploitations take advantage of tactical opportunities. Division and higher headquarters normally plan exploitations as a branch or sequel.

6-30. (U) In addition to the intelligence requirements identified in table 6-2 on page 6-7, exploitation includes considering the following intelligence requirements:

(b)(3)

Pursuit (U)

6-31. (U) A *pursuit* is an offensive task designed to catch or cut off a hostile force attempting to escape, with the aim of destroying it (ADRP 3-90). A pursuit normally follows a successful exploitation. However, if enemy resistance breaks down and the enemy begins fleeing the battlefield, any offensive task can transition into a pursuit. Pursuits entail rapid movement and decentralized control. Bold action and calculated initiative are required in the conduct of a pursuit.

6-32. (U) Any rapid decision making in support of a pursuit uses IPB planning and products from the original offensive task and the appropriate branch or sequel planning. In addition to the intelligence requirements identified in table 6-2 on page 6-7, pursuit includes considering the following intelligence requirements:

(b)(3)

OTHER KEY TASKS FOR SHAPING LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS (U)

6-33. (U) There are many important aspects of all offensive and defensive tasks, including the tactical enabling tasks. In combat, seizing the initiative involves conducting reconnaissance, maintaining security, performing defensive and offensive tasks at the earliest possible time, forcing the enemy to culminate offensively, and setting the conditions for decisive operations. Operations in the deep area involve efforts to prevent uncommitted or out-of-contact enemy maneuver forces from being committed coherently or preventing enemy enabling capabilities, such as fires and air defense, from creating effects in the close area. The purpose of operations in the deep area is to set conditions for success in the close area or to set conditions for future operations. Therefore, units must execute successful reconnaissance, security operations, and deep operations before or as a part of all offensive and defensive tasks. Specifically, executions of these three key tasks are critical to the success of all offensive and defensive tasks.

Reconnaissance (U)

6-34. (U) Typically, reconnaissance is conducted to gain more information about a terrain feature, geographic area, enemy force, or other operational or mission variable that is important for a commander to formulate, confirm, or modify a COA. Commanders normally assign reconnaissance objectives, which can be information about a specific geographic location, a specific enemy activity to be confirmed or denied, or a specific enemy unit to be located and tracked. Therefore, every reconnaissance is different and there is no general list of information requirements.

Security Operations (U)

6-35. (U) The main difference between performing security tasks and reconnaissance tasks is that security tasks orient on the force or facility being protected, while reconnaissance tasks are enemy- and terrain-oriented. The goal of security tasks is protecting a force from surprise and reducing the unknowns in any situation. Commanders may perform security tasks to the front, flanks, or rear of a friendly force. Security tasks are shaping operations. As a shaping operation, economy of force is often a consideration when planning. Security operations encompass five tasks:

- **Screen.** *Screen* is a security task that primarily provides early warning to the protected force (ADRP 3-90).
- **Guard.** *Guard* is a security task to protect the main force by fighting to gain time while also observing and reporting information and preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body. Units conducting a guard mission cannot operate independently because they rely upon fires and functional and multifunctional support assets of the main body (ADRP 3-90).
- **Cover.** *Cover* is a security task to protect the main body by fighting to gain time while also observing and reporting information and preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body (ADRP 3-90). (Cover, as a doctrinal term, also has other definitions.)
- **Area security.** *Area security* is a security task conducted to protect friendly forces, installations routes, and actions within a specific area (ADRP 3-90). The security force may be protecting the civilian population, civil institutions, and civilian infrastructure with a unit's AO.
- **Local security.** *Local security* is a security task that includes low-level security activities conducted near a unit to prevent surprise by the enemy (ADRP 3-90). Local security is closely associated with unit force protection efforts.

Deep Operations (U)

6-36. (U) Deep operations are combined arms operations directed against uncommitted enemy forces or capabilities before they can engage friendly forces in the close fight. Deep operations also contribute to setting the conditions to transition to the next phase of an operation (for example, from a defensive to an offensive task). Deep operations are not simply attacking an enemy force in depth. Instead, they are the sum of all activities that influence when, where, and in what condition enemy forces will be committed. Deep operations are normally planned and controlled at theater army, corps, and division levels, and typically include information collection, target acquisition, ground and air maneuver, fires, CEMA, and information operations either singly or in combination. (See ATP 3-94.2 for more on deep operations.)

6-37. (U) Intelligence support to deep operations is an inherent part of intelligence support to targeting. Intelligence requirements to address deep operations include—

(b)(3)

THE INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE AND THE INFORMATION COLLECTION PLAN (U)

6-38. (U) After completing the MDMP (to include developing requirements), the commander and staff develop an information collection plan. Developing the information collection plan involves overlaying the information requirements on the current situation, operational plan, and the existing intelligence architecture. Other staff activities that affect the development of the information collection plan include—

- The air tasking order cycle.
- The targeting process and targeting boards and workgroups.
- Collection management boards/workgroups or operations and intelligence working groups, when formed.

6-39. (U) When the commander and staff start planning, many aspects of and limitations to information collection have already been set based on the specifics of the intelligence architecture and mission command network. While units can change a few components of the intelligence architecture within a short timeframe, most components are already set or require a fairly long lead time to change. Therefore, setting the intelligence architecture is an important aspect of the shape and deter roles.

6-40. (U) The intelligence architecture is developed well before deployment based on future planning and assumptions on the employment of intelligence capabilities. Periodically, units will revise the intelligence architecture based on new planning factors and assumptions, as well as the addition of new capabilities. Before deployment, units task-organize information collection capabilities based on the intelligence architecture and other factors such as the command post structure and other key mission command nodes. Following initial deployment, the intelligence architecture will already be largely established and each unit will develop an information collection plan within the context of the architecture.

ESTABLISHING THE INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE (U)

6-41. (U) The intelligence architecture begins with understanding intelligence capabilities. Intelligence capabilities broadly fall into the categories of intelligence collection capabilities (by intelligence discipline) and all-source intelligence capabilities. However, understanding capabilities is more complex than simply knowing the broad categories. Each intelligence collection capability comprises specific collectors/collection platforms with one or more specific capabilities or associated sensors. For example, a HUMINT collection

team is a HUMINT team that can conduct interrogations, military source operations, and debriefings. (Appendix A provides specific information and planning considerations for intelligence collection capabilities by intelligence discipline.)

6-42. (U) Many intelligence capabilities are designed to be employed as organic capabilities at a specific echelon. However, some MI units are designed to provide downward reinforcing capabilities that are task-organized to a lower echelon. For example, an E-MIB deploys HUMINT units to conduct interrogations in various detention facilities and deploys HUMINT collection and Prophet teams to support the division and/or BCTs.

6-43. (U) The tables in chapter 4 provide a general list of the organic and supporting intelligence collection and all-source intelligence capabilities by echelon. However, each echelon receives and depends on intelligence from higher and lower echelons and lateral units. They can receive this intelligence through various means on a number of different networks. The means include formal message traffic, databases, product libraries, chat rooms, intelligence dissemination systems, and various voice methods. Intelligence personnel disseminate and access information and intelligence on a number of networks, including the NIPRNET, SIPRNET, JWICS, coalition networks, and intelligence broadcast systems.

6-44. (U) Therefore, the tables in chapter 4 do not provide the depth and breadth of the intelligence warfighting function at each echelon. Figure 6-2 on page 6-12 illustrates how leveraging national to tactical intelligence capabilities can support tactical operations down to the BCT level through organic and supporting collection, as well as dissemination through intelligence broadcast dissemination systems and other intelligence systems, such as DCGS-A, down to the battalion level.

6-45. (U) To establish an effective intelligence architecture, it is important to understand some key aspects and limitations of all intelligence architectures:

- All-source analysis is the central portion of the intelligence architecture. Information collection is meaningless without all-source analysis. All-source analysis drives subsequent information collection requirements.
- The PED structure is an important component of the intelligence architecture. Processing is inherent within all intelligence collection.
- There are more requirements for intelligence collection than there are collectors.
- Each echelon has unique challenges based on the enemy and the specific operation. The enemy fights to counter the friendly force's information collection capabilities.
- The commander and staff must adequately resource the intelligence architecture. Adequate resourcing includes sufficient network capability (for example, bandwidth) and access. Network access and effective unit communications are especially critical.
- Those MI units designed to be downward reinforcing may require equipment or other support to be effective.
- Intelligence capabilities and specific collectors face their own issues, such as complex communication challenges, technical parameters, terrain effects, survivability, unique equipment, and support and intelligence and EW maintenance. (See paragraph 3-12 for a list of intelligence capability considerations.)
- Other important aspects of the intelligence architecture include MI unit mission command and technical channels/management.

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DEVELOPING THE INFORMATION COLLECTION PLAN (U)

6-46. (U) PIRs and the most important intelligence requirements and targeting requirements form the basis of an integrated information collection plan. Based on the MDMP, including a thorough war game, the commander and staff develop a detailed and realistic information collection plan to answer as many requirements as possible. Staff integration and synchronization ensures the enemy situation and the operational environment (not just a predetermined operational plan) drive the information collection effort. Sometimes, this is referred to as fighting the enemy and not just fighting the plan. Generally, intelligence units and collectors are allocated based on priorities and the unit's main effort. Additionally, a unit may have to depend on the higher echelon to provide intelligence support during a particular operational phase because the unit is constantly moving or has a high operating tempo and cannot produce its own intelligence.

6-47. (U) Commanders and staffs use the principles of information collection, IPB and other key staff products, and knowledge of information collection capabilities and limitations to develop the information collection plan. One effective technique to develop an integrated information collection plan is forming an operations and intelligence working group. A good technique for emphasizing the information collection effort is including the most important aspects of this effort in the concept of operations. (See FM 3-55 and ATP 2-01 for more on developing an information collection plan.)

INFORMATION COLLECTION GAPS (U)

6-48. (U) As commanders and staffs develop the information collection plan, they may encounter information collection gaps, which often occur due to—

- Rules of engagement.
- Insufficient networks, systems, or personnel/linguists.
- Lack of technical capabilities.
- Inadequate collection range.
- Movement in preparation for operations.
- A high operating tempo and constant maneuver.
- Unfavorable terrain.
- Unacceptable risk for the employment of specific assets.
- Threat countermeasures.

6-49. (U) Figure 6-3 on page 6-14 illustrates an example scenario that includes potential operational- and tactical-level information collection gaps from 75 to 300 kilometers beyond the forward edge of the battle area. Potential information collection gaps exist because—

- National technical means, when available, focus on national priorities. Even when aligned against joint force command priorities, these means may not meet tactical-level requirements.
- Most of the other Service ISR systems do not focus on ground requirements unless they are allocated to Army forces.
- Most theater-level intelligence collection capabilities and sensors are employed to answer theater intelligence requirements.
- Corps-level and below information collection units and systems cannot collect at the 75 to 300-kilometer range due to the limited range of ground collection systems and the lethality of enemy IADSs to aerial intelligence collection. Figure 6-3 on page 6-14 illustrates the furthest information collection range and relative employment risk by echelon.

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- Report information rapidly and accurately.
- Provide early warning.
- Retain freedom of movement.

6-53. (U) The information collection plan must be simple enough to execute, should avoid being predictable to enemy forces, and should include adequate operations security measures to protect friendly operations. Effective information collection planning depends on collaboration across the echelons in order to vertically and horizontally layer the information collection effort. A layered and continuous information collection effort provides better opportunities for detecting enemy formations, fires capabilities, and critical specialized capabilities that pose the greatest threat to friendly forces.

6-54. (U) Information collection at certain depths or against certain threat capabilities may not seem possible. However, commanders and staffs can attempt several approaches, such as the following, to ensure or surge information collection during critical phases of an operation:

(b) (3)

DEVELOPING THE SITUATION AND CONTINUOUS INFORMATION COLLECTION (U)

6-55. (U) The fight for intelligence becomes more difficult as units receive long-range fires and make contact with enemy forces. Information collection and intelligence analysis are integral to developing the situation. The intelligence staff conducts synchronizing activities to assist the unit in developing the situation and adjusting information collection. There are many requirements for the G-2/S-2 and rest of the intelligence staff to participate in unit battle rhythm activities to synchronize intelligence support and the information collection effort. The intelligence staff provides updates on the situation and briefs changes to the information collection plan during various commander updates, boards, cell meetings, and other meetings. Additionally, the corps and division intelligence staffs may attend or watch theater-level collection management boards, giving them insight into national and joint priorities and coverage. This insight, coordination, and preparation create opportunities for tactical units to leverage national and joint capabilities.

6-56. (U) The theater army, corps, and division G-2s convene an operations and intelligence working group, or some form of synchronization meeting, with key staff and subordinate units. These intelligence synchronization meetings (normally conducted via video teleconferencing) create a common understanding of the enemy, ensure information collection plans address changes in the situation, and coordinate continuous information collection across echelons and units.

6-57. (U) For example, the G-2 might anticipate an enemy unit designated as an HPT will cross a key phase line in the next 24 to 48 hours. The predicted movement of the HPT could cause the corps G-3 and G-2 to coordinate with the division G-3 and G-2 to ensure there is continuous tracking of the HPT with no loss of coverage. During the intelligence synchronization meeting, the corps G-2 and division G-2 could coordinate or adjust an intelligence hand-over line to ensure continuous coverage of the HPT. Another information collection

technique is to coordinate for complementary/supporting coverage. For example, the theater army could conduct UAS collection for the corps while the HPT moves into a corps deep engagement area. At the BCT and battalion levels, there is no requirement for an operations and intelligence working group but the operations and intelligence staff must still synchronize intelligence support and the information collection effort.

6-58. (U) Information collection is continuous through the execution of operations and transition to consolidate gains. The all-source analytical effort is key to informing the commander and staff, who in turn support the continued fight for intelligence. Therefore, G-2/S-2s, all-source analysts, and collection managers must collaborate closely. Intelligence analysis assists in discovering collection gaps, generating more information requirements, and driving all operations. As with initial planning, information collection requirements can be answered immediately or designated as PIRs by the commander or validated as information requirements in order to drive information collection. Additionally, analysis assists in determining the effectiveness of the information collection effort. That assessment leads to adjustments in the information collection plan, making it more efficient and effective. Thorough planning allows continuous collection planning through all phases, branches, and sequels of an operation.

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their impacts; civil authority considerations; military organizations, structure, and equipment; and attitudes toward U.S., multinational, or host-nation forces. Studies can also include the views and attitudes of multinational and host-nation forces towards these factors. Complete studies include two tasks:

- Produce an area, regional, or country study of a foreign country.
- Produce a specified study.

TAILOR THE INTELLIGENCE FORCE (2.1.5) (U)

B-21. (U) The generating force uses mission analysis to focus the allocation of intelligence resources for use by a JTF or combatant commander as well as to support strategic objectives, the Army's mission, and operations at each echelon. Based on its own mission analysis, the staff at each echelon allocates intelligence resources obtained through the generating force according to the commander's guidance, intent, and mission objectives.

PROVIDE SUPPORT TO SITUATIONAL UNDERSTANDING (2.2) (U)

B-22. (U) *Situational understanding* is the product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the relationships among the operational and mission variables to facilitate decision making (ADP 5-0). Support to situational understanding is the task of providing information and intelligence to commanders so they can clearly understand the force's current state with relation to the threat and other aspects of the AO. It supports the commander's ability to make sound decisions. (See figure B-3 on page B-8.) Support to situational understanding includes the following six tasks:

- Perform IPB.
- Perform situation development.
- *Intelligence support to unique missions.*
- Provide tactical intelligence overwatch.
- Conduct police intelligence operations.
- Provide intelligence support to civil affairs (CA) operations.

Note. (U) Headquarters, U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence will rescind ART 2.2.3 (*provide intelligence support to protection*) with the next publication of ADRP 3-37.

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Appendix C

Joint Task Force and Unified Action Partner Considerations (U)

OPERATING AS A JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS (U)

C-1. (U) When a division or corps is designated to function as a JTF headquarters, it requires significant augmentation to fulfill the associated tasks. An Army unit designated as a JTF headquarters follows joint doctrine. (See JP 3-33.) The Army intelligence staff assumes the role of the joint force intelligence staff. (Joint doctrine calls this staff the intelligence directorate.) (See JP 2-01.)

C-2. (U) The primary function of the Army intelligence staff when employed as a JTF intelligence staff does not change; however, this function becomes more complex. The amount of available information often exceeds the staff's ability to manage, fully understand, and leverage it. There is a high demand for information from national leadership, the media, and higher headquarters. This demand has the potential to overwhelm the staff unless additional resources are allocated. There are also complex multinational and interagency considerations for the conduct of intelligence operations, the intelligence architecture, liaison, and intelligence sharing.

C-3. (U) The primary tasks of the joint intelligence staff include—

- Facilitating an understanding of the operational environment and supports decision making.
- Tailoring and distributing intelligence operations, if necessary implementing a federated structure across multiple echelons. When appropriate, the joint force intelligence staff must also place analysis assets in forward locations to better support lower echelon requirements.
- Ensuring availability of intelligence.
- Prioritizing collection and allocating analysis resources.
- Integrating threat assessments developed by the combatant command intelligence organization to provide the JTF commander, staff, components, and subordinate units with the complete air, space, ground, maritime, and cyberspace threat situation.

C-4. (U) The joint force intelligence staff uses the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment process to analyze the relevant aspects of the environment, including the physical domains, the information environment, and PMESII-PT system and subsystems. (See JP 2-01.3.) This analysis allows the joint staff to develop a COP and the joint force intelligence staff to provide other intelligence support products.

C-5. (U) Joint ISR and Army information collection both share the purpose of synchronizing and integrating the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and PED systems in direct support of current and future operations. In both joint and Army doctrine, this activity is an integrated operations and intelligence function.

C-6. (U) Army information collection doctrine expanded the joint doctrinal concept of ISR by better accounting for the role of ground reconnaissance and surveillance operations. (See FM 3-55.) Information collection activities are a synergistic whole, with emphasis on synchronization and integration of all components and systems. Commanders and staffs have vital responsibilities in information collection planning, preparation, execution, and assessment. Commanders' involvement is particularly important. The success of information collection is measured by its contributions to the commander's understanding, visualization, and decision making. Table C-1 on page C-2 depicts the comparison of the joint ISR and Army information collection.

Table C-1. (U) Joint ISR and Army information collection responsibilities

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Joint ISR		***Army***	
Task	***Responsibility***	***Task***	***Responsibility***
ISR concept of operations	J-2 (in coordination with the J-3)	Annex L (Information Collection) of the plan or order	G-2 and G-3 (S-2 and S-3)
Collection management: • Collection requirements management • Collection operations management	J-2 (in coordination with the J-3)	Collection management	G-2/S-2
		Direct information collection	G-3/S-3
Execute collection	Units and organizations	Execute collection	Units and organizations
Assessment and retasking		Assessment and retasking	
G-2 assistant chief of staff, intelligence G-3 assistant chief of staff, operations ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff		J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff S-2 battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer S-3 battalion or brigade operations staff officer	
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C-7. (U) The ISR concept of operations roughly corresponds to Annex L (Information Collection) of an Army operation plan or order. The ISR concept of operations documents the synchronization, integration, and operation of ISR resources to support current and future operations. It outlines the capability to task, collect, process, exploit, and disseminate timely and accurate information that provides the awareness necessary to successfully conduct operations. It addresses how all available ISR collection assets and associated PED infrastructure, including multinational and commercial assets, will be used to satisfy the joint force's anticipated collection tasks.

C-8. (U) To facilitate the optimum use of all available ISR assets, the J-2, in coordination with the J-3, develops an ISR concept of operations in conjunction with the command's planning effort. The ISR concept of operations should be based on the collection strategy and ISR execution planning, and it should be developed jointly by the joint force intelligence and operations staffs. Planning for the ISR concept of operations must also identify and discuss any ISR and PED asset gaps relative to the joint force's validated PIRs. This assessment may be used to justify a commander's request for the allocation of additional ISR and PED resources. It should also require a periodic evaluation of the capabilities and contributions of all available ISR assets relative to the joint force mission in order to maximize their efficient utilization and ensure the timely release of allocated ISR resources when no longer needed by the joint force.

C-9. (U) In the joint lexicon, collection management is a process with two subfunctions:

- **Collection requirements management**—
  - Defines what intelligence systems must collect.
  - Focuses on the requirements of the customer.
  - Is all-source oriented and advocates for what information is necessary for collection.
- **Collection operations management**—
  - Specifies how to satisfy the requirement.
  - Focuses on the selection of specific intelligence disciplines and systems within a discipline to collect information addressing the customer's requirement.
  - Is conducted by organizations to determine which assets can best satisfy customers' product requests.
  - Is informed by weather effects on collection assets based on current and predictive weather conditions in the operational environment.

UNIFIED ACTION INTELLIGENCE CONSIDERATIONS (U)

C-10. (U) Every operation is different. So are the ways in which intelligence operations are conducted with unified action partners, especially multinational forces. There are many complex considerations when conducting interagency and multinational intelligence operations, to include intelligence sharing, the intelligence architecture, and liaison.

MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS (U)

C-11. (U) Multinational operations are common, making multinational intelligence operations very important. (See FM 3-16.) National interests require the United States to act with other nations. In many situations, U.S. forces join with foreign forces to defeat common threats. The classification of U.S. intelligence will present a challenge in releasing information, but sharing as much information and intelligence as possible improves interoperability and trust within a multinational force. Commanders and staffs need to understand their own and other nations' policies on intelligence sharing. Early sharing of information during planning ensures that multinational forces operate effectively.

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS PLANNING AND COORDINATION IN MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS (U)

C-12. (U) The multinational force intelligence staff plans and coordinates intelligence operations to support the multinational effort. The U.S. joint force staff provides intelligence and products to partners as authorized within the confines of the national disclosure policy and direction of the foreign disclosure office (FDO).

The Collection Coordination and Intelligence Requirements Management Process (U)

C-13. (U) The multinational force intelligence staff uses the collection coordination and intelligence requirements management (CCIRM) process, which describes those activities that result in the effective and efficient employment of intelligence collection and PED to satisfy intelligence requirements in support of operations. The CCIRM process consists of two major activities:

- **Intelligence requirements management** equates to collection management in Army doctrine, and to collection requirements management in joint doctrine.
- **Collection coordination** equates to direct information collection in Army doctrine and to collection operations management in joint doctrine.

C-14. (U) A CCIRM staff section executes the CCIRM process. CCIRM staff duties include—

- Coordinating component-level collection requirements.
- Developing an electronic collection exploitation plan.
- Validating, prioritizing, and disseminating PIRs, specific information requirements, and RFIs received from subordinate elements and adjacent staffs respectively.
- Monitoring and ensuring collection requirements are identified in minimum time to satisfy requesters.

Note. (U) Paragraphs C-13 and C-14 implement multinational doctrine contained in AJP-2.

Fusion Centers (U)

C-15. (U) Fusion centers mark a significant improvement to dynamic operational support by integrating mission command with focused analysis within a single centralized entity. A fusion center is an ad hoc collaborative effort between several units, organizations, or agencies that provide resources, expertise, information, and intelligence to a center with the goal of supporting the rapid execution of operations.

C-16. (U) Fusion centers are primarily designed to focus collection and promote information sharing across multiple participants within a specific geographic area or mission type. Commanders at various echelons create fusion centers to—

- Enhance the flow of information and intelligence.
- Focus information collection to satisfy information requirements.
- Collaborate to effectively incorporate and leverage PED and analysis results (reports/products).

C-17. (U) As an ad hoc effort, each fusion center is designed in a different manner. Historically, fusion centers have relied heavily on intelligence, operations, fires, and special operations personnel and systems. Fusion centers are most effective if they have participation from all of the key elements in the AO and representatives from all of the warfighting functions. When possible, fusion centers should include unified action partners. The centers require the ability to immediately leverage information collection assets to support current operations. Table C-2 lists fusion center participants.

Table C-2. (U) Fusion center participants

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Intelligence portion of the fusion center typically comprises—
• Different tactical echelons • Interagency partners • Multinational organizations • host-nation organizations • Nongovernmental organizations operating in the area of operations. For example, if a division creates a fusion cell, the division will contribute intelligence professionals and may require brigade intelligence representatives.
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C-18. (U) Fusion-center intelligence members focus on developing requirements for inclusion in information collection plans, and to process, exploit, analyze, and disseminate the resulting collection. Representatives and analysts manage, share, and fuse their agency- or unit-specific information into the collective body of information for refined intelligence analysis. Conversely, intelligence representatives are the conduit back to their parent agency to communicate, monitor, and process new fusion-center information requirements. Intelligence representatives ensure intelligence collection, reporting, analytic products, and threat information are directed back to their parent agency or organization for proper dissemination and feedback.

SHARING AND WRITE TO RELEASE (U)

C-19. (U) Because each multinational operation is unique, there are generally no fixed set of rules or policies for conducting intelligence operations as part of multinational operations. Commanders participating in a multinational operation develop the policy and procedures for that particular operation. In most multinational operations, commanders are required to share intelligence with foreign forces and to coordinate receiving intelligence from those forces. A multilevel security system that can easily facilitate sanitization and dissemination of information to U.S. and multinational commanders does not currently exist.

C-20. (U) One technique to facilitate collaboration and intelligence sharing is to establish an information exchange cell. Another technique for sharing critical intelligence with multinational partners efficiently is having U.S. intelligence information written for release at the lowest possible classification level (with the least dissemination restrictions) within foreign disclosure guidelines. When information relating to a particular source cannot be shared, the intelligence derived from that source should still be provided as long as the information itself does not potentially compromise the source. The U.S. Director of Intelligence must establish procedures for separating intelligence from sources and methods. Analysts must balance the

accuracy and amount of information written for release with the security of classified material. Then, they must properly vet that intelligence through the foreign disclosure officer prior to dissemination. Intelligence production agencies often print highly classified reports in a format that separates compartmented information from intelligence that can be widely disseminated with what is referred to as a tear line. The U.S. joint and component intelligence staffs keep information above the tear line for U.S. forces while disseminating the intelligence below the tear line to multinational forces. Having intelligence production agencies use tear lines greatly facilitates intelligence sharing.

DISCLOSURE POLICY AND THE DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION (U)

C-21. (U) The FDO may approve the disclosure of classified and controlled unclassified military information to foreign representatives. This is based on the policies, directives, and laws that govern national disclosure policy and the release of classified information. The FDO provides this service to the command and staff and to assigned, attached, and supporting agencies, allies, and other multinational partners. Each nation individually determines what collected information can be passed, in what format, and how that information is passed. The U.S. force intelligence staff enforces national disclosure policy and disclosure of classified information to multinational intelligence partners through the FDO. The FDO has staff proponency for this action.

C-22. (U) Using the disclosure policy, pertinent laws, regulations and directives, the FDO adjudicates disclosure requests by using delegated disclosure authorities and sanitization guidelines. The FDO also advises the commander and staff on potential problems when existing disclosure authorities do not support current or future requirements to disclose. The FDO facilitates sharing relevant and pertinent intelligence about the situation and threat between the U.S. military and allies and other multinational partners consistent with disclosure policy and U.S. joint force guidance. The FDO pays special attention to intelligence classification and levels of access of multinational personnel. However, it avoids sharing information about intelligence sources and methods with allies and other multinational partners until approved by the appropriate national-level agency.

C-23. (U) The U.S. joint force intelligence staff obtains the necessary foreign disclosure authorization for category 8 (MI) information from the (b) (3) disclosure authority from the combatant command FDO as soon as possible. U.S. intelligence personnel should be knowledgeable of the specific foreign disclosure policy, procedures, and regulations for the operation. It is therefore imperative that the U.S. joint force intelligence staff considers adding extra FDO billets to the joint manning document. Personnel knowledgeable of foreign disclosure enhance the efficient flow of intelligence.

C-24. (U) Intelligence support to protection of the force is critical. Every effort should be made to share any intelligence that could affect accomplishing the multinational force mission or protecting the force. A key consideration is the apportionment of trained foreign disclosure personnel within a theater of operations to facilitate the capability of sharing information and products with the multinational force. (See AR 380-10 for additional information on foreign disclosure.)

C-25. (U) The following includes other general principles that assist in guiding multinational intelligence operations--

- **Maintain unity of effort.** Intelligence officers of each nation need to view the threat from multinational as well as national perspectives. A threat to one element of a multinational force must be considered a threat to all elements.
- **Make adjustments.** There will be differences in intelligence doctrine and procedures among multinational partners. Major differences may include how intelligence is provided to the commander or procedures for sharing information among intelligence agencies.
- **Plan early and plan concurrently.** This permits solutions to any differences to be developed and tried before operations begin. Ensure there are sufficient resources for liaison requirements to support multinational operations.
- **Perform complementary operations.** Partner intelligence operations must be complementary, and all intelligence resources must be available for application to the entire intelligence problem.

The intelligence staff must be prepared to navigate different approval processes and political sensitivities when executing multinational intelligence operations.

C-26. (U) The following are considerations for intelligence networks and architectures while operating with multinational forces:

- Establish a shared local area network using systems such as the Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System or the Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System. Establish and enforce a standardized process for the intelligence sharing architecture, such as using the cross-domain enterprise all-source user repository for cross-domain operations.
- Many nations provide their own national suite of analytical tools, digital mapping capabilities, collaboration software, and internal capabilities. DCGS-A is the primary intelligence component residing on the U.S.-only mission command network.
- Multinational intelligence analysis occurs on the multinational network of shared database servers, with its metadata catalog and releasable databases. These tools access and pull data from the multinational force shared databases and other nationally owned storage facilities.
- Standardize compatible formats in which information is converted or stored so that it is accessible and useable by multinational partners. However, ensure information that does not require conversion is left in its original format to a facilitate faster flow of information.
- Use the multinational intelligence center to coordinate multinational ISR and collection plans for each nation.
- Designate a single officer as the director of intelligence for the multinational force.
- Ensure each nation has a representative present at the multinational intelligence center.

C-27. (U) The effective use of intelligence liaison personnel can establish strong relationships with multinational partners. Effective liaisons can be instrumental in resolving the normal problems that result from language barriers and cultural and operational differences during multinational intelligence operations.

Appendix D

Force Projection Operations Considerations (U)

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO FORCE PROJECTION (U)

D-1. (U) *Force projection* is the ability to project the military instrument of national power from the United States or another theater, in response to requirements for military operations (JP 3-0). It is the military component of power projection and a central element of the national military strategy. Army organizations and installations linked with joint forces and industry form a strategic platform to maintain, project, and sustain Army forces wherever they deploy. Force projection operations are inherently joint and require situational understanding and detailed planning and synchronization.

D-2. (U) Unstable conditions worldwide often preclude a significant period of time to produce intelligence to meet contingency operation requirements. Therefore, MI units and staffs prepare for potential contingencies by building their intelligence readiness, including their skills and systems expertise, daily. When a unit receives a warning order for deployment or is assigned a contingency mission, it will begin to generate intelligence knowledge on the projected area of interest.

D-3. (U) Built on a foundation of intelligence readiness, the intelligence warfighting function provides the commander with the intelligence needed to conduct force projection operations. Successful intelligence during force projection operations relies on continuous collection and intelligence production before and during the operation. During force projection operations, higher echelons provide intelligence to lower echelons until the early-entry force secures the lodgment area. The joint staff of the intelligence directorate begins the tasks to set the theater. This joint staff must exercise judgment when providing information to subordinate intelligence staffs to avoid overwhelming them.

D-4. (U) Key planning factors for intelligence in force projection include—

- Staying out front in intelligence planning:
  - Begin to generate intelligence knowledge as soon as possible.
  - Develop a steady effort.
  - Prioritize intelligence requirements for development of the initial PIR.
  - Identify intelligence training requirements (including augmentees).
- Understanding how to get intelligence support:
  - Understand the combatant command and deployed force intelligence architecture.
  - Identify asset, sensor, and intelligence PED requirements.
  - Identify personnel augmentation requirements.

D-5. (U) Intelligence leaders anticipate, identify, consider, and evaluate all threats to the unit throughout force projection operations. This is critical during the deployment and entry operations stages of force projection. During these stages, the unit is particularly vulnerable to threat actions because of its limited combat power and knowledge of the AO. Therefore, intelligence professionals emphasize providing combat information and intelligence products that indicate changes to the threat or relevant aspects of the operational environment. Intelligence leaders should—

- Review available databases on assigned contingency areas, begin collaboration and generating intelligence knowledge, and develop initial IPB products concerning these areas of interest.
- Comply with regulatory guidelines for conducting specific intelligence operations.
- Coordinate for and rehearse using the same communications protocols that the joint force, higher headquarters, and subordinate and lateral units will use when deployed.

- Plan, train, and practice surging intelligence analysis on likely or developing contingencies.
- Prepare and practice coordination with other elements and organizations (for example, intelligence units and analytical elements, the information operations officer, the USAF SWO, CA, military information support operations, the space support element, and special operations forces units).
- Include the following as a part of daily (sustainment) operations:
  - A linguist plan with proficiency requirements.
  - Training (individual and collective), including augmentees.
  - Appointed and trained foreign disclosure personnel.
- Establish formal or informal intelligence links, relationships, and networks to meet developing contingencies.
- Conduct analysis of threats, terrain and weather, and civil considerations requirements or forward RFIs in accordance with unit SOPs.
- Determine the need for additional civil considerations and sociocultural research and analysis to generate intelligence knowledge.
- Establish statements of intelligence interests and develop production and warning requirements.

D-6. (U) Intelligence leaders support peacetime contingency planning with intelligence knowledge and IPB products and databases on likely contingency areas. Intelligence leaders, with the G-2/S-2 and G-3/S-3, establish an information collection plan implemented upon alert notification. For a smooth transition from predeployment to entry, intelligence leaders must coordinate an intelligence architecture. To support information collection, the intelligence staff identifies requirements, including—

- Collection assets providing support throughout the area of interest.
- Intelligence PED capabilities required to support information collection assets, including the use of expeditionary or reach intelligence PED to best support the requirements of the operation.
- Command and support relationships.
- Report and request procedures not covered in unit SOPs.
- Deployment sequence of information collection personnel and equipment. Early deployment of key information collection personnel and equipment is essential for force protection and operations. The composition of initial and follow-on deploying assets is influenced by the mission variables (METT-TC), availability of communications, and availability of lift.
- Communications architectures supporting both intelligence staffs and collection assets.
- Friendly vulnerabilities to hostile intelligence threats and plans for conducting force protection. The staff must begin this planning as early as possible to ensure adequate support to force protection of deploying and initial-entry forces.
- TPFDD requirements. When necessary, the staff should recommend changes to priority of movement, unit, or capability to enable information collection.

D-7. (U) Intelligence leaders continually monitor and update applicable plans and orders to reflect the evolving situation, especially during crises. National intelligence activities monitor regional threats worldwide and can answer some intelligence requirements supporting the development of plans and orders.

FORCE PROJECTION PROCESSES (U)

D-8. (U) Force projection encompasses five processes that occur in a continuous, overlapping, and repeating sequence throughout an operation. The five processes, as they pertain to intelligence, include—

- Mobilization.
- Deployment.
- Employment.
- Sustaining intelligence capabilities.
- Redeployment.

D-9. (U) Figure D-1 depicts the mobilization, deployment, and employment processes.



Figure D-1. (U) Force projection processes

MOBILIZATION (U)

D-10. (U) *Mobilization* is the process by which the Armed Forces of the United States or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency, which includes activating all or part of the Reserve Component as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel (JP 4-05). This is also the point where the intelligence staff begins conducting the tasks required to set the theater. It assembles and organizes resources to support national objectives. (See ADRP 4-0.)

D-11. (U) The intelligence staff updates estimates, databases, IPB products, and other intelligence products needed to support command decisions on force composition and deployment priorities and sequence. Units reassess their collection requirements immediately after alert notification. The intelligence staff begins verifying planning assumptions within the operation plan. The intelligence staff, with CI personnel support, provides force protection support and recommends antiterrorism measures.

D-12. (U) During mobilization, intelligence leaders—

- Monitor intelligence reporting on threat activity, civil considerations, and warning data.
- Manage information requirements and RFIs from the unit and subordinate units to include updating information collection planning.
- Establish habitual training relationships with augmentation units and personnel as well as higher echelon intelligence organizations identified in the existing operation plan.
- Support augmentation units and personnel by preparing and conducting intelligence training and threat update briefings and by disseminating intelligence.

- Identify information collection and intelligence PED force requirements for the different types of operations and contingency plans.
- Identify individual military, civilian, and contractor augmentation requirements.

D-13. (U) During mobilization, intelligence leaders, in conjunction with the rest of the staff, ensure adequate equipping and training of MI organizations and individual augmentees that conduct intelligence operations. Predictive intelligence supports the decisions the commander and staff make regarding the size, composition, structure, and deployment sequence of the force.

D-14. (U) In a force projection operation, higher echelons provide intelligence for situation and target development to lower echelons until the tactical ground force completes entry and secures the lodgment area. The higher headquarters' intelligence section may be reluctant to push everything down through tactical-level intelligence channels due to the volume of the intelligence information available. DCGS-A provides the BCT S-2 access to theater and national databases with the ability to collaborate with knowledge centers. Intelligence readiness training assists in ensuring intelligence professionals and assets are able to meet the unit's needs during operations. The G-2/S-2 must anticipate, identify, consider, and evaluate all potential threats to the entire unit throughout force projection operations.

D-15. (U) Throughout mobilization, unit intelligence activities provide deploying forces with the most recent intelligence on the contingency area. The intelligence staff also updates databases and situation graphics. Intelligence leaders—

- Fully understand the unit, higher headquarters, and joint force intelligence organizations.
- Revise intelligence and intelligence-related communications architectures and integrate any new systems and software into current architectures.
- Support 24-hour operations and provide continuous intelligence (to include terrain and weather) support.
- Plan all required intelligence reach procedures.
- Determine transportation availability for deployment as well as during deployment.
- Determine all sustainability requirements.
- Determine intelligence release requirements and restrictions and releasability to multinational and host-nation sources.
- Review status-of-forces agreements, rules of engagement, international law, intelligence sharing agreements, and other agreements, emphasizing the effect they have on intelligence collection. (Coordinate with the staff judge advocate on these issues.)
- Ensure deployment priorities for the information collection assets with required intelligence PED capabilities are reflected in the TPFDD to support information collection activities.
- Ensure intelligence links provide the early-entry commander access to joint and Army all-source intelligence and information collection assets, processing systems, and databases.
- Review the supported unit commander's specified tasks, implied tasks, task organization, intelligence scheme of support, and coordination requirements. Address issues or shortfalls and direct or coordinate changes.
- Establish access to national databases and repositories for each intelligence discipline and complementary intelligence capability, as well as links to joint, Service, multinational, and host-nation databases and repositories.

DEPLOYMENT (U)

D-16. (U) Deployment is the movement of forces and materiel from their point of origin to an operational area. During deployment, intelligence organizations at the home station or deployed with the early-entry force take advantage of the communications architecture and higher and lower intelligence organizations to provide graphic and textual intelligence updates to the forces en route. En route updates assist in reducing information gaps and allow commanders to adjust plans in response to changes in the situation before arriving at the operational area. In a mature theater, intelligence handoff is conducted between arriving units and those

previously deployed. The three primary areas of intelligence handoff are operations, targeting, and technical channel requirements.

D-17. (U) Intelligence units extend established networks to connect intelligence staffs and collection assets at various stages of the deployment flow. Where necessary, units establish new communications paths to meet mission requirements. If deployed, joint force and corps ACEs play a critical role in making communications paths, networks, and intelligence databases available to deploying forces.

D-18. (U) The Army relies on space-based capabilities and systems, such as global positioning satellites, communications satellites, weather satellites, and intelligence collection platforms. These systems are critical enablers for Army personnel to plan, communicate, navigate and maneuver, provide missile warning, and protect and sustain Army forces. Planning and coordination of space support with national, joint, Service, and theater resources occur through liaison with space professionals. Space-enabled capabilities are key to supporting intelligence during deployment and employment by—

- Monitoring terrestrial areas of interest to assist in revealing the threat's location and disposition.
- Providing communications links between deploying forces and the United States and its territories.
- Permitting MI collection assets to determine their position accurately through the Global Positioning System (also called GPS).
- Providing meteorological, oceanographic, and space environmental information and data that are processed, analyzed, and exploited to produce timely and accurate weather effects on operations.
- Providing warnings of ballistic missile launches.

D-19. (U) Situation development dominates intelligence activities during early-entry operations. The intelligence staff attempts to identify all threats to arriving forces and assists the commander in developing force protection measures. During entry operations, echelons above corps organizations provide intelligence. This support includes providing access to the national intelligence and deploying scalable intelligence elements. The entire effort focuses on providing tailored support to deploying and deployed echelons in response to their PIRs and other requirements.

D-20. (U) Collection and processing capabilities are enhanced as assets arrive and buildup in the AO, with emphasis on the buildup of the deployed capability required to conduct sustained information collection activities. Intelligence PED capabilities are employed either through the deployment of PED capabilities with the force (expeditionary PED) or through reach PED conducted in theater, at sanctuary sites, or from the locations within the United States.

D-21. (U) When the senior Army headquarters arrives in the operational area, the joint force intelligence staff implements and, where necessary, modifies the theater intelligence architecture. Deploying intelligence assets establish liaison with staffs and deployed units. Liaison personnel, basic communications, and an intelligence network should be in place before the scheduled arrival of parent commands. Information collection units increase operations.

D-22. (U) Installations in the United States and its territories and other bases outside the operational area continue to support deployed units. Systems capable of rapid receipt and processing of intelligence from national systems and high-capacity, long-haul communications systems are critical to the success of intelligence reach and overwatch to a deployed force. These systems provide a continuous flow of intelligence to satisfy many operational needs.

D-23. (U) During entry operations the intelligence staff—

- Monitors protection indicators.
- Assesses the information collection effort.
- Monitors intelligence reporting on threats and civil considerations.
- Assesses—
  - Push versus pull requirements of intelligence reach and overwatch.
  - The effectiveness of the intelligence communications architecture.
  - Reporting procedures and timelines.

EMPLOYMENT (U)

D-24. (U) Intelligence and information collection support operations by meeting the commander's requirements. They focus primarily on supporting the commander's situational understanding, targeting, and protection requirements. Good planning and preparation can ensure a smooth transition from deployment to employment and from employment through sustainment to redeployment.

SUSTAINING INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES (U)

D-25. (U) Sustaining intelligence capabilities involves providing and maintaining the appropriate numbers and skill levels of intelligence professionals and materiel required for the duration of operations. Continuity may be provided from locations within and outside the United States and its territories. For intelligence, continuity may be focused on force rotation, ensuring intelligence professionals or units entering the AO have current intelligence and a detailed knowledge of ongoing intelligence operations. This includes—

- Providing data-file updates.
- Ensuring a coordinated intelligence handoff of ongoing intelligence operations, such as military source operations.
- Ensuring units have the right intelligence PED and other MI assets, to include personnel (including linguists), communications systems, information collection systems, and appropriate maintenance support.

REDEPLOYMENT (U)

D-26. (U) *Redeployment* is the transfer or rotation of forces and materiel to support another joint force commander's operational requirements, or to return personnel, equipment, and materiel to the home and/or demobilization stations for reintegration and/or outprocessing (JP 3-35). As with deployment, there is a requirement to conduct intelligence handoff from the redeploying to the deploying unit. A well-prepared intelligence handoff ensures a smooth and seamless transition between units.

D-27. (U) As combat power and resources decrease in the operational area, protection and warning become the focus of the commander's intelligence requirements. This drives the selection of those assets that must remain deployed until the end of the operation and those that may redeploy earlier. The G-2/S-2—

- Monitors intelligence reporting on threat activity and warning data.
- Continues to conduct intelligence support to protection.
- Requests information collection support (combatant command and national systems) and intelligence to support redeployment.

D-28. (U) After redeployment, MI personnel and units recover and return to predeployment activities. Information collection units resume contingency-oriented peacetime intelligence operations. The intelligence staff—

- Prepares after-action reports and lessons learned.
- Monitors intelligence reporting on threat activity and civil considerations for contingencies.
- Updates or consolidates databases.
- Maintains intelligence readiness.
- Provides input into the force-design update process to refine modified tables of organization and equipment and to evaluate the need for individual mobilization augmentee personnel.
- Submits organizational needs requests.

Appendix E

General Intelligence Provisions and Authorities (U)

UNITED STATES CODE TITLES AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333 (U)

E-1. (U) G-2/S-2s, intelligence planners, and MI unit commanders must comply with the intelligence provisions and authorities included in the following titles of the United States Code and with Executive Order 12333 as amended:

- **Title 10, *Armed Forces of the United States*.** Key topic areas include—
  - The authority of the Secretary of Defense over all DOD intelligence organizations and activities.
  - The position of Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
  - The role of national intelligence through tactical intelligence and the integration of DOD ISR capabilities.
  - Meeting the needs of combatant commanders through tactical commanders.
  - Funds for foreign cryptologic support.
  - Appropriations, use, and auditing of DOD intelligence funds.
  - Congressional oversight.
- **Title 32, *National Guard*.** Key topic areas include—
  - Posse Comitatus.
  - Defense support of civil authorities.
- **Title 50, *War and National Defense*.** Key topic areas include—
  - The role of the Secretary of Defense in conducting intelligence activities.
  - The purpose of all-source intelligence and the role of an integrated and synchronized DOD intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination as a part of the larger intelligence community.
  - The role of national intelligence through tactical intelligence.
  - The needs of combatant commanders through tactical commanders.
  - Specialized intelligence functions of the (b) (3)
    (b) (3)
  - CI activities.
  - Intelligence budget and oversight.
- **Executive Order 12333, *United States Intelligence Activities* (as amended).** Key areas include the following:
  - Principal legal authority for intelligence activities (provides intelligence goals and directions).
  - Defines structure and mission of the intelligence community.
  - Delineates jurisdictional boundaries among intelligence agencies and establishes duties and responsibilities for each department and agency within the intelligence community.
  - Declares rules to guide and limit the conduct of intelligence activities.
  - Defines agency responsibilities, including the DOD's role, for national intelligence efforts.
  - Declares rules of conduct for intelligence activities involving U.S. persons.
  - Contains general provisions pertaining to oversight, implementation, and definitions.

E-2. (U) Intelligence activities authorized by Executive Order 12333 as amended are further extended to combatant commanders through operation orders and plans. Additionally, certain intelligence activities may be directed by other legislative authority and are not exclusive to Title 10 or Title 50 statutes.

E-3. (U) Each organization or unit must have a specific assigned mission to conduct a particular type of intelligence activity. These specific authorities are often found in a wide range of documents, such as DOD directives, intelligence-agency-specific authorities, Army regulations, operation orders, and operation plans. If the intelligence staff has any questions on authorities or funding sources, it should coordinate closely with the unit staff judge advocate because of the dynamic nature, complexity, and large volume of intelligence laws and policies.

E-4. (U) The implications of and considerations associated with these provisions and authorities include the oversight, management, and resourcing of intelligence operations and the authority for or prohibitions on certain specific intelligence activities.

E-5. (U) Titles 10 and 50 are inextricably linked and mutually supportive statutory provisions for DOD intelligence activities at every level of operations (strategic, operational, and tactical) during peacetime or war.

INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY SOURCES (U)

E-6. Table E-1 lists some of the most important intelligence authority sources.

Table E-1. (U) Law, policy, and other sources applicable to intelligence operations

UNCLASSIFIED
Executive Order 12333, *United States Intelligence Activities* (as amended)
AR 381-10, *U.S. Army Intelligence Activities*
AR 381-20, *Army Counterintelligence Program*
AR 381-26, *Army Foreign Materiel Program*
AR 381-47, *Offensive Counterintelligence Operations*
AR 381-100, *Army Human Intelligence Collection Programs*
AR 381-102, *Army Cover Program*
AR 381-141, *Intelligence Contingency Funds* (classified)
DOD 5240.1-R, *Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components That Affect United States Persons* (Procedures 11 through 13 remain)
DOD Law of War Manual
DODD 2310.01E, *DOD Detainee Program*
DODD 3115.09, *DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning*
DODD 5148.13, *Intelligence Oversight* (Replaced Intelligence Oversight Procedures 14 and 15 of DOD 5240.1-R)
DODM 5240.01, *Procedures Governing the Conduct of DOD Intelligence Activities*
FM 2-22.3, *Human Intelligence Collector Operations*
FM 27-10, *The Law of Land Warfare*
ICD 104, *National Intelligence Program (NIP) Budget Formulation and Justification, Execution, and Performance Evaluation*
ICD 113, *Functional Managers*
ICD 116, *Intelligence Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Evaluation System*
ICD 203, *Analytic Standards*
ICD 204, *National Intelligence Priorities Framework*
Title 10, USC, *Armed Forces*
Title 32, USC, *National Guard*
UNCLASSIFIED

Table E-1. (U) Law, policy, and other sources applicable to intelligence operations (*continued*)

UNCLASSIFIED			
Title 50, USC, *War and National Defense*			
Relevant DOD instructions			
U.S. Army Directive 2016-37, *U.S. Army Open-Source Intelligence Activities*			
Privacy Act of 1974 (Section 552a, Title 5, USC [also called 5 USC § 552a])			
Manual for Courts-Martial United States (2016 Edition)			
International treaties, such as the Hague Convention (1899 and 1907), the Geneva Conventions (1949), and Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (1977)			
AR	Army regulation	FM	field manual
DOD	Department of Defense	ICD	intelligence community directive
DODD	Department of Defense directive	U.S.	United States
DODM	Department of Defense manual	USC	United States Code
UNCLASSIFIED			

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Appendix F

Language Support Considerations (U)

LANGUAGE REQUIREMENTS (U)

F-1. (U) Military operations highly depend on military- and contractor-provided foreign language support. The requirement to communicate with and serve on multinational staffs, communicate with local populations, and collect information necessitates the use of linguists. The growing focus on multinational operations increases the competition for limited linguist resources that are vital for mission success.

LANGUAGE SUPPORT CATEGORIES (U)

F-2. (U) Language support requirements typically fall into one of six broad categories:

- Intelligence operations.
- Multinational liaison.
- Special operations.
- Civil-military operations (CMO).
- CA operations.
- Sustainment.
- Information.

Intelligence Operations (U)

F-3. (U) This category includes linguist requirements inherent in traditional CI, HUMINT, and SIGINT disciplines, as well as foreign language support to protection and exploitation of open-source information.

Multinational Liaison (U)

F-4. (U) This category includes coordination of military operations and liaison with multinational partners, previously unaffiliated nations, host-nation personnel and offices, and at times adversary or former adversary nations. (See FM 6-0.)

Special Operations (U)

F-5. (U) Operations conducted by special operations forces typically require foreign language capabilities. Because of the broad range of languages, Army special operations forces may not have the required number of personnel trained in a specific language or dialect. In many cases, Army special operations forces require sophisticated language skills requiring a nuanced language capability that can only come from or vetted by a native speaker. For example, psychological operations specialists develop product series in target languages to obtain a specific response and special forces team members convey the intent of the operation to an indigenous force; CA personnel work in specialized terms found in government, law, medical support, law enforcement, infrastructure projects, public safety, and population control. (See FM 3-05.)

Civil-Military Operations (U)

F-6. (U) *Civil-military operations* are activities of a commander performed by designated civil affairs or other military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, indigenous populations, and institutions, by directly supporting the attainment of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation (JP 3-57). CMO may include military forces performing activities and functions normally performed by the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur before, during, or subsequent to other military actions. These activities are fundamental to executing stability tasks conducted during offensive and defensive tasks. CMO is an inherent commander's responsibility and Army forces conduct CMO to coordinate civil and military

activities, minimize civil-military friction and threats from the civil component, maximize support for operations, and meet the commander's legal obligations and moral responsibilities to the civilian populations within the operational area.

F-7. (U) CA personnel, other Army forces, other government agencies, or a combination of all three perform these activities, and the G-9 is the lead staff officer for these activities. Foreign language support is critical to CMO and may include language requirements in addition to those native in the nation where the operation is occurring, as there may be other foreign governments and nongovernmental agencies involved in stability tasks. (See FM 3-57.)

Civil Affairs Operations (U)

F-8. (U) CA operations enhance the relationship between civil authorities and military forces. They involve applying CA functional specialty skills to areas normally under the civil government's responsibility. These operations involve establishing, maintaining, influencing, or exploiting relations between military forces and all levels of host-nation government agencies. CA personnel work with specialized vernacular in such areas as government liaison, legal agreements, medical support and operations, law enforcement, infrastructure projects, engineering projects, public safety, security, and population control. (See FM 3-57.)

Sustainment (U)

F-9. (U) This category consists of foreign language support to sustainment functions. These functions include logistic contracting; port, railhead, airhead, or transshipment operations; and convoy operations. (See ADP 4-0 and ADRP 4-0.)

Information (U)

F-10. (U) DOD makes every effort to synchronize, align, and coordinate communication activities to facilitate an understanding of how the planning and execution of DOD strategies, plans, operations, and activities will be received or understood by key audiences. To support these efforts, commanders and staffs should identify and understand key audience perceptions and possible reactions when planning and executing operations. This understanding of key audience perceptions and reactions is a vital element of every theater campaign and contingency plan, and it is essential to the Army's ability to achieve unity of effort through unified action with the joint force, interagency partners, and the broader interorganizational community. Key audience beliefs, perceptions, and behavior are crucial to the success of any strategy, plan, and operation.

F-11. (U) Using accurate language, in the right tone and with the right connation, is crucial to these efforts and requires foreign language support. Through the commander's communication synchronization, public affairs, information operations, and defense support to public diplomacy are realized as communications supporting capabilities. The commander's communication synchronization assists leaders, planners, and operators at all levels in understanding the desired effects and anticipating potential undesired effects of the Army's actions and words, identifying key audiences, and actively addressing their perspectives when appropriate.

Command Language Program Manager (U)

F-12. (U) Commanders appoint a unit command language program manager to oversee the unit's command language program. Commanders with a large number of assigned linguists (150 or more) must appoint a full-time command language program manager with a specified job description to manage the command language program. All personnel performing command language program manager duties (either full-time or as an additional duty) must attend the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center Command Language Program Manager course.

COMMAND LANGUAGE COUNCIL (U)

F-13. (U) A command language council is required for a unit with more than 50 language-coded positions authorized on Army manning documents. The purpose of the command language council is to promote linguistic excellence through the sharing of ideas and information and to prioritize training. The command language council should include the commander, command sergeant major, S-1, S-2, S-3, S-4, and the resource manager. However, the commander may direct other staff participation. For units with less than 50 linguists, it is at the commander's discretion to authorize the establishment of a command language council. (See AR 11-6.)

LANGUAGE SUPPORT FOR INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS (U)

F-14. (U) The SIGINT, HUMINT, and CI disciplines require specific language skills to accomplish their collection tasks successfully. SIGINT collectors often analyze and report information obtained through intercept of foreign language communications. Communications intelligence, together with intelligence research and analysis missions, demands highly skilled listening and reading language capabilities. HUMINT collection operations that require foreign language capabilities include the following:

- **Interrogation.** Foreign language requirements for interrogation include listening and speaking abilities for conducting the interrogation itself.
- **Debriefing.** Debriefers require foreign language reading, listening, and speaking capabilities to prepare for and carry out debriefings of foreign subjects.
- **Liaison.** HUMINT collectors rely heavily on language ability to conduct effective liaison with host-nation and other officials.
- **Military source operations.** All foreign language capabilities are required to conduct military source operations effectively.

F-15. (U) CI tasks often require language skills similar to those required for HUMINT tasks. The CI and HUMINT specialties both identify language proficiency with a skill qualification identifier. However, when language-qualified debriefers are not available, interpreters may be used to assist the debriefers.

LANGUAGE SUPPORT SOURCES (U)

F-16. (U) Commanders can use various sources to obtain the linguists needed to support operations. It is vital to know the advantages and disadvantages of each type of linguist and to match the available linguists to the various requirements of the operation carefully.

ARMY LANGUAGE MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES (U)

F-17. (U) The language-dependent MI enlisted military occupational specialty (MOS) is 35P with a skill qualification identifier of L (cryptologic linguist). HUMINT collector specialties (MOS 35M and warrant officer MOS 351M) are designated as language- -dependent. Leaders should be aware of the language proficiency level of their assigned HUMINT collectors, which may range from almost no language to full native proficiency. Some Soldiers in the following enlisted and warrant officer MOSs are trained in foreign languages: MOSs 35F and 350F (all-source intelligence analyst), MOSs 35L and 351L (CI agent), and MOSs 35N and 352N (SIGINT analyst).

F-18. (U) The following non-MI career management fields, branches, and functional areas include language-qualified enlisted MOSs and officer areas of concentration: 18 (special forces [enlisted, warrant officers, and officers]), 37 (psychological operations [enlisted and officers]), 38 (CA), functional area 48 (foreign area officer), and 09L (interpreter-translator).

CONTRACT LINGUISTS (U)

F-19. (U) U.S. civilians can be contracted to provide linguist support. They have an advantage over local-national hires because their loyalty to the United States is more readily evaluated and it is easier for them to be granted the necessary security clearance. However, there are usually severe limitations on the deployment and use of civilians. A careful assessment of their language ability is important because they may use old-fashioned terms or interject U.S. idioms. If the linguists are recent immigrants, the use of the language in their country of origin could be dangerous to them. Similarly, their loyalty may reside with their country of origin, religious group, tribal affiliation, or other close connections when the interests of these groups are at odds with U.S. interests.

F-20. (U) Local-national hires often provide the bulk of linguist support. They are usually less expensive to hire than U.S. civilians are and know the local dialect, idioms, and culture. The expertise of these linguists in particular areas or subject matters can be an asset.

F-21. (U) All commands must comply with the CI screening policy for contract linguist support. This may be performed by the hiring agency within the joint operations area or by CI personnel. CI personnel also screen contract linguists periodically throughout their employment.

F-22. (U) When requesting civilian contract linguists, the commander and staff must identify requirements by category:

- **Category I** linguists are locally hired personnel with an understanding of the English language. They undergo a limited screening, are hired in-theater, do not possess a security clearance, and are used for unclassified work. During most operations, category I linguists must be rescreened on a scheduled basis. Category I linguists cannot be used for intelligence operations.
- **Category II** linguists are U.S. citizens who have native command of the target language and near-native command of the English language. They undergo a screening process that includes a national agency check. Upon favorable findings, category II linguists are granted a secret collateral clearance.
- **Category III** linguists are U.S. citizens who have native command of the target language and native command of the English language. They undergo a screening process that includes a special background investigation and a polygraph. Upon favorable findings, category III linguists are granted an interim or final top secret/sensitive compartmented information clearance by the designated U.S. Government personnel security authority.

NON-DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TRAINED ARMY LINGUISTS (U)

F-23. (U) The Army has numerous Soldiers of all grades who are proficient in a foreign language but whose primary duties do not require foreign language proficiency. They may have attended a civilian school to learn a foreign language, or they may have acquired proficiency through their heritage. They have the advantage of being trained Soldiers and are therefore readily deployable throughout the AO. They may qualify for a foreign language proficiency bonus by passing the Defense Language Proficiency Test. It is difficult for nonlinguist to assess the capabilities of Soldiers who have not taken the Defense Language Proficiency Test. Without a test score on record, it is also difficult for the manpower and personnel staff to identify them as linguists.

DETERMINING LANGUAGE SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS (U)

F-24. (U) Determining linguist requirements for any operation can be difficult because each operation is unique. The staff determines linguist requirements as part of IPB during mission analysis. It starts by identifying specified or implied tasks requiring foreign language support. Other critical factors are the organization or echelon of command and the location of the AO. The staff uses these criteria to determine the allocation of linguists, such as one linguist team per echelon of command, one linguist per piece of equipment, or one linguist team per location where the function is to be performed. The staff then determines the number of linguists needed for an operation based on the tasks to be performed and the allocation of linguists.

Within this process the staff considers the different dialects within the AO when determining language support requirements. (For policy on the Army foreign language program, see AR 11-6.)

F-25. (U) The intelligence cell at each echelon is responsible for the following:

- Identifying category II and category III linguist requirements needed to support intelligence functions in all contingency areas. Intelligence staff requirements for linguist support include but are not limited to evaluating and/or using local maps and terrain products in operations and assessing local open-source information for intelligence value.
- Determining linguist requirements, based on the mission and on the foreign languages and dialects spoken in the AO.
- Providing intelligence training for MI linguists employed in AOs.
- Coordinating for security investigations, as necessary, for local-hire linguists.
- Providing support to CI screening of contracted linguists and hired local-national labor force.

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Glossary (U)

(U) The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army and joint definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definition. The proponent publication for other terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS (U)

ACE	analysis and control element
ADP	Army doctrine publication
ADRP	Army doctrine reference publication
AO	area of operations
AR	Army regulation
ART	Army tactical task
ASCC	Army Service component command
ASCOPE	areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (civil considerations)
ATP	Army techniques publication
BCT	brigade combat team
CA	civil affairs
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CCIR	commander's critical information requirement
CCIRM	collection coordination and intelligence requirements management
CEMA	cyberspace electromagnetic activities
CI	counterintelligence
CMO	civil-military operations
COA	course of action
COP	common operational picture
DCGS-A	Distributed Common Ground System-Army
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense directive
DODM	Department of Defense manual
E-MIB	expeditionary-military intelligence brigade
EMS	electromagnetic spectrum
EW	electronic warfare
FDO	foreign disclosure office
FM	field manual
G-2	assistant chief of staff, intelligence

G-2X	counterintelligence and human intelligence staff element
G-3	assistant chief of staff, operations
G-4	assitant chief of staff, logistics
G-6	assistant chief of staff, signal
G-9	assistant chief of staff, civil affairs operations
GEOINT	geospatial intelligence
HPT	high-payoff target
HVT	high-value target
HVTL	high-value target list
HUMINT	human intelligence
IADS	integrated air defense system
ICD	intelligence community directive
IEWTPT	Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Tactical Proficiency Trainer
INSCOM	United States Army Intelligence and Security Command
INTSUM	intelligence summary
IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlefield
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
J-2	intelligence directorate of a joint staff
JFLCC	joint force land component commander
JP	joint publication
JTF	joint task force
JWICS	Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System
MDMP	military decision-making process
MASINT	measurement and signature intelligence
METT-TC	mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (mission variables)
MI	military intelligence
MIB-T	military intelligence brigade-theater
MOS	military occupational specialty
NAI	named area of interest
NIPRNET	Non-classified Internet Protocol Router Network
OAKOC	observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment (military aspects of terrain)
OPCON	operational control
OSINT	open-source intelligence
PED	processing, exploitation, and dissemination
PIR	priority intelligence requirement
PMESII-PT	political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (operational variables)
RFI	request for information
S-1	battalion or brigade personnel staff officer

S-2	battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer
S-3	battalion or brigade operations staff officer
S-4	battalion or brigade logistics staff officer
S-6	battalion or brigade signal staff officer
S-9	battalion or brigade civil affairs operations
SIGINT	signals intelligence
SIPRNET	SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network
SOP	standard operating procedure
SWO	staff weather officer
TACON	tactical control
TAI	target area of interest
TECHINT	technical intelligence
TPFDD	time-phased force and deployment data
TPFDL	time-phased force and deployment list
TTP	tactics, techniques, and procedures
UAS	unmanned aircraft system
U.S.	United States
USACIDC	United States Army Criminal Investigation Command
USAF	United States Air Force

SECTION II – TERMS (U)

adversary (U)

(U) A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged. (JP 3-0)

area defense (U)

(U) A defensive task that concentrates on denying enemy forces access to designated terrain for a specific time rather than destroying the enemy outright. (ADRP 3-90)

area security (U)

(U) A security task conducted to protect friendly forces, installations routes, and actions within a specific area. (ADRP 3-90)

ARFOR (U)

(U) The Army component and senior Army headquarters of all Army forces assigned or attached to a combatant command, subordinate joint force command, joint functional command, or multinational command. (FM 3-94)

attack (U)

(U) An offensive task that destroys or defeats enemy forces, seizes and secures terrain, or both. (ADRP 3-90)

civil-military operations (U)

(U) Activities of a commander performed by designated civil affairs or other military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, indigenous populations, and institutions, by directly supporting the attainment of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation. (JP 3-57)

common operational picture (U)

(U) (Army) A single display of relevant information within a commander's area of interest tailored to the user's requirements and based on common data and information shared by more than one command. (ADRP 6-0)

***consolidate gains* (U)**

(U) Activities to make enduring any temporary operational success and set the conditions for a stable environment allowing for a transition of control to legitimate authorities. (ADRP 3-0)

consolidation area (U)

(U) The portion of the commander's area of operations that is designated to facilitate the security and stability tasks necessary for the freedom of action in the close area and to support the continuous consolidation of gains. (ADRP 3-0)

counterintelligence (U)

(U) Information gathered and activities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons or their agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities. (JP 2-01.2)

cover (U)

(U) (Army) A security task to protect the main body by fighting to gain time while also observing and reporting information and preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body. (ADRP 3-90)

defensive task (U)

(U) A task conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability tasks. (ADRP 3-0)

direct support (U)

(U) A support relationship requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force's request for assistance. (FM 3-0)

delaying operation (U)

(U) (DOD) An operation in which a force under pressure trades space for time by slowing down the enemy's momentum and inflicting maximum damage on the enemy without, in principle, becoming decisively engaged. (JP 3-04)

enemy (U)

(U) A party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized. (ADRP 3-0)

estimative intelligence (U)

(U) Intelligence that identifies, describes, and forecasts adversary capabilities and the implications for planning and executing military operations. (JP 2-0)

exploitation (U)

(U) (DOD) An offensive operation that usually follows a successful attack and is designed to disorganize the enemy in depth. (JP 2-01.3)

force projection (U)

(U) The ability to project the military instrument of national power from the United States or another theater, in response to requirements for military operations. (JP 3-0)

general military intelligence (U)

(U) Intelligence concerning the military capabilities of foreign countries or organizations, or topics affecting potential United States or multinational military operations. (JP 2-0)

guard (U)

(U) A security task to protect the main force by fighting to gain time while also observing and reporting information and preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body. Units conducting a guard mission cannot operate independently because they rely upon fires and functional and multifunctional support assets of the main body. (ADRP 3 90)

H-hour (U)

(U) The specific hour on D-day at which a particular operation commences. (JP 5-0)

high-value target

(U) A target the enemy commander requires for the successful completion of the mission. (JP 3-60)

identity intelligence (U)

(U) The intelligence resulting from the processing of identity attributes concerning individuals, groups, networks, or populations of interest. (JP 2-0)

information collection (U)

(U) An activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. (FM 3-55)

intelligence (U)

(U) (1) The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. (2) The activities that result in the product. (3) The organizations engaged in such activities. (JP 2-0)

intelligence community (U)

(U) All departments or agencies of a government that are concerned with intelligence activity, either in an oversight, managerial, support, or participatory role. (JP 2-0)

intelligence operations (U)

(U) (Army) The tasks undertaken by military intelligence units through the intelligence disciplines to obtain information to satisfy validated requirements. (ADRP 2-0)

intelligence preparation of the battlefield (U)

(U) (Army)The systematic process of analyzing the mission variables of enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations in an area of interest to determine their effect on operations. (ATP 2-01.3)

intelligence reach (U)

(U) The activity by which intelligence organizations proactively and rapidly access information from, receive support from, and conduct direct collaboration and information sharing with other units and agencies, both within and outside the area of operations, unconstrained by geographic proximity, echelon, or command. (ADRP 2 0)

intelligence warfighting function (U)

(U) The related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding the enemy, terrain, weather, civil considerations, and other significant aspects of the operational environment. (ADRP 3-0)

knowledge management (U)

(U) The process of enabling knowledge flow to enhance shared understanding, learning, and decision making. (ADRP 6-0)

landpower (U)

(U) The ability—by threat, force, or occupation—to gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people. (ADRP 3-0)

local security (U)

(U) A security task that includes low-level security activities conducted near a unit to prevent surprise by the enemy. (ADRP 3-90)

military decision-making process (U)

(U) An iterative planning methodology to understand the situation and mission, develop a course of action, and produce an operation plan or order. (ADP 5-0)

mobile defense (U)

(U) A defensive task that concentrates on the destruction or defeat of the enemy through a decisive attack by a striking force. (ADRP 3-90)

mobilization (U)

(U) The process by which the Armed Forces of the United States or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency, which includes activating all or part of the Reserve Component as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel. (JP 4-05)

movement to contact (U)

(U) (Army) An offensive task designed to develop the situation and establish or regain contact. (ADRP 3-90)

offensive task (U)

(U) A task conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain, resources, and population centers. (ADRP 3-0)

operational art (U)

(U) The cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means. (JP 3-0)

operational environment (U)

(U) A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 3-0)

operational framework (U)

(U) A cognitive tool used to assist commanders and staffs in clearly visualizing and describing the application of combat power in time, space, purpose, and resources in the concept of operations. (ADP 1-01)

planning (U)

(U) The art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying out effective ways of bringing that future about. (ADP 5-0)

preparation (U)

(U) Those activities performed by units and Soldiers to improve their ability to execute an operation. (ADP 5-0).

pursuit (U)

(U) An offensive task designed to catch or cut off a hostile force attempting to escape, with the aim of destroying it. (ADRP 3-90)

redeployment (U)

(U) (DOD)The transfer or rotation of forces and materiel to support another joint force commander's operational requirements, or to return personnel, equipment, and materiel to the home and/or demobilization stations for reintegration and/or outprocessing. (JP 3-35)

retirement (U)

(U) A form of retrograde in which a force out of contact moves away from the enemy. (ADRP 3-90)

retrograde (U)

(U) (Army) A defensive task that involves organized movement away from the enemy. (ADRP 3-90)

risk management (U)

(U) The process to identify, assess, and control risks and make decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits. (JP 3-0)

running estimate (U)

(U) The continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander's intent and if the planned future operations are supportable. (ADP 5 0)

scientific and technical intelligence (U)

(U) The product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of foreign scientific and technical information that covers: a. foreign developments in basic and applied research and in applied engineering techniques; and b. scientific and technical characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of all foreign military systems, weapons, weapon systems, and materiel; the research and development related thereto; and the production methods employed for their manufacture. (JP 2-01)

screen (U)

(U) A security task that primarily provides early warning to the protected force. (ADRP 3-90)

site exploitation (U)

(U) (DOD) A series of activities to recognize, collect, process, preserve, and analyze information, personnel, and/or materiel found during the conduct of operations. (JP 3-31)

situational understanding (U)

(U) The product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the relationships among the operational and mission variables to facilitate decision making. (ADP 5-0)

striking force (U)

(U) A dedicated counterattack force in a mobile defense constituted with the bulk of available combat power. (ADRP 3-90)

target intelligence (U)

(U) Intelligence that portrays and locates the components of a target or target complex and indicates its vulnerability and relative importance. (JP 3-60)

threat (U)

(U) Any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm United States forces, United States national interests, or the homeland. (ADRP 3-0)

troop leading procedures (U)

(U) A dynamic process used by small-unit leaders to analyze a mission, develop a plan, and prepare for an operation. (ADP 5-0)

warning intelligence (U)

(U) Those intelligence activities intended to detect and report time-sensitive intelligence information on foreign developments that forewarn of hostile actions or intention against United States entities, partners, or interests. (JP 2-0)

withdrawal operation (U)

(U) (DOD) A planned retrograde operation in which a force in contact disengages from an enemy force and moves in a direction away from the enemy. (JP 3-17)

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