

OCTOBER 2002

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HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

INTRODUCTION

This aid is published to assist Civil Affairs (CA) soldiers as they conduct CA support to special operations forces (SOF) Army, joint, and coalition forces. It is critical that CA elements at all echelons properly plan and execute their missions to enhance the supported commander's successful mission accomplishment. In today's operational environment, the military decision-making process (MDMP) is vital to allowing the commander to make informed decisions to maximize success with minimum risk. Never in history has the role of CA in MDMP been more critical than now.

Planning in all phases and at all levels of the operation will be enhanced through the use of this aid. From the basic principles of CA planning through determination of measures of effectiveness (MOEs), this graphic training aid (GTA) outlines and provides examples of successful CA planning.

This GTA provides valuable time-saving information on how to conduct a quick but valuable assessment of the operational area to assist the commander in making informed decisions. Incorporating SPHERE Project and United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) emergency indicators and standards into emergency humanitarian assistance (HA) assessments will make those assessments more accurate, timely, and resource-efficient.

The interaction between CA personnel and agency representatives has never been more important than it is today. This GTA contains valuable advice on how to interact with these organizations and with local government officials.

CA forces are combat multipliers with unique capabilities to influence and support the commander's mission accomplishment in war and peace.

Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

CA APPLICATION OF SOF MISSION CRITERIA

Is the mission appropriate for CA? The best use of CA is against key strategic or operational targets that require the unique skills and capabilities of CA forces. Commanders should not assign CA forces if targets are not of strategic or operational importance. Commanders should not use CA as a substitute for other forces.

Does the mission support the theater geographic combatant commander's campaign plan? If the mission does not support the joint force commander's (JFC's) campaign plan, more appropriate missions are probably available for CA.

Is the mission operationally feasible? During the course of action (COA) analysis, the CA commander must realistically evaluate his force. Planners must understand that CA is not structured for unilateral operations. They should not assign missions that are beyond the scope of CA capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities.

Are the required resources available to conduct the mission? Almost all CA missions require support from conventional forces. Support involves protecting, integrating, and sustaining employed CA. Support may include airlift, intelligence, communications, and logistics.

Does the expected outcome justify the risk? Some operations that CA can execute make a marginal contribution to the JFC's campaign plan and present great risk to personnel and material. Commanders should recognize the high value and limited resources of CA. They must make sure the benefits of successful mission execution are measurable and balanced with the risks inherent with the mission. Risk management considers not only the potential loss of CA units and equipment but also the risk of adverse effects on United States (U.S.) diplomatic and political interests in a failed mission.

CA METHODOLOGY

The CA methodology describes how CA soldiers, elements, and units approach all CA operations and civil-military operations (CMO). It consists of six steps:

Assess. Assess current conditions against a defined norm or established standards. A continuous process that looks at the nonmilitary factors that shape the operational environment (CASCOPE). Conducted for each of the 16 functional specialties and the general aspects of the area of operations (AO). Products include an initial estimate and restated mission statement.

Decide. Decide who, what, when, where, why, and how to focus CA assets and activities toward a common operational effect (COE). Encompasses CA COA analysis, COA decision, and creation of the CA/CMO plan. Directs task-organized CA elements to create or observe those conditions or events that would either mitigate or trigger a specific CA/CMO response. Addresses all CA/CMO activities in civil lines of operations from initial response through transition to other (military or civilian) authorities. Products include the commander's intent for CMO, defined CA priorities of effort, defined MOEs, and the CAAnnex.

Develop and Detect. Develop rapport and relationships with the nonmilitary participants of the operation (including the affected populace) and detect those conditions or events that would either mitigate or trigger a specific CA/CMO response. Provides input to the common operational picture (COP) and helps set up the common operational response (COR) that, in turn, achieves a COE. Typical tasks include facilitating the interagency process in the civil-military operations center (CMOC), conducting deliberate assessments and local meetings, supporting dislocated civilian (DC) control

points, and monitoring public information programs and CA/CMO-related reports from the field. Products include continuous assessments, revised or updated plans, formalized CMOC terms of reference, and fragmentary (FRAG) orders.

Deliver. Engage the civil component with planned or on-call CA activities (populace and resources control, foreign nation support (FNS), HA, military civic action, emergency services, and support to civil administration), as appropriate. This step is executed according to synchronized plans and represents a COR by CA soldiers, non-CA soldiers, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), host nation (HN) assets, and so on. The product is an executed mission.

Evaluate. Evaluate the results of the executed mission. Validates the CA/CMO concept of operations and determines whether the established MOE have been met. Constitutes CA "battle damage assessment." Looks at the effects of the operation on each of the 16 functional specialties, determines the sustainability of any projects or programs initiated during the execution phase, and recommends follow-on actions. Products include trip reports, after-action reports (AARs), new mission requirements, and execution orders for transition plans.

Transition. Transition CA operations or CMO to follow-on CA units, other military units, HN assets, United Nations (UN) organizations, international organizations, NGOs, and other civilian agencies, as appropriate. This step is CA's direct contribution to a sustainable solution and the commander's ability to secure the victory. This step is executed according to synchronized transition plans. The outcome of this step includes successful transition of authority or relief-in-place and programs that are durable and sustainable by the follow-on force or organization.

CASCOPE

Using the mnemonic "CASCOPE," civil considerations are analyzed for how they help, hinder, or are affected by military operations. The six characteristics are:

Civil Areas. Key localities or aspects of the terrain within a commander's battlespace that are not normally thought of as militarily significant (for example, locations of government centers, areas defined by political boundaries, agricultural and mining regions, and trade routes).

Structures. Existing civil structures (for example, jails, warehouses, schools, television and radio stations, utilities, and cultural sites) and their location, function, capabilities, and application.

Capabilities. Existing or required indigenous capabilities to sustain the populace and infrastructure (for example, public administration, public safety, emergency services, food, and agriculture systems) and resources and services that can be contracted to support the military mission (for example, interpreters, laundry services, construction materials, and equipment).

Organizations. Organized groups that may or may not be affiliated with government agencies (for example, church groups, fraternal organizations, patriotic or service organizations, community watch groups, international organizations, and NGOs).

People. All the civilians one can expect to encounter in the AO, as well as those outside the AO, whose actions, opinions, or political influence can affect the military mission.

Events. Civilian events that may affect the military mission (for example, planting and harvest seasons, elections, riots, and evacuations) and military events that impact on the lives of civilians in an AO (for example, air, ground, and sea combat operations, deployments, redeployments, and payday).

| | | Inherent Responsibilities Are: | | | | | | | |
|---------|--|---|--|--|-----------------------------------|---|---|---|---|
| R | lf elationship Is: | Has Command Relation- ship With: | May Be Task- Organized By: | Receives Combat Service Support (CSS) From: | Assigned Position or AO By: | Provides Liaison To: | Establishes/ Maintains Communica- tions With: | Has Priorities By: | Gaining Unit Can Impose Further Command or Support Relation- ship Of: |
| | Attached | Gaining unit | Gaining unit | Gaining unit | Gaining unit | As required by gaining unit | Unit to which attached | Gaining unit | Attached; OPCON; TACON; GS; GSR; R; DS |
| COMMAND | Operational Control (OPCON) | Gaining unit | Parent unit and gaining unit; gaining unit may pass OPCON to lower head- quarters (HQ) NOTE 1 | Parent unit | Gaining unit | As required by gaining unit | As required by gaining unit and parent unit | Gaining unit | OPCON; TACON; GS; GSR; R; DS |
| | Tactical Control (TACON) | Gaining unit | Parent unit | Parent unit | Gaining unit | As required by gaining unit | As required by gaining unit and parent unit | Gaining unit | GS: GSR; R; DS |
| | Assigned | Parent unit | Parent unit | Parent unit | Gaining unit | As required by parent unit | As required by parent unit | Parent unit | Not applicable |
| SUPPORT | Direct Support (DS) | Parent unit | Parent unit | Parent unit | Supported unit | Supported unit | Parent unit and supported unit | Supported unit | NOTE 2 |
| | Reinforcing (R) | Parent unit | Parent unit | Parent unit | Reinforced unit | Reinforced unit | Parent unit and reinforced unit | Reinforced unit; then parent unit | Not |
| | General Support Reinforcing (GSR) | Parent unit | Parent unit | Parent unit | Parent unit | Reinforced unit and as required by parent unit | Reinforced unit and as required by parent unit | Parent unit; then reinforced unit | Not applicable |
| | General Support (GS) | Parent unit | Parent unit | Parent unit | Parent unit | As required by parent unit | As required by parent unit | Parent unit | Not applicable |

NOTE 1. In North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the gaining unit may not task-organize a multinational unit (see TACON).

NOTE 2. Commanders of units in DS may further assign support relationships between their subordinate units and elements of the supported unit after coordination with the supported commander.

TRANSITION OPERATIONS

For the CA unit, the transition phase is arguably the most difficult and critical part of any operation. Planning for the transition phase begins during the decide phase and then after weeks, months, or even years it is time to conduct transition operations.

Successful execution of transition is the CA community's direct contribution to a sustainable solution and the commander's ability to secure the victory.

Depending on the situation, CA activities and CMO in transition operations may be terminated, transferred to follow-on forces, or passed to the indigenous population or institutions. If operations are terminated, CA soldiers take the appropriate steps to cease operations. If transferred to some other military or civilian organization, CA soldiers take steps to orient the incoming organization to the activity or task, supervise the incoming organization in performing the activity or task, transfer the task, and redeploy as directed.

Regardless of the type of transition occurring, there are some fundamental principles and goals of transitioning to follow-on organizations, or indigenous populations or institutions.

Throughout all operations, CA planners, functional specialists, and team members maintain continuity books that will orient new personnel to their routine tasks. Ideally, there will be an overlap period when mission handoff occurs between individuals and units. A continuity book facilitates a turnover of operations between outgoing and incoming personnel that is transparent to the supported organization, agency, or populace.

A well executed transition ensures that programs are sustainable; reflects well on the unit, the Army, and the United States; and truly helps the supported unit Secure the Victory.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS (IO)

| | ю | смо | PA | |
|---|---|--|---|--|
| IO Can Support By: | | Influencing/informing population of CA activities and support. Neutralizing misinformation and hostile propaganda directed against civil authorities. Controlling EMS for legitimate purposes. | Conducting counterpropaganda and protecting from misinformation/rumor. Developing EEFI to preclude inadvertent public disclosure. Synchronizing PSYOP and OPSEC with PA strategy. | |
| CMO Can Support By: | Providing information to support friendly knowledge of information environment. Synchronizing communications media and message with PSYOP. Coordinating C2 target sets with targeting cell. Establishing and maintaining liaison or dialogue with indigenous personnel, NGOs, and PVOs*. Supporting PSYOP with feedback on PSYOP themes. Providing news and information to the local people. | | Providing information on CMOC activities to support PA strategy. Synchronizing information communications media and message. Identifying, coordinating, and integrating media, public information, and HNS. | |
| PA Can Support By: | Developing information products to protect soldiers against the effects of misinformation. Coordinating with PSYOP and counterpropaganda planners to ensure a consistent message and maintain OPSEC. Support counterpropaganda by countering misinformation. Providing assessment of effects of media coverage to OPSEC planners. Providing assessment of essential non-U.S. media coverage of deception story. | Producing accurate, timely, and balanced information for the public. Coordinating with CA specialists to verify facts and validity of information. | | |
| EEFI ess EMS em HNS hos OPSEC ope PA put PSYOP Psy | C2 command and control essential elements of friendly information emergency medical services HNS host nation support OPSEC perations security PA public affairs *NOTE: The term PVO is no longer widely accepted within the civilian community. It has generally been *NOTE: The term PVO is no longer widely accepted within the civilian community. It has generally been *NOTE: The term PVO is no longer widely accepted within the civilian community. It has generally been *NOTE: The term PVO is no longer widely accepted within the civilian community. | | | |


MISSION, ENEMY, TERRAIN AND WEATHER, TROOPS AND SUPPORT AVAILABLE— TIME AVAILABLE, AND CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS (METT-TC)

| TROOP LEADING PROCEDURES (TLP) | MDMP |
|---|--|
| 1. Receive the Mission 2. Issue the Warning Order 3. Make a Tentative Plan 4. Initiate Movement 5. Conduct Reconnaissance 6. Conduct the Plan 7. Issue the Order 8. Supervise | Receive the Mission Mission Analysis Course of Action Development Course of Action Analysis Course of Action Comparison Course of Action Approval Orders of Production |


MISSION ANALYSIS


- Step 1. Analyze the Order From Higher Headquarters
- Step 2. Conduct Initial Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)
- Step 3. Determine Specified, Implied, and Essential Tasks
- Step 4. Review Available Assets
- Step 5. Determine Constraints
- Step 6. Identify Critical Facts and Assumptions
- Step 7. Conduct Risk Assessment
- ${\it Step 8.} \quad {\it Determine the Initial Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR)}$
- Step 9. Determine the Initial Reconnaissance Annex
- Step 10. Plan Use of Available Time
- Step 11. Write the Restated Mission
- Step 12. Conduct the Mission Analysis Briefing
- Step 13. Approve the Restated Mission
- Step 14. Develop the Initial Commander's Intent
- Step 15. Issue the Commander's Guidance
- Step 16. Issue a Warning Order
- Step 17. Review Facts and Assumptions

MDMP



CA OPERATIONAL CONTINUUM






CA OPERATIONS:

- ➤ Are simultaneous with combat operations.
- ➤ Constructively engage the civil element of the operational environment.
- ➤ Create success by transferring civil-military tasks to indigenous control.
- ➤ Have concurrent strategic, operational, and tactical consequences.
- ➤ Leverage the latent potential of indigenous people and their institutions with the international community toward achieving a durable solution in the absence of U.S.-led forces.
- ➤ Involves engaging key areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events of civil society.

CIVIL LINES OF OPERATIONS



Civil lines of operation define the directional orientation of CA forces and military forces engaged in CMO in time and space as they relate to the civil sector of the AO. Lines of operations connect a series of decisive points that lead to the desired civil outcome. A CA or CMO mission may have a single or multiple lines of operations as depicted above.

(CLASSIFICATION)

(Change from oral orders, if any)

Copy ____ of ___ copies Issuing headquarters Place of issue Date-time group of signature Message reference number

FRAGMENTARY ORDER ___

References: (Mandatory) Reference the order being modified.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: (Optional)

- 1. SITUATION. (Mandatory) Include any changes to the existing order.
- 2. MISSION. (Mandatory) List the new mission.
- 3. EXECUTION.

Intent: (Optional)

- a. Concept of operations. (Mandatory)
- b. Tasks to subordinate units. (Mandatory)
- c. Coordinating instructions. (Mandatory) Include statement, "Current overlay remains in effect" or "See change 1 to Annex C, Operations Overlay." Mark changes to control measures on overlay or issue a new overlay.
- 4. SERVICE SUPPORT. Include any changes to existing order or the statement, "No change to OPORD xx."
- 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. Include any changes to existing order or "No change to OPORD xx."

ACKNOWLEDGE: (Mandatory)

NAME (Commander's last name) RANK (Commander's rank)

OFFICIAL: (Optional)
ANNEXES: (Optional)
DISTRIBUTION: (Optional)

(CLASSIFICATION)

ANNEX (CIVIL AFFAIRS) TO ____ (CORPS/DIVISION/BRIGADE) OPLAN (OPORD) NO ____

References: List those documents used to prepare this annex.

- 1 CA Annex of higher headquarters.
- 2 Relevant plans of participating civilian organizations.
- 3 Relevant civilian agency operations guides and standards documents.
- 4 Coordinated transition plans.
- 5 International treaties and agreements.
- 6 Operational CA database.
- 7 Others, as applicable.

Task Organization. State the CA task organization for this mission. Identify CA elements and the units or organizations they support.

Interagency Task Organization. Include elements such as liaison officers and the units or organizations they support.

- 1. SITUATION. State the general operational/tactical situation that will be discussed in the base plan and in other annexes. Describe here the general civil situation, in terms of CASCOPE, as analyzed in the CMO estimate.
- a. CIVIL. List the major strengths and vulnerabilities of civil components of the AO and how they relate to the overall mission.
- (1) Areas. Include the key aspects of the commander's battlespace, such as political boundaries, centers of government, open areas for possible temporary settlement, agricultural and mining regions, and other significant geographic and economic features.
- (2) Structures. Include traditional high-payoff targets (HPTs) and structures such as cultural sites, facilities with practical applications—jails and warehouses—power plants, water purification plants, radio and TV antennas.
- (3) Capabilities. List an ally's or an aggressor's ability to provide services; for example, policing, routine emergency medical services, temporary shelters, public administration, reestablishing industrial and agricultural capability.
- (4) Organizations. List locations and meeting cycles of key international organizations and NGOs, for example, UNHCR, World Food Programme (WFP), Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), governing bodies, health services, legal and law enforcement, religious groups, fraternal groups, multinational corporations, and community watch organizations.
- (5) People. Include key personnel and linkage to the population, all the civilians in and outside the AO, leaders, figureheads, clerics, subject matter experts (SMEs). For example, computer and communications specialists, sewage plant operator, and demobilized soldiers.
- (6) Events. List cycles and seasons (harvest and planting seasons), significant weather events (floods), elections, school year, fiscal year, holidays (religious periods and traditional vacation time).

(CLASSIFICATION)

- (7) Civil centers of gravity. List the one or two elements of the civil component that, when engaged, will result in a change that has a cascading impact on the entire civil system, resulting in furthering the achievement of stated objectives.
- b. THREAT. State the actual/potential nonmilitary threats to the force and to mission accomplishment; for example, natural, man-made, and technological hazards; disease; dislocated civilians; criminals; time; and so on.
 - c. FRIENDLY FORCES.
 - (1) Outline CA plans of higher headquarters.
 - (2) Outline CA plans of higher and adjacent units.
- (3) Identify CA- or civil-military- capable units in the AO and their missions.
- d. ATTACHMENTS/DETACHMENTS. If not covered in task organization, list all military and nonmilitary organizations participating in CMOC operations and CA activities; for example, in support of reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plans, CA assets detached for liaison duties, and so on.
- e. ASSUMPTIONS. (OPLAN only) State critical planning considerations and unknown conditions that must be confirmed by deliberate assessments. Include a statement describing the operational risks associated with not engaging the civil component of the AO through CMO.
- MISSION. Provide short, understandable, and descriptive statement of CA activities required to support the basic plan; for example, CA unit conducts HNS support (or other CA missions to include: populace and resources control [PRC], humanitarian assistance, military-civic action, emergency services, support to civil administration) operations NLT (date-time group) vicinity objective (OBJ) ______ (or in AO ______) to (purpose of the CA activity or activities).

3. EXECUTION.

- a. COMMANDER'S INTENT. State the commander's intent for CMO as found in the CMO estimate. This should include the relationship between the military force, civilian participants in the operation, and the indigenous populace, as well as a statement of the commander's desired effects before and after transition of CA activities and CMO to civil responsibility.
- b. CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION. Provide a brief overview of the CA activities, described in terms of lines of operations, by phase. This should include a discussion of civil-military objectives, civil decisive points, measures of effectiveness and transition for each line of operation, and a general timeline for the operation. Each line of operation will be discussed in greater detail in the appendixes.
 - (1) Phase I.
 - (a) Line of operation 1 (for example, PRC).
 - (b) Line of operation 2 (for example, FNS).
 - (c) Line of operation 3 (for example, HA).
 - (d) Line of operation 4 (for example, CA activities, as needed).
 - (2) Phase II.
 - (a) Line of operation 1 (for example, PRC).
 - (b) Line of operation 2 (for example, FNS).

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- (c) Line of operation 3 (for example, HA).
- (d) Line of operation 4 (other CA activities, as needed).
- (3) Phase III. Additional phases, as per supported OPORD.
- c. TASKS TO SUBORDINATE UNITS. List specific tasks assigned to the elements listed in the task organization and attachments/detachments subparagraphs of paragraph 1. This may include tasks to conduct deliberate assessments, report civil decisive points according to the R&S plans, evaluate measures of effectiveness, and others.
- d. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS. Provide instructions and details of coordination that apply to two or more subordinate units not covered by standing operating procedure (SOP). This includes civil CCIR, policy statements, special reporting procedures, force protection guidance, effective time of attachments or detachments, references to annexes not mentioned elsewhere in the annex, coordinating authority, and so on.
- 4. SERVICE SUPPORT. Provide instructions and details concerning the service support relationship between the CA elements and their supported units, as well as any special operations support elements in the AO.
 - a. Administrative.
 - b. Medical.
 - c. Logistics.
 - d. Maintenance.
- 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.
- a. COMMAND. List command relationships, the location of the CA command post and/or CMOC, alternate locations of the CA command post and/or CMOC, and a succession of command within the CA unit structure. This may also include the location of the CA command post and/or CMOC of the next higher headquarters.
- b. SIGNAL. List all pertinent communication information, including primary and alternate means of communicating with and among military organizations, as well as with and among participating civilian organizations.

APPENDIXES: Include diagrams, synchronization matrices, civil overlays, and so on.

- 1 Cultural Briefing.
- 2 Populace and Resources Control Plan.
 - A Dislocated Civilian Plan.
 - B Noncombatant Evacuation Plan.
- 3 Humanitarian Assistance Plan.
- 4 Emergency Services Plan.
- 5 Military Civic Action Plan.
- 6 Support to Civil Administration Plan.
- 7 FNS Plan.
- 8 Transfer of Authority Plan.
- 9 Others, as required.

DETERMINING CMO MOEs

The term "measures of effectiveness," or MOEs, refers to observable, quantifiable, subjective indicators that an activity is proceeding along a desired path. A commander uses MOEs to determine how well or how poorly an operation is proceeding in achieving the goals of the operation according to his mission statement.

MOEs are a product of mission analysis. As the commander and his staff identify specified, implied, and critical tasks, they define what constitutes successful completion of each task. They decide how the MOEs will be identified, reported, and validated.

CMO planners should ensure that MOEs are—

- ➤ Appropriate. MOEs should correlate to the audience objectives.
- ➤ Mission-Related. MOEs must correlate to the mission. If the mission expands, so should MOEs. Planners should tailor MOEs to address strategic, operational, and tactical levels.
- ➤ *Measurable*. Quantitative MOEs reflect reality more accurately than nonquantitative MOEs, and hence, are generally the measure of choice when the situation permits their use.
- ➤ Numerically Reasonable. MOEs should be limited to the minimum required to effectively portray the relief environment. Planners should avoid establishing excessive MOEs; they become unmanageable or the collection efforts outweigh the value.
- ➤ Sensitive. MOEs should be sensitive to force performance and accurately reflect changes related to joint force actions.

➤ *Useful.* MOEs should detect situation changes quickly enough to enable the commander to immediately and effectively respond.

Examples of MOEs in CMO could include the following:

- ➤ Drops in mortality rates in the affected population below a specified level per day.
- ➤ Increase in water available to each disaster victim per day to levels established for human consumption, to support sanitation measures, and for livestock consumption.
- ➤ Decrease the population of displaced persons in camps to a level sustainable by the affected country or non-U.S. military organizations. Another aspect of these MOEs are the increase in the number of persons per day returning to their homes.
- ➤ Decrease in incidence of disease to an acceptable or manageable level.
- ➤ Increase in the presence and capabilities of NGOs and international organizations.

In addition to deciding what the MOEs are, CA/CMO planners must decide certain aspects about each one, for example—

- ➤ Who will observe the MOEs? (For example, task a specific individual or team.)
- ➤ When will the MOEs be observed? (Are the MOEs event-driven or time-driven? How often will the MOEs be tested?)
- ➤ How will the MOEs be observed? (What method will be used to detect indicators? Direct observation or all-source analysis?)
- ➤ Where will the observation(s) be made? (For example, ground level, the CMOC, an all-source analysis center, or some other location.)

- Who will approve and validate achievement of the MOEs?
- ➤ What actions will be taken when the MOEs are satisfactorily achieved? By whom?

RAPID ASSESMENT

CURRENT AS OF (MM/DD/YY):

1. GENERAL

- a. Village Name:
- b. Grid:
- c. Sector:
- d. Language:

2. POPULATION

- a. Total Pop:
- b. Families:
- c. Male:
- d. Female:
- e. Children:
- f. Refugees:
- g. Refugee Origin:
- h. Abroad:

3. STANDARD OF LIVING (General Description or Percentage)

- a. Food:
- b. Water:
- c. Shelter:
- d. Power:
- e. TV:
- f. Radio:
- g. Transportation:

4. ETHNIC COMPOSITION BY PERCENT

a.

b.

5. POLITICS

- a. Parties:
- b. Representatives:

6. EMERGENCY SERVICES

- a. Police:
- b. Fire:
- c. Rescue:
- d. Militia:

7. KEYPERSONS

- a. Mayor:
- b. Police Chief:
- c. Military Commander:

8. ECONOMICS

- a. Unemployed:
- b. Self-Employed:
- c. Nature of Self-Employment:
- d. Employed:
- e. Nature of Employment:
- f. Agriculture:
- g. Industry:

9. LINES OF COMMUNICATION/UTILITIES

- a. Communications:
- b. Water Supply:
- c. Electrical Supply:
- d. Road System:
- e. Rail System:
- f. Medical Facilities:
- g. Education Facilities:

10. OBSERVATIONS:

FORCE PROTECTION

It is difficult to prevent threat forces from successfully attacking someone or something they really want. However, there are ways that CA soldiers can make themselves less desirable targets. CA soldiers should not limit themselves to the following considerations when developing a sound force protection plan. As with any planning sequence, CA soldiers must consider the environment.

Maintain a low profile. CA soldiers—

- ➤ Discourage very important person (VIP) treatment.
- ➤ Limit the use of staff cars, or do not use them at all. If they are used, the vehicle should blend in as much as possible with the vehicles used by the local population.
- ➤ Avoid using official or diplomatic license plates.
- ➤ Do not permanently affix decals required by the base or Embassy to the vehicle.
- ➤ Drive themselves, which allows them to control the routes, speed of travel, and pickup times. **NOTE:** Personnel who have a driver or chauffeur are considered to be important.
- ➤ If required to have a bodyguard or escort, keep the number to a minimum and make sure they blend in with the local population.
- ➤ When their jobs require them to be interviewed or photographed, downplay their importance.

Control the environment. CA soldiers—

➤ Whenever possible, use on-base facilities. These generally offer better security and are probably better equipped to deal with hostile attacks.

- ➤ Choose a hotel that employs security measures; for example, guards, cameras, visitor sign-in rosters, and so on.
- ➤ Avoid street-level rooms.
- ➤ Are alert for anyone loitering or carrying objects that could conceal weapons.
- ➤ Are familiar with the uniforms of local police, military, fire department, emergency services, and hotel security. Also know the proper procedures for obtaining their services.

Select a working/meeting place. CA soldiers ensure that—

- ➤ The area has reliable police, fire, and rescue services.
- ➤ The area does not have a high crime rate or any late-night establishments.
- ➤ The area has multiple routes to and from the meeting/working place and not be located on narrow or one-way streets.
- ➤ The building selected has high walls and fences. There should be more then one gate to offer alternative ways in and out of the compound.
- ➤ Tall trees and shrubs serve as a screen to anyone trying to observe the grounds, but shrubbery in the perimeter near the building should be trimmed or removed to prevent them from being used to conceal intruders.
- ➤ When possible, dogs monitor the building and surrounding area. It does not matter whether the dog is big or small as long as it is loud.
- ➤ Security guards and night watchmen monitor the building and surrounding area.
- ➤ Doors and windows are strong. Existing locks are changed upon taking control of the building.

- ▶ When possible, doors and windows should have bars.
- ► Employees should be hired from approved Embassy lists.
- During a meeting, participants must not sit in direct line with the windows.

Meeting outside of the workplace. CA soldiers ensure that—

- ➤ The meeting place has at least two exits.
- ➤ Whenever possible, a premeeting visit to the location should be made to become familiar with the layout of the building and routes.
- ➤ Appointments are not made in advance.
- ➤ Buildings used has only one floor.
- ➤ The interior is well lit.

USE OF INTERPRETERS

Selecting the Interpreter. An interpreter should be selected based on the following criteria:

- ➤ Native Speaker. The interpreter should be a native speaker of the socially or geographically determined dialect. His speech, background, and mannerisms should be completely acceptable to the target audience so that no attention is given to the way he talks, only to what he says.
- ➤ Social Status. In some situations and cultures, an interpreter may be limited in his effectiveness with a target audience if his social standing is considerably lower than that of the audience.
- ➤ English Fluency. As a rule, if the interpreter understands the CA soldier and the CA soldier understands the interpreter, the interpreter's command of English should

be satisfactory. The CA soldier can check that "understanding" by asking the interpreter to paraphrase, in English, something the CA soldier has said and by restating the interpreter's comments to ensure correct interpretation.

- ➤ Intellectual Intelligence. The interpreter should be quick, alert, and responsive to changing conditions and situations. He must be able to grasp complex concepts and discuss them without confusion in a reasonably logical sequence.
- ➤ Technical Ability. In certain situations, the CA soldier may need an interpreter with technical training or experience in special subject areas. This may be needed to translate the "meaning" as well as the "words."
- ➤ Reliability. The CA soldier should beware of the potential interpreter who arrives late for the interview. Throughout the world, the concept of time varies widely. In many less-developed countries, time is relatively unimportant. The CA soldier ensures the interpreter understands the military's preoccupation with punctuality.
- ➤ Loyalty. If the interpreter used is a local national, the CA soldier may safely assume the interpreter's first loyalty is to the HN, or subgroup, not the U.S. military. The security implications are clear. The CA soldier must be very cautious in explaining concepts to give the interpreter a greater depth of understanding. Additionally, some interpreters, for political or personal reasons, may have ulterior motives or a hidden agenda when they apply for the interpreting job.
- ➤ Gender, Age, and Race. Gender, age, and race have the potential to seriously affect the mission. Since traditions, values, and biases vary from country to country, the CA

- soldier must check with the in-country assets or area studies for specific taboos or favorable characteristics.
- ➤ Compatibility. The CA soldier and the interpreter will work as a team. The target audience will quickly recognize personality conflicts between the CA soldier and his interpreter, which can undermine the effectiveness of the communication effort.

Conducting the Interview. The CA soldier and interpreter should avoid simultaneous translation; that is, they should not talk at the same time. Although the CA soldier's interpreter will be doing some "editing" as a function of the interpreting process, it is imperative that he transmit the exact meaning without additions or deletions. During an interview or lesson, if questions are asked, the interpreter should immediately relay them to the CA solider for an answer. Just as establishing rapport with the interpreter is vitally important, establishing rapport with an interview subject or target audience is equally important.

Communication Techniques. When speaking extemporaneously, the CA soldier should think about what he wants to say. He should break down what he wants to say into logical bits and give out a small piece at a time. The CA soldier should use short, simple words and sentences, which can be translated quickly and easily. The CA soldier should—

- ➤ Limit the use of transitional phrases and qualifiers.
- ➤ Keep the entire presentation as simple as possible.
- ➤ Avoid idiomatic English.
- ➤ Avoid a tendency toward flowery language.
- ➤ Avoid slang and colloquial expressions.

Do's and Don'ts. The following are some do's and don'ts to consider when working with an interpreter. The CA soldier—

- ➤ Positions the interpreter by his side (or even a step back). This will keep the subject or audience from shifting their attention or fixating on the interpreter and not on the CA soldier.
- Always looks at and talks directly to the subject or audience. Guards against the tendency to talk to the interpreter.
- ➤ Speaks slowly and clearly. Repeats as often as necessary.
- ➤ Does not address the subject or audience in the third person through the interpreter.
- ➤ Speaks to the individual or group as if they understand English. Is enthusiastic and employs the gestures, movements, and voice intonations and inflections normally used for an English-speaking group.
- ➤ Avoids side comments to the interpreter that are not expected to be translated. This tends to create the wrong atmosphere for communication.
- ➤ While the interpreter is translating and the subject or audience is listening, avoids doing anything distracting.
- ➤ Periodically checks interpreter's accuracy, consistency, and clarity. Has another American, who is fluent enough in the language, sit in on a lesson or interview.
- ► Checks with audience whenever he suspects misunderstandings, and clarifies immediately.
- After acquiring an effective interpreter, makes him feel like a valuable member of the team. Gives him recognition commensurate with the importance of his contribution.

SETTING UP A MEETING

It may be necessary to conduct periodic meetings with certain groups for specific recurring or sequential topics. Weekly meetings may be appropriate for planning operations, tracking progress, and managing projects. Monthly meetings provide a better chance to look at certain long-range or developmental subjects in greater depth.

Every meeting ought to be assigned to a single meeting coordinator. The meeting coordinator is responsible for the planning, coordination, and execution of the meeting. Depending on the circumstances and level of the meeting, the meeting coordinator may or may not also serve as the moderator of the meeting.

Successful meetings require detailed planning, regardless of the location, circumstances, timing, or frequency. Successful planning requires the meeting coordinator to approach the task professionally and systematically. He must understand the purpose, expected outcome, and implications of the meeting. The more care taken in preparing and structuring the meeting, the more likely the outcome of the meeting will be favorable.

Planning the Meeting. The meeting coordinator should—

- ➤ Determine the purpose of the meeting, the desired results of the meeting, and implications of the meeting on ongoing operations and initiatives.
- ➤ Make a list of the desired attendees. Identify individual ranks, status, and protocol requirements. Identify potential agenda items among the attendees that may surface before, during, or after the meeting.
- ➤ Select an appropriate location. Consider security of the site, clearance of routes, and if needed, travel passes. Consider the neutrality of the location and the possible message it may send to participants and nonparticipants.

- ➤ Invite the attendees and, when appropriate, confirm their attendance.
- ➤ Determine appropriate seating arrangements. Consider the number of participants, the rank and status of the participants, the size and shape of the room, and local culture and customs.
- ➤ Consider local ceremonial customs, and ensure that the members of the U.S. or coalition party are aware of what will be expected of them in such ceremonies. (Ceremony may be an important part of some types of meetings.)
- ➤ Be familiar with other cultural idiosyncrasies, such as the exchanging of gifts before or after a meeting or how much "small talk" is acceptable before "jumping into business."

During the Meeting. The meeting moderator should—

- ➤ Welcome all participants and allow for introductions.
- ➤ Orient the participants to the layout of the meeting area, including locations of break areas, rest rooms, telephones, fax machines, and other administrative support.
- ➤ Provide an overview of the purpose of the meeting and meeting objectives, relevant background information and assumptions, the time allotted for the meeting, and the expected outcome at the meeting's conclusion.
- ▶ Publish clear and concise ground rules for behavior. For example, participants must arrive on time, there should be no interruptions to take phone calls, topics not on the agenda will be tabled for a follow-up meeting, and meeting organizers should always strive to finish the meeting on time. Other rules might include guidelines on sending proxies or on the need for confidentiality. Importantly, in a volatile environment, full constructive challenge, as opposed to destructive confrontation, should be encouraged.

- ➤ Propose and formalize an agenda that is agreeable to all parties. Designate an individual to enforce the agenda by keeping time or reminding participants when they are straying from the approved topics.
- ➤ Designate an individual to perform as the official recorder and note-taker, since it is almost impossible to effectively run a meeting and take thorough notes at the same time. Legal clerks from the Judge Advocate General (JAG) section, if available, may be helpful.
- ➤ Monitor the composition and skills of the attendees to confirm that the right people are attending.
- ➤ Provide the opportunity for people to be creative and spontaneous. Encouraging participation fosters a sense of common purpose and accomplishment. In some meetings, participants might not be vocal with their ideas. To obtain the feedback necessary to resolve issues, the meeting coordinator may have to extract the information by asking direct questions.
- ▶ If necessary, break large groups into smaller working groups (no more than 10) to facilitate communication and participation.
- ➤ Use the last few minutes of a meeting to review the group's decisions, define the required next steps (if necessary), and assign due dates for each assignment. If follow-up action is necessary, it is important to be specific so that it is clearly understood which individual will handle each outstanding task.

After the Meeting. The meeting coordinator or moderator should produce a complete report consisting, at a minimum, of the following:

- ➤ List of attendees.
- ➤ Copy of the agenda.

- ➤ A synopsis of all issues and discussions covered during the meeting, decisions made, agreements drafted, topics tabled for future meetings, and further actions to be taken.
- ➤ The dates and subjects of future meetings.

The meeting moderator must be aware of certain skills or tactics that he, or another meeting participant may try to employ to turn the meeting in his favor. The use of the following skills or tactics are situational-dependent:

- ➤ Aggression. There is no place for angry aggression in meetings. Often, a well-timed apology can put even the most abusive attacker off guard and bring a situation back under control.
- ➤ Conciliation. Conciliation is usually the best way to defuse aggression. Conciliation must be used sparingly.
- ► Enthusiasm. Unlike aggression and conciliation, enthusiasm is encouraged. Enthusiasm fosters participation by reinforcing the feeling that each participant's idea counts. The meeting moderator should, however, be wary of giving the impression of false enthusiasm.
- ➤ Interrogation. Interrogation in the context of meetings means interrogative statements rather than making speeches. Asking pointed and relevant questions is often a more effective means of promoting communication.
- ➤ *Patience*. Patience allows one to listen to the arguments advanced by all sides with an open mind.
- ➤ Sulking. As with aggression and conciliation, sulking should be used sparingly.
- ➤ Withdrawal. Withdrawing from a meeting is a tactic of last resort and should be used most sparingly of all.

SOF NEGOTIATION TECHNIQUES

Recognizing a Negotiation Situation. The difficulty every SOF soldier faces is having the maturity to recognize a situation that requires placing his inherent combat power aside and entering into a principled negotiation setting because of the commander's mission. Success criteria may include developing a trusting relationship to resolve disputes and incorporating solutions from the disputants rather than dictating a solution. Lasting conflict resolutions incorporate a solution that is arrived at jointly. Negotiations make this possible.

Obstacles to Effective Negotiations. Think about the communication difficulties that exist between people of the same culture who have a common language. Negotiation difficulties are compounded when the people involved are from other cultures with different languages, requiring an interpreter. Understanding the operational environment and all that it entails can help SOF soldiers be better prepared.

Prepare, Prepare, Prepare. Knowing the best alternative to negotiated agreement (BATNA), or walk-away position, is absolutely critical before entering into a negotiation situation. Knowing the BATNA will enable SOF soldiers to recognize a good deal. Of course, doing so is easier said than done. Having only one issue to discuss—for example, money—is not nearly as complicated as when SOF soldiers must consider political or other intangible criteria in determining the BATNA.

To determine the zone of possible agreement (ZOPA), consider the SOF BATNA and what is the possible BATNA of the other parties involved in the negotiation. The negotiating partners' BATNA may be derived either through direct information or data from other sources. Overlap between BATNAs could result in a ZOPA.

Claiming Value Versus Creating Value. Positions versus interests, tangible versus. intangible, objective versus subjective—all are elements of claiming value versus creating value. Claiming value is based upon negotiating for a piece of pie that is only so big. To create value, negotiators seek to make the pie (and ultimately what each receives) bigger. Creating value is to understand what a person's interests are behind the position that is being represented at the bargaining table.


Structure of Negotiations and the Tensions of That Structure. Depending on the complexity of the negotiations, the structure of that negotiation is compounded by all the relationships that exist. Are SOF soldiers negotiating alone or as part of a team? Are the relationships of the team defined? Who on the team has the authority to make the deal, or does the authority come from the chain of command? Will the chain of command give the negotiators the needed latitude? What are the negotiating team's limits?

Defense Against Hard Bargaining. Are negotiators prepared to defend against guerilla negotiations or negotiations by intimidation? A known BATNA can help defend against intimidation. No one can make a negotiator take a bad deal, unless they point a gun at the negotiators, and at that point it is no longer a negotiation!

Don't Lose the War, Fighting to Win One Battle. During the types of negotiations SOF soldiers must undertake, the relationship, whether it is long-term or not, may be more important to the commander's mission success than pressuring the local mayor for the best possible deal. Depending on the combatant commander's guidance, it may be more important to gain trust and favor than get the lowest price. These principled negotiations are not the "used car salesman" adversarial approach. When negotiators or their successors will see people

again, it may be more important to nurture the relationship. Taking the SOF soldiers' natural competitive spirit for winning and relegating that to the back shelf to make these relationships work can be the hardest thing the SOF soldiers' government will ask them to do. Setting aside inherent combat power to negotiate is where the SOF soldiers' maturity and professionalism will show. These relationships can last a lifetime. As one 5th Special Forces Group captain found out, SOF soldiers may be negotiating with future friends or possibly the interim prime minister of Afghanistan!

CA TEAMS



KEY EMERGENCY INDICATORS

| Crude Mortality Rate (CMR) | Normal rate among a settled population Emergency program under control Emergency program in serious trouble Emergency: out of control Major catastrophe | 0.3 to 0.5/10,000/day <1/10,000/day >1/10,000/day >2/10,000/day >5/10,000/day | |
|---|---|---|--|
| Mortality Rate Among Children Under 5 Years Old (U5MR) | Normal rate among a settled population Emergency program under control Emergency program in serious trouble Emergency: out of control | 1/10,000/day <2/10,000/day >2/10,000/day >4/10,000/day | |
| Clean Water | Minimum survival allocation Minimum maintenance allocation | 7 liters/person/day 15-20 liters/person/day | |
| Food | Minimum food requirement for a population totally dependent on food aid | 2,100 kilocalorie/person/day | |
| Nutrition | Emergency level | >15% of the population under 5 years old below 80% weight for height Or >10% of the population under 5 years old below 80% weight for height together with aggravating factors; for example, epidemic of measles, crude mortality rate>1/10,000/day | |
| Measles | Any reported cases 10% or more not immunized among ages 6 months to 5 years | | |
| Respiratory Infections | Any pattern of severe cases | | |
| Diarrhea | Protection from wind, rain, freezing temperatures, and direct sunlight are minimum requirements | | |
| Appropriate Shelter | Minimum shelter area Minimum total site area | 3.5 square meters/person 30.0 square meters/person | |
| Sanitation | Lack of organized excreta and waste disposal. Less than 1 latrine cubicle per 100 persons | | |
| Calculating the Mortality | Rate | | |

Calculating the Mortality Rate
The chief indicator of an actual emergency is an accelerated mortality. In all cases, deaths should be
reported as total number and as a rate since population sizes will vary considerably depending on the
nature of the emergency. The presentation of the number of deaths as rate will make comparison to existing
norms possible regardless of the number of people considered in the group. An example of how to calculate
the death rate follows:

Number of Peethor 14,000

Days Counted x Total Population Number of Deaths x 10,000

For example, if 21 people have died in one week in a total population of 5,000, then the death rate for that situation would be:

21 (Deaths) x 10,000 7 Days x 5,000 (Total Population) = 6/10,000/Day

COMPARISON OF SPHERE AND UNHCR STANDARDS AND INDICATORS

(February 2001)

| TOPIC AREA/ISSUE | SPHERE PROJECT | UNHCR EMERGENCY HANDBOOK | |
|--|--|---|--|
| WATER | | | |
| Quantity | 15 liters per person per day collected | 15 liters per person per day; absolute minimum for short-term survival is 7 liters per person per day | |
| System/Delivery | Taps provide flow rate of at least 0.125 liters per second | | |
| | At least one water point per 250 people | At least one tap per 80–100 refugees and no more than 200 refugees per handpump or per well with one rope and bucket | |
| Quality | No more than 10 faecal coliforms per 100 milliliters at point of delivery | 1–10 faecal coliforms per 100 milliliters is reasonable quantity | |
| | For piped systems, residual-free chlorine at tap is 0.2–0.5 milligrams per liter and turbidity is less than 5 nephelometric turbidity units (NTUs) | Residual-free chlorine at tap is 0.2–0.5 milligrams per liter at distribution point | |
| | Dissolved solids no more than 1,000 milligrams per liter | | |
| HYGIENE - SANITATION | | | |
| Soap | 250 grams of soap per person per month | | |
| Laundry | 1 washing basin per 100 people | | |
| Toilets/Latrines | Maximum 20 people per toilet | 1 latrine per family; second option, 1 per 20 persons; or third option, 1 per 100 persons or defecation field | |
| Refuse Bins | 100 containers at 1 per 10 families | 100 containers at 1 per 50 families | |
| Refuse Pits | No shelter farther than 15 meters from container or 100 meters from communal refuse pits | 1 pit 2 meters x 5 meters x 2 meters deep per 500 persons | |
| CAMP SITE PLANNING | | | |
| Gross Area | 45 square meters per person (inclusive of all uses except agriculture or garden) | 30 square meters per person (inclusive of all uses except agriculture or garden space) | |
| Dimensions/Distances | Maximum distance between shelter and toilets is 50 meters | Maximum distance between shelter and toilets is 50 meters | |
| Firebreaks | 2 meters between shelters, 6 meters between clusters of shelters, 15 meters between blocks of clusters | 30 meters per every 300 meters of built up area | |
| Distance Between Wells/Springs and Latrines | Latrines farther than 30 meters from ground water sources and 1.5 meters above water table | Latrines farther than 30 meters of built-up area | |
| | Maximum distance from shelter to water supply is 500 meters | No dwelling should be farther than 100 meters or a few minutes' walk from distribution points | |


COMPARISON OF SPHERE AND UNHCR STANDARDS AND INDICATORS (Continued)

| TOPIC AREA/ISSUE | SPHERE PROJECT | UNHCR EMERGENCY HANDBOOK | | |
|---|--|---|--|--|
| CAMP SITE PLANNING (C | ontinued) | 1 | | |
| Elevation/Drainage | 3 meters above high water table | | | |
| | 2–4% gradient (ideal) and not more than 7% without extensive site engineering | | | |
| SHELTER | | | | |
| Shelter Area | 3.5–4.5 square meters covered area per person | 3.5 square meters covered area per person in tropical climates 4.5–5.5 square meters covered area per person in cold or urban situations | | |
| Plastic Sheeting for Temporary Shelter | 4 meters x 6 meters sheet per household of 5 people (to meet UNHCR material specifications) | 4 meters x 5 meters reinforced plastic tarpaulins in sheets with aluminum eyelets all four sides | | |
| FOOD/NUTRITION | | | | |
| Calories | 2,100 kilocalories per day (initial planning figure to be modified based on through demographic analysis of population | 2,100 kilocaloiriess per day (initial planning figure) | | |
| Makeup | 10-12% total energy from protein | 10-12% total energy from protein | | |
| | 17% total energy from fat | 17% total energy from fat | | |
| HEALTH | | | | |
| Excessive Mortality | 1 per 10,000 per day CMR | Normal rate among a settled population Emergency program under control * 0.3 to 0.5/10,000/day * <1/10,000 day | | |
| CMR | 1 per 10,000 per day CMR | Emergency program in serious trouble Emergency: out of control Major catastrophe Emergency: out of control Major catastrophe S > 5/10,000/day | | |
| U5MR | 2 per 10,000 per day under 5 CMR | Normal rate among a settled population Emergency program under control Emergency program in serious trouble Emergency: out of control | | |

COMPARISON OF SPHERE AND UNHCR STANDARDS AND INDICATORS (Continued)

| TOPIC AREA/ISSUE | SPHERE PROJECT | UNHCR EMERGENCY HANDBOOK |
|---------------------------------|---|--|
| HEALTH (Continued) | | |
| Measles Vaccination Coverage | 95% of all children 6 months–12 years | UNHCR advocates the immunization of all children from 6 months up to 12 or even 15 years (rather than the more usual 5 years) because of the increased risk from the living conditions in refugee emergencies. As an emergency indicator, any reported cases of 10% or more unimmunized among ages 6 months to 5 years. |
| Measles Vaccination Coverage | Measles vaccine needs = 140% of target group (15% waste, 25% stockpile) | |
| Medical Staff | 1 home visitor for each 500–1,000 population 1 traditional birth attendant for each 2,000 1 supervisor for each 10 home visitors 1 senior supervisor 1 peripheral health facility for each 10,000 population 1 central health facility for each 10,000 population | Approximate staffing levels for refugee health and sanitation services for a population of 10–20,000: • Community health workers: 10–20 • Traditional birth attendant: 6–10 • Public health nurse: 1 • Clinic nurse midwives: 3–4 • Doctor/medical assistants: 1–3 • Pharmacy attendant: 1 • Laboratory technician: 1 • Dressers/assistants: 10 • Sanitarians: 2–4 • Sanitation assistants: 20 |
| NONFOOD ITEMS (Domes | stic Needs) | |
| Water Containers | 2 vessels 10–20-liter for collecting plus 1 20-liter vessel for water storage, narrow necks and covers | Ability to transport 10 liters, and ability to store 20 liters per 5-person household |
| Eating Utensils | 1 cooking pot with lid 1 basin 1 kitchen knife 2 wooden spoons 1 plate per person 1 spoon per person 1 mug per person | |
| PROTECTION AND SECU | RITY | |
| Location | 50 kilometers from threat (border?) | A reasonable distance |

FUNCTIONAL SPECIALTY TEAMS



RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX

| | | HAZARD PROBABILITY | | | | |
|--------------|----------|--------------------|------------|--------|----------|--|
| SEVERITY | Frequent | Likely | Occasional | Seldom | Unlikely | |
| Catastrophic | E | E | н | н | М | |
| Critical | E | н | Н | М | L | |
| Moderate | н | М | М | L | L | |
| Negligible | М | L | L | L | L | |
| LEGEND: | | | | - | | |

Hazard Probability The likelihood that an event will occur. Frequent Occurs often, continuously experienced. Likely Occurs several times. Occurs sporadically.

Seldom Unlikely, but could occur at some time. Can assume it will not occur. Unlikely

The degree of injury, property damage, or other mission-impairing factors.

Death or permanent total disability, system loss, major property damage.

Permanent partial disability, temporary total in excess of 3 months, major system damage, significant property damage.

Minor injury, lost workday accident, compensable injury or illness, minor system damage, minor property damage. <u>Severity</u> Catastrophic Critical Marginal

Negligible First aid or minor supportive medical treatment, minor system impairment.

<u>Risk Levels</u>
E (Extremely High) Loss of ability to accomplish mission.

Significantly degrades mission capabilities in terms of required mission standards.

Degrades mission capabilities in terms of required mission standards.

Little or no impact on mission accomplishment. H (High)
M (Medium)
L (Low)

REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE (RFA) CHECKLIST

Can we do it?

- □ Is it legal?
- □ Does it comply with the commander's guidance?
- □ Do we have the assets?
- □ Do we have the time?

Should we do it?

- □ Is there already a system in place to handle the request?
- □ Does it support MOE?
- □ Does it support transition?
- □ Does it support lines of operations?
- □ Does it support civil decisive points?
- □ Will the population support it?
- □ Will it have a positive impact on civil-military relationships?

How will we do it?

- □ Who has the capability to do it (military, international organization, indigenous)?
- □ Are outside resources available?
- □ Can it be a joint venture?
- □ Can it be started immediately?
- □ Does it comply with PSYOP/IO themes?
- □ Can or will the host government support it?

COMPARISON OF AGENCY ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES

| | | | Regional and | International | |
|--|--|---|--|--|--|
| EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES | ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES | STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT | NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO) | UN | NGOs |
| Directors U.S. Agency for | Secretary of Defense Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Geographic Combatant Commander (1) | Governor State Adjutant General | NATO Headquarters Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) | UN Headquarters Functional Headquarters (for example, UNHCR) | National Headquarters President/ Chief Executive Officer |
| Ambassador/ Embassy Staff (2) Usissons (3) Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) (4) USAID OFDA | Commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF) (5) Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) (4) | State Coordinating Officer (SCO) (4) Office of Emergency Management (OEM) Department/ Agency | Major Subordinate Commands (for example, Allied Forces Southern Europe) | Special Representative to the UN Secretary General (6) Note: UN Command Korea when activated, is the only UN organization at the operational level. | Regional Offices Field Offices |
| Ambassador/ Embassy Staff Consul/ Consulate Staff OrDA Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) (7) | JTF Service Components | National Guard Unit Commanders County Commissioner City Mayor/ Manager County/City Services (for example, Police, Emergency Medical Services) | Principal Subordinate Commands (for example, Allied Land Forces Southern Europe) Commander, Combined Joint Task Force Task Element/ Unit | Secretary General • Military Force Commander • Teams | Field Office in Program Country Relief Workers |

The geographic combatant commander, within the context of unified action, may function at both the strategic and operational levels in synchronizing the application of all instruments of national power in time, space, and purpose with the actions of other military forces, United States Government Agencies (USG) agencies, NGOs, regional and international organizations, and corporations toward theater strategic objectives.

regional and international organizations, and corporations toward insealer strategic objectives.

2. The Ambassador and Embassy staff, which includes the Country Team, function at both the operational and tactical levels by supporting joint operation planning conducted by a geographic combatant commander or CJTF.

3. Liaisons at the operational level may include the foreign policy advisor (FPA) or political advisor (POLAD) assigned to the geographic combatant commander by the Department of State, the CIA liaison officer, or any specifically assigned person. Other USG agencies do not have a similar counterpart to the geographic combatant commander.

The FCO, DCO, and SCO and their staffs are the primary coordinators for domestic support operations.

The CVTF coordinates the actions of other military forces, USG agencies, NGOs, regional and international organizations, and corporations toward theater operational objectives.
 The Special Representative to the UN Secretary General may function at both the operational and tactical levels.
 USAID's OFDA provides its rapidly deployable DART in response to international disasters. A DART provides specialists, trained in a variety of disaster relief skills, to assist U.S. Embassies and USAID missions with the management of USG response to disasters.

PROPERTY CONTROL

Property control (a specific CA function) serves to protect property within established limits and to preserve negotiable assets and resources. It is based on a uniform and orderly system for the custody and control of property.

There are four basic categories of property subject to property control: public movable, public immovable, private movable, and private immovable. Public property refers to government-owned property versus that owned by private individuals. Immovable property consists of real estate and land and those structures and property permanently fixed to the land (also known as fixtures). Houses and other buildings qualify as immovable property.

The powers a military commander may exercise over property in enemy territory may be broadly classified as destruction, confiscation, seizure, requisition, and control.

Destruction. Destruction is the partial or total damage of property. With the exception of medical equipment and stores, property of any type or ownership may be destroyed if the destruction is necessary to or results from military operations either during or preparing to combat. No payment is required. Destruction is forbidden except where there is some reasonable connection between the destruction of the property and overcoming enemy forces.

Confiscation. Confiscation is the taking of enemy public movable property without obligation to compensate the state to which it belongs. The term applies only to public property because the Hague Rules (Article 46) specifically forbid the confiscation of private property and Article 55 only permits the occupant to act as a usufructuary for public immovable property. Private property taken on the field of battle that was

used by the troops to further the fighting is also subject to confiscation on the theory that it has forfeited its right to be treated as private property. Otherwise, the confiscation of public movable property is generally limited to that property with direct or indirect military use.

Seizure. Seizure is the taking of certain types of enemy private movable property for use by the capturing state. Title does not pass to the occupying power. Such use is limited to the needs of the occupying force, but may be employed outside as well as within the occupied territory. Payment or compensation is normally made at the time a peace treaty is signed or hostilities end.

Requisition. A requisition is the act of taking private enemy movable or immovable property for the needs of the army of occupation. It differs from seizure in three basic respects. First, the items taken may be used only in the occupied territory; second, private immovable and private movable property may be seized; and third, the owners are to be compensated as soon as possible (without having to wait for the occupation to end or for the restoration of peace).

Control. Property within occupied territory may be controlled by the occupant to the degree necessary to prevent its use by (or for the benefit of) hostile forces or in any manner harmful to the occupant. As a general principle of international law, the occupation commander is required to maintain public order. Included within this general mandate is the requirement for the occupation force to take control of and protect abandoned property, to safeguard banks, and ensure looting, blackmarketing, and so on do not get out of hand.

FM 27-10, *The Law of Land Warfare*, paragraph 394 c, property whose ownership is in question should be treated as public property until its ownership is ascertained. Religious buildings

and shrines are to be respected and treated as private property. Similarly, hospitals enjoy a protected status under international law, but may be used in a manner consistent with their humanitarian purposes. The property of municipalities is afforded the same treatment as private property.

| BASIS FOR POWER | WILL YOU USE IT | LIMITS ON LOCATION | CATEGORY OF POWER | LIMITS ON TYPE (MOVABLE/ IMMOVABLE) | LIMITS ON TYPE (PUBLIC/ PRIVATE) | PAYMENT/ TIMING |
|-----------------------|--------------------|------------------------|---|--|---|-----------------------------|
| Military Necessity | Not Used | N/A | Destruction See page 41 | N/A | Public | No Payment |
| | Used | Use Anywhere | Confiscation (Usufructuary) See page 41 | Movable (Public Immovable) | + Private on Battlefield | |
| | | Use Anywhere | Seizure See page 42 | Movable Only | Private | Payment at End or Return |
| | | Use Only In-Country | Requisition See page 42 | N/A | | Pay ASAP |
| | Not Used | N/A | Control See page 42 | N/A | Either | No Payment |

UNIFORM AND PERSONAL EQUIPMENT CONSIDERATIONS

AR 670-1, Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and Insignia, prescribes Department of the Army policy for proper wear and appearance of Army uniforms. The proponent for this regulation, Deputy Chief of Staff, G1, has the authority to approve exceptions to the regulation that are consistent with controlling law and regulations. The proponent may delegate this authority in writing to an individual within the proponent agency who holds the grade of colonel or above. CA soldiers operate worldwide across the range of military operations. The uniform worn and personal equipment carried are influenced by operational and environmental considerations, force protection, civil-military relationship management, and

credibility management. These factors do not always support one another and are often mutually exclusive.

| UNIFORM | PROS | cons |
|--|---|---|
| Battle Dress Uniform (BDU) complete with combat equipment, to include Kevlar, load-bearing vest, individual weapons, and basic load. | Professional appearance. High level of combat readiness. Greatly reduces the possibility of fratricide. Aids in dealing with supported unit. Aids in dealing with foreign militaries. | Can make it difficult to work with NGOs, international organizations, and some civilian agencies. In some environments, can present a more visible target. Makes it difficult to present the local environment as "safe and secure" to the total populace. |
| BDU complete without combat equipment, with or without concealed weapons. | Professional appearance. Greatly reduces the possibility of fratricide. Aids in dealing with supported unit. Aids in dealing with foreign militaries. | Reduced level of combat readiness. Reduced level of force protection. Can make it difficult to work with NGOs, international organizations, and some civilian agencies. |
| BDU complete without specified badges and insignia, without combat equipment, and with or without concealed weapons. | Aids in dealing with HN military and civilian population by addressing local stereotypes and taboos. Professional appearance. Greatly reduces the possibility of fratricide. | Reduced level of combat readiness. Reduced level of force protection. Can make it difficult to work with NGOs, international organizations, and some civilian agencies. In some environments, can present a more visible target. |
| Civilian clothes with or without concealed weapons. Modified grooming standards. | In some environments, can increase level of force protection. Creates a lower profile. Can make it easier to deal with NGOs, international organizations, and some civilian agencies. | Greatly increases the possibility of fratricide. Can reduce protection under the Geneva Convention. May present a decreased professional military appearance. Greatly reduced level of combat readiness. Can make it difficult to work with supported units. Can make it difficult to deal with foreign militaries. |

NINE-LINE MEDICAL EVACUATION (MEDEVAC) FORMAT

| LINE | ITEM | EXPLANATION | WHERE/HOW OBTAINED |
|------|--|--|-----------------------|
| 1 | Location of pickup site. | Encrypt the grid coordinates of the pickup site. When using the DRYAD Numeral Cipher, the same "SET" line will be used to encrypt the grid zone letters and the coordinates. To preclude misunderstanding, a statement is made that grid zone letters are included in the message. (Unless unit SOP specifies its use at all times.) | From map |
| 2 | Radio frequency, call sign with suffix. | Encrypt the frequency of the radio at the pickup site and not a relay frequency. The call sign (and suffix if used) of person to be contacted at the pickup site may be transmitted in the clear. | From SOI |

NINE-LINE MEDEVAC FORMAT (Continued)

| LINE | ITEM | EXPLANATION | WHERE/HOW OBTAINED |
|------|---|--|---|
| 3 | Number of patients by precedence. | Report only applicable information, and encrypt the codes. A—Urgent. B—Urgentsurgery. C—Priority. D—Routine. E—Convenience. If two or more categories must be reported in the same request, insert the word 'BREAK' between each category. | From evaluation of patients |
| 4 | Special equipment required. | Encrypt the appropriate brevity code(s): A - None. B - Hoist. C - Extraction equipment. D - Ventilator. | From evaluation of patients/ situation |
| 5 | Number of patients by type. | Report only applicable information and encrypt the brevity code. If requesting MEDEVAC for both types, insert the word "BREAK" between the litter entry and ambulatory entry. L + # of PNT—Litter. A + # of PNT—Ambulatory (sitting). | From evaluation of patients |
| 6 | Security of pickup site (wartime). | N - No enemy troops in area. P - Possibly enemy troops in area (approach with caution). E - Enemy troops in area (approach with caution). X - Enemy troops in area (armed escort required). | From evaluation of situation |
| 6 | Number and type of wound, injury, or illness (peacetime). | Specific information regarding patient wounds by type (gunshot or shrapnel). Report serious bleeding, along with patient blood type, if known. | From evaluation of patients |
| 7 | Method of marking pickup site. | Encrypt the appropriate brevity code(s): A - Panels. B - Pyrotechnic signal. C - Smoke signal. D - None. E - Other. | Based on situation and availability of materials |
| 8 | Patient's nationality and status. | The number of patients in each category need not be transmitted. Encrypt only the appropriate brevity code(s): A - U.S. military. B - U.S. civilian. C - Non-U.S. military. D - Non-U.S. civilian. E - Enemy prisoner of war. | From evaluation of patients |
| 9 | Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) contamination (wartime). | Include this line only when applicable. Encrypt the appropriate brevity codes: N - Nuclear, B - Biological. C - Chemical. | From situation |
| 9 | Terrain description (peacetime). | Includes details of terrain features in and around proposed landing site. If possible, describe relationship of site to prominent terrain feature (lake, mountain, tower). | From area survey |

WEIGHT, MEASURES, AND CONVERSION TABLES

Temperature

| CONVERT FROM | CONVERT TO |
|--------------|--|
| Fahrenheit | Celsius Subtract 32, multiply by 5, and divide by 9 |
| Celsius | Fahrenheit Multiply by 9, divide by 5, and add 32 |

Approximate Conversion Factors

| TO CHANGE | то | MULTIPLY BY | TO CHANGE | то | MULTIPLY BY |
|---------------|----------------------|-------------|-----------------------|---------------|-------------|
| Inches | Centimeters | 2.540 | Ounce-inches | Newton-meters | 0.007062 |
| Feet | Meters | 0.305 | Centimeters | Inches | 3.94 |
| Yards | Meters | 0.914 | Meters | Feet | 3.280 |
| Miles | Kilometers | 1.609 | Meters | Yards | 1.094 |
| Square inches | Square centimeters | 6.451 | Kilometers | Miles | 0.621 |
| Square feet | Square meters | 0.093 | Square centimeters | Square inches | 0.155 |
| Square yards | Square meters | 0.836 | Square meters | Square feet | 10.76 |
| Square miles | Square kilometers | 2.590 | Square meters | Square yards | 1.196 |
| Acres | Square hectometers | 0.405 | Square kilometers | Square miles | 0.386 |
| Cubic feet | Cubic meters | 0.028 | Square hectometers | Acres | 2.471 |
| Cubic yards | Cubic meters | 0.765 | Cubic meters | Cubic feet | 35.315 |
| Fluid ounces | Milimeters | 29.573 | Cubic meters | Cubic yards | 1.308 |
| Pints | Liters | 0.473 | Milimeters | Fluid ounces | 0.034 |
| Quarts | Liters | 0.946 | Liters | Pints | 2.113 |
| Gallons | Liters | 3.785 | Liters | Quarts | 1.057 |
| Ounces | Grams | 28.349 | Liters | Gallons | 0.264 |
| Pounds | Kilograms | 0.454 | Grams | Ounces | 0.035 |
| Short tons | Metric tons | 0.907 | Kilograms | Pounds | 2.205 |
| Pounds-feet | Newton-meters | 1.356 | Metric tons | Short tons | 1.102 |
| Pounds-inches | Newton-meters | 0.11296 | Nautical Miles | Kilometers | 1.852 |

WEIGHT, MEASURES, AND CONVERSION TABLES (Continued)

Statute Miles to Kilometers and Nautical Miles

| STATUTE MILES | KILOMETERS | NAUTICAL MILES | STATUTE MILES | KILOMETERS | NAUTICAL MILES |
|---------------|------------|-------------------|---------------|------------|-------------------|
| 1 | 1.61 | 0.869 | 60 | 96.60 | 52.14 |
| 2 | 3.22 | 1.74 | 70 | 112.70 | 60.83 |
| 3 | 4.83 | 2.61 | 80 | 128.80 | 69.52 |
| 4 | 6.44 | 3.48 | 90 | 144.90 | 78.21 |
| 5 | 8.05 | 4.35 | 100 | 161.00 | 86.92 |
| 6 | 9.66 | 5.21 | 200 | 322.00 | 173.80 |
| 7 | 11.27 | 6.08 | 300 | 483.00 | 260.70 |
| 8 | 12.88 | 6.95 | 400 | 644.00 | 347.60 |
| 9 | 14.49 | 7.82 | 500 | 805.00 | 434.50 |
| 10 | 16.10 | 8.69 | 600 | 966.00 | 521.40 |
| 20 | 32.20 | 17.38 | 700 | 1127.00 | 608.30 |
| 30 | 48.30 | 26.07 | 800 | 1288.00 | 695.20 |
| 40 | 64.40 | 34.76 | 900 | 1449.00 | 782.10 |
| 50 | 80.50 | 43.45 | 1000 | 1610.00 | 869.00 |

Kilometers to Statute and Nautical Miles

| KILOMETERS | STATUTE MILES | NAUTICAL MILES | KILOMETERS | STATUTE MILES | NAUTICAL MILES |
|------------|---------------|-------------------|------------|---------------|-------------------|
| 1 | 0.62 | 0.54 | 60 | 37.28 | 32.38 |
| 2 | 1.24 | 1.08 | 70 | 43.50 | 37.77 |
| 3 | 1.86 | 1.62 | 80 | 49.71 | 43.17 |
| 4 | 2.49 | 2.16 | 90 | 55.93 | 48.56 |
| 5 | 3.11 | 2.70 | 100 | 62.14 | 53.96 |
| 6 | 3.73 | 3.24 | 200 | 124.28 | 107.92 |
| 7 | 4.35 | 3.78 | 300 | 186.42 | 161.88 |
| 8 | 4.97 | 4.32 | 400 | 248.56 | 215.84 |
| 9 | 5.59 | 4.86 | 500 | 310.70 | 269.80 |
| 10 | 6.21 | 5.40 | 600 | 372.84 | 323.76 |
| 20 | 12.43 | 10.79 | 700 | 434.98 | 377.72 |
| 30 | 18.64 | 16.19 | 800 | 497.12 | 431.68 |
| 40 | 24.86 | 21.58 | 900 | 559.26 | 485.64 |
| 50 | 31.07 | 26.98 | 1000 | 621.40 | 539.60 |

INTERNATIONAL PROTECTIVE SYMBOLS

| SYMBOL | DESCRIPTION | MEANING | REFERENCES |
|--------|---|---|--|
| 4 | A red cross on a white background, formed by reversing the flag of | These are the symbols of protected medical facilities and personnel. The symbol may be used on building, on armbands, on vehicles and aircraft, and on ID cards. The Red Cross is used by most of the world's armed forces. A red crescent is used by Muslim nations. Persons and places marked with a medical symbol are protected form attack as long as they are used solely for medical purposes. | • FM 27-10, Paragraph 238, page 95. |
| _ | Switzerland A red crescent moon. | | DA Pamphlet 27-1, Treaties Governing Land Warfare, Chapter 4, |
| C | with the horns facing right. The horns may or may not touch. | | Article 38, page 37. • DA Pamphlet 27-161-2; International Law, Volume II: Chaoter 4. |
| *** | A red star of David (Magen David), formed by interlocking two red triangles. | | Section I, Paragraph E, page 111. |
| | | | Training Circular 27-10-1; Selective Problems in the Law of War; Section II, Problem I, page 7. |
| | Square or rectangle sign, the upper triangle black, the lower triangle white. | The marking for protected cultural, historic, educational, and religious buildings. The protection is from coastal naval bombardment. | FM 27-10, Chapter 2, Section II, Article 46a, page 21. |
| | Three blue and white shields of royal blue and white, set two up and one below. | The marking for protected cultural, historic, educational, and religious buildings. One shield may be on an armband or ID card. | Training Circular 27-10-1, Section II, Problem 35, page 54. |
| | A royal blue triangle on a bright orange background. | Civil Defense facilities and Civil Defense personnel. The symbol may mark <i>civilian</i> bomb shelters and may be on armbands and ID cards. | GP I/Protocol I Protocol additional to The Geneva Conventions of 1945 (not ratified by United States) |
| 000 | Three bright orange circles of equal size, on line, and spaced one radius apart. | Works or installations containing dangerous forces. Used to mark reactors, chemical plants, dams, and so on. Not a protective symbol. | GP I/Protocol I Protocol additional to The Geneva Conventions of 1945 (not ratified by United States) |