IMSO

MULTI-SERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR INTEGRATED MONETARY SHAPING OPERATIONS

ATP 3-07.20
MCRP 3-33.1G
NTTP 3-57.4
AFTTP 3-2.80

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FOREWORD

This multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures (MTTP) publication is a project of the Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center in accordance with the memorandum of agreement between the Headquarters of the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force doctrine commanders directing ALSA to develop MTTP publications to meet the immediate needs of the warfighter.

This MTTP publication has been prepared by ALSA under our direction for implementation by our respective commands and for use by other commands as appropriate.

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PREFACE

1. Purpose

This reference publication describes how to integrate monetary resources, in conjunction with various types of aid (e.g., economic, financial, humanitarian, and developmental) within unified action to shape and influence outcomes throughout the range of military operations. This document provides basic multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures (MTTP) to affect or achieve immediate tactical and operational objectives; contribute to long-term success of operations; counter the abilities of adversaries to gain access to the United States' (US) monetary resources; provide oversight of projects; and safeguard against fraud, waste, and abuse.

Note: For the Army, the term "command and control" was replaced with "mission command". "Mission command" now encompasses the Army's philosophy of command (still known as mission command) as well as the exercise of authority and direction to accomplish missions (formerly known as command and control).

2. Scope

This publication provides fundamental tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for commanders and staffs to integrate monetary resources in conjunction with various types of aid (e.g., economic, financial, humanitarian, and developmental) to shape the operational environment. It facilitates planning, synchronizing, and integrating monetary resources and counter-threat finance operations across the range of military operations in a multi-Service environment. It provides a multi-Service framework enabling commanders and staffs to gain the support of a local populace, deny an adversary's ability to gain access to US monetary resources, and influence the outcome of military operations to achieve immediate tactical objectives. It further assists the commander's ability to contribute to the long-term success of operations by promoting the self-reliance of an affected population.

3. Applicability

This publication provides commanders and staffs, at the tactical level and across all Services, with guidance for planning and using monetary resources to shape operations during exercises and contingencies. This document is intended to be non-theater-specific and provides information from existing Service directives, current lessons learned, and subject matter experts.

4. Implementation Plan

Participating Service command offices of primary responsibility will review this publication, validate the information and, where appropriate, reference and incorporate it in Service manuals, regulations, and curricula as follows:

Army. Upon approval and authentication, this publication incorporates the TTP contained herein into the US Army Doctrine and Training Literature Program as directed by the Commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

Marine Corps.[1] The Marine Corps will incorporate the procedures in this publication in US Marine Corps training and doctrine publications as directed by the Commanding

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Air Force. The Air Force will incorporate the procedures in this publication upon approval by the Commander, LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education and in accordance with applicable governing directives. Distribution is in accordance with Air Force Instruction 33-360.

5. User Information

a. US Army Combined Arms Center (CAC), MCCDC, NWDC, Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education (LeMay Center), and the Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center developed this publication with the joint participation of the approving Service commands. ALSA will review and update this publication as necessary.

b. This publication reflects current joint and Service doctrine, command and control organizations, facilities, personnel, responsibilities, and procedures. Changes in Service protocol, appropriately reflected in joint and Service publications, will likewise be incorporated in revisions to this document.

c. Recommended changes for improving this publication are encouraged. Comments should be keyed to the specific page and paragraph and rationale for each recommendation should be included. Send comments and recommendations directly to:

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IMSO

MULTI-SERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR INTEGRATED MONETARY SHAPING OPERATIONS

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
INTEGRATED MONETARY SHAPING OPERATIONS

Monetary resources are critical to a commander's ability to shape the operational environment. Money gives the tactical commander a means to conduct tasks traditionally performed by United States (US) government, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental agencies and organizations. These tasks include repairing facilities, supporting governance, restoring essential services, and improving the economy. Integrated Monetary Shaping Operations (IMSO) are tools a commander can use to influence the outcome of operations and attain immediate tactical and operational objectives with long-term implications.

This publication:

- Introduces planning considerations for incorporating IMSO in support of the operational plan.

- Identifies key stake holders and potential partners in implementing IMSO.

- Introduces counter threat finance (CTF) and its impacts on operations.

Chapter I Introduction to Integrated Monetary Shaping Operations
Chapter I provides an introduction to IMSO and describes key terms, providing the doctrinal context as a base for IMSO.

Chapter II IMSO Resources, Stakeholders, and Stakeholder Integration
Chapter II highlights capabilities available to a commander to conduct IMSO. It discusses sources of funding, the role of other US government, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental agencies.

Chapter III Planning and Execution Considerations for IMSO
Chapter III provides planning and execution considerations for conducting IMSO.

Chapter IV Monitoring and Assessing IMSO
Chapter IV discusses the importance of developing methods to monitor the progress, evaluate effects of individual projects, and assess the overall impact of IMSO.

Chapter V Counter Threat Finance
Chapter V provides an understanding of CTF principles, techniques, and considerations and describes the importance of integrating CTF into the IMSO planning process.

Appendices
The appendices provide supplementary information for use when conducting IMSO. Specific topics include:

- The district stability framework.

- Funding sources.

- Training considerations.

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Chapter I
Introduction to Integrated Monetary Shaping Operations

> *"To wage war, you need first of all money, second, you need money, and third, you also need money."*
>
> —**Field Marshall (Prince) Raimondo Montecuccoli,**
> **Memorie della Guerra, 1675**

1. Introduction

a. Monetary resources are vitally important to a commander's ability to shape the operational environment (OE). Used properly, money is a key enabler. Used improperly, money can be counterproductive and even destructive to efforts to stabilize an area. Money gives commanders, at all levels, a means to repair infrastructure, support governance, restore essential services, improve the local economy, and complete other tasks traditionally performed by other United States Government (USG) agencies, intergovernmental (IGO), and nongovernmental (NGO) organizations, or indigenous populations or institutions (IPI). Integrated monetary shaping operations (IMSO) can influence the outcome of operations at the tactical and operational levels, and support strategic end states. IMSO are not without historical precedent, but their importance has increased during recent United States (US) military overseas contingency operations.

b. The US and its allies should use instruments of national power at the strategic level, including economic power, to improve conditions affecting the local populace. Commanders at the operational and tactical levels must ensure the use of monetary influences are tied into the strategic framework set forth by the country plan being executed by the US embassy in conjunction with the host nation (HN). Improving local economies:

    (1) Restores social, political, and economic security.

    (2) Undermines the appeal of an adversary.

    (3) Creates conditions to transition from military to civil control.

Note: For the purpose of this publication an "adversary" may refer to any organization conducting operations against the US military, and includes conventional forces, insurgents, criminal activity, bad actors, and negative influencers.

c. Economic power is wielded at the highest level of the USG. Economic stabilization within the OE can be promoted by supporting USG development efforts that support stabilization. The USG employs the instruments of national power (i.e., defense, diplomacy, and development) abroad through the National Security Council, Department of State (DOS), and Department of Defense (DOD). Employed together, they have the ability to resolve sources of instability (SOI) and isolate or deny an adversary's ability to influence the populace, and prevent or deter conflict. Employing them out of sync, or individually, strengthens the adversary's ability to project influence.

> *"Planning should address all lethal and nonlethal options for creating desired effects, including use of interagency and multinational, nontraditional ways and means."*
>
> —*Joint Publication 3-60, The Joint Targeting Process*

d. Providing timely funding is critical to success. Tactical level commanders must have readily available funding, with the authority to execute and manage economic stabilization programs to target SOIs that support the strategic country plan for the HN. Today's commanders, at all levels, directly control some amount of discretionary funds to support their operational mission.

e. This publication seeks to synchronize the application of military financial resources with other USG agencies, multinational forces, IGOs, and NGOs. IMSO are more than just adhering to fiscal policies and providing financial assistance and accounting oversight. They refine planning processes, promote efficiency, and shape multilateral efforts to employ financial resources across the range of military operations.

2. IMSO Doctrinal Context

a. IMSO are the use of monetary resources, provided with various types of aid (i.e., economic, financial, humanitarian, or developmental), involving the voluntary transfer of resources (i.e., money, equipment, knowledge, or training other than military) from US, or unified action partners to an HN IPI, directly or indirectly, for mutual benefit. Simply stated, IMSO are the coordinated use of money, goods, or services to support the commander's objectives; they are a means to an end. IMSO are used to attack SOIs, build partnerships, and provide for economic stabilization and security. The Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force categorize IMSO-type activities as part of information operations (IO) executed through civil military operations (CMO). The Army categorizes IMSO as inform and influence activities (IIA). IMSO has two major components:

(1) Supporting operations by funding developmental assistance, infrastructure, and governance support projects to win the support of an indigenous populace and erode support for the adversary.

(2) Denying adversaries sanctuary and operational flexibility by hindering their ability to reliably fund operations.

b. Key objectives of IMSO:

(1) Build trust between the US armed forces and the HN by:

(a) Engaging partners.

(b) Persuading partner audiences.

(c) Partnering with HN government and institutions.

(2) Increase support for the HN by:

    (a) Determining partner requirements.

    (b) Developing influential programs.

(3) Provide nation assistance and build partner capacity by:

    (a) Promoting good governance.

    (b) Promoting rule of law.

    (c) Assisting HN security of the populace.

(4) Decrease support and influence of adversaries by:

    (a) Keeping HN and foreign audiences informed.

    (b) Encouraging competition.

c. IMSO is a stability mechanism consisting of a project or series of projects that support the larger scheme of maneuver, conducted with other lethal and nonlethal operations. They benefit US, coalition, and unified action partners by achieving short-term security goals and objectives enabling transition to the HN. They benefit the recipient by providing short-term support, and promote self-reliance. IMSO may be used throughout all phases and levels of military operations but have primarily been used during stability or counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Given the changing scenarios facing the US military, IMSO likely will be used in other operations across the range of military operations (see FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*). Figure 1 illustrates the use of IMSO across the range of military operations and along the continuum between peace and war. Use of IMSO fluctuates depending on the phase of operations, type of operation, and desired outcome. Figure 2 illustrates how the use of IMSO fluctuates by campaign phase. During the shape phase (phase 0), IMSO and supporting projects are at a steady state, or rise slightly to build partner capacity using as few resources as possible. As a crisis becomes imminent, use of IMSO increases to provide greater influence and deter possible conflict (phase I). During phases II and III, seize the initiative and dominate, use of IMSO falls off while resources are focused on combat operations. Entering the stabilize phase (phase IV), IMSO sharply increase to reestablish essential services, provide immediate humanitarian assistance, and build partner capacity. During the final phase, enable civil authorities, usage declines as the HN becomes self-sustaining and requires less support from the US.

Figure 1.   IMSO Across the Range of Military Operations

Figure 2.   Example of IMSO Usage During Phases of a Plan

> *"While the military normally focuses on reaching clearly defined and measurable objectives within given timelines under a command and control structure, civilian organizations are concerned with fulfilling changeable political, economic, social, and humanitarian interests using dialogue, bargaining, risk taking, and consensus building. Civilian organizations may have a better appreciation of the political-social-cultural situation, and have better relief, development, and public administration."*
>
> —*Joint Publication 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations*

d. IMSO and supporting projects are significant for their immediate tactical advantages, and have operational and strategic impacts. They should bolster, augment, and nest with operational and strategic plans of the higher headquarters. **Success of IMSO is not gauged by the number of projects completed, or amount of money spent, but by the overall impact on the operation.** Figure 3 illustrates how tactical level unit's IMSO and supporting projects provide a foundation to support the higher level operational and strategic commanders' intent.

Figure 3.   Linking IMSO Projects: Tactical to Strategic

e. Tactical-level commanders should concentrate on projects with immediate benefit to the general population (e.g., immediate building repairs). There is a fine line between conducting monetary shaping operations and nation building. National-level projects (e.g., power plants, transportation networks, or dams) are better suited for other USG agencies and aid organizations (e.g., the US Agency for International Development (USAID)). IMSO can potentially achieve strategic, operational, and tactical level objectives and may entirely preempt the need for conducting lethal operations. To successfully integrate IMSO into operations, commanders and staff must:

(1) Understand the local economy in an area of operations (AO).

(2) Coordinate with local HN government, and joint and unified action partners to ensure a project supports a unified end state.

(3) Understand types of funding and programs available for use.

(4) Integrate monetary shaping operations early in the planning process.

(5) Identify potential projects or programs and determine the validity, achievability, affordability, ability to be assessed, and sustainability (by the HN).

(6) Prioritize ongoing and future projects to achieve the end state.

(7) Understand projects and activities planned or conducted by other unified action partners to avoid wasting resources or "project fratricide."

(8) Develop assessment tools to determine a project's progression and contribution to the overall objective.

(9) Identify and understand second, third, and fourth order effects caused by projects.

(10) Understand the success and failure of previous projects and use lessons learned to determine new requirements.

(11) Understand money is merely a tool the commander possesses to achieve the objectives.

(12) Recognize money is like any other capability; it must be allocated and used to create specific desired effects, not simply expended.

(13) Understand how leveraging money to influence tactical operations contributes directly to operational and strategic objectives.

Note: Project fratricide is "damaging" or undoing the benefits gained from a project's operations by not having situational awareness (SA) of past, present, or future projects in the AO.

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3. Key Terms

a. Human terrain: The element of the OE encompassing the cultural, sociological, political, and economic factors of the local population. (Army)

Note: Human terrain is a term used only by the Army. The Joint community has adopted the term human environment. In this publication the term human environment will be used followed by (terrain) for Army use.

b. Shaping Operations: Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations*, describes shaping operations as; "missions, tasks, and actions designed to dissuade or deter adversaries and assure partners, as well as set conditions for the contingency plan and are generally conducted through security cooperation (SC) activities." Joint and multinational operations and various interagency activities occur routinely during the shape phase. Shape activities are executed continuously with the intent to do the following:

(1) Enhance international legitimacy and gain multinational cooperation by shaping perceptions and influencing adversaries' and allies' behavior.

(2) Develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations.

(3) Improve information exchange and intelligence sharing.

(4) Provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access.

(5) Mitigate conditions leading to a crisis."

Note: Each Service has definitions for shaping operations. The key theme of each Service's definition is to "influence events, adversaries, actors, and terrain to set the conditions to change the environment to an advantage." In IMSO, the key area of concern is the "human environment (terrain)." An SOI may be an event, adversary, or actor.

c. CTF: CTF refers to the activities and actions taken by the DOD and other USG agencies to deny, disrupt, destroy, or defeat threat finance systems and networks negatively affecting US interests in compliance with all existing authorities and procedures. This includes persons and entities providing financial and material support to illicit networks such as terrorists, insurgents; drug, weapon, or human traffickers; or corrupt government officials attempting to undermine their own government or efforts of the HN, coalition, or US forces.

d. Threat Finance: Threat finance is the generation, movement, storage, management, control, accountability, distribution, and disbursement of funds and/or valuable commodities that can be traded or converted to money by adversaries.

e. Integration: The arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging as a whole (JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*).

IGO: An IGO is "an organization created by a formal agreement (e.g., a treaty)

between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. IGOs are formed to

protect and promote national interests shared by member states" (JP 1-02). JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations,* discusses nonmilitary organizations. Examples of an IGO include the following:

    (1) United Nations (UN).

    (2) Organization of American States (OAS).

    (3) World Food Program.

    (4) European Union.

f. NGO: "A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society" (JP 1-02). JP 3-08 discusses nonmilitary organizations. Examples of NGOs are the following:

    (1) International Committee of the Red Cross.

    (2) Médecins sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders).

    (3) Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere.

    (4) Save the Children.

g. USG agencies: These are USG agencies, other than the DOD, which support the force or operate within the AO. Also referred to as USG departments and agencies. Examples of USG agencies are the the following:

    (1) DOS.

    (2) USAID.

    (3) US Department of the Treasury.

    (4) Federal Bureau of Investigation.

    (5) Central Intelligence Agency.

    (6) US Department of Agriculture.

Chapter II
IMSO Resources, Stakeholders, and Stakeholder Integration

1. General

a. Resources are capabilities, means or actions the commander can use to conduct IMSO. A tactical commander may or may not have direct access or authority to employ resources and capabilities needed to conduct IMSO and stabilize an area.

b. Resources to support IMSO come from multiple sources internal, and external, to a unit. External sources include other USG agencies, IGOs, NGOs, and possibly the private sector or multinational corporations. Interaction, liaison, and integration with these external sources are critical. Success may depend on the commander's ability to find common ground and develop unity of effort with these organizations.

> *"While the ways and means between military and civilian organizations may differ, they share many purposes and risks, and the ultimate overall goal may be shared."*
> —*JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations*

c. IMSO do not always involve actually transferring cash. Depending on the local economy, it may be the exchange of goods, or services. Currency may have no relative value and payment may be in the form of a like, in kind, exchange (e.g., paying with goats instead of cash). Depending on the funding source, limits may be imposed on amounts of money spent and what it can be used to make a purchase. Policies, procedures, and guidelines vary by AO. Financial management and contracting personnel, and the staff judge advocate (SJA) can advise the commander on specific aspects of each program. Appendix B contains information on appropriations and programs.

2. Internal Resources and Special Appropriations

Internal resources and special appropriations are funds tactical commanders have at their disposal for use on projects within a unit's AO. Congress appropriates unique funding that assists commanders in IMSO. Authorized expenses include the following. (See also Army Field Manual (FM) 1-06, *Financial Management Operations*, and DOD 7000.14-R, *DOD Financial Management Regulation*, Vol. 12, chapter 27, for additional examples).

a. Water and sanitation: Projects to repair or improve drinking water availability, and public sanitation (e.g., water purification, distribution, or waste disposal).

b. Food production and distribution: Projects to increase food production or distribution processes to further economic development (i.e., production and storage facilities, or supply chain management).

c. Agriculture/irrigation: Projects to increase agricultural production or cooperative agricultural programs (e.g., irrigation systems, or canal cleanup).

d. Electricity: Limited scope projects to repair, restore, or improve existing local electrical production, distribution, and secondary distribution infrastructure (e.g., power lines or transfer stations).

e. Healthcare: Projects to repair or improve infrastructure and equipment; provide medical supplies, immunizations, and training; provide or maintain medical facilities; maintain or restore health by providing trained and licensed professionals.

f. Education: Projects to repair or reconstruct schools, purchase school supplies or equipment, and train education professionals.

g. Telecommunications: Projects to repair or extend local communication infrastructure (e.g., radio, telegraph, television, telephone, data communication, or computer networking).

h. Economic, financial, and management improvements: Projects to improve economic or financial security (e.g., sustainable employment programs or small business development.

i. Transportation: Limited scope projects to repair or restore transportation to include infrastructure and operations (e.g., road or railway section).

j. Rule of law and governance: Projects to repair government buildings (e.g., court houses) or construct new rule of law or governance facilities in a local community.

k. Civic activities: Projects to clean up, repair, or restore public and cultural facilities, purchase equipment (e.g., tools) for public utilities, and purchase or lease vehicles for use by public/government officials in support of civic and community activities.

l. Battle damage repair: Projects to repair, or make payments for repairs, of property damage resulting from US military operations not compensable under the Foreign Claims Act.

m. Condolence payments: Payment to individual civilians for the death of a family member or physical injury of self or a family member resulting from US military operations not compensable under the Foreign Claims Act. Consult the SJA for additional guidance.

n. Hero payments: Hero payments are defined as payments to the surviving spouse or next of kin of an HN's personnel, or in extraordinary circumstances (e.g., government civilians killed as a result of or in support of US military operations).

o. Former detainee payments: Payments to individuals upon release from US detention facilities. Consult the SJA for additional information.

p. Protective measures: Projects to repair or improve protective measures to enhance the durability and survivability of a critical infrastructure site.

q. Other urgent humanitarian or reconstruction projects: Projects to repair collateral damage not otherwise payable because of combat exclusions.

r. Temporary contract guards: Projects to guard critical infrastructure, including neighborhoods and other public areas.

s. Rewards: Payments to persons for information and other nonlethal assistance. See appendix B for more information on rewards programs.

t. Weapons buy back: Payments to persons who voluntarily turn in weapons to improve security, stability, and development.

u. Humanitarian civic assistance: Funds used to promote US and HN security interests while enhancing the operational readiness of Service members.

v. Reintegration programs: Funds contracts, salaries, and supplies associated with reintegrating former opposing forces into society.

3. External Resources

External resources are capabilities commanders do not have at their direct disposal, but are available to support the warfighter's efforts. These resources may be strategic-level funds allocated for use by DOD, other USG agencies, or IGOs and NGOs, designed to be spent at the local (tactical) level. Depending on the scenario, another agency (e.g., DOS) may be the lead for an operation, but may depend on the military to plan and execute the mission. An example of this would be humanitarian assistance funds controlled by the DOS, but used to pay for DOD responses to a foreign natural disaster.

4. Stakeholders

The following is a list of major stakeholders and their roles in IMSO. The list is not all inclusive. Situations may dictate the addition or deletion of others.

a. Commander: The commander oversees planning, coordinating, and supervising projects; issues guidance; and approves projects and programs. The commander appoints project purchasing officers (PPOs), pay agents (PAs), and project managers (PMs) to execute IMSO.

b. Financial management (G8/C8/J8): The financial manager provides financial guidance, certifies funds availability, and implements fiscal controls. The financial manager and SJA verify the purpose for, time to allot, and amount and availability of funding to support IMSO.

c. Civil affairs (CA): CA forces and units are organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct CA operations and to support civil military operations (CMO). CA individuals are the subject matter experts (SMEs) for establishing collaborative relationships among military, governmental, NGOs, IGOs, and IPIs.

d. Military information support operations (MISO): Active and reserve component MISO forces are organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct IIA in support of a commander's objectives. Psychological operations Soldiers conducting MISO are SMEs in target audience analysis, and able to advise commanders on the use of IMSO to achieve psychological effects by co-opting local leaders and populations. (Co-opting means, to neutralize or win over through assimilation into an established group or culture.) In coordination with IIA or IO planners, the public affairs officer (PAO) and combat camera teams, MISO planners can develop information products to inform the populace to increase the psychological effects of IMSO projects.

e. CTF community: These are SMEs on entities that provide financial and material support to illicit networks.

f. Operations officer (S3/G3/C3/J3): The operations officer is responsible for military actions conducted by joint forces or by Service forces employed under command relationships. (JP 3-0)

g. Contracting officer (KO): The KO has legal authority to enter into, administer, and/or terminate contracts, and is responsible for training, appointing, and clearing PPOs. The KO is responsible for ensuring all contract actions comply with contract law, executive orders, regulations, and other applicable procedures and local policy. Also, the KO trains and appoints field ordering officers, PPOs, and contracting office representative (CORs).

h. Disbursing officer (DO): The DO is the account holder for all the government funds (i.e., cash and negotiable instruments) within a specific area of responsibility. The DO must comply with existing financial management regulations, policies, and procedures concerning the management of these funds. They make electronic funds transfer or limited depository checking account payments to vendors at the request of the PPO or KO. The DO is the SME for receiving and disbursing cash for project/program expenditures according to command guidance and finance regulations. The DO also trains, funds, and clears PAs.

i. SJA: Advises the commander and staff on all matters of law (including contract and fiscal law), reviews IMSO and supporting projects for legal sufficiency, and provides legal documentation.

j. PM: The PM monitors and accepts service and construction projects performed by a vendor. The PM may be appointed and trained by the KO as a COR to perform these duties although additional expertise and qualifications may be required. The PM manages the project from nomination to completion.

k. PA: The PA is an extension of the DO at the unit level. The PA accounts for government funds and makes payments in relatively small amounts to local vendors. A PA is appointed to the position as a collateral duty and is under the supervision of the DO.

l. PPO: Under certain authorities, PPOs can serve as an extension of the KO at the unit level. The PPO makes contractual agreements in limited scope with local vendors and places orders for goods or services.

m. PAO. The PAO analyzes military missions, unit policies, and relationships with the populations of local communities to determine requirements for communication. The PAO develops a working relationship with media representatives and develops and maintains liaison with representatives of civilian organizations.

n. IGO: IGO is defined under key terms in chapter I.

o. NGO: NGO is defined under key terms in chapter I.

p. IPI (joint): This is a generic term used to describe the civilian construct of an operational area to include its populations (i.e., legal citizens, legal and illegal immigrants, and all categories of dislocated civilians), governmental, tribal, commercial, and private organizations and entities. They generate ideas and are sources for information garnering support for IMSO.

q. HN government representatives: HN representatives are the local government leaders or officials through whom IMSO and supporting projects should be coordinated (generates "buy in" with a special emphasis on sustainability).

5. Integration of Stakeholders

a. IMSO must be coordinated with higher, lower, and adjacent units, as well as various other organizations (e.g., USG agencies, IGOs, and NGOs). The conflicting goals and missions of these organizations often complicate coordination, and achieving unity of effort. SA of the missions, goals, projects, operational construct, and programs of these organizations is required to leverage, integrate, and synchronize efforts. Figure 4 demonstrates the complexity of integrating the various stakeholders in IMSO. To properly effect coordination and integration, commanders may need to establish liaisons with many of the stakeholders listed in paragraph 4. FM 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency* (COIN), states four principles military forces must adhere to when operating with or beside other organizations. These four principles are:

    (1) Know the roles and capabilities of US, intergovernmental, and HN partners.

    (2) Include other participants, including HN partners, in planning at every level.

    (3) Support civilian efforts, including those of NGOs and IGOs.

    (4) As necessary, conduct or participate in political, social, informational, and economic programs.

Figure 4. Complexity of Stakeholder Integration

b. The civil-military operations center (CMOC) is the primary integration mechanism to coordinate civil and military elements. CMOCs can be established at all levels of command. A CMOC is neither designed, nor should it be used, as a command and control element. However, it is useful for transmitting the commander's guidance to other agencies, exchanging information, and facilitating complementary efforts to build unity of effort. There is no established CMOC structure; its size and composition depend on the situation. CMOCs are organic to Army CA organizations. Senior CA officers normally serve as the CMOC director and deputy director. More information on CMOCs can be found in FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 and FM 3-57/Marine Corps reference publication (MCRP) 3-33.1*, Civil Affairs Operations*.

c. Tactical units responsible for large AOs may find interagency expertise pushed to their level and must be prepared to integrate their efforts with civilian organizations. Units should coordinate with all interagency representatives and organizations entering the AO. Figure 5 is a recommended list for coordinating with interagency and other nonmilitary organizations. More information on working with other organizations is found in appendix D.

- Identify organizational structures and leadership.

- Identify key objectives, responsibilities, capabilities, and programs.

- Develop common courses of action or options for inclusion in planning, movement, coordination, and security briefings.

- Determine how to ensure coordination and communications before and during the execution of the organization's activities in the unit's area of operations.

- Develop relationships that enable the greatest possible integration.

- Assign liaison officers to the most important civilian organizations.

- Define problems in clear and unambiguous terms.

- Determine the intended duration of operations.

- Determine the locations of bases of operations.

- Determine the number, names, and descriptions of personnel.

- Determine type, color, and number of civilian vehicles.

- Identify other agency resources in the area of operations (AO).

- Identify local groups and the agencies in the AO.

- Establish terms of reference or operating procedures, especially in the event of incidents that result in casualties.

- Identify funding for interagency projects.

Figure 5.   Interagency Coordination Checklist Example

6. Developing Interorganizational Coordination and Collaboration

a. Developing a climate that fosters interorganizational coordination and collaboration is a monumental task. Complicating the issue is the addition of private sector entities working in and transiting the battlefield. Commanders and staffs must view the civil-military relationship as collaborative rather than competitive by looking at the comparative advantages of the two communities.

b. JP 3-08 provides the following steps to support building and maintaining coordination and collaboration with other organizations. Some steps do not apply to the tactical level, but provide a foundation upon which to build.

(1) Forge a collective definition of the problem in clear and unambiguous terms.

(2) Understand the objectives, end state, and transition criteria for each involved organization or agency.

(3) Develop a common, agreed upon set of assumptions that will drive the planning among the supported and supporting agencies.

(4) Understand the differences among US national objectives; end state and transition criteria; and objectives of other governments, IGOs, NGOs, the private sector, and parties to the conflict.

(5) Understand and appreciate the differences among federal, state, tribal, private sector, and NGO objectives and desired end states.

(6) Establish a common frame of reference.

(7) Capitalize on experience.

(8) Develop courses of action (COA) or options.

(9) Support a comprehensive approach.

(10) Establish responsibility.

(11) Establish an interorganizational coordination office, staff element, or process tailored to the mission and situation.

(12) Plan to transition key responsibilities, capabilities, and functions.

(13) Direct all actions toward unity of effort.

(14) Develop an information sharing strategy.

Chapter III
Planning and Execution Considerations for IMSO

1. IMSO Planning

a. This chapter outlines considerations for IMSO in mission planning and execution. As with any military operation, the planning considerations, framework, timeframe, and metrics must be tailored to the OE. Planning for IMSO is conducted in parallel with mission or operation planning.

b. IMSO planning is intricate and multi-echelon. It requires coordination and cooperation from a variety of organizations and agencies. IMSO planning considerations range from determining resources to determining the impact variables (e.g., political, social, and economic) have on conducting IMSO with a tactical operation. A thorough analysis of the population, adversary, and variables is a prerequisite. Remember, the human environment (terrain) is the center of gravity IMSO are attempting to shape. To coordinate and leverage efforts in the AO effectively, the commander and staff should incorporate IMSO in the planning and targeting processes as early as possible.

2. Understanding the OE

a. Understanding the OE is critical to developing a plan using money as the mechanism to shape the OE and defeat an adversary. A recommended tool for understanding the OE is the district stability framework (DSF). The DSF is a simple, field-level analysis, planning, and programming tool developed by USAID for conducting interagency stability operations. The DSF has been adopted by military units and civilian agency personnel in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, to provide a common civil-military picture, promoting unity of effort. Because stabilization activities frequently involve the expenditure of resources, DSF also may be an appropriate IMSO planning tool. The DSF uses eight operational variables: political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information systems, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT); and six mission variables: areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE). PMESII-PT describes the foundation and key features of an enemy state or HN. ASCOPE enables an in-depth analysis of the key civil considerations vital for long-term success along the lines of operation, or effort, necessary to set the conditions to achieve the commander's long-term end state. Both PMESII-PT and ASCOPE:

  (1) Help the staff estimate the effects various operations will have on the OE.

  (2) Provide the staff a way to outline and define the spectrum of threat interdicting progress toward achieving an objective.

b. The DSF is an iterative, four-step process focusing on stabilization, as opposed to long-term development, and helps users influence the environment and local perceptions over a short- to medium-term timeframe. It generates useful information to support higher level civilian-military planning and creates a baseline to assess the effectiveness of projects and programs. See appendix A for a more complete description of the DSF methodology. The four steps of DSF are:

(1) Gaining SA.

(2) Identifying SOI and their root causes.

(3) Designing effective stabilization projects/activities.

(4) Monitoring the implementation, and evaluating the impact of these activities.

> *"The beauty of district stability framework (DSF) is its simplicity…and its scalability for the Company…and higher. I think it's the simplest way for a commander to focus on counterinsurgency. DSF is the lens the commanders use to see their area of operations."*
>
> **(b)(6)**
>
> *S-3, 3-509th Infantry*

3. Unique Planning Considerations

As part of planning for IMSO, stakeholders will have to provide unique information having significant impacts in executing IMSO. These include the following.

(1) Operations:

    (a) Nonlethal effects planning.

    (b) Second-order and tertiary effects.

    (c) Lethal operations that may negate the benefit of IMSO.

    (d) Interagency coordination and cooperation; synchronizing and leveraging USG capabilities and eliminating duplication of effort.

(2) Intelligence:

    (a) Enemy, adversary, and threat influences in the AO.

    (b) Identification of enemies, adversaries, and threats (macro-micro).

    (c) Project implications on affecting enemy, adversary, and threat goals, programs, objectives, etc.

(3) Logistics:

    (a) Availability of assets.

    (b) Logistical impacts on other operations.

    (c) Local capabilities.

(4) Civil-military:

    (a) Economic dynamics of the area.

    (b) Macro and micro societal impacts.

    (c) Religious/spiritual-specific issues.

    (d) Second-, third-, and fourth-order cultural and societal impacts.

(5) CTF considerations:

    (a) Adversary funding sources.

    (b) Adversary financial mechanisms and payment procedures.

    (c) Vulnerabilities of USG and local contractors to fraud, waste, and abuse.

(6) Legal:

    (a) US law applicability.

    (b) Funding legality.

    (c) HN laws.

    (d) Local (indigenous) legal structure (if any).

    (e) Memorandums of understanding/agreement.

    (f) Status-of-forces agreements.

(7) Financial management:

    (a) Funding availability.

    (b) Funding authority.

    (c) Added value of the IMSO versus associated project costs.

    (d) Contingent or tail costs attached to any project.

(8) Contracting:

    (a) Employing properly warranted personnel.

    (b) Using local contractors versus third nation or contractors from other areas.

    (c) Vetting potential vendors/contractors.

    (d) Understanding CTF processes and implications.

    (e) Employing measure of performance (MOP) and measure of effectiveness (MOE).

    (f) Contract termination.

4. Planning Methodologies

a. There are various planning methodologies staffs may use to integrate IMSO into the operations process (i.e., plan, prepare, execute, and assess). The two methods highlighted in this publication are the CA methodology and the DSF.

b. The CA methodology is used by CA to plan civil affairs operations (CAO) in support of CMO. The CA methodology consists of five steps: assess, decide, develop and detect, deliver, evaluate/transition (AD3E). Transition is not included in a separate step, but should be incorporated into all steps of AD3E. How and when an IMSO supporting project will be transitioned to the HN should be planned and prepared for continuously. Table 1 shows how AD3E crosswalks to other planning processes.

(1) Assess: Use PMESII-PT and ASCOPE to assess current conditions.

(2) Decide: Determine how to focus CA assets and actions to support the commander's intent.

(3) Develop and detect: Develop a rapport and relationships with nonmilitary participants of the operation and detect the conditions or events calling for a specific response.

(4) Deliver: Engage the civil component with planned or on-call CAO as appropriate.

(5) Evaluate/transition: Evaluate the results of the executed mission using MOP and MOE to assess task accomplishment and attainment of objectives; and transition to follow-on CA units, other military units, HN assets or NGO, IGOs, or other civilian agencies.

c. AD3E can be applied at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. More information on AD3E can be found in FM 3-57/MCRP 3-33.1A, *Civil Affairs Operations*.

Table 1. AD3E Planning Process Crosswalk						
Civil Affairs Methodology	Basic Problem Solving Steps	Special Operations Planning Procedures	Joint Operational Planning Process	Crisis Action Planning	Military Decision Making Process	Troop Leading Procedures
Assess	Identify the problem	Receive the mission	Initiation	Phase 1 – Situation Development	Receive the mission	Receive the mission
	Identify facts and assumptions	Initiate the SOMPF	Mission analysis	Phase 2 – Crisis Assessment	Mission analysis	Issue a warning order
		Conduct mission analysis				
Decide	Generate alternatives	Send CONOPS to mission tasking HQ	COA development	Phase 3 – COA Development	COA development	Make a tentative plan
	Analyze the alternatives	Attend mission conference/ orders briefs and conduct pre-deployment site survey	COA analysis	Phase 4 – COA Selection	COA analysis	Start necessary movement
	Compare the alternatives	Receive CONOPS approval	COA comparison		COA comparison	Conduct preliminary/ initial assessment
	Make a decision	Refine concept into OPLAN/ CONPLAN/ supporting plan or OPORD	COA approval		COA approval	
		Conduct brief-back	Develop the plan or order		Orders production	Issue the order
Develop and Detect	Execute the decision	Deploy		Phase 5 – Execution Planning	Prepare	Supervise
Deliver	Execute the decision	Execute the mission		Phase 6 – Execution	Execute	
Evaluate and Transition	Assess the results	Document results of the mission	Redeploy (Transition)			
Legend: COA– course of action CONOPS– contingency operations CONPLAN– contingency plan HQ– headquarters			OPLAN– operations plan OPORD– operations order SOMPF– special operation mission planning folder			

5. IMSO COA Development

a. IMSO COA development is accomplished in the same manner as COA development for other operations. The IMSO COA selected is the overarching plan within which individual IMSO supporting projects are nested to support the commander's mission and intent. It is the overarching goal driving IMSO targeting, or individual project selection. Figure 6 shows how projects of a subordinate unit nest within and support the higher headquarters overarching IMSO plan.

Figure 6.   IMSO Supporting Project Nesting

b. IMSO COAs, like all COAs, must be feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and suitable (FADS); however, there are unique considerations for creating IMSO COAs.

(1) Feasible. The COA is feasible when it:

(a) Is within the unit's capability to conduct.

(b) Is within the unit's authority to approve and conduct.

(c) Can be completed using resources available (affordable).

(d) Is within the unit's mission or scope.

(e) Can be completed during a unit's rotation or easily transferred or transitioned to the follow-on unit, unified action partners, or HN.

(2) Acceptable. The COA is acceptable when:

(a) The benefits gained outweigh the cost in resources.

(b) It is welcomed by the local population.

(c) There is a legitimate and compelling need for the project (valid).

(d) It is legally acceptable (appropriations).

(3) Distinguishable. The COA is distinguishable when it:

(a) Is distinctly different in scope from previous or ongoing projects.

(b) Provides a distinct benefit different from previous or ongoing projects.

(4) Suitable. The COA is suitable when it:

(a) Provides an immediate or near-term benefit to the local populace.

(b) Provides added value for the unit and local populace, and supports the overall plan.

(c) Promotes the development of local capacity.

(d) Provides work for the local population.

(e) Effects are visible to the local populace.

(f) Is transitional to, and sustainable by, the HN.

6. IMSO Targeting

> *"Targeting—The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities."*
>
> *—JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*

a. IMSO targeting is the deliberate method by which individual projects are selected. It identifies SOIs within an AO requiring influence or change. A targeting process ensures projects selected meet the commander's intent, produce the desired effects, support the higher commander's mission objectives, and contribute toward the desired end state. Improper target selection results in "project fratricide". The same principles and processes used to determine lethal targets (e.g., indirect fires) are also used to determine projects to address an SOI (nonlethal target) and influence the populace to support friendly objectives. These include:

(1) Preparing targeting guidance that articulates the desired effects.

(2) Determining high-payoff targets (HPT) and high-payoff target lists of IMSO supporting projects to provide the most impact or influence.

(3) Developing target selection standards using descriptive criteria to explain the selection standard.

(4) Preparing a combined list of lethal and nonlethal targets.

See JP 3-60, *Joint Targeting,* FM 3-09.31/MCRP 3-16C, *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for the Combined Arms Commander,* and FM 3-60 for joint and Army targeting doctrine. FM 3-13, appendix E, describes how to apply the targeting process to IO/IIA-related targets.

> *"The same process used to determine when a radar system should be attacked with the Army Tactical Missile System is also used to determine when building a new sewer system will influence local leaders to support friendly objectives."*
>
> —*FM 3-60, The Targeting Process*

b. Targets are nominated and vetted through a targeting board or working group. The leveraging asset is identified to achieve the commanders' end state in time and space, in accordance with their guidance, priorities, vision, and objectives. In the case of IMSO, the leveraging asset is money, to include the goods and services money provides. All populace-influencing venues and options must be tied into a single targeting process, including IMSO identified non-lethal targets. IMSO targets are not separated from lethal targets but are included in a combined target list.

c. Using IMSO to co-opt a populace requires identifying key communicators and leaders in the population. Selection of appropriate local leaders to help coordinate a supporting project can help amplify the impact of the project. Careful target audience analysis by MISO forces, with input from CAO/CMO planners, can help identify local leaders and key communicators who can help influence local perceptions about an IMSO supporting project and identify actions that will provide the desired effect. IMSO targets become part of the CAO target plan in support of the commander's CMO plan. These civil targets contribute to the targeting process. Table 2 provides an example of a targeting support matrix containing lethal and nonlethal targets.

(b) (7)(E)

> *"Effective targeting identifies the targeting options, both lethal and nonlethal, to create effects that support the commander's objectives. Some targets are best addressed with lethal means, while other targets are best engaged with nonlethal means."*
>
> *—JP 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations*

d. This publication highlights two processes that may be used for IMSO targeting; decide, detect, deliver, and assess (D3A); and find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate (F3EAD). AD3E and DSF, introduced in paragraph 5, can be used with either of these two doctrinal targeting methodologies. The D3A methodology facilitates attack of the right target with the right asset at the right time. F3EAD enables the dynamic tasking process required for tactical level targeting and addresses certain SOIs, such as personality and network-based targeting. D3A is viewed as a planning tool while F3EAD is an execution tool for short-suspense targets. These processes are discussed in detail in JP 3-60 and FM 3-60.

e. D3A is a leader driven process normally done at the operational level. It is not a distinct series of actions, but is an integrated part of the decision-making process following receipt of mission. It begins during intelligence preparation of the battlespace/battlefield, identifying unique and significant characteristics throughout the OE and encompasses decisions made during the planning process. As the staff is also the targeting team, it eliminates the need to conduct separate targeting meetings. Figure 7 depicts D3A as a continuous cycle and assessment as continuous throughout the cycle. See FM 3-60, and FM 3-09.12/MCRP 3-16.1A, *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Field Artillery Target Acquisition*, for an in-depth discussion of D3A.

Figure 7.   D3A Targeting Methodology

f. F3EAD provides maneuver leaders a methodology to organize resources and array forces across the range of military operations. While the targeting aspect of F3EAD and D3A are consistent, F3EAD provides the maneuver commander an additional tool to address certain targeting challenges. F3EAD is not a replacement for D3A and is not exclusive to targeting, but is an example of TTP for leaders to understand the OE and visualize the desired effects at the tactical level. Figure 8 explains how F3EAD works within D3A.

Figure 8.   F3EAD within D3A

(b) (7)(E)

j. The unique nature of IMSO requires additional considerations when nominating targets. IMSO targets (projects) are nominated by units and CA teams through an informed analytical process linking the proposed activity to a targeted SOI. It is informed through interaction with the local population and leaders. Leaders may use

criteria similar to FADS to evaluate the proposed project. The project must be valid, achievable, affordable, assessable/measurable, and sustainable.

(1) Valid:

(a) Addresses a SOI.

(b) Benefits the local populace.

Commanders should be careful not to conform to the "wants" of local government leaders and other persons when considering IMSO supporting projects. A village may "want" a ten-room school with computers, etc. What they "need" may be a tent school that the local government can afford to keep up and staff. Moreover, not every legitimate "need" drives instability. Supporting projects should be tied to a SOI to contribute to the overarching objective of shaping the OE. See appendix A for criteria to identify SOIs.

(2) Achievable:

(a) Simple and quickly executable.

(b) Achievable in the unit's scope and mission.

(c) Is within the unit's capability and capacity.

(3) Affordable:

(a) The project must be in the unit's ability to afford the project within the funds allotted to them by a higher headquarters.

(b) It must be within the ability of the HN or local government to cover or share in the costs and maintenance following transition.

(c) It must be in the unit's ability to afford in terms of manning to oversee the project, provide security, etc., (troops to task).

(4) Assessable: MOP and MOE can be developed to determine the impact of the IMSO.

(5) Sustainable:

(a) The project is sustainable by the unit, or a follow-on unit.

(b) It is sustainable by the HN or local government following transition to ensure continuation and promote self-reliance.

(c) Does not saddle the follow-on unit or the local government with resource burdens (time, money, manpower).

(d) The projects and programs do not make the local populace or economy depend on the presence of US troops or bases by displacing (temporarily inflating) the local economy.

DETERMINING THE REQUIREMENT

The US Marine Corps' 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, was stationed in the Nawa District, Helmand Province, Afghanistan from April to October of 2009. After security issues were addressed, through the tactical conflict survey (TCS) the unit discovered the second most important local grievance was the lack of cell phone coverage. Further TCS questioning revealed cell phones were the primary and most reliable forms of communication for locals to contact their family members who may have been injured in attacks in neighboring areas. Not being able to reach family members created anxiety and insecurity for the populace. Cell phone towers ranked as more important than clinics and jobs, something the unit would not have known without a deep understanding of the local population's perceptions. By establishing cell phone towers, the unit enabled a sense of security among the populace who had the ability to tell others, thus creating support for the unit and the government. The battalion commander, **(b)(6)** **(b)(6)** noted, "This is something we had never thought about, as we considered phones a luxury. Without the district stability framework (DSF) we would never have known about this concern, understood why it was a concern, or done anything about it."

SOURCE: Stability Operations: From Policy to Practice

(b)(6) , **May 2010**

7. Prioritization

a. Projects should be prioritized based on impact on an SOI and a logical sequence. For example, if the goal of an IMSO is to stimulate the local farming community's economy, constructing a new processing facility does not make sense when the roads must be improved for farmers to get their crop to the facility.

b. Commanders and staffs may want to develop criteria for prioritizing projects. Examples of criteria include the following.

    (1) Can the project be executed quickly?

    (2) Does it meet an immediate humanitarian need?

    (3) Is the project highly visible to the local community?

    (4) Does it promote local employment?

    (5) Is it sustainable by the HN?

8. Horizontal, Vertical, Internal, and External Integration

a. IMSO requires horizontal, vertical, internal, and external integration. Not only must a unit coordinate plans and physical terrain on the battlefield, but also plans for influencing the human environment (terrain). Figure 9 depicts not only the complexity of coordination within a unit with higher, lower, and adjacent units, but also with elements outside the unit over which they have no control.

Figure 10. Horizontal, Vertical, Internal, and External Integration

b. Horizontal integration is not just coordination with adjacent units for battle space, but also the integration of IMSO and supporting projects across the battle space. Horizontal integration ensures adjacent units do not conduct conflicting or redundant projects. Conducting the same type of project in separate areas is not necessarily bad, but combining resources may make money available for other projects. Additionally, horizontal integration ensures the population in one area is not perceived as receiving more than the population in another area.

c. IMSO and supporting projects must also be synchronized and integrated over time. Commanders must have SA of previous projects in the AO and understand what has and has not been successful. Synchronization and integration over time reduces redundant efforts, saves resources, and prevents frustration by the local populace and project fratricide.

> **PERCEPTIONS**
>
> Two villages in Afghanistan were relatively close in distance, but each was in a different brigade combat team's (BCT's) area of operations. In order to stimulate the economy and provide employment opportunities in both areas, the respective BCT commanders developed plans for area garbage disposal. Based on their respective priorities the commander in one area worked with the local leaders to purchase a garbage truck and hire four men with a salary of roughly $300 a month. The second village purchased two less expensive dump trucks and employed 12 men for roughly $200 a month. Though the men in the first village worked fewer hours and with better equipment the perception was the second village had received "more," and the first village had been *"short changed,"* even though the men in the second village worked for less pay, longer hours, and did all the labor by hand.
>
> **—IMSO Joint Working Group, 10 February 2012**

e. Vertical integration is the most intuitive and ensures a unit's efforts support the mission and intent of the higher commander and facilitate the efforts of the lower level commanders. This reduces incidents of "project fratricide" by coordinating resources and capabilities.

f. Internal integration is internal coordination between stakeholders taking part in IMSO, but is made difficult by the number of entities required to conduct IMSO.

g. External integration ensures IMSO and supporting projects are integrated with HN authorities' near- and long-term efforts, as well as nation-building efforts of the IGOs and NGOs sharing the AO.

9. Expectation Management

Managing the expectations of the populace when planning and executing IMSO is important. Civilians may not totally understand the resource limitations, the complexity of the issues being addressed, or the constraints caused by insecurity and lack of local technical expertise. They may expect more projects than can be managed by a unit, or for projects to have greater impact than is reasonable. Make efforts to ensure the local populace understands the constraints and are on board with project specifics by involving them in the project assessment, development, and prioritization process.

> **THE UNINTENDED EFFECTS**
>
> A unit commander, in collaboration with the local village leaders, decided to construct a small clinic to improve the health care of the villagers. To be expedient, the contracting officer selected the contractor with the lowest bid. The selected contractor was not from the same village where the clinic was to be constructed. Bids by contractors from the village were not considerably higher in cost than [that of] the selected contractor. The project was plagued with setbacks, and upon completion, was not opened for use because the village could not afford to hire a doctor. The United States' commander agreed to hire a doctor for a period of time until the local government could take over responsibility. After six months the clinic was closed and sits unused. Village men were out of work and [sided] with the insurgency. The relationship among the commander and village leaders soured and the commander no longer received their support. Wargaming the second order effects may have determined:
>
> —Hiring a contractor from another village did not bring money into the local economy.
>
> —The project was not sustainable by the HN and could not be transitioned.
>
> —The "goodwill" benefits of hiring a contractor from the village versus another village far outweighed the higher cost.
>
> —The real need of the village was to have a health professional available not to have a clinic.
>
> **—IMSO Joint Working Group, 10 February 2012**

10. Unintended Effects

Commanders and staffs should consider the possible second and third order effects an IMSO may produce. Second and third order effects are the results of miscalculations in the expected reaction of the local population or the adversary. Many times the unintended effects are counterproductive and complicate or change the outcome of operations. The unintended effects of IMSO may not be immediately life threatening, but can alienate the population, or sway support to the adversary. Estimating unintended effects is not an exact science, but efforts should be made to wargame possible scenarios that result from the IMSO. IMSO may create negative opportunities for the adversary to exploit, or positive opportunities for friendly forces to increase cooperation with the HN. Commanders and staffs must view the possible outcomes more than "one layer deep" as the impact of single events can be multiplied over time, eroding any outcomes from the initial effect. Even the smallest misstep by friendly forces can be blown out of proportion causing reactions from the international community. Unintended effects can be indicators an IMSO is on track, or needs adjustment. Mitigating unintended effects requires continuous assessment and constant coordination among the key stakeholders of an IMSO.

11. Transfer, Transition, and Termination

THE NEED FOR TRANSITION PLANNING
Following the 1994 acts of genocide in Rwanda (Central Africa), the provision of potable water was critical to saving thousands of lives. While the Armed Forces of the United States perhaps have the greatest capacity to purify water, this service could not be provided indefinitely. Effective interagency coordination enabled the identification of other sources of reverse osmosis water purification units, associated equipment, support funding, and mutually agreed-upon timelines and procedures for transitioning from military support to intergovernmental and nongovernmental control.
—Joint Publication 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations

a. Continual monitoring and evaluation determines if IMSO and their supporting projects should be adjusted, transferred, transitioned, or terminated. IMSO are assessed throughout their lifespan to ensure they are creating the desired effects. The determination to adjust or terminate an IMSO could have tactical, operational, or strategic impacts. To help make this determination, commanders and staffs should develop termination criteria. Termination criteria may be determined by asking questions like those that follow:

(1) Is there no change in the SOI?

(2) Are there benefits to the unit's mission or the local populace?

(3) Are there cost overruns?

(4) Is there contractor corruption?

b. Transferring IMSO supporting projects to follow-on forces or other organizations requires detailed, coordinated, and synchronized planning. Unsuccessful projects should not be turned over to a follow-on unit. Doing so will damage the credibility of the arriving unit making it difficult for its members to build rapport with the local populace.

c. The ultimate goal is to transition sustainable projects to the HN, IGOs, or NGOs. CA has termed this as Transition Operations. IMSO are no longer shaping operations once they have created the desired effect and indicate the HN no longer needs the support of US forces. An in-depth discussion on Transition Operations can be found in FM 3-57/MCRP 3-33.1A, Appendix A and JP 3-57, chapter III, *Civil Affairs Operations.*

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Chapter IV
Monitoring and Assessing IMSO

1. General

a. It is important to develop methods to monitor the progress, evaluate the effects of individual projects, and assess the overall impact of IMSO. There is an important difference between projects being completed and IMSO creating the desired effect. Assessment tools and methods should be qualitative and quantifiable.

> *"Assessment tools help commanders and staffs determine:*
> *—Completion of tasks and their impact.*
> *—Level of achievement of objectives.*
> *—Whether a condition of success has been established.*
> *—Whether the operation's end state has been attained.*
> *—Whether the commander's intent was achieved."*
>
> *—Army Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting*
> *Publication 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency*

b. IMSO success is not based on the number of projects completed, or amount of money spent, but on the quality of the individual projects, progress toward creating the intended effect, and the projects' impact on the overall mission objective. Monitoring, evaluating, and assessing provide:

  (1) Results of mission execution.

  (2) Information to determine if the SOI remains relevant.

  (3) Needed changes to the plan.

  (4) An assessment of the effectiveness of IMSO and supporting projects.

  (5) Vital feedback to the commander.

  (6) A basis for future operations planning.

2. Monitoring

Monitoring progress of individual projects ensures work is being completed on time, to standard, and with the intended results. Tactical leaders interact daily with communities but may not entirely know the total impact of the projects on the OE. Leaders, with the assistance of the KO, financial manager, and subordinate leaders must understand the basics of the project to include the costs, timeline for completion, basic materials usage, and contractor performance. Quantifiable milestones and benchmarks, which become MOPs, should be compiled to monitor the progress of projects. Leaders should also understand the indicators of fraud, waste, and abuse by the contractor, and ties he has to the local community.

3. Assessing

Assessment is defined as continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation, a comparison of forecasted outcomes to actual events. Targeting and combat assessments are cyclical and must be focused on the environment. In IMSO, focusing on the enemy limits thinking and ignores the real problem, which is the SOI. Developing qualitative and quantifiable metrics is vital to determining the success of IMSO. Clear and concise objectives, outputs, and impacts for the IMSO should be defined to ensure proper assessment.

4. MOP and MOE

a. A MOP is criterion used to assess friendly actions that are tied to measuring task accomplishment (JP 1-02). They are specific indicators used to evaluate how well a person, organization, or system is operating and provide quantifiable data points. In IMSO, these measures may be as simple as knowing the project is on track to be completed as scheduled. Examples of IMSO MOP are:

(1) The number of projects completed.

(2) The number of projects completed on time.

(3) The number of projects completed within budget.

(4) An increased number of people employed by a specific IMSO supporting project.

(5) An increased output of local products or services.

b. A MOE is criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or OE that are tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect (JP 1-02). MOE measures operational success and must be closely related to the objective of the mission. A MOE is outcome-based. For IMSO MOE is more important than MOP. Examples of IMSO MOE are:

(1) Presence and activity of small and medium-sized businesses.

(2) Increased agricultural activity (FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5).

(3) Increased self-reliance.

(4) Changes in local attitudes (e.g., friendliness toward US and HN personnel).

(5) Changes in behavior or statements by the populace that indicate a change in public perceptions (e.g., reporting insurgent activity that could disrupt an IMSO supporting project).

(6) Changes in the economic or political situation of an area (e.g., self-reliance).

c. The commander and staff must determine "why" and "what to do" should an IMSO or a supporting project fails to create the desired effects. Several things can cause the evaluated effect of a project to be unsuccessful (e.g., expectations were set too high, the wrong action was measured, etc.). Commanders must be careful not to redefine success to what has been achieved. Options include:

(1) Continuing the operation as currently planned and reevaluating at a future date.

(2) Accepting the results and proceeding with transition of the operation as planned.

(3) Redefining the mission, using the CA methodology, and developing a new plan with new effects and MOEs.

(4) Stopping the project and redirecting resources to other successful projects.

d. The DSF uses three levels for monitoring and assessing progress. The first two are the same as the MOP and MOE described in paragraphs 4.a and b. The third adds a concept related to achieving the overall mission objective. They are as follows:

(1) Level 1–(MOP/output):

(a) Have the projects/programs been completed?

(b) Are they being implemented successfully?

(c) Are there external factors affecting the implementation of the projects/programs?

(2) Level 2–(MOE/impact):

(a) Were the desired effects created?

(b) Is the intended ichange being accomplished?

(c) Does this change represent progress toward the objective and a mitigation of the SOI?

(d) How are external factors influencing and/or causing the observed changes?

(3) Level 3–(Overall impact):

(a) Is the overall situation getting better?

e. Overall impact does not measure the impact of individual activities; but it measures the aggregate impact of all activities and influences upon the civil component of the OE in relationship to the overarching goal. Good overall impact indicators answer the question, "What will the local population do or say differently if things are getting better?" Examples of overall impacts include the following:

(1) Government legitimacy (e.g., people willingly turn to the government for assistance).

(2) Local-on-local violence.

(3) Economic activity.

(4) Confidence and activity of host nation security forces (HNSF).

(5) Local population's freedom of movement.

(6) Governance perceptions (e.g., people say the government is doing a good job).

(7) Security perceptions.

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> *"Money is the oxygen of terrorism. Without the means to raise and move money around the world, terrorists cannot function."*
>
> —**Colin Powell, Secretary of State, 7 November 2001**

(b) (7)(E)

> *"As for the needs of the jihad in Afghanistan, the first of them is financial. The mujahidin of the Taliban number in the thousands, but they lack funds. And there are hundreds wishing to carry out martyrdom-seeking operations, but they can't find the funds to equip themselves. So funding is the mainstay of jihad."*
>
> *"…And here we would like to point out that those who perform jihad with their wealth should be certain to only send the funds to those responsible for finances and no other party, as to do otherwise leads to disunity and differences in the ranks of the mujahidin."*
>
> —(b)(6)
>
> **al-Qaida Leader in Afghanistan**

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

3. CTF Policy

a. DOD Directive (DODD) 5205.14, *DOD Counter Threat Finance Policy*, signed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense on 19 August 2010, formally recognizes CTF as a responsibility within the department. In implementing CTF as policy, it appointed the Commander, US Special Operations Command, as the lead component for synchronizing DOD CTF activities. In establishing the DOD role in CTF, DODD 5205.14, and the follow-on strategy detailed in the DOD *Counter Threat Finance Roadmap*, signed 1 November 2010, affirmed the key to success in countering threat financing is DOD supporting a whole-of-government approach (illustrated in figure 12) led by the USG interagency departments and law enforcement agencies. Certain provisions of law, including Section 1004 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1991, and Section 1022 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2004 (as amended), allow DOD to serve as a significant force multiplier in this context by giving it the authority to provide needed resources to law enforcement agencies as they prosecute counterdrug and counterterrorism activities, both of which are critical elements of the CTF effort. Ultimately, DOD's success in CTF depends on the department's ability to integrate with, support, and complement other USG activities.

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

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Appendix A
District Stability Framework (DSF)

1. DSF Overview

a. The District Stability Framework (DSF) is a field-level analysis, planning, and programming tool specifically created to guide and support stabilization efforts. It emphasizes the local population's perspectives and development principles, and measures effects (not just output). The DSF helps users identify local sources of instability (SOI) and design programs and activities to address them. Figure 12 depicts the four iterative steps of the DSF.

Figure 13. DSF

b. The DSF uses four "lenses" to achieve a population-centric and stability-oriented understanding of the local environment. These "lenses" are:

  (1) Operational environment (OE)

  (2) Cultural environment.

  (3) Local perceptions.

  (4) Stability/instability dynamics.

2. Situational Awareness

a. OE: The OE generally refers to the physical or tangible characteristics of the local area. The DSF uses political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) and areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE) to determine these characteristics. It does not simply generate a list of facts about the OE, but the relevance of those facts to the local population and stabilization mission. For example, it can tell if the local government is dominated by one tribal group, but also shows an inequity that undermines the legitimacy and support for the government among other tribes. Table 3 shows the relationship of PMESII and ASCOPE used to assess the OE.

Table 3. PMESII/ASCOPE Matrix					
	Description			**Factors**	**Relevance**
P	Political Governance: Political actors, agendas, government capability and capacity.	**A**		Key elements of the formal, informal, and shadow systems of government which significantly influence the local population.	Why is a factor relevant to the local population? How does it affect stability?
M	Security/Military: Capabilities in the area of operations (e.g., equipment, mission, resource constraints).	**S**		Key elements that could influence the security situation.	Why is factor relevant to the local population? How does it affect stability?
E	Economic: Trade, development, finance, institutional capabilities, geography, and regulation.	**C**		Key elements that influence economic activity in the area.	Why is factor relevant to the local population? How does it affect stability?
S	Social: Demographics, migration trends, urbanization, living standards, literacy/education level, etc.	**O**		Key elements that describe or could influence traditional social dynamics in an area.	Why is factor relevant to the local population? How does it affect stability?
I	Infrastructure: Basic facilities, services, and installations.	**P**		Effects on the physical infrastructure: sewage, water, electricity, educational and healthcare facilities, and transportation.	Why is factor relevant to the local population? How does it affect stability?
I	Information: Means of communicating using media, telecommunications, or word of mouth.	**E**		Key elements that facilitate information transfer to and among the local population.	Why is factor relevant to the local population? How does it affect stability?

Note: The DSF is a United States Agency for International Development (USAID) tool. USAID does not use physical environment and time as part of the operational variable. Table 3 only describes the relationship between PMESII and ASCOPE.

b. Cultural environment: The cultural matrix tells who the major groups are, what they care about (and possibly fight over), and how they regulate society and solve

disputes. Table 4 is an example of a cultural matrix depicting the areas of cultural environment that should be assessed.

Table 4. Cultural Matrix			
Major Cultural Groups	**Their Interests**	**Cultural Codes, Traditions, and Values**	**Traditional Conflict Resolution Mechanics**
Identify the major cultural and/or tribal groups in the area of operations.	Identify the things cultural groups care about or consider to be valuable, both material and intangible.	Identify cultural codes, traditions, and values that the major cultural groups live by.	Identify how conflicts between individuals and groups have traditionally been resolved.
Traditional Authorities	**Disruption to these Authorities/Mechanisms**		**How Malign Actors, Stabilizing Forces, Leverage these Factors**
Identify the traditional authorities to whom the locals give respect and/or normally turn for assistance.	Describe what new actors or conditions may have disrupted the traditional conflict resolution mechanisms and/or undermine the influence of traditional authorities.		Describe how malign actors leverage and/or exploit these cultural factors to their advantage. Also, consider how stabilizing forces do or could leverage these factors.

c. Local Perceptions: To be effective, efforts must be based on a deep understanding of local conditions, grievances, and norms; cultural characteristics; religious beliefs; and customs rather than outsider assumptions. This understanding can be gained through several mechanisms (i.e., population surveys, focus groups, engagements, input from the local staff). Establishing a baseline for local perceptions prior to beginning an integrated monetary shaping operations (IMSO) project and periodic assessment thereafter, to include post-completion of the IMSO and supporting projects, are key to being able to accurately measure its effects before, during, and after completion.

One simple, effective method for collecting local perceptions is the tactical conflict survey (TCS). TCS is comprised of four open-ended questions, which can be used by military units on patrol, civilian agency implementing partners, and host nation (HN) government and security forces. Each question is followed by asking "why" to ensure full understanding of the person's response and perspective. The four questions are:

(1) Has the number of people in the area (i.e., village, town, or province) changed in the last year, and why?

(2) What are the most important problems facing the area, and why?

(3) Who do you believe can solve your problems, and why?

(4) What should be done first to help the area, and why?

Figure 14 depicts an example of TCS results.

What is the most important problem facing the village?

Sample local perception quotes:

• "Nobody is safe here."

• "Elders can't solve our problems anymore."

• "Police take our money."

• "Judges support those who pay them."

• "Government doesn't help the people."

• "United States forces endanger us."

• "We have no doctor or clinic."

• "The government should do more to protect us."

• "Police are not competent to solve or prevent crimes."

• "We avoid the police. They only help themselves."

• "We have no schools for our children."

Pie chart segments:
- Corruption (Police) 9%
- Infrastructure 4%
- Physical Security 24%
- Education 11%
- Land Disputes 22%
- Healthcare 13%
- Justice/Conflict Resolution 17%

Figure 14. Local Perceptions: TCS Data Example

d. Stability/instability dynamics: The DSF identifies potential stability and instability factors in the local environment.

    (1) Factors of stability include:

        (a) Resiliencies in the society (i.e., institutions and mechanisms that help the society function peacefully).

        (b) Events that present a window of opportunity to enhance stability.

        (c) Key actors (individuals) who are helping to promote stability.

    (2) Actors of stability include:

        (a) Grievances of the local population (taken from various local perception data sources).

        (b) Events creating a window of vulnerability in which stability may be undermined.

        (c) Key actors (individuals) who are fomenting instability.

Events are usually the same in both matrices; whether they end up reinforcing stability or instability depends mainly on who exploits them and how they play out. Table 5 shows the relationship between the factors of stability and instability.

Table 5. Factors of Stability/Instability			
	Resiliencies	**Events**	**Key Actors: Means, Motives, and Actions**
Stability	What processes, relationships, or institutions enable the society to function normally and peacefully? Are there any previous resiliencies that have been or are being undermined?	What potential or anticipated situations could create an opening for key actors and their followers to reinforce stability?	Which individuals or institutions in society are attempting to preserve and strengthen stability? What means do they possess, what are their motives, and what actions are they taking?
	Grievances	**Events**	**Key Actors: Means, Motives, and Actions**
Instability	What issues or problems is the local populace concerned or upset about? Who do they blame for these conditions, and how severe are they?	What potential or anticipated situations could create an opening for key actors and their followers to further undermine stability?	Which individuals or institutions are leveraging popular grievances and events to create instability? What means do they possess, what are their motives, and what actions are they taking?

3. Analysis

a. After gaining SA, the DSF provides tools to analyze and identify potential SOI, their causes, the desired objectives, and impact indicators to measure progress in addressing each SOI.

b. The four SA lenses typically result in a list of problems, needs, and grievances. The primary purpose of analysis is to narrow the list to smaller lists of valid SOIs. The DSF begins by grouping issues closely related or logically connected in a symptom-cause relationship. For example, the problems of poor border control, police corruption, and violent crime may all be grouped under the heading of "physical insecurity." If physical insecurity is an SOI, the DSF process breaks these issues apart again to address them in detail.

c. Next, each problem or group of related problems is entered in the SOI analysis matrix (table 6 is an example of an SOI analysis matrix) and vetted against the three instability criteria. The criteria ask whether the issue does the following:

   (1) Decreases support for the government or "legitimate governance institutions?"

Note: "Legitimate governance institutions" refers to nongovernmental entities that help the society regulate itself, such as a village elder or tribal council.

   (2) Increases support for malign actors?

Note: This usually occurs when the malign actors are either directly addressing the problem (e.g., providing security to a community the police never visit) or successfully leveraging the issue in their propaganda (e.g., "If we were in charge, we would reform and expand the police").

   (3) Undermines the normal functioning of society?

Note: The emphasis here is on local norms, which are usually based on what community members have personally experienced in the past. For example, if a community has never had electricity, the continued lack of electricity does not undermine the normal functioning of their society.

	Instability Criteria			Source of Instability	Prioritization
Potential Sources of Instability	**Does this issue decrease support for the legitimate government? Explain.**	**Does this issue increase support for malign actors? Explain.**	**Does this issue disrupt the normal functioning of society? Explain.**	**Does the issue meet two of the three instability criteria?**	**Is the SOI a priority grievance for the local populace?**
Justice/Conflict resolution (including land disputes)	Yes. Formal and traditional mechanisms are seen as ineffective.	Yes. Adversaries increase their reputation by solving disputes.	Yes. Traditionally, disputes were solved by local leaders, now they are a source of violence.	Yes	Yes
Political group A dominates government	Yes. Undermines support for political group B, increases resentment.	No. Adversary is not taking advantage of it.	No. Political group A has dominated for decades.	No	No
Lack of healthcare	Probably. Provincial government healthcare excludes town X.	No. Adversary does not provide healthcare.	No. Town X has never had healthcare.	No	Yes
Poor road infrastructure	No. Governor is actually working to build new roads.	No. Adversary is not building new roads.	No. Roads have always been rudimentary at best.	No	No
Civilian government corruption	No. Corruption complaints directed solely at police.	No. Evidence shows adversary exploits this issue.	No. Locals are not concerned; apparently this is within normal bounds.	No	No
Insecurity (including police and civilian casualties)	Yes. Civilian casualties, insecurity, police ineffectiveness reflect poorly on government.	No. Adversaries are also blamed for civilian casualties, and are not providing security, either.	Yes. Insecurity and police problems exceed local norms.	Yes	Yes
Lack of education	No. Despite limitations, people are grateful for education improvements.	Yes. Adversary uses this to promote radical education.	No. Despite low levels, education has actually improved since 2001.	No	Yes

Table 6. Source of Instability Analysis Matrix Example

d. After identifying and prioritizing a select number of SOIs, a tactical stability matrix (TSM) is constructed for each one. The TSM helps further analyze and design activities to address each SOI. It consists of nine columns. Six support the analysis process, while three support the design phase. (Table 7 is an example TSM.) The columns in the TSM are filled out by identifying:

(1) The targeted SOI.

(2) Perceived causes (how locals perceive the situation and why they think it exists).

(3) Systemic causes (the root causes or underlying conditions that lead to the problem, allow it to continue, or prevent it from being addressed).

(4) Objective (a succinct statement of "end state" to address the SOI).

(5) Impact indicators/measure of effectiveness (MOE) (how success is measured).

(6) Impact indicator data sources (where the information to track the impact indicators can be obtained).

(7) Activities (things that can be done to mitigate the systemic design).

(8) Causes and achieves the objective (taken from the activity design worksheet).

(9) Output indicators, or measures of performance (MOP), (metrics indicating progress toward the completion of an activity).

(10) Output indicator data sources (where the information to track the output indicators can be obtained).

Table 7. Tactical Stability Matrix Example								
Analysis						Design		
Source of Instability (SOI)	Perceived Causes	Systemic Causes	Objective	Impact Indicators	Impact Data Sources	Activities	Output Indicators	Output Data Sources
Taken from the SOI analysis.	Perception data contributing to SOI (i.e., priority grievances commonly cited by the local populace).	The root causes of the SOI relating to the perceived causes.	A statement of the conditions that will diminish the identified SOI.	Also called measures of effectiveness, they measure effectiveness of activities against the predetermined objective and system causes.	Methods to obtain the information identified in the impact indicators	The things done to mitigate the systemic causes of instability and achieve the identified objective.	Also called measures of performance, output indicators determine whether an activity has been implemented.	Methods to obtain the information identified in the output indicators

4. Design

a. In the next phase of DSF, design, prioritize, and synchronize stabilization activities. The process starts by brainstorming potential activities to address each systemic cause of the SOI. These are screened and refined using the three stability criteria, the eight design principles, and resource availability. The activity design worksheet helps guide this process and feed results into the activities column of the TSM. See table 8 for an example of an activity design worksheet.

Table 8. Activity Design Worksheet Example															
Brainstorm possible activities	Stability Design Criteria (must meet two of three)			Design Principles							Resources				Select
Brainstorm possible activities	Does the activity increase support for the government–legitimate governance? Explain.	Does the activity decrease support for malign actors? Explain.	Does the activity increase institutional and societal capacity and capability? Explain.	Sustainability	Local ownership	Short-term vs. long-term results	Leverage support from other organizations	Culturally and politically appropriate	Accountability and transparency	Leverage existing resiliencies	Money	Personnel	Expertise	Time	Is the activity realistic?
Generate a list of potential activities that will address systematic causes and contribute to achieving the objective for a SOI.	Explain how the activity will increase support for the government and/or legitimate governance institutions.	Explain how the activity will decrease support for malign actors.	Explain how the activity will increase institutional and societal capacity and capability.	For each potential activity that meets at least two of three stability criteria, refine the proposed activity to make it meet as many of the eight design principles as possible.							Does the unit and its partners, have the resources to complete the activity? If not, eliminate the proposed activity.				Based on the stability criteria, design principles and resource availability, should the activity be implemented.

b. The stability criteria are the mirror image of the instability criteria. (See table 6.) Any proposed activity not meeting at least two of these criteria should be eliminated. Proposed activities meeting the stability criteria should be refined using the eight design principles. Each activity should be designed or modified so it:

(1) Can be sustained by the local government or society.

(2) Maximizes local involvement to create local ownership.

(3) Minimizes the trade-offs between short-term positive effects and any potentially negative long-term impacts (i.e., unintended consequences).

(4) Leverages or supports the programs of other government agencies, intergovernmental or nongovernmental organizations, and the HN's government.

(5) Is appropriate to the local political and cultural context.

(6) Strengthens governmental accountability and transparency.

(7) Leverages and builds upon existing societal resiliencies.

(8) Includes the flexibility to adapt if circumstances change.

c. Next, each proposed activity is screened against available resources (e.g., time, money, or personnel) and appropriate expertise. Activities having the necessary resources are entered into the activities column of the TSM. The TSM is then completed by identifying output indicators and output indicator data sources enabling the staff to determine whether each activity is proceeding as planned or when it has been completed.

d. During the final steps of the design process, selected activities are prioritized and synchronized. They should be prioritized based on their anticipated impact on the SOI (e.g., activities with more anticipated "bang for the buck" should be implemented first.) and should also be synchronized with activities conducted by other units. A synchronization matrix can help accomplish this. Table 9 is an example of an SOI synchronization matrix.

Table 9. Synchronization Matrix Example Format

SOI #1: List Source of Instability being targeted

Timeframe	January (Week 1–4)	February (Week 1–4)	March (Week 1–4)	April (Week 1–4)	May (Week 1–4)	June (Week 1–4)
Operations	Shaping Operations (list specific)	Shaping Operations (list specific)	Clearing Operations	Clearing Operations / Holding Operations (list specific)	Building Operations (list specific)	Building Operations (list specific)
Key Events	List Specific Events	List Specific Events	List Specific Events	List Specific Events	List Specific Events	List Specific Events
Example: USAID	List Activity #1	List Activity #2	List Activity #3	List Activity #3	List Activity #4	List Activity #5
Example: DOS	List Activity #1	List Activity #2	List Activity #3	List Activity #4	List Activity #5	
Example: Military	List Activity #1	List Activity #2	List Activity #3	List Activity #5	List Activity #5	
Example: USDA	List Activity #1	List Activity #1	List Activity #2		List Activity #3	List Activity #3

List Systematic Cause #1 (covers Example: USAID, DOS, Military, USDA)

	January	February	March	April	May	June
Actor 1						
Actor 2						
Actor 3						
Actor 4						

List Systematic Cause #2 (covers Actor 1, Actor 2, Actor 3, Actor 4)

5. Monitoring and Evaluating

a. The final step in the DSF takes place during and after the implementation of activities. Monitoring and evaluation are conducted on three levels. The first two have already been identified as part of the TSM:

(1) Output indicators/MOP track implementation of an activity. They answer the question, "Is the activity progressing?" or "Is the activity complete?" Output indicators are monitored during the implementation of an activity, until it is completed.

(2) Impact indicators/MOEs measure the effect an activity creates.

(3) Overall Impact is the third level of monitoring and evaluation. Rather than measuring the impact of individual activities, it takes into account the impact of all activities conducted over a period of time and the influence of external factors. Table 10 is an example of the monitoring and evaluation matrix.

Table 10. Monitoring and Evaluation Matrix								
Source of Instability	Activity	Measures of Performance		Measures of Effectiveness				
		Output Indicator Data	Output Data Sources	Impact Indicator	Baseline	Change	Impact Data Sources	Objective
Taken from Tactical Stability Matrix (TSM)	Taken from TSM	Data output indicators identified in TSM	Taken from TSM	Taken from TSM	Baseline Data for impact indicator identified on TSM	Change in Baseline data	Taken from TSM	Taken from TSM

b. The best overall stability indicators reflect the local population's perceptions of stability, not perceptions or assumptions held by outsiders. The following are seven suggested indicators of overall stability that was field tested in Eastern Afghanistan:

(1) District government recognition (e.g., how many locals take their problems to the district government for resolution): Reflects trust and confidence in the HN government.

(2) Local-on-local violence: a direct measure of insecurity.

(3) Bazaar activity: reflects freedom of movement and economic confidence.

(4) HN security force presence: reflects security force's confidence to range farther and more frequently into insecure areas.

(5) Population freedom of movement: reflects security conditions.

(6) Local perceptions of their government: direct measure of the public's stated confidence in the government's competence, transparency, and relevance.

(7) Local perceptions of security conditions: direct measure of perceived safety.

Appendix B
Sources of Funding

1. Committing, Obligating, and Disbursing Funds

a. The ability to commit, obligate, and disburse funds is based on specific authority. Commanders at different levels provide guidance on how funds are spent based on their priorities of effort. The financial manager (J-8/C-8/G-8) can provide he most up to date funding information. **It is important to consult the financial manager and the staff judge advocate (SJA) before obligating funds for IMSO supporting projects.** The following are most common authorities and funding sources used for IMSO projects/programs.

(1) Appropriated funds—Appropriated funds are monies paid out of the United States (US) Treasury pursuant to statutory authority granted by Congress to the Department of Defense (DOD) to incur obligations and make payments.

(2) Nonappropriated funds—These funds are not generally appropriated by Congress, but generated by DOD military and civilian personnel and their dependents. They are used to supplement funds separate from those appropriated by the Congress to provide a comprehensive, morale-building welfare, religious, educational, and recreational program. Nonappropriated funds are designed to improve the well-being of military and civilian personnel and their dependents.

b. US law, codified into US Code (USC), provides the authority for the DOD to administer and execute security cooperation (SC) activities and execute security assistance activities. USC is divided into subject areas known as "titles." The two titles (and the administering department) that apply most directly to SC are:

(1) Title 10 USC ("Armed Forces")—DOD.

(2) Title 22 USC ("Foreign Relations and Intercourse")—Department of State (DOS).

c. The titles delineate a group of programs or "SC tools" that authorize, and through Congressional appropriation processes, fund specific SC and security assistance programs and activities.

(1) Title 10. Delineates programs that authorize the DOD to administer and execute specified SC programs and activities.

(2) Title 22. Delineates programs that authorize the DOS to administer/execute, and the DOD to execute, specified security assistance programs and activities. Title 22 primarily contains two laws, the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, as amended (chapter 32) and the Arms Export Control Act as amended (chapter 39).

2. Military Funds

a. Military construction (MILCON): An appropriation used for construction, alteration, development, conversion, or extension of any kind carried out with respect to a military installation. While there are certain types of MILCON funds that could be used for IMSO, their use will be very limited. MILCON appropriations generally fund major projects such as bases, schools, storage facilities, maintenance facilities, medical/dental clinics, and military family housing. For specific uses, consult the command resource manager and command SJA.

b. Operation and maintenance (O&M): generally fund expenses such as civilian salaries, travel, minor construction projects, operating military forces, training and education, depot maintenance, stock funds, and base operations support. Different types of O&M programs are identified in various sections of Title 10, USC that provide the authority to commanders to conduct humanitarian operations are explained in the following paragraphs.

(1) The main point of confusion in funding humanitarian assistance programs (HAP) is determining which authorized activities can be funded with DOD O&M funds appropriated to the military Services as opposed to those that can be funded with a fenced category of DOD O&M funds. The Congress and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), which oversees HAP, have carefully delineated which funds must be used for which activities. Following 9/11, Congress appropriated additional funds and enacted a series of statutes (codified in Title 10 USC sections 401, 402, 404, 2557, and 2561) that collectively became known as Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) funds. OHDACA is DOD's sole statutory authority for using O&M funds for HAP. Title 10 USC 401, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Provided with Military Operations, permits DOD to carry out a range of humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA). There are a number of statutory conditions that must be met, to include the following.

(a) The assistance must promote the national security interests of the US and beneficiary country.

(b) The Secretary of State must approve all assistance.

(c) The assistance shall complement, but may not duplicate, other US assistance to the beneficiary nation.

(d) The assistance must serve the basic economic and social needs of the beneficiary nation.

(e) The assistance must not be provided to any individual, group, or organization engaged in military or paramilitary activity.

(2) Title 10 USC 401(c)(4), authorizes commanders to fund minimal (de minimus) expenditures of HCA from the unit's O&M funds, commonly referred to as the operational fund. DOD Instruction 2205.2, *Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Activities*, provides guidance on minimal cost HCA activities. Such activities, by law, must promote the security interests of the US, the country in which the activities are carried out, and the operational readiness skills of

participating US forces. If a project is executed through the HCA program, US military forces must provide the labor.

(3) De minimis HCA activities must be one of the four activities statutorily allowed financial, contract, and project management as an HCA activity. Additionally, all of the other restrictions for conducting HCA, previously mentioned, apply to de minimis HCA. HCA activities, are defined in 10 USC 401 as:

(a) Medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural or underserved areas of a country.

(b) Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems.

(c) Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.

(d) Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.

(4) Section 2557, Title 10, USC, describes OHDACA funding which provides the authority to make available for humanitarian relief purposes, through the DOS, any nonlethal excess supplies of DOD. The identified excess property inventory normally transfers to USAID, as an agent for the DOS, for distribution to the target nation.

(5) Section 2561, Title 10, USC, describes OHDACA which provides the authority for DOD to carry out broader, more extensive, HA projects. Projects which use contractors include the purchase of end items other than those used in connection with 10 USC 401 HCA activities, or involve the provision of training or technical assistance for humanitarian purposes, are carried out under this authority. This authority can also be used to provide the transportation of humanitarian and relief supplies using DOD assets or resources. OHDACA funds are generally used to pay for operations and activities that are authorized by 10 USC 2561, HA, and 10 USC 401, demining. Even though the law specifically lists HCA and disaster relief as appropriate uses for the fund, the actual practice is that OHDACA funds are used to pay for activities authorized by 10 USC 2561.

(6) DOD Rewards are payments to persons that offer incentives for information and can be a remarkably effective tool in preempting enemy operations and denying sanctuary and weapons. Rewards provide monetary, goods, or services for information and other nonlethal assistance beneficial to force protection or operations against international terrorism. Rewards programs are governed by 10 USC 127b and implementing guidance is in DOD 7000.14-R, *DOD Financial Management Regulation*, volume 12, chapter 17. Additionally rewards programs have "sunset" provisions included by Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act limiting the time period in which they can be used.

(7) Intelligence contingency funds (ICF) are operational or strategic level funds used for gaining intelligence to help shape a commander's operations. ICF, part of the O&M, Army appropriation, are a portion of the Secretary of the Army's emergency and extraordinary expense funds (designated as limitation .0017). Annual appropriation acts grant authorization of ICF "for emergency and extraordinary expenses" with the approval or authority of the SA. The SA may certify payments are necessary for worldwide intelligence activities.

(8) Traditional combatant commander activities (TCA) are flexible resources, implementing 10 USC 168 to promote US national and regional security interests. TCA funds approved interactions with HN entities in the area of responsibility. Can be used for conferences, subject matter experts (SMEs), state partnership programs, exchanges, exercise observers, etc.

(9) The Defense Health Program provides funding for human immunodeficiency virus prevention educational activities undertaken in connection with US training, exercise and HA activities conducted in African countries.

3. Other than Title 10 Appropriated Funds

a. Economic support fund (ESF) is an appropriated program administered by USAID, established to promote economic and political stability in areas where the US has special political and security interests and where the US has determined economic assistance can be useful in helping to secure peace or to avert major economic or political crisis. ESF promotes US foreign policy interests by providing assistance to key US allies and countries in democratic transition. USAID, with foreign policy guidance from the DOS implements most ESF programs. Flexible in nature, ESF is available on a grant basis for a variety of economic purposes, including:

(1) Balance of payments support.

(2) Infrastructure.

(3) Capital/technical assistance development projects.

b. Global peace operations initiative is a presidential initiative in coordination with the other group of eight countries to increase the capacity of selected countries to deploy in support of international peace operations. It is a DOS program requiring DOD support. For additional guidance, contact the servicing SJA.

c. Peacekeeping operation fund is an appropriated grant program administered by the DOS. Authorization can be found in Chapter 32, Sub-chapter II, Part VI (22 USC 2348-2348d) of the FAA. It has historically provided funds for multinational force observers (MFO) and various UN peacekeeping missions.

4. Special Appropriations

In some cases, Congress authorizes and appropriates funds for humanitarian relief and related activities for a specific operation. An example is the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP). CERP was developed to enable commanders to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their area of operations (AO). Rules governing the use of such funds are based on Congressional restrictions in the legislation and are tailored to the needs of the particular operation. Further guidance is available from the servicing SJA and the current year's Operational Law Handbook, published by the Center for Law and Military Operations of the Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School. The CERP program is discussed in more detail in Army Techniques Publication 1-06.2, *The Commander's Emergency Response Program*.

5. Financial Management Terminology

a. Unauthorized Commitment: An agreement that is not binding solely because the government representative who made it lacked the authority to enter into the agreement on behalf of the government.

b. Commitment: The act of certifying and recording, by an authorized official, a programmed expenditure of funds for the costs associated with the purchase or reimbursement of products and services. An authorized commitment certifies funds are available and provides the purchasing authority with the accounting data necessary to obligate the government for payment.

c. Obligation: Acts legally binding the US government (USG) to make payments. Funds may be obligated only for the purposes for which they were appropriated and only to satisfy the bona fide needs of the fiscal year for which the appropriations are valid for obligation.

d. Disbursement: The payment of funds to satisfy a legal obligation of the USG.

e. Reconcilability: The process of accounting for the expenditure of funds by means of documenting the commitment, obligation, receipt, and payment for supplied goods and services.

6. Obligating the Government

a. As a general rule, only contracting officers (KOs) have the authority to legally bind the government and enter into, administer, or terminate contracts. A limited exception allows nonprocurement personnel to execute purchases within specified amounts. These individuals and the limits of their authority must be specified in writing.

b. Any government employee who makes an agreement to purchase goods and services without the authority to do so creates an unauthorized commitment. Unauthorized commitments can result in disciplinary action against the responsible individual, if the act was intentional and done to circumvent regulatory and statutory requirements. An unauthorized commitment may also expose the responsible individual to financial liability to the contractor if a contracting office is unable to retroactively approve, or ratify, the purchase.

c. Ratification is the retroactive adoption of an unauthorized act. By ratifying the act, the government becomes financially liable. Ratification is not automatic. The following circumstances must have existed at the time of the unauthorized commitment in order for the KO to ratify it:

(1) The government was provided and has accepted supplies or services, or the government has otherwise obtained a benefit resulting from performance.

(2) The ratifying official has the authority to enter into a contractual commitment.

(3) The resulting contract would otherwise have been proper if made by an appropriate KO.

(4) The KO reviewing the unauthorized commitment determines the price to be fair and reasonable.

(5) The KO recommends payment, and legal counsel concurs in the recommendation.

(6) Funds are available and were available at the time of the unauthorized commitment.

(7) The ratification is in accordance with any other limitations prescribed under agency procedures.

7. Authority to Execute DOD Funds

a. Commanders have the authority to execute appropriated funds. Commanders are directly involved in the oversight of the process. This level of involvement ensures compliance with established financial management policies and procedures to prevent fraud, waste, and mismanagement of authorized funds. A commander's authority includes the ability to appoint subordinates to positions of responsibility specifically to manage and execute funds.

b. KOs, uniformed and civilian, are professionally trained to negotiate and legally obligate the USG by means of contracts and purchase agreements. The amount of money a particular KO is authorized to obligate is usually based on the KO's formal training, experience, and duty position. A KO's obligation authority is prescribed in a personal warrant that describes the types of contracts and funding limitations of the KO's authority.

c. Depending on the level of command, a commander's staff may include a financial management officer who is responsible for the commitment, obligation, and reconciliation of unit funds. This officer would normally provide staff oversight of the unit's field ordering officers and pay agents (PA). The total amount of funds available for execution by a commander and the maximum value of a single transaction normally depend on the level of command. For example, a brigade commander may be authorized a total of $200,000 in CERP funds per quarter and given authority to approve projects valued at a maximum of $10,000; whereas, a battalion commander may be authorized half those amounts.

8. Key Considerations

There are six key points to understand when researching, programming and applying SC and security assistance authorities, programs and funds.

a. Use the funds properly. Use SC and security assistance funds only for the purpose for which they were appropriated. Many programs have "strings" attached to their execution. An example is the US cannot train partner nation security forces using TCA/Military-to-Military (M2M) Program funds.

b. Use all available SC tools to develop the plan. Do not be limited to familiar SC tools. Some programs are used more frequently by certain ground component commanders while certain programs are rarely fully executed, affording the creative SC planner additional options for resourcing solutions.

c. Plan and coordinate early. The lead time for approval and allocation of funds for many programs can be very lengthy. SC activities must be approved by the geographic combatant command (GCC) (or possibly DOD) and coordinated with the security cooperation organization (SCO)/partner nation. Security assistance activities must be coordinated with and initiated by the SCO, who must in turn coordinate with the partner nation.

d. Justify the plan. Strongly link the plan to the GCC's theater campaign plan objective and end states. The strong tie-in of the justification improves the chances of the proposal being approved and funding allocated.

e. Use SMEs and publications to assist. The GCC, DOD, and DOS have SMEs, publications, and Web sites related to SC and security assistance authorities and programs.

f. Do not execute until the request is approved and funding is allocated. Executing prior to approval is a violation of federal law.

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Appendix C
Training Considerations

1. Trained and Ready Personnel

a. Training prior to a unit's deployment is critical to the effective execution of IMSO. After action reports (AARs) indicate a major deficiency is the lack of proper training for key personnel (e.g., civil affairs (CA) or pay agent) prior to arriving in the AO. A significant delay in training key personnel degrades the ability of units to begin or continue operations requiring the use of money. Commanders may leverage CA personnel to give training to company-level and higher leaders employing integrated monetary shaping operations.

b. It is recommended units have a minimum of two trained project managers, project purchasing officer (PPO), and PA. These personnel must hold billets allowing sufficient time to execute these additional duties.

2. Recommended Training

a. Brigade and regimental combat team commanders and staff should receive project purchasing familiarization training to understand the limits associated with the use of funding. Training should include processes and PPO guidelines.

b. Commanders and staff should be trained on the District Stability Framework to correctly plan, monitor, and assess IMSO and supporting projects. United States Agency for International Development can provide training for units on using the DSF.

c. A trained and warranted contracting officer (KO) is required for the legal use and purpose of funds for IMSO supporting projects.

d. PPO training provides the basic knowledge and expectations of personnel serving as PPOs. PPOs should request theater-specific training guidance upon arriving in the AO. The following are examples of training requirements:

    (1) Statement of work requirements (Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook 09-48).

    (2) Documentation requirements for individual projects (theater AARs, local KO).

    (3) Fiscal processes in theater.

e. The PA should receive theater-specific finance training from a local disbursing/finance officer upon arriving in an AO. Examples of training requirements are:

    (1) Duties and roles of the PA.

    (2) Fiscal processes in theater.

    (3) Documentation requirements associated with financial transactions.

f. Contracting officer's representative (COR) is appointed by a KO or PPO to assist in the technical monitoring or administration of a contract or project and is extremely useful in complex services, supplies, or construction contracts. Examples of COR training requirements include:

(1) Attending formal COR courses provided through the Service's logistics agency.

(2) Understanding additional information unique to the contract (provided by the theater KO).

(3) Understanding the limitations of COR authority.

(4) Understanding necessary documentation.

(5) Understanding reporting requirements.

Appendix D
Working with Other Organizations

1. Purpose

This appendix provides basic information for working with other organizations including other United States Government (USG) agencies, intergovernmental organization (IGO), nongovernmental organization (NGO), or private-sector organizations. The primary publication to support this appendix is Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations*.

Key Terms

Interagency—Of or pertaining to United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense. (JP 3-08)

Intergovernmental organization—An organization created by a formal agreement (e.g., a treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Examples include the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the African Union. (JP 3-08)

Nongovernmental organization—A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. (JP 3-08)

Private sector—An umbrella term that may be applied in the United States and foreign countries to any or all of the nonpublic or commercial individuals and businesses, specified nonprofit organizations, most of academia and other scholastic institutions, and selected nongovernmental organizations. (JP 3-08)

Figure 15. Key Terms for Interorganizational Interaction

2. Developing Unity of Effort

a. NGOs, and IGOs do not operate within military or governmental hierarchies. Some may have policies that are entirely opposite to those of the USG, and particularly the US military. Many are not hostile to the US, or its military goals, but will not collaborate in order to maintain the perception of neutrality. However, US Armed Forces and these organizations often occupy the same operational space, increasing confusion. The greater the number of agencies and the more diverse the objectives, the more difficult it is to work toward a common goal. Conducting interagency and interorganizational coordination:

  (1) Promotes unity of effort.

  (2) Deconflicts activities.

  (3) Provides a common understanding.

(4) Facilitates cooperation in areas of common interest.

(5) Avoids unintended negative consequences when working in the same space.

b. The difficulty of coordinating operations with other organizations is determining appropriate counterparts and exchanging information with them when habitual relationships are not established. Interorganizational interaction is critical to understanding the roles and relationships of relevant stakeholders as well as their interests, equities, and insight into the challenges faced.

c. To successfully coordinate, collaborate and cohabitate with other organizations the commander must foster a common understanding and unifying goal. Common understandings identify opportunities for cooperation, and avoid unnecessary conflict. Zeal to develop a common goal should not concede the authority, roles, or core competencies of individual agencies.

3. **Organizational Perspectives**

a. During US military operation, contests between near-term military imperatives and actions that support long-term development objectives are frequent. Military commanders strive for immediate results to reduce the risk of violence, while developmental specialists focus on repairing infrastructure and social programs. Military policies, processes, and procedures are very different from those of civilian organizations and may present significant challenges to interorganizational coordination. Understanding other organizations perspectives is key to working with them.

b. When interacting with other organizations it is important to remember the following points about the organization's perspective:

(1) Core values and authorities. Like the military, each agency or organization has specific core values and authorities that create the scope of their operations.

(2) Focus. Each organization has individual organizational perspectives and agendas that do not always coincide with the goals of the military.

(3) Policies and procedures. Other organizations often have different, and sometimes conflicting, policies, procedures, and decision-making techniques than the military.

(4) Structure. The military relies on structured and hierarchical decision-making processes; detailed planning; and using standardized tactics, techniques, and procedures. A civilian organizational structure is more horizontal. It may employ similar principles, but may not have the same degree of structural process as the US military. A civilian agency's decision processes may be more ad hoc, collaborative, and collegial.

(5) Decision making. Obtaining a decision at the lowest levels may not be possible because field coordinators may not be vested with the authority to speak for parent organizations.

(6) Reduction of uncertainty. Handling crises is generally not a core or defining mission for these other organizations. Crises require participating agencies to divert attention, resources, and personnel away from other priorities. Differing

agency perspectives, capabilities, and interests will cause conflicts on how best to execute a mission and carry out policy in a crisis.

(7) Mutually supportive interests. Cooperation among the US military, IGOs, NGOs, and the private sector is often based on a perceived mutually supportive interest, rather than a formalized agreement.

(8) Long- and Short-term Objectives. What other organizations view as long- and short-term is different from the US military's view. At the tactical level, a period of a year or two may be viewed as a long-term plan. Whereas an organization that is involved in "nation building" (e.g., USAID) develops 5-year short-term plans and 30 year long-term plans.

4. Coordination, Collaboration, and Liaison

a. Coordination. Although there is no equivalent command relationship between military forces and civilian agencies and organizations, clearly defined relationships may foster harmony and reduce friction between the participants. Civilian agencies tend to operate via coordination and communication structures, rather than command and control structures.

b. Collaboration. Effective joint operations require close coordination, cooperation, and information sharing among multiple organizations. The most common technique for promoting collaboration is the identification or formation of centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, working groups, planning teams, and other enduring or temporary cross-functional staff organizations to manage specific processes and accomplish tasks in support of mission accomplishment.

c. Liaison. Direct, early liaison is a valuable source of accurate, timely information on many aspects of a crisis area, especially where involvement by civilian agencies and organizations precedes military forces and presents an opportunity to significantly enhance early force effectiveness. An additional benefit is an opportunity to build working relationships based upon trust and open communications among all organizations. For this reason, ongoing liaison and exchange of liaison personnel with engaged organizations is equally important.

5. Tips for Interaction

a. Recognize all USG agencies, departments, IGOs, NGOs, and private sector organizations in the AO.

b. Meet with USG agencies, NGO, or IGO representatives early to understand their roles and responsibilities, polices, procedures, and goals. Ensure they understand the military's mission, goals, and objectives.

c. Understand how they plan and vice versa. Consider creating an integrated planning team or other ad hoc entity to address how military activities may be better synchronized and complement their work.

d. Form a unifying goal with a desired end state. Spend a great deal of time on clarifying and restating the goals to be achieved.

e. To the extent possible, support their objectives by tying short-term projects with long-term goals, without compromising the military mission.

f. Accept that they may not be able to allocate resources to achieve short-term results. Using resources of other USG agencies is governed by law (e.g., the Economy Act), policy, and regulation. Involve the Staff Judge Advocate and comptroller to ensure compliance.

g. Continually exchange information (within security restrictions) to avoid confusion over objectives, differences in procedures, resource limitations, and shortfalls or overlaps of authorities. Exchange liaison officers, if acceptable to the other organization.

h. Never just "pop in" on IGOs or NGOs. Make prior arrangements for meetings. Give them the option of meeting inside or outside military installations to maintain their appearance of neutrality. Using a civil-military operations center (CMOC) for these meetings is advantageous. In some instances IGOs, NGO and other organizations of the host nation may be collocated at an established CMOC. This reduces confusion, and builds unity of effort by conducting coordination and planning meetings on issues that affect the operational area.

i. Do not refer to NGOs or IGOs as force multipliers, partners, or any term that may compromise their neutrality.

j. Do not interfere with their work with the civilian population, even if with elements deemed as unfriendly.

k. Understand if another organization, even within the USG, decides not to participate in a project or program.

l. Respect views on the bearing of arms within NGO or IGO sites.

m. Use bridging agencies (e.g., US Agency for International Development's Office of Military Affairs, United Nations' Humanitarian Coordinator) to coordinate with other organizations (e.g., Doctors without Borders).

n. Ensure all organizations share the responsibility for the job and receive appropriate recognition. This encourages stakeholders to participate in the process by validating and reinforcing their roles and responsibilities.

6. Other Organizations Guidelines

Below are examples of guidelines published by the United States Institute for Peace for use by other organizations when working with the military.

a. Do not wear military styled clothing. This does not preclude protective gear (i.e., helmets, protective vests, etc).

b. Limit travel in military vehicles to the extent practical.

c. Avoid collocating in facilities used by the military.

d. Use own logos (those of the organization) on clothing, vehicles, and buildings.

e. Pre-arrange visits to military installations and sites.

f. Except for liaison arrangements, minimize activities at military bases.

g. Request military protection for humanitarian assistance convoys, take advantage of logistic support, or evacuation (medical or from a hostile environment) from the military only as a last resort.

7. Helpful References

a. USAID Civil-Military Program Operations Guide.

b. USAID Primer: What We Do and How We Do It, 2006.

c. USAID Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy, 2008.

d. USAID Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy Implementation Guidelines (Internal USAID Document).

e. Guidelines for Relations Between US Armed Forces and nongovernment health organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Areas.

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OTHER PUBLICATIONS

Guide to Nongovernmental Organizations for the Military

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GLOSSARY

PART I – ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

A

AAR	after action report
AD3E	assess, decide, develop, detect, deliver, evaluate
AFB	Air Force base
AFI	Air Force instruction
AFTTP	Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures
AKO	Army Knowledge Online
ALSA	Air Land Sea Application (Center)
ALT	alternate
AO	area of operations
AOI	area of interest
AOR	area of responsibility
ASCOPE	areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events
ATP	Army techniques publications

B

BCT	brigade combat team
BN	battalion

C

C2	command and control
CA	civil affairs
CAC	Combined Arms Center
CADD	Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate
CAO	civil affairs operations
CAS	close air support
CAT	category
CCE	continuing criminal enterprise
CCMD	combatant commander
CERP	Commanders' Emergency Response Program
CMO	civil military operations
CMOC	Civil-military operations center
Co	company

COA	course of action
CONPLAN	concept plan
CONOPS	contingency operations
COR	contracting officer representative
CTF	counter threat finance

D

D3A	decide, detect, deliver, and assess
DO	disbursing officer
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense directive
DOS	Department of State
DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
DSF	District Stability Framework (USAID)
DT	dynamic targeting

E

EA	electronic attack
EO	executive order
ESF	economic support fund
EW	electronic warfare

F

F3EAD	find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate
FA	field artillery
FAA	Foreign Assistance Act
FADS	feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and suitable
FININT	financial intelligence
FM	field manual (Army)
FOB	forward operating base

G-H

HA	humanitarian assistance
HAP	humanitarian assistance program
HCA	humanitarian and civic assistance
HN	host nation
HPT	high-payoff target

HQ	headquarters

I

ICE	Immigrations and Customs Enforcement
ICF	intelligence contingency funds
IED	improvised explosive device
IGO	intergovernmental organization
IIA	inform and influence activities
IMSO	integrated monetary shaping operations
IN	infantry
IO	information operations
IPI	indigenous populations or institutions

J

JP	joint publication
JTF	joint task force

K

KO	contracting officer

L

LeMay Center	Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education
LOC	lines of communications
LOE	line of effort
LOO	line of operation

M

MCCDC	Marine Corps Combat Development Command
MCPDS	Marine Corps Publications Distribution System
MCPP	Marine Corps Planning Process
MCRP	Marine Corps reference publication
MCWP	Marine Corps warfighting publication
MILCON	military construction
MILSTRIP	military standard requisitioning and issue procedure
MISO	military information support operations
MNC	multinational corporation
MOE	measure of effectiveness

| **MOP** | measure of performance |
| **MTTP** | multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures |

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NAVSUP	Naval Supply Systems Command
NDLS	Navy Doctrine Library System
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NTTP	Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures
NWDC	Navy Warfare Development Command

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O&M	operation and maintenance
OAS	Organization of American States
OE	operational environment
OHDACA	Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (DSCA)
OPLAN	operations plan
OPORD	operation order

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PA	pay agent
PAO	public affairs officer
PID	positive identification
PLT	platoon
PM	project manager
PMESII-PT	political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, time
PPO	project purchasing officer
PRI	primary
PS	private sector

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| **RCT** | regimental combat team |

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SA	situational awareness
SC	security cooperation
SCO	security cooperation organization

SJA	staff judge advocate
SOI	source of instability
SOMPF	special operation mission planning folder

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T

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TCA	traditional combatant commander activity
TCS	tactical conflict survey
TFI	threat finance intelligence
TRADOC	United States Army Training and Doctrine Command
TSM	tactical stability matrix
TTP	tactics, techniques, and procedures

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U

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UAS	unmanned aerial system
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
USA	United States Army
USAF	United States Air Force
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USC	United States Code
USG	United States Government
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USN	United States Navy

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V

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VBIED	vehicle borne improvised explosive device

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W, X, Y, Z

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PART II – TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

appropriated funds–Appropriated funds are monies paid out of the United States Treasury pursuant to statutory authority granted by Congress to the Department of Defense (DOD) to incur obligations and make payments. (DOD 7000.14-R, DOD Financial Management Regulation)

civil affairs–Designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to support civil military operations. Also called CA. See also civil military operations. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-57)

civil-military operations–The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace

in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO. See also civil affairs; operation. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-57)

decide, detect, deliver, and assess–Methodology which optimizes the integration and synchronization of maneuver, fire support, and intelligence from task force to corps level operations. Also called D3A. (SOURCE: FM 3-60)

economic–Of or relating to an economy, the system of production and management of material wealth; "economic growth"; "aspects of social, political, and economical life".

find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess–The process developed to facilitate dynamic targeting steps at the joint level. of the joint targeting process. Also called F2T2EA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-60)

find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate–A process used that enables leaders at all levels to organize resources and array forces to provide insight into the enemy's network. It provides the maneuver commander an additional tool to address certain targeting challenges, particularly those found in a counterinsurgency environment. Also called F3EAD. (FM 3-60)

high payoff target–A HVT target whose loss to the enemy will significantly contribute to the success of the friendly course of action. High-payoff targets are those high-value targets that must be acquired and successfully attacked for the success of the friendly commander's mission. Also called HPT. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-60)

high payoff target list–A prioritized list of high-payoff targets by phase of the joint operation. Also called HPTL. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-60)

high value target–A target the enemy commander requires for the successful completion of the enemy mission. The loss of high-value targets would be expected to seriously degrade important enemy functions throughout the friendly commander's area of interest. Also called HVT. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-60)

human terrain–The element of the operational environment encompassing the cultural, sociological, political, and economic factors of the local population. (This term and its definition are applicable only in the context of this publication and cannot be referenced outside this publication.)

inform and influence activities–Is the integration of designated information-related capabilities in order to synchronize themes, messages, and actions with operations to inform U.S. and global audiences, influence foreign audiences, and affect adversary and enemy decision making. Also called IIA. (FM 3-13)

information operations (IO)–The integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own. Also called IO. See also computer

network operations; electronic warfare; military deception; operations security; military information support operations. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: SecDef Memo 12401-10)

monetary–1. Of or relating to money. 2. Of or relating to a nation's currency or coinage.

nonappropriated funds–Funds generated by DOD military and civilian personnel and their dependents and used to supplement funds separate from those appropriated by the Congress to provide a comprehensive, morale-building welfare, religious, educational, and recreational programs, designed to improve the well-being of military and civilian personnel and their dependents. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 1-0)

prioritization–To list or rate (as projects or goals) in order of priority. (This term and its definition are applicable only in the context of this publication and cannot be referenced outside this publication.)

resources–The forces, materiel, and other assets or capabilities apportioned or allocated to the commander of a USMC unified or specified command. (JP 1-02)

synchronization–The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time. 2. In the intelligence context, application of intelligence sources and methods in concert with the operation plan to ensure intelligence requirements are answered in time to influence the decisions they support. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 2-0)

target–1. An entity or object considered for possible engagement or other action. 2. In intelligence usage, a country, area, installation, agency, or person against which intelligence operations are directed. 3. An area designated and numbered for future firing. 4. In gunfire support usage, an impact burst that hits the target. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-60)

target audience–An individual or group selected for influence. Also called TA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-13)

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By Order of the Secretary of the Army

Official: **RAYMOND T. ODIERNO**
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