ARMY, MARINE CORPS, NAVY, AIR FORCE, SPACE FORCE

ADVISING

MULTI-SERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR ADVISING FOREIGN SECURITY FORCES

ATP 3-07.10
MCRP 3-03D.1
NTTP 3-07.5
AFTTP 3-2.76

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MULTI-SERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES

FOREWORD

This multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures (MTTP) publication is a product of the Air Land Sea Space Application (ALSSA) Center in accordance with the memorandum of agreement between the Headquarters of the United States (US) Army, US Marine Corps, US Navy, and US Air Force doctrine commanders directing ALSSA to develop MTTP publications to meet the immediate needs of the warfighter.

This MTTP publication has been prepared by ALSSA under our direction for implementation by our respective commands and for use by other commands as appropriate.

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PREFACE

1. Purpose

This multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures (MTTP) publication assists in advising foreign security forces (FSF). It serves as a reference to ensure coordinated multi-Service operations for planners and operators preparing for and conducting advisor team missions. This MTTP publication provides units and personnel advising FSF with viable tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) so they can successfully plan, train for, and carry out their mission. Material regarding advising is found in joint and Service doctrine regarding treatment of security cooperation, foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency, security force assistance, and unconventional warfare. This MTTP publication provides guidance that enhances the activities of some advisor functions and improves inter-Service coordination for this joint mission.

2. Scope

This publication incorporates the positions of organizations within each Service that relate to preparing, controlling, and employing advisors with FSF. This MTTP publication incorporates TTP extracted from existing Service doctrine, publications, and directives, as well as joint and Service lessons-learned, subject matter expert input, and other identified best practices. It is designed for use by advisors at all levels, in any region or theater, and provides guidance for tactical forces on conducting advisor team planning and training.

3. Applicability

This MTTP publication applies to all commanders and their staffs that participate in or support advising missions with FSF.

4. Implementation Plan

Participating Service command offices of primary responsibility will review this publication; validate the information; and, where appropriate, use it as a reference and incorporate it in Service manuals, regulations, and curricula as follows.

Army. Upon approval and authentication, this publication incorporates the TTP contained herein into the United States (US) Army Doctrine and Training Literature Program as directed by the Commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command. Distribution is in accordance with applicable directives listed on the authentication page.

Marine Corps.[1] The US Marine Corps will incorporate the procedures in this publication in Marine Corps doctrine and training publications as directed by Commanding General, Training and Education Command (TECOM). Distribution is in accordance with the Marine Corps Order 5600.31_, *Marine Corps Printing, Publishing, and Reprographics Equipment Regulations*.

Navy. The US Navy will incorporate these procedures in Navy training and doctrine publications as directed by the Director, Navy Warfare Development Center (NWDC) [N5]. Distribution is in accordance with *MILSTRIP/MILSTRAP Desk Guide,* Naval Supply Systems Command Publication 409.

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Air Force. The US Air Force will incorporate the procedures in this publication in accordance with applicable governing directives. Distribution is in accordance with Department of the AFI 33-360, *Publications and Forms Management*.

5. User Information

a. US Army Combined Arms Center; US Marine Corps TECOM; NWDC; Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education; and Air Land Sea Space Application (ALSSA) Center developed this publication with the joint participation of the approving Service commands. ALSSA will review and update this publication as necessary.

b. This publication reflects current joint and Service doctrine, command and control organizations, facilities, personnel, responsibilities, and procedures. Changes in Service protocol, appropriately reflected in joint and Service publications, will be incorporated in revisions to this document.

c. We encourage recommended changes for improving this publication. Key your comments to the specific page and paragraph and provide a rationale for each recommendation. Send comments and recommendations directly to:

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SUMMARY OF CHANGES

ATP 3-07.10/MCRP 3-03D.1/NTTP 3-07.5/AFTTP 3-2.76, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Advising Foreign Security Forces*.

This revision:

Updates:

- The Overview chapter (Chapter I) to better set the context for the advisor.
- Language regarding advisor activities and assessments in accordance with JP 3-20, *Security Cooperation*.
- Updates Distribution Statement from Distribution Statement D to Distribution Statement A.

Removes:

- Appendices D (incorporated into Chapter VII), H, I (incorporated into Chapter VI), and J.

Adds:

- A chapter (Chapter II) on the planning and preparation activities that deserve emphasis on advising missions.
- Broader language that includes advising missions outside of the combat environments of Iraq and Afghanistan.

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ATP 3-07.10	**US Army Training and Doctrine Command** **Joint Base Langley-Eustis, Virginia** **US Army Combined Arms Center** **Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**
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15 June 2023

ADVISING

MULTI-SERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR ADVISING FOREIGN SECURITY FORCES

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

ADVISING

Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (MTTP) for Advising Foreign Security Forces serves as a reference to ensure coordinated multi-Service operations for planners and operators preparing for and conducting advisor team missions.

Chapter I: Overview

Discusses how advising fits into security assistance, security cooperation, and security force assistance, and provides definitions of specific terms.

Chapter II: Advisor Predeployment Planning and Preparation Considerations

Discusses advisor team functional areas, outlines advisor missions, and discusses advisor-specific equipment and logistical concerns.

Chapter III: Advisor Principles and Skills

Discusses the principles of advising and clarifies critical individual and collective skill sets. The chapter also provides detailed guidance for performing critical skills.

Chapter IV: Culture and the Advisor

Discusses the impact of culture and provides techniques for understanding and adapting to foreign cultures.

Chapter V: Working with Foreign Security Forces' Partner Organizations

Discusses the development of good working relationships with coalition and adjacent units.

Chapter VI: Observations and Insights from Former Advisors

Discusses lessons learned and insights from previous advisor experiences.

Chapter VII: Assessments

Depicts how advisor assessments fit within the Defense Security Cooperation Agency's reporting mandates and provides guidance on how to approach these assessments.

Appendix A: Advisor Team Checklist

Provides a broad checklist of performance objectives for advising teams to prevent the neglect of any one aspect of a mission.

Appendix B: Advisor Predeployment Site Survey

Provides a checklist and recommended actions to conduct a predeployment site survey.

Appendix C: Advisor Team Handover

Details recommended procedures for a handover to an incoming advisory team.

Appendix D: Force Protection

Provides force protection considerations for advisor team personnel.

Appendix E: Post-Mission Debriefing Procedures

Provides a discussion and considerations for a post-mission debriefing.

Appendix F: Other Stakeholders

Discusses considerations of other stakeholders such as United States embassies, combatant commands, Service component commands, and theater special operations commands.

Appendix G: Engagement Worksheet Examples

Provides blank pre-engagement worksheets, an engagement recorder worksheet, and a post-engagement report for possible use by advisors. It also provides examples of how these documents may be completed.

PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS

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Chapter I
OVERVIEW

> *"The job of training, advising and partnering with foreign military and security forces has moved from the periphery to become a critical skill set across the armed forces."*
>
> ***—Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, July 2012***

1. Introduction

a. *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Advising Foreign Security Forces* covers the principles associated with advisor duties for conventional and special operations forces (SOF), civilian expeditionary workforce, and contract personnel. This publication establishes a baseline foundation for understanding the specific tasks in which an advisor must be proficient when functioning as a foreign security forces (FSF) advisor. This publication describes techniques that blends science and art. Even though this publication focuses on the advisor team, the principles contained herein are relevant to the individual advisor as the building block of the team.

b. This multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures (MTTP) addresses advisor considerations and skill sets from planning to mission follow-through. This first chapter explains the strategic picture that advisors support, the processes and authorities that drive advisor mission sets, the frameworks under which advisors operate, and the various roles that advisors are expected to fill. These overarching topics set the background for the daily decisions advisors make and the parameters within which they act. It is important to note that advisors can serve at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels—in all theaters, under all conditions, and in support of any type of mission or operation.

c. This MTTP does not revise or supersede Service training doctrine or current advisor unit tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and/or standard operating procedures (SOPs). Nor does it cover common occupational specialties or combat, survival, or Service-specific skills that may be critical to the advisor mission.

2. The Strategic Picture

a. Advising is not a new mission for the US military. From Lieutenant General Claire Lee Chennault's support to China with the Flying Tigers during World War II, through Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, and hundreds of smaller efforts around the globe, United States (US) military advisors have been an important part of achieving US strategic goals. Current national policy encourages the employment of advisors early as a method of engagement to prevent crisis rather than as a response to it.

b. Success or failure of the US security cooperation (SC) strategy often depends on *the impact the US has on the FSF,* so the FSF's progress towards shared objectives becomes the measuring stick for advisors. The FSF include all personnel available within a national arsenal trained and employed for the purpose of security, whether they are civil or military, federal, state, provincial, or local. Examples of FSF are coast guards, fire departments, police, border patrols, customs and immigration, and active and reserve military. Security forces will vary, based on an individual country's priorities, often having unique deployment, employment, equipping, and sustainment requirements. The condition of the FSF, in some cases, will require it to be built from scratch; in others, advisors may be able to transform existing FSF so they can best meet the needs of the partner nation (PN).

c. Advisor Significance. Advisors need to understand their efforts are part of a larger program of US assistance to other nations, and, in many cases, the advisor is the critical link between the United States and its partners to produce capability and capacity. In fact, success at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels requires advisors to coordinate with related efforts in the PN or region.

Note: This interorganizational coordination may include US Government departments and agencies; state, local, and tribal governments; international organizations; nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); and the private sector. For additional information, see JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Cooperation*.

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d. The concepts of advisor significance and the progress of FSF are echoed in US strategic documents:

(1) The Interim National Strategic Security Guidance of 2021 states: "Ensuring our national security requires us to . . . lead and sustain a stable and open international system, underwritten by strong democratic alliances, partnerships, multilateral institutions, and rules." It also states, "When we strengthen our alliances, we amplify our power and our ability to disrupt threats before they can reach our shores."

(2) In light of revisionist powers' predatory economic practices and political subversion in competition short of war, the 2018 National Defense Strategy states: "We will support U.S. interagency approaches and work by, with, and through our allies and partners to secure our interests and counteract this coercion."

e. It is these and other guiding documents that ensure military advisor teams and their interagency counterparts are all driving towards the same strategic goal line. Figure 1 depicts how this unified effort occurs.

f. As indicated in figure 1, each combatant commander (CCDR) develops a campaign plan—nested within the Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP)—utilizing various theater SC activities (military engagement and development). These activities shape the environment relative to US defense interests, as well as the PN defense and development objectives, by building relationships, improving PN security forces, and gaining access within the region. Advisors will often do military engagement to gain access and build relationships, thus setting the stage for development.



Legend:
CCMD—combatant command
CSCS—country-specific security cooperation section
DOD—Department of Defense
JSCP—joint strategic campaign plan
JSP—joint strategic plan
NDS—national defense strategy
NSS—national security strategy
PN—partner nation

Figure 1. Identifying Common Security Interests

Note: For additional information on military engagement or the purposes of SC, see JP 3-20, *Security Cooperation*.

g. The CCDR theater campaign plan details specified country plans that articulate the CCDR's intent to apply time, money, and effort in a specific country. Likewise, with guidance from the Department of State (DOS) and US ambassadors (chiefs of mission [COMs]), US embassy country teams develop the integrated country strategy. The integrated country strategy is a three-year, US Government country plan that incorporates the unique circumstances and needs of the host nation, and then identifies the most significant US national interests in each country and describes the US Government's plan to attain them. Combatant commands (CCMDs) use integrated country strategies to inform their country planning teams and help ensure Department of Defense (DOD) efforts are aligned with those of the specific US diplomatic mission.

h. For a specific country, ambassadorial authority extends to all elements of the US mission and all official US Government activities and establishments within the PN. The only exception to the ambassador's authority over US Government activities is the control of military elements under the direct command of a CCDR.

i. Together, CCMD and US embassy country plans account for US defense and diplomatic interests, as well as where those interests overlap with the host nation's objectives (see figure 1). This three-way guidance overlap shapes the parameters of advisors' missions and defines how they will conduct their assigned tasks. *The strategic picture described in this section is important for advisors on the ground to know how their actions impact a wider set of plans and the process by which they obtain their legal authorities and funding.*

3. Conceptual Frameworks

a. This section looks at three frameworks that help advisors execute their missions. The frameworks are:

(1) The PN functions of an organization (governance, executive, generating, and operating [G-EGO]) model.

(2) The advisor planning framework (APF).

(3) The developmental activities of organize, train, equip, build, advise (OTEBA).

b. These models, while still broad, set a more tangible context for the advisor's daily decisions.

c. **The Functions of a PN Security Force: The G-EGO Model.** Foreign security force organizations, regardless of type (e.g., military, police, etc.), must be able to perform common functions to be viable. See figure 2 for the G-EGO functions. US advising efforts can be directed towards supporting any or all of the functions performed by a PN security force. Commonly, mission objectives will drive an advisor team to focus on one aspect of the G-EGO construct, but problems in one function usually impact the others. Therefore, it is good practice to conduct a weekly evaluation of what the team has learned about the entire G-EGO construct, capturing any current or future problems in a situation report (SITREP). Connecting the dots will help refine mission orders and authorities for future missions with FSF.

(1) Governance Function. The FSF governance function provides the PN government the means to organize and set laws and policy to provide necessary resources to the FSF. Typical instruments within this function include general law and annual authorizations.

(2) Executive Function. The FSF executive function includes strategic direction that provides oversight, policy, and resources for the FSF generating and operating functions.

(3) Generating Function. The FSF generating function refers to the capability and capacity of the security force to carryout doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) processes, enabling operational formations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.



Core processes of each function:

Governance function: authorizations, appropriations, foreign policy and national security

Executive function: strategy and policy, human resource management, resource management, force management, acquisition and logistics, inspector general

Generating function: doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership development and education, personnel, facilities

Operating function: command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, sustainment, information

Figure 2. Common Functions of a Partner Nation Security Force

(4) Operating Function. The FSF operating function employs capabilities to achieve PN security objectives. This employment can be seen as the tactical, operational, and strategic use of security elements, but it also includes the planned direction of Ministry of Defense elements using processes similar to the strategic documents in the United States.

(5) Advisors can be employed to support FSF conducting one or more of these functions. Most FSF do not perform these functions in the same way as US forces, where the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Services perform the *executive function;* the Services perform the *generating function;* and the CCMDs and below perform the *operating function.* However, every successful security force performs these functions in some fashion.

(6) Large organizations such as a national defense force will create organizations with missions that perform a function for the entire force (similar to the way Training and Doctrine Command performs most of the generating function for the US Army). For each function, someone will ultimately be responsible for integrating all of the processes, subordinates will manage the individual processes, and their subordinates will carry out the work. An APF was developed to illustrate this hierarchy within the functions.

Note: For additional information on G-EGO Core processes, see JP 3-20.

d. **Advisor Planning Framework**

(1) The APF provides a tool for advisors to understand how they are aligned within the executive, generating, and operating functions of FSF. Subsequently, this tool helps US organizations that are supporting advisor missions (e.g., Service headquarters) select and train/sustain advisors for on-going and future operations.

(2) The APF enables commanders and planners to match advisors based on their capabilities and experience to specific counterparts within the G-EGO functions of FSF. The APF provides the advisor category and position descriptions (characteristics and skill sets) associated with each category.

Note: For more information on the APF, see JP 3-20.

(a) **Principal Advisors** are aligned to FSF principals. FSF principals are elected or appointed civilian or uniformed officials that have the authority to direct a particular organization(s) and allocate resources to an organization(s) as appropriate. They may or may not be experts in all the processes of their function, but they must know how the processes are linked, what they produce, and what resources the processes need. The authority of an FSF principal pertains to the individual having the power to employ processes or organizations to satisfy certain ends. They typically derive their power from law or policy.

(b) **Process Advisors** are aligned to FSF process owners. FSF process owners are appointed civilian or uniformed officials who are the primary leaders of processes in each of the G-EGO functions. Process owners should be experts in the performance of their process. Typically, FSF process owners derive their authority from a principal. Process owners have the primary responsibility for organizing, manning, training, equipping, and employing a process to fulfill its primary purpose.

(c) Subject matter advisors are aligned to technical FSF subject matter experts (SMEs). Technical SMEs are civilian or uniformed personnel who are organized within a process in each of the G-EGO functions of FSF. System FSF SMEs operate systems or perform tasks within their process. A system is any process, weapon, vehicle, aircraft, or equipment that fulfills a particular purpose. These FSF individuals operate in teams such as a squad, platoon, or section and perform mission-essential/critical tasks.

(3) Irrespective of the advisory function, advisors may have one or more counterparts. Each counterpart may fall under more than one category. For example, a brigade commander is a principal while commanding the brigade and must integrate command and control (C2), fires, maneuver, intelligence, information, logistics, and protection. At the same time, in the eyes of the division commander, the brigade commander could be a process owner for fires.

(4) In some cases, advisors may have sole responsibility to integrate other process and subject matter advisors as part of a broader advising effort. For example, an advisor team could include a principal advisor, process advisor, and

several subject matter advisors that provide the necessary skills to assess and influence the development of a particular FSF counterpart(s).

e. As figure 3 illustrates, G-EGO and APF work together to ensure depth and breadth in the advising mission. For example, the governance function has principals, process owners, and SME personnel in roles typically performed by the DOS or United States Agency for International Development (USAID) advisors to ensure the right capability is applied to the right PN need. *For all other functions, DOD advisors may be the appropriate capability for principal, process, and subject matter advisors.*



Figure 3. The Advisor Planning Framework (Using the G-EGO Functions)

f. Advisors should not fall into the trap of equating the mission of a partner organization as its sole function that the organization performs. Every organization must be organized, manned, trained, equipped, led, and resourced to perform its primary purpose. Ultimately, all FSF organizations need to be able to plan, execute, and assess tasks and missions. The G-EGO functions of FSF provide organizational and operational solutions for each type of FSF organization. See Chapter VII, Assessments, for FSF organizational, operational, and institutional assessments.

g. **Developmental Activities.** The DOD has grouped the developmental activities (i.e., OTEBA) under the term security force assistance (SFA). SFA is defined as the DOD activities that support the development of the capacity and capability of FSF and their supporting institutions. While the DOD can organize, train, equip, and build as the situation requires, it much prefers to advise PN counterparts as they carry out those activities. The definitions of the OTEBA developmental tasks are:

(1) Organize. This includes all activities taken to create, improve, and integrate doctrinal principles, organizational structures, capability constructs, and

personnel management. This may include doctrine development, unit or organization design, command and staff processes, and recruiting and staffing functions.

(2) Train. This includes all activities taken to create, improve, and integrate training, leadership development, and education at the individual, leader, collective, and staff levels. This may include task analysis, program of instruction development and execution, training event implementation, and leadership development activities.

(3) Equip. This includes all activities needed to integrate materiel and equipment solutions into the FSF. Equipping the FSF usually includes procurement, fielding, accountability, and maintenance through life cycle management of all major end items, as well as forecasting, procuring, and distributing all classes of supply. Equipping the FSF requires a holistic approach that includes not only fielding of new equipment, but also operational readiness processes, maintenance management, repair, and recapitalization, which is accomplished through foreign military sales. Advisors deployed to support FSF with foreign military sales operate under the authorities defined in Title 22, United States Code (USC), *Foreign Relations and Intercourse*.

(4) Build. This includes all activities taken to create, improve, and integrate facilities and supporting infrastructure. This may include working on bases and stations, lines of communication, ranges and training complexes, and administrative structures.

(5) Advise. This includes all activities taken to provide subject matter expertise, guidance, advice, and counsel to FSF while carrying out the missions assigned to the unit or organization. Advising may occur under combat or administrative conditions, at tactical through strategic levels, and in support of individuals or groups. Activities such as assessment, provision of materiel assistance, and liaison with US or coalition enabling capabilities may all be inherent in advising FSF.

h. If DOD is organizing, training, equipping, or building, it is temporarily performing the generating activities, in part or in total, for the PN. DOD performs these same activities using the same processes (DOTMLPF) to develop its own forces. However, DOD does not advise its own forces. Based on DOD's overall size, the long-standing performance of its generating function, and the requirement for senior leaders to develop their own subordinates through mentorship, advising is not inherent to all organizations in the force. It is for this reason that the art of advising FSF must be taught.

Note: During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, units were told to train, advise, and assist. Later, during Operation INHERENT RESOLVE, the units were tasked to train and equip or advise and assist. This MTTP differentiates train and advise as two distinct tasks that share some common characteristics. This distinction will be developed further in this publication.

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i. In regards to development, it is important for an advisor to understand the difference between capability and capacity. The definitions are as follows:

(1) Capability. The ability to complete a task or execute a course of action under specified conditions and level of performance. That is, the ability of FSF or their supporting institutions to execute a given task under specified conditions.

(2) Capacity. The maximum extent (scale, scope, and duration: parameters) to which a task can be performed. Capacity can be viewed as the measurable aspects of a capability.

j. Advisors should use the G-EGO, APF, and developmental activities frameworks described in Section 3 to ensure they are covering the range of partner needs with the right solutions and personnel. Advisors should periodically compare weekly activities with the frameworks to ensure they are not drifting off course.

4. Force Suitability

a. When employing advisors, CCDRs assign advisors to FSF principals (e.g., chief of defense, commander), process owners (e.g., human resource management, doctrine, sustainment, etc.), and SME personnel (e.g., weapon system operator). These assignments are based on specific needs within one or more G-EGO functions of FSF and their supporting institutions. CCDRs may employ a combination of uniformed, civilian, or contractor personnel/teams to carry out advising within FSF. In some cases, a CCDR may align specific units to advise FSF operational formations such as SOF or the US Army security force assistance brigade (see figure 4).



Legend:
BN—battalion
CF—conventional forces
COIN—counterinsurgency
CT—counterterrorism
PN—partner nation
SOF—special operations forces
UW—unconventional warfare

Figure 4. Partner Nation Mission Impact on Advisor Selection

b. Based on a CCMD's advisor utilization, supporting organizations such as Service headquarters then select and train personnel or teams to meet these requirements. Other organizations such as the Defense Security Cooperation Agency follow a similar process when selecting and training ministry of defense advisor personnel. Units such as SOF and conventional force units like the security force assistance brigade consider advising as a mission-essential task and are organized, trained, and equipped to advise FSF operational formations.

c. Previous advisor experience is an enabler but not necessarily transferable beyond a given G-EGO function of FSF. For example, an advisor who has previous experience advising operational formations of FSF may not have the requisite knowledge and skills to advise within the executive or generating functions of FSF. However, in all cases, core advisor skills (e.g., teach, coach, advise) remain constant regardless of where an advisor is aligned within the G-EGO functions.

d. Considerations for selecting the right person (or people) for an advisor position are not that simple. Commanders and planners should use caution when selecting an advisor solely on availability. Obviously, availability is a factor in selection, but, more importantly, the advisor must have experience in the subject to be advised, a willingness to do the job, and some training on advising.

e. Most US military personnel are well trained to function in their specialty in an operational unit, but considerably fewer have experience with organizations that predominately perform a generating (DOTMLPF) or executive (policy) function.

Selecting by rank and military skill identifier does not guarantee a match; one must consider past assignments as well. Even for operational units, there is some overlap and trade-off based on the counterpart's role and mission. Figure 4 depicts how the selection of advisors may change for the same FSF unit based on the mission the unit is performing.

5. Common Roles

a. The roles of an advisor team are defined by the authority under which that team deploys. Advisors deployed under the authorities of Title 10, USC, *Armed Forces*, will have different restrictions than personnel deploying under one of the authorities of Title 22, USC. The request for forces (RFF) will specify the authority with an events list detailing the assigned mission per each authority. A judge advocate may be helpful in understanding the parameters of an advising team's RFF.

b. In practice, advisors commonly serve multiple roles. Figure 5 identifies the most common roles associated with being a US advisor. Advisors must be aware of mission creep and avoid exceeding the limitations of their assigned mission, which are defined by the allocation of operational authorities and permissions. For example, conducting tasks such as logistical support may actually exceed the defined mission as specified in the RFF and the event list. Thus, it is important for advisors to maintain a clear focus within their mission parameters.



Figure 5. Common Advisor Roles

c. Advisors are often assigned to perform all four roles noted below with little consideration for the added demands on the advisor team (see appendix A for an example of an advisor team checklist). A brief description is provided in the following paragraphs to differentiate the functions of the common roles.

(1) Advising Role. The primary advising role can be broken down into three developmental tasks: teach, coach, and advise. Sometimes, advisors mistakenly believe they only need to provide sound advice. This might be true when they are working with a highly capable and well-developed counterpart. Normally, the advisor must rapidly transition between the developmental tasks of teach, coach, and advise. The definitions for each follow.

Note: Personnel assigned with just the **Train** task are only responsible for instructing and coaching and are deliberately precluded from providing advice. Personnel assigned the **Advise** task have the latitude to teach and coach where necessary in addition to providing advice. Personnel tasked with **Train and Advise** should expect to conduct formal training such as instructing a course and providing advice to help the partner use their skills to solve real world problems. The Services do not title their personnel performing these tasks in a standard way. The Services use various methods such as the qualification level of the personnel, unit designation, or the mission's assigned task. This can cause confusion such as when a certified advisor is sent on a **Train** mission.

(a) Teaching means to provide training, education, or both to FSF to develop skills or knowledge necessary to execute a particular task. Training is instructing personnel to enhance their capability to perform specific military functions and tasks, or exercising one or more military units to enhance their combat readiness.

- Teaching conveys concepts and knowledge that can be applied over a broad range of situations.
- The advisor must be ready to teach and coach skills, concepts, and knowledge.
- A teacher is responsible for ensuring that individuals and organizations are capable of conducting a task or series of tasks through education and training, under clearly defined, observable, and measurable activities or actions accomplished in either an individual or collective setting.
- A teacher is also responsible for evaluating and assessing the learned skills and developing courses of action (COAs) to slow down, reinforce, or move forward based on FSF performance.

(b) Coaching is helping a counterpart attain and sustain maximum potential by practicing those skills or building on previous instruction. The distinctive feature is the recipient assumes more responsibility for success than when being taught, while the advisor gives assistance as required. Coaches help the unit to understand what is holding back performance and develop training plans to improve and maintain skills. Teaching would be training to standard, while coaching would be pushing the student beyond the standard and toward maximizing individual and unit potential. Even highly performing organizations will employ coaches in order to reach or maintain their maximum potential.

(c) Advising means to provide the advisor's counterparts with expert opinions, advice, or counsel to assist them in decision-making based on applying knowledge through a mutually developed bond of trust to solve real world problems. The distinctive feature is the recipient is *responsible* for making the decision and for its consequences, while the advisor provides only advice. Confusion exists regarding the difference between trainers and advisors. Unfortunately, when these two terms are used as position titles, their duties are blurred, and they are often used as synonyms. However, the tasks of training and advising are distinct, and the chain of command's failure to clearly define positions and responsibilities can result in operating beyond the team's authority. The distinction is trainers focus on teaching and coaching, whereas advisors teach, coach, and advise (see the previous note for differences with regard to Service definitions of these responsibilities). US forces are familiar with training. US training is conducted by instructors and unit leaders. The advisor can perform as a trainer when only teaching and coaching are permitted by mission authorities. The trainer's responsibility ends with the completion of the training. From that point on, FSF leaders are responsible for improving and maintaining skills and proficiency. Additionally, during employment, the leader is expected to make all the decisions. When working with FSF, the training task equates to teaching and coaching to improve skills, whereas the advising task supports the FSF's leaders in making decisions by providing sound advice. FSF leaders are responsible for training their own unit and leading it as it operates. Trainers and advisors both must have the ability to communicate with their counterparts, but it is the advisor who is directly tied to helping the FSF achieve specific mission objectives. Chapter III discusses specific skills needed for advisor proficiency.

(2) Capability Support to FSF. In a support role, advisors or advisor teams may be expected to provide actual capabilities to the FSF. This will require additional personnel with specific expertise and equipment to accomplish the mission. Depending upon available resources and priorities, only a portion of the FSF support needs are likely to be met. Rarely are resources available to meet all the support needs, so advisors must develop a plan to identify, prioritize, and maximize available resources and mitigate shortfalls. To ensure legality and sustainability, the advisor must have the answer to seven critical questions prior to entertaining the FSFs' requests for support. They are:

(a) What does the RFF or deployment order state?

(b) Has authorization been given (by law, executive order, or some other competent authority) to take contemplated action, and has it been funded?

(c) Do policies, rules of engagement (ROE), etc. authorize action to be taken?

(d) What legal and other limitations are in place for accomplishing the mission or assigned task?

(e) Does the FSF really need specific material or capability to accomplish the mission, and what would be the impact if not sourced?

(f) Is there any way the FSF could procure or acquire this resource or capability using their own systems, processes, or methods?

(g) Are there mechanisms in place for the FSF to sustain this system or capability over the long term?

(3) Liaison Officer (LNO). It is a normal practice, especially in the case of multinational operations, for units that are working in close coordination to exchange LNOs. However, if advisors are assigned to that unit, the advisor team is often required to facilitate communication between themselves and other elements to ensure a mutually shared understanding and unity of purpose and action. Liaison is the most commonly employed technique for establishing and maintaining close, continuous, physical communication between supporting and supported units of action such as an advisor team. LNOs must be able to understand, interpret, and convey their commander's vision, intent, mission, concept of operations, guidance, and the FSF daily operations cycle. See appropriate Service doctrine for more information on LNOs.

d. Advisors may be required to serve in various organizations from PN ministries to the squad level. When deployed supporting FSF, advisors will normally be operational control to a CCDR and may be further delegated to a Service component (such as the Army Service component command); advisors will normally be tactical control to their Service component. The actual command relationship is specified in the RFF.

6. Overview Conclusion

This chapter has served as a broad overview of topics that apply to the advisor and those leaders employing advisors at a variety of levels ranging from strategic to tactical. The discussions included the processes and authorities that drive advisor mission sets, the frameworks within which advisors operate, and the various advisor roles. These topics set the foundation for the remainder of this advising MTTP, where advisor planning, attributes, applications, methodology, and functions will be discussed. We now take a look at the unique planning considerations of advisor missions.

Chapter II
ADVISOR PREDEPLOYMENT PLANNING AND PREPARATION CONSIDERATIONS

> *"Plans are nothing, planning is everything."*
>
> ***—Dwight D. Eisenhower***

1. Introduction

a. This chapter will highlight the points of emphasis in planning that are **unique to advising missions.** However, it is *not* a full lesson on planning that covers topics found in various other doctrine sources.

b. Advising missions have unique planning considerations because, whereas conventional deployments are accompanied by a sufficient complement of enabler and staff support to do mission analysis, **advisor missions**—*based on location, nature, and the small number of personnel typically assigned to advisor units*—**tend to require that the advisor teams conduct the majority of the data collection and analysis independently.** The purpose of this chapter is to alert advisors to the nuances of those planning aspects and better prepare them for meaningful problem framing and mission planning.

2. Collection and Consolidation of Planning Data

a. Sources and Methods of Data Collection.

(1) Plan to Plan. Before diving into planning, team leadership should map out the planning process to ensure that preparation activities follow a logical flow, and the team gets the most out of each one. This plan will include determining how, when, and with whom the team will communicate internally and externally; how data will be marked and retained; and what the best sequencing and timing is for video teleconferences versus on-the-ground site visits.

(a) Table 1 provides a tool for team leadership to choose the best means for communicating during predeployment activities. Leadership should ensure the appropriate level of operations security is considered prior to implementing any means of communication.

Table 1. Effective Collaboration and Dialog Matrix

Means	Brainstorm	Plan	Schedule	Track	Awareness
Face-to-Face	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent	Good	Excellent
Phone	Poor	Good	Excellent	Poor	Good/Excellent
E-Mail	Poor	Poor	Good	Poor	Good/Excellent
Audio Conference	Good	Good	Excellent	Poor	Good/Excellent
Video Conference	Good	Good	Excellent	Poor	Good/Excellent

Table 1. Effective Collaboration and Dialog Matrix (Cont'd)					
Means	**Brainstorm**	**Plan**	**Schedule**	**Track**	**Awareness**
Screen Share	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent	Good	Excellent
Repository	Poor	Poor	Poor	Poor	Poor
Discussion	Good	Poor/Good	Good	Good	Good
Teams	Poor	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent

(b) Data collection and assessments of the mission and FSF begin immediately upon receiving the mission. One of the principal determinants of how to approach this data collection is whether the mission is episodic or persistent. *Persistent engagements* provide a great opportunity to transition advisor teams while minimizing the loss in momentum of the overall mission. In this case, advisors will want to take advantage of the US counterpart the team has on the ground to answer questions, verify assessments, share best practices, and maintain updated awareness all the way through the team's arrival. In the case of an *episodic engagement,* the team does not have a counterpart with which to discuss the mission and environment, and finding a Service member with any direct knowledge of the mission may be difficult. It is in these instances that the margin for error in making good use of the touchpoints and visits the team has with the FSF and the country team is significantly reduced.

(c) When considering how a team's collection efforts will be captured, advisors must have a mechanism to consolidate and organize the data so all personnel involved can track and account for mission data, when needed, to facilitate preparation activities. Technology today allows advisors to share information more rapidly with all participants to ensure a clear understanding of the mission and, most importantly, the what, when, where, why, and how they should participate.

(d) Once the mission is received, the team needs to establish its task organization, ensuring all leader and staff roles, as well as warfighting functions, are covered by the team. This will also allow the team to interact with the higher headquarters staff and establish a point of contact (POC) for each pertinent functional area. The team should also establish its mission folder that manages planning products and supports, at a minimum, the following:

- Utilizing a web-based system that is accessible with the appropriate encryption devices while traveling or conducting the mission.

    1. Folders organized by staff functions.

    2. Base documents such as the deployment order, mission letters, ROE, country team requirements, and terms of reference are collected as the guiding documents for the mission.

• Determining what must be on SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) and Nonclassified Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET).

1. Keep on one site.
2. Ensure access to those who require it.

• Displaying POCs with contact information.

• Creating hyperlinks to key web sites that support planning and preparation.

1. Embassy web page.
2. DOS country page.
3. Country study.
4. Theater entry requirements.

• Accessing standardized formats, checklists, and SOPs; providing examples to ensure data submitted is in accordance with guidance/intent.

• Accessing other recommended reading materials.

• Providing a request for information/tasking format and file for team to submit internally/externally.

(2) Identifying Country Team Requirements. Country teams have various entry requirements that the team must identify early. These may include special visa requirements; visit requests through the US embassy; survival, evasion, resistance, and escape instruction; and travel coordination measures. The Service component command (SCC) should be able to provide a list of requirements for the PN and assist the team in completing the requirements. However, it is the team's responsibility to plan the time necessary for training and the administration of these requirements.

(3) Task Organization and Force Mix Selection. The RFF and its associated events list detail the force structure needed as envisioned by the CCDR to successfully accomplish the mission. Prior to final RFF and event list publication, the advisor-providing force and the SCC within the combatant command (e.g., US Naval Forces, Central Command) should discuss and define the force structure needed to accomplish the advising mission. This is the providing unit's opportunity to establish the size (capacity) and kind (capability) of force required to achieve mission objectives. Wargaming the various advising activities on the events list against the RFF force structure will illuminate the capacity and capability gaps in the mission. The final RFF and event list specifies the force structure allowed for the advising mission.

(4) Legal Considerations. Law and policy govern the actions of US forces in all military operations. For US forces to conduct operations, a legal basis must exist. This legal basis profoundly influences many aspects of the operation and can constrain the advisor team's ability to do certain things. These constraints must

be considered in the very early phases of planning. The following paragraphs provide a summary of key laws and policies that bear upon US military operations in support of advising.

Note: This summary does not replace a consultation with the unit's supporting staff judge advocate.

(a) Legal Authority for Security Force Assistance or Security Cooperation Activities. Programs under Title 22, USC, authorize security assistance, developmental assistance, and other forms of aid. Title 10, USC, authorizes certain types of military-to-military contacts, exchanges, exercises, and limited forms of humanitarian and civic action coordinated with the US ambassador to the PN. Under these legal codes, cooperation and assistance are limited and do not include direct involvement in operations.

(b) International Law and Treaties. Advisors must understand and abide by all applicable laws and treaties. The staff judge advocate should be contacted for more information.

(c) Planners must identify necessary authorities (including status-of-forces agreement [SOFA], technical agreements, or other legal arrangements), requirements for interaction and liaison, and the option for predeployment of key enablers.

(d) In addition to the planning imperatives, other factors should be considered to achieve the best outcome, such as respect of the law, transparency, and the full incorporation of security forces into the legal framework of justice and the rule of law. These additional factors emphasize the importance of incorporating nonmilitary actors, as a part of a comprehensive approach, into the planning process for the overall benefit of the campaign.

(e) When planning partnered operations, a number of factors must be incorporated into the advisor planning process. One of the key factors is the legal aspect, either based on CCDR directives and orders, international agreements (e.g., North Atlantic Treaty Organization-to-partner nation agreements), existing laws (e.g., the law of war), or along national caveats and restrictions. All may restrict or influence the forces conducting FSF in areas such as:

- Use of force
- Intelligence sharing
- Balance of operations security, force protection, and synchronization
- Targeting
- Handling of opponents or hostile actors
- Provision of medical support to host nation security forces (including medical evacuation)

(f) Medical rules of eligibility should be utilized within legal and ethical constraints, as well as PN capabilities and objectives, to ensure that the advisor's mission is accomplished in the best and most sustainable possible way.

(g) Advisors must know the rule of law and comply so that they do not have a negative impact on the mission and all that has been gained by potentially being "the ugly American." This is tied directly to knowing, understanding, and embracing PN narratives and culture.

b. **Risk.** Risks to force and mission are familiar to every trainee that has served in the US military. For advisors, these risks are still present, but *political* risk now becomes a more tangible concern. US advisors tend to have more visibility and interact with local nationals of greater prominence than line units, so the effects of a miscalculation in these interactions has a much greater impact. To illuminate the various risk factors, advisors probe with a series of questions such as:

(1) Risk to Mission

- Has the predeployment site survey (PDSS) confirmed the level of leader and unit proficiency in core tasks or competencies?
- Is there a risk in trying to achieve the team's goal in the allotted time?
- Is there risk to the relationship if we hold back and do not achieve the next set of target objectives?
- Is there risk in making FSF take on more of an ownership role?

(2) Risk to Force

- What criminal or terrorist elements exist in the country, what are their means of violence, and what are their patterns?
- How can the team identify threat actors and their connectors?
- What is the history on US advisor interaction with threat actors?

(3) Political Risk

- How are US forces and citizens perceived in the country and what triggers may exist for conflict between the team and the population?
- What are the indicators of increased tension?
- What third country actors are operating in the PN? How?

c. Mitigating risk does not solely pertain to training when FSF members are involved. It also includes what advisors do when no one is looking to prevent a breakdown in rapport and to continue the mission. These questions aid advisors in identifying friendly vulnerabilities and critical threats to their operation. This ensures that during planning, commanders have the information from the advisor's perspective to assess risk as an element of operational design. The commander's responsibility is to only approve the plan with an acceptable level of risk across all elements of the advisor mission.

3. Assessment

a. To inform decision making, joint forces carrying out SFA developmental activities (recall OTEBA tasks from Chapter I) use the operational assessment, which starts with the planning initiation step of the joint planning process (JPP). The operational assessment activities of *monitor, evaluate, recommend,* and *direct* inform and are informed by SFA planning, execution, and assessment at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. CCMDs, SCCs, and theater special operations commands (TSOCs) use the operational assessment to strengthen and reinforce DOD assessment, monitoring, and evaluation (AM&E) policy and guidelines. For more information on each operational assessment activity, see Chapter VII, Assessments.

(1) Advisors can use the results of a CCMD and SCC operational assessment to inform their predeployment planning and preparation such as devising their own assessment plan.

(2) During execution, advisors can update their assessment plan in concert with their counterparts to monitor (observe and analyze), evaluate (judge), make recommendations, and, when appropriate, advise their counterpart to direct changes to FSF measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs).

(3) Assessment Plan. Determining effectiveness is a complex issue for the advisor. However, it plays a critical role in (1) linking advisor tasks to the desired end state and (2) understanding the effects advisor engagements have with the PN (see the callout below from JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*). Effectiveness applies to both internal and external factors.

b. Internal effectiveness looks at the advisors themselves and how well their actions and engagement with the PN progress team, FSF, and strategic objectives.

c. External effectiveness looks at the PN and seeks to determine how well they implement and execute implied, specified, essential, and critical tasks, objectives, and standards through interaction, instruction, coaching, and advising by the advisor team.

d. Indicators can be utilized when trying to determine internal or external effectiveness. JP 5-0 describes *indicators* as a specific piece of information that infers the condition, state, or existence of something and provides a reliable means to ascertain performance or effectiveness. Indicators should be relevant, observable/collectable, responsive, and resourced.

> **Effectiveness** is defined as the degree to which something is successful in producing a desired result. It refers to the level of quality with which a task or process is carried out that ultimately leads to overall performance or completion that can be attained and measured.
>
> **Efficiency** is defined as the ability to accomplish something with the fewest resources (least amount of wasted time, money, effort, etc.).
>
> The relationship between effectiveness and efficiency is that effectiveness is a measure of 'goodness' of output, while efficiency is a measure of the resources required to achieve the output. Thus, effectiveness of the system refers to the quality of outputs from the system.

e. The indicators the advisor needs to be most familiar with are the MOPs and MOEs. These will be utilized differently depending on the environment and event type. MOPs and MOEs are also not constrained to the internal and external factors described here, but are utilized to understand the operational environment (OE) during the monitoring phase of AM&E. They are also invaluable in informing operational assessments at the tactical and operational levels, and functional evaluation at the strategic level.

f. MOPs are indicators used to assess partner actions tied to measuring task accomplishment. MOPs commonly reside in task execution matrices and confirm or deny proper task performance. MOPs help answer the question: “Are we doing things right?” “Was the action taken?” or “Was the task completed to standard?” (Source JP 5-0).

g. MOEs are indicators used to help measure a current system with change indicated by comparing multiple observations over time to gauge the achievement of objectives and attainment of end states. MOEs help answer the question, “Are we doing the right things to create the effects or changes in the conditions of the OE that we desire?” (Source JP 5-0).

h. MOEs/MOPs during Training. Advisor training operations are generally well-suited for clearly defined tasks, conditions, and standards that can be deliberately planned for and assessed. Advisors should ensure that operations are planned with appropriate MOEs and MOPs to report the completion of training for a specific student audience.

i. MOEs/MOPs during Advising. Advising tasks present a unique challenge when determining MOEs or MOPs. A deep understanding of the OE is required to predict and validate the causal relationship between an advisor’s presence and advice versus the intended tactical or operational effects.

j. Developing these measures is an art. Different types of assessments require different measures, which can lead decision makers, commanders, and advisors at different levels to different conclusions. Commanders may favor MOPs because they are more easily measured and yield empirical answers and pay inadequate attention to MOEs. The following guidelines can help substantiate the assessment data from where they are derived. (For more information, see the Operations and Planning Annex of JP 3-0, *Joint Campaigns and Operations*.)

(1) Measures should be relevant and necessary.

(2) Measures should represent a scale, not a goal or objective.

(3) The data satisfying a measure should be observable or at least inferable.

(4) Measures should be clear and concise.

(5) The entire plan or strategy should be measured, even if multiple measures need to be used.

k. Recommending or Directing Action. Advisors must continually monitor and evaluate—these are considered critical activities. However, an assessment is incomplete without any recommendation or direct action taken. Regardless of the planning process, assessments can diagnose problems, but unless the assessment results in suggested adjustments, its use to the team is limited. Based on the evaluation of progress, the team brainstorms likely improvements to the plan and makes preliminary judgments about the relative merit of identified changes. Team members identify those changes possessing sufficient merit and provide them as recommendations to the team leader or higher headquarters, or make necessary adjustments within their delegated authority.

l. Assessments are ongoing. It is important to note that assessments on the environment and the FSF begin the moment the mission is received. To gain situational awareness most efficiently, advisors must exploit every touchpoint to obtain the best information as stated throughout this chapter.

m. Prior to a mission, these touchpoints include the existing information on a mission (the assessments and after action reviews [AARs] of previous teams), SITREPs from ongoing missions, the team's PDSS, direct liaison authority with the deployed team and specific others, and the team advanced echelon party. The team's information gathering should include verifying existing assessments, which can be a heavy task if the mission is episodic and the FSF has not partnered with advisors recently.

n. Critical to the assessment process is developing an assessment plan. Advisors and supporting staffs integrate and develop an assessment plan within their planning process. As the advisor team and staff begin mission analysis, they must also determine how to measure forward progress in meeting the intended end state. Teams and staffs develop assessment plans when appropriate.

o. Effective assessment incorporates both measurable (observation-based) and subjective (judgment-based) indicators. A balanced assessment relies upon both *human judgment* (subjective), which requires critical thinking, and *direct observation and mathematical accuracy* (objective), as observables alone can be misleading. The following paragraphs discuss some considerations for approaching assessments.

p. **Assessment Considerations.**

(1) Step 1: Gather Tools and Assessment Data. Planning begins with receipt of the mission. The receipt of the mission alerts the staffs to begin updating the running estimates and gathering the tools necessary for mission analysis and continued planning.

(2) Step 2: Understand Current and Desired Conditions. Fundamentally, assessment is about measuring progress toward the desired end state. To do this, commanders and staffs compare current conditions in the area of operation (AO) against desired conditions.

(3) Step 3: Develop an Assessment Framework. All plans and orders have a general logic. This logic links tasks to subordinate units to the achievement of objectives, and the achievement of objectives to attainment of the operation's end state. An assessment framework incorporates the logic of the plan and uses

MOEs, MOPs, and indicators as tools to determine accurate and objective assessments of proficiency and progress toward attaining desired end state conditions.

(4) Step 4: Develop the Collection Plan. Each indicator represents an information requirement. In some situations, staffs feed these information requirements into the information-collection synchronization process. Then, staffs task information-collection assets to collect on these information requirements. In other situations, reports in the unit SOPs may suffice. If not, the unit may develop a new report. The assessment plan identifies the source for each indicator as well as the staff member who collects that information.

(5) Step 5: Assign Responsibilities for Analyzing and Generating Recommendations. In addition to assigning responsibility for collection, commanders assign staff members to analyze assessment data and develop recommendations.

(6) Step 6: Identify Feedback Mechanisms. A formal assessment with meaningful recommendations that is not presented to the appropriate decision maker wastes time and energy. The assessment plan identifies the who, what, when, where, why, and how within the assessment presentation.

Table 2. Assessment Measures and Indicators

Measure of Effectiveness	Measure of Performance	Indicator
Answers the question: Are we doing the right things?	Answers the question: Are we doing things right?	Answers the question: What is the status of this measure of effectiveness or measure of performance?
Measure's purpose of accomplishment	Measures task completion	Measures raw data inputs to inform measures of effectiveness and measures of performance
Measures the why in the mission statement	Measures the what in the mission statement	Information used to make measuring what or why possible
No hierarchal relationship to measures of performance	No hierarchal relationship to measures of effectiveness	Subordinate to measures of effectiveness and measures of performance
Often formally tracked in formal assessment plans	Often formally tracked in execution matrixes	Often formally tracked in assessment plans
Typically challenging to choose the correct ones	Typically simple to choose the correct ones	Typically as challenging to select correctly as the supported measure of effectiveness

q. Once the designated assessment team develops the assessment plan in support of the commander's intent, it assists the team leader in applying the assessment process of monitor, evaluate, recommend, and direct continuously throughout the preparation and execution phases.

4. In Review

a. Leading the process of preparing for an advising mission comes down to effective leadership. Advisor team leaders must set the tone for team members to comprehend the OE, effectively collaborate with various entities, and measure the progress of the FSF and the broader mission partners to ensure the right application of advising with the right timing throughout the mission. Leaders on the team should remember that while preparing their team to be great partners for FSF, they should not forget to sharpen their "shoot, move, communicate, medicate, and survive" skills.

b. This chapter explored the points of emphasis that are important for advisors to keep in mind as they plan and prepare for their missions. Highlighting these portions of mission analysis helps advisors better focus the resources and time of their teams in order to ensure the most important information is developed first.

c. Country team requirements, legal considerations, risk, and assessments were also reviewed during this discussion on planning. Each is important for advisors in understanding their left and right limits and evaluating their plans. It is within this context that advisors will apply the principles and skills that appear in the next chapter.

Chapter III
ADVISOR PRINCIPLES AND SKILLS

"Win and keep the confidence of your leader. Strengthen his prestige at your expense before others when you can. Never refuse or quash schemes he may put forward; but ensure they are put forward in the first instance, privately, to you. Always approve them, and after praise modify them sensibly, causing the suggestions to come from him, until they are in accord with your own opinion. When you attain this point, hold him to it, keep a tight grip of his ideas, and push them forward as firmly as possible, but secretly, so no one but [him] (and he not too clearly) is aware of your pressure."

—T.E. Lawrence, August 1917

Advisors in El Salvador

SOF Advisor Teams were tasked at the end of the El Salvadorian conflict to assist in the reconstruction phase by building schools in various key districts that were ravaged by war. One team was tasked at the last minute and deployed on short notice to the most contested area. The team was given a blueprint, a fund, a timeline, and a link-up plan with US personnel at the arrival airfield. From there, the team was authorized to send only two personnel as their advanced echelon, and it was this two-man team which set the conditions to accomplish the mission.

Because the team had been to El Salvador on a prior mission, it had a clear understanding of the culture, history, and tensions within the operational environment. The FSF that the team fell in on was now a military unit that was a mix of both former Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) and El Salvadorian soldiers who—up to this point—had fought each other and now were in the same military unit tasked to support the advisor team while building a school. This was also the same area where the only US SOF Soldier was killed during an attack on a nearby fort.

Through critical and creative thinking, and hitting the ground running on day one, the advisors multi-tasked and worked into the night to set up their team house and construct the rebar outline to pour the school's foundation. The team was prepared the next day for opening ceremony. In spite of short notice, and because of the team's understanding of the operational environment, as well as knowing and embracing the language and culture, the team was able to defuse any issues between the FSF's El Salvadorian and FMLN elements rapidly through team building, rapport, and treating all as equals, and thus finished the school on time in accordance with set constraints.

It is important to note the team's efforts outside of the mission to build trust, credibility, and rapport with the FSF and local population: throughout the mission, the team on its own initiative would go into town and assist the locals with food procurement, purchasing construction materials from multiple vendors, providing food and ice cream for the orphanage, and repairing a roof for an elderly woman all in front of the FMLN headquarters in the center of town which earned acceptance and recognition from the FMLN leadership.

By clearly understanding the operational environment prior to the mission and embracing the situation, the advisor team was easily able to navigate political risk, risk to mission, and risk to force. The team overcame all situations that could have been catastrophic to the success of the mission and the country's overall ability to recover.

—Command Sergeant Major (Ret.) Frank Browski, March, 2021

1. Principles of Advising

This chapter includes the behaviors and mindsets that advisors must express every day to achieve the kind of success that Command Sergeant Major (Ret.) Browski's team achieved in El Salvador. The principles in subparagraphs a through j come from a collection of experiences and lessons learned by advisors. Table 3 is an example of advisor imperatives complemented by those principles.

Table 3. Examples of Advisor Imperatives

Understand the operational environment.	Operate with and through others.
Consider long-term effects.	Develop cross-cultural communication and negotiation skills.
Support legitimacy and credibility.	Ensure unity of effort and purpose.
Manage information.	Balance security and synchronization.
Demonstrate effective leadership.	Achieve total force integration.
Understand the rule of law.	

a. Advisor Support of the FSF. Advisors only succeed by supporting the success of their FSF counterpart. Advisors aim to develop FSF that the local population sees as responsible and capable of securing their safety. This legitimacy with the local population is the cornerstone of stability. Advisors, at all levels, must focus on building FSF legitimacy from the populace as they consider the impact of operations on local perception.

b. Empathy Leads to Understanding. A US advisor described his tour with an Iraqi infantry battalion as a "year-long course in human empathy." Empathy can be defined as identifying with and understanding another's situation, feelings, perspectives, and motives.

(1) Cross-cultural empathy is tough to accomplish and harder to explain, but understanding it and overcoming one's own cultural biases are keys to the success of an advisor mission.

(2) Understanding other human beings and their motivations allows for the development of honest relationships, which is a critical factor of success. In most cultures, the way to begin understanding another person's feelings and experiences is by understanding the other's narrative.

(3) The narrative is a collective group's identity as an interpretation of ancient history and recent collective experiences. Delving into the narrative and understanding the context and how it affects people are the beginnings of empathy.

c. Success is Built Upon Personal Relationships. Empathy is not enough. To change attitudes or values, advisors must establish a relationship with those whom they are tasked to advise. No amount of resources or firepower can compensate for a lack of relationship between an advisor and the FSF counterpart. The relationship must be honest, genuine, and heartfelt. Mutual respect, trust, and understanding are the keys to success. Both parties rely on each other for mission accomplishment and survival. The relationship is likely to be tested on numerous occasions, but a solid relationship built on mutual trust can survive and promote mission success. Furthermore, advisors must learn to pick their battles. Painstakingly built camaraderie and rapport can vanish in an instant if one does not prioritize and define the boundaries in the FSF relationship.

d. Advisors Must Not Lose Their Identity. Living with FSF allows for the development of true bonds, empathy, and trust. However, once advisors have formed a hard-earned relationship with their counterparts, they must remember they are not part of the FSF unit.

e. Advisors Never Win; Nor Should They. One of the hardest things for US leaders to understand is what success looks like. Progress may occur at a very slow pace and may not be tracked on a day-to-day basis. The advisor may achieve a tactical objective, but not success. Success is achieved by the FSF *habitually* meeting the objective. Conversely, failure belongs to the advisor. In a more immediate sense, advisors likely never please their own Service with regard to the forces they are advising, and they never fully satisfy the demands of the FSF unit. Advisors are figuratively, and literally, caught in the middle. Advising is the art of striving to make a positive situation for all parties.

f. Only an FSF plan will succeed, and it will only succeed if it is their plan.

g. Advisors Are Not Commanders. Advisors are responsible for the C2 of their own small team of US advisors, but they do not command or lead the FSF. Advisors provide expert advice and access for the FSF to US or coalition assets.

h. Living With Shades of Gray. Advisors should understand all situations will not be black and white. They are caught between two cultures, systems, and narratives. They must live in the proverbial gray area while maintaining legal, moral, and ethical standards. It is likely that advisors will find themselves isolated with great autonomy and no supervision. Advisors will have to grow mentally to be comfortable in this environment. They will lose sleep at night and question their actions and those of the FSF. Under these conditions, they will face moral, ethical, and legal dilemmas on a daily basis. An honest self-assessment should be encouraged. Thus, the advisor mission calls for leaders of enormous character, moral courage, and sharp intellect.

i. Talent is Everything, but Understand Rank. Military forces around the world approach rank and prestige in different ways. In some cultures, rank equals experience, nobility, education, or familial ties. Often many militaries have rewarded loyalty with promotions, resulting in rank-heavy armies. What is common among all militaries, however, is the recognition of talent. The FSF paradox occurs when recognized talent takes a back seat to rank. While advisors likely will advise counterparts more senior in rank, they must foster relationships and build talent.

j. Make Do. Advisors will never have everything they need to succeed; however, their creativity makes up the difference between success and failure.

2. Individual Advisor Skills

> *"We are still using the age-old approach to our newly acquired problem, and professional competence and military know-how are considered as the dominating factors in selecting advisors. From a strictly military viewpoint, this is a correct determination.*
>
> *"On the other hand, empathy on the part of advisors has seldom been formally encouraged as a need-to-have personality factor. Advisors who possess both empathy and knowledge are rare, indeed, but possessing military knowledge alone is not sufficient."*
>
> ***—Major Irving C. Hudlin, "Advising the Advisor", Military Review, November 1965***

a. Advisors need to possess a variety of individual skills to properly perform their assigned mission. Initially, advisors should be selected based on subject matter expertise. Tactical proficiency, however, does not equate to proficiency as an advisor. Modern-day military advisors must be able to teach and advise the FSF. To do this, advisors must be knowledgeable and proficient in TTP and have the skills to impart knowledge effectively. Beyond this, they have to operate effectively within cultural settings that can be very different in behavior and language from their own. Some advisors may be required to provide occasional direct support to the FSF within their specialty and legal authorities. Advisors should be proficient in basic combat, advisor, and situation-specific skills. Figure 6 illustrates these subsets of individual skills.



Figure 6. Individual Advisor Skills

(1) SME Skills. SME skills are defined as those skills learned through experience, education, or training. Selecting someone who does not have the

correct subject matter expertise does not automatically result in mission failure, but it puts that individual at a severe disadvantage.

(2) Combat Skills. Common skills (e.g., land navigation or radio operation), warrior skills (e.g., weapons proficiency or call for fire procedures), and survival skills (e.g., combat lifesaving) are often required by advisors. Combat skills should be refreshed during predeployment training, especially when deploying on a mission that involves training FSF on combat skills. These skills may be critical to an advisor due to the isolated and independent nature of the mission.

(3) Advisor Skills. Advisor-specific skills fall into two subcategories:

(a) Enabling Skills. These include understanding human nature, communicating across cultures, building rapport, influencing, and negotiating. Successfully employing enabling skills sets the conditions for advisors to move forward with their mission.

(b) Developing Skills. These are the main advisor tasks of advising, coaching, and teaching. Advisors use these skills to develop the capabilities of the FSF.

(4) Situation-specific Skills. These skills are determined based on the OE and the specific mission, and include cultural and regional understanding and language.

b. SME and combat skills are covered in depth throughout Service doctrine and will not be expanded upon in this MTTP publication. Care must be taken to understand the releasability of US doctrine; advisors should check the distribution statements of all doctrine before sharing with FSF.

3. Understanding Human Behavior

a. Behavior is driven by three principal factors: basic needs, culture, and personality. Understanding how these factors interact allows the advisor self-awareness, as well as a better awareness of what shapes the behavior of FSF. Although advisors cannot change the basic needs of people, the culture of the region, or the personality of their counterpart, these principal factors combine to create the counterpart's beliefs, values, and attitudes, which advisors may be able to change (see Figure 7, Human Behavior). It is also important to understand that counterparts' personalities and experiences may have caused them to develop beliefs, values, and attitudes that are different from the regional culture.

b. While human behavior varies around the world in relation to time and culture, certain aspects are believed to be constant over long periods of time and across very different cultural contexts. Basic needs, the elements that make up a culture, and the individuality of people must be taken into consideration wherever the advisor is assigned.



Figure 7. Human Behavior

c. Basic Needs. Despite obvious differences in culture and language, people share basic needs. People generally respond to fear and motivation for similar reasons. Abraham Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs theory, which expresses common motivating factors among all people, supports the concept that people are similar. This theory emphasizes humans have certain needs that are unchanging and innate. These needs are the same in all cultures and are physical and mental. They are hierarchal, meaning some needs are more basic or more powerful than others; and as these needs are satisfied, higher needs emerge. Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs presents human needs as a pyramid with the basic needs at the bottom of the pyramid (see figure 8). The basic needs of an individual must be met first and are essential for life and health. The higher needs only become important when the lower needs have been satisfied. Once an individual has moved upwards to the next level, the needs in the lower level will no longer be prioritized. However, if a lower set of needs is no longer being met, the individual temporarily reprioritizes those needs by focusing attention on the unfulfilled ones. The needs are described as follows.

(1) Physiological Needs. Physiological needs of the person take precedence. These consist mainly of eating, drinking, sleeping, and shelter. Physiological needs can control thoughts and behaviors, and cause people to feel sickness, pain, and discomfort.



Figure 8. Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs

(2) Safety Needs. When physiological needs are met, the need for safety emerges. These include personal and family security, security from violence, security against unemployment, health and well-being, and safety against accidents and illness.

(3) Social Needs, Love, and Belonging. After physiological and safety needs are fulfilled, the third level of human needs is social. This psychological aspect involves emotionally based relationships in general, such as friendship, intimacy, and having a supportive and communicative family. Humans need to feel a sense of belonging and acceptance. These may come from large social groups (e.g., clubs, work, religious groups, professional organizations, sports teams, or gangs) or small social connections (e.g., family members, intimate partners, mentors, close colleagues, or confidants). People need to love and be loved by others. In the absence of these elements, many people become susceptible to loneliness, social anxiety, and depression. This need for belonging can often overcome the physiological and security needs, depending on the strength of the peer pressure (e.g., an anorexic person ignores the need to eat and the security of health for a feeling of belonging).

(4) Esteem Needs. All humans need to have self-esteem, self-respect, and respect for others. People have a need for recognition in activities that give a sense of contribution. Imbalances at this level can result in low self-esteem. People with low esteem often seek respect from others. However, many people with low self-esteem are not able to improve their view of themselves simply by

receiving fame, respect, and glory externally, but must first accept themselves internally.

(5) Self-actualization. Self-actualization falls into the psychological requirements level on Maslow's pyramid. This is the instinctual need of humans to make the most of their abilities and strive to be the best they can. They embrace the facts and realities of the world (including themselves) rather than deny or avoid them. They are spontaneous in their ideas and actions. These people are creative. They are interested in solving problems; this often includes the problems of others. Solving problems is often a key focus in their lives. They feel closeness to other people and, generally, appreciate life. They have a system of morality fully internalized and independent of external authority. They have discernment and are able to view all things in an objective manner. In short, self-actualization is reaching one's fullest potential. The advisor wants to identify members of the FSF that have achieved self-actualization, because they are powerful influencers within the organization.

d. Culture. Culture reflects the beliefs, values, attitudes, traditions, customs, and norms of a society or group and is addressed as a situation-specific skill. Multiple layers of culture affect the counterpart simultaneously, each with their own set of norms that may conflict with one another. (Male military personnel may shave while their civilian counterparts may not.) While cultures change over time, the advisor has to consider how the existing culture shapes the counterparts decisions. Chapter V is devoted to the further discussion of culture.

e. Personality. While Maslow's theory shows a commonality among all people, no two people are exactly alike. Often people within groups are thought to act and think alike under similar circumstances, but this is a false impression. Two biological brothers could be raised in the same house under the same conditions and have completely opposite personalities. If advisors can identify a few critical aspects of the personality of the people with whom they deal, they may be more effective in selecting techniques to advise them. At the least, it may help explain the activities of individuals when they act differently than their needs or culture would indicate.

f. Application. Understanding the needs, culture, and personality of an individual is key to building rapport. Building rapport is central to advisor mission accomplishment. Advisors must understand themselves through the lenses of the previously discussed concepts to identify cultural and personal biases. Conversely, with that understanding, advisors must also determine the key personality attributes of their counterpart that can be used to influence. The following are five factors advisors should assess by speaking with and observing the people with whom they come in contact.

(1) Extroversion Versus Introversion. People with a preference for extroversion draw energy from action: they tend to act, then reflect, then act further. If they are inactive, their level of energy and motivation tends to decline. Conversely, those whose preference is introversion become less energized as they act: they prefer to reflect, then act, then reflect again. Extroversion is marked by pronounced engagement with the external world. Extroverts enjoy being with people, are full

of energy, and often experience positive emotions. They tend to be enthusiastic, action-oriented individuals who are likely to say “Yes!” or “Let’s go!” to opportunities for excitement. In groups, they like to talk, assert themselves, and draw attention to themselves. Introverted people prefer time to reflect to rebuild energy. Someone with a clear extroversion preference is not necessarily a party animal or a show-off, any more than someone clearly preferring introversion is necessarily shy, retiring, and unsociable.

(2) An introverted person meeting another introverted person may begin a conversation with recognition of a shared interest and continue with a rapid exchange of data and theories. Introverts lack the social exuberance, energy, and activity levels of extroverts. They tend to be quiet, low-key, deliberate, and less dependent on the social world. The introvert simply needs less stimulation than an extrovert and more time alone. Samples of extroversion-introversion questions follow.

(a) Does the individual like being the center of attention?

(b) Does the individual enjoy meeting (interacting) with lots of people?

(c) Does the individual feel comfortable around people?

(d) Does the individual start most conversations?

(e) Does the individual talk to a lot of different people in a relaxed setting?

(f) Is the individual quiet around strangers?

(g) Does the individual try to avoid drawing attention to self?

(h) Is the individual reserved when talking?

(i) Does the individual have little to say?

(3) Sensing Versus Conceptualizing. Sensing versus conceptualizing refers to how people gather information: sensing (i.e., touch, taste, sight, smell, sound) or conceptualizing (i.e., thought or reflection). Sensing versus conceptualizing describes a dimension of personality that distinguishes imaginative, creative thinking people from the more concrete thinking people. It describes how new information is understood and interpreted.

(4) Individuals with a preference for sensing prefer to trust information in the present that is tangible and concrete: information that can be understood by the five senses. They tend to distrust hunches that seem to come out of nowhere. They prefer to look for detail and facts. For them, the meaning is in the data. They prefer the plain, straightforward, and obvious over the complex, ambiguous, and subtle. Sensing people tend to prefer familiarity over novelty; they are conservative and resistant to change.

(5) On the other hand, those with a preference for conceptualizing tend to trust more in abstract or theoretical information. They tend to trust those flashes of insight that seem to come from the unconscious mind. The meaning is in how the data relates to the wide context or pattern. They tend to hold abstract and individualistic beliefs, although their actions may be conforming.

(6) Samples of sensing-conceptualizing questions follow.

(a) Is the individual full of ideas?

(b) Is the individual quick to understand things?

(c) Does the individual speak with a rich vocabulary?

(d) Does the individual spend time reflecting on things?

(e) Is the individual disinterested in abstract ideas?

(f) Does the individual have difficulty understanding abstract ideas?

(7) Logic Versus Values. Logic versus values refers to value-based or logic-based decision-making. People making decisions based on either process strive to make rational choices based on the data they receive. Those with a preference for values reach decisions by empathizing with the stakeholders in a situation and weighing it to achieve harmony, consensus, and fit, considering the needs of the people involved and unverifiable rules.

(8) Those with a preference for logic decide things from a detached standpoint by measuring the decision by what seems reasonable, logical, causal, and consistent, and matching it to a set of verifiable rules. People with a logical preference do not necessarily “think better” than their value-based counterparts; the opposite preference is considered an equally rational way of coming to decisions.

(9) Similarly, those with a value-based preference are not necessarily more emotional than their logic-based peers. Leaving no man behind would be considered a values decision rather than a logical decision. It is not logical to lose living personnel to recover dead ones. It makes perfect sense based on values.

(10) Samples of logic-values questions follow.

(a) Is the individual interested in people?

(b) Does the individual empathize with others?

(c) Is the individual soft hearted?

(d) Does the individual make people feel at ease?

(e) Does the individual take time out for others?

(f) Is the individual disinterested in other people’s problems?

(g) Does the individual feel little concern for others?

(h) Does the individual insult people?

(11) Contemplative Versus Impulsive. Contemplative versus impulsive concerns the way impulses are controlled and directed. Impulses are not inherently bad; occasionally, time constraints require an immediate decision and acting on the first impulse.

(12) Contemplative individuals tend to avoid trouble and achieve high levels of success through purposeful planning and persistence. They are regarded by

others as reliable. They can be compulsive perfectionists and workaholics. Conversely, impulsive people may be criticized for unreliability and failure to remain focused. They are praised for their ability to make quick decisions or adapt to new situations.

(13) Samples of contemplative-impulsive questions follow.

(a) Is the individual always prepared?

(b) Does the individual work to exacting standards?

(c) Does the individual follow a schedule?

(d) Does the individual get chores done right away?

(e) Does the individual like order?

(f) Does the individual pay attention to details?

(g) Does the individual leave belongings lying around?

(h) Does the individual shirk duties?

(14) Consistent Versus Unpredictable. Consistent versus unpredictable refers to the tendency to follow a set pattern. Those who are highly unpredictable are often emotionally reactive. They respond emotionally to events that would not usually affect most people, and their reactions tend to be more intense than normal. They are more likely to interpret ordinary situations as threatening and minor frustrations as hopelessly difficult. Their negative emotional reactions tend to persist for unusually long periods of time, which means they exhibit frequent and significant mood swings. These problems in emotional regulation can diminish the ability to think clearly, make decisions, and cope effectively with stress.

(15) Conversely, individuals who are consistent are often less easily upset and are less emotionally reactive. Samples of consistent-unpredictable questions follow.

(a) Is the individual easily disturbed?

(b) Does the individual change moods a lot?

(c) Is the individual easily irritated?

(d) Is the individual stressed out easily?

(e) Does the individual get upset easily?

(f) Does the individual worry about things?

(g) Is the individual relaxed most of the time?

(h) Does the individual follow a set pattern?

(i) Does the individual react the same to similar circumstances?

(16) Implications. The main point is to acknowledge that people from the same culture or social group may act differently, but still base their behavior on a predictable form or pattern.

(17) Cultures tend to favor specific personality traits. Advisors need to be aware of the personality traits of the cultures in the area in which they are operating, and use the factors introduced in this section to evaluate interactions and choose wise responses.

4. Establishing Rapport

a. This section looks at rapport, its role in advisor missions, possible ways to develop adequate rapport to accomplish the mission, and other interpersonal skills supporting the advisor's mission.

b. Establishing rapport is the desired method for effective advising. Genuine rapport is developed slowly, but can be ruined in an instant by any act that destroys trust.

c. Components of Rapport. Rapport is comprised of the following three components:

(1) Understanding. Understanding is the first component of rapport. It begins prior to deployment and may include cultural studies, language training, and FSF equipment and doctrine familiarization. Once in country, advisors should continue to broaden their understanding by observing and asking questions.

(2) Respect. Respect is the next component of rapport. It is a reciprocal commodity. The FSF counterpart should grow to respect who the advisors are (character), what they know, and how they perform. The advisor should look for things they respect in their counterpart. The counterpart may not fit the mold of US or other nations' personnel with whom the advisor has previously interacted. The counterpart may not have formal training or education, or may even be illiterate. The counterpart's standards may not be the same as the advisor's. For example, a counterpart may have egregious characteristics like corruption, a poor attitude toward the profession, or even a lack of basic warrior values, such as timeliness.

(a) Outward displays by advisors should always be respectful. Remaining respectful is paramount to maintaining a professional and personal rapport, including when suggesting necessary corrective actions on the part of the FSF.

(b) Start with the basics and expand over time. There may be additional factors affecting the counterpart's willingness and motivation. For example, counterparts may be placing self, and possibly family, in mortal danger by accepting their job. They may be proven, fearless warriors, even if they did not have formal training. In short, there may be traits deserving of respect even before the relationship matures.

(c) Mutual respect grows through shared experiences, hardships, and dangers. Advisors should live, eat, and, if authorized, fight with their counterparts.

(3) Trust. Trust is the third critical component of the rapport-building process. Trust grows over time and is based on understanding and respect. Building trust needs to begin on day one, but it will not mature until later in the relationship. There also remains the possibility the advisor's counterpart may not prove worthy of complete trust. In this instance, the advisor may need to constantly mitigate the counterpart's shortcomings. Advisors should begin by showing they are reliable by doing everything they say they will do. Trust develops as the FSF and their advisors perform their functions. Examples of actions that assist in growing trust are the following.

(a) Advisors should be where they are supposed to be and on time.

(b) Advisors should start out with confidence-building missions. Early success builds self-confidence and trust.

(c) Advisors should not promise any support that cannot be delivered.

d. Since all the components of rapport are reciprocal, advisors have to be willing and able to share things about their lives, such as culture, language, and experiences. It is important to remember rapport building requires the advisor to establish a personal level of understanding with the counterpart to be effective.

(1) Be a positive example. FSF respect advisors who demonstrate the right way to do a task, rather than just talk about how to do a task. The following areas also contribute to building rapport.

(a) Maintaining enthusiasm and a positive attitude.

(b) Developing language skills and the ability to use an interpreter.

(c) Respecting a counterpart's rank, age, status, and experience.

(d) Developing negotiation skills.

(e) Improving interpersonal skills.

(f) Being confident, competent, and capable.

(g) Never expecting or demanding counterparts do something the advisor is unable or unwilling to do.

(h) Demonstrating the task to standard.

(i) Learning the counterparts' names and spending time with them on both their compound, and one's own, at meals and during holidays.

(j) Preparing, mentally, to interact with counterparts at all times.

(k) Avoiding the creation of a US enclave; an advisor assignment requires constant interaction to achieve the desired results.

(l) Frequently assessing the counterpart's perceptions.

(m) Avoiding the impression of favoring one group.

(n) Recognizing threats to discipline (e.g., the FSF trying to circumvent their own leadership by going to an advisor with a complaint or problem).

(o) Enforcing the unit's chain of command even if the advisor, discretely, influences the decision process and outcomes.

(2) Rapport Considerations.

(a) Language. Advisors should make every effort to learn to communicate effectively in their FSF counterpart's language. Generally, advisors that can converse directly with their counterparts are more effective than those who cannot. If language proficiency is not an option, advisors should learn to work with an interpreter. It is essential to learn enough of the language for basic communications, like greetings. It helps to have enough of an understanding to catch the basic direction of conversations, even those between the interpreter and the counterpart. Advisors should attempt to improve their language proficiency over time because this is usually a well-received gesture of respect.

(b) Nonverbal Communication. Nonverbal communication comprises 90 percent of communication. Body language, tone of voice, and gestures are more powerful than verbal language. Tone of voice may send messages that conflict with the content of the spoken message. Subtle movements of the body may indicate a person understands the message being conveyed. Likewise, conflicting messages may be sent by unintentional body language or gestures.

(c) Local Customs. Respecting local customs goes a long way in building effective rapport. In every culture, refusing invitations without a reasonable excuse is seen as a slight. This is extreme in some cultures. The advisor must be prepared to accept many forms of unfamiliar hospitality. Eating local food, unless there is a documented health threat, should be encouraged. Participating in cultural ceremonies also helps build rapport. At some point, however, there is a level of activity where it is necessary to draw the line. The advisor must be prepared to be able to deal tactfully with—and report as necessary—issues that are not aligned under US law (or issues that present an appearance of a violation of laws), military regulations, policy, and ethics. Advisors must consult with their chain of command and servicing staff judge advocate in such situations.

(d) Uniform and Grooming Standards. Advisors should adhere to their Services' grooming and uniform standards. At times this may be modified in accordance with mission requirements and higher headquarters policy. This establishes a level of expectation with respect to other standards, such as training and maintenance.

(e) Expertise. Expertise is based on one's knowledge and experience. The advisor has to repeatedly demonstrate expertise by making sound judgments. Bad advice can destroy credibility. If credibility is lost, the advisor will fail to build rapport.

(f) Going Native. The term *going native* defines the line where advisors experience the loss of one's identity and blur the line between US objectives and PN objectives. Advisors should not cross that line to truly understand the PN and its challenges. In the military, it is appropriate to assume enough of the customs common to the AO to be effective. Advisors who are close to their counterparts can often provide their higher headquarters with valuable insights into how things look from a grass-roots level. However, once the advisor begins to pursue the agenda of the FSF to the detriment of the US or coalition campaign plan, that individual has, effectively, stepped over the line.

(g) Political Discussions. Advisors should avoid initiating lectures about political philosophy. The FSF should know about the current situation in their country and may have preconceived notions about the United States. When the topic of politics does arise, advisors should be ready to discuss US history, difficulties in establishing peaceful democracies, minority rights, and positive aspects of the US system. Advisors should reinforce the counterparts' national pride and get them talking about their national traditions and history.

5. Influence

a. Understanding human behavior and building rapport allow the advisor to influence the counterpart. In general, influence can be assessed as one's ability to shape the desired outcome. The following paragraphs discuss the two major methods of influencing. See figure 9.

(1) Compliance-focused influence is based, primarily, on the advisor's authority. Compliance is appropriate for short-term, immediate requirements and for situations where little risk can be tolerated. If something needs to be done with little time for delay, compliance may be an acceptable approach. On the other hand, compliance-focused influence is not particularly effective when the advisor's aim is to create initiative and high esteem within the FSF unit. The effects only last as long as the advisor is able to affect the FSF unit's behavior.

(a) Incentives and Disincentives. Incentives and disincentives refer to the advisor's ability to give things or take things away to change behavior. Behavior can be modified or changed by changing the consequences of the current behavior or by introducing new consequences (incentives or disincentives) a subject receives for engaging in a behavior.

(b) Encouraging a Behavior. Encouraging a behavior involves increasing positive consequences and decreasing negative consequences. Introducing or emphasizing desirable or pleasant things in the environment when a person engages in the desired behavior, or removing unpleasant things when a person engages in the desired behavior, are ways of encouraging a behavior.

(c) Discouraging a Behavior. Discouraging a behavior involves devaluing or reducing the positive consequences and increasing negative consequences a subject receives. Removing something desirable or pleasant that reinforces a behavior, or introducing something unpleasant into the environment are ways of discouraging a behavior.



Figure 9. How Advisors Influence

(2) Commitment-focused influence changes attitudes, values, and beliefs, and produces longer lasting and broader effects. Whereas compliance only changes short-term behavior, commitment reaches deeper and, subsequently, generates long-term behavioral change. For example, when an advisor builds a sense of responsibility among counterparts, the individual will likely demonstrate more initiative, personal involvement, and creativity. Commitment grows from an individual's desire to gain a sense of control and develop self-worth by contributing to the organization. Depending on the objective of the influence, advisors can strengthen commitment by reinforcing their counterpart's identification with the nation (loyalty), the Service (professionalism), the unit or organization (selfless service), the leadership in a unit (respect), and to the mission (duty). Long-term success hinges on the advisor's ability to develop commitment.

b. The art of influencing requires knowing what techniques to use based on the situation. No single technique works in every situation. Positive reinforcement in the form of incentives (e.g., supplies or time off) and internal rewards (e.g., praise and recognition) can produce positive outcomes. Disincentives (e.g., withholding support, scorn) can be used when there is an immediate need to discontinue dangerous

COAs. Disincentives also can send a clear message to others in the unit about expectations and the consequences of violating those expectations. By using these techniques, an advisor can shape the social norms of a unit. One caution, however, is disincentives should be used sparingly and only in extreme cases because they can lead to resentment.

c. Doctor Robert Cialdini, author of *Influence: the Psychology of Persuasion,* identified six influencing principles relevant to virtually any culture and group. Understanding and applying these basic principles can increase an advisor's effectiveness in persuading a group or individual.

(1) Principle of Scarcity. People value more what they can have less of. They typically associate greater value with things that are rare, dwindling in availability, or difficult to acquire.

(2) Principle of Authority. People are easily persuaded by individuals perceived to be legitimate authorities or experts. They defer to experts who provide shortcuts to decisions requiring specialized information.

(3) Principle of Social Proof. People often look to the behavior of those around them for direction about what choices to make. This action is heightened when those around them are similar in terms of age, education, social standing, and experience.

(4) Principle of Liking. People prefer to say yes to and comply with the requests of those they like and who they feel like them.

(5) Principle of Reciprocity. If someone grants favors, gifts, or concessions, an overpowering need to repay the favor immediately blooms within the recipient of the favor, gift, or concession. This human trait transcends all cultures and races.

(6) Principle of Consistency. The desire to be consistent with one's own commitments in the form of prior actions, beliefs, values, and statements has a very strong pull and is a central motivator of behavior. The drive to look for and be consistent with one's own commitments is a highly potent weapon of social influence. People do not like to be inconsistent and tend to align their actions with their prior commitments.

Advisor Influence Example

We graduated our first group of new instructors in several months, increasing the number of Iraqi instructor pilots in the Fighter Training Wing by 150%. For the previous months, Iraqi instructors had only flown (on average) four sorties each per month. We needed to get them to increase the workload for two reasons. One, our student population was increasing and we had no additional influx of US instructors. Two, the focus on transition to Iraqi control and leadership had intensified, and we needed to begin positioning the Iraqis to take our place. With the graduation of the new instructors, the time was ripe to push towards transition.

We sat down with the Iraqi leadership and spoke with them about allowing the Iraqis to take a larger ownership role in the wing by increasing their sortie production rates. Their duty schedule, which was limited by the amount of monthly leave each pilot took, seemed to be the critical impediment to their ownership of various programs in the wing. We suggested they modify their duty schedule to be present three weeks out of the month. The Iraqi wing commander explained that he wished he could, but his pilots would feel he was being too hard on them, and he needed to get guidance from his commander to that effect. That way, his pilots wouldn't be mad at him, and would realize there was a common Iraqi Air Force duty standard. He told me he had even asked his commander to issue an order to codify the work schedule.

What I didn't realize was he was trying to politely tell me he didn't support an increased work schedule. He had sent no such request to his commander. By telling me he couldn't make the decision—his commander needed to issue an order to that effect—he was telling me no. Not realizing that, I pushed ahead with the proposal to change the vacation schedule, sending it up through the advisor staff, and mentioning it to the Iraqi Air Force commander the next time we sat down together to chat. It caused a huge rift. The Iraqi wing commander became extremely frustrated and was present even less at work. When he was there, he began acting in a very hostile manner towards the advisors, and me in particular. It was obvious our efforts—my plans—were not achieving the desired results. Instead, they were harming the relationship between the Iraqi leadership and the advisor team.

So we changed our vector. Rather than push for a different work or vacation schedule, I stopped asking them about their work schedule or even when they would be present for duty. Instead we began to post sortie counts prominently in the operations room. It was also about this time our new instructor pilots began flying in earnest. Every day, we would post the top fliers for the month, and a bar graph of how many sorties were being flown. We showed the sorties for the Iraqi and US pilots. Within the Iraqi ranks, the younger pilots quickly jumped ahead in the sortie counts. All of a sudden, the senior Iraqi pilots began making themselves available to fly. It was a pride issue—the older pilots did not want to be out performed by the younger pilots. Sortie rates per pilot more than tripled by the end of the month. Every day, the Iraqi pilots would look at the sortie count, and then look at the scheduling board to ensure they were up to fly the next day. Some pilots began to take considerably less vacation time.

The key, it turned out, was finding the correct leverage point. The older pilots were not interested in true ownership over the processes, and they certainly did not want to give up time with their families. So offering them ownership as an incentive to spend more time away from their families was not an effective form of persuasion. But personal pride—being on top of the sortie count list—now, that was important to them. This month, one of the younger pilots has announced he will not take vacation the entire month, because he wants to maximize his sorties. He wants to build experience so he can be better qualified to teach his students. So in the end, we're achieving success by letting them be motivated by the same thing that motivates us as advisors—leadership by example. Only in this case, the example is being set by their newest pilots. And that is a great success for us.

—United States Air Force Advisor, Coalition Air Force Transition Team

6. How to Influence/Change Behavior

Figure 10 depicts a cycle of influence.

a. Step 1: Determine a Goal. Advisors influence others to achieve a purpose. To be successful at exerting influence, advisors have an end goal in mind. Sometimes the goal is very specific. Many goals are less distinct and measurable, but are still valid and meaningful. Goals should be written down and addressed in mission statements and internal assessments.



Figure 10. How to Influence

b. Step 2: Determine Who to Influence. The advisor needs to develop a mental list of those who need to be influenced. Getting an FSF unit to do what the advisor wants may be as simple as influencing the commander, but the advisor may have to influence the unit members as well as the leader's commander. The advisor should consider as many variations as practical. Advisors should look for any conditions or circumstances in the immediate environment that significantly affect the individual or the group's emotions, beliefs, or behavior. Individual or group characteristics the advisor might consider include:

(1) Gender.

(2) Religion.

(3) Age.

(4) Socioeconomic status.

(5) Ethnicity.

(6) Political affiliation.

(7) Level of education (very important in determining how to assess and persuade people).

(8) Occupation.

(9) Recent events.

(10) Geography (beliefs and values can vary widely from region to region).

c. Step 3: Determine Motives. Motives are the reasons behind the decisions people make. Motives come from an inner desire to meet a need or want. Advisors use the knowledge of what motivates others to influence them. Knowing one's counterpart, and others who may be influenced, gives advisors insight into affecting their behavior. The desire to fulfill, alleviate, or eliminate a need or want provides the motivation to change behavior.

(1) Identify Basic Motives. Basic motives involve physiological needs such as food, water, and safety (i.e., security and shelter). When people feel hunger, they are motivated to eat. When people feel pain, they are motivated to reduce the source of the pain. Such basic motives are extremely powerful in driving behavior and overwhelm psychological needs and wants.

(2) Identify Social Motives. Social motives are derived from access to other tangibles (e.g., money, goods, education, infrastructure, and health care) or more complex psychological motives, such as status. For example, people learn to want money because it can be exchanged for food and other desired goods. Power and control, achievement, reassurance, escape or avoidance, justice or revenge, and acceptance or affiliation are all types of learned social motives. Examples include:

(a) Wanting better educational opportunities for their children.

(b) Wanting better paying jobs.

(c) Wanting their interests represented by the government.

(d) Wanting revenge for perceived wrongs.

(e) Wanting self-rule.

(3) Prioritize Motives as Critical, Short-term, and Long-term. Advisors prioritize motives by immediacy of the need or want and delay in satisfaction. Critical motives are immediate needs. Short-term motives are those currently being satisfied or for which active efforts are being made to satisfy them in the near future. Long-term motives are those desired, but not immediately important, and satisfaction may be delayed until some point in the future.

d. Step 4: Determine Individual's and Group's Beliefs, Values, and Attitudes.

(1) Beliefs are information thought to be true. The advisor must ascertain what individual beliefs are considered true by the FSF. Religious and cultural beliefs can hold deeper meaning and significance than intellectual beliefs.

(2) Values are a prioritization of what one believes. Values can be ethical and moral, doctrinal and ideological, social, aesthetic, or economic. The advisor must ascertain what is valued. (What is considered important?)

(3) Attitudes reflect whether one likes or dislikes something. Likes and dislikes can often be traced to a person's beliefs and values. This includes things loved or hated, and those causing frustrations and fears. They provoke an emotional response that can be used to increase the effectiveness of an argument or act. For example, frustrations occur when a want is not met. By examining what is causing frustration, the advisor may find another motive that needs to be addressed. The following are questions the advisor may ask to determine what causes a particular attitude.

(a) What is loved?

(b) What is hated?

(c) What causes anger?

(d) What is feared?

(e) What is considered shameful or embarrassing?

(f) What causes dissatisfaction and what are the group's or individual's complaints?

(g) What are the group's or individual's frustrations? (What do they want that they cannot get?)

(4) Although difficult to derive, beliefs, values, and attitudes can prove to be very effective in persuasion.

e. Step 5: Compare an Individual's Beliefs, Values, and Attitudes with the Predominant Cultural Beliefs, Values, and Attitudes. The predominant cultural beliefs, values, attitudes, traditions, and norms may be very different from the group the advisor is trying to influence. This difference in behavior is directly related to the host's predominant culture.

f. Step 6: Determine Openness. Openness is the likelihood an individual or group will be open to persuasion. Determining openness aids in prioritizing efforts. If openness is moderate to high, an advisor may not need to focus as much effort as would be necessary if the openness were low. Openness is determined by assessing the strength of the underlying motivation source and the FSF perception of the desired, corresponding behavior. The strength of the motivation depends on the perceived risk and perceived reward, while the perception of the behavior is linked directly to how consistent the behavior is with the individual's or group's values and beliefs.

(1) Risks and rewards can be social, emotional, financial, and physical. Risks may include the threat of physical harm, financial loss, or disapproval of peers.

Rewards may include financial gain, political power, approval of peers, or increased self-esteem. Risks and rewards can be immediate or long-term. Immediate risks and rewards are stronger than long-term risks and rewards. For example, very few people are willing to walk a tightrope (immediate risk), but many people smoke (long-term risk). The higher the perceived rewards and the lower the perceived risks, the more likely the behavior will occur.

(a) Perceived Risk. What are the negative consequences expected by the individual who engages in the desired behavior?

(b) Perceived Reward. What is the positive consequence anticipated by the individual who engages in the desired behavior?

(2) Advisors should determine how consistent the desired behavior is with the values and beliefs of the individual. Generally, behavior is consistent with values and norms relative to moral, ethical, religious, political, or cultural beliefs. Behavior inconsistent or incongruent with values and beliefs decreases over time. Alternately, if behavior continues to be incongruent with values and beliefs, individuals are likely to adjust their behavior before modifying their values and beliefs. Thus, the likelihood of a desired behavior change is based on the connection with an individual's values and beliefs.

(3) A lower openness does not mean the person cannot be influenced, but more effort and analysis will be required to effectively influence behavior. The lower the susceptibility, the higher the effort required to adjust conditions for a behavior change to occur.

g. Step 7: Determine Methods. Motives, personal characteristics, and environmental conditions determine which influence method or combination of methods is appropriate. When a situation is urgent and great risk is involved, eliciting counterpart compliance may be necessary. Advisors typically pursue a longer-term focus and use influence to build strong commitment.

(1) When influencing their counterparts, advisors should consider the following.

(a) Objectives for using influence should be in line with the advisor's values, ethics, laws, and code of conduct.

(b) Compliance (seeking influence) focuses on meeting and accounting for specific task demands.

(c) Commitment (encouraging influence) emphasizes empowerment and long-lasting change.

(2) Advisors can use various methods that focus on compliance or commitment (see table 4 for method examples). Advisors will want to employ several methods simultaneously to rapidly change behavior while providing knowledge and experience to change beliefs, values, and attitudes.

(a) Professional Relationship. This method begins with the advisor's credentials. After the first meeting, the advisor immediately needs to establish and maintain credibility by providing good advice. If the counterpart is not making a professional or personal connection with the advisor, the advisor must depend on the quality of the advice to win over the FSF counterpart. With time, a consistent approach can gain commitment effectively from FSF counterparts. It works best with a personal friendship, but it also works where personal friendships cannot be established.

Table 4. Influence Methods

Methods	Description	Commitment/ Compliance
Professional relationship	Initially depends on credentials, but quickly depends on the ability to give good advice. (Expertise)	Commitment
Personal friendship	Requires counterparts to like the advisor, and the advisor must appear to like them. (Rapport)	Commitment
Collaboration	The advisor assists counterparts with their plan.	Commitment
Participation	The advisor involves counterparts in the plan to make it their plan. (Buy-in)	Commitment
Rational persuasion	An experienced expert provides evidence or logical arguments.	Commitment
Inspiration	Using strong emotion to build conviction.	Commitment
Authority	The source of authority is the basis for the request.	Compliance
Exchange	A trade of desired actions or items.	Compliance
Apprising	Explaining the benefits of the requested action. (The benefits are not within the control of the advisor.)	Compliance

(b) Personal Friendship. This method is used when the advisor has established a strong rapport with the counterpart. This works when the foreign counterpart actually likes the advisor. The advisor has to have a high level of trust in the counterpart as well. This method allows the advisor to assess the counterpart's attitudes and beliefs in a way not possible in any other method. However, it is not always possible to achieve and has a great risk of the advisor internalizing and adopting the counterpart's problems.

(c) Collaboration. This method occurs when the advisor cooperates in providing assistance or resources to carry out the FSF counterpart's plan. This works when counterparts are at a level where they can develop their own plans or are determined to do things their way. The advisor should become involved in the counterpart's process to help shape how the FSF operate. For example, the advisor could offer to proofread an order before a major planning effort to ensure the operation has collaboration with joint, interagency, or multinational agencies.

(d) Participation. This method occurs when the advisor asks the FSF counterpart to take part in planning. Active participation leads to an increased sense of worth and recognition. It provides value to the effort and builds commitment. An invitation to get involved in problem solving or objective planning is critical when the advisor tries to institutionalize a vision for long-term change. By involving key FSF leaders at all levels during the planning phases, the advisor ensures counterparts share in the vision. Later, these FSF leaders will be able to pursue critical intermediate and long-term objectives, even after the advisor has moved on.

(e) Rational Persuasion. This method requires the advisor to provide evidence, logical arguments, or explanations showing how a request is relevant to the goal. This is often the first approach to gaining commitment from counterparts and is likely to be effective if the advisor is recognized as an expert with an established rapport. Advisors who try to change beliefs and values often draw upon their own experience to give reasons that work, based on their expertise.

(f) Inspiration. This method occurs when the advisor arouses strong emotions to build conviction. The advisor is working to amplify existing beliefs and values as well as change attitudes. An advisor may stress to the counterpart that, without help, the safety of the team may be at risk. By appropriately stressing the results of stronger commitment, an advisor can inspire followers to surpass minimal standards and reach a higher level of performance.

(g) Authority. This method occurs when advisors refer to sources of authority (e.g., legal, religious, tradition, or position) to establish the basis for a request. In the military, certain jobs must be done, regardless of circumstances, when subordinate leaders receive legitimate orders from higher headquarters. A reference to one's position suggests to those who are being influenced there is the potential for official action if the request is not completed. The following are types of authority appeals.

- Legal. This is an appeal to laws or regulations, or to people in superior positions in the social hierarchy (e.g., the Uniform Code of Military Justice, noncommissioned officers [NCOs] and officers, police officers, parents, or government officials). The group or individual must recognize the authority for the appeal to work.

- Religious. This is an appeal to a belief-teaching institution, a sacred text, or an individual revered or worshiped (e.g., the Roman Catholic Church, the Qur'an, the Dalai Lama, or a local Imam).

- Tradition. This is an appeal to time-honored customs familiar to the group or individual or behaviors repeated continually without question (e.g., people eat turkey on Thanksgiving as a time honored practice).

- Position. This is an appeal from someone of authority (e.g., chairman of the board, leader of a military unit, family patriarch or matriarch, or boss or foreman). The appeal is useful where the counterpart's superior has issued an order who has the power to enforce it. The advisor has to be fully aware of what direction was given by the counterpart's superior.

(h) Exchange. This is an influence method advisors use when they make an offer to provide a desired item or action in trade for compliance with a request. The exchange technique requires the advisor to control certain resources or rewards valued by those being influenced.

(i) Apprising. This method happens when the advisor explains why a request benefits a counterpart, such as giving greater work satisfaction or performing a task a certain way to save time. In contrast to the exchange technique, the benefits are out of the control of the advisor. An advisor may use the apprising method to inform a new unit commander of the information gain that is obtainable by building rapport with the local population.

(3) Influence methods outline the general efforts an advisor can make to change behavior. If the advisor has time for long-term change, the focus will be on commitment. If the advisor has infrequent interaction with the person, the focus, probably, will be on compliance to get the desired behavior. Once a method is selected, the advisor needs to assess the counterpart's motives and personality, and the environment to determine the proper influence techniques to persuade the counterpart to change behavior.

h. Step 8: Determine Techniques. The influence techniques that follow can be selected and implemented along with the previously mentioned methods to answer basic needs including social, psychological, or growth. They also can be used to emphasize fears, likes, or dislikes depending on environmental conditions (e.g., traditions or demographics). These techniques can emphasize positives or negatives (incentives or disincentives) and can be applied with little or large amounts of pressure.

(1) Inevitability. This technique most often relies on the emotion of fear, particularly the fear of death, injury, or some other type of harm. For example, if a person does not surrender, he will die; or if a person does not pay his taxes, he will go to jail. It also can be an appeal to logic. Both require proof the promised outcome will occur. Therefore, it is crucial that credibility is gained and maintained.

(2) In Group-Out Group. This technique seeks to divide a group or separate two groups. It creates an enemy of one group, and encourages the other group to rebel or discriminate against them. This appeal frequently points out major differences between groups or factions within a group.

(3) Bandwagon. This technique plays upon the group's need to belong or conform to group standards. The two main types of bandwagon appeal are an appeal to companionship and an appeal to conformity. Peer pressure is an example of a conformity type of bandwagon appeal.

(4) Nostalgia. This technique refers to how things were done in the past. The appeal can be used to encourage or discourage a particular behavior. In a positive light, it refers to the "good old days" and encourages the group to behave in a manner reminiscent of those times. In the negative, it points out how bad things were in the past and why a change in behavior avoids a return to misery.

(5) Self-interest. This technique plays directly to the wants and desires of the individuals. The appeal can play upon the group's vulnerability for acquisition, success, or status. A self-interest appeal can be presented as a gain or loss. An appeal to loss exploits the group not wishing to engage in an advisor-recommended and desired behavior by highlighting that the current behavior will not satisfy the group's need. An appeal to gain would inform the group that, to satisfy a want, the group must engage in a desired behavior.

(6) Glittering Generalities. This technique uses intense, emotionally appealing words to muster strong feelings of the listener. These words are so closely associated with highly valued concepts and beliefs, the appeals are convincing without being supported by fact or reason. The appeals are directed toward such emotions as love of country or home and desire for peace, freedom, glory, or honor.

(7) Transference. This technique projects positive or negative qualities of a person, entity, object, or value to another. It is generally used to transfer blame from one party in a conflict to another.

(8) Least of Evils. This technique acknowledges the COA being taken is possibly undesirable, but emphasizes any other COA would result in a worse outcome.

(9) Name-calling. This technique seeks to arouse prejudices in an audience by labeling the object of the propaganda as something the group fears, loathes, or finds undesirable.

(10) Plain Folks or Common Man. This technique attempts to convince the group the position noted in the argument is actually the same as their own. It is designed to win the confidence of the audience by communicating in the usual manner and style of the audience. Communicators use ordinary language, mannerisms, and clothes (via face-to-face or other audiovisual communications) when they attempt to identify their point of view with the average person.

(11) Testimonials. This technique uses quotations cited to support or reject a policy, action, program, or personality. The reputation or role of the individual giving the statement is used to foster belief in a statement or plan. There can be different types of testimonial authority. Official testimonials use endorsements of approved people in authority or well known in a particular field. Personal sources of testimonials may include hostile leaders, fellow Service members, opposing leaders, famous scholars, writers, popular heroes, and other personalities.

(12) Insinuation. This technique creates or increases suspicions of ideas, groups, or individuals as a means to divide the adversary. One hints, suggests, or implies, but lets the group draw its own conclusions.

(13) Presenting the Other Side. This technique involves some people in a group believing neither of the opposing persons is entirely virtuous. To them, messages that express concepts solely in terms of right and wrong may not be credible. Agreement with minor aspects of the enemy's point of view may overcome cynicism. This also shows that the presenter has researched both sides and has determined the better approach.

(14) Simplification. This technique reduces facts to either right, wrong, good, or evil. It provides simple solutions for complex problems and offers simplified interpretations of events, ideas, concepts, or personalities.

(15) Compare and Contrast. This technique compares two or more ideas, issues, or choices and explains the differences between them. It is effective if the group has a conflict that must be resolved.

(16) Compare for Similarities. This technique compares two or more ideas, issues, or objects to try and find a common understanding. It tries to show the desired behavior or attitude is similar to one already accepted by the group.

(17) Illustrations and Narratives. This technique uses an illustration, which provides a detailed example of the idea being presented to make abstract or general ideas easier to comprehend. When a story is used, it is called a narrative.

(18) Specific Instances. This technique lists examples to help prove a point.

(19) Statistics. This technique uses statistics that have a certain authority, but the statistics must be clear enough to maintain relevance for the group. In most cases, it is best to keep the statistical evidence simple and easily absorbable by the group.

(20) Explanations. This technique is used when a term or idea is unfamiliar.

(21) Gifts. This technique involves giving something tangible before requesting compliance. The idea is the target will feel the need to reciprocate later. For example, one could say: "Accept this well and cistern as a gift to the people of your town from the partner forces… to demonstrate our good will and hope for mutual cooperation in the future."

(22) Debt. This technique calls in past favors. For example, one could say: "Coalition forces have done a lot for your town: the new school, the well in the center of town… These insurgents are endangering all we have worked for together. We need your help in stopping these groups by reporting any information you and your people may discover."

(23) Aversive Stimulation. This technique is used when continuous punishment and the cessation of punishment is contingent upon compliance.

(24) Moral Appeal. This technique entails finding moral common ground and using the moral commitments of a person to obtain compliance.

(25) Positive and Negative Self-feeling. This technique entails making a person feel either positive or negative about themselves as a method of persuasion.

(26) Positive and Negative Esteem of Others. This technique entails making a person feel emotional about others' thoughts of them.

(27) Fear. This technique entails using fear techniques to make the listener comply with suggestions.

i. Step 9: Apply Techniques. During this step, the techniques discussed in Step 8 are applied. Below are some identified barriers to successfully applying these methods.

(1) While communicating with one's counterpart, the advisor will possibly encounter the two following barriers.

(a) Indifference.

- What value are you to me?
- I do not care; what's in it for me?

(b) Concerns of the advisee or counterpart.

- Misunderstanding (believes something that is not factual).
- Skepticism (does not believe or trust the advisor).
- Drawback (the counterpart's demand and concern is impossible or beyond the advisor's capability to solve).

(2) The following lists the above barriers and immediate actions for overcoming them.

(a) Indifference.

- Probe for opportunities and effects.
- Create awareness of needs.
- Support the needs.
- Close.

(b) Misunderstanding.

- Acknowledge the concern.
- Probe.
- Offer relevant proof.
- Check for acceptance.

(c) Skepticism.

- Acknowledge the concern.
- Probe.
- Offer relevant proof.
- Check for acceptance.

(d) Drawback.

- Step back, draw attention to the bigger picture.
- Readdress needs.

- Check for acceptance.

(3) The following is the process used above for gaining understanding and obtaining an agreement that overcome barriers.

(a) Open. Open the discussion to determine if it is indifference or one of the concerns of the counterpart that is creating the barrier.

(b) Probe. Probe for opportunities and effects. Determine the root cause of the barrier.

- Circumstances. Determine if one time or local circumstances are the root cause or are the circumstances for substantial.

- Needs. Determine the needs of the person causing the barrier.

(c) Support needs. Support the needs of the person or the circumstance that removes the barriers.

(d) Close. Make an agreement on that talking point or barrier and repeat the process on the next perceived barrier.

(e) Continue until an agreement is reached, or take immediate action on indifference or concerns. Repeat as necessary.

j. Step 10: Check MOEs and Look for Unintended Consequences. The advisor should be able to easily assess the effectiveness of actions by assessing the related MOEs. However, with every action there may be unintended consequences, or the activity may not be preparing the counterparts for more complicated tasks later. Using soccer as a team building effort could work well as the sides learn to work with each other, unless it causes the unit to split into two ethnic or political factions.

Note: All the approaches mentioned are designed to help the advisor achieve a goal, but just knowing the counterpart wants something is not enough. The advisor will have a limited supply of resources available to commit for changes or behavior modification. Since advisors can only bend so much on rules and regulations; eventually, they must resort to negotiations.

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7. Negotiation

a. **Overview.** Negotiation can be a challenging and complex process; yet, people negotiate on many levels every day. Negotiation is not always about the FSF counterpart or people encountered while deployed. In fact, most people apply negotiation skills to interactions within their own organizations and personal lives.

(1) Negotiation contexts are always changing depending on the AO, social situation, and environment. It is important to keep an open mind in approaching any engagement, meeting, or negotiation. Remember, both parties are at the table because they both want something.

(2) This section on negotiations is presented from a Western perspective. Many of these techniques are useful universally. Advisors should refer to the section on culture (Chapter IV, Section 1) to see what adaptations need to be considered before using them. Modern negotiation techniques emphasize the integrative

approach (win/win), and discount the distributive (win or lose) and other approaches. Each major approach to negotiating (integrative or distributive) has advantages and disadvantages. In planning for each negotiation, advisors should consider the desired outcome (both sides), the situation, and the cultures. This helps determine the initial negotiating approach. Although all situations are different, learning, practicing, and improving the skills outlined in this section assist the Service member in accomplishing key tasks in today's OE. Advisors should adjust or change the approach based on changing circumstances and new information.

(3) In planning for any meeting or negotiation, advisors must understand what is needed and wanted, the ROE, and the commander's guidance. US goals and objectives drive an advisor's negotiations. The "how" should be negotiated to achieve those goals and objectives, not what goals and objectives to achieve.

(4) Advisors should understand that although some of their attempts to influence counterparts will be unsuccessful, the goal of negotiation is compromise.

b. **Factors Impacting Negotiations.** The following paragraphs discuss the four factors impacting negotiations.

(1) Time. Some cultures and individuals see time in a micro-view. It is all about here and now. Other cultures and individuals see time in a macro-view. Individuals see themselves on the entire timeline of their lives, making temporary circumstances seem less substantial, and the present moment is a point bridging the past with the future. For example, a deadline-driven person may strive for a decision in minutes or hours, whereas an FSF member may think in terms of months or years to reach a decision.

(2) Environment. Some cultures believe the impact on the environment is directly attributable to a person, and every accident is preventable. Other cultures believe the environment impacts the person. Accidents just happen, and no one can do anything about it. One side may be quite ready to commit to something in the future "knowing" nothing stands in the way, while the other side may be reluctant to talk in certainties of the future "knowing" factors beyond their control may prevent them from fulfilling their commitments.

(3) Self. In some cultures, when a person makes a mistake, blame can be isolated to that person. In other cultures, the individual is seen as an element of the group, so a mistake is made not by the individual, but rather the whole group. Thus, in negotiations, one might accept a personal slight to accomplish a goal; but the counterpart, representing the group, cannot allow shame to fall on the group.

(4) Nonverbal Communication. Since advisors often have to work through interpreters, nonverbal communication is very important. Some cultures respect people who mean what they say and maintain their composure. Other cultures respect the eloquence in which something is said or the emotion used to convey it. Where words may be translated improperly, the advisor or the counterpart can hear tone and sense emotion.

c. **Negotiation Roles.** When entering a negotiation, it is important to know the advisor's role. The following paragraphs discuss the three major roles associated with negotiation. Each role has its own techniques and functions.

(1) Negotiator. The negotiator is the most common advisor role. A negotiation is the process by which parties exchange commitments or promises to resolve disagreements and reach settlements. The advisor needs to prepare for each negotiation or will be at a significant disadvantage during the negotiation session. To prepare for a negotiation session, the advisor should consider the following.

(a) Examine the options.

- What is the advisor trying to accomplish?
- How important is it to the advisor?
- How important is it to the counterpart?
- How much leverage does the advisor have?
- Who is in the position of power?
- What if the advisor and counterpart cannot agree?

(b) Discover the counterparts' motivations. What are their underlying needs?

(c) List all the scenarios that could satisfy mutual needs. Features should be added to these scenarios that increase the opportunity for all parties to be satisfied. Advisors should list and prioritize the interests that support one's own positions. This helps determine the "why" influencing the "what" (position, solution, and demand). Also, advisors should list the other party's interests that influence their potential positions. At the negotiation, the information sharing process (discussing each other's interests) is the basis for the follow-on brainstorming session to develop potential solutions that could be developed separately because neither party has complete information before the meeting.

(d) Use the integrative process, which seeks to generate a solution better than any single party could generate, as the primary option. It is a process that supports a long-term relationship and can build trust between partners who have successfully solved a problem while making mutual concessions. At times, simple compromises can facilitate the negotiation and help create a "win/win" outcome. Achieving consensus, not total agreement or satisfaction, is key. A consensus means all parties are at least minimally satisfied. Negotiators should strive to maximize the benefits (positive) to each party while minimizing the cost (negatives). This is the hallmark of a skilled negotiator as it creates an agreement with an increased chance of being effectively executed while, simultaneously, preserving the relationship.

(e) The negotiator represents one side and has a vested interest in the outcome of the negotiation.

- If the FSF ask the advisor to negotiate for them, they expect the advisor to have their best interests in mind. The coalition may try to use the advisor to push their agenda and influence, rather than negotiate.
- It is best to avoid conflict of interest situations. The advisor could lose the trust of the counterpart by blindly pushing the coalition's agenda.
- If the FSF counterpart desires to take action that is not legally acceptable, the advisor probably will not be able to use the commitment techniques discussed earlier in Chapter 6. The advisor probably needs to use some form of compliant technique.
- If the FSF counterpart is not violating any laws, the advisor should focus on commitment techniques. Success will not be achieved quickly. Table 5 is an example of an interest-based negotiation worksheet.

Table 5. Interest-Based Negotiation Worksheet

Assessing the Negotiation Context	Advisor's Side	Other Party
Position **(Assumed best outcome or solution.)**	• What is "our" position? Is the position unique to a single organization or must the position include other organizations (i.e., other stakeholders)? • Is this a new situation or the continuation of another situation? • Are there any existing agreements? • What does the advisor's organization, chain of command, or team want to happen? • What is the rationale for this position?	• What is the other party's position? • Do they present any existing agreement to support their position? • Do they see it as a new situation or the continuation of another situation? • Is there precedent or tradition? • What does the other party's chain of authority look like (formal and informal)? What does the advisor think they desire as their "best" position? • What might be the rationale for this position?
Interests and Priorities **(Why does the advisor want this outcome? How important is the interest?)**	List and prioritize the advisor's interests in this case. What are the context, situation, conditions, and environment influencing the advisor's position and driving the negotiation? 1. From the advisor's perspective, what are the overarching issues? What are other stakeholders' overarching issues? 2. From the advisor's perspective, what are issues specific to the region outside of this case (e.g., economic, political, cultural, etc.)?	List and prioritize the other parties' interests in this case. What are the context, situation, conditions, and environment influencing their position and driving the negotiation? 1. From their perspective, what are the overarching issues? What do they think the advisor's objectives might be? (Avoid mirror imaging, strive to put issues in their context.) 2. From their perspective, what are issues specific to the region and other interested parties with power outside of this case (e.g., economic, political, cultural, etc.)? What are their issues? Why might they be interested in the negotiations?

Table 5. Interest-Based Negotiation Worksheet (Cont'd)		
Assessing the Negotiation Context	**Advisor's Side**	**Other Party**
	3. From the advisor's perspective, what are issues specific to this individual case (e.g., a status-of-forces agreement, laws and authorities, existing contracts or agreements, maximizing a gain or minimizing a loss, political issues, economics, tradition, etc.)? Is this an individual case or part of a larger situation? 4. Identify the stakeholders. What are the stakeholders' positions and interests? What are their relationships with other parties and each other? Who has power; why and how can it be affected? 5. Are there interrelations between issues? For example, if the advisor executes an action because of this case, how will it affect the relationship with other parts of their government? May other parties' (stakeholders') relationships change? How and why? 6. What is the advisor's desired negotiation outcome? What are the long-term interests? Do all stakeholders share the same long-term goal?	3. From their perspective, what are issues specific to this case? What might their perceptions be of the advisor(s)? Does the other party see this as an individual case or part of a larger situation? 4. Identify their potential stakeholders. What are their positions and interests? What are their relationships within their organization and with outside stakeholders? Who has power; why and how can it be affected? 5. What does the other party see as the interrelations between issues? For example, if they execute an action because of this case, what might the effect be on other elements of their relationship with interested stakeholders? 6. What does the advisor think they want the situation to be after the negotiations conclude? What are their perceptions of long-term interests?
Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement **(What can the advisor do if an agreement is not reached with the other party?)**	The best alternative to a negotiated agreement is an action pursued by the advisor's own side without consultation with or, agreement by, the other party. Determine the options the advisor can execute unilaterally after "leaving the table." Within each option: 1. What are the desired responses from the other party? 2. What action by the other party might trigger this event?	The best alternative to a negotiated agreement may be pursued by the other party without consultation with or, agreement by, the advisor. Determine the options the other party can execute unilaterally, if they "leave the table." Within each option: 1. What are the responses they might desire from the advisor? Can they impact a stakeholder who can exert influence on the advisor's best alternative to a negotiated agreement? 2. What advisor action might trigger this event?

Table 5. Interest-Based Negotiation Worksheet (Cont'd)		
Assessing the Negotiation Context	**Advisor's Side**	**Other Party**
	3. How might the stakeholders respond? 4. What are some possible consequences that are undesirable to your position? 5. How will executing the option affect the advisor's long-term relationship with the other party and with stakeholders? 6. How much does the other party know about the option? How much power or ability do they have to weaken the advisor's best alternative to negotiated agreement options? Can the advisor impact a stakeholder that can exert influence on the 'foreign security forces' best alternative to a negotiated agreement?	3. How might their stakeholders respond? How might the advisor's stakeholders respond? 4. What are some possible consequences that are undesirable to them, their stakeholders, the advisors, and the advisor's stakeholder's positions? 5. How will executing the option affect their long-term relationship with the advisor and advisor's stakeholders? 6. How much does the advisor know of the details? How much power does the advisor have to weaken their best alternative to negotiated agreement options?
Meeting Agenda	What is the appropriate approach; presenting the "full proposal" or an issue at a time? Consider broadening or narrowing the scope. (Should the advisor add or subtract issues from the table to help create a common interest?) Are there automatic derailers? How might the advisor avoid them? What will be the advisor's 90-second, opening statement? What is the other party's expected 90-second opening statement? Who should go first? What should be presented first? An easy issue (for trust building) or a hard issue?	

(2) Mediator. An advisor may fill the position of mediator. In Western culture, a mediator is defined as one who is not known to either party, has an impartial stance in any outcome of the mediation, and has no decision-making authority. In many other cultures, a mediator is a known and respected person who sometimes has a stake in the outcome and, at times, has decision-making authority. Before embarking on the role of mediator, advisors need to understand the cultural expectations and adjust as needed. As a minimum, the advisor must be seen as an honest broker, able to understand all aspects of the argument, and guide the disputing parties to their own solution with a minimum of direction. Table 6 outlines some potential mediator roles.

Table 6. Mediator Roles			
Role	**Function**	**Outcome**	**When to Use It**
Facilitator	The advisor is not a player.	No influence.	When the advisor is not a player.
Their decision, their outcome	The focus is on the process.	Participants will agree on their own.	When the focus is on the process.
Formulator	The advisor coaches both sides.	Indirect influence.	When both sides need a coach.

(a) Facilitator Tactics. The facilitator should:

- Be available to meet with both parties as they desire or as needed.
- Share only information with one party that is permitted to be shared by the other party.
- Arrange for interaction.
- Clarify the situation.
- Supply missing information.
- Transmit messages between parties.
- Ensure all interests are discussed.

(b) Formulator Tactics. The formulator should:

- Be available to meet with both parties as they desire or as needed.
- Share only information with one party that is permitted to be shared by the other party.
- Control the pace, formality, and physical environment of the meetings.
- Highlight common interests.
- Help parties save face.
- Keep the process focused on the issues.
- Make substitutive proposals.
- Suggest concessions the parties could make.

(3) Arbitrator. The FSF may try to put the advisor in the position of arbitrator. Arbitration is the process by which disputing parties submit their differences to be judged by an impartial source selected by mutual consent or statutory provision. The advisor is in trouble when FSF want the advisor to make a decision between two FSF positions. If a positive solution for both parties can be found, the advisor improves rapport with both parties, but when a solution is not positive for both parties, the advisor may alienate one or both parties. If the FSF constantly seek

decisions from the advisor, the advisor should reassess the level of involvement to avoid the arbitrator role.

d. **Distributive and Integrative Negotiating.** US culture leads the advisor to believe every situation has a win/win solution, and the counterpart also wants to achieve a win/win outcome. Some cultures do not believe win/win is optimal and prefer a win/lose philosophy. Distributive and integrative negotiating are discussed as follows.

(1) Distributive. The distributive process uses negotiation meetings to present a position, protect information from disclosure, or discredit another party. The objective is victory for one's own position and defeat for the other party's inputs.

(a) It is known as "win/lose" or "fixed-pie approach." There are usually a fixed number of available resources. One party usually feels it won; the other feels it lost.

(b) Conflict is viewed as inevitable; negotiation is guided by competition rather than collaboration.

(c) Deception and distrust may be perceived with this approach. Information is seen as powerful.

(d) The dominant concern, usually, is maximizing one's own interests.

(2) Integrative. The integrative process uses negotiating meetings to share ideas, interests, and information, but not preconceived positions. The discovery process then fosters the development of potential solutions none of the parties could have likely developed on their own due to incomplete information. From the potential solutions, parties agree on selection criteria to determine which option provides an agreeable solution. The objective is consensus and satisfaction, not victory. The following are insights about integrative negotiation.

(a) It is known as the "win/win" or "expanding-the-pie" approach. Both parties feel they have gained something. Interest-based negotiation is an example of integrative negotiation covered later in this chapter.

(b) Conflict is not viewed as inevitable; mutual gains exist. Trust-building is initiated to develop a cooperative environment.

(c) An understanding of needs allows resources to be divided and both sides can win.

(d) Through collaboration, valued resources become known to both parties, and interests from both sides are satisfied.

(e) Negotiations focus on the interests or the "why." For example, one may say, "We need better security." The personal relationship is crucial; mutual long-term gain is often the goal.

(3) Distributive and integrative negotiating strategies are different in their approaches and desired outcomes. However, after selecting the initial strategy, the advisor should consider what triggers might occur that would motivate the advisor to switch approaches to reach a desired outcome. When considering a

change in approach, advisors should think about the new set of pros and cons. Successful negotiations can involve a mix of both strategies.

e. **Interest-based Negotiation.**

(1) Interest-based negotiation is an integrative approach focusing on relationships. Because long-term relationships are increasingly important, especially in SC with FSF, achieving US and PN objectives, the following paragraphs delve into interest-based negotiations closely and include a negotiation planning sheet (see table 7). Essential components of interest-based negotiation are the following.

(a) Separate the people from the problem; focus on issues not personalities.

(b) Focus on the interests not the position.

(c) Discover the reasons or "whys" behind stated positions.

(d) Brainstorm for mutual gains.

(e) Discover all the ways parties can work together to reach an agreement.

(f) Use objective criteria to measure fairness or reasonableness of the agreement.

(2) During talks, there may be a tendency for advisors to forget they are dealing with other human beings. The emotional aspect can range from helpful to disastrous. If there is a working relationship built on trust, advising is a little easier. If there is a tenuous or nonexistent relationship, it can be more difficult to separate the people from the problem. Consider the following.

(a) Perceptions. Advisors should place themselves in the counterparts' shoes (gain empathy). Also, be mindful of one's own and each other's fears.

(b) Emotions.

- Acknowledge one's own emotions and, if appropriate, validate the other party's emotions.
- Allow time to process, discuss, and vent.
- REMEMBER, it is not about the advisor; it is about the situation.
- Emotions are expressed differently across cultures.

(c) Communication:

- Practice active listening skills.
- Try not to interrupt.
- Be aware of the counterpart's body language.
- Use two important tools: observing and asking questions.

(d) If advisors have difficulty separating emotions from the issue, they should breathe (when in doubt, breathe and count to ten). The advisor should consider silence or request a break.

(3) Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement. The advisor should explore ways to improve the best alternative to a negotiated agreement. The following describe the best alternative to a negotiated agreement.

(a) It is determined before the implementation or meeting phase.

(b) It is what options are or will be available if no agreement is reached or the meeting does not occur.

(c) It is critical to have a thorough understanding of potential second- and third-order effects for any alternative. What are the consequences? What is the impact on current and future relationships?

(4) Zone of Possible Agreement. The zone of possible agreement is the range between the reservation point (referred to as bottom line—the least the advisor will accept) and the aspiration point (the ideal outcome), and often is used to gauge fairness. Limiting offers to those within this range can hinder the negotiating parties in realizing the possibilities for mutual gains.

f. **Negotiation Styles.** Negotiation styles are critical components of negotiation and conflict resolution. Five styles are discussed below. Advisors should consider the key uses and consequences of over- and underuse of each style with regard to the needs of the situation. Although advisors may choose a style at a particular moment, they are not locked into it. As situations shift, so must the advisors' approaches. A single negotiation may cover multiple topics that require the employment of different negotiation styles, depending on the topic and situational atmospherics. This is especially important in the military context where, potentially, dangerous situations may arise that require the use of a competitive style. These styles are neither correct nor incorrect, but rather a series of tools to help achieve the military objectives.

(1) Competing or Insisting. This is a power-oriented mode that pushes the advisor's position and wins.

(a) Key Uses. Executing quick action, making unpopular decisions, and using in emergency situations.

(b) Consequences of Overuse. Lack of feedback, reduced learning, and low empowerment.

(c) Consequences of Underuse. Lowered level of influence, indecisiveness, slow action, and withheld contributions.

(2) Collaborating or Cooperating. This is a relationship-oriented mode that seeks "win/win" solutions.

(a) Key Uses. Integrating solutions, learning, merging perspectives, gaining commitment, building trust, and improving relationships.

(b) Consequences of Overuse. Diffusion of responsibility, others may take advantage, work overload, and it is time intensive.

(c) Consequences of Underuse. Quick-fix solutions, lack of commitment by other team members, and loss of innovation.

(3) Compromising or Settling. This is a relationship-oriented mode that loses some to win others.

(a) Key Uses. Equally powerful parties and commitment to opposing views; issues of moderate importance.

(b) Consequences of Overuse. Loss of long-term goals and lack of trust create a cynical environment; lacking strength of character or ineffective.

(c) Consequences of Underuse. Difficulty making concessions, difficulty getting out of destructive arguments, or failure to get the fair share.

(4) Avoiding or Evading. This is a delay-oriented mode that does not pursue either parties' issues.

(a) Key Uses. Issues of low importance reduce tensions and strengthen the best alternative to a negotiated agreement; success is redefined by creating more options.

(b) Consequences of Overuse. Low level of input; decision-making by default allows issues to fester.

(c) Consequences of Underuse. Possible increased level of hostility and hurt feelings.

(5) Accommodating or Complying. This is a goodwill-oriented mode that gives in to foster goodwill.

(a) Key Uses. Issues of low importance create goodwill by showing the advisor is reasonable; performance development and peacekeeping.

(b) Consequences of Overuse. Ideas get little attention, influence is restricted, contributions are lost, and great challenges emerge.

(c) Consequences of Underuse. Lack of rapport, low morale, and inability to yield.

g. **Confrontation Preference and Expected Outcomes.** Negotiators have one of three preferences for confrontation: avoidance, collaboration, or competition. Those who prefer avoidance consider accommodation as a viable means to resolve an issue. A negotiator who prefers collaboration considers compromise as the preferred outcome. A competitive negotiator wants to win. Intentionally losing in a negotiation to avoid confrontation seems counterintuitive; however, it tends to protect the current relationship. Collaboration requires a mutual respect of the existing relationship, while competition is, generally, indifferent. For example, consider the situation where Friend A wants to go fishing, and Friend B wants to go to a baseball game. If inclined toward avoidance, Friend A would value the friendship, give in, and go to the game. However, if inclined toward collaboration, Friend A might suggest taking a radio on the fishing trip to listen to the game. If inclined toward competition, Friend A would go fishing with or without Friend B. It would be fairly easy to take advantage of a negotiator who prefers to avoid confrontation. At the same time, expecting to be able to compromise with a highly competitive negotiator may become a point of frustration. For the competitor, winning may be more important than the deal itself.

Some of the characteristics associated with each type of negotiation perspective or start position are listed in table 7.

Table 7. Negotiation Perspectives and Positions

Positional Soft (Avoidance)	Positional Hard (Competition)	Principled (Collaborative)
Participants are friends.	Participants are hostile.	Participants are problem solvers.
The goal is agreement.	The goal is victory.	The goal is a mutually advantageous option.
Make concessions to reach an agreement.	Demand concessions to agree.	Separate the people from the problem.
Be soft on the person and problem.	Be hard on the person and problem.	Be soft on the person and hard on the problem.
Trust others.	Distrust others.	Manage risk.
Change your position easily.	Stand firm.	Focus on interests not positions.
Make offers.	Make threats.	Explore interests.
Disclose your bottom line.	Mislead as to your bottom line.	Avoid having a bottom line.
Accept losses to reach agreement.	Demand gains as the price for agreement.	Invent options for mutual gain.
Insist on agreement.	Insist on your position.	Insist on using objective criteria.
Avoid a contest of wills.	Try to win a contest of wills.	The result is based on standards independent of will.
Yield to pressure.	Apply pressure.	Yield to reason.

h. **Negotiation Focus.** Determining whether the negotiation is a “win/win” situation is not as simple as which side gained the most tangible material from the negotiation. Every negotiation will vary on which factor is most important. Just as a car dealer may accept less profit on individual services, the dealer gains overall if the customer returns because the customer trusts the dealer.

i. **Negotiation Team Organization.** Typically, formal negotiations are conducted by three to five member teams with each team member fulfilling a specific function for the process. The actual size and make-up of the team will be determined through mission analysis. Table 8 provides an explanation of the various roles and examples of the duties and responsibilities of each.

Table 8. Negotiation Team Duties and Responsibilities	
Team Role	**Duties and Responsibilities**
Negotiator	Before Negotiations: • Assigns personnel to team roles. • Prepares the team for negotiation. • Determines the best alternative to a negotiated agreement. • Selects strategies for the negotiation that are nested within a team engagement strategy. • Determines the approach to use. • Considers impacts to negotiations. • Analyzes risk and potential mission impact. • Determines goals and objectives. • Determines content, including if and when other members of the team speak.
	During Negotiations: • Represents the team. • Positions team members. • Sets the team's behavioral attitude. • Controls team content and inputs into negotiation. • Closes the negotiations.
	After Negotiations: • Leads the team debrief, including interpreters, as appropriate. • Prepares all required reports. • Adjusts the team engagement strategy, as required, based on outcomes.

Table 8. Negotiation Team Duties and Responsibilities (Cont'd)	
Team Role	**Duties and Responsibilities**
Process Observer	Before Negotiations: • Assists the negotiator in preparing the team. • Assists the negotiator in planning a strategy.
	During Negotiations: • Records key conversational points. • Controls information flow to the negotiator. • Assists the negotiator in adjusting or developing the strategy throughout the negotiation process. • Monitors the interpreter. • Summarizes the negotiation. • Ensures the negotiator is aware, and has a good understanding, of all outcomes.
	After Negotiations: • Assists the negotiator during the team debrief. • Assists the negotiator in preparing required reports.
Interpreter or Translator Description: Interpreters come with different qualifications or categories. (See chapter VI).	Before Negotiations: • Rehearses dialogue with the negotiator.
	During Negotiations: • Interprets or translates dialogue for the negotiator.
	After Negotiations: • See chapter VI.
Overwatch #1 Description: Overwatch personnel are armed team members employed for the security of the team.	Before Negotiations: • Conducts a security assessment of the engagement location. • Assigns the positions of additional overwatch personnel.

Table 8. Negotiation Team Duties and Responsibilities (Cont'd)	
Team Role	**Duties and Responsibilities**
	During Negotiations: • Monitors the entire interaction for potential threats to team safety. • Limits effects of any attack on the team. • Covers the team as members withdraw to safety in the event of an attack.
	After Negotiations: • Participates in the team debrief.
Overwatch #2	Before Negotiations: • Assists with a security assessment of the engagement location.
	During Negotiations: • Monitors the assigned sector for potential threats to team safety. • Limits effects of any attack on the team. • Covers the team as members withdraw to safety in the event of an attack.
	After Negotiations: • Participates in the team debrief.

j. **Coordinated Advising Efforts.** In many instances, an advisor team will manage multiple negotiation teams that are employed simultaneously. The advisor team leader should develop a team engagement strategy that will guide the inputs and be affected by the outcomes of individual team negotiations. Each negotiation team should develop an engagement strategy as a guide to influence desired outcomes from an individual meeting or negotiation that are nested within the team engagement strategy. It is important that the inputs and outcomes of individual negotiation teams are captured and managed at the advisor-team level to manage the larger team engagement strategy. There is an art to controlling, influencing, and managing multiple negotiation teams to reach a single desired end state. It requires persistent information sharing and management, constant wargaming of injects and consequences of projected outcomes, and flexibility.

8. Advising Role

a. **General.** Every advisor is required to be proficient in the developing skills: teaching, coaching, and advising. The advisor will make an initial assessment of the FSF unit's proficiency to determine the appropriate developing skill to use. Figure 11 illustrates the appropriate level of advice that corresponds to the FSF unit's capabilities.



Figure 11. Appropriate Advising Skill

b. **Teach, Coach, or Advise.** Advisor teams have limited positional power and depend upon personal influence to affect positive FSF efforts via teaching, coaching, or advising. Advisor team members often work with people of higher rank or grade than themselves. Advisors should remain cognizant of the FSF unit's experience and capabilities to carefully choose opportunities for injecting knowledge. FSF units are, normally, agreeable to advisor teams who teach unobtrusively. Advisors who are subtle in their approach to teaching, coaching, and advising are highly valued by FSF units. Advisors who make FSF personnel feel they are teaching themselves are often the most effective.

(1) **Teaching.** Teaching includes training and education. Methods of teaching can include classroom lectures, seminars, exercises, or simulations.

(2) **Coaching.** Coaching refers to guiding people through a set of tasks to enhance capabilities already present. Those being coached may not realize their potential. The coach helps them understand their current level of performance and instructs them on how to reach the next level of knowledge and skill. Coaching requires identifying short- and long-term goals and devising plans to achieve them. The coach discusses strengths and weaknesses with the leader being coached to sustain improvement. Coaches:

(a) Focus goals.

(b) Clarify the leader's self-awareness.

(c) Uncover potential.

(d) Eliminate developmental barriers.

(e) Develop action plans and commitment.

(f) Follow up.

(3) **Advising.** Advisors have experience in their advising areas but are not required to have similar backgrounds.

(a) Advisors provide expert opinion, advice, and counsel by focusing on personal (i.e., interpersonal and communication skills) and professional development (i.e., technical and tactical knowledge) to develop mutual trust and respect.

(b) Advisor relationships are not based on superior to subordinate relationships.

(c) Figure 12 shows how teaching, coaching, and advising align with corresponding FSF tasks of learning, practicing, and executing. As the FSF master one skill, the advisor can move on to other skills and initiate the process again for new skills. If they require additional teaching or coaching, the advisor can focus them on one part of the cycle. Eventually, the teaching and coaching should decrease and the majority of the advisor's time will be spent as an advisor providing an expert second opinion.



Figure 12. Advisor Cycle

(d) Every advisor has to be a trainer, but not all trainers can perform the more demanding task of advising. Training occurs in a controlled environment with the trainer frequently following a fixed program of instruction to improve unit skills, whereas advising often requires the advisor to develop a training program and then coach or advise the unit under actual circumstances where the outcomes are real. The advisor works to improve the performance of the unit in real time. To be effective, personnel selected as advisors need to have the requisite experience to be considered an SME and the interpersonal skills required to influence effectively.

9. Collective Advisor Skills

a. Collective Skills. Once the advisor team is formed, team members must practice their unit combat and survival skills tasks and organize to cover normal functions associated with any team, including member duties and responsibilities. As with individual advisor skills, some collective skills are refined prior to deployment, and others are learned in country. See figure 13 for collective advisor skills and tasks.



Figure 13. Collective Advisor Skills and Tasks

b. Training FSF.

(1) Training Concept. Training varies according to the FSF requirements, force composition, and US and foreign agreements. Advisor teams may need to use a “train the trainer” concept to prepare the FSF to be self-sufficient and capable of sustaining skills. Initially, US personnel may find themselves conducting all instruction through interpreters.

(a) Advisors must prepare to be the primary instructors.

(b) Advisors should use the *building block* or *crawl, walk, run* approaches for developing FSF capabilities. However, the level (e.g., walk) of the building block is determined after assessing the FSF. The key is to develop effective procedures FSF leaders accept and maintain.

(c) Advisors should encourage FSF to develop standards that can be measured individually and collectively. This will require negotiation and, in some cases, approval from higher echelons of FSF command structures.

(d) Advisors should quickly establish capable FSF personnel as primary instructors. This builds rapport, credibility, and friendship.

(e) Advisors use training to build FSF leader credibility. Advisors train the leaders and let them lead. They coach and assist the leaders in training their personnel.

(2) Methods of Instruction. Advisors preplan quality, thoughtful training with notes that guide discussions and ensure that the FSF meets all learning objectives. However, advisors should be rehearsed and know their material so that they do not *depend* on their notes.

(a) Advisors should use hands-on training. It is the best method of instruction. FSF officers should be involved in all training events where their troops participate. Hands-on training involves:

- Demonstration.
- Step-by-step walkthroughs.
- Practice.
- Tests.

(b) Advisors should not rely on lecture as a method of training. Since some FSF may be illiterate, advisors cannot rely solely on using written media.

(c) Advisors should reinforce bottom-up planning and top-down guidance. This takes time, but the FSF will be receptive to this methodology once they see it can contribute to successful missions. Advisors should encourage problem solving at the lowest level.

(d) Advisors should take advantage of technology-independent, low-cost solutions, such as sand tables or table-top exercises. They should consider sustainable solutions using material and resources readily available to the FSF.

(e) If available, advisors can use simulation, but exercise caution when designing programs around expensive simulation systems.

(f) Advisors reinforce the FSF chain of command. Advisors help them solve their problems; they do not solve their problems for them.

(3) Common Pitfalls.

(a) Some members of the FSF may try to use the advisor as a scapegoat when tough or unpopular decisions have to be made.

(b) The FSF take on some of the personality of their advisors. If the advisors are overly aggressive, overly confident, or falsely motivated, the FSF may be the same.

(c) If members of the FSF try to influence their advisors with excuses or even threats to get leave and passes, advisors should refer these incidents to the FSF leadership. Advisors should encourage, if necessary, the FSF leaders to establish an equitable pass and leave policy that supports both readiness and wellness.

(d) In many parts of the world, directly confronting someone is considered improper and results in FSF leaders being unwilling to confront individuals about performance. Advisors need to be aware of how the FSF provides feedback and encourage FSF leaders to adopt a command climate that permits open dialogue, appropriate with cultural considerations, that leads to improved FSF effectiveness.

(e) The FSF leadership may attempt to get advisors involved in simple organizational problems they should handle. Advisors need to be careful to avoid being seen as decision makers because it undermines a unit's morale and cohesiveness.

(f) Tribal, ethnic, economic, caste, racial, or religious discrimination may be common within the AO. The advisor should, carefully, consider mixing diverse groups in an attempt to get them to work together. One method to overcome ethnic bias, for example, is by promoting teamwork and basing rewards on merit. Advisors should encourage friendly competition between units to build cohesiveness and teamwork. Tribes may have deep-seated animosity that goes back generations and cannot be overcome by friendly competition and familiarity. ***Apply these techniques with humility, not hubris.***

(g) The advisors' perception of corruption or nepotism may be quite different from the local society's perception. Family, friends, and affiliated tribe members may receive favored status for appointments, jobs, and other rewards. Advisors must learn the locally-acceptable practices and work to change those that inhibit developing professional, cohesive units. Strong leadership, training, and performance-based awards are factors that contribute to managing these problems.

(h) Some leaders will be reluctant to delegate authority. They may feel threatened by anyone around them who is competent or possesses leadership abilities. They may view such people as threats to their position and attempt to get rid of their perceived competitors. Advisors need to show, through example, how powerful leaders can maximize the abilities of their subordinates.

10. Chapter Conclusion

This chapter covered the skill sets that advisors at all levels must present to meet with success. These skill sets included advising principles, self-awareness, influence techniques and procedures, negotiation techniques, and a deeper look at the roles that advisors play. These skill sets should be kept in mind through the next chapter, as advisors will employ them in varied cultures.

Chapter IV
CULTURE AND THE ADVISOR

1. Culture

a. Culture is the way a society sees and thinks about the world. It includes the traditions, ideals, and customs of a nation, tribe, region, state, or other group of people.

b. Culture is:

(1) A system of shared beliefs, values, customs, behaviors, and artifacts members of a society use to cope with the world and one another.

(2) Learned through a process called enculturation and deeply embedded and regarded as normal or natural.

(3) Patterned, meaning people in a society live and think in ways forming definite, repeating patterns.

(4) Adaptive and responsive to environmental changes; changeable through social interactions between people and groups.

(5) Subjective, meaning advisors should have no presumptions regarding what an external society considers right and wrong or good and bad.

(6) Internalized, in the sense that it is habitual, taken for granted, and perceived as natural by people within the society.

c. The unpredictable nature and location of military operations require a set of universal and transferrable culture concepts and skills that personnel can employ wherever they go. There is a need for advisors to learn "how to learn" about culture, to observe cultural differences, and how to interact appropriately and effectively no matter where they find themselves in the world. As such, *cross-cultural competence* emerged as a key outcome of culture training and education. A commonly used working definition of cross-cultural competence is the ability to quickly and accurately comprehend, and then act effectively and appropriately in, a culturally complex environment to create the desired outcome—without necessarily having exposure to a particular group, region, or language.

d. The advisor must be aware of the cultural and historical aspects which influence behavior. Advisor team members must understand the motivations underlying personal interaction and practice patience when dealing with their counterparts. Instead of asserting their separateness and privacy as independent individuals, other cultures tend to interact as members of a group (i.e., family, clan, village, neighborhood, and tribe). Group norms guide individual behavior, and some cultures display a high need for social approval.

e. Cultural understanding is not derived from demographic information provided to the military through country briefs prior to deployment. It is gained from studying and understanding people's religion, history, customs, and social and political structures.

To be fully versed, it is necessary to live among the people to understand the subtleties of their culture.

2. Awareness

a. Cultural awareness reduces friction and allows high-quality communications based in a relationship capable of negotiating substantive issues.

b. Cultural awareness allows better prediction and tracking of second- and third-order effects, helping to avoid unforeseen or unintended consequences.

c. Acquiring a basic understanding of local history and culture allows advisors to recognize and effectively counter an adversary's propaganda based upon a misrepresentation of history.

d. Cultural understanding improves negotiations, operational planning, and decision-making.

3. Understanding Another Culture

Effective advising depends on an understanding of a foreign culture. Understanding another culture improves the ability to convey ideas, concepts, and purposes without causing counterproductive consequences. Judging the norms and traditions of another culture solely through the lens of one's own culture and experience can impede the ability to understand why others think and act as they do, and could jeopardize the mission.

Note: Advisors must avoid a rigid view that their culture is right and others are wrong.

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4. Cultural Dimensions of the Operational Environment

a. Values, beliefs, behaviors, and norms are parts of a culture. They include a people's history and religion, their use of body language and personal space, power distance between superiors and subordinates, time orientation, individualism, formality, perceptions, use of reason, and belief in cause and effect versus fate.

b. Values, beliefs, behaviors, and norms provide the framework for people to deal with others within their own society as well as societies around the world. Without this framework, every day would be a new challenge, forcing people to relearn the rules for interacting with others. A common set of rules (formal and informal) provides expectations for a given situation. Observing others, objectively and thoroughly, helps create strategies for dealing with them and enables better interaction.

c. Advisors should try to understand the local differences in values and beliefs within the context in which they are observed. They should look for patterns and behaviors that do not fit the "normal" activities in an AO. The following paragraphs give examples of how the US Army and US Marine Corps categorize the elements that shape values, beliefs, behaviors, and norms.

d. While not doctrinal, the Army uses society, environment, authority, religion and beliefs, communication, and history (SEARCH) to provide a framework that organizes the basic dimensions of culture into a map that can be as simple or as complex as needed. Advisors should use SEARCH as a memory aid to examine any culture. Each element of SEARCH is addressed in the following paragraphs.

(1) Society. Family and kinship, tribal/lineage/clan ties, sex and gender roles, health, learning, aesthetics, and recreation.

(2) Environment. Weather, geography, natural resources, production, distribution, consumption, and technology.

(3) Authority. Politics, patron-client relationships, religion, corruption, and military aspects.

(4) Religion and Beliefs. Ideology, codes of conduct, sacred books and stories, cultural assumptions, time, and space perceptions.

(5) Communication. Language, media, body language, and gestures.

(6) History. Knowledge, previous events, myth, and folk tales.

e. The Marine Corps uses several frameworks to organize culture. One framework is the five dimensions of operational culture. Similar to SEARCH, these dimensions are physical environment, economic, social structure, political structure, and beliefs and symbols. Table 9 explains the five dimensions of operational culture.

Table 9. The Five Dimensions of Operational Culture

Ecological Model	**Dimension 1: Physical Environment**
	The way the cultural group determines the use of the physical environment. Who has access to important physical resources (e.g., water, land, food, etc.) and how do they view these resources (e.g., land is owned or free to everyone)?
	Dimension 2: Economic
	The way the people in a culture obtain, produce, and distribute physical and symbolic goods (e.g., food, clothing, cars).
Social Structure Model	**Dimension 3: Social Structure**
	How people organize their political, economic, and social relationships, and the way this organization influences the distribution of positions, roles, status, and power within cultural groups.
	Dimension 4: Political Structure
	The political structures of a cultural group and the unique forms of leadership within such structures (e.g., bands, councils, hereditary chiefdoms, tribal structures, and electoral political systems). The distinction between formal, ideal political structures versus actual power structures.
Symbolic Model	**Dimension 5: Beliefs and Symbols**
	The cultural beliefs that influence a person's world view, and the rituals, symbols and practices associated with a particular belief system. These also include the role of local belief systems and religions controlling and affecting behavior.

5. United States and Military Culture

a. It is important to understand US and military culture to achieve a realistic awareness of how foreigners view US citizens and how actions influence others. Advisors must learn to adjust their behavior with respect to foreign traditions. US culture may be unusual to people who are unfamiliar with it. Understanding a foreign culture allows for better anticipation of foreign perceptions and associated reactions, allowing for modification of behavior to create desired results.

b. Other societies may view US traditions differently. US citizens, generally, value open and direct communication, while other cultures, particularly those in the Middle East, view these traits as abrupt and rude behavior. US culture tends towards individualism and encourages competition, innovation, and materialism. Collective societies may view these features as selfish preoccupations and aggressiveness.

c. Common attributes of US society include the following:

(1) The “American dream” (i.e., anyone can achieve anything by working hard enough).

(2) The conglomerate of US culture is a unique mixture of many cultures.

(3) The US concept of exceptionalism (i.e., our Nation is the best in the world).

(4) Egalitarianism (i.e., everyone is created equal and special favors are looked down on).

(5) Get back up on the horse; failure is an opportunity to improve.

(6) Low context culture (i.e., truth is fact-based and explicit [“yes means yes”]).

(7) Monochromic society (i.e., time is linear and punctuality is valued).

(8) Capitalism rules (i.e., competition is expected and condoned; strive to win).

6. Principles of Culture

a. Several important principles from the concept of culture follow.

(1) Culture is learned. People are not born with a particular culture. It is learned first in the family and then by other experiences over the life of the individual.

(2) Culture is adaptive. The customs a group develops are based largely on a particular environment as opposed to attitudes which may change quickly. Values, however, are the slowest to change because they are directly related to beliefs.

(3) Culture is in a constant state of change. Most cultural change occurs quite slowly over a period of years, in a series of small accommodations to new circumstances. Globalization, in particular the use of social media, has allowed for rapid and varied cultural changes. Rapid cultural change often creates tension (or even violence) as people attempt to reconcile their beliefs and values with the new conditions.

b. As a body of learned behaviors common to a given society, culture acts like a template, shaping behavior and consciousness within a society from one generation to the next. Most of what we observe as the explicit forms of culture including clothing, gestures, and food, are only the surface-level manifestations. In other words, these are the most visible, but the least important elements of culture.

c. When comparing cultures, there is a tendency to focus on how cultures are different from each other. However, cultures are also similar because they are designed to resolve common human problems. Advisors must be familiar with their own culture to find common experiences they can use to convey their message. While focusing on differences will help an advisor avoid areas where common bonds are difficult, the similarities will help an advisor find and use those points of similar understanding. In Western culture, pride is often based on individual achievement. In other cultures, pride is more based on group harmony. In group-level pride situations, the advisor should emphasize how FSF actions would bring credit and harmony to the group.

7. Cultural Training

a. Training cultural awareness is difficult, but necessary because it asks advisors to understand another culture from the viewpoint of a person belonging to that culture. The functional components of cultural training include:

(1) Language.

(2) Religion.

(3) Traditions.

(4) Food.

(5) Ethnicity and social distinction.

(6) Social organizations.

(7) Human behavior.

(8) Values, beliefs, and norms.

(9) Gender-specific considerations.

b. The general methodology for culture training should be to introduce culture as a concept and then apply it to understand one's own culture, learn ways to communicate cross-culturally, and to develop a basic understanding of the specific FSF culture. This includes a knowledge of those items which may appear unusual to the advisor. See table 10 for a list of training recommendations.

Table 10. Cultural Training Recommendations	
Training Outline	
Cultural Indoctrination	Comparison of cultural values and social structures (e.g., United States compared to those of the area of operations). Local customs and traditions (e.g., greetings, etiquette, good or proper behavior). Geopolitical history (classical through contemporary eras and the orientation of each faction or party). The role of religion in daily life.
Cultural Awareness	How to gain acceptance and trust. How to maintain a neutral perspective (e.g., avoiding stereotyping and being aware of bias). How to gain cooperation during investigations and information gathering sessions. How to avoid embarrassing or potentially dangerous situations. How to recognize and mitigate culture shock.
Resources	Guest speakers from the country of interest (e.g., nongovernmental staff, foreign students, recent immigrants, or selected refugees). Others who have worked in or studied the mission area (e.g., special operations personnel, diplomats, and scholars, credible news sources).
Format	Combination of briefings, small group discussions, and question and answer periods. Handouts to augment, not replace, speakers. Visual media, specifically, slides and videos of the mission area.

8. Culture Shock

a. Culture shock is the anxiety experienced by people in a completely new environment, or who do not know what is appropriate or inappropriate.

b. The four general stages in the culture shock process are enthusiasm, withdrawal, reemergence, and achievement. See figure 14 to view the process and effects of culture shock.

c. Common examples of culture shock:

(1) Treatment of animals (public slaughter of animals for celebration, etc.).

(2) Public punishments or executions.

(3) Open prayer in the workplace.

(4) Physical contact and personal hygiene.

(5) Operational skills and safety standards.

(6) Public restrooms.

(7) Food and drink.

(8) Treatment of troops, children, and genders.



Figure 14. Stages of Culture Shock

d. Culture shock is a normal part of the advisor's adjustment process. To cope with culture shock, advisors should be patient, maintain contact (with team members and new culture), and accept the new culture as different. Advisors should be prepared to accept things in the local culture that seem culturally wrong. They should try to learn at least a little bit of the local language while attempting to reduce stress.

(1) The advisor team must understand the effects culture shock will have on them. Culture shock comes from:

(a) Living and working for a period of time in a different environment.

(b) Having values team members hold as absolute brought into question because of cultural differences.

(c) Being constantly put into situations where advisor team members are expected to function with maximum proficiency, but where the rules have not been adequately explained.

(2) Generally, the feeling of culture shock sets in after the first two weeks of arriving in a new place. Culture shock occurs because the mind and body have to go through a period of psychological and physiological adjustment when individuals move from a familiar environment to an unfamiliar one.

(3) The "spoken" rules of a culture (such as favored foods) may not be simple or pleasant to adopt. The "unspoken" rules are even more difficult to understand or adopt. Creative advisors will be able to extract basic information on why similar acts are performed differently. Also, FSF may have culture-based expectations that are unfamiliar to the advisors. These situations occur everywhere during the first few months in a new country.

(4) Some of the differences between life at home and life in a new place are obvious. Other differences that are not as obvious include the following.

(a) How people make decisions.

(b) How people spend their leisure time.

(c) How people resolve conflicts.

(d) How people express feelings and emotions, meanings of gestures, facial expressions, and other body language.

(5) Common reactions to culture shock include the following.

(a) Irritability, even anger, directed toward one's own group or organization.

(b) Feeling isolated or alone.

(c) Tiring easily.

(d) Changes in normal sleep patterns (e.g., too much sleep, insomnia).

(e) Suffering minor but persistent body pains, especially in the head, neck, back, and stomach.

(f) Hostility and contempt directed towards local people.

(g) Withdrawal (e.g., spending excessive amounts of time reading or listening to music or avoiding contact with host or partner nationals).

(6) Ways to fight culture shock include the following.

(a) Become familiar with the language used in the new area. It is one of the most important advantages for the advisor. An ability to communicate in the new culture, even at a very basic level, goes a long way toward shortening the period of adjustment.

(b) Seek those with previous experience in the area.

(c) Develop a portable hobby.

(d) Be patient; the process of adaptation to new situations takes time.

(e) Learn to be constructive. If an unfavorable encounter occurs, advisors should learn from it and not get in that position again.

(f) Do not try too hard; patiently adjust.

(g) Learn to regularly exercise. This helps combat stress in a constructive manner. Advisors could swim, run, or do whatever is appropriate in the area.

(h) Relax and meditate. These techniques have proven to be very positive for people who are passing through periods of stress.

(i) Maintain contact with teammates and pay attention to relationships with them. This increases a feeling of belonging and reduces feelings of loneliness and alienation. Teammates can serve as support in difficult times.

(j) Maintain contact with the new culture.

(k) Accept the new culture. Advisors should focus on getting through the transition. They should try to think of one thing each day that's interesting or likeable about the new environment.

(l) Establish simple goals and continuously evaluate progress. Advisors should find ways to live with things that are not 100 percent satisfactory.

(m) Maintain confidence in self, the organization, and own abilities.

(n) Look for help when feeling stressed. Uncertainties and confusion will continue to present themselves. Advisors should imagine how a local resident might react to living in the United States. They should observe how people in the new environment act in situations that are confusing. Advisors should try to understand what they believe and why they behave as they do.

(o) Avoid judging things as either right or wrong; regard them as merely different.

(p) Remember the methods that were successful in reducing stress in difficult situations in the past and apply those methods to the present circumstances.

(q) Try to see the humor in confusing or frustrating situations; laughter is often the best medicine.

(r) Accept the challenge of learning to live and function in a new cultural setting. Advisors should believe in one's on ability to learn the skills to make a satisfactory transition.

(s) Gradually try to apply some of the learned skills.

(t) Recognize the advantages of having lived in two different cultures. Meeting people with different cultural backgrounds can enrich one's life. Advisors should share time with many different people. They should avoid having only US friends, but maintain strong personal ties to the United States. They can think about ways to help local residents learn what US citizens believe and how they act.

(u) Acknowledge even slight progress in adjusting to the new culture. Advisors should recognize, like many who have adjusted to difficult and alien environments, anyone can make a successful adjustment to the new culture.

9. Culture Domains

a. The 12 culture domains for reviewing the principal aspects of working with people from other countries and backgrounds are described in the following paragraphs. Table 11 provides questions that help the advisor answer the "So what?" questions about culture. Advisors should use these as tools for preparing for deployment and for researching the culture. Table 11 is not an all-inclusive list of questions, but rather a starting point to building awareness.

Table 11. Cultural Domains

Cultural Domain	Questions to Consider
Family and Kinship	Is it okay to talk about one another's family? Does family size mean something in their culture? What role does age/generation play in their culture? When do youths become adults in their culture?
Sex and Gender	In general, how do men and women relate? Is there gender-based separation? How does the culture view people being single, married, or divorced?
Sustenance and Health	What are the local eating customs (e.g., utensils, hands, prohibitions)? How does the advisor refuse food or drink without offending? What is safe to eat or drink? Have approved food sources been identified? How does hygiene (personal and public) differ from that of the advisor team? How do cultural beliefs affect health care?
Language and Communication	What is the official language? What languages are spoken? Does the local population understand or speak English? What are their nonverbal communications?
Learning and Knowledge	What is the literacy rate and level of education of the advisor's counterpart? What teaching methods work best with the local population? How does their culture respond to failure (e.g., stigma, punishment)?
Religion and Spirituality	What are the major religions? What factions, if any, exist in those religions? Is it appropriate to discuss religion? How might religious factors affect mission accomplishment? What is the relationship between religion and law in the partner nation (PN)? Is proselytizing okay?

Table 11. Cultural Domains (Cont'd)	
Cultural Domain	**Questions to Consider**
Political and Social Relations	What is the role of media in the PN and who has access? How do individuals view or deal with security issues? What is the cultural view of alcohol? Will I be required to partake? How do they view the United States and allies (e.g., culture, history, politics, religion, etc.)? How will their physical contact norms potentially affect the advisor? What are their acceptable displays of friendship (e.g., holding hands, hugging, etc.)? How do the norms vary in a professional context? What are gift giving and receiving conventions? How is the military viewed in their culture? How do PN personnel resolve conflicts or disagreements?
Economic and Resources	What are the local population's principle income producing activities? What is the average income? What is their banking system and do they accept credit cards? What is their primary currency and how do they handle credit?
Time and Space	Is the PN's culture short- or long-term oriented? What is their workday or week? What is this local national's concept of time, punctuality, and holidays? What is their view of personal space compared to United States culture?
History and Myth	Is history a source of pride or shame for their culture? Have there been significant cultural changes in recent history? What is their world view and how does the world view their country and culture?
Aesthetics and Recreation	What are the personal appearance and dress standards and taboos? What are the major pastimes (e.g., sports, hunting, fishing, etc.)? What is acceptable humor to them?
Technology and Material	Does the PN government censor communications (e.g., Internet, television, radio, etc.)? How many people have access to technology (e.g., Internet, etc.)?

b. Family and Kinship. In many societies, every action or decision is made within the context of family and kinship. In most societies, inheritance (transfer of property) and succession (transfer of social position) take place within kin groups. Inheritance and succession occur through either the father's line to the son's or the mother's line to the daughter's and may differ even between neighboring tribes. In some cultures, earned wealth and social status mean nothing compared to one's position within the family. Clans and tribes war against others for many generations in response to grievances going back thousands of years. Arranged marriages settle disputes, unite powerbases, and consolidate wealth.

c. Sex and Gender. Every culture distinguishes between men and women, although different societies attach their own social meanings to them. Gender often determines social relations involving power, individuals, group identities, and meaning and value.

d. Sustenance and Health. Societies have different methods of transforming natural resources into food. Sustenance encompasses what and how we eat; how we prepare food; and when, where, and with whom we eat. Food getting, or a subsistence strategy, is an essential part of human culture and serves as a basis for cultural differences. Sustenance influences residential patterns, family life and kinship systems, methods of exchange, and structures of power and prestige. Theories of disease and healing practices are part of all cultures, and medical systems serve as an adaptive response to disease and illness.

e. Language and Communication. Language is crucial to establishing social relationships. By translating experience into language, humans gain knowledge that can be communicated to new members of a group or society. People use language to teach culture.

f. Learning and Knowledge. Human beings depend on the social, not biological, transmission of knowledge for survival. Teaching children the skills and knowledge they need to function as adults in society is practiced in every culture, although societies vary in their teaching approaches. Human social organization and group living provide the basic context for growth and learning (e.g., what children learn from their parents). Learning is not always at the conscious, formal level. In Western societies, the long period of human childhood dependency provides cultural learning.

g. Religion and Spirituality. Religion may be defined as a set of beliefs concerning the cause, nature, and purpose of the universe. It often involves belief in a god or gods, usually involves devotional and ritual observances, and often contains a moral code governing the conduct of human affairs. For the purpose of this publication, religion is a system cultures use to provide meaning, unity, peace of mind, and control over events in society. It often helps preserve social order. By defining an individual’s place in society and the cosmos, religion provides people a sense of personal identity and belonging. Spirituality is a broader term than religion. It also refers to philosophical or psychological core commitments and values that, similarly, provide a sense of identity, meaning, and purpose.

h. Political and Social Relations. Political organization is the patterned way of applying power in a group to regulate behavior, and exists in all societies. Different cultures have diverse approaches to social interactions and include various social groups that may interact differently. The authority to make decisions that affect public interest is a part of social relations and is linked to kinship, economics, and religion. People may become leaders because of their positions as heads of families, their lineages, or clans, or based on claims of divine right to rule. In some societies, the coordination and regulation of behavior are in the hands of religious practitioners.

i. Economics and Resources. The economics and resources domain refers to ways in which goods and services are produced, distributed, and consumed in a society. They reflect choices people make regarding their livelihood. Notably, economics and resources are equally influenced by tradition, technology, and the environment.

j. Time and Space. The perception of time differs among cultures. A culture with a highly linear orientation toward time, like North America, sees it as a limited commodity to be used efficiently towards problem-solving or coming to agreement. Nonlinear cultures have a longer view of time. Consequently, there may be less pressure to accomplish things quickly. Additionally, the concept of personal space or distance and their significance often varies between cultures.

k. History and Myth. History is the study of the past. It is a component of human knowledge, in general, along with cultural and scientific knowledge. While myth is often associated with fiction and the supernatural, it also embodies popular ideas about the natural world and historical events in a particular culture. It implies that a group or society telling a myth believes it is true. In societies throughout the world, mythical truths become customs that are passed on through the generations. Myth and history are interrelated.

l. Aesthetics and Recreation. In every society, people express themselves in ways that surpass the need for physical survival. Every culture has its own forms of creative expression, guided by aesthetic principles of imagination, beauty, skill, and style. These expressions are in art, music, sport, clothing, rest, and leisure.

m. Technology and Material. Societies use technology to transform the material environment. Technology includes the raw materials, tools, knowledge, and procedures needed to produce and manufacture material goods in a basic agrarian or a complex industrial society. Cultural values determine technology development and use. Values and patterns in this domain have a significant impact on the environment. Two of the most important sources of environmental impact are consumer desires and the energy needs of industrial nations.

10. Advisors and Cultural Relations

a. Setting the Example. Setting the example for the advisor's counterpart must be an ongoing effort to avoid the appearance of a "do as I say, not as I do" attitude. In setting the example, the advisor should make every effort to explain to the counterpart that what is being done is the most effective action for the situation. This is particularly true when the behavior (or purpose) is not readily understood by the counterpart. In following this guidance, the advisor may also reinforce perceived competence.

b. Compromise. When seeking a compromise with the FSF counterpart, the advisor may create a situation in which the counterpart has a personal interest in successful execution. In some cultures, seeking a compromise may be desirable to allow the counterpart to save face. In certain situations, the counterpart may have a better solution to the problem at hand because of practical experience.

(1) Advisors must recognize when they seek a compromise in certain cultures, their perceived competence may suffer. This may be mitigated somewhat by

approaching the compromise as two professionals (the advisor and the counterpart) reaching a mutual conclusion.

Note: There are two areas of concern that must never be compromised for the sake of maintaining rapport: force protection and human rights. See appendix E for additional force protection considerations.

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(2) Advisors must prevent their counterpart (or their counterpart's subordinates) from working the advisor team into the FSF chain of command. Advisors provide recommendations, not orders, to their counterparts. Only the counterpart should issue orders to the FSF subordinates.

c. Family. The concept of family is heavily steeped in religious and cultural norms. The family is one of the most influential elements of social institutions. It is the starting point for developing all other forms of social organization. Families teach individuals what is demanded of them in society and it is where people learn to transcend themselves. A person's first experience with power and authority occurs with the family.

d. Gender, Age, and Race. Gender, age, and race have the potential to seriously affect the mission. One example is the status of females in society. In some countries, cultural prohibitions may render a female interpreter ineffective under certain circumstances. Another example would be the Balkans, where the ethnic divisions may limit the effectiveness of an interpreter from outside the target audience's group. Since traditions, values, and biases vary in each country, state, and tribe, it is important to check with the in-country assets or area studies for specific taboos or favorable characteristics.

e. Religion. Because religion is an integral part of culture, advisors should use careful mission preparation and analysis to examine the religions and religious groups in the AO for a given mission. Most people practice a religion, and many take it very seriously. Religious beliefs, leaders, and institutions are central to the worldview of many societies. The impact of religion on the local population must be considered when planning any operation.

f. Language.

(1) Communication is the foundational skill of cross-cultural competence and a most necessary skill for military advisors. It is important for advisors to be aware that linguistic competence and communication competence are not the same thing. Whereas it is one thing to be able to speak a language (linguistic competence), it is quite another to be able to use a language appropriately and effectively in context (communication competence).

(2) Language is one, but not the only, component of communication competence. Misunderstandings can result from different interpretations associated with paralanguage and nonverbal communication. (Paralanguage is vocal features that accompany speech and contribute to communication but are not, generally, considered to be part of the language system as vocal quality loudness and tempo.)

(3) The greater the proficiency in the local language, the quicker an advisor can effectively communicate. Reaching a communication level that permits the advisor or liaison to understand nuances and inferred or implied messages vastly enhances the probability of mission accomplishment. However, this can take months or years of training and exposure. As a minimum, the successful advisor studies common phrases used in the AO. While proficiently using an interpreter can be substituted for language ability, interpreter usage always diminishes the capability to effectively and confidently communicate. Language proficiency and properly using interpreters require significant training.

g. FSF Subculture. Advisors should not assume all military or security force subcultures mirror that of the United States. The FSF's chain of command will be unique within each country and may differ from the United States. Leaders in positions of authority and command may have gained their positions through nepotism, political appointment, or corruption. Their culture may not allow subordinates the ability to influence decisions. Dress and appearance may not be held to Western standards, and might tempt the advisor to perceive them as unprofessional.

h. Developing Rapport. Setting the example, being open to compromise, and recognizing the importance of family, religion, and language can contribute to developing good rapport with the advisors' FSF counterparts. Advisors succeed or fail based on the rapport they develop with their FSF counterpart. This rapport can add to the success of advising amid the differences in culture, personal experience, and language. When thinking about rapport between an advisor and an FSF counterpart, advisors should focus on developing mutual understanding, respect, and trust. The advisor should seek to understand first, then be understood. By placing the FSF counterpart first, the advisor is paving the road for respect and trust.

i. Understanding. Advisors should broaden their knowledge of the AO by studying its history, politics, language, society, and culture. Interpreters can offer valuable insight into local culture. However, their insight may be biased, general, or very narrow. For initial research, the Central Intelligence Agency World Fact Book is a consolidated reference source for geographical, political, and other societal information.

j. Respect. Advisors should maintain integrity, look for admirable qualities and areas of interest to respect in counterparts, and show a sincere interest in them.

k. Trust. An advisor-counterpart relationship will eventually develop into strong trust when built on shared understanding and respect. Advisors should understand what comprises a promise in the local culture. They should show reliability and follow through on commitments. Advisors must not give the impression of a promise for anything they might not be able to deliver.

l. Personal Issues. FSF counterparts may want to speak with advisors about personal issues. Here are some guidelines for dealing with personal questions.

(1) Be careful when talking about religion, regardless of personal beliefs.

(2) Be careful regarding talk about women to prevent shaming the counterpart.

(3) Be careful if asked about sex, drugs, or alcohol. Be aware of the roles of these topics in their culture before answering. This may be a test.

m. Chain of Command Communications.

(1) FSF. Effective communication is essential for an advisor-counterpart relationship. Advisors should stress using proper channels at all echelons. Advisors must keep the FSF unit's leaders informed of advice the team has given to FSF subordinates. FSF officers should be encouraged to pass information up, down, and across the chain of command and staff channels. While encouraging open and honest communication with the FSF chain of command and staff channels, the advisor must keep in mind the affects that culture and command climate play on how honest and open the FSF communication channels are.

(2) US Advising Chains of Command. There will likely be an advising chain of command as well as staff and functional area channels. US personnel in the advising chain of command and acting as the relevant staff or functional area POCs should be kept informed of advice the team has offered to their counterparts. Advisors must be trusted and empowered by the chain of command to make communication decisions without fear of retribution. The unique nature of the advising team dictates that they have liberal direct liaison authorities. These authorities do not relieve the advising team of the responsibility to keep their chain of command and relevant staff informed if they have coordinated with higher headquarters.

Technical Control (TECHCON)

TECHCON is an Australian doctrine term, but has been applied with success in Afghanistan and with the International Security Assistance Force. The advisor network can utilize a communication structure defined as TECHCON. TECHCON is the provision of specialist and technical advice by designated authorities for the management and operation of forces to influence FSF systems. If the FSF are unable to solve a problem, advisors can seek assistance from any other advisors along the functional process—from the lowest tactical level up to the government level. This TECHCON communication network is not a chain of command, rather it is a pathway to vertically integrate FSF systems. The advisor's TECHCON channels are designed to resolve FSF issues that arise during operations. There are numerous instances where advisors cannot resolve FSF process issues because of the many cross-functional interactions and the problem requiring operational/strategic-level command influence. Past efforts to overcome these obstacles resulted in stagnation and frustration due to attempts by advisors to resolve issues at only one level of command. Using TECHCON allows issues to be tackled by multiple advisors at multiple levels simultaneously.

SOURCE: Resolute Support Security Force Assistance Guide 3.1, 1 July 2014

Note: TECHCON is not a command relationship like operational control or administrative control. It is a way of interpreting the team of teams that are all aiming at achieving a bigger set of objectives. Understanding the efforts of the teams to the left and right in other agencies and communicating with them will help coordinate the efforts of the whole.

n. Customs and Courtesies. Observe local customs and courtesies. Advisors should seek to understand the counterpart's customs and social structure on which they are built (e.g., local tribal dynamics). Counterparts senior in grade should be treated accordingly. If warranted by the FSF customs, and in keeping with the local force protection posture, advisors should salute senior-ranking personnel. Advisors should refer to such individuals by their rank (as customs permit) and show them respect and deference. Although FSF officers may have no command authority over the advisor, effectiveness is greatly enhanced when the advisor displays respect for the counterpart and the FSF chain of command.

o. Social Dynamics. People throughout the world have developed various methods of social organization based on varying and fluid or fixed and rigid social identities. Often, social organization and social identity are overlapping constructs which are occasionally in conflict with one another. If advisors look at their own lives, they can see various layers of social identity and organization similarly in conflict with one another. At the core of any culture is the structure of the society. Societal structures can range from nationalistic to tribal. The most common social structure advisors will encounter in the developing world will be tribalism. Tribalism is a normal cultural component in a large portion of the world. Common themes in tribal cultures are pride, revenge, hospitality, honor, brotherhood, and warrior ethos.

(1) Understanding Tribalism. Many US forces do not understand tribalism. The following are several benefits to individuals in a tribal society.

(a) Tribes serve as social safety nets in countries lacking strong centralized governments.

(b) Tribes provide a sense of belonging and community.

(c) Tribes spread responsibility and risk away from individuals.

(d) Tribes are designed to prevent warfare and chaos. Individual tribal debts of blood and honor serve as a surrogate to warfare.

(e) Individuals are viewed mostly as how they serve the tribe.

(2) Tribal Dynamics.

(a) Advisors should seek to understand the specific tribal dynamics within the FSF they are advising and the local populace. They should not ask a tribe member to do something contrary to the wishes of the tribe (e.g., go arrest a relative). Advisors must appeal to the tribal sense of honor and warrior ethos to influence tribe members. Figure 15 illustrates the loyalties found in tribal culture and is representative of most tribal societies.



Figure 15. Tribal Society

(b) While tribalism exists in many forms, it is, generally, characterized by familial bonds strengthened through intermarriage and the possession of a common tribal origination. Tribes develop norms and rules that structure behavior towards members of the tribe and toward other tribes. Generally, these rules regard the welfare of the tribe over the welfare of the individual. These rules focus on structuring the competition for resources, spouses, and power as well as establishing forms of social welfare. At times, these rules may come into conflict with other means of social organization, such as national or religious laws.

(3) Tribal Structures. Ethnic, religious, and civic nationalism are relatively new forms of social organization, and their identities often conflict with tribal norms and rules. Dealing with tribalism is a vital and difficult task when establishing, building, and strengthening national governments. Even within a theater, the nature and challenges presented by different tribal structures will vary geographically and across tribes.

(4) Traditions and Rules.

(a) Tribal rules and traditions provide challenges and opportunities for the advisor. A thorough knowledge of tribal governance and traditions is required to tailor actions across the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) spectrum. Rules and traditions are often comprehensive and regulate political action (e.g., ties to the government and other tribes), economic behavior (e.g., smuggling, farming, toll-taking), and social behavior (e.g., roles of men, women, children, marriage and divorce, sexuality, and drug use).

(b) Tribal rules may provide means to tie tribes that resist authority into evolving government structures. Conversely, some tribal structures are extremely egalitarian with little or no sanction placed on a head of household who refuses to observe a given tribal rule or tradition. Rules and traditions will vary across tribes and may even vary within the same tribe. Also, long periods of conflict and noncontiguous geographic arrangements may weaken the role of tribal law. A detailed understanding of tribal rules and traditions must be gained through interaction with tribal elders and determination of the extent to which these rules are followed.

(5) Identity. Tribal identity can be fluid or fixed. It may be subordinate or superior to other identities (e.g., religious identity, national identity, ethnic identity, or familial identity). Identity may vary across the tribe. Tribal identity may be enmeshed with ethnic or religious identity or may be separate and cut across ethnic and religious lines. Often, tribal identity is stronger in rural and weaker in urban areas. Geographic dispersion into noncontiguous enclaves can weaken tribal identity, especially in areas where different tribal organizations are commingled. Often, tribal identity is compartmentalized into ethnic or supratribal identity and subtribal identity (and into smaller categories or branches). Tribe members, often, will consider themselves first as members of the closest, smallest group. For example, they are branch “w” of subtribe “x” as opposed to a member of subtribe “x” from tribe “y,” or a member of tribe “y” from ethnic group “z.” The smaller the tribal affiliation (i.e., a branch of a subtribe), the stronger the identity will be. Different subtribes within the same tribe may compete over resources and power. A strong sense of tribal identity among members of the FSF can result in conflicts within or among developing national forces and prevent effective units from evolving unless there is intervention by advisors.

(6) Boundaries. The geographic extent, distribution, and contiguousness of a tribe are vital to understanding the implications of a particular tribe within the advisor’s AO. Generally, the larger the geographic area of a tribe and the more contiguous its tribal boundaries, the more power tribal leaders will have over the actions of their tribe. Additionally, small, but contiguous enclaves of different tribal groups may create a highly unstable environment. Often, administrative boundaries, including district, province, and national boundaries, will not align with tribal boundaries. This is particularly true in countries where colonial powers arbitrarily drew boundaries without consideration of tribal demarcation lines.

(7) Tribal Ties. To deal with issues arising from tribes, governors or sub-governors, and the FSF from adjoining administrative areas need to work jointly with tribal leaders to develop solutions for tribally based problems. This may include working with leaders across national borders. Geographically dispersed tribes that exist in small enclaves across wide swaths of land will, generally, have weaker tribal governance structures, increasing the importance of local tribal leaders. Tribal ties are often maintained across geographical space through intermarriage and visits. Dispersion is used to maintain trading routes and economic activities, such as smuggling. These tribal ties may allow insurgents to operate in one area while exploiting administrative and military boundaries in another area. To deny safe haven, the FSF require detailed understanding and coordination by military and civilian leaders to prevent exploitation.

(8) Access to Patronage. In most tribal constructs, tribal leadership is expected to provide patronage to tribe members in the form of wealth, jobs, and goods. Ineffective tribal leaders will bankrupt themselves on these provisions, setting the stage for others to step in. However, conflict situations, illicit trade, and government corruption can result in upsetting the normal economy, fluctuating balance of patronage goods available. Understanding the means of obtaining and distributing patronage is vital. Advisors must understand how their counterpart uses patronage to navigate the informal and formal systems in a collectivist culture (e.g., centralized social and economic control).

(9) Tribal Leadership. Leadership in tribal systems varies across tribes. It is vital to understand who the leaders are and the nature of their tribal leadership. Some are based on kinship to the leader passed from brother to brother or father to son. In other cases, religious connections may result in leadership positions within the tribe. In times of conflict, traditional leadership may become destabilized and military capability (e.g., the ability to provide security) can result in new leaders arising outside traditional nobility or religious families. Intratribal conflict is often the result of conflicting claims on leadership, particularly based on postconflict rivalries between tribal elders. Conflicting claims on tribal leadership can result in significant unrest, and leaders may turn to either the government or its opposition to gain support for their claims. Advisors must understand the leadership dynamics of a tribe to ensure they are dealing with the underlying causes of unrest in a particular area and not simply fueling an ongoing intratribal rivalry. In addition, areas where leadership remains relatively stable and unchallenged present opportunities to gain tribal support through close collaboration with tribal leaders.

Chapter V
WORKING WITH FOREIGN SECURITY FORCES' PARTNER ORGANIZATIONS

1. Advisor Team Challenges

a. This chapter provides a method to help an advisor team establish credibility with US coalition units and other organizations or agencies sharing their AO. While many organizational leaders understand the value of the advisor team, they may have difficultly integrating these organizations with FSF units and the advisor team. Advisor team leaders should prepare their teams for an initial worst-case scenario when it comes to coordinating operations or other activities with these units. Items to consider:

(1) Advisors may not have conducted predeployment training with the units in the advisor's AO.

(2) US or coalition units may be unaware of the advising team's specialized predeployment training and capabilities.

(3) Other units may not be familiar with the FSF leaders, capabilities, or limitations in the AO. One selling point to the partnering organization is the advising team can offer a deep understanding of the FSF, including personalities, culture, and human networks.

(4) NGOs may have biases or restrictions against working with US military organizations like the advisor's team.

(5) Third-country militaries operating unilaterally will present similar challenges as those mentioned in the previous paragraphs. Advisor teams should always seek guidance and, possibly, the authority to coordinate with third-country militaries.

(6) Regardless of the origin or type of organization, FSF units may be wary and untrusting of the advisor's team. This may stem from bias, past experiences, or lack of information.

(7) There will be wariness and mistrust based on crucial unknown qualities.

2. Organizational Perspectives and Developing Unity of Effort

a. The key to working with other organizations is understanding their perspectives, roles, and relationships. Nonmilitary organizations do not operate within military or governmental hierarchies. Military policies, processes, and procedures are different from those of civilian organizations and may present significant challenges to interorganizational coordination. Some organizations have policies directly opposed to those of the US Government, particularly the US military. Although they may not be hostile towards the United States or its goals, they do not cooperate to maintain a perception of neutrality.

b. It is important to remember the following points about another organization's perspective.

(1) Core Values and Authorities. Like the military, each agency or organization has specific core values and authorities that provide the scope of their operations.

(2) Focus. Each organization has individual organizational perspectives and agendas that do not always coincide with military goals.

(3) Policies and Procedures. Other organizations often have different, and sometimes conflicting, policies, procedures, and decision-making techniques.

(4) Structure. The military relies on structured, hierarchical decision-making processes; detailed planning; and standardized TTP. Civilian organizational structure is more horizontal. It may employ similar principles but not with the same degree of structural process.

(5) Decision-making. Decision-making processes may be more ad hoc, collaborative, and collegial. Field coordinators may not have the authority to speak for the parent organization, which makes decision-making at lower levels impossible.

(6) Reduction of Uncertainty. Crisis action planning, generally, is not a core or defining mission for other organizations. Crises divert attention, resources, and personnel from other priorities. Different agency perspectives, capabilities, and interests may conflict with how to execute missions and carry out policies in a crisis.

(7) Mutually Supportive Interests. Cooperation among US military, international organizations, NGOs, and the private sector is based on perceived mutually-supportive interests, rather than a formalized agreement.

(8) Long-term and Short-term Objectives. Other organizations and the US military's view of long-term and short-term is different. A year or two may be viewed as long-term at the tactical level. Whereas organizations involved in nation building (e.g., USAID) develop 5-year, short-term plans and 30-year, long-term plans.

c. To avoid unnecessary conflict, advisors must identify common understandings, opportunities for cooperation, and a unifying goal. Finding a common goal becomes more difficult as the number of organizations increases and should not concede the authority, roles, or core competencies of individual agencies. Conducting interagency and interorganizational coordination:

(1) Promotes unity of effort.

(2) Deconflicts activities.

(3) Provides a common understanding.

(4) Facilitates cooperation in areas of common interest.

(5) Avoids unintended negative consequences when working in the same space.

3. Coordination, Collaboration, and Liaison

a. Coordination. Civilian agencies tend to operate via coordination and communication structures, rather than C2 structures. Although there is no command relationship between military and civilian organizations, clearly defined relationships may foster harmony and reduce friction.

b. Collaboration. Effective operations require close coordination, cooperation, and information across military, interagency, and nongovernmental entities. The most common technique for promoting collaboration is forming a civil-military operations center (see JP 3-57, *Civil Military Operations*, or FM 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations*).

c. Liaison. Direct, early liaison is a valuable source of accurate, timely information, especially where involvement by civilian agencies and organizations may precede military forces and present opportunities to enhance force effectiveness significantly. An additional benefit is an opportunity to build working relationships based on trust and open communications among all organizations. Ongoing liaison and an exchange of liaison personnel with engaged organizations are equally important.

4. Tips for Interaction

a. Recognize all US Government agencies, departments, international organizations, NGOs, and private-sector groups in the AO. See appendix F for a discussion on other stakeholders.

b. If applicable, meet with other US Government agencies, NGOs, or international organization representatives early to understand their roles and responsibilities, policies, procedures, and goals. Ensure they understand the military's mission, goals, and objectives.

c. Understand how they conduct planning and vice versa. Consider creating an integrated planning team or other temporary entity to address how military activities may be synchronized to complement their work.

d. Form a unifying goal with a desired end state. Spend time on clarifying and restating the goals to be achieved.

e. Support their objectives by tying short-term projects with long-term goals, without compromising the military mission.

f. Accept that they may not be able to allocate resources to achieve short-term results. Using resources of other US Government agencies is governed by law (e.g., the Economy Act), policy, and regulation. Advisors should involve the staff judge advocate and comptroller to ensure compliance. Since advisor teams do not deploy with a staff judge advocate or comptroller, this requires reachback to the advisor's home station.

g. Continuously exchange information (within security restrictions) to avoid confusion over objectives, differences in procedures, resource limitations, and shortfalls or overlaps of authorities. Exchange LNOs, if acceptable to the other organization.

h. Never drop in on an international organization or NGO. Arrange meetings deliberately. Give them the option of meeting inside or outside military installations to maintain their appearance of neutrality.

i. Do not refer to NGOs or international organizations as force multipliers, partners, or any term that may compromise their neutrality.

j. Do not interfere with their work with the civilian population, to include elements deemed as unfriendly.

k. Be understanding if another organization, even within the US Government, decides not to participate in a project or program.

l. Respect views on bearing arms within NGO or international organization sites.

m. Use bridging agencies (e.g., the USAID Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation or United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator) to coordinate with other organizations (e.g., Doctors without Borders).

n. Ensure all organizations, sharing responsibility for the job, receive appropriate recognition. This recognition strengthens the bonds of interdependence and encourages each stakeholder to participate in the process by validating and reinforcing roles and responsibilities.

5. Other Guidelines

a. The following are guidelines for nonmilitary organizations when working with the military. These examples are published by the United States Institute for Peace (USIP) and are typical practices by nonmilitary organizations.

(1) Do not wear military styled clothing. This does not preclude protective gear (e.g., helmets, protective vests, etc.).

(2) Travel in military vehicles should be limited to the practical extent.

(3) Avoid collocating in facilities used by the military.

(4) Use the organization's own logos on clothing, vehicles, and buildings.

(5) Prearrange visits to military installations and sites.

(6) Minimize activities at military bases, except for liaison arrangements.

(7) Request military protection for humanitarian assistance convoys, to take advantage of logistic support, or for evacuation (e.g., medical or from a hostile environment) only as a last resort.

6. Helpful References

a. *The Ugly American,* by Eugene Burdick and William Lederer. A novel that highlights US cultural tendencies towards hubris and offending the populace of a host nation. This is a common read within the DOS, which will not only help advisors gain self-awareness, but give them common ground with advisors of other agencies.

b. USAID Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy, 2008 https://www.usaid.gov/policy/civ-mil.

c. USAID's Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy Implementation Guidelines (Internal USAID Document) https://www.usaid.gov/policy/dod-cooperation.

d. Guidelines for Relations Between US Armed Forces and Nongovernmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments (USIP/InterAction/DOD): http://www.usip.org/publications/guidelines-relations-between-us-armed-forces-and-nghos-in-hostile-or-potentially.

7. Initial Employment Activities

a. When the advisor's team arrives in theater, the advisor will have to make three initial assessments during the relief in place (RIP) or transfer of authority (TOA) period. These cover:

(1) The effectiveness of the advisor team being replaced.

(2) The US and coalition unit operating in the AO.

(3) The FSF unit.

b. The first and most important assessment the advisor must make is of the outgoing team to determine if the advisors were successful during their tour. If they have good relationships with both the FSF unit and the US unit, the SOPs may be valuable and the incoming advisor can continue the established relationships. If the incoming team determines the outgoing team was ineffective, then it can begin making lists of things to fix and relationships to build.

8. Remove Misunderstanding and Mistrust

> "I was escorting my Iraqi battalion commander, a colonel, around a newly established US patrol base located near one of his checkpoints. A US Specialist (E-4) approached my Iraqi battalion commander, grabbed his shoulder, spun him around, and said 'dude, let me see your pistol!' After apologizing for the US Soldier's breach of military customs and courtesies, I spent the rest of the day explaining to the Iraqi commander why our Army, after 4 years, couldn't tell an Iraqi private from a colonel."
>
> **—Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Battalion Military Transition Team Leader**

a. Advisor team members should receive specialized training in the culture and language of the FSF. At the end of the RIP or TOA process, the advisor will have interacted with the FSF and generated a unique comfort level with them because of familiarity.

b. Through these interactions, the advisor will learn cultural lessons and nuances that help mitigate the team making any cultural missteps. However, misunderstandings are going to happen, and it is in those times that advisors will need to lean on the capital they have built in terms of rapport and respectful patterns of behavior to remove misunderstandings and avoid them turning into mistrust. The most effective way to capitalize on this information is to share it abundantly with all members of the advisor team.

9. Support Operations

a. FSF logistics are important while building capabilities. An advisor may end up in a situation where the PN's functioning support system precludes the advisor becoming involved in supporting the FSF. Conversely, it is possible that at some point during the tour, an advisor will request every class of supply while supporting the FSF unit. While trying to get the unit to be self-sufficient, the advisor must keep them functioning within their national maintenance and supply systems—keeping the logistics solutions *sustainable* for the FSF in the long-term.

b. There are times the advisor will provide logistical support to the FSF unit simply to maintain a relationship with the FSF commander. This is a cultural reality. FSF leaders may attempt to get as much material support as possible, far beyond what they reasonably need, simply because it is there for the taking. This is a common situation where the advisor must identify what the FSF unit truly needs versus what they want. Do not assume this is a product of greed as much as it is a display of status. The more stuff one has, the more powerful and the better officer one is. The advisor team provides the reality check to the process: an evaluation on whether the support is more of a benefit as a way of filling a short-term capacity gap or more of a crutch that conditions the FSF to rely on advisor logistics, rather than addressing its own sustainment shortcomings. The advisor must understand the FSF processes and improve them as necessary within the context and culture of the FSF's OE.

c. Logistical support represents one of the best leverage tools the advisor has to motivate the FSF unit. It is a bargaining chip, and the FSF commander can use it to get what the unit wants by trading concessions for things the advisor wants. An example would be an FSF commander who wants all the accessories to make vehicles look more like US vehicles. The advisor may be able to fill these repair parts requests if the commander establishes and enforces a vehicle maintenance program to improve the fleet's operational readiness rate. Also, keep in mind, this type of bartering is common in many parts of the world. By driving hard bargains, the advisor may gain respect from FSF officers. If the advisor liberally gives away goods and services to the FSF unit, unit personnel may think the advisor is weak, and not have respect for and may take advantage of the advisor.

d. Advisors can never accept logistical support from the FSF unit they are advising. This would give the FSF commander leverage over the advisor team and, thus, degrade the advisors' status and ability to complete the mission. Advisors must have access to their own food, electricity generator, fuel, and maintenance support. FSF commanders may try to get support items they want by depriving the advisors in their compound of desired items (e.g., fuel). By not running their generators during the summer months for "lack of fuel," the FSF commander could deprive the advisors of electricity needed to run their computers. This would force the advisors to request a fuel resupply the team may not need. If the advisors refuse to accept this type of leverage, unnecessary support requests will decrease and the FSF is forced to use their supply system.

10. Building FSF Confidence

a. Advisor team leaders should remember that they are building the confidence of the FSF in addition to the tangible measures of the FSF unit (e.g., troop strength, combat vehicles, and weapons). This confidence can be established and maintained by tactical success.

b. If the FSF fail, the local populace may begin to lose confidence in the government's ability to protect them. A string of relatively minor adversary victories can cause a widespread loss of FSF morale and influence public opinion in a way that wins criminal elements favor. In short, the FSF must be prepared for operations so they have every possible advantage. As their competence and confidence grow, these forces can assume complex assignments.

c. The general concept is for the advisor team to partner with the FSF unit in training or operations as the team's authorities allow. The extent to which the advisors take lead, mentor, and observe FSF preparation and execution activities depends on evaluations of the FSF and the progress of previous advisor teams. For newly formed or low-performing FSF, the advisor team will take the lead and show the basic steps of FSF operations. Over time, the FSF unit will feel confident enough to take over operations as the lead force with an end state of trained, manned, and equipped FSF conducting independent operations. The oversight and integration of FSF and advisors will naturally extend beyond the operations themselves, to include:

(1) Including FSF commanders in debriefing higher headquarters.

(2) Mentioning FSF to press organizations.

(3) Distributing military means recovered from tactical operations (e.g., weapons, ammunition, vehicles, and equipment). This may be a useful source of spare parts for FSF equipment. US forces must ensure their conduct, as well as that of FSF with which they operate, does not include pillaging—the taking of private or public movable property, including enemy military equipment, for private or personal use, where that use is not justified by military necessity. Through general orders or similar directives, the CCDR or other competent authority may authorize retaining enemy or belligerent military equipment for reasons other than military necessity (e.g., war souvenirs). The wrongful retention of unauthorized war souvenirs (trophies) or taking private property is punishable under Article 108a, *Captured or Abandoned Property*, and Article 121, *Larceny and Wrongful Appropriation*, of Title 10 USC, Chapter 47, Uniform Code of Military Justice. Unlawful firearms importation into the US carries an additional penalty.

(4) Allowing FSF units to take possession of and process any detainees or evidence.

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Chapter VI
OBSERVATIONS AND INSIGHTS FROM FORMER ADVISORS

Note: This chapter appears after the chapters on advisor skills, culture, and working with FSF to summarize those lessons in the form of TTP from advisors that have gone before. The style is different and the entire chapter is intended not as a set of rules to live by, but to present some of the nuances that advisors have stumbled through in the past. The TTP are for awareness and may or may not fit the context of the advising mission.

1. Recommended Practices for Working with Counterparts by Former Advisors

Note: Some of the recommendations in this section fit only to missions where advisors have the authority to accompany their partner forces on combat operations.

a. Practice Cultural Awareness. Advisors need to become well acquainted with the culture of the people with whom they will work. Cultural awareness yields situational awareness and leads to increased force protection for the advisor and the advisor team. Learn enough of the language for simple conversation. Know the basics and use them from the first meeting (e.g., hello, please, thank you, yes, no, and goodbye). Language demonstrates a willingness to understand and be competent in the PN’s culture. During an advisor mission, the relationship continues to evolve both when working and socializing; advisors must not overlook the opportunities to better understand their partners through informal settings. Try to employ fables and short stories relevant to the local culture to teach a lesson. Ask questions to illustrate a point. Be aware that some US and coalition practices may not be appropriate in the counterparts’ culture. Off-handed remarks made in unguarded moments or a casual comment can cause problems later on. Avoid sarcastic or condescending comments. Such remarks are often misunderstood. In addition, tone of voice or body language can change the way information is understood, thereby negating its positive intent. Advisors should strive to ensure all their actions and verbal communications can be fully understood. Read all available literature (e.g., country handbooks) on the local culture but expect cultural shifts to occur more rapidly than described in the literature. Remember, the things that do not concern the advisor should be left alone. People in developing areas are often inclined to be superstitious and secretive and will guard their beliefs and secrets with their lives.

b. Respect ranks and positions of counterparts. Accept local nationals and respect them as individuals; treat them with dignity. When associating with PN officers and local officials, dignify their positions. They often outrank the advisor in their society and station. Always demonstrate respect towards counterparts.

c. Be patient. Be flexible and exercise tempered patience. Explain the benefits of an action. Get them to accept it as their idea. After the advisor plants an idea, let the counterpart modify it and take full credit for it. The advisor’s mission is to enable and advise. Consider unit limitations and adjust within the FSF organizational framework. Keep an open mind and attempt to operate within the cultural pattern, as closely as possible. Humor and laughter are wonderful tools for building rapport, if used in culturally correct ways. The best approaches should include local cultural influences and practices to encourage FSF ownership and understanding. Use caution when using Western cultural measurements for honesty and morals. In many cultures, expect counterparts to be long on promises and short on deliveries.

d. Develop ideas and solutions with the FSF counterparts. Be willing to ask for the counterparts' advice. Often, the FSF's solutions are preferable, in the long run, to "US solutions," which may only solve short-term issues. In many cases, FSF will be experienced in areas of concern, like cultural issues or local customs and courtesies. Skillfully present recommendations that explain the advantages to the FSF counterpart. During advising, however, the advisor must stay within the boundaries of US and coalition intent while using influence to ensure the FSF counterpart retains ownership of the outcome. The advisor's approach must be based on facts, logical reasoning, and sincere attempts to do what is best for the FSF and US and coalition forces. Advisors must always be cognizant of presenting a negative view of a particular subject (e.g., do not humiliate an FSF commander). If possible, avoid making recommendations requiring an immediate decision. For example, expect subjects involving religious holidays and operations to take several meetings to gain initial decision-making progress. Counterparts must be allowed to exercise their prerogatives and not appear to be overly dependent on US and coalition influence.

e. Make corrections diplomatically. Praise success and build unit pride. Look for things the counterpart is doing well and praise the counterpart on successes. After this, the counterpart will be more willing to hear criticism and engage in problem solving sessions designed to improve unit effectiveness. Be willing to compromise. Never convey the impression that everything the counterpart does is all wrong. Instead, an advisor must be prepared to explain the pros and cons of a decision in tactical and technical terms easily understood by their counterparts. The advisor must provide reasonable alternatives supported by local culture and sound tactics. Advisors should never be reluctant to help the counterpart improve, but any corrections must be couched with tact. An unwillingness to provide appropriate advice may leave the impression the advisor lacks either knowledge or concern. Appropriate and timely corrections can engender respect and save the counterpart from making costly mistakes. Give advice at appropriate times in appropriate places; however, do not harass or berate the FSF counterparts or any local leader. This is especially critical when the FSF counterparts are in the presence of subordinates since it may degrade their authority.

f. Assist and enable, do not command. During planning, stay in the background as much as possible. The advisor should act as a catalyst. Never attempt to command the counterparts' organization. Advisors must ensure that they never become part of the FSF chain of command and are not considered to be a decision-maker. Refrain from coercion or threats (even psychological) as methods to shape the counterpart's decisions. Develop ideas and solutions with the FSF counterparts that are clear, simple, measurable, and sustainable after US advisors depart the area. They must study the counterparts' personality and background and make every effort to build and maintain friendly relationships based upon professional respect.

g. Remain a broker of honesty and do not align within a certain social or cultural standing.

h. Keep counterparts informed. The advisor is a bridge in the communications network. The advisor needs to ensure that information flows in both directions (i.e., US and PN forces). As a corollary, the advisor maintains a continuity book with a series of lessons learned and AARs for a RIP or TOA plan on how to work with counterparts from day one.

i. Be prepared to act as a liaison to multinational units. Liaison is NOT the advisor's primary function, but is a task one must accept, to some degree (e.g., when dealing with civil affairs units). Advisors may have to represent their counterparts or defend the counterparts' position in disputes with US agencies. However, this support should be based on sound judgment and not blind loyalty.

j. Be ready to advise on equipment maintenance. However, refrain from using status reports as the most important metric of an FSF unit. The reports are difficult and time consuming, and the logistics and maintenance systems may not adhere to FSF frameworks.

k. Know small unit tactics and unit security procedures (e.g., base defense). Teach hand and arm signals (e.g., universal and quiet language) for actions in combat patrolling. Integrate indigenous forces into battle drills, (i.e., teach them what to expect from a professional force). During execution, do not get so far ahead of the counterpart that the counterpart is lost. Be proficient in all combat skills. Mastery of these skills helps establish the advisors' identity as a professional warfighter. Additional subject matter expertise and combat experience help enhance the advisors' position when the FSF counterparts are experienced combat veterans.

l. Stay with the unit. When able, advisors should not live separately. Eat their food and live in their conditions. Advisors should live as close as possible to those with whom they work, but not "go native," which is a colloquial term in the advising community for losing one's identity and blurring the line between US objectives and PN objectives. Advisors are ambassadors for their country and will be evaluated accordingly. Be willing to participate actively in local military, athletic, and social functions. If unable to accept a social invitation, decline with regrets expressed in accordance with the local custom, and invite counterparts to appropriate social functions. Ensure partners are active participants as much as possible. Develop a sense of identity with the counterparts' unit or geographic area by spending the maximum time at the scene of activity. Advising FSF is a 24-hours a day, 7-days a week job.

m. Be aware of operations in the area to prevent friendly fire incidents. Advisors act as a safety to ensure deconfliction of the AO on behalf of the FSF unit, in addition to providing access to coalition effects. These include, for example, quick-reaction forces, medical and casualty evacuation for casualties, unmanned aircraft surveillance, aviation assets, and combat camera.

n. Be objective in reports on unit and leader proficiency. Nothing will be gained from glossing over problems. Advisors should report gross corruption or incompetence and guard the confidence partners placed in them. Do not divulge intimate secrets. Insist on observing human rights standards. Report violations through the chain of command.

o. Maintain military bearing and a professional manner, and model good leadership. Advisors should be themselves and not pretend. People can recognize a phony. Never forget to use the old adage “under-promise and over-deliver” as a valid tactic when it comes to promises. Advisors should only make promises they can deliver within the limits of their authority. Advisors who oversell themselves may arouse suspicion or create false expectations that cannot be met. Advisors should demonstrate initiative and inventiveness and encourage this in their counterparts. They should encourage counterparts to consider orders they receive and ask for clarification or permission to deviate when the need seems obvious. Social networks and political structures may cause counterparts to present false understanding and compliance in order to avoid reprisal from their commanders. Counterparts also may be reluctant to accept ideas or recommendations from subordinate leaders. This may occur even if the subordinate has valid ideas. The counterpart can be encouraged to accept requests or suggestions from subordinates by highlighting that the net gain to unit effectiveness is a reflection of the FSF’s leadership.

p. Train security units to standard and fight alongside them, if allowed by mission parameters. Encourage continuous training and improvement. Help develop SOPs. The amount of advising during combat is small. The advisor does most of the advising while preparing for combat. The advisor bases advice on personal observations or those of fellow advisors during past operations. Capitalize on the strengths of the team to achieve maximum training effectiveness. Never present too many subjects at once or unnecessarily prolong a discussion of one subject. Permit the FSF counterparts time to take action to correct any deficiencies prior to reassessing that area. However, do make sure a subject is discussed until the counterpart understands it. Advisors must be prepared to deal with slow or minimal progress. Use confidence missions to validate training and gauge progress. Suggestions should be within the counterparts’ authority and capability. Advisors should take care not to strain their relationship with their counterparts by asking them to do the impossible. Encourage frequent inspections of all kinds. Advisors may need to help their FSF counterparts understand how frequent inspections help them determine the actual condition of their units. However, advisors should verify information provided by FSF unit counterparts to ensure assessments are accurate.

q. Look ahead. Anticipate the next issue. Take nothing for granted and be prepared for surprises.

2. Advisor Team Activities and Planning Considerations

a. Battle Rhythm. Advisors should balance their team’s daily schedule, without being predictable, and ensure team operations security by developing a battle rhythm known only by themselves. The battle rhythm should be flexible with few details to accommodate combat operations, FSF training, and team administrative requirements. To prevent being predictable, teams should change their battle rhythm every 30 days. Events to consider for a team’s battle rhythm are shown in table 12.

Table 12. Battle Rhythm Events	
• Team battle update briefs. • Team patrol debriefs. • Coalition security meetings. • Precombat inspections. • Counterpart time. • Foreign security forces (FSF) battle update briefs. • Team maintenance. • Mission preparation.	• Officer and noncommissioned officer professional development. • Training preparation. • After action reports for FSF. • FSF maintenance. • Rehearsals. • Team physical training. • Local governance meetings.

b. Down Time. The rigors of living, working, and fighting alongside FSF counterparts will fatigue advisors over time. Advisor teams are small by design and over-worked by nature, so the team leader should invest in the mental well-being of the team members. It is highly recommended to have a day of no scheduled activity in the battle rhythm. Including this day on the team's schedule will enforce compliance and allow the team to unwind and take care of personal needs.

c. Interagency Considerations. As external assistance to the local government increases, other personnel may be introduced into the area. The FSF advisor can expect to find representatives from US governmental or NGOs, international organizations, third country nationals, private corporations, and local national voluntary organizations involved in tasks such as medical care and agricultural development. Assistance brings positive benefits to the FSF, but effective coordination may be required by the advisor to ensure all activities are coordinated, for maximum impact. The advisor, having the authority, should ensure interagency agreements are established as soon as possible. In the absence of such authority, the advisor should actively encourage the development of such agreements. The advisor can expect to find certain technical agencies and services are extensions of local national ministries. These activities and efforts should be integrated into the overall plan. This requires the advisor to maintain close coordination with any US representative who has responsibility for advising these agencies.

3. Training FSF

a. Training/Operations Cycle.

(1) As part of understanding their environment, advisors should be empathetic to the ongoing duties that the FSF are performing outside of the training cycle. Many of the countries with which the US partners are battling cartels, insurgencies, or other internal stability threats, so it is incumbent upon the advisors to work with the FSF leadership to achieve balance among combat, training, maintenance, and rest. One solution would be to help FSF develop and implement a training and operational cycle akin to a US model, but modified to function within FSF terms.

(2) FSF “Fight-Train-Leave-Fight” Training Cycle. Using an Army battalion-sized model as an example, based on four rifle companies and one headquarters and service company, it is possible to develop a training and operational cycle balancing all four requirements. One COA would be to establish a 20-day cycle with company rotations occurring every 5 days. Calling it a “Fight-Train-Leave-Fight” rotation, the battalion could implement a system much like a green-amber-red training and operational cycle. The fight or “green” companies would be manned 100 percent and would execute continuous operations for 10 days. Another company, the train or “amber” company, would execute command maintenance on all its assigned equipment and execute individual task training (e.g., first aid, marksmanship, and communication skills) for 5 days. The remaining leave or “red” company would be 100 percent on leave for 5 days. The headquarters and service company could still rotate FSF home and have 25 percent of the support personnel and staff gone at any given time. The specialty platoons also would rotate through training and maintenance along with the rifle companies. If needed, this same model can be used at the platoon level. See table 13.

Table 13. Foreign Security Forces’ Unit Cycle Example

	Day 1–5	Day 6–10	Day 11–15	Day 16–20
A Company	Fight	Train	Leave	Fight
B Company	Train	Leave	Fight	Fight
C Company	Leave	Fight	Fight	Train
D Company	Fight	Fight	Train	Leave

b. Task-oriented Training. Based on the FSF agreed upon mission-essential task list, a plan for all individual, collective, and leadership training can be developed and approved for use by the FSF. The training the advisor team provides comes from relevant doctrine and individual advisor experience. The mission-essential task list is standard among the companies and provides assessment criteria.

c. Leadership Training. Most of what counterparts learn about leadership is through observing the advisor team. Leadership training should be modeled on the principle of leadership through example. It is the advisor’s job to reinforce desired values in the counterpart’s attitude. The effect of this mindset is the creation of a learning organization with professional leaders who are competent and confident. How advisors train them on these basic values and effects is the art of advising. Part of that art relies on the advisor and advisor team to demonstrate these values and effects through their actions. Some suggestions include:

(1) Allowing the FSF to observe the advisor team as it conducts precombat checks and inspections, operation orders, maintenance, and debriefs.

(2) Training at one level and evaluating two levels down (e.g., a successful battalion has lethal platoons).

(3) Teaching the art of command presence and staff ownership by routinely taking the higher leadership on subordinate unit missions.

(4) Coaching the FSF counterpart to conduct thorough unit debriefs after every mission or training evolution.

(5) Coaching the FSF counterpart to start a NCO development program run by senior FSF NCOs.

d. Advisor's Approach to FSF Training.

(1) On-the-job Training. Advisors are equipped to train functional areas and systems development within an FSF unit. Unfortunately, defeating the enemy requires more than the joint planning process and a solid supply system. Coalition forces should assist if the advisor team is unable to provide on-the-job training in certain areas. The advisor team can schedule these combined operations and use them to train the entire FSF unit structure. In addition to training the FSF while conducting the operation, the advisor also can train the FSF staff and FSF logistics units to track and support the events.

(2) Integrate and Synchronize Training. A good advisor team will integrate and synchronize individual, staff, unit, and leader training into FSF operational requirements. A great advisor team also teaches the FSF how to integrate and synchronize training opportunities into their schedule. The following tips for success can be useful in adding perspective when developing a training plan with the FSF.

(a) Be the Expert. Advisors should ensure the team understands and can execute to the standard, which the advisor is expecting the FSF to perform. The FSF will model the advisor's actions.

(b) Understand foreign disclosure requirements. Much of what can be taught or given to the FSF is limited by foreign disclosure laws. For example, teaching mortar employment may be authorized; however, giving them the lesson plans and protractors may be restricted due to foreign disclosure laws. Advisors must remember that the technology present in training equipment and any disclosure of the capabilities of US equipment must comply with foreign disclosure laws.

(c) Incorporate their experience level into the training plan. The FSF may have differing TTP they have found effective. The advisor should be open-minded enough to consider their TTP for the desired training effect.

(d) Maintain emotional control. An even temperament, with a robust sense of humor, is more effective than losing one's temper. Normal US reasons for anger and impatience seldom translate to other cultures.

(e) Be cognizant of insider threats. Advisors are coaching and training the enemy if the FSF have been infiltrated by enemy forces.

(f) Become immersed in their environment. Advisors should live, eat, train, and fight with FSF. They should learn some of their language. The confidence built by doing this is greater than having the occasional cup of tea with them. FSF will listen to those they respect.

(g) Learn their doctrine. Advisors are there to reinforce FSF systems and doctrine, not to replicate one's own. Advisors should learn FSF doctrine and operate and train within it. They should understand that the FSF counterpart may use centralized command, for example.

(h) Learn their weapons, weapon systems, and equipment. Advisors must be able to coach FSF on effective employment of their weapons, weapon systems, and equipment.

(i) Train their trainers. Advisors should teach and coach through FSF leadership. This establishes legitimacy for the FSF's right to lead and effectively enables the secondary objective of training more FSF over time.

(j) Be present. The advisor team must have a presence at training events and during operations. The FSF become proficient at tasks the advisor team reinforces.

(k) Do not become their supply system. The advisor team must train them to use their system or coach them to develop one.

4. Advising in Combat

a. Command Relationships (Advisors are not Commanders).

(1) Advisors contribute to developing and improving FSF capabilities by providing advice and guidance within US command policy. The US or coalition chain of command should be used to obtain and disseminate guidance and assistance. The advisor is responsible for ensuring the intent of the US or coalition chain of command is received and understood by the FSF.

(2) Advisors should recognize differences in leadership styles employed by their FSF counterparts, which may differ from the standards expected of US and coalition units, yet be effective for their force. Recognition of the differences will help advisors avoid being perceived as leading the FSF.

(3) The advisor provides recommendations to the FSF, not orders. Only the counterpart should issue orders. The FSF counterpart is the advisor's peer, not the boss; neither is the advisor the counterpart's boss. Much of the success of an advisor is based on the personal and professional relationship the advisor has with the FSF counterpart. Advisor duty is leadership by example. The FSF counterpart watches what the advisor does more than listens to what is said.

b. FSF Planning Process and Considerations. An advisor must understand what planning process is used by the FSF.

c. Intelligence.

(1) There may be coalition organizations in the AO that can assist with intelligence requirements, but the advisor may still lack intelligence about the AO, FSF, and the civilian personalities who dwell in the AO. What may be missing is an adequate intelligence fusion cell to consolidate the intelligence picture. See

appendix K for examples of engagement worksheets for possible use by advisors.

(2) The advisor should collaborate and share information among units in the AO. There is too much information at stake not to take advantage of the capability. If creative, then the results gained will be surprising.

(3) The advisor should be familiar with area studies, area assessments, and AARs. The Joint After-Action Reporting System database and the Joint Lessons Learned Information System are useful tools for reviewing AARs. Pertinent documents should be compared to detect trends or changes. These systems also provide examples of how documents may be completed. If a relationship is built over the years, the advisor could evaluate the following, if requested by the FSF.

(a) FSF intelligence staff section (G-2 or S-2), and its SOPs and effectiveness.

(b) FSF unit chain of command and communication channels.

(c) Intelligence projects initiated or proposed by predecessors.

(d) Advisor communication channels.

(e) Other available intelligence reference material from other intelligence agencies.

(4) Advisors may be called upon to provide guidance and assistance in operations security activities. When acting in such roles, advisors should attempt to answer the following questions:

(a) Is intelligence disseminated on a need-to-know basis?

(b) Are security precautions observed?

(c) Is access to sensitive areas positively controlled?

(d) Are cryptographic systems available and used in transmitting classified information?

(e) Do personnel follow proper communications procedures?

(f) Are personnel with access to classified information properly cleared? How thorough or effective is the investigation process?

(g) Are security inspections of installations conducted at regular and irregular intervals?

(h) Is periodic security training conducted?

(i) What means of communication are employed and do they jeopardize the security of informants?

(5) The advisor should never assume technology will be the sole savior of the advisor team in combat. Routinely, the enemy is proving to be adept at overcoming technological advancements and changing TTP. The best way to

survive as a team, and train the FSF to survive, is through intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE). It is better to avoid or mitigate kill zones with combat power than trust improvised explosive device defeat mechanisms on assigned vehicles to do the work. Outthinking the enemy is the best way to defeat them. The following are crucial questions to ask regarding the enemy.

(a) Who is the team fighting?

- Terrorists, insurgents, or a militia?
- Identify their zones (i.e., attack, support, kill, reconnaissance, sanctuary).
- Identify their existing trends.

(b) What can the enemy do to the advisor team?

- Use improvised explosive devices, complex ambushes, reconnaissance, demonstrations.
- How will the enemy use the locals?
- What times of day or night will they be active, and where?

(c) What can friendly forces do to the enemy?

- How can the advisor team and FSF mitigate enemy actions?
- What joint effects are available to the FSF?
- What coalition forces can assist, and how?
- What deception can the advisor use; where and how?

(d) How will the enemy react to the advisor's plan?

- Throughout the mission, what are anticipated enemy reactions to the FSF and advisor team?
- How does the advisor counter them?

(6) Once the advisor team understands and applies the basics of IPOE, the FSF should be trained to do the same. Many FSF may lack a basic understanding of how to analyze their OE despite being in the same culture and sharing a common language. Also, the FSF may not live in the same operating area. Often, their deference for rumors drives conclusions regarding enemy activity. The advisor team should be aware of rumors because they may create unproductive combat operations. The advisor should train FSF to analyze their area correctly and focus their understanding on intelligence and combat information.

Note: Observations in (7) and (8) are only conducted under an intelligence cooperation agreement.

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(7) Advisors should establish relationships with the various "special units" within the operational environment. Most will not contact the advisor or offer assistance without a request. These organizations may include cross-functional teams of the

Federal Bureau of Investigation, other US law-enforcement personnel, and many US intelligence agencies. Many of these special coalition intelligence or law enforcement task forces will share information with the advisor team if asked for assistance. Reciprocal information sharing helps keep their interest in helping the advisor team.

(a) The advisor should train the FSF concerning enemy infiltration, weapons smuggling, or other criminal activities.

(b) Information from the FSF is valuable and can be used by the advisor team to assist in building packets and case files supporting US and FSF objectives. In exchange for the information, FSF could receive reciprocal information regarding targets, intelligence, and human factors. For example, these may include sectarian infiltration routes and ethnic cleansing areas of focus. These types of information help the advisor understand enemy locations and kill zones, and determine how the enemy is trying to target the advisor, advisor team, and FSF.

(8) When directed, advisors plan and conduct intelligence training. The advisor should assist their FSF counterpart in developing a local intelligence collection program, training intelligence personnel in their specialties, and effectively using trained intelligence personnel. Advisors may accomplish these aims by:

(a) Assisting in establishing an operations center to coordinate intelligence efforts.

(b) Maintaining liaison with police and intelligence agencies responsible for countersubversion.

(c) Providing intelligence support and force protection information to US personnel working at other levels.

(d) Establishing secure and reliable communications channels.

(e) Preparing daily reports on intelligence-related activities.

(f) Assisting in developing effective procedures for collecting and disseminating intelligence.

(g) Assisting in establishing an adequate security program to safe-guard against subversion, espionage, and sabotage.

(h) Assisting in developing and achieving intelligence training quotas for selected, qualified personnel.

d. General Observations.

(1) Advisors should prepare and maintain a list of essential elements of information, priority intelligence requirements, friendly force intelligence requirements, and opposition indicators, if appropriate. Advisors should determine if:

(a) Trained subversive opposition leaders have been discovered.

(b) Evidence exists of an underground opposition organization.

(c) Efforts exist to create or increase civil disturbance and dissension.

(d) An opposition psychological campaign is ongoing against existing or proposed government policies and programs.

(e) Attempts are being made to provoke the government into harsh measures (such as curfews).

(f) Assassinations and kidnappings of local political leaders, doctors, or schoolteachers are taking place.

(g) Adversarial actions are occurring.

(h) An appreciable decline exists in school attendance.

(2) Human Rights and Misconduct. The advisor must stress the consequences of mistreating suspects, detainees, or prisoners taken into custody. These persons must be treated in accordance with Article 3 of the Geneva Convention. This means advisors or FSF provide care for the sick and wounded as well as protect prisoners and detainees from all types of abuse or harm. Murder, mutilation, and torture are forbidden as is humiliation or degrading treatment. Sentences and executions may not be carried out unless judgment has been pronounced by a regularly constituted court. US Service members must never be active participants in conducting any such punishment and must strongly discourage any such activity. They must explain to their counterparts they are obliged to report any atrocities, of which they have knowledge, under the Leahy Laws, which could result in termination of US assistance.

(3) The advisor’s task is not to teach FSF the JPP and IPOE or institute battalion systems to operate effectively in garrison. It is to advise and train them on how to be effective in combat. The advisor team’s combat missions must be deliberately planned and executed in a multinational, sometimes joint, fashion with the FSF. The advisor should understand and respect the difficulty of the mission. The benefits received through aggressive prosecution of duties will directly reflect in the FSF units being advised. The better this is done, the faster the advisor and team will achieve success.

5. Introduction to FSF Logistics

a. Although advising the FSF logistical counterpart may be the primary mission, taking care of the team’s logistical needs can seem like a full-time job. Advisor teams can teach, coach, and advise their counterparts in all aspects of logistics. This includes accounting for property; maintaining property books; requesting, storing, and distributing all classes of supplies; and performing unit-level maintenance or establishing a maintenance program if one is not already in place. In addition, advisors may have to request contracts to improve their FSF AO through PN construction companies. The advisor’s mission may require assisting the SC officer by teaching FSF how to use equipment obtained through the foreign military sales program, although this training is usually provided or sold as part of the foreign military sales program or Section 1206/2282 Train and Equip program. Additionally, advisors keep their higher logistics advisors informed of any logistical function the FSF counterpart is performing through their logistical system.

(1) Understanding FSF Logistics. The FSF counterpart is likely to have shortfalls in logistics capabilities and may ask advisors to fulfill shortages. It is critical that advisors develop good working relationships with their FSF counterparts, but realize, if they are unsure about a logistics issue, say “no” and develop a successful outcome later. It is difficult for advisors to recover from a loss of credibility caused by the inability to fulfill promises to their counterparts.

(2) Typical Problems. FSF lack the logistical capability required to sustain their equipment. This problem is complex and can include the following.

(a) They may have underfunded logistical systems or are subject to corruption from the point of issue to point of delivery.

(b) They may lack adequate infrastructure systems and processes that could hamper logistical planning.

(c) Many officers and NCOs do not have plans developed that address future sustainment demands. The lack of understanding or emphasis on logistics leads to a lack of inventory, poor planning, and an unworkable system of resupply.

(3) Logistical Advising. The logistics officer serves as the primary logistical advisor to the FSF logistics officer by coaching, teaching, and advising the FSF counterpart regarding the classes of supply. Additionally, the advisor may be expected to request contracts for the FSF.

(a) Property Accountability and Property Book. It is important, during the RIP or TOA process with the outgoing team, advisors ask the outgoing advisor if there is an equipment inventory of what has been issued to the FSF up to the RIP or TOA date. The list will serve as the base document for tracking how much equipment, by major end item, has been issued to the FSF unit via the PN government. During the advisors’ tour, they will add major end items issued to keep track of the percentage of fill per item. This will help advisors provide accurate information to higher headquarters regarding the amount of major end items issued to the FSF unit. See table 14 for an example of accounting for property.

Table 14. A Property Accountability Example				
Item	**Authorized**	**On Hand**	**Short**	**Fill Percentage**
AK-47	500	250	250	50%
Medium machinegun	200	175	25	88%
Chevy LUV (pickup)	250	75	175	38%
Chevy Silverado	500	360	140	72%
Cargo trucks	32	15	17	47%
Fuel trailers	4	1	3	25%
Very high frequency radio handset	475	450	25	95%

(b) Tracking FSF Equipment. Tracking how much property the FSF unit has issued to their subordinate units by major end item is as important as property accountability. Build a good working relationship with the FSF counterpart to determine the FSF commander's written authorization for major end item distribution. The FSF counterpart may already have a working property book the advisor can use to compare numbers to ensure a somewhat accurate document. The advisor will most likely have to work through interpreters to translate both documents, if the counterpart is unable to read or speak English. See table 15 for an example of a property book.

Table 15. Property Book Examples		
AK-47	**Issued**	**Total**
Date: 15 JUL XX	700	700
Division Headquarters	100	100
1st Brigade (BDE)	200	200
2nd BDE	200	200
3rd BDE	200	200
Date: 20 AUG XX	300	1,000
Division Headquarters	0	100
1st BDE	100	300
2nd BDE	200	400
3rd BDE	0	200

b. Request, Store, and Distribute all Classes of Supply.

(1) Advisors should understand the SOP or methods used in requesting supplies within their FSF's logistical system. Advisors can ask FSF logistical personnel what forms they use, their forecasting requirements, and where to send requests.

In addition, the advisor will need to ask the advisor team's logistics chain of command what the procedures are for requesting oversight and tracking.

(2) Once supplies have arrived at the FSF base, the FSF counterpart is advised on inventory and storing controls to ensure the safety and security of the supplies.

(3) After supplies have been inventoried and secured, the advisor and FSF counterpart will assess all subordinate units for supply shortfalls. Ideally, the advisor wants the counterpart to decide that the best way to distribute the supplies is by filling the units with the most shortages. However, the advisor may have to help the counterpart identify the best way to distribute the supplies. The FSF logistical officer does not have the final say in the distribution. The logistical officer will take the suggestion to the unit commander for the final distribution decision. The advisor should be aware that unit commanders may use property and supplies as a form of superiority. The commander who wishes to reward a subordinate commander might give that commander more property or supplies than others. In addition, a unit commander may show power by waiting for subordinate commanders to ask for supplies or property.

c. Unit-level Maintenance for the FSF.

(1) The advisor's FSF counterparts may emphasize performing preventive maintenance and preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) on their equipment. One reason for this is that they may not have spare parts or lubricants within their system. The FSF counterparts should be asked, through the advisor logistics channels, if there is a maintenance contract or are repair parts or lubricants available for FSF use.

(2) The advisor may be amazed at the level of maintenance the FSF counterparts are able to perform. Out of necessity, FSF units with inadequate supply systems are often very skillful at cannibalization. They do whatever it takes to keep their vehicles mission capable. However, they may not understand the importance of performing PMCS to avert problems.

(3) There are few PMCS manuals in foreign languages for the FSF counterparts to use to perform the correct preventive maintenance. In addition, the advisor's counterpart may have many different vehicles in the motor pool with no owner's manuals, organic, trained mechanics, or spare parts.

d. Contracting.

(1) In case the advisor needs to build, purchase, or service something beyond the limits or authorities of the advisor team, a request for proposal or a request for a quotation should be submitted to the higher headquarters that provide contracting support to the team. For example, if armor is needed on the FSF vehicles to increase survivability, a contract is required to purchase the armor and install it. Another example may be to purchase air conditioner units and installation services for the advisor's FSF offices or a detainee area. A contract must be awarded to purchase and install these units.

(2) The logistics advisor starts the contracting process, but the final approving authority may reside at the general officer level. All contracts must be fully vetted to ensure they remain within the funding authority by which the contracts will be executed. To complete the contracting process, The advisor should reach back to the home station or a supporting contracting office in country to guide the team.

Chapter VII
ASSESSMENTS

1. General

a. SC activities conducted with FSF and their supporting institutions range from the visible—training, equipping, and exercising together—to those less obvious, such as holding bilateral talks, workshops, and conferences and providing education. It is often challenging to determine if these and other activities such as advising have contributed to the achievement of US objectives and, if so, by how much or in what ways.

b. As discussed in Chapter II, the operation assessment process is used by CCMDs, SCCs, joint task forces, and TSOCs to inform SC activity decision-making at the appropriate levels. The operation assessment process starts with the planning initiation step and continues through each step of the JPP. The operation assessment process activities of *monitor, evaluate, recommend,* and *direct* inform and are informed by decision-making that occurs at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

Note: The JPP is a recognized and proven problem-solving approach, which advances decision-making at all levels. Advisors can use the process at any time for any issue, and results from each step can inform other steps.

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c. Advisors can use the JPP and participate in the operation assessment process to inform their decision-making related to advising their FSF counterpart as well as informing other stakeholders (e.g., CCDR, chief of mission, etc.) in the OE. Doing so helps to achieve unity of effort as well as creates a common operational picture for making estimates of developmental progress in FSF and their supporting institutions.

d. The operation assessment process strengthens and reinforces DOD AM&E policy and guidelines. From both the perspective of joint planning and AM&E guidelines, assessment involves analyzing the context, conditions, capabilities, and requirements of a PN to inform follow-on or in-progress SC activities and the programs that enable those activities.

Note: For more information on assessments, see JP 5-0, JP 3-20, and DODI 5132.14, *Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Policy for the Security Cooperation Enterprise.*

In the context of security cooperation:

Operation assessment process.

1. A continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing capabilities during military operations to achieve stated objectives.

2. Determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective. (JP 5-0)

In accordance with AM&E policy and guidelines, assessment is the systematic analysis to provide an understanding of the context, conditions, partner capabilities, and requirements to inform security cooperation planning and implementation. (DODI 5132.14).

e. When considering their role, advisors should recognize that different headquarters will likely have different areas of focus for the assessment of SC activities. While all advisors are sensors for both MOPs and MOEs, these examples shed light on some general tendencies at tactical and operational levels:

(1) Tactical-level. The assessment at the tactical-level focuses more on task accomplishment and performance management, and whether assigned or implied tasks are performed to standard using MOPs. MOPs answer the questions “was the task completed?” and “was it completed to standard?” (e.g., delivery of equipment, construction of contingency bases, construction of a school, or seizure of an objective to specified standards) to assist the unit in improving future performance. These assessments include any SFA developmental activity (e.g., OTEBA) that occurs within the G-EGO functions of FSF and any action taken by an FSF counterpart within these functions. Advisor assessments inform and are informed by assessments at the operational level.

(2) Operational-level. CCMDs, SCCs, joint task forces, and TSOCs focus on whether SC activities are creating the necessary effects and achieving objectives using MOEs. MOEs orient on whether they are making progress towards mission accomplishment (e.g., gaining support within a population or effecting a decrease in enemy activity), which answers whether they are “doing the right things.” Similarly, advisors aligned to principals within FSF can expect to advise their counterparts on identifying and using MOEs as well as harmonizing (coordination and synchronization) of these MOEs with a CCMD or SCC.

f. The advisor plays a direct role in using the operation assessment process to support all aspects of DOD AM&E policy and guidelines. The remainder of this chapter will depict the principles within an operation assessment and how these fundamentals inform decision-making at the appropriate levels. With input from an advisor, CCDRs use their operation assessment process to inform the Secretary of Defense prioritization and resourcing decisions such as US investments in advisor missions and whether the activity is yielding the intended return.

2. Assessment

a. Assessments inform decision-making at the appropriate levels by helping to establish information about the conditions within a PN that are relevant to planning a successful advising engagement. Assessments serve at least two critical functions by informing the design (e.g., a CCDR's plan) of advising activities and providing baseline information to enable accurate measurement of progress of SC activities and programs that enable them. Initial assessments should precede all advising activities in order to measure the progress of three fundamental and interrelated considerations:

(1) The level of progress towards building a security relationship.

(2) FSF capability and capacity.

(3) US access within the PN, including anticipated freedom of action that results from the relationship between the United States and PN.

b. Advisors must develop an understanding of FSF capability, capacity, and conditions that affect development to effectively conduct operations and meet US and PN objectives. Assessments identify gaps in FSF capabilities so solutions can be developed. Considerations include an overarching assessment of FSF requirements, existing capabilities, capacity, and constraints, as well as environmental considerations across the PMESII spectrum. Also included are the desires of the PN and US defense objectives. Each situation differs depending upon the level of conflict in the PN, the existing capability and capacity of the FSF, and the desires of the PN.

c. The assessment must start with an understanding of the OE, allowing follow-on planning efforts to support strategy development, encourage unity of effort, focus resources, and anticipate partner needs. The desired end states account for US strategic goals, priorities of the FSF or the PN government, and regional factors and concerns.

d. In total, initial and follow-on assessments describe FSF willingness and ability to implement and sustain assistance; improve institutional capacity; build capabilities in the context of country or other relevant objectives; and identify requirements, gaps, and potential risks. The following section discusses the FSF assessment.

Note: Determining how well FSF perform a specific task or achieve an objective depends on the conditions with which they must deal. For example, if an infantry battalion is succeeding in defeating the enemy when coming into direct contact, it does not need to improve marksmanship to make all battalion personnel a sniper. If the enemy changes tactics and begins engaging at longer ranges, the unit may then have to improve its marksmanship capabilities.

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3. FSF Assessment

a. As discussed earlier, advisors play a crucial role in supporting the operation assessment process activities of monitor, evaluate, recommend, and direct. When assessing FSF and their supporting institutions, CCMDs, SCCs, joint task forces, and TSOCs use the FSF Assessment Model (Logical Order of Assessment). See figure 16.



Core Processes of each function

G-Governance: authorizations, appropriations, national security and foreign policy

E-Executive: strategy and policy, human resource management, resource management, force management, acquisition and logistics, inspector general

G-Generating: doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership development and education, personnel, facilities

O-Operating: command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, sustainment, information

Legend:
ASCOPE—areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events
C2—command and control
DOTMLPF—doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities
FSF—foreign security forces
OE—operational environment
OTEBA—organize, train, equip, build, advise
US—United States

Figure 16. FSF Assessment Model (Logical Order of Assessment)

b. The FSF Assessment Model consists of four interdependent assessments—organizational, operational, environmental, and institutional—conducted in the order listed. Advisors can expect to support these assessments as well as use them to inform their planning as it relates to their specific counterparts.

c. The FSF assessment is continuous, collaborative, and simultaneous in nature. It may appear these assessments are separate and distinct but they are not—they are interdependent and reinforcing to inform decision-making at the appropriate levels.

(1) Organizational Assessment. This assessment should evaluate to what extent (scale, scope, duration parameters) an FSF core process/entity is organized, manned, trained, equipped, led, and resourced based on its assigned role/mission. To determine the organizational structure of the FSF, advisors will need to understand what the organization is designed to do. The organizational assessment should answer these questions: What are the FSF's roles? What is

the FSF mission (FSF mission analysis)? What are the FSF's developmental goals and objectives?

(2) Operational Assessment. This assessment reveals strengths and weaknesses in an FSF core process/organization as it attempts to fulfill its directed role or purpose. This assessment follows a common operations process to determine how well the FSF can plan, execute, and assess their assigned missions or roles. This assessment requires that a core process(es)/organization demonstrate in an actual operation, exercise, or simulated environment, the FSF's ability to plan, execute, and assess activities that accomplish directed missions or objectives.

(a) A clear understanding of the FSF operational or institutional mission serves as the starting point to base the operational assessment. The operational assessment reveals strengths and gaps in the FSF's ability to perform their missions, roles, or functions, and it measures how well the FSF can conduct their missions. It is not only a snapshot of FSF warfighting capabilities, but also of the FSF operating concept and how those functions work to support each other.

(b) Assessments of FSF operational standards, capabilities, and gaps must include root cause analysis. For example, a unit that did not properly conduct a cordon and search may have failed because it lost communication with part of the cordon force, or it may have gone to the wrong location. The lack of communication could be because of old and worn-out equipment, poor equipment maintenance, insufficient training, poor leadership, lack of an SOP, or a number of other causes. The wrong location could be caused by incomplete intelligence, poor navigation skills, or navigational equipment failure. In both cases, operational assessments need to identify and address the root cause of why the unit did not perform to standard.

(c) Operational assessments also identify FSF strengths to build on and help focus resources during future operations and engagements. In total, operational assessments are a critical piece of the advisor team handover process as discussed in appendix C.

(d) When evaluating the FSF assess component of the FSF operational assessment, advisors can use the operational assessment activities of monitor, evaluate, recommend, and direct to gauge the extent to which their counterparts use assessments to inform their planning and execution.

(3) Environmental Assessment. This assessment considers current conditions in the environment and their effects on a specific FSF organization. The environmental assessment should validate the suitability of an FSF organization's directed missions. This also may reveal the requirement to develop additional capabilities or capacities in the FSF beyond those normally associated with a similar type of security force. The environmental assessment answers the following question, What are the effects of PMESII on the FSF? Advisors working with higher headquarters staff and other SME (e.g., civil affairs)

analyze each PMESII variable using areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events to determine the following:

- To what extent a variable(s) impacts FSF capability development or the ability of the FSF to accomplish its mission?
- What are the threats?
- Are there any geographical considerations?

(a) The environmental analysis must consider an understanding of current conditions that affect specific FSF units and their core processes. Operational variables such as PMESII positively or negatively influence development. For example, if a commander is perceived to be corrupt, the commander's unit may be denied resources, which would hamper unit development. Conversely, units with a strong political or social connection may receive priority for new equipment. PMESII is only one of many frameworks that can be utilized to collect environmental data, so it is important to identify the environmental drivers or inhibitors of success in achieving mission objectives, even if they fall outside of a doctrinal template.

(b) Environmental assessments are critical in understanding the operational environment, beginning in the planning process, as noted in chapter 2.

Note. Advisors will need to work with their higher headquarters staff and other SMEs to conduct the environmental assessment.

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(4) Institutional Assessment. This assessment seeks to evaluate institutional capability and capacity and determine how the FSF resolves gaps in one or more G-EGO functions. This assessment examines the outputs of each FSF G-EGO function and provides consideration for potential implications to US-provided OTEBA and funding activities. The institutional assessment evaluates FSF capabilities by examining the G-EGO framework holistically. An FSF capability is enabled by one or more legal, policy, or DOTMLPF solutions. To close existing capability gaps found in the institutional assessment, advisors aligned to the Service headquarters (air, land, maritime, cyberspace, space) equivalents of FSF will lean on DOTMLPF core process recommendations. Whereas advisors aligned to a ministry will lean on policy process recommendations that may impact specific DOTMLPF processes or operational matters (e.g., C2, intelligence, fires, sustainment, etc.). Within DOD, this is collectively viewed as a DOTMLPF approach, which advisors can logically apply within and across FSF. However, core processes within the governance function of FSF, which establish legal authorities and national policy, routinely impact DOTMLPF and operational matters within FSF and its supporting institutions. Advisors aligned to principals and process owners within the executive function of FSF will often collaborate with US interagency advisors to inform the development of a PN's parliament or national security-like council. The institutional assessment will typically be formally conducted and maintained at the CCMD, SCC, or TSOC level, but advisors will likely be asked to monitor (observe and analyze) information and

make recommendations pertinent to the FSF as an institution using the elements of each G-EGO function.

4. Operation Assessment Process Activities

a. Monitor

(1) Monitoring not only focuses on joint forces carrying out SC activities, CCDRs expect advisors, in concert with their counterparts, to monitor the activities of the FSF to inform decision-making at the appropriate levels.

(2) Monitoring speaks to the long stare (over multiple advisor rotations) at how partner forces and mission accomplishment are evolving. It enables planners and advisors to understand changes in the operational environment based on advising activities, and it further informs a commander's intent, guidance for planning, prioritization, and execution. The FSF Assessment Model describe earlier provides a tool for advisors to monitor the activities of the FSF. Monitoring focuses on tasks carried out by FSF, normally using MOPs and MOEs, which informs and is informed by assessments at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels within the joint force and the FSF.

For clarity:

A. Factors that affect capability and capacity include, but are not limited to, the extent to which FSF or their supporting institutions are organized, employed, manned, equipped, trained, led, and resourced.

B. In some instances, FSF may have military department equivalents that carryout similar core processes of the executive function that establish policy for DOTMLPF and administrative processes for its service headquarters as well as respective operational formations (air, land, maritime, cyberspace, and space).

C. As part of the institutional assessment, advisors will need to make estimates of other US developmental activities (OTEBA) that are occurring within FSF whether these activities are supplanting FSF MOP or MOE.

Note: The extent (scale, scope, and duration parameters) to which a core process effectively performs (MOP) its stated role and the expected results (MOE) it is able to achieve is a measure of its overall capability. CCDRs and PN senior leaders may set parameters (targets) at higher levels, which may impact the capacity of the core process to perform at a certain level (MOP) or its ability to achieve higher results (MOE).

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(3) Task monitoring focuses on "are we/they doing things right," while evaluation focuses on "are we/they efficiently and effectively doing the right things" to create the effects to achieve objectives. Task monitoring includes tracking whether tasks are completed as planned, whether tasks are completed according to the planned timeline, whether costs are as projected, and other indicators used to

determine whether planned activities are being executed successfully; it informs leaders and decision-makers at all levels.

(4) Generally, indicators that suggest the MOE of an advisor equates to how well the counterpart performs a task (MOP) as well as the results the counterpart achieves (MOE).

Monitoring. Observing and analyzing indicators of performance or effectiveness, as well as the conditions in the operational environment that affect those indicators.

*DOD AM&E guidelines distinguish between monitoring SC outputs (typically via MOPs focused on the US Government's activities) and monitoring SC outcomes (**via MOE and/or MOP of FSF**). Examples include:

A. Output monitoring. Monitoring specific advisor deliverables, such as advisor-provided **verbal**, **written**, or **demonstrative** methods of delivering advice (MOP), to document progress (e.g., the number of times, when, and for what purpose the advisor used a common planning process with a counterpart to inform shared decision-making). This includes the quantity, quality, and timeliness.

B. Outcome monitoring. Monitoring the results (MOE) of advisor actions to gauge success (e.g., did the counterpart apply the steps of the planning process correctly—MOP? Did the counterpart use the results of the common planning process to direct (via a plan) the actions of subordinates and assess these actions to adjust FSF planning and decision-making—MOE?).

b. **Evaluate**

(1) Evaluation is primarily a commander's business but may be conducted at any level and involves systematic collection and analysis of information and evidence about the characteristics and outcomes of an ongoing or completed SC activity such as advising, its design, implementation, and results.

(2) Evaluations determine an advisor mission's relevance, efficiency, sustainability, and impact with respect to mission accomplishment as a basis for improving effectiveness and to inform decision-makers regarding future plans, programs, and activities. Evaluation, distinct from initial or follow-on assessment and monitoring, focuses on documenting the achievement of objectives, the attainment of end states, and in some cases the value of continuing advising activities. Evaluations at the strategic level depend on operation evaluations, which are critical in explaining why certain efforts succeed or fail.

(3) Evaluations are typically administered by teams from a CCMD, SCC, or TSOC headquarters, but advisors play a role in providing objective assessments and collecting focused data/feedback on behalf of the evaluation team. At the tactical and operational level, advisors normally contribute to the evaluation process through assessments. Continual assessments depict changes in the operational environment and track progress, effects, and end state or objective achievement status, making them a primary tool for evaluation teams. All key participants in a particular activity or operation should be committed to seeing the mission objectively and involved in the development of the operation assessment process or monitoring plan, collection of relevant data, and reporting.

c. **Recommend**

(1) Results from evaluation enable commanders and advisors to integrate relevant information to inform decision-making at the appropriate levels, which includes advisors making recommendations to their counterparts.

(2) Advisor recommendations are important for informing decision-making at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, but may also be appropriate for informing interorganizational stakeholders, such as DOS or specific counterparts within FSF. For example, based upon monitoring and the evaluation of an FSF training exercise, advisors may recommend to their counterparts ways to resolve or mitigate training shortfalls or inform other advisors as to potential institutional issues that impact the FSF organization.

d. **Direct**

(1) At the operational level, this assessment activity is inherent to a CCDR's authority to organize and employ joint forces as deemed necessary to accomplish assigned tasks and missions.

(2) Based on monitoring and evaluation results, advisors aligned to FSF commanders may advise an FSF commander how to direct certain actions or modify plans.

Note: To inform SC planning and execution across the DOD, commanders capture and integrate their observations and recommendations into systems of record such as the Joint Lessons Learned Information System. These systems provide a mechanism to record and make available information to strengthen analysis and learning across DOD's SC enterprise.

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5. Assessment Conclusion

a. This chapter provided a brief overview of the operation assessment process activities of monitor, evaluate, recommend, and direct. This chapter highlighted how the advisor has a direct role in assessment. It introduced the FSF Assessment Model with four interdependent assessments—organizational, operational, environmental, and institutional. Advisors use these assessments to develop an understanding of FSF capability and capacity as well as apply the model when making estimates of progress using indicators that suggest MOP and MOE.

b. Furthermore, the chapter discussed how monitoring activities span several advisor rotations in order to observe how partner forces and mission accomplishment are evolving. Specifically, it presented ways to think about input and output monitoring as it relates to advisors and their counterparts. The chapter explored how evaluations determine an advisor mission's relevance, efficiency, sustainability, and impact with respect to mission accomplishment.

c. Ultimately, the operation assessment process begins immediately upon the receipt of mission (e.g., planning initiation of the JPP) and occurs continuously throughout the mission. Supporting the operation assessment process are the follow-through and coordinating actions to the mission. The chapter emphasizes that advisors must iteratively update their assessments, because thoughtful, honest, and accurate advisor estimates are critical. Advisor estimates (judgement) make the difference between building on the hard work that advisors have done and stagnating progress towards accomplishing mutual US and PN objectives

Appendix A
ADVISOR TEAM CHECKLIST

1. Recommended Advisor Tasks

The recommended tasks required to accomplish advisor missions are deploy the team, provide command and control (C2), advise foreign security forces (FSF), and protect, sustain, and redeploy the team. Table 16 is an example of an advisor task list.

Table 16. Example Advisor Task Checklist
<u>Task 1—Deploy the Team</u>
1.1-Build an effective team.
1.1.1—Select team members based on subject matter expert (SME) skills, advisor knowledge, cross-cultural communications skills, teaching ability, regional orientation, and mission objectives. 1.1.2—Internally task organize by ability, function, and personality. 1.1.3—Conduct team building activities, tasks, or functions. 1.1.4—Conduct advisor training.
1.2—Conduct predeployment preparation.
1.2.1—Conduct individual, collective, unit, and directed tasks. Understand and employ planning considerations for the advisor environment. 1.2.2—Identify and analyze any existing reports, assessments, or after action reviews (AARs) from similar engagements. 1.2.3—Conduct a predeployment site survey (PDSS). Refer to appendix B for an example of a PDSS checklist. 1.2.4—Conduct an area study and intelligence preparation of the operational environment. 1.2.5—Ensure Leahy Amendment vetting of foreign security forces (FSF) has been completed.
<u>Task 2—Command and Control</u>
2.1—Conduct planning for advisor-specific missions.
2.1.1—Conduct concurrent team planning for all FSF events. 2.1.2—Conduct planning for movement to each mission location. 2.1.3—Understand the rank, gender, and age perceptions of the advisor team while working with the FSF and local populace. 2.1.4—Conduct planning for engagements with critical stakeholders.

Table 16. Example Advisor Task Checklist (Cont'd)
2.2—Coordinate and deconflict with higher, supporting, and adjacent units (coalition and FSF).
2.2.1—Identify higher, supporting, and adjacent units. 2.2.2—Establish rapport and communication with higher, supporting, and adjacent units. 2.2.3—Advise and influence higher, supporting, and adjacent units on the advisor mission and requirements. 2.2.4—Execute reporting procedures and requirements. 2.2.5—Conduct an assessment across the FSF capabilities and identify capacity gaps or institutional shortfalls for future resources and higher unit regional understanding.
2.3—Identify and establish rapport with key personnel in the area of operations (AO).
2.3.1—Identify key FSF personnel. 2.3.2—Establish rapport with key FSF personnel. 2.3.3—Identify key local civilian, religious, and governance leaders. 2.3.4—Establish rapport with key local civilian, religious, and governance leaders.
Task 3—Advise FSF
3.1—Effectively communicate in an advising environment. The ability for an advisor to communicate with a counterpart is critical to the success of the advisor mission. Interpreters are often relied upon to bridge the communication gap, but they are not always available or dependable for providing an accurate representation of a translated conversation based on language skill or experience working with the military. Thus, language training for the advisor team is an important aspect of the train-up to facilitate mission success.

Table 16. Example Advisor Task Checklist (Cont'd)
3.1.1—Effectively communicate without an interpreter. 3.1.1.1—Exchange common greetings in the language used in the AO. 3.1.1.2—Identify and employ nonverbal communications common in the AO. 3.1.1.3—Understand verbal and nonverbal threat indicators common in the AO. 3.1.2—Effectively communicate through an interpreter. 3.1.2.1—Understand the language and security capabilities of the interpreter. 3.1.2.2—Evaluate the trustworthiness of the interpreter. 3.1.2.3—Understand the background, cultural, and gender biases of the interpreter. 3.1.2.4—Plan and prepare an interpreter for a communications event. 3.1.2.5—Conduct a meeting or event through the interpreter. 3.1.2.6—Prepare to work with a nonvetted or unfamiliar interpreter. 3.1.2.7—Understand the regional perceptions of the interpreter based on background, culture, or gender biases to manage employment of the interpreter. 3.1.2.8—Plan a negotiation with the interpreter and mediate a conflict with FSF or key local civilian, religious, and governance leaders.
3.2—Gain and use influence to progress advisor mission objectives. An advisor must be able to influence the counterpart to act in ways that may be different from past experience and cultural norms. Without the ability to influence the counterpart's actions, the advisor mission may fail. Affinity between the advisor and counterpart must exist for true influence to occur. A successful advisor will put an influence strategy in motion resulting in a voluntary, long-lasting change in the counterpart's actions despite the absence of formal authority. Successful influence is gained through a combination of rapport building techniques used to demonstrate value, credibility, and trust. This can only be achieved when each individual perceives the other as competent, mature, responsible, and compatible (working toward a common goal). If the advisor can convey a committed attitude to the FSF counterpart, a long-lasting, effective advisor relationship will exist.
3.2.1—Demonstrate the professional ability of one's own military occupation and function on the advisor team. 3.2.2—Demonstrate to the FSF counterpart that the advisor provides value. 3.2.3.1—Demonstrate SME advisor knowledge. 3.2.3.2—Demonstrate access to the advisor team and coalition support or effects. 3.2.3—Determine and employ the proper influence techniques.

Table 16. Example Advisor Task Checklist (Cont'd)
3.2.4—Understand and employ effective negotiations. 3.2.4.1—Prepare to conduct negotiations with the FSF counterpart. 3.2.4.2—Prepare the FSF counterpart to conduct negotiations with local leaders. 3.2.4.3—Prepare the FSF counterpart to conduct negotiations with coalition forces. 3.2.5—Effectively advise higher, supporting, and adjacent units or coalition forces. 3.2.5.1—Build rapport with higher, supporting, and adjacent units or coalition forces. 3.2.5.2—Educate higher, supporting, and adjacent units or coalition forces on the capabilities and limitations of the FSF counterpart and unit. 3.2.5.3—Influence higher, supporting, and adjacent units or coalition forces to progress advisor mission objectives.
3.3—Advise FSF unit mission-essential task list, mission objective, or assigned tasks. Advisors must teach, coach, and advise FSF to develop their professional skills. Teaching means to provide instruction and education to FSF to develop skills and knowledge necessary to do a particular task or mission. Coaching means to assist a counterpart in reaching the next level of knowledge or skill by practicing those skills and building on previous teaching. The goal is for the FSF to assume more responsibility for success while the advisor gives assistance as required. Advising means to provide counterparts with counsel to assist them in making a decision based on applying knowledge. The distinctive feature is the recipient is responsible for making the decision while the advisor only provides counsel.

Table 16. Example Advisor Task Checklist (Cont'd)
3.3.1—Develop an advisor campaign plan. 3.3.1.1—Incorporate FSF objectives into the campaign plan. 3.3.2—Assess the FSF unit's, team's, or individual's strengths and capabilities. 3.3.2.1—Develop measures of effectiveness and measures of performance. 3.3.3—Employ SME and military occupational specialty and experience bases to support mission. 3.3.3.1—Teach individual and collective tasks. 3.3.3.2—Coach/walk through mission rehearsal and assist. 3.3.3.3—Advise FSF leaders in the mission. 3.3.3.4—Advise the FSF leaders on the benefit of organizational assessments through AARs within the context of the FSF cultural norms. 3.3.4—Evaluate effectiveness of the advisor effort. 3.3.4.1—Determine FSF leader development needs and education. 3.3.4.2—Conduct an assessment of the FSF organization to determine capabilities, capacity, or institutional gaps.
3.4—Understand and operate within operational limitations from higher headquarters. Every unit, team, or individual working with FSF must receive guidance on what operational constraints may exist. The advisor will almost always possess more detailed information than the FSF require or need to possess. The advisor should always receive a detailed briefing from the appropriate intelligence office prior to departing on any advisor mission. Likewise, the advisor may have many assets that may be provided to FSF counterparts. The advisor must be aware of all the assets and under what conditions they may be provided to the FSF counterpart. In addition, the advisor must not only verify the training tasks for the FSF, but must also evaluate the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that apply to those tasks.
3.4.1—Determine when to provide or withhold information from a counterpart. 3.4.1.1—Understand and ensure all information is cleared for foreign disclosure through a foreign disclosure officer (FDO). 3.4.2—Determine when to provide or withhold assets from a counterpart. 3.4.2.1—Ensure funds are properly used and approved through an appropriate funding source. 3.4.2.2—Understand the United States (US) and FSF standards regarding corruption and acceptable business conduct.

Table 16. Example Advisor Task Checklist (Cont'd)
3.4.2.3—Understand and ensure all material is cleared for foreign disclosure through an FDO. 3.4.3—Determine effective TTP for the counterpart's usage. 3.4.3.1—Understand and ensure all TTP are cleared for foreign disclosure through an FDO.
3.5—Operate with cross-cultural competence. The advisor must be able to anticipate the actions of the counterpart, understand those actions within the cultural context, and influence those actions to achieve an acceptable outcome. The advisor will not always be able to influence outcomes, but must determine an acceptable level and influence adherence to that level. The advisor must also inform and educate own chain of command on any deviations from advisor and unit acceptable norms and convey the cultural context of the counterpart's actions.
3.5.1—Understand the local ethical model and employ acceptable solutions within it. 3.5.1.1—Educate the chain of command on deviances from US-accepted cultural behavior.
Task 4—Protect the Team
4.1—Plan for a quick response force (QRF). The advisor deploys through the full range of operations or environments where adversarial threats can expand from nonexistent to a daily, persistent threat to the advisor team and FSF. With the goal of developing the FSF for self-sustainability, the advisor must advise the FSF to prepare and conduct organic partner nation (PN) QRF support. Based on the advisor's situation, QRF support may be available in country or out of country and be comprised of US and coalition forces or PN forces. Additionally, the advisor should assist the FSF with developing a QRF plan with organic FSF assets from the PN structure, whether it is Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, police, paramilitary, or local security forces.
4.1.1—Plan QRF for the advisor team based on local and regional threats. 4.1.2—Advise the FSF leadership on planning for a QRF. 4.1.2.1—Assist the FSF in establishing threat indicators to activate the QRF. 4.1.2.2—Assist the FSF in a communications hierarchy to support and activate the QRF. 4.1.2.3—Assist the FSF in linkup procedures between the QRF and FSF in duress. 4.1.2.4—Advise the FSF on rehearsing the activation through linkup of the QRF.
4.2—Implement a team force protection plan with a posture that can be adjusted based on current or emerging threats. The advisor team should

Table 16. Example Advisor Task Checklist (Cont'd)
understand the threats inherent to the region and the security situation of the operational environment. The advisor team should plan for and look at ways to mitigate threats to the team and FSF. A force protection posture should be implemented based on the threat to the advisor team and adjusted as new threats emerge or the situation improves. The advisor team should have a way to rapidly communicate the posture among other team members. The plan should include advisor team and FSF team protection. Advise the FSF leadership on proper planning for force protection and plan management.
4.2.1—Integrate FSF into the protection plan.
4.3—Execute emergency procedures.
4.4—Plan for organic and nonorganic fire support.
4.5—Conduct personnel recovery.
<u>Task 5—Sustain the Team</u>
5.1—Develop relationships with supporting units, organizations, and assets.
5.2—Coordinate gaining basic necessities.
5.3—Mitigate culture shock.
5.4—Maintain unit cohesion and morale.
<u>Task 6—Redeploy the Team</u>
6.1—Conduct effective FSF unit or counterpart transfer to the follow-on advisor team.
6.2—Prepare historical documentation of the mission.
6.2.1—Prepare a written AAR. 6.2.2—Prepare written lessons learned or a record of events and training. 6.2.3—Follow through to ensure post-mission products are discoverable the next unit, if no face-to-face transition occurred.
6.3—Conduct individual, collective, unit, and directed tasks.
6.3.1—Understand and employ planning considerations for deploying from the advisor environment. 6.3.2—Ensure proper disposition of equipment.

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Appendix B
ADVISOR PREDEPLOYMENT SITE SURVEY (PDSS)

This appendix provides an example of considerations for conducting a site survey. Site surveys are critical parts of the pre-mission planning and coordination process for persistent and episodic deployments.

1. PDSS Checklist

a. Preparation. Prior to deploying, the team leader and selected members of the advisor team may have an opportunity to visit the area of operations (AO). Ideally, the PDSS is scheduled 180–270 days prior to beginning the mission and is an extremely useful tool to help the new advisor team understand the operational environment. A PDSS checklist can help answer many questions regarding foreign security forces (FSF) in the area and shortcomings or opportunities to focus advisor efforts for the incoming team. If available, incoming teams should consider conducting video teleconferences or gaining access to web portals containing current information.

(1) Every advisor team will have differing missions, AOs, units, and personalities with which they will engage. The environment, relationships, FSF level of autonomy, and level of stability within the AO help define their mission.

(2) Prior to departure for the PDSS, the incoming team leader should assemble the request for information list based on input from the team. The checklist in table 17 provides a basic outline. Team members involved in developing the PDSS may use the checklist as a guide when preparing their PDSS plan. However, it is important for the incoming advisor team to remain flexible and keep an open mind with respect to training and operating with their assigned FSF.

b. Site Survey Checklist. The site survey checklist helps answer questions identified by the team during its preparation for deployment. The checklist can be modified to aid the site survey team in acquiring information for planning before deployment.

2. Site Survey Team Mission

The mission of the site survey team is to report on the current FSF mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations conditions. It also clarifies in-country command and control (C2) systems and logistics relationships for the follow-on unit’s mission execution and coordinates the in-country reception of the main body. If possible, the PDSS should be conducted by members of the actual advisor team in conjunction with the partner force.

Table 17. Advisor Team Site Survey Checklist
Intelligence
(1) Intelligence briefing. (2) Threat briefing. (3) Maps and photos of the area. (4) Weather forecast data. (5) Restricted and off-limits areas. (6) Local populace (i.e., attitudes, customs, and dangers). (7) Regional and local special events and dates of significance.
Operations
(1) Initial coordination. • Training plans. • Aviation support (available hours and type of aircraft). • Foreign security forces (FSF) plans. • Problem areas. • Evasion plan of action: related directives, guidance, plans, or orders. (2) Points of contact (POCs), phone number list, communications requirements, and systems used.
Logistics
(1) Transportation requirements. (2) Special equipment requirements. (3) Other support requirements. (4) Construction equipment and supply requirements. (5) Advisor basing/billeting arrangements.
Medical
(1) Location and availability of medical care for advisor team members. (2) Medical evacuation distances, times, procedures. (3) Health threats, to include endemic disease, occupational and environmental health considerations, prophylaxis requirements. (4) Location and availability of CL VIII medical supplies.

Table 17. Advisor Team Site Survey Checklist (Cont'd)
Communication
(1) Requirements for communicating with higher headquarters. (2) Requirements for communicating with partner unit. (3) Requirements for communicating with embassy or emergency personnel. (4) Requirements for communication within the team.
FSF Unit Commanders
(1) Training estimate. (2) Current training status. (3) Units available for training. (4) Command and control. (5) Additional training desires. (6) Unit policies.
FSF Provided Intelligence
(1) Local civilians. (2) Security policies and problems. (3) Populace control requirements (e.g., identification cards or passes).
FSF Operations
(1) Training plan. (2) Support available. • Ammunition. • Weapons. • Vehicles. • Aircraft and air items. • Facilities: training areas, arms rooms, ammunition storage facilities, classrooms, ranges, training aids, and special equipment. (3) Unit equipment. (4) Landing and drop zones in the area. (5) Maps. (6) Rations for field training. (7) Daily training schedules and status reports.

Table 17. Advisor Team Site Survey Checklist (Cont'd)
(8) POC for training problems.
(9) Holidays and unit requirements that may interfere with training.
(10) Medical and dental support.
(11) Communications capabilities.
(12) FSF current activities.
FSF Logistics
(1) Detachment facilities. • Barracks. • Drinking water. • Messing facilities. • Secure storage areas. • Morale, welfare, and recreation facilities. • Medical facilities. • Hangars. • Electrical power supply (220v); plug configurations.
(2) Fuel supply (e.g., diesel, automobile gasoline, aviation gasoline, or jet propulsion fuel, type 8).
(3) Rations.
(4) Transportation.
(5) Lumber and materials for training aids.
(6) Special equipment.
(7) Ammunition.
(8) Availability of construction equipment, tools, and supplies.

3. Site Survey Team Procedures

a. Before departure, the site survey team conducts predeployment activities. Unit standard operating procedures should be used when conducting predeployment activities; however, the following lists suggested activities:

(1) Obtaining required travel documents (i.e., visas and passports) through the unit's personnel staff and a copy of the country clearance messages sent by the United States (US) embassy, if required, through the unit's operations staff and the country briefing through the appropriate intelligence office.

(2) Ensuring site survey team members' medical and immunization records are current.

(3) Determining financial management support (e.g., the location of supporting finance unit funding).

(4) Confirming all agencies concerned with the site survey have been briefed on the team's itinerary and are available for coordination.

(5) Receiving and updating the threat briefing and reviewing the rules of engagement (ROE) and status-of-forces agreement (SOFA).

(6) Conducting a mission analysis and backbrief in accordance with unit standard operating procedures. The team tailors its mission analysis and backbrief to the site survey mission.

(7) Assess deployment location to identify environmental threats and hazards in order to obtain appropriate equipment (mosquito nets, treated uniforms, iodine tablets, additional canteens) to mitigate risk to the team.

b. Upon arrival in the AO, the team processes through customs, notifies the security cooperation (SC) officer of its arrival and status, and requests an updated threat briefing. The survey team must be ready to brief the mission and program of instruction to the SC officer for approval or modification.

c. The survey team commander and operations staff confirm the team's command relationship (COMREL) with the next higher, in-country, US commander. The team commander also briefs that commander, if requested, on the planned execution of the survey and the required preparations for the main body.

d. The survey team commander obtains any additional guidance from the country team. At a minimum, the commander meets with the SC officer to confirm the ROE, evasion and recovery support, and any limitations on the relationships with FSF counterparts. The survey team commander discusses the following topics with the SC officer.

(1) Training objectives.

(2) Initial terms of reference. (This is captured in a formal document that includes the initial, agreed upon training objectives and support requirements for the advisor and the FSF.)

(3) Terms of reference (a final, signed agreement).

(4) The political situation.

(5) Social customs.

(6) Guidelines for official and personal associations with foreign personnel.

(7) Currency control.

(8) Procedures for obtaining intelligence support from the next higher operational control commander.

(9) Administrative support.

(10) Legal status in relation to the foreign country (i.e., SOFA).

(11) Procedures for obtaining logistics from the next higher, in-country, US commander.

(12) If the Leahy Amendment Vetting of Foreign Forces has been completed.

(13) If country clearance requirements are met.

(14) If foreign disclosure requirements will be met.

e. The team commander confirms communications and reporting procedures between the country team or the next higher, in-country, US commander, the survey team, and the follow-on advisor units still in mission preparation. The team commander, also, must verify the availability of communications equipment needed to support the mission.

f. The team commander confirms procedures for obtaining logistics based on the team's mission orders and COMREL. Support may be from the next higher, in-country, US commander depending on COMREL or other logistical sources. The team commander identifies a point of contact (POC) at the country team crisis management element or at the emergency operations center of the US military staff. The POC then informs the team of necessary actions during increased threats or emergencies requiring evacuation of US personnel from the AO. The team commander also coordinates procedures to obtain intelligence support from the country team, the next higher, in-country, US commander, or other US agencies.

g. The survey team establishes direct working relationships with its next higher, in-country headquarters, the country team, or the out-of-country support element. The survey team:

(1) Identifies the supporting element's location.

(2) Contacts the supporting element to determine any limitations on support. The team should know the expected reaction time between the initiation of the support request and its fulfillment.

(3) Requests support for the in-country reception of the main body in accordance with the requirements in the survey team operation orders.

(4) Confirms or establishes communications procedures among the supporting element, survey team, and follow-on advisor team. They identify alternate and emergency communications procedures for C2, logistics, and medical or casualty evacuation.

(5) Determines the established communications support requesting procedures for the follow-on advisor team.

h. The survey team establishes procedures to promote interagency cooperation and synchronize operations. The team:

(1) Identifies the location of appropriate FSF and international or US agencies.

(2) Contacts the appropriate agencies to establish initial coordination.

(3) Exchanges information and intelligence.

(4) Confirms or establishes communications procedures.

(5) Reports the newly established or changed procedures for inclusion in the follow-on advisor mission.

i. The survey team commander establishes a direct working relationship and rapport with the FSF commander. The survey team:

(1) Briefs the FSF commander on the advisor team survey mission and the restrictions and limitations imposed on the advisor team by the higher US commander.

(2) Assures the FSF commander the commander’s assistance is required to develop the tentative objectives for training and advisor assistance.

(3) Deduces or solicits the FSF commander’s estimate of the unit’s capabilities, required training, and advisor assistance, including material requirements. The team discusses training (i.e., plans, current status, units available, facilities, and any additional requirements).

(4) The survey team obtains the FSF commander’s approval of the plan in accordance with the partner nation’s (PN’s) security force development plan and requests a linkup with their counterparts under the mutual supervision of the FSF commander and survey team commander.

j. The team does not make any promises (or statements that could be construed as promises) to the FSF commander about commitments to provide assistance or fulfill material requirements. In particular, the survey team does not:

(1) Make any comment to the host government concerning US Government resources of any kind.

(2) Provide any kind of independent assessment or confirmation of the external threat as perceived by the FSF.

(3) Provide advice on tactics, doctrine, basing, combat planning, or operations.

k. The survey team analyzes the FSF unit’s status to determine its requirements for advisor assistance. The team:

(1) Collects enough information to confirm the validity of current intelligence and selects tentative training and advisor assistance courses of action (COAs).

(2) Prepares written estimates for advisor assistance COAs prioritized in order of desirability.

(3) Analyzes the FSF location and its effects on the populace.

(4) Collects and analyzes all information affecting force protection.

(5) Determines FSF existing logistics and maintenance support shortfalls and capabilities.

(6) Determines the compatibility of recommended US equipment with equipment in the FSF inventory.

l. The survey team helps the FSF unit prepare facilities (i.e., training, security, and administration) for the execution of the mission. The survey team inspects the facilities the FSF unit has designated for its use during the mission. The team identifies any deficiencies that will prevent execution of the advisor assistance COAs. After the inspection, the survey team commander recommends to the FSF commander the most desirable COAs to correct any deficiencies found. The survey team commander:

(1) Ensures the FSF commander understands the desired COAs are tentative (contingent on the US commander's decision).

(2) Ensures the higher, in-country, US commander and country team are informed of significant findings in the survey of the FSF unit.

(3) Provides recommended COAs to the follow-on advisor team after obtaining input from the FSF commander.

m. The survey team ensures its security at all times according to the latest threat assessment. The team:

(1) Fortifies its position (i.e., quarters, communications, medical spaces, and command), using available means, keeping in mind the requirement to maintain low visibility.

(2) Establishes and maintains an internal alert plan.

(3) Organizes and maintains an internal guard system with at least one member who is awake and knows the location of all team members. The guard is ready to react to emergencies by following the alert plan and starting defensive actions according to established ROE and evasion and recovery procedures.

(4) Maintains communication with all team members outside the immediate area occupied by the team's main body.

n. Before departing from the AO, the survey team visits all appropriate US and FSF staff agencies and identifies any unresolved problem areas (see table 17).

Appendix C
ADVISOR TEAM HANDOVER

> *"Believe it or not, you will not resolve the insurgency on your watch. Your tour will end, and your successors will need your corporate knowledge. Start handover folders, in every platoon and specialist squad, from day one. Ideally, you would have inherited these from your predecessors, but if not, you must start them."*
>
> ***—Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen, Ph.D., Australian Army,***
> ***"Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency" 2006***

1. Advisor Team Relief in Place or Transfer of Authority

a. In support of a persistent advisor engagement, transition of forces and transfer of authority (TOA) are required. Every advisor unit follows a theater-approved relief in place (RIP) or TOA checklist managed by the outgoing advisor team leader. The incoming team should maximize opportunities to learn from those who are leaving. They should observe the outgoing team and learn how its relationships work with its foreign security forces (FSF) counterpart. The incoming team should ask lots of questions, but not question methods until after completing an assessment.

b. The operational environment is often diverse, dynamic, and volatile. In addition, every area of operation is different and requires an analysis based on political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time aspects defining the area. Understanding these aspects explains how the FSF unit operates, defines its motivations and perceptions, and determines its effectiveness. The following are questions for consideration by the incoming advisor team. These are particularly useful if the advisor is assigned a new FSF unit and does not have an opportunity to hold a RIP or TOA.

(1) Political. What is the dominant political party in the area? Is the government effective at influencing the people? Do the people support the government? Is there a shadow government in place and is it the source of power? Is there an effective neighborhood action council? When and where does it meet? Is the neighborhood action council's process infiltrated by militia or insurgent sympathies?

(2) Military. What FSF authorities operate in the area? Do the advisor's FSF have jurisdiction? What is the division of labor between civil and military units in the area of operations (AO)? What is the infiltration factor by insurgents or militia in the team's assigned FSF and others in the area? What are the insurgent's lines of communications and support? What threats exist and how will they fight the FSF unit? What coalition units operate in the AO and what can be expected from them?

(3) Economic. What is the poverty level of the AO? What is the primary source of income? What criminal activities exploit the AO (e.g., racketeering, prostitution, extortion, illegal fuel sales, bomb making, etc.)? What job opportunities exist to employ the young and disenfranchised? What role do the FSF have regarding

corruption within the economic arena in the AO? What corruption is best left alone in the interest of mission accomplishment?

(4) Social. Is there a tribal network in the AO? Who runs the families and tribes? Does the presence of women and children in the streets indicate stability or merely the perception of it? Is there a dominant religious or ethnic group, and, if so, where does it get its support? What is the ethnic breakdown by neighborhood or village? Where do the sectarian dividing lines exist?

(5) Information. Are there any local media in the area? How do people receive their news? How might deception be used against the advisor's team? What is the enemy using to influence information in the area? What are the FSF doing to promote a positive perception of security? What are FSF or partner units doing to detract from promoting a positive perception of security?

(6) Infrastructure. What is the current sewage, water, electric, and trash pick-up assessment in the AO? What projects must be supported by the FSF? What projects require external support? What defines the AO: urban or agrarian (what affect does the physical geography have on an insurgency)? What are the road conditions? Are there political offices, sensitive sites, or other restricted areas?

(7) Physical Environment. How do geographical considerations affect the FSF? How does terrain benefit or compartmentalize the FSF? How do rivers and other water sources affect the population? How do weather or other environmental considerations impact the situation?

(8) Time. Is there a sense of urgency from the people within the AO? How do they view time? What are the FSF's time constraints?

(9) Departing Team Legacy. The FSF counterparts will speak of the old team as if they were long lost brothers after their departure. Honor this relationship. Whether they thought the predecessors were competent or incompetent, they usually speak highly of them. The advisor should not speak ill of the predecessors, regardless of opinion, as this will not endear the advisor to the counterparts.

2. Mission Handover Procedures

a. Timeline. Table 18 is a sample timeline (checklist) that lists the tasks an advisor team performs for mission handover. During long-term advisor operations, the commander may elect to replace an advisor team using a mission handover. Mission handover is the process of passing an ongoing mission from one unit to another with no discernible loss of continuity. On occasion, advisors may be going into a country where there has been a gap since the last advisor team was in country (episodic engagement). Advisors should look to the combatant command, the theater Service component, the theater special operations command, the senior defense official, or any other in-country, US defense entities to complete as much of a hand off as possible. Table 18 is based on a 179-day requirement and involves two advisor teams.

Table 18. Sample Mission Handover Timeline			
Outgoing Team		Incoming Team	
Day	**Requirements**	**Day**	**Requirements**
1	Following planning and preparation, the advisor team (less advance party) deploys to the area of operations (AO). The advisor team deploys with all personnel and equipment required to perform the assigned mission. If this is a first deployment to the AO, the advisor team deploys a site survey team (advisor team members) to coordinate all training with the foreign security forces (FSF) unit and the United States embassy. If there is an advisor team in country, the incoming advisor team deploys an advance party to coordinate with the deployed advisor team and counterparts. Area assessment begins as soon as the advisor team members arrive in country. The advisor team sends the information it gathers from the area assessment to the incoming team. See appendix H for an example of an area assessment. As soon as the advisor team arrives, it establishes communications links with the higher, in-country command and control element. The advisor team also establishes a communications link with the advisor commander who has authority to order the handover. This link becomes the information and intelligence link between the in-country and incoming advisor teams. It is maintained and monitored in accordance with prescribed communications schedules. FSF training begins as soon as the advisor team is settled.	179	The incoming advisor team receives notification it will replace the current advisor team in 179 days. The advisor team starts its pre-mission planning. The advisor team coordinates for its deployment into the AO. Leave, common tasks training, and range qualifications take place immediately after the mission notification. The advisor team starts training for the assigned mission. It must use this time wisely. Support for the upcoming mission must come from all levels. Review personnel files.

<table>
<tr><th colspan="4">Table 18. Sample Mission Handover Timeline (Cont’d)</th></tr>
<tr><th colspan="2">Outgoing Team</th><th colspan="2">Incoming Team</th></tr>
<tr><th>Day</th><th>Requirements</th><th>Day</th><th>Requirements</th></tr>
<tr><td>30</td><td>The advisor team sends training reports at least every 30 days. These reports indicate how the FSF unit is responding to the in-country advisor team’s training program.

The incoming advisor team uses these reports to modify its training programs and schedules. (See appendix I for additional observations and insights from former advisors.)</td><td>90</td><td>The advisor team receives formal mission notification.

All travel arrangements are finalized; the in-country advisor team is notified.</td></tr>
<tr><td>45</td><td>Command inspections performed by the advisor commander are vital for an advisor team and give the commander a chance to see what the advisor team has accomplished. Inspections ensure the FSF is looking after the welfare of the advisor team and any problems with the FSF are corrected immediately.</td><td>85</td><td>The formal advisor team training program begins. All other support requirements must stop; the advisor team mission must take priority.</td></tr>
<tr><td>60</td><td>Training reports (same as day 30).</td><td rowspan="2">80</td><td rowspan="2">The advisor team senior medical noncommissioned officer (NCO) begins screening the members’ records. The medical NCO ensures all personnel have physicals and their shots are up-to-date and obtains and cross-matches their blood types within the team.

The advisor team prepares initial shortage lists and sends them to the battalion logistics staff officer (S-4). If the advisor team requires special items, it requests them as soon as possible.</td></tr>
<tr><td>89</td><td>The team prepares a detailed intelligence report. This report becomes a major part of the incoming advisor team’s mission planning process.

The incoming advisor team receives this report the same day it receives its mission notification and starts its detailed planning.</td></tr>
</table>

Table 18. Sample Mission Handover Timeline (Cont'd)			
Outgoing Team		**Incoming Team**	
Day	**Requirements**	**Day**	**Requirements**
90	Training reports (same as day 30). Mid-tour leave is programmed into the training schedule. This leave must be staggered so it does not interfere with training. In-country leave should be considered, if appropriate.	70	Final leave is granted to advisor team members. They ensure their personal affairs are in order.
100	Command inspection. The advisor team finalizes its travel arrangements. The initial arrangements were made the day the advisor team deployed.	60 to 40	A member from the incoming advisor team may conduct in-country coordination. The advisor team's commander ensures only the commander's personnel are on this team. The advisor team prepares its final shortage lists and sends them to the battalion S-4. The advisor team picks up specialized items from the S-4.
110 to 165	The incoming advisor team has had its formal mission notification and has started its mission preparation. Training reports (same as day 30). Command inspection. This period is the most critical phase of the mission. The advance party advisor team members depart. The incoming advisor team advance party quickly meshes with the remaining in-country advisor team members and their FSF counterparts. They establish rapport and begin the next phase of training. The in-country advisor team must have completed all training by this time.	30	The advisor team medical personnel complete a final medical screening. Members receive their shots at this time. Personnel who sustained injuries during certification and validation training and require more time to recover, may be replaced.

Table 18. Sample Mission Handover Timeline (Cont'd)			
Outgoing Team		**Incoming Team**	
Day	**Requirements**	**Day**	**Requirements**
179	The remaining in-country advisor team members depart.	20	The advisor team members' dependents (families) receive a briefing. Every effort is made to answer all questions that do not create a security risk for the deploying advisor team. Dependents are provided a point of contact in the event of problems.
		18	The advisor team palletizes its equipment and personal gear.
		16	The advisor team establishes a communications link.
		14	The advance party members deploy to the AO. They meet with the in-country advisor team members, establish rapport with their FSF counterparts, and conduct necessary coordination. The incoming advisor team (less its advance party) deploys to the AO. The mission handover is completed.

b. Procedures.

(1) The overall authority for the handover and assumption of command lies with the commander ordering the change. The authority for determining the handover process lies with the incoming commander, since this commander will assume responsibility for the mission. This changeover process may affect the conditions under which the mission continues.

(2) The outgoing commander advises the incoming commander on the tentative handover process and mission assumption directly or through a liaison. If this handover conflicts with the mission statement or the incoming commander's desires, and the conflict cannot be resolved with the authority established for the incoming commander, the commander ordering the relief resolves the issue.

(3) As a rule, the commander ordering the change does not automatically place the outgoing advisor team under the incoming advisor team during the changeover process.

c. Considerations. The incoming and outgoing advisor team commanders must consider the following seven factors.

(1) Mission. The incoming advisor team commander must make a detailed study of the advisor mission statement and understand the present and implied mission tasks. The mission also may require a unit with additional skill sets, such as specific weapons employment or water operations. Knowing the mission, the commander's intent, the commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs), and the information requirements will help the incoming advisor team commander understand the mission. The incoming advisor team must become familiar with all ongoing and upcoming information requirements and CCIRs. After an in-depth study of the operational area, the incoming advisor team commander should complete the handover in a manner allowing for continued, uninterrupted mission accomplishment. The changeover must not allow the enemy to gain any operational advantages.

(2) Operational Area. The in-country advisor team provides continuous intelligence updates to the advisor commander (e.g., priority intelligence requirement, information requirements, or relevant operational, strategic, and tactical information). The incoming advisor team must become familiar with all ongoing and upcoming mission priority intelligence requirements, information requirements, and CCIRs.

(3) Enemy Forces. The incoming advisor team commander must have the latest intelligence on all enemy forces affecting the mission. This information can be obtained through the unit intelligence officer and include data on criminal- or terrorist-related incidents over the past several months. In addition to the normal intelligence provided to the incoming advisor team commander on a regular basis, the situation calls for a meeting with an intelligence liaison from the outgoing team commander.

(4) Friendly Forces. For the incoming advisor team, learning about the friendly forces is as important as knowing the enemy situation. The team must be familiar with the command and control structure for daily operations. It must know all blue (joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational) units and green (nongovernmental, private, and charitable) organizations in the AO and be aware of the purpose and capabilities of its mission support base. If possible, the incoming advisor team members should receive biographical data on their FSF counterparts including photographs. This data allows advisor team members to familiarize themselves with their counterparts before deployment.

(5) FSF. The incoming advisor team plans and prepares for a quick and friction-free transition in counterpart relations. However, potential or anticipated friction between the FSF unit and the incoming advisor team may cause the relief to take place more slowly than desired. Therefore, the incoming and outgoing advisor teams need a period of overlap to allow for in-country, face-to-face contact with

their counterparts before the mission handover. Continued execution of the mission must be achieved within the capabilities of the advisor teams, the FSF unit, and the available supporting assets. The best case is, if US combat support units are to be relieved, the relief should occur after the relief of the advisor teams they support.

(6) Civilian Populace. The incoming advisor team must do an in-depth area study giving close attention to local problems. Popular support for US activities taking place within the AO may directly influence changes in the mission statement. The outgoing advisor team must provide all critical information and describe, in detail, the completed civic action projects and those still underway. The incoming advisor team must understand the functioning of the local government and the status of any international civilian or government agencies involved in or influencing the situation in its AO.

(7) Time. The depth and dispersion of units and the number of operations conducted determine the time required to exchange advisor teams. There must be an overlap period to allow the incoming advisor team to become familiar with the AO and to establish rapport between the team personnel and their FSF counterparts. However, the handover operation must take place as quickly as possible. The longer the operation takes, the more vulnerable the advisor team in the AO becomes as a target for the enemy or terrorists. A quickly executed relief reduces the time available for the enemy to strike before the incoming advisor team has time to consolidate its position. The advisor team commander should not sacrifice continued, uninterrupted execution of ongoing operations for speed. The incoming advisor team needs to have enough time to observe training techniques and procedures and conduct debriefings on lessons learned.

d. An effective RIP/TOA is a critical part of keeping a mission moving toward its end state as units begin and finish their rotations. It is in the interests of mission success and both the outgoing and incoming units to achieve an effective RIP/TOA, but a number of human barriers hinders the process. These barriers and techniques for overcoming them are enumerated below:

(1) **Hubris and ego drive some outgoing units to want to protect the recognition they will receive for their work and incoming units to downplay the previous unit's accomplishments.** Advisors must commit to the mindset that working their way out of a job by achieving FSF that have sustainable capacity and capability is the ultimate measure of success. Overcoming the barrier of hubris establishes mutual respect, honors the hard work of previous US advisors, and keeps each unit oriented on the proper focal point: mission success.

(a) For outgoing units, this means advisors continue to own the mission after departure by genuinely trying to make the next unit better than their own. If advisors failed to meet their own expectations, they should have the humility to identify what kept them from achieving more and offer recommendation on how to overcome those barriers if it could be done again.

(b) For incoming units, this means advisors recognize the limitations of their situational awareness and make use of the outgoing unit's tacit knowledge to help evaluate and war-game ideas on how to proceed.

(2) **Force capacity limits and administrative procedures can prevent having two people in the same position even for a short time.** Units should take advantage of technology to elongate the handover process as much as possible. They should treat the mission like a movie, not a snapshot, by observing it unfold through situation reports and discussions prior to the incoming team's arrival. Outgoing personnel should make every possible effort to identify and contact their replacements. Incoming personnel should contact sitting advisors as soon as possible after being notified. Once established, the collective RIP discussion should be ongoing to and through TOA.

(3) **Determining how to best allow successive teams to "stand on the shoulders of giants."** This barrier recognizes the limited human capacity to absorb an entire deployment's worth of data. The question for the outgoing team becomes "what is the most important information to convey to the new team and how is it best delivered so that they can stand on our shoulders and reach higher?"

(4) **Humans are iterative learners.** Units should build an RIP plan that intentionally covers the same priority information multiple times. The incoming unit will make new connections with each iteration, and these connections will allow them to create new solutions that they can ask the outgoing team to war-game. Even if the teams determine that the new solution is not feasible, uncovering the "why" through this process will leave the new team with a deeper understanding of the problem set and the environment.

(5) **The relationship should persist, but often does not.** The crossover point—where the incoming unit's knowledge base is more relevant and complete with respect to the current environment than the outgoing unit's—is somewhere beyond the TOA. Therefore, it is helpful for the outgoing unit to write and discuss a three-month plan as if it were going to be extended on the mission, given its tacit knowledge. Likewise, any changes to that plan by the incoming unit can be shared with the outgoing unit after its departure to determine if there is any history or cultural nuance that the new team is missing.

e. Advisor teams should coordinate a virtual meeting with the team in country. During this meeting, the controlling headquarters should be involved and provide the command's perspective of the mission. The current advisors should discuss what they are currently doing and where the mission should be when the incoming team arrives. If possible, it would be good to add key members from the last previous team to return from the mission to get a full appreciation of the mission.

(See Service manuals for additional information for Service practices on RIP/TOA.)

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Appendix D
FORCE PROTECTION

Advisors operating in small teams in remote locations have always found themselves in challenging environments where individual advisor security was questionable due to a lack of understanding their counterparts and their motives. Attacks on advisors by individuals have brought to light the challenges of securing themselves while advising their counterparts and maintaining an air of mutual trust.

1. The Advisor's Threat Environment

a. Advisors operate in conditions anywhere on the competition continuum. They must deal with local criminal activity, directed terrorist threats, and open combat. Their rules of engagement will differ for each and every mission. In many environments, advisors may not be armed, while in others, they may have access to quick reaction forces and indirect fire or close air support. Additionally, advisors must maintain control of their equipment and be careful not to disclose information to unapproved sources. In this section, we will explore some of the attributes that make the advisor's threat environment unique.

b. **Declared Theaters of Active Armed Conflict (DTAACs).** A DTAAC environment is generally semipermissible or nonpermissible. The threats are clear and present, and advisor teams will typically travel to and from engagements, as well as conduct meetings/training in a combat posture. Carrying weapons, wearing body armor, and establishing external and internal security is often normal in this setting. In this environment, the security of the advisor team is often rooted in the relationship and trust it has built with its partners, so the team must tune its awareness to what is normal in the environment and with foreign security forces (FSF) behavior to identify abnormalities and anticipate threats.

c. **Outside of Declared Theaters of Active Armed Conflict (ODTAACs).** An ODTAAC environment is generally permissible or semipermissible. Advisor teams might stay in a partner nation (PN) hotel or eat in local restaurants rather than stay in a hardened defense like those found in a DTAAC. The threats tend to be less visible, more insidious, and less familiar to the average advisor, and the advisor team will likely not be carrying weapons when not training with FSF. In an ODTAAC environment, it is easy to be lulled into a false sense of security and overlook the many threat vectors at play, from simple crime to kidnapping and terrorism to great power competitors. In this environment, advisor teams must be hyper-vigilant of patterns and abnormalities in the environment, as well as news trends that might change the local reception of US Service members. Teams will want to move in buddy teams or groups even for routine travel or tasks, and incorporate a member of the FSF in those groups to benefit from their local knowledge. In the sections that follow, additional TTP should be considered while maintaining a smart force protection posture.

2. Lexicon

a. Force Protection. An overarching security program developed to protect uniformed advisors, civilian employees, facilities, information, and equipment in all locations and situations across the competition continuum.

b. Guardian Angel. An individual designated to perform duties similar to those of a personal security detachment by conducting passive surveillance during all engagements with PN forces and representatives, including the local populace. The guardian angel's activities should not jeopardize the trust and confidence of the PN force.

c. At Risk. Uniformed advisors, Department of Defense (DOD) civilians, and DOD contractors operating worldwide are *at risk* because of the value that they represent to threat actors of all kinds.

d. Key Leader Engagement. An engagement between individuals to clarify information requirements, exchange information, or gain a decision.

e. Personal Motivation. Perpetrators act on their own accord; motivated by personal dispute, combat stress, extremist ideology, mental illness, and cultural insensitivity of international forces.

f. Co-option. Perpetrators who are recruited or coerced by the opposition. The opposition uses physical intimidation, financial incentives, ideological appeal, and family ties.

g. Infiltration. The opposition enlists in the PN security force with the intent of collecting intelligence or conducting high-profile attacks against coalition or PN forces.

h. Impersonation. The opposition uses PN security force uniforms to gain access to coalition or PN security force facilities to conduct an attack.

i. Evasion. The process whereby isolated personnel avoid capture with the goal of successfully returning to areas under friendly control.

j. Evasion Plan of Action. A course of action developed prior to executing a combat mission that is intended to improve a potential isolated person's chances of successful evasion and recovery by providing the recovery forces with an additional source of information that can increase the predictability of the evader's action and movement.

k. Isolated Personnel. United States military, DOD civilians, and contractor personnel (and others designated by the President or Secretary of Defense) who are separated from their unit (as an individual or a group) while participating in a United States sponsored military activity or mission, and are, or may be, in a situation where they must survive, evade, resist, or escape.

l. Isolated Personnel Guidance. A series of classified, country-specific products developed to provide information to enhance survivability in the event of isolation or captivity. Isolated personnel guidance incorporates information found in other references and are designed to be used with intelligence assessments, culture briefs, country studies, and other products.

m. Isolated Personnel Report (also referred to as an ISOPREP). A DOD form containing information designed to facilitate the identification and authentication of an isolated person by a recovery force.

n. Personnel Recovery. The sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel.

o. Recovery. Personnel recovery actions taken to physically gain custody of isolated personnel and return that person to friendly control.

p. Irregular Threat. A diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, and criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects. In the context of growing great power competition, irregular threats are becoming harder to identify. In some cases, they are merely a collection on team activities such that TTP, patterns, or objectives can be passed to the host nation of the threat—or such that the team can be threatened or extorted for anything embarrassing or anything that can be twisted to seem embarrassing. In other cases, these threats can be used to sabotage or subvert the advising mission, like in the case of threat financing.

q. Threat financing can present itself in a variety of ways, but it is typically a clandestine activity, so it is difficult to determine whether the source of what the team is experiencing is rooted in malicious intent or a coincidence. For instance, FSF may have massive absences or tardiness during training events, which disrupts mission accomplishment for the team; the FSF behavior could be tied to foreign financing that did not show up during Leahy vetting. There may be subversion of training because a foreign entity is paying to create a major accident or traffic jam along the route to training each day, or they are paying members of the FSF to disrupt or slow down mission progress while also collecting and passing information on the team. In some cases, threat financing does not affect the advising mission, but advisors may see indicators that would be of value to the US embassy that a foreign entity is attempting to gain greater influence over the PN by purchasing things like a majority of the shipping ports or tourist infrastructure. With these examples of threat financing in mind, we will briefly discuss what the advisor's role is in identifying and reporting threat financing.

Note: Leahy vetting is the implementation of US law through the process in which prospective aid recipients are searched for evidence of past commission of gross human rights violation.

(1) A mapping of the fiscal operational environment (OE) is something that should be included in a team's country study. The first team working on a particular mission should consider requesting special operations forces support or tapping into finance or comptroller expertise to get an initial baseline of the fiscal OE. This support may come in the form of collocating with the team (depending on force cap limitations) or reachback support.

(2) During mission preparation, advisors should receive a sensitization brief from the combatant command or theater special operations command on activity in the PN by strategic competitors. These briefings are important to understand the competitors' activities and objectives within the PN and where there are holes in

the US understanding of the threat picture. Advisors often have unique placement in and around a PN, so maintaining continual situational awareness can lead to reports that provide valuable information to the agencies that analyze the OE.

3. Force Protection Concepts, Personnel Selection, and Training

a. Force protection can be critical to an advisor and the advisor team's success. Advisors must strive to maintain situational awareness and understand all current, external, and internal threats in their assigned area of operations. Advisors should know what looks normal. Understanding the culture, history, local languages, and values can be an advisor's greatest asset. Isolated personnel guidance is a country-specific product to enhance the advisors' understanding of the impact of these factors.

b. While advisors focus on building their counterparts' capability and capacity, it is critical the advisors operate in secure environments. In wartime, this can be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.

c. Remember, the rapport advisors develop with their counterparts can strengthen their counterparts' desire to protect them and their team. It is important for advisors working with PN military forces and police to build rapport and trust. In some cultures, advisor teams are considered the guest of the PN security force and any harm to advisors can reflect negatively on the host.

d. Interpreters can be crucial to rapport building with FSF and can aid in picking up on side-bar conversations and interpreting nonverbal cues of potential threats.

e. Rapport can be the advisors' first line of defense. Advisors should keep their counterparts close by learning everything they can about them. They should learn their problems and develop solutions.

f. For advisor teams with a dedicated security force, early selection and training of those individuals are important. The individuals selected must demonstrate sound tactical judgment as well as tactical patience, and should be prepared to respond immediately to threats.

g. For advisor teams without a security force, the advisor team should have each individual trained to perform force protection roles as part of additional duties. When performing force protection duties, it is critical that force protection duties be their only focus and that no additional advising duties be performed.

h. Where appropriate, teams should develop several levels of defensive preparation and overwatch to ensure self-protection.

i. A unit standard operating procedure should cover preparation and mindset at the individual, buddy team, section, and overall unit levels and provide for reachback support. Advisors should rehearse buddy team and section-level drills and individual precombat inspections regularly.

j. Knowledge of PNs is the first level of security. Knowing what is "normal" and recognizing the "absence of normal" are the best ways to spot indicators of an insider threat. Actions to take vary. They may be immediate actions in self-defense or the advisor may decide to start quietly by building a PN target packet.

k. Periodically, the team should hold an internal debrief or after action review of changes in partner behavior and rapport.

l. In addition to spotting indicators of immediate and future threats, team members should always know their closest rally point; who is overwatching them; the primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency plans; standing linkup procedures; local danger areas; and the lost advisor drill in accordance with their evasion plan of action. Evasion plans of action are described in JP 3-50, *Personnel Recovery.*

m. Individual preparation and mindset are the next layers of security. All team members should carry (on their person) items to navigate, signal, sustain, and protect themselves for a short period. Most important, advisors need to be "escape-minded." Advisors must have a comprehensive knowledge of their issued communication devices and how to secure them, and a working knowledge of survival equipment and techniques and aids (e.g., personal locater beacons, evasion charts, blood chits, pointee-talkees). Advisors must remain knowledgeable of their evasion plan of action and isolated personnel report, and be mentally and physically prepared to survive and evade (perhaps over an extended period) until recovered or upon reaching friendly forces.

n. The first level of overwatch is the buddy team. Advisors should develop a habit of keeping an interval between team members, covering each other's flank (360°), and covering entryways and avenues of approach. Team members should maintain situational awareness for each other and *be ready to shoot first.*

o. The security force is the second level of overwatch. Leaders will have to enforce using buddy teams during mundane activities (such as key leader engagements), during physical training, or in the tactical operations center. They ensure teams are able to support each other as much as possible (mutual support), even if it is only as an immediate reaction team. Where appropriate, leaders develop standard operating procedures to ensure someone has a loaded weapon any time the advisor or team is working with local nationals. The weapon may have to be concealed. Leaders plan for the worst-case scenario and rehearse for active shooter, isolated Service member, and lost individual situations.

p. The final level of overwatch should be reachback support to higher headquarters and continental United States intelligence support. Advisor teams should constantly spot and assess potential threats and vet them with organizations having more time and assets. Additionally, the teams should consider using biometric and other technical identification equipment and have a plan for where to send information gathered using it.

q. Advisors should make sure to complete their current antiterrorism training and any other theater force protection requirements prior to deploying.

(For additional information on force protection, ADP 3-37, Protection, and ATP 3-37.15, Foreign Security Force Threats.)

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Appendix E
POST-MISSION DEBRIEFING PROCEDURES

1. General

a. The advisor team commander conducts a debriefing providing an overview of the mission, military geography, political parties, military forces, insurgents, foreign security forces (FSF), underground, targets, health and sanitation practices of the populace, and evasion and recovery.

b. Redeployment is not the end of the mission. Upon arrival at the redeployment location, the advisor team undergoes an extensive debriefing. The supported unit intelligence section organizes and conducts the debriefing subject to the unit's standard operating procedures. (See table 19.)

c. The intelligence section coordinates with higher level intelligence organizations to take part in the advisor team debriefing. All deployed personnel must be available for the debriefing.

d. After the debriefing, the advisor team leader, with the assistance of other members of the team, prepares two documents: an after action review (AAR) and a report of lessons learned. Depending on the nature of the mission, these documents may need to be classified.

2. AAR

The AAR states the who, what, when, where, and how of the operation. It is a permanent record of the team's major activities from isolation to debriefing. As such, it is an extremely important template by which past missions may be compared and future missions planned. Normally, the AAR is submitted through command channels to the higher commander no later than 48 hours after an advisor team has been debriefed. The intelligence and operations officers at each echelon keep copies of the advisor team's AARs.

3. Lessons Learned

Shortly after completing the AAR, or simultaneously with its submission, the advisor team leader submits a report of lessons learned. This is the team leader's reflection on the most recent operation and recommendation for the future. One preparation method is to organize the lessons according to the seven joint warfighting functions: command and control, movement and maneuver, information, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection. The debrief addresses what worked or did not work during the operation, why it did or did not work, and what changes or substitutions are needed for existing tactics, techniques, and procedures for the unit. Though the specific format will be provided by the component headquarters the team is serving, table 19 gives an example of a post-mission debrief.

Note: Useful AARs are built throughout the mission, rather than waiting until the end to recall all of the impressions the team had throughout. A best practice is to revisit the AAR framework and any points of interest the US embassy and component headquarters had, then recording relevant ideas in a weekly situation report (SITREP).

This method opens a line of communication with the chain of command and periodically reminds the team members to remain aware of all aspects of the mission.

Table 19. Post-mission Debrief
MISSION
A brief statement about the mission by advisor team commander.
EXECUTION
A brief statement of the concept of operation developed before the deployment. A statement of the method of operation accomplished during the operation, including deployment, routes, activity in the area of operations, and redeployment. Uniforms and equipment used. Weapons, demolitions, and ammunition used and results. Communications equipment used and results. Casualties (friendly and enemy) sustained and disposition of bodies of those killed in action. Friendly contacts established, including descriptions, locations, circumstances, and results.
MILITARY GEOGRAPHY
Geographic name, universal transverse mercator or geographic coordinates, and locations. Boundaries (north, south, east, and west). Distance and direction to nearest major cultural feature. Terrain. • What type of terrain is dominant in this area? • What natural and cultivated vegetation is present in the area? • What is the density and disposition of natural vegetation? • What is the approximate degree of slope? What natural obstacles to movement did the advisor observe and what are their locations? What natural or man-made drainage features are in the area? • Direction of flow. • Speed.

Table 19. Post-mission Debrief (Cont'd)
• Depth.
• Type of bed.
What are the physical layouts of rural and urban settlements?
What are the layouts of various houses within the area?
How would the advisor describe any potential landing or drop zones?
How would the advisor describe any beach landing sites, if applicable?
How would the advisor describe any areas suitable for cache sites and what are their locations?
People.
• What major ethnic groups or tribes populate each area?
• What is their attitude toward other ethnic groups or tribes in the area?
• What is the principal religion of the area and how is it practiced?
• What influence does religion have on the people?
• What are the religious holidays?
• What are their taboos?
• What are their religious conflicts?
How would the advisor describe the average citizen of the area (height, weight, hair color, and characteristics)?
How do the people of this area dress compared with other areas?
What type of clothing, footwear, ornaments, and jewelry do they wear?
What symbolism is attached to certain items of jewelry or ornaments?
What are the local traditions, customs, and practices?
• Between males and females?
• Between young and old?
• Toward marriage, birth, and death?
• Between the populace and local officials?
What is the ordinary diet of the people?
What was the attitude of the populace toward the advisor and the foreign security forces (FSF) with the advisor?
What was the general feeling and attitude of the populace and the FSF troops toward the government and leaders, government policies, and general conditions within the country?

Table 19. Post-mission Debrief (Cont'd)
What was the general feeling of the populace toward the United States, its policies, and involvement with other nations? How did the populace cooperate with the advisor team? What is the approximate wage and economic status of the average citizen? What formal and informal educational practices did the advisor observe? What is the state of health and well-being of the people in this area? Did the populace in this area speak the national language differently from others in the country? If so, how? What percentage of the populace and the indigenous forces speak English or other foreign languages? Was the advisor approached or questioned by some member of the populace about the advisor team or the advisor's mission? If so, describe in detail. Give names, if possible.
POLITICAL PARTIES (Major and Minor Parties).
Leaders. Policies. Influence on the government. Influence on the people. Foreign influence. • Ethnic and ideological. • Regional. • International. • Stability, strengths, and weaknesses.
MILITARY
Friendly forces. Disposition. Composition, identification, and strength. Organization, armament, and equipment. Degree of training, morale, and combat effectiveness. Mission. Leadership and capabilities of officers and noncommissioned officers compared with those of the United States.

Table 19. Post-mission Debrief (Cont'd)
Logistics.
Maintenance problems with weapons and equipment.
Methods of resupply and their effectiveness.
Psychological strengths and weaknesses.
Relationship between the FSF and the populace.
Influence on the local populace.
Recommendation for these forces (military and/or paramilitary) for unconventional warfare contact.
THREAT VECTORS
Disposition.
Composition, identification, and strength.
Organization, armament, and equipment.
Degree of training, morale, and combat effectiveness.
Mission.
Leadership capabilities.
Logistics.
Maintenance problems with weapons and equipment.
Method of resupply and its effectiveness.
Psychological strengths and weaknesses.
Relationship between insurgent forces, the advisor's team, and the populace.
Influence on the local populace.
Sources of funding.
POLICE AND SECURITY FORCES
Disposition, strengths, and location.
Organization, armament, and equipment.
Logistics.
Motivation, reliability, and degree of training.
Psychological strengths and weaknesses.
Relationship with the government and local populace.

Table 19. Post-mission Debrief (Cont'd)
AUXILIARY AND UNDERGROUND
Disposition, strength, and degree of organization. Morale and general effectiveness. Motivation and reliability. Support. • Logistics. • Intelligence. • Operations. • Communications.
TARGETS
Rail system. • General route. • Importance to the local and general area. • Bridges, tunnels, curves, and steep grades. • Bypass possibilities. • Key junctions, switching points, and power sources. • Location of maintenance crews who keep the system operational during periods of large-scale interdiction. • Security. Telecommunications system. • Location and description of routes, lines, and cables. • Location of power sources. • Location and capacity of switchboards. • Critical points. • Importance to the local general area. • Capabilities of maintenance crews to keep the system operating, at a minimum. • Security. Petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) storage and processing facilities. • Locations. • Capacity of storage facilities.

Table 19. Post-mission Debrief (Cont'd)
• Equipment used for the production of POL. • Power source. • Types and quantities of POL manufactured. • Methods of transportation and distribution. • Rail. • Truck. • Ship. • Air. • Pipeline routes and pumping station capacities. • Security. Electrical power system. • Locations and descriptions of power stations. • Principal power lines and transformers. • Locations of maintenance crews, facilities, and their reaction times. • Critical points. • Capacity (kilowatts). • Principal users. • Security. Military installations and depots. • Size. • Activity. • Location. • Units. • Equipment. • Reaction time. • Security. Highway and road system. • Name and number. • Type of surface, width, and condition.

Table 19. Post-mission Debrief (Cont'd)
• Location of bridges, tunnels, curves, and steep grades. • Bypass possibilities. • Traffic density. • Location of maintenance crews, facilities, and their reaction times. • Security. Inland waterways and canals. • Name and number. • Width, depth, and type of bed. • Direction and speed of flow. • Location of dams and locks, their power source, and other traffic obstructions. • Location and descriptions of administrative, control, maintenance and reaction crew facilities. • Location and description of navigational aids. Natural and synthetic gas systems. • Locations and capacity of wells and pipelines. • Storage facilities and capacity. • Critical points. • Maintenance crews, facilities, and reaction times. • Principal users. • Security. Industrial facilities. • Capabilities of plants to convert their facilities, in wartime, to produce essential military materials. • Types of facilities. • Power sources. • Locations. • Sources of raw materials. • Number of employees. • Disposition of products.

Table 19. Post-mission Debrief (Cont'd)
• General working conditions. • Critical points. • Security.
HEALTH AND SANITATION
To what degree do hunting and fishing contribute to the local diet? What cash crops are raised in the area? What domestic and wild animals are present? What animal diseases are present? What is the availability and quality of water in populated and unpopulated areas? What systems are used for sewage disposal? What sanitation practices did the advisor observe in the populated and unpopulated areas? What are the most common human illnesses and how are they controlled?
EVASION AND RECOVERY
From which element of the populace was assistance most likely? Would the advisor recommend any safe houses or areas for evasion and recovery purposes? What types of shelters were used? Were fires small and smokeless? Were shelters adequate? Was food properly prepared? Were camp sites well chosen? Were camp sites and trails sterilized after movement to a new one? What edible wild plants are found in the area?
MISCELLANEOUS
Weather. • Wind speed and direction. • Temperature. • Effect on personnel and equipment. Problems encountered.

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Appendix F
OTHER STAKEHOLDERS

1. United States Embassy

a. The Department of State is represented overseas by United States (US) embassies. In the embassies, the chief of mission (COM) is an ambassador who serves as the personal representative of the President and the Secretary of State. As principal officer in the embassy, the COM oversees all US Government programs and interactions within the partner nation (PN) and is charged with the operations and security of the mission and all its employees. The COM has full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all Department of Defense (DOD) personnel on official duty in country, regardless of their employment categories or location, except those under command of a combatant commander (CCDR) or on the staff of an international organization. The COM chairs the embassy's country team, which meets on a weekly basis to discuss and coordinate all activities within the mission.

b. The deputy chief of mission (DCM) serves as the chief of staff of the embassy and manages the daily operations of the embassy staff. In matters that cross agency lines within the country team, the DCM coordinates and facilitates decisions or makes recommendations to the COM. In the temporary absence of the ambassador, or during an interim period between ambassadors, the DCM assumes the title of chargé d' affaires. While the COM focuses attention outward toward the PN, the DCMs focuses internally, ensuring the country team is working smoothly in support of the COM's objectives.

c. The Country Team. The COM at each US embassy heads the team of US Government personnel, collectively known as the "country team." The country team is the principal means by which a diplomatic mission comes together as a cooperative, coordinated, and well-informed staff. A country team's organization is dependent on embassy size and the nature of US interests in a country, with some including more than 40 agencies. See figure 17 for an example of US embassy organization.

(1) The political officer, or sometimes the political-military officer, is located within the embassy's political section and deals with domestic politics, human rights, external relations, international organizations, political and military issues, labor, and narcotics. Additionally, the political office is the section that is primarily responsible for human rights vetting for potential international military education and training provided by the US.

(2) The regional security officer (also referred to as RSO) has overall responsibility for security, antiterrorism, and force protection for all personnel under the authority of the COM and is responsible for the embassy's emergency action plan. The regional security officer also supervises the Marine security guard detachment, where assigned.

(3) The economic section can provide valuable information on the host country's economy, budget, and its ability to support military purchases, and deals with trade, import/export issues, environment, science and technological issues, agriculture, energy, and communications. In many embassies, the transition to a single political-economics unit is occurring.

(4) The consular operations section issues immigrant and nonimmigrant visas and provides US citizen services such as citizenship determination, replacing lost or stolen passports, and assistance with federal benefits, arrests, deaths, and notary services.

(5) The public affairs section coordinates media, cultural, and educational programs; its leader acts as the primary spokesperson for the mission. All significant military events should be coordinated with the embassy public affairs section.

(6) The management section includes the human resources, financial management, information management, health services, community liaison, facility management, and general services operations subunits. In addition, it addresses issues of reciprocity with the host government, interagency administrative support, and community-wide benefits (such as post allowances).



Figure 17. US Embassy Organization

d. The senior defense official (SDO) is the COM's principal military advisor, the senior DOD military officer assigned to a US diplomatic mission, and serves as defense attaché (DATT) to the PN and the chief of security cooperation at that US embassy. As such, the SDO/DATT acts as the in-country focal point for planning, coordinating, supporting, and executing US defense issues and activities in the host nation. This includes security cooperation (SC) programs under the oversight of the

CCDR. The SDO/DATT is the single point of contact for all DOD matters involving the US mission or DOD elements assigned to, or working from, the US mission. All DOD elements under COM authority are under the coordinating authority of the SDO/DATT, except for the Marine security guard detachment. The SDO/DATT operates under the authority of the COM, and is the key figure within the US mission for establishing and fostering a SC relationship with the host nation.

(1) Security cooperation organizations (SCOs) are all DOD elements located in a foreign country (as part of the US embassy or consulate) responsible for carrying out SC and security assistance management functions. They include military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and DATT personnel designated to perform SC or security assistance functions. SCOs in PNs play a key role in planning, coordinating, and executing security assistance and other SC programs, especially those that involve providing education or training. Specifically, SCOs are responsible for managing the host nation military's requests, sales, and deliveries of US defense equipment, training, and services.

(2) For security force assistance, the SCO (with country team approval) will coordinate with the PN and the executing unit once direct liaison authorized is granted from the Service component. It also coordinates for logistical support on the ground.

e. Other US Government Agencies. Advisors should be aware of other governmental organizations that may have advisor teams in country that are working certain aspects of developing the security force. For example, the Department of Justice may have teams that are conducting rule of law training or advising. These entities should be able to be reached through coordination with the SDO and the country team.

2. Combatant Commands

a. CCDRs are assigned a geographic area of responsibility (AOR) and are responsible for the missions in their AOR, unless otherwise directed. CCDRs are responsible for aligning military activities with diplomatic activities in their AOR with the COM and the country team. The CCDR plans and implements military strategies, operations, and interorganizational coordination. CCDR planning is contained in theater campaign plans (TCPs). Depending on the preferences of the CCDR, the TCP can be divided into regional campaign plans and subdivided into country-specific SC sections/country plans.

b. Theater campaign planning should incorporate country planning and the CCDR's country plans, or in some cases, regional plans. Also, they should align with the COM's goals because TCP activities and resource investments occur at the country level. Individual country plans should add details regarding routine SC activities that would include advising activities.

c. CCDRs are responsible for the missions in their AOR, which include planning, conducting, and assessing SC activities. CCDRs also delineate specific command authorities and relationships necessary for security force assistance missions or other regional training missions, or delegate this to a Service component command.

3. Service Component Commands

a. Combatant commands have a Service component command (SCC) from each of the Services. The SCCs provide Service-specific support and activity proposals as well as assist the CCDR with Service-specific forces, equipment, and resources. They also prepare supporting plans to the CCDR's TCP.

b. The Service components are responsible for developing the Service-specific proposals that meet the vision in the program of activities and milestones of the country plans. They must ensure the appropriate authorities are in place to support the mission. The SCCs will develop a concept sheet for an advising mission, liaise with the country team and unit sourced to complete the mission, assist with predeployment training, and complete vetting of planned content. Planners must ensure that authorization has been granted by the combatant command or SCC prior to coordinating directly with subordinate command structures or US embassy personnel.

4. Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs)

TSOCs are subordinate unified commands established by United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to plan, coordinate, conduct, and support joint special operations within an AOR. These commands and special operations forces (SOF) are under the combatant command (command authority) of USSOCOM, and under the operational control of the CCDRs. The CCDRs' operational control of SOF is exercised through the TSOCs when operating within their AORs. TSOCs coordinate SOF integration and Service component support of SOF for foreign internal defense, security force assistance, counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare, foreign humanitarian assistance, and other special operations core activities in all campaigns and operations. TSOCs support SOF conducting security force assistance activities and other SC activities in support of the CCDRs' TCPs.

Appendix G
ENGAGEMENT WORKSHEET EXAMPLES

In this appendix, figures 18–20 provide examples of completed pre-engagement worksheets, post-engagement reports, and engagement recorder worksheets for possible use by advisors.

CONTACT: Colonel Amir, Masood, District G4

DTG: 011300cMay2016

COPY 1 OF 1

DESIRED ENDSTATE: Advise class IV stockage levels for future operations and events.

OPENING COMMENTS: Greetings and discussion of upcoming elections and possible unrest in the district.

1) THANKS/REGRETS: Inquire about officers injured during yesterday's attack.

2) CMD MSG: By, With, and Through

3) PURPOSE OF MTG: Supply stockage forecasting

INFLUENCE TECHNIQUE: Rational Persuasion

TALKING POINTS: Recent enemy practice of attacking checkpoints

INTENDED OUTCOMES: District logistics officer has force protection supplies on-hand for upcoming events.

BOTTOM LINE: Request additional force protection now before it is needed during the elections.

TARGET'S INTENDED OUTCOMES: Get the coalition to provide force protection for future elections.

HIS BOTTOM LINE: Greetings and discussion of upcoming elections and possible unrest in the district.

POSSIBLE IMPASSES: HQ does not favor requisitioning supplies until they are needed.

IMPASS STRATEGY: Provide logistics officer with a translated request for additional supplies by amount and type. Explain estimation method.

POSSIBLE OTHER TARGET ISSUES: Logistics officer may not know how much class IV to requisition based on the assigned area and may not openly request calculation advice.

TARGET ISSUE STRATEGY: Encourage HNSF to forecast supply requests to avoid critical shortages.

ORDER OF EVENTS:
1. Intro
2. Discuss need for requisition
3. Present written translated requisition

RELATIONSHIP BUILDING TOPICS:
Olympic sports
Local Bazaar
Local school graduation

EXIT STRATEGY: Task force plans meeting. (Leave the written requisition)

SAMPLE

Figure 18. Pre-engagement Worksheet Example



Unit: Ghor District Advisor Team	DTG: 021600May2016 · COPY 1 OF 1
Meeting Leader Contact Info LCDR John Brown, HNSF Logistics Advisor John.j.brown100@cjsf.mil or 00-5159-8845	**Commitments Made US:** Provide assistance in storing class IV if/when distributed (Connex containers) **Commitments Made Partner Nation:** G4 will advise district command of fortification capability and limitations.
US Attendees: LCDR Brown, CPT Jones, CPT George, Nasir Adair (Interpreter)	
PNSF Attendees: COL Masood, MAJ Muushalla, SGT Bashir **Partner Nation Attendee:** Mr. Naseem Muhammad, Voting Council Representative (by phone from COL Masood)	**Future Meeting Recommendations:** • Provincial and regional advisor team emphasize protecting voting sites in order to garner support for district forecast requests. • Encourage forecasting requests when appropriate.
Objective: Advise and coach forecasting and requisition of materials to fortify voting sites.	**Actionable Intelligence:** District Class I vendor may be under influenced by insurgents to cancel contracts. (CCIR 3.4.a Indication of Coercion)
Items of Discussion: Class IV requisition. Class I contracting	**Additional Observations:** Soldiers and patrolmen were in uniform indicating likely receipt and issue of requested new uniforms. (will confirm)
Overall Assessment: Receptive, but may be intimidated by HQ to not request forecasted supplies	

Figure 19. Post-engagement Worksheet Example



NATURE OF MEETING: Logistics and Sustainment	**DTG:** 021300OMay2016 / **COPY** 1 **OF** 1
THEMES/MESSAGES: Defeat Da'esh – Government protects citizens with effective local security and law enforcement.	**AGREEMENTS MADE:** • G4 agreed to pre-order class IV to fortify election sites. • G4 will review and consider advised stockage amounts. • G4 will inform advisors of requisition decision next visit (48 hours). • Advisors will provide up to 3 empty containers if needed (CJTF has approved 6 containers for transfer to HNSF on advisor request).
TALKING POINTS: • Recent enemy practice of attacking checkpoints • Election site fortification • Supply projections	
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS: • Arrived at office 1200hrs • Impromptu meeting with MAJ Sadr (G8) in hallway in regard to provincial food (class I) contract issues. • Meeting with COL Masood began at 1318 • Meeting concluded at 1500	
INFORMATION OF VALUE: G4 is aware of polling locations but is concerned about Tahir and Baluk village security due to location on MSR and recent protests. * District Class 1 contract is not approved. G4 has not officially requested assistance with this.	**ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE:** District Class I vendor may be under influenced by insurgents to cancel contracts. – (CCIR 3.4.a Indication of Coercion)

Figure 20. Engagement Recorder Worksheet Example

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GLOSSARY

PART I – ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

A, B

AAR	after action review
ADP	Army doctrine publication
AFI	Air Force instruction
AFTTP	Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures
ALSSA	Air Land Sea Space Application (Center)
AM&E	assessment, monitoring, and evaluation
AO	area of operations
AOR	area of responsibility
APF	advisor planning framework
ASCOPE	areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events
ATP	Army techniques publication
BN	Battalion
BDE	Brigade

C

C2	command and control
CCDR	combatant commander
CCIR	commander's critical information requirement
CCMD	combatant command
CF	conventional forces
COA	course of action
COIN	counterinsurgency
COM	chief of mission
CSCS	country-specific security cooperation section
CT	counterterrorism

D, E

DATT	defense attaché
DOD	Department of Defense
DCM	deputy chief of mission
DOS	Department of State

DOTMLPF	doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities
DTAAC	declared theater of active armed conflict

F

FDO	foreign disclosure officer
FM	field manual
FMLN	Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front
FSF	foreign security forces

G, H

G-2	Army or Marine Corps component intelligence staff officer (Army division or higher staff, Marine Corps brigade or higher staff)
G-EGO	governance, executive, generating, and operating

I

IPOE	Intelligence preparation of the operational environment

J, K

JP	joint publication
JPP	joint planning process
JSCP	Joint Strategic Campaign Plan
JSP	Joint Strategic Plan

L

LNO	liaison officer

M

MCRP	Marine Corps reference publication
MOE	measure of effectiveness
MOP	measure of performance
MTTP	multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures

N

NCO	noncommissioned officer
NDS	national defense strategy
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NSS	national security strategy
NTTP	Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures
NWDC	Navy Warfare Development Center

O

ODTAAC	outside of declared theater of active armed conflict
OE	operational environment
OTEBA	organize, train, equip, build, and advise

P

PDSS	predeployment site survey
PMCS	preventive maintenance checks and services
PMESII	political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information
PN	partner nation
POC	point of contact
POL	petroleum, oils, and lubricants

Q

QRF	quick response force

R

RFF	request for forces
ROE	rules of engagement
RIP	relief in place

S

S-2	battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer (Army, Marine Corps battalion or regiment)
S-4	battalion or brigade logistics staff officer (Army, Marine Corps battalion or regiment)
SC	security cooperation
SCC	Service component command
SCO	security cooperation organization
SDO	senior defense official
SEARCH	society, environment, authority, religion and beliefs, communications, and history
SFA	security force assistance
SITREP	situation report
SME	subject matter expert
SOF	special operations forces
SOFA	status-of-forces agreement
SOP	standard operating procedure

T

TC	training circular
TCP	theater campaign plan
TECHCON	technical control
TOA	transfer of authority
TSOC	theater special operations command
TTP	tactics, techniques, and procedures
	U, V, W, X, Y, Z
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USC	United States Code
USIP	United States Institute for Peace
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
UW	unconventional warfare

PART II – TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

combatant command (command authority)—Nontransferable command authority, which cannot be delegated, of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces; assigning tasks; designating objectives; and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Also called COCOM. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 1 Vol 2)

foreign internal defense—Participation by civilian agencies and military forces of a government or international organizations in any of the programs and activities undertaken by a host nation government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. Also called FID. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-22)

interagency—Of or pertaining to United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-08)

measure of effectiveness—An indicator used to measure a current system state, with change indicated by comparing multiple observations over time. Also called MOE. See also combat assessment; mission. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

nongovernmental organization—A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. Also called NGO. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-08)

private sector—An umbrella term that may be applied to any or all of the nonpublic or commercial individuals and businesses, specified nonprofit organizations, most of academia and other scholastic institutions, and selected nongovernmental organizations. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-57)

security assistance— A group of programs authorized by federal statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, lease, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives, and those that are funded and authorized through the Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency, which are considered part of security cooperation. Also called SA. (Source: JP 3-20)

security cooperation—All Department of Defense interactions with foreign security establishments to build security relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations. Also called SC. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-20)

security force assistance—The Department of Defense activities that support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. Also called SFA. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-20)

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***ATP 3-07.10**
MCRP 3-03D.1
NTTP 3-07.5
AFTTP 3-2.76

15 June 2023

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