



Analysis

North Korean Media Campaign Suggests Long-Term Planning for Hereditary Successor

Pyongyang last autumn reinvigorated a nuanced propaganda campaign that it apparently began eight years ago to prepare for the emergence of a hereditary successor to Kim Jong Il. The effort has been focused from the outset on Kim's sons with his late wife, Ko Yo'ng-hu'i, and aspects of the renewed push suggest an attempt to elevate their youngest son, Kim Cho'ng-un, in preparation for Kim Il Sung's birth centennial in 2012. Notably, the current drive shares a number of characteristics with the campaign leading up to Kim Jong Il's own emergence in 1980, which took more than a decade to accomplish. As was the case then, the recent signals have been extremely subtle, suggesting that they are designed to inform internal audiences without alerting outsiders. While Kim Jong Il's stroke last year may have accelerated the timeline for the actual naming of a successor, it appears that Kim has been planning and preparing for the move since at least 2001. The correlation between shifts in succession propaganda and the portrayed influence of certain regime officials suggests that the issue has been a source of political jockeying in the intervening years. It also is likely that these internal dynamics are influencing regime decisions on a number of fronts, including foreign policy.

Resuscitating Dormant Campaign

After a pause of nearly four years, a North Korean media campaign apparently meant to pave the way for a hereditary successor to the 67-year-old Kim Jong Il has resurfaced. The first indication of the renewed push appeared in a preparatory ideological primer for Kim's first major policy-setting appearance after returning from a reported stroke last fall. Likely due to the sensitivity of the succession issue, the regime has restricted the campaign to what might appear to outside observers as routine "cult-of-personality" propaganda.

- The first signal of the resuscitated effort came on 6 November 2008 in the form of a lengthy, poetic party daily "political essay" by Song Mi-ran -- the regime's most prolific writer on the topic of Kim family leadership. Song stated that those who would inspire Kim two months later at an historic steel mill where he launched a major economic rehabilitation drive were "third- and fourth-generation members of the revolution" who have "highly raised the flames of succession to the cause of the revolution." In a more direct allusion to Kim Jong Il's sons, she went on to state that these people identified themselves as "grandsons" of the "standard-bearers of Ch'o'llima," a reference to Kim Il Sung's generation.^{1 2}
- The regime has used the flowery, often esoteric "political essay" vehicle, Song's writings, and these themes on and off for years to elevate the post-Korean war generation of which Kim's sons are a part and to stress the need for the Kim family's continued leadership of the country. In particular, the current campaign -- which is in its eighth year -- was launched with a "political essay," and has frequently used the word "grandson" to portray the required familial relationship of the eventual successor to Kim Il Sung -- namely, a male heir related to him through paternal bloodline.³

Another recent signal appeared in central media coverage of Kim Jong Il's 67th birthday in February, when the regime seemed to go out of its way to underscore the need for continued Kim family rule based on Kim Jong Il's own progeny.

- The party daily *Rodong Sinmun's* editorial -- an authoritative vehicle used to articulate party policy to internal audiences -- commemorating Kim's birthday stated that the "bright future" of the "chuch'e revolution" depends on a "brilliant succession" of the "bloodline of Paektu," a reference to Kim Jong Il's alleged birthplace and thereby Kim's own sons rather than one of Kim Il Sung's other grandchildren. It went further in connecting the eventual successor to Kim Jong Il by adding that the future would be "guaranteed" by the "reliable successor(s) to the revolution" who were "raised" by Kim.⁴
- While central media occasionally discuss Kim Jong Il's own emergence as leader, birthday editorials in recent years have largely avoided such explicit succession-related discussion, despite the maneuverability afforded by double entendre. The last observed mention of "successor(s)" in a birthday editorial was in 1997 in reference to Kim as Kim Il Sung's successor. The mention of Kim Jong Il's "bloodline" in the editorial was last seen in 2002 and 2004, when the current hereditary succession campaign was launched and hitting its stride. Even then, however, the language was not nearly as explicit.^{5 6 7}
- Suggesting that the formulations were indeed significant and possibly placed there to underscore the implications for succession, they were supplemental to what appeared to be standing editorial guidelines for media comment on Kim's birthday. In a break with standard practice, the phrases in question were not included in a speech delivered by nominal head of state Kim Yong Nam the day before at a national meeting to mark the event. The addition in the editorial is striking given that authoritative pronouncements marking major national holidays such as these rarely diverge on so significant a point.⁸

Kim Jong Il himself seemed to publicly endorse the newly reenergized campaign earlier this month. One of his recent high-profile appearances included a rare reference to an event historically associated with succession.

- Coverage of Kim's visit to the newly renovated Pyongyang Grand Theater, presumably on 4 April, included an unprecedented reference to the 4th Party Congress in 1961. Party congresses are the highest decisionmaking body of the Workers Party of Korea, and, according to OSC records, central media reports on Kim Jong Il's activities simply do not mention them. The 6th Party Congress in 1980 -- the last observed to date -- was Kim's coming out party, and the 4th Party Congress in 1961 was held just a couple of months after Kim Jong Il supposedly entered the party. At the time, Kim was seven years younger than his youngest son, Kim Cho'ng-un, is now.
- Furthermore, the report on Kim Jong Il's visit to the Pyongyang Grand Theater mentioned that the renovation was completed in less than half a year, which would mean the project was initiated after Kim returned from his stroke, around the time of the steel mill political essay that marked the resurgence of the campaign. Kim's

reported references during the visit to "generation after generation" and how it is now becoming "possible to pass on another precious treasure to posterity" also could be significant in the context of potential succession plans.⁹

Evolution of Campaign

Emphasizing Need for Succession System

The origins of this hereditary succession campaign can be traced back to at least 2001, when central media began focusing again on the historical and ideological basis of Kim Jong Il's own succession process and emphasizing the need to replicate it. (See timeline on following page.)

- The first major signal came on 21 July 2001 in the form of a party daily "political essay" entitled "A Brilliant Succession," which underscored Kim Jong Il's leadership credentials and defined father-son succession as a North Korean "tradition." The essay's key passage cited the younger Kim as saying "emphatically" that "we should carry forward [Kim Il Sung's] tradition in its purest form," that tradition being the "long, long journey of pure succession." As if to underscore the importance of the message, the essay went on to state that a "revolution with no tradition or to which tradition is not being succeeded" is "dead."¹⁰
- While justification for hereditary succession was a pervasive media theme following the death of Kim Il Sung in 1994 -- when the regime was apparently aiming to underscore the legitimacy of the succession process amidst widespread famine -- it tapered off at the end of the mourning period in the late 1990's. The reappearance and subsequent use of the theme well after the announced conclusion of the "Arduous March" suggests it was designed for some purpose other than legitimizing Kim's rule amid hardships.


Passing Baton to Kim Il Sung's Grandson

A year into the initial campaign in the early 2000's, the regime began issuing a rare, if not unprecedented, call for one of Kim Jong Il's own sons to carry on the leadership tradition of his father and grandfather. This was the first relatively clear indication that Kim was attempting to portray his sons as the only qualified candidates for succession.

- In late 2002, central media began attributing to Kim Il Sung a decades-old quote by Kim Jong Il's grandfather, Kim Hyo'ng-chik, that pointed to his grandson as successor. The subtle generational shift equated to a nod to one of Kim Jong Il's sons but did not name which one. The original quote by Kim Hyo'ng-chik stated that the "completion" of a father's cause must be carried out by his "son" (Kim Il Sung) or "grandson" (Kim Jong Il) if he himself cannot complete it. The regime established the original Kim Hyo'ng-chik adage in the late 1960's to lay the groundwork for Kim Jong Il's designation as successor. The saying was canonized in the opening chapters of Kim Il Sung's memoirs "With the Century," a frequently cited multi-volume work the regime began publishing in the early 1990's.^{11 12}

North Korean Succession – Evolution of a Propaganda Campaign

The origins of the hereditary succession campaign in North Korean central media can be traced back to at least 2001, when regime propaganda began focusing on the historical and ideological basis of Kim Jong Il's own succession process and the need to replicate it. Less than a year later the campaign evolved to signal the identity of the successor as one of Kim's sons with his late wife Ko Yo'ng-hu'i. The campaign ebbed with Ko's death in August 2004 but picked up steam again following Kim Jong Il's return from reported stroke in the fall of 2008. The correlation between shifts in succession propaganda and internal and external events suggests that the succession issue and the internal dynamics resulting from it are influencing regime decisions on a number of fronts.



SOURCES: Japanese, North Korean, and South Korean media

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- The reconfigured formulation -- attributed to Kim Il Sung and pointing to one of Kim Jong Il's sons -- first appeared in a 6 October 2002 "political essay" by succession writer Song Mi-ran. Her piece, entitled "Son of a Partisan," stated: "Already a long time ago, President Kim Il Sung expressed his determination to win the final victory of the Korean revolution by his son, if not by himself, or by his grandson, if not by his son. President Kim Il Sung reportedly expressed this determination at the secret camp in Mt. Paektu in the spring of 1943." Central media have repeated Kim Il Sung's modified version of the formulation at least six times over the past six years. It eventually was framed as a comment to Kim Jong Il's mother Kim Cho'ng-suk, in an apparent effort to further clarify the relevant bloodline.¹³

Justifying a Young Leader

Coinciding with the emergence of the "grandson" theme and apparently taking into account the young age of Kim's sons, the regime began making the case for youth leadership by further rooting Kim Jong Il's ideological credentials in his teens and 20's.

- For example, a North Korean novel called "The Successor" -- which focuses on Kim Jong Il's influence on the youth league in the 1970's -- was published a year after the campaign was launched in 2001 and presumably commissioned around the time of the launch. The novel begins with a scene that intimates that Kim by his early 30's had already established himself as the country's co-leader with Kim Il Sung. The scene portrays the younger Kim as managing much of the country's affairs alongside his father. The novel was subsequently adapted for television and broadcast in 14 installments in the lead-up to Kim's birthday in February 2006.¹⁴
- The campaign's first overt signal on youth came in May 2004 in the form of a Song Mi-ran "political essay" that established the new catchphrase "gun-barrel youth," which referred to the heroism of the young defenders of the fatherland who "embrace the blood of Mt. Paektu partisans." A year later, the regime began pushing the origins of Kim Jong Il's ruling "military-first" idea further back into history -- from 1995 to 1960 -- attributing Kim with having established the basis of the system when he was only 18 years old.^{15 16 17}


Identifying the Successor

Recent Signals Point to Youngest Son

The recent push has included hints that Kim Jong Il is signaling his intent to designate as successor his youngest son with his late wife Ko Yo'ng-hu'i, and that the move is being undertaken with an eye toward the 2012 birth centennial of Kim Il Sung. (See family tree on following page.)

North Korea – Three Generations of Kims

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SOURCES: Japanese, North Korean, and South Korean media

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- Most notably, Song's "political essay" on Kim Jong Il's steel mill visit last year contained what appeared to be a highly unusual nod to Kim's youngest son, Kim Cho'ng-un. The essay cited the younger Kim's exact age -- 25 at the time of publication -- in the key passage on "succession" to the "cause of the revolution." Song responded to the rhetorical question, "Who are these people [the successor(s)]," by stating: "Their average age is 25. Average age of 25. What a heart-stirring reality this is."
- While part of the succession campaign over the years has involved making the case for youth leadership, the citing of a specific age in this way is highly unusual and almost certainly significant. The closest that central media have previously come to pinpointing an age has been in highlighting the exploits and importance of "those in their 20's" to the country's future. The specific reference to the age 25 seems to rule out Kim's other sons -- Kim Cho'ng-ch'o'l, 27, Ko's oldest; and Kim Cho'ng-nam, 37, Kim Jong Il's son with his late wife So'ng Hye-rim -- as the intended targets of the allusion.
- Another possible nod to Kim Cho'ng-un appeared less than a week after the Kim Jong Il birthday editorial. Pyongyang television on 21 February broadcast a children's program entitled "Good Heart of the Third Child," which emphasized the moral virtue of the youngest of three brothers in his adherence to socialist principles. The overriding message -- that the oldest son is not necessarily the most virtuous or worthy -- could have been meant initially to deemphasize Kim Cho'ng-nam as a succession candidate and not necessarily to rule out Kim Cho'ng-ch'o'l too.¹⁸
- In terms of timing, Kim's birthday editorial this year linked the effort to "firmly succeed to the sacred history and tradition of our revolution that began from Paektu" to "2012, the year marking the 100th birth anniversary of the great leader." Central media have been signaling for the past year and a half that some major event -- heretofore related primarily to the economy -- will coincide with Kim Il Sung's birth centennial. Kim Jong Il will turn 70 and Kim Cho'ng-un's official biography could easily be written to have him turning 30 that year, just as Kim Jong Il's birth year was adjusted.

Limited Information on Third Son

Like Father, Like Son Similar to foreign media reporting on Kim Jong Il prior to his emergence in the 1970's and 1980's, much of what is available in open sources on the younger Kim is speculative and contradictory. The most detailed and likely accurate description of him is found in the memoirs of a Japanese sushi chef who had access to the Kim family while working for Kim Jong Il on and off from 1982 to 2001. Former Kim family chef Kenji Fujimoto (pseudonym) paints a portrait of a highly confident, competitive, and kind-hearted Cho'ng-un who bears a striking resemblance to his father, both in terms of temperament and physical appearance. The only known photo of Cho'ng-un was taken when he was 10 years old.¹⁹

Qualifications for Succession This dearth of information to outsiders possibly is one reason regime leadership sees Cho'ng-un as the most suitable candidate for succession among Kim's three sons. Unlike his older brothers, he has never been reported or shown by foreign media as traveling abroad outside of his reported schooling in Switzerland, a fact that likely bolsters his supporters' claims of ideological purity. It could also serve as justification for Kim Jong Il's departure from Confucian tradition in selecting someone other than his oldest son as successor, in addition to the historical rationale that a number of Korean kings were second or lesser sons selected largely due to acumen. This is not to say that Cho'ng-un is ignorant of the outside world. In addition to being educated abroad, he reportedly speaks English, French, and German, in addition to Korean. He is also reportedly a fan of US professional basketball and almost certainly has free and full access to outside information via the Internet and to foreign entertainment.²⁰

Reports of Designation It is unclear what, if any, professional experience he brings to the table. The open-source reporting record on this point is far from consistent and appears to be driven largely by assumptions based on information about Kim Jong Il's ascension. Coming at the same time as the current propaganda drive, the most compelling report on Cho'ng-un's status appears to be a 15 January report from South Korea's semiofficial news agency Yonhap, which stated that Kim Jong Il had officially designated him as successor and had "delivered a directive on the nomination" to party leadership on the younger Kim's birthday, 8 January, according to anonymous sources "well-informed on North Korea."²¹

[For a detailed description of the open-source reporting record on Kim Cho'ng-un, see the OSC Report, **Profile of Kim Jong II's Third Son, Kim Cho'ng-un.**²²]



Only known photo of Kim Cho'ng-un, reportedly taken when he was 10 (top) and an OSC-generated age-progression photo of what Kim may look like now at 26 (bottom).

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Building on Earlier Signals

Highlighting Kim Cho'ng-un in this way would fit with an earlier stage of the campaign that appeared to be aimed at glorifying Ko and, thereby, elevating her sons. Ko's oldest son, Kim Cho'ng-ch'o'l, seemed to be the initial focus of such efforts.

- In January 2002, less than half a year after the launch of the initial campaign, the party daily began running frequent commentaries attributed to an unknown writer named Ko Yo'ng-hu'i. The paper ran no less than 150 of these articles from 2002 to 2006, when it stopped completely. While the majority were focused on foreign affairs, occasionally an article would appear that lauded Kim Jong Il's mother, the Kim family, or the concept of families in general. Content with Ko's name in the by-line had never been published in the paper prior to that, and use of her name or even the employment of an identically named reporter almost certainly would have had to have been approved at high levels, given Ko's relationship to Kim. In addition, it is unusual for a full-fledged commentator to appear out of nowhere without having done at least a short stint first as a "staff reporter."^{23 24}
- Later that year, the regime appeared to further elevate Ko by issuing an internal military indoctrination pamphlet that spoke of an unnamed "respected mother" and "mother of Korea" who was always by Kim Jong Il's side during his inspections, providing guidance of her own and showing the utmost loyalty to Kim. A faithful and capable female figure supporting the leader is how central media described Kim's own mother, Kim Cho'ng-suk, during his grooming process. While the document failed to mention the name of the "respected mother," it was almost certainly a reference to Ko given both her reported status at the time as Kim's wife and the party daily's unusual proxy use of her name. It is worth noting that Kim's marital status and details about his immediate family are not discussed in central media, so it is likely that these signals are aimed at those in the know, likely the country's elite.^{25 26}
- Two years later, similarly constructed signals began appearing in central media that pointed to Ko's oldest son, Kim Cho'ng-ch'o'l. First, the government daily *Minju Joson* in November 2004 carried a "Kim Cho'ng-ch'o'l" by-lined article that lauded the achievements of a family of soldiers who were unfailingly loyal to the "leader," a key characteristic of a suitable successor, according to Kim Il Sung's own definition. The article was conspicuous for two reasons: (1) the only record of a *Minju Joson* writer named "Kim Cho'ng-ch'o'l" prior to that was a foreign affairs reporter who typically did not write such ideologically focused pieces; and (2) its positioning against a vertical header for another article that read "The Days [He Spent] Raising Successors to the Chuch'e Revolution" suggests it was meant to be viewed with a perspective on succession.^{27 28}
- In the same vein, the party daily six months earlier carried a report that seemed designed to demonstrate Kim Cho'ng-ch'o'l's preeminence over his older step brother, Kim Chon'g-nam. The report -- which described the local response to a 2004 train explosion widely speculated in foreign press as being an assassination attempt on Kim Jong Il -- portrayed a "people's public security agent" named "Kim Cho'ng-ch'o'l" as

more proactive and demonstrating greater selflessness than a "functionary" named "Kim Cho'ng-nam." The item stands out for its timing and the fact that the names of Kim's children rarely, if ever, appear juxtaposed this way in central media.²⁹

Rooting Approach in History

This proxy-writer system of signals almost certainly would resonate with internal audiences as central media did almost the same thing in the lead-up to Kim Jong Il's designation as successor four decades earlier.

For Mother Beginning in the late 1960's, the party daily used Kim Jong Il's then-deceased mother's name to point to Kim and legitimize his eventual selection as his father's heir. A commentary published on 31 May 1968 on the revolutionary fervor of youth and students was attributed to a commentator named "Kim Cho'ng-suk," who had only published one previous time and then only as a foreign affairs "staff reporter." In a possible effort to clarify the connection to Kim Jong Il, who was in his 20's at the time, the piece ran on the same page as a historical painting of a young Kim Il Sung organizing resistance fighters during the Japanese occupation of Korea. The "Kim Cho'ng-suk" by-line was used two more times over the next three years and then disappeared completely a month prior to the 6th Congress of the Socialist Working Youth League (SWYL), where Kim Il Sung signaled his intent to designate Kim Jong Il as his successor.^{30 31 32}

...and Son There even appears to have been corresponding proxy-writer and code word identification efforts for Kim Jong Il himself. A "staff reporter" with the same name as Kim Jong Il, who had written only three articles on the machine-building industry from 1958 to 1960, suddenly became prolific in the four-year period leading up to the SWYL 6th Congress in 1971, authoring an average of an article a month, many dealing with loyalty to Kim Il Sung. In addition, a phase of the legitimization media campaign leading up to Kim Jong Il's first official appearance in state media in 1980 involved the use of the code word "Party Center" to refer to him in reports on his leadership activities.^{33 34 35}

Putting Campaign on Hold, 2004-08

The regime began phasing out the proxy-writer identification aspect of the current campaign over a two-year period following Ko's death in 2004. With that, the campaign appeared to enter a state of dormancy until last autumn's political essay apparently pointing to Kim Cho'ng-un.

- Within a month of Ko's death, the party daily ran three straight family-related "Ko Yo'ng-hu'i" articles in the span of two weeks -- likely as part of a broader central media dedication campaign -- and then abruptly downgraded the name with the lesser title of "staff reporter." *Rodong Sinmun* continued to publish articles under the "staff reporter" by-line for the next two years and then stopped abruptly in December 2006. Rather than a disavowal of Ko and her sons, however, the shift was likely meant as either a show of respect for Ko -- whom Kim Jong Il reportedly loved deeply -- or to maintain the credibility of the initial signal, which was associated with Ko while alive.^{36 37 38 39}

- During the next three years, central media continued to signal the need for a hereditary successor but omitted additional hints regarding the figure's identity. Suggesting that Kim was merely pushing the pause button and not terminating the campaign completely, general succession-related formulations used over the previous five years continued to appear. For example, the "grandson" quote attributed to Kim Il Sung surfaced again in *Rodong Sinmun* in December 2007, and a radio "serial analysis" underscoring the need for an established succession structure was aired in June 2008.⁴⁰

41

Campaign's Effect on Leadership Dynamics

Jang Song Thaek's Disappearance...

Though subtle, these signals are likely easily discernible by internal observers, particularly those close to Kim who lived through his own ascension and who have a stake in how the current process plays out. Most significantly, the portrayed influence of Kim Jong Il's now powerful brother-in-law Jang Song Thaek -- one of Kim's key supporters from the 1970's -- and those in his circle took a major hit in the early stages of the campaign, possibly due, in part, to Jang's apparent support at the time for Kim's oldest son Kim Cho'ng-nam. Jang's reported rival -- Ri Che-kang, a high-level party official who presumably supports the Ko Yo'ng-hu'i line -- meanwhile, appeared to flourish under the campaign.^{42 43}

- Kim Jong Il may have used his oldest son Kim Cho'ng-nam's arrest in Japan in May 2001 -- an event that almost certainly embarrassed regime leadership -- as a pretext to sideline Jang and support a campaign focused on Ko and her sons. It is probably not coincidence that the first signal of the current campaign -- the "Brilliant Succession" political essay -- surfaced within two months of Kim Cho'ng-nam's arrest. Kim Jong Il may have reached a general decision on hereditary succession well prior to that and was just waiting for the right moment to move forward.⁴⁴
- What is clear is that by the time the Ko Yo'ng-hu'i glorification phase of the media campaign had begun in late 2002, Jang was on his way out and his close associates were being replaced. His public appearances with Kim Jong Il -- a key indicator of influence in the North Korean system -- had tapered off that year, and he completely disappeared from central media for more than two years beginning in July 2003.^{45 46}
- Rather than a purge in the traditional sense, however, Kim may have decided that it was necessary for Jang to maintain a low profile, given that his continued activity under those circumstances would have been untenable and possibly even a threat to stability. Given the sensitive nature of the succession issue, the ostensible explanation for the dismissal -- abuse of power and corruption, as reported in foreign media and probably based on stories circulating in North Korea -- might have simply been a cover for the real reason.
- By stark contrast, the portrayed clout of Jang's reported rival Ri Che-kang, a party Organization and Guidance Department vice director who reportedly backs Ko Yo'ng-hu'i and her sons, increased significantly around the time of the campaign's launch. Ri

made his first public appearance with Kim Jong Il a week before the campaign began and has appeared with Kim fairly regularly ever since.⁴⁷

...and His Return

Jang's reemergence in a lower-level position in 2006 coincided conspicuously with the end of the Ko Yo'ng-hu'i glorification efforts in central media. The focus of the media campaign -- which by then had apparently been put on hold -- remained on hereditary succession, but the shift away from Ko could have been designed to facilitate Jang's return in a less divisive environment. That Jang's return did not result in the purge of his reported rival and Ko-supporter Ri Che-kang seems to support this idea.⁴⁸

- The recent signals pointing to Ko's youngest son, however, suggest that a factor in Jang's return and recent high-profile promotion may have been his unconditional acceptance and endorsement of the regime's choice of Kim Cho'ng-un as heir apparent. It is unlikely that Jang would have been promoted to chief of internal security and made a member of the all-powerful National Defense Commission if this was not the case.⁴⁹
- Suggesting that Kim essentially demanded a truce between Jang and Ri and that regime leadership has reached consensus on future succession moves focused on Kim Cho'ng-un, the two have appeared together on a number of occasions over the past year. Most recently, central media reported them as having accompanied Kim Jong Il during his "on-the-spot guidance" tour in Kangwo'n Province, presumably on 26 April.⁵⁰

Creating the Right Environment for Successor...

Kim Jong Il's apparent decision in 2001 to begin identifying a hereditary successor likely influenced regime efforts to improve the internal and external security environment at the time.

- In the late 1990's, the regime began preparing for sweeping changes in both foreign and domestic policy. If the Kim Cho'ng-nam arrest in Japan was indeed the ostensible trigger for the North Korean media campaign, then Kim Jong Il and regime leadership likely began discussing the issue well in advance, at a time when they saw drastically improved relations with Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul on the horizon. Kim Jong Il also announced new economic management plans in October 2001, which led to the implementation of market-oriented reforms in July of the following year. These unprecedented moves were all made in a short two-year period from 2000 to 2002, and almost all have stalled over the past eight years.^{51 52}
- Given the potential significance of the changes underway, Kim may have wanted to time any moves on the succession front with the right environment, one that would be conducive to achieving the regime's longstanding goal of a prosperous state. Despite the frequent characterization of Kim by foreign press and pundits as cold-hearted and narcissistic, he appears to care greatly for his own children and almost certainly would not want to see them placed in a position to fail or, worse, face mortal danger. Kim's former Japanese chef -- who does not appear to harbor any particular allegiance to the North Korean state or Kim -- described Kim as a loving father in his memoirs. In

addition, a review of Kim's public appearances over the past several years shows that he consistently takes days off from his inspection and work schedule, possibly to spend with his children on their birthdays.^{53 54}

System Built for Hereditary Leadership Transition

Hard To Disagree It is hard to say what, if any, actual clout Kim Cho'ng-un currently has among senior leadership, but if Kim Jong Il has signaled his intent to formally designate him successor, it has probably resulted in an internal environment that militates against opposition to his candidacy and makes reversing his ascension difficult. Kim Jong Il might tolerate debate for certain evolving issues, but once he makes a firm and unambiguous decision, there appears to be little room for further discussion, particularly on a potentially destabilizing issue like leadership transition. Kim Jong Il's handling of Jang Song Thaek over the past several years seems to be a reflection of this dynamic.

Time To Groom As long as Kim Jong Il is alive, the younger Kim probably has time to enhance his support base and leadership credentials. Kim Jong Il went through a similar process himself, having spent nearly a decade and a half building his public leadership profile and solidifying control under the watchful eye of his father. Given the more than five decades of Kim family rule, it is possible that Kim Cho'ng-un is in a less precarious position than his father was in this regard, and the system may now be even better designed to facilitate this process.

Regime Maintenance as Driver Even if Kim Jong Il passes away suddenly, it is likely that senior regime leaders will coalesce around the younger Kim to maintain a regime that ensures the livelihood of them and their families. The 1998 revision of the North's Constitution seemed designed, in part at least, to give regime leadership a larger stake in the status quo by establishing a strong collective system of leadership centered on the National Defense Commission (NDC). The latest constitutional revision further elevated the stature of the NDC, placing the leadership of the North's military and internal security institutions under a single organizational structure headed by Kim Jong Il.^{55 56}

Watching for Indications of Opposition Though unlikely, if internal opposition to the current process materializes or if Kim even perceives such a trend, he might use central media to address the issue by emphasizing, obliquely, the necessity of his succession plan and the importance of loyalty in the context of succession-related media themes and formulations.

...Hunkering Down To Meet Same Goals

Pyongyang's recent escalatory actions might be meant to achieve the same overarching goals as the 2000-2002 policies but in inverse fashion. Rather than reaching out diplomatically and reforming domestic policies to achieve stability, Kim appears intent on hunkering down. He has already taken steps to enhance his nuclear deterrence, solidify internal security, and regain central control of the economy, and he has walked away from the dialogue table with the South Koreans. Kim may calculate that he can use a tense external environment, at least in the short term, to rally domestic elements behind the regime and his choice of successor.

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- Following the North's 5 April "satellite" launch, Kim used the Foreign Ministry to signal that Pyongyang is firmly committed to its current escalatory path and is not looking to engage in serious dialogue in the near term. The regime has essentially declared the Six-Party Talks and all of its agreements null and void and announced that it will conduct another nuclear test, launch more long-range missiles, and openly pursue uranium enrichment to bolster its nuclear deterrent.⁵⁷
- Kim recently has elevated and expanded the powerful National Defense Commission (NDC), shuffled his top military leadership, and raised the profile of the Army's General Staff. On the economic front, he has revised the national Constitution, splitting up ministries for heavy industry and, apparently, elevating the State Planning Commission, which has been associated with renewed emphasis on central planning and control. Kim appears to be using these moves, especially on the personnel front, to put in place bureaucratic heavyweights who would be better able to assist a new heir.⁵⁸
- He accelerated the deterioration in North-South relations, which began in early 2008, by giving his secret police a public profile associated with defending the country from what central media portrayed as South Korean efforts to undermine the regime and even assassinate its leadership. In a break with his activities in past years, he has appeared repeatedly at live-fire artillery exercises that are almost certainly designed to underscore the North's offensive capabilities against Seoul.^{59 60}

¹ [OSC | | KPP20081106025005 | 6 November 2008 | | DPRK PARTY ORGAN HAILS COMPLETION OF ELECTRIC FURNACE MODERNIZATION AT CH'O'LLIMA STEEL COMPLEX | | (U) | (U) | Pyongyang Rodong Sinmun (via KPM Internet) in Korean -- Daily (formerly transliterated as Nodong Sinmun) of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea; posted on the Korean Press Media (KPM) website run by the pro-Pyongyang General Association of Korean Residents in Japan. URL: <http://dprkmedia.com>]

² [OSC | | KPP20081225025001 | 24 December 2008 | | DPRK RADIO 25 DEC REPORT: KIM JONG IL VISITS CH'O'LLIMA STEEL COMPLEX; NO DATE GIVEN | | (U//FOUO) | (U//FOUO) | Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Station in Korean -- DPRK-owned central radio network]

³ [OSC | | KPP20010727000055 | 21 July 2001 | | DPRK: NODONG SINMUN 'POLITICAL ESSAY' HAILS KIM FATHER-SON SUCCESSION, TRADITION | Page 2 | (U) | (U) | P'yongyang Nodong Sinmun in Korean -- Daily newspaper of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea]

⁴ [OSC | | KPP20090216106002 | 16 February 2009 | | DPRK PARTY DAILY EDITORIALIZES ON 'GREAT REVOLUTIONARY UPSWING,' 'SUCCESSORS' TO REVOLUTION | | (U) | (U) | Pyongyang Rodong Sinmun (Electronic Edition) in Korean -- Daily (formerly transliterated as Nodong Sinmun) of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea; posted on the Korean Press Media (KPM) website run by the pro-Pyongyang General Association of Korean Residents in Japan; URL: <http://dprkmedia.com>]

⁵ [Open Source (Not OSC) | | Rodong Sinmun | Widaehan Honyo'nilch'e-u'i Wiroyo'k-u'ro Uri Hyo'ngmyo'ng Wio'p-u'l Kkut-kkaji Wanso'nghaenagaja | 02/16/1997 | 2 | | 04/28/2009 | Pyongyang Rodong Sinmun in Korean -- Daily of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea]

⁶ [Open Source (Not OSC) | | Rodong Sinmun | Widaehan Kimjo'ngil Tongji-u'i So'ngun Ryo'ngdo-ttara Kango'ng Taeguk Ko'nso'l Wio'p-u'l Pitnagae Sirhyo'nhaenagaja | 02/16/2002 | 2 | | 04/28/2009 | Pyongyang Rodong Sinmun in Korean -- Daily of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea]

⁷ [Open Source (Not OSC) | | Rodong Sinmun | Ilsim Tangyo'l-u'i Wiryo'k-u'ro Cho'njinhanu'n Uri Tang-u'i So'ngun Hyo'ngmyo'ng Wio'p-u'n P'ilsu'ng Pulp'aeida | 2/16/2004 | 1-2 | | 04/28/2009 | Pyongyang Rodong Sinmun in Korean -- Daily of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea]

⁸ [OSC | | KPP20090216045001 | 16 February 2009 | | Text of DPRK SPA Presidium President's Report on Kim Jong Il's Birthday | | (U) | (U) | Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Station in Korean -- DPRK-owned central radio network]

⁹ [OSC | | KPP20090404021001 | 4 April 2009 | | DPRK RADIO 5 APR REPORT: KIM JONG IL VISITS PYONGYANG GRAND THEATER; NO DATE GIVEN | | (U//FOUO) | (U//FOUO) | Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Station in Korean -- DPRK-owned central radio network]

¹⁰ [OSC | | KPP20010727000055 | 21 July 2001 | | DPRK: NODONG SINMUN 'POLITICAL ESSAY' HAILS KIM FATHER-SON SUCCESSION, TRADITION | Page 2 | (U) | (U) | P'yongyang Nodong Sinmun in Korean -- Daily newspaper of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea]

¹¹ [Open Source (Not OSC) | Kim Tong-ch'o'l | Rodong Sinmun | 4 Ch'onman Choso'n Inmin-u'i Widaehan Suryo'ng Kimilso'ng Tongji-u'i Hyo'ngmyo'ngjo'k Kajo'ng-kwa Ch'ogi Hyo'ngmyo'ng Hwaltong-u'l Kip'i Haksu'p | 03/20/1968 | 2 | | 04/28/2009 | Pyongyang Rodong Sinmun in Korean -- Daily of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea]

¹² [Open Source (Not OSC) | | NKchosun.com | Segi-wa To'bu'ro' | 05/05/2009 | | http://www.nkchosun.com/glossary/glossary.html?ACT=word&enc_id=417&encres_id=&mode=search_f&INDEX=&keyword=%BC%BC%B1%E2%BF%CD+%B4%F5%BA%D2%BE%EE&page= | 05/05/2009 | Seoul NKchosun.com in Korean -- North Korean reference website run by South Korea's largest daily Chosun Ilbo]

<p>This OSC product is based exclusively on the content and behavior of selected media and has not been coordinated with other US Government components.</p>
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- ¹³ [OSC | | KPP20021011000026 | 6 October 2002 | | DPRK Hails Leader as Partisan's Son, Mentions Son-to-Grandson Succession | | (U) | (U) | P'yongyang Nodong Sinmun in Korean -- Daily newspaper of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea]
- ¹⁴ [OSC | | KPP20060209051001 | 1 February 2006 | | NEW DPRK TV DRAMA 'SUCCESSOR' HIGHLIGHTS KIM JONG IL'S INFLUENCE ON YOUTH LEAGUE IN 1970S | | (U) | (U) | Pyongyang Korean Central Television via Satellite in Korean -- DPRK-owned television network]
- ¹⁵ [OSC | | KPP20040507000123 | 6 May 2004 | | DPRK's Nodong Sinmun Carries Political Essay on New 'Gun-Barrel Youth' Theme | | (U//FOUO) | (U//FOUO) | Pyongyang Uriminjokkiri WWW-Text in Korean - Internet home page for North Korea's "By the United Efforts of Our People" movement; site administered out of Shenyang, China. URL: <http://www.uriminzokkiri.com>]
- ¹⁶ [OSC | | KPP20050824000217 | 25 August 2005 | | DPRK MARKS 45TH ANNIVERSARY OF LEADER'S 'MILITARY-FIRST REVOLUTIONARY LEADERSHIP' | | (U) | (U) | Pyongyang KCNA (Internet version- WWW) in Korean -- Internet home page of the official DPRK news agency, provided by Tokyo-based Korea News Service. URL: <http://www.kcna.co.jp>]
- ¹⁷ [OSC | | KPP20050824000176 | 24 August 2005 | | DPRK'S KCNA: 45TH ANNIVERSARY OF KIM JONG IL'S START OF SONGUN REVOLUTIONARY LEADERSHIP MARKED | | (U) | (U) | Pyongyang KCNA in English -- Official DPRK news agency. URL: <http://www.kcna.co.jp>]
- ¹⁸ [OSC | | KPP20090221106004 | 21 February 2009 | | DPRK TV Program Preview for 21 Feb 09 | | (U) | (U) | Pyongyang Korean Central Television via Satellite in Korean -- DPRK-owned television network]
- ¹⁹ [OSC | | KPP20060803300005 | 10 July 2006 | | DPRK Leader's Former Chef Offers Timeline of His Service | | (U//FOUO) | (U//FOUO) | Tokyo Kaku to Onna o aishita Shogun-sama in Japanese -- Third book by Kenji Fujimoto, former sushi chef to Kim Jong Il, on North Korean leader's private life.]
- ²⁰ [Book | JaHyun Kim Haboush | A Heritage of Kings | | 15 October 1988 | | | n/a |]
- ²¹ [OSC | | KPP20090115971092 | 15 January 2009 | | ROK'S YONHAP: SOURCES SAY DPRK LEADER NAMED 3D SON AS SUCCESSOR 'AROUND JAN. 8' | | (U//FOUO) | (U//FOUO) | Seoul Yonhap in English - - Semiofficial news agency of the ROK. URL: <http://www.yonhapnews.net/Engservices/3000000000.html>]
- ²² [OSC | | KPP20090422051003 | 22 April 2009 | | OSC Report: Profile of Kim Jong Il's Third Son, Kim Cho'ng-un | | (U//FOUO) | (U//FOUO) |]
- ²³ [Open Source (Not OSC) | Ko Yo'ng-hu'i | Rodong Sinmun | Ongat Sahoeak-i P'an-u'l Ch'inu'n Sso'kko Pyo'ngdu'n Sahoe | 20 January 2002 | 6 | | 5 May 2009 | Pyongyang Rodong Sinmun in Korean -- Daily of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea]
- ²⁴ [Open Source (Not OSC) | Ko Yo'ng-hu'i | Rodong Sinmun | Ttu'go'un Ch'inhyo'ryuk-u'i Cho'ng | 16 December 2006 | 4 | | 5 May 2009 | Pyongyang Rodong Sinmun in Korean -- Daily of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea]
- ²⁵ [OSC | | KPP20030219000056 | 1 March 2003 | | DPRK 'Classified' Document Highlights 'Respected Mother' as 'Mother of Korea' | | (U) | (U) | Seoul Wolgan Choson in Korean -- Monthly political and economic newsmagazine published by Choson Ilbo and similar in editorial orientation]
- ²⁶ [OSC | | KPP20030930000114 | 30 June 2003 | | Kim Chong-il's Chef on DPRK Leader and Family | | (U) | (U) | Tokyo "Kin Seinichi no Ryorinin " in Japanese -- book written by Kenji Fujimoto (pseudonym), self-described former chef to Kim Chong-il, published by Japanese publisher Fusosha]]

- ²⁷ [OSC | | KPP20041215000101 | 20 November 2004 | | DPRKG Paper Lauds Leader's 'Love, Trust' for 'Gun-barrel Family' | | (U) | (U) | Pyongyang Minju Choson in Korean -- Daily of the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly Presidium and Cabinet]
- ²⁸ [OSC | | KPP20041215000102 | 20 November 2004 | | DPRKG PAPER STRESSES KIM IL-SO'NG, JONG IL'S EFFORTS TO RAISE YOUTH 'SUCCESSORS' | | (U) | (U) | Pyongyang Minju Choson in Korean -- Daily of the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly Presidium and Cabinet]
- ²⁹ [OSC | | KPP20040525000086 | 25 May 2004 | | DPRK PARTY PAPER ON PUBLIC SECURITY AGENTS' ROLE IN RESCUE EFFORTS IN YONGCH'ON | | (U) | (U) | Pyongyang Rodong Sinmun in Korean -- Daily of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea]
- ³⁰ [Open Source (Not OSC) | Kim Cho'ng-suk | Rodong Sinmun | Cho'ngnyo'n Haksaengdu'Isok-eso' Hyo'ngmyo'ngjo'k Kago-ru'l Nop'yo' Suryo'ng-kke Ch'unjikhwan Ku'nwidae, Kyo'lsa-taero Taegehaja | 31 May 1968 | 2 | | 5 May 2009 | Pyongyang Rodong Sinmun in Korean -- Daily of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea]
- ³¹ [Open Source (Not OSC) | Kim Cho'ng-suk | Rodong Sinmun | Sunan-u'i Ryo'ksa | 11 June 1965 | 5 | | 5 May 2009 | Pyongyang Rodong Sinmun in Korean -- Daily of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea]
- ³² [Open Source (Not OSC) | Kim Il Sung | Rodong Sinmun | Cho'ngnyo'ndul-u'n Tae-ru'l Io' Hyo'ngmyo'ng-u'l Kyesokhayo'yahanda | 25 June 1971 | 1-2 | | 5 May 2009 | Pyongyang Rodong Sinmun in Korean -- Daily of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea]
- ³³ [Open Source (Not OSC) | Kim Cho'ng-il | Rodong Sinmun | Kigye Chejak Kongo'p-u'i Kailch'u'ng-u'i Palcho'n-u'n Inmin Kyo'ngje-u'i Kisulcho'k Kaego'n-u'i Chungyo Kori | 24 September 1958 | 2 | | 5 May 2009 | Pyongyang Rodong Sinmun in Korean -- Daily of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea]
- ³⁴ [Open Source (Not OSC) | Kim Cho'ng-il | Rodong Sinmun | Mije-nu'n Choso'n-eso' Taan Ch'imt'ong-u'i Kyohun-u'l Itchimalla | 14 May 1966 | 3 | | 5 May 2009 | Pyongyang Rodong Sinmun in Korean -- Daily of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea]
- ³⁵ [Open Source (Not OSC) | Morgan E. Clippinger | Asian Survey | Kim Chong-il in the North Korean Mass Media: A Study of Semi-Esoteric Communication | 1 March 1981 | 289-309 | |]
- ³⁶ [Open Source (Not OSC) | Ko Yo'ng-hu'i | Rodong Sinmun | Ch'inhyo'ryuk-i Toen Tu Kajo'ng | 15 September 2004 | 4 | | 5 May 2009 | Pyongyang Rodong Sinmun in Korean -- Daily of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea]
- ³⁷ [Open Source (Not OSC) | Ko Yo'ng-hu'i | Rodong Sinmun | O'mo'ni-u'i Ponbun-u'l Chik'yo' | 27 September 2004 | 4 | | 5 May 2009 | Pyongyang Rodong Sinmun in Korean -- Daily of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea]
- ³⁸ [Open Source (Not OSC) | Ko Yo'ng-hu'i | Rodong Sinmun | Abo'ji-u'i Tangbu | 1 October 2004 | 4 | | 5 May 2009 | Pyongyang Rodong Sinmun in Korean -- Daily of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea]
- ³⁹ [Open Source (Not OSC) | Ko Yo'ng-hu'i | Rodong Sinmun | Ttu'go'un Ch'inhyo'ryuk-u'i Cho'ng | 16 December 2006 | 4 | | 5 May 2009 | Pyongyang Rodong Sinmun in Korean -- Daily of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea]
- ⁴⁰ [OSC | | KPP20071223021002 | 23 December 2007 | | DPRK Party Organ Political Essay Marks Kim Cho'ng-suk's 90th Birth Anniversary | | (U) | (U) | Pyongyang Rodong Sinmun (via KPM Internet) in Korean -- Daily (formerly transliterated as Nodong Sinmun) of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea; posted on the Korean Press Media (KPM) website run by the pro-Pyongyang General Association of Korean Residents in Japan. URL: <http://dprkmedia.com>]

<p>This OSC product is based exclusively on the content and behavior of selected media and has not been coordinated with other US Government components.</p>
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- ⁴¹ [OSC | | KPP20080605025002 | 5 June 2008 | | DPRK Radio Explains Kim Il Sung's Theory on 'Succession of Leadership' | | (U) | (U) | Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Station in Korean -- DPRK-owned central radio network]
- ⁴² [OSC | | KPP20090215971028 | 15 February 2009 | | DPRK LEADER ALLEGEDLY NAMED 3D SON SUCCESSOR ON BROTHER-IN-LAW'S ADVICE: SOURCES | | (U//FOUO) | (U//FOUO) | Seoul Yonhap in English -- Semiofficial news agency of the ROK. URL: <http://www.yonhapnews.net/Engservices/3000000000.html>]
- ⁴³ [OSC | | JPP20081201015001 | 1 December 2008 | | Japan: Rift Opens Between Guardians of KJI's Sons Over Succession Issue | | (U//FOUO) | (U//FOUO) | Tokyo Mainichi Shimbun in Japanese -- Japan's third largest daily]
- ⁴⁴ [OSC | | JPP20010503000078 | 3 May 2001 | | Kyodo: Japan Detains Man Believed To Be Son of North Korea's Kim Chong-il | | (U//FOUO) | (U//FOUO) | Tokyo Kyodo News Service in English--Japan's largest domestic and international news agency, owned by nonprofit cooperative of 63 newspaper companies and NHK]
- ⁴⁵ [OSC | | KPP20030706000024 | 5 July 2003 | | DPRK LEADER INSPECTS KANGGYE ECONOMIC SECTORS, HISTORICAL REMAINS, SCHOOL -- MULTIMEDIA | | (U//FOUO) | (U//FOUO) | P'yongyang KCNA (Internet version-WWW) in Korean -- Internet home page of the official DPRK news agency, provided by Tokyo-based Korea News Service. URL: <http://www.kcna.co.jp>]
- ⁴⁶ [OSC | | KPP20060128051002 | 28 January 2006 | | DPRK Radio Reports Leader Attending Defense Commission's 28 Jan Banquet | | (U//FOUO) | (U//FOUO) | Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Station in Korean -- DPRK-owned central radio network]
- ⁴⁷ [OSC | | KPP20010716000099 | 16 July 2001 | | DPRK LEADER WATCHES PERFORMANCE BY ART PROPAGANDA TEAM OF KPA AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS 16 JUL | | (U//FOUO) | (U//FOUO) | P'yongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Station in Korean -- DPRK-owned central radio network]
- ⁴⁸ [OSC | | KPP20060129971002 | 29 January 2006 | | ROK's Yonhap Cites DPRK Report: DPRK Leader's Brother-in-Law Returns to Power | | (U//FOUO) | (U//FOUO) | Seoul Yonhap in English -- Semiofficial news agency of the ROK. URL: <http://www.yonhapnews.net/Engservices/3000000000.html>]
- ⁴⁹ [OSC | | KPP20081110971068 | 10 November 2008 | | ROK ONLINE DAILY: 'SOURCE' REPORTS LEADER'S BROTHER IN LAW RETURNS TO DPRK POWER | | (U//FOUO) | (U//FOUO) | Seoul The Daily NK WWW-Text in English -- Internet website of "The Daily NK," specializing in North Korean affairs, published by the Network for North Korean Democracy and Human Rights and NGOs. URL:// <http://www.dailynk.com>]
- ⁵⁰ [OSC | | KPP20090427104001 | 27 April 2009 | | DPRK Radio 27 Apr Report: Kim Jong Il Gives Guidance in Wo'nsan; No Date Given | | (U//FOUO) | (U//FOUO) | Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Station in Korean -- DPRK-owned central radio network]
- ⁵¹ [OSC | | KPP20070507356001 | 3 October 2001 | | REPORTED FULL TEXT OF DPRK LEADER'S 2001 INSTRUCTIONS ON CHANGES IN ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT | | (U//FOUO) | (U//FOUO) | Pyongyang Kangso'ng Taeguk Ko'nso'l-u'i Yogu-e Matke Sahoejuu'i Kyo'ngje Kwalli-ru'l Kaeso'n Kanghwahaltae Taehayo' in Korean -- North Korean leader Kim Jong Il's October 2001 instructions to economic and party functionaries on improving economic management]
- ⁵² [OSC | | KPF20040713000099 | 13 July 2004 | | FMA 13 Jul: DPRK Media Codewords Convey Regime Interest in Economic Reform | | (U//FOUO) | (U//FOUO) |]
- ⁵³ [OSC | | KPP20060822300004 | 10 July 2006 | | Kim's Chef on DPRK Leader's Sons, Late Wife | | (U) | (U) | Tokyo Kaku to Onna o aishita Shogun-sama in Japanese -- Third book by Kenji Fujimoto, former sushi chef to Kim Jong Il, on North Korean leader's private life.]

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⁵⁴ [OSC | | KPF20070116389002 | 16 January 2007 | | OSC ANALYSIS 16 JAN: SPECIAL DAYS DPRK LEADER IS ABSENT FROM PUBLIC APPEARANCES | | (U//FOUO) | (U//FOUO) |]

⁵⁵ [OSC | | FTS19980905001370 | 5 September 1998 | | SPA Amends, Supplements DPRK Constitution | | (U//FOUO) | (U//FOUO) | P'yongyang KCNA in English -- Official DPRK news agency]

⁵⁶ [OSC | | KPP20090409356001 | 9 April 2009 | | DPRK's KCNA Reports Details on 12th SPA | | (U//FOUO) | (U//FOUO) | P'yongyang KCNA in English -- Official DPRK news agency. URL: <http://www.kcna.co.jp>]

⁵⁷ [OSC | | KPF20090415433001 | 14 April 2009 | | OSC ANALYSIS: NORTH KOREAN RESPONSE TO UNSC STATEMENT SIGNALS FURTHER ESCALATION | | (U//FOUO) | (U//FOUO) |]

⁵⁸ [OSC | | KPF20090410433001 | 9 April 2009 | | OSC-INR Analysis: DPRK Expands Role of Military, Reasserts Economic Control | | (U//FOUO) | (U//FOUO) |]

⁵⁹ [OSC | | KPF20081219433001 | 19 December 2008 | | OSC ANALYSIS: DPRK -- RARE SSD STATEMENT SUGGESTS PROLONGED INTER-KOREAN TENSION | | (U//FOUO) | (U//FOUO) |]

⁶⁰ [OSC | | KPF20090213433001 | 13 February 2009 | | OSC-INR ANALYSIS: NORTH KOREA -- MAJOR MILITARY SHUFFLE; IMPLICATIONS UNCERTAIN | | (U//FOUO) | (U//FOUO) |]

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OSC Analysis: North Korean Media Campaign Points to Hereditary Successor

KPF20090506429001 North Korea -- OSC Analysis in English 06 May 09

[Correction: adding photo to graphic on page 6]

North Korean Media Campaign Suggests Long-Term Planning for Hereditary Successor

Pyongyang last autumn reinvigorated a nuanced propaganda campaign that it apparently began eight years ago to prepare for the emergence of a hereditary successor to Kim Jong Il. The effort has been focused from the outset on Kim's sons with his late wife, Ko Yo'ng-hu'i, and aspects of the renewed push suggest an attempt to elevate their youngest son, Kim Cho'ng-un, in preparation for Kim Il Sung's birth centennial in 2012. Notably, the current drive shares a number of characteristics with the campaign leading up to Kim Jong Il's own emergence in 1980, which took more than a decade to accomplish. As was the case then, the recent signals have been extremely subtle, suggesting that they are designed to inform internal audiences without alerting outsiders.

While Kim Jong Il's stroke last year may have accelerated the timeline for the actual naming of a successor, it appears that Kim has been planning and preparing for the move since at least 2001. The correlation between shifts in succession propaganda and the portrayed influence of certain regime officials suggests that the issue has been a source of political jockeying in the intervening years. It also is likely that these internal dynamics are influencing regime decisions on a number of fronts, including foreign policy.



Image used by the North Korean regime in 1968 to justify the eventual designation of a young Kim Jong Il as successor. The painting, carried by the party daily Rodong Sinmun, shows Kim Il Sung in his youth organizing resistance fighters during the Japanese occupation of Korea.