DISCUSSION - PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA

PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA
NUCLEAR WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT POLICY AND STRATEGY

A. Antecedents

1. 1949-1960 -- The Formative Years

a. Nuclear weapon employment policy and strategy

(1) Perception of the threat: Long range

US nuclear attacks on mainland China followed by large scale conventional assault by land, naval, and air forces.

(2) Responses and initiatives.

(a) In 1949 when the Chinese communists came to power they possessed little more than a sizable land army. And, to quote Mao, that army possessed little more than sizable than "millet plus rifles." To the Chinese leaders, their victory proved the validity of Mao's teachings that man, not weapons, is the decisive factor in war, and that victory over a technologically superior enemy can be gained in a protracted war of attrition and annihilation. Despite an assertion by Mao as early as August 1946 that "the atom bomb is a paper tiger used by the US reactionaries to scare people," the Chinese appreciated the fact that their defense capabilities were limited. Hence, they had to look to the Soviet Union to underwrite their security. On 14 February 1950 China signed with the USSR a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance and a program of military aid began.

(b) There is no evidence that the Chinese communists participated in planning for the Korean War nor, until the summer of 1950, made any preparations for participation. But, with the entry of United Nations forces into the conflict and their success against the North Korean forces and the approach to the Yalu, the Chinese reacted out of a real sense of fear. In entering the Korean war, the Chinese communists wrote two new facets of their strategic doctrine: they would fight beyond their own borders to insure the integrity of those borders: and they would fight to prevent the collapse of another Asian communist regime. China emerged from the Korean War with a more modern military force and with the perception that conventional conflicts need not escalate into a nuclear war. Further, in their eyes, the Korean War experience underscored the Maoist concepts of the power of mobilized and indoctrinated masses; the necessity of clearly understanding the political objectives of warfare; and the importance of man over machines as the decisive factor in war. China had also learned the need of an indigenous military-industrial capability but was burdened with a heavy debt for Soviet assistance provided. By saddling the Chinese with outlays as heavy as they could bear, the Soviets for a number of years rather dramatically hindered China from developing an independent military establishment.

(c) During the period 1953-54, the Chinese were assessing the impact of international events on their military strategy. The Soviet acquisition of atomic weapons increased China's security: but this was offset by the US development of thermonuclear weapons. At the same time, the strategic "massive retaliation" concepts of the Eisenhower administration contained, in Chinese eyes, alarming features. Additionally, while Soviet thermonuclear developments were gratifying, the Chinese began to question Soviet support on China's behalf at the risk of US thermonuclear response on Soviet territory. And, lastly, the United States' Asian containment policy represented by the creation of SEATO, posed further problems for the Chinese. These events showed Peking that, while political factors might remain supreme, China's foreign policies would be subject to major constraints so long as the Chinese lacked adequate means of their own for deterring nuclear threats.

(d) Peking reinforced its efforts to develop base necessary to support an indigenous nuclear capability. But this led to the strategic debates of 1955-56: Should China acquire her own weapons or should reliance be placed on a Soviet nuclear umbrella. Professional military leaders argued in support of nuclear weapons and of new military technology, in general, at the expense of the slow development of the country's economic potential, as favored by some party leaders. the final policy decision rejected the view of the military professionals: economic development wou would be pursued.

(e) In 1956 the Soviet party chief, Nikita Khrushchev, introduced a new equation. He argued that atom bombs were no respecters of class laws, that conflicts could escalate, and that one should not insist on violent revolution to the point of courting disaster. This contradicted the Maoist belief that atomic weapons were "paper tigers" and presented again the question of continuing Soviet strategic nuclear support. Meantime, however, the Soviets did provide substantial assistance to the Chinese nuclear program. In October 1957, the two countries signed an agreement on new technology for national defense.

(f) The weakness of the Chinese and the Soviet refusal to back them in any risky situation, was evident in the Quemoy crisis of August-September 1958. Events made it clear to the Chinese leaders that while the US might be willing to use nuclear weapons if pressed too hard, the Soviets were unwilling to take similar risks in protecting China. Here, again, was reason to question the validity of Chinese reliance on the Soviet nuclear shield.

(g) The decision of the Chinese to develop their own missile delivery systems must have been made prior to 1958, possibly as early as 1956. Options available varied from that of stressing relatively short range missiles based on the systems being received from the Soviets to developing an ICBM with which to reach the continental United States. The first of these options was accepted. Thus, China established the basis for creation of a regional nuclear strategy and capability.

(h) Sino-Soviet relations began to deteriorate as early as 1956. Subsequent events caused further schism and in 1959 apparently contributed in large degree to a renewed policy debate among the Peking leadership and the dismissal of the Minister of National Defense and four vice ministers. During that same year, the Soviets abrogated the 1957 national defense technology agreement. The final breach in Sino-Soviet military cooperation occurred in 1960 when the Soviets withdrew their military advisors and a large portion of arrangements for economic-military cooperation were phased out. China was on her own, having operated under a nuclear strategy of defense dependency but now finding the guardian gone.

b. The evidence

(1) Force deployments

(a) Following the Korean War the Peoples Liberation Army was generally deployed to accomplish two objectives: defense against a US conventional attack on mainland China; and maintenance of internal security. Defense against a strategic nuclear attack was limited to subsonic interceptor aircraft and conventional antiaircraft artillery weapons deployed in a point defense pattern. The ground forces remained the dominant element of China's military structure, but all elements had undergone some modernization and had acquired three years experience in fighting a conventional war against a modern and well equipped enemy. These forces were constrained to the conduct of limited and unconventional warfare.

(b) Before 1960 direct Soviet military assistance had included the provision of advisors and a vast variety of equipment. Of the assistance provided, most significant to China's future strategic nuclear capability were an experimental nuclear reactor, facilities for processing uranium, a cyclotron, and some equipment for a gaseous diffusions plant. Related military equipment included two TU-16 jet medium bombers, 13 TU-4 propeller driven medium bombers, plans for a Golf class conventionally powered guided missile submarine; SS-1, SS-2 and SS-3 surface-to-surface missiles and launch equipment, technology for developing the SS-4 and a small number of SA-2 surface-to-air missiles. Additionally, the Soviets probably provided assistance in constructing the missile test range at Shuangchengtzu.

(2) Exercises and training. In the first year of its formal existence the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) training was oriented toward a "military first" concept. Following the Korean War, efforts were initially directed to correcting deficiencies pointed up by that war. Subsequently, stress was placed on the political aspects of training while traditional military training was degraded. At the same time, the trend was away from Russian doctrine with emphasis being given to Chinese needs and conditions. Throughout this period, training by all services was exclusively concerned with the conventional and unconventional offense and defense character of warfare.

(3) Command control. No nuclear command and control system existed in China during this period.

(4) Research and developments.

(a) In 1951 Peking signed a secret agreement with Moscow through which China provided uranium ores in exchange for Soviet assistance in the nuclear field. There is some indication that by 1953 the Chinese, under the guise of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, had initiated research leading to the development of nuclear weapons.

(b) In mid-October 1957 the Chinese and Soviets signed an agreement on new technology for national defense. The full scope of this agreement is not known, but from available evidence it included provision for additional Soviet nuclear assistance as well as the furnishing of some surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles. Pursuant to this agreement the Soviets provided the Chinese with assistance in building a major gaseous diffusion facility for production of enriched uranium. Some years later the Chinese accused Moscow of having torn this agreement up in 1959, and having "refused to supply a simple atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture." Thus, the Chinese were forced to continue to play down the importance of advanced weapons while at the same time attempting gradually to build up an advanced weapons capability with only token Soviet help -- and to do this first in the face of national emphasis on domestic economic development and then later in the face of the chaos created by the Great Leap Forward. In May 1958, the Chinese announced that they intended to build their own missiles.

2. 1961-1969 -- China Goes It Alone

a. Nuclear weapon employment and policy.

(1) Perception of the threat: Long range nuclear attacks by the United States or the Soviet Union, or the alternative of large scale conventional assault, primarily by the Soviets.

(2) Responses and Initiatives.

(a) Just when the Chinese leaders began to think about the concept of a strategic nuclear doctrine and strategy is not known. And, Chinese reticence, even up to the present time, with respect to their nuclear capability and intentions has not facilitated the evaulation of China's nuclear strategy and plans for developing a strategic nuclear force.

(b) Almost nothing has been written or voiced by Chinese leaders which could indicate the formulation of a definitive nuclear strategy. In fact, it is quite possible that Peking has not even today clearly defined its doctrine and strategy for waging nuclear war. Nevertheless,it certainly must have been apparent to the Chinese leaders from the start that they had almost no chance of achieving nuclear parity with the superpowers. Consequently, their cautious, pragmatic doctrine for development, deployment and employment of their strategic forces was forced on them rather than being adopted voluntarily. Certainly the development of a deterrent doctrine and capability must have appeared as the only feasible course of action at least for the near and mid-term periods. Should deterrence fail, the Chinese leaders perceived the need for an assured retaliatory capability. But, at the same time they were highly sensitive to the paucity of their defenses against a strategic attack. If China was to survive such an attack, measures were necessary to insure such survival. Hence, the defensive strategy of hardening, dispersal, redundancy and civil defense measures was adopted.

(c) During the early years of this decade available evidence indicates that the formulation of a comprehensive Chinese strategy was characterized by major gaps and unresolved problems. Chinese thinking about nuclear war continued to be concerned with defense, and survival, although reference was made to use of tactical nuclear weapons. In essence, the doctrine took into consideration the following types of warfare;

1 Surprise strategic air attack with nuclear weapons against mainland China.

2 Invasion of the mainland by ground forces armed with conventional

weapons.

3 Chemical/bacteriological warfare, both strategic and tactical.

4 Lower level conflicts, such as local wars in contiguous areas.

(d) At that time, the Chinese had little to propose as a defense against a strategic nuclear attack except improvement of air defenses and the dispersal, hardening and camouflage of military targets. Nevertheless,they postulated that a potential enemy could not rely exclusively on nuclear weapons in dealing with China because of China's vast territory, complicated terrain and huge numbers of people. Thus, their defense strategy provided for the possibility of a protracted war on Chinese soil, requiring large conventional forces. This strategy sought to exploit time, space, man power, and will.

(e) The Chinese-initial program for construction of space and missile related facilities, whichhad begun in 1957 or 1958, was insulated from the ravagesand collapse of the Great Leap Forward. With the withdrawalof Soviet technicians in 1960, however, progress in theprogram vitas slowed; nevertheless, the Chinese did move forward with a broad R&D program. Possibly even to a greater extent, the Chinese appear to have successfully isolated the nuclear energy program from disruptive domestic influences.

(f) At the same time, China's military leaders continued to realize that until China had developed an effective go-it-alone capability, they could find themselves dependent upon Soviet assistance in any Sino-US confrontation. Just what form that assistance would take and under what circumstances it could be expected remained very much in question. As a consequence new emphasis was placed on self reliance as a solution to national defense problems and on the theme of "man-over-weapons" as the determinant in war. The 1962 Sino-Indian border incident provided no reason to change that theme. On the other hand, the Cuban confrontation in 1962 offered the Chinese a rather telling lesson in the consequences of serious strategic inferiority.

(g) That the Chinese were interested in developing a tactical nuclear capability, as well as strategic, can be traced back to at least 1961. At that time training in both defensive and offensive tactical nuclear situations was being stressed in support of conventional forces. In policy terms the Chinese may have calculated that a tactical nuclear capability could be used to persuade a nuclear armed enemy against intervening in local crisis situations or raising intervention to a nuclear level.

(h) In October 1964 China joined the nuclear club by conducting its initial atomic test at Lop Nor, in western China. This was the prelude to a series of increasingly sophisticated test shots which has continued up to the present. In announcing this test, the Chinese promulgated a "no-first use" policy, reiterated Mao's atom bomb-paper tiger theme, repeated China's advocacy of complete prohibition and destruction of all nuclear weapons, condemned the Moscow test ban treaty of 1963 as a "big fraud to fool the people of the world," and stated that "China's aim is to break the nuclear monopoly of the nuclear powers..."

(i) The Chinese conducted the first firing of an MRBM missile with a range of about 600 nm in 1963 and the first firing of an IRBM having a range of 1,400 nm in 1966. On 27 October 1966, they conducted their first, and to date only, missile delivered nuclear test (CHIC 4).

(j) Events following the Gulf of Tonkin incident in 1964 created consternation among China's hierarchy. Most troubling was the bombing of North Vietnam which created a real fear that it would be extended into China. This precipitated a new debate within the Peking leadership, not on whether China should enter the war but rather how China could best be defended against the US air attacks. The conservative elements in the leadership again prevailed and China continued to stress scientific/technological development over a spectacular force development and modernization program. Out of that debate emerged a relevant Chinese doctrinal statement. In an article on 10 May 1965 Lo Jui-ching, then Chief of th'e General Staff, wrote:

"Our principle is: We will not attack unless we are attacked, if we are attacked we will certainly counterattack."

(k) In June 1967, China exploded its first thermonuclear device in its sixth nuclear test.

(l) The Chinese cultural revolution during the period 1966-1969 had far reaching effects on the political, governmental, military, educational, and economic spheres of Chinese society. Again, strategic, nuclear and related activities were insulated from these disruptive domestic events and progress continued to be made in the acquisition of a strategic deterrent posture.

(m) During this same period the United States both became fully involved in the Vietnam War and began to feel domestic as well as some international pressure to withdraw from that war. These facts, most significantly the latter, were not lost on the leaders in Peking. The commitment of the US to the war confirmed in Chinese eyes the estimate that, where a people have a will to make revolution and can appeal to weaknesses and instability in an existing regime, a breeding ground for wars of national liberation exists. Of special importance, however, was the knowledge that at no time during the period before the bombing of North Vietnam ended in 1968, had the US made any threat to attack China. While this would not mean that the Chinese could totally discount a US threat and more particularly a nuclear attack, they certainly must have perceived that the US had explicitly sought to avoid a direct confrontation with the PRC. It is, therefore, possible to deduce that the Chinese could, with some sense of relief, turn their attention to the developing threat along the Sino-Soviet border.

(n) In 1965, the Soviets had begun a buildup of their forces along the Sino-Soviet border. This buildup accompanied by increasing tensions certainly enhanced the possibility of clashes involving ever increasing numbers of men and equipment, despite the fact that Chinese troop deployments remained largely unchanged; The border clashes beginning with the Ussuri River incident in March 1969 clearly pointed up in Chinese eyes, a serious Soviet threat.

(o) The Chinese began troop training firings of the CSS-1 (MRBM) system at least by the spring of 1969 in preparation for deployment.

b. The evidence

(1) Force deployments

(a) PLA troop deployments remained generally stable during this period and showed little evidence of any significant reaction to perceived external threats or international developments. However, substantial steps were being taken to assure the survivability of the Chinese military forces, industry, and the civilian population.

(b) A campaign was initiated in 1959 to disperse and harden military installations. This was clearly a passive defensive strategy undertaken to reduce the effects of a nuclear attack. In the early 1960s, this campaign was expanded to include heavy industries. The attainment of a nuclear capability in 1964 did not lessen the pace of dispersal and hardening, and the "war preparations" campaign of 1969 broadened the scope of such activities.

(c) On 9 June 1961 an instruction on construction policy was published by the General Staff Department, the General Political Department, and the General Rear Services Department. It was approved by the Military Affairs Committee (MAC) and stated that the instruction was necessary to insure an understanding of the sudden nature and destructiveness of modern warfare and of carrying out the MAC construction policy. The instruction continued:

For strategic requirements, new barracks,warehouses, and factories must be built in locations far from large- and medium-sized cities, communication and transportation centers, large manufacturing and mining districts, large reservoirs, and densely populated areas. They should be built near and into hills, on hillsides, and be properly dispersed according to topographic and terrain conditions. Further more, they should be properly camouflaged.

(d) This instruction certainly indicated that the Chinese did not expect a purely counterforce campaign and were concerned with the question of survivability. Thus, renewed stress was being given to the government policy on dispersal, hardening, and redundancy. Similar stress was being given to at least some civil defense measures. In the early 1960s the Chinese initiated a program of building personnel air-raid shelters. According to available evidence this program is nationwide and has been progressing at a steady pace. Shelter construction received two added shots-in-the-arm by government direction during the 1960s. The first was during the mid-1960s when the bombing of North Vietnam started and the second follows the Sino-Soviet border clashes in 1969. By 1968, over 100 personnel shelters had been identified in Shanghai and in several cities in north and northeast China.

(2) Exercises and training.

(a) During this period, Lin Piao succeeded Peng Teh-huai as Minister of National Defense. Lin instituted the "revolutionized" military, requiring the Chinese communist forces to develop the "glorious tradition." Emphasis was now on ideological training and required a minimum of 50% of the time be assigned daily for studying Mao's writings. The remaining hours were used for the work of the masses and part time agricultural production. This left little time for actual military training. Lo Jui-ching, Chief of General Staff under Lin, felt this emphasis was detrimental to national defense. Without Lin's approval Lo shifted the emphasis back to military training. For his efforts Lo, like Peng Teh-huai,was purged on the charge of treason against the armed forces. It became obvious that stressing military training over political training was unsafe.

(b) Military training during this period emphasized basic training within the company, especially on the individual soldier, team, squad and platoon levels. After a good foundation had been laid by company-level units,the military regions could arrange joint training for a few battalions, regiments, and divisions, as required. The India/PRC conflict, Sino/Soviet split, and the Gulf of Tonkin take place during this time period, however, none of them seemed to affect the training doctrine.

(c) Between 1967 and the present, two events occurred which greatly effected the course of PLA training. The cultural revolution brought most large-scale training to a standstill. What training that did had the following characteristics:

1 Short training periods -- courses which usually lasted several years were now telescoped to a few months;
2Emphasis was placed on experience and not theories;
3Mutual teaching and learning between students;
4 Inferior quality of students as a result of emphasis on family background and political outlook;
5Frugality -- lack of training facilities, equipment, and instructors necessitated keeping training very basic.

(d) The 1969 border conflict with the Soviet Union awakened the Chinese to the need for effective military training. Although ideological training remains number one in priority, military training has been upgraded to prepare for combat. Combat readiness exercises are emphasized as well as bivouac training, live ammunition firing, sea-air, and land-air joint exercises, and long-distance marches. The largest and probably the most extensive field and command post exercises ever conducted by the Chinese have taken place since 1969. This type of training is continuing.

(e) In 1968, the large surface-to-surface missile training facility identified at Brunei appeared to be getting ready for a new phase of activity. Possibly as early as August 1968, but certainly no later than the spring of 1969, training of some missile force personnel had begun there. Meanwhile, live firing exercises had begun at Shuang-cheng-tzu.

(3) Command and control.

(a) Little evidence is available concerning command and control systems being developed by the Chinese in support of their strategic nuclear forces during this period. Several references to a "Second Artillery" created a basis for speculating that the Chinese were establishing their counterpart to the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces. However, there was insufficient evidence during this time to verify the function and operational methodology of this organization.

(b) Command and control of conventional forces, during this time, as reflected by communications intelligence, indicated a high degree of centralized control at Ministry of National Defense level.

(4) Research and development

(a) The gaseous diffusion plant at Lanchou, construction of which began in 1957, probably commenced operation in 1963. Construction of a plutonium production complex at Yumen, in Kansu Province, was also started in 1958 or 1959. This construction continued steadily for at least the next decade and operation of the large plutonium chemical separations plant position of the complex commenced in the latter part of 1970. During that same early period of time (1959) the Chinese began construction of a nuclear stockpile site and large weapons complex, both near Koko Nor. The facilities probably became available for use sometime in 1965. (b) It is considered possible that beginning in the late 50s, the Chinese put such a high priority on development of a viable nuclear energy program, particularly as it related to weapons development, that a higher ratio of China's scientific expertise was assigned to this program than that devoted to similar programs by either the US or the USSR. Regardless, Peking realized that a nuclear capability remained some distance in the future. In January 1961, a Chinese military leader stated that should a war occur within the next three to five years the Chinese would have to rely on hand weapons. This seemed to imply that the Chinese leaders did not expect to acquire nuclear weapons capability before 1964-66.

(c) The first Chinese nuclear test was conducted at Lop Nor on 16 October 1964 (CHIC 1). It was a tower shot involving a fission device with a yield of 25 kilotons. However, of the ten test shots that followed by 29 September 1969, six are believed to have been relatedto thermonuclear development. The others had as their goals the adaptation of CHIC 1 for bomber delivery and test of a missile warhead (CHIC 4). CHIC 6, an airdrop test on 17 June 1967, was the first full-yield, two-stage thermonuclear test.

(d) The Chinese conducted their first test launch of a ballistic missile (CSS-1) in 1963. Test launches continued throughout the period with this system furnishing the delivery vehicle for the first, and to date only, missile delivered test shot, in October 1966 (CHIC 4).

(e) Production of the Chinese versionof the TU-16/BADGER jet medium bomber began in 1968.

3. 1969-1972 -- An Emerging Strategic Nuclear Capability

a. Nuclear weapon employment and strategy.

(1) Perception of the threat: Soviet nuclear attacks of either a nationwide or selective nature accompanied by large scale assaults by conventional forces. The likelihood of US attacks on China is seen as being greatly reduced, unless China were to create a severe provocation.

(2) Responses and initiatives.

(a) While immediate Chinese military response to the Ussuri River and subsequent incidents was negligible, Peking initiated a vigorous psychologica1 campaign urging the Chinese people to wage an all-out struggle against the "new Tsars." During the late summer of 1969, there were numerous indications that the Soviets could be preparing to use nuclear weapons against China. China's only apparent response was to initiate a "war preparations" program. Although a border truce was initiated between the two countries in October 1969, the exchange of acrimoniouscharges-and countercharges has continued, and it is now evident that by the latter part of 1969 the Chinese recognized the Soviet threat as the most immediate and most ominous. Since that time, China has augmented its ground and air forces deployed in the military regions and air districts contiguous to the border. This augmentation, however, has been fairly modest and the bulk of the forces remain in a defensive posture considerably removed from the border.

(b) It became evident prior to 1971 that China intends to become a major nuclear power. To achieve this goal, the Chinese are willing to accept the economic burden involved and the risks of slowing basic economic development through diversion of scarce resources and skills to specialized defense tasks. This is apparent in that activity in both general purpose and strategic military programs is at an all time high, but still must be considered as moving at a moderate pace. It is equally evident that some principles other than Mao's "peoples war" guide the costly and wide-ranging strategic weapon programs now underway. Those programs appear to be designed to ultimately provide for a considerable systems-mix and a number of options in warhead yield.

(c) It is probable that China deployed some CSS-1 MRBMs, possibly as early as 1969, and a small number of CSS-2 IRBMs beginning in late 1971. Training of CSS-2 crews had begun in 1970. No firm evidence of such deployments is available. However, 1972 photography indicates the probably imminent deployment at two separate locations in China as well as the identification of CSS-1 ground support equipment at a military installation in the Peking Military Region. It is highly likely that if deployment has occurred, a major portion of the missiles are targeted against the Soviet Union.

(d) The Chinese have twice flight tested a third missile-system which appears to have sufficient range to provide full coverage of the USSR. It could be operational by 1974-75. Known as the "Chingyu" missile, it is liquid propelled and is a two-stage vehicle with the first stage probably incorporating the design and technology of the CSS-2. This missile could be intended for hardened site deployment. Additionally, on 10 September 1971 the Chinese tested at reduced range a missile having the characteristics of an ICBM capable of striking targets within the continental United States. Operational deployment of this missile is not expected to occur before 1975 or 1976. At the same time the Chinese recognize that both the US and the USSR are developing strategic defenses including antiballistic missiles (ABMs), which would be more effective against the limited Chinese nuclear attack capability than they would be against each other. Chinese countermeasures are not known at this time.

(e) The Chinese appear to be on the brink of establishing a tactical nuclear capability. The two most recent nuclear tests (CHIC 12, CHIC 13) are suggestions of a new phase of the PRC test programs. Both were low yield weapons. It appears possible that CHIC 13 was delivered by an F-9 fighter aircraft and may have been a proof test of a weapon. As with strategic nuclear weapons, the Chinese have given no indication of their doctrine for the deployment and employmentof tactical nuclear weapons.

(f) During the late 1950s, China had become increasingly disturbed by perceived Soviet efforts to obtain arms control arrangements. On 21 January 1960, the Chinese National Peoples Congress passed a resolution stressing that China would not be bound by any disarmament except with its express consent and that it would accept no disarmament agreement unless it had participated in the negotiations. The Chinese were to continue to deprecate the "tripartite" nuclear test ban treaty and to stress "the legitimate right of all peace-loving nations to develop armed forces for self defense." In 1963, Premier Chou En-lai enunciated for the first time the Chinese position that a summit conference on nuclear matters should include all the countries of the world, large and small. On the other hand, on 24 June 1966, the authoritative "Observer," in the Peking Review, stated ...

. . . Chinese representatives definitely will not attend any world disarmament conference within or outside the United Nations...The Chinese Government will advocate thecomplete prohibition and thorough destructionof nuclear weapons when the US nuclear threatis countered.

(g) As recently as 7 August 1971, Peking rejected a Soviet proposal for the convening of a five-power conference, to include the US, the USSR, China, Great Britain, and France, to discuss the question of nuclear disarmament. In their statement, the Chinese said that they had consistently stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and had declared on many occasions that under no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons. The statement went on to indicate that the PRC would at no time participate in a disarmament conference between the nuclear powers behind the backs of the nonnuclear countries. It urged Moscow and Washington to openly agree not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances and called for the dismantling of all nuclear bases and stockpiled weapons on foreign soil. Following their admission to the United Nations, the Chinese again rejected a Soviet proposal for a world disarmament conference placed under consideration by the 26th United Nations General Assembly. The Peking representative reiterated the previously expressed Chinese objections to such a conference. There is some indication of growing Chinese interest in participating in multilateral arms negotiations through the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). However, it is also evident that while the Chinese may be adopting a more pragmatic approach to the disarmament question, they have, as yet, shown no inclination to abandon any of their stipulated requirements essential to the convocation of a disarmament conference.

(h) The Chinese leaders are watching the US and USSR SALT exchange and are intently interested in the outcome as it could have an important impact on the PRC strategic program. The two areas of prime interest are those of ABM developments, which could counter the Chinese missile program, and the possibility of no agreement constraining missile development or deployment posed against the PRC. The arms limitation program will probably become more of an issue as the leadership changes in China and the worldwide political area develops. Since the end of the cultural revolution and more particularly since joining the UN in late 1971, the Chinese have begun to develop international relationships. If the Chinese were to participate in arms limitation talks, it would probably be through the UN channels.

(i) Since coming to power the Chinese communists have sought to insure the existence of friendly states on their borders. In addition, the Japanese are seen by Peking as representing the greatest potential threat of anypower in Asia with the exception of the USSR. Therefore, they are making strenuous efforts to discourage the rebirth of Japanese militarism, particularly acquisition of a nuclear capability. Concurrently, however, they are seeking Japan's technological and industrial know-how to improve the PRC economy and industrial base, particularly as it relates to their defense posture. The Chinese would view as an extremely serious development any Japanese move into the nuclear arena and could see in it a need for expanding their own strategic offensive capability.

b. The evidence.

(1) Force deployments.

(a) By the latter part of 1969, the Chinese had recognized the Soviet threat as the most ominous and immediate as any confronting them. Since that time, China has augmented its ground and air force elements deployed in the military regions and air districts contiguous to the border. This augmentation has been modest and the bulk of the forcesremain in a defensive posture considerably removed from the border.

(b) The Chinese Navy, while still essentially a coastal defense force is continuing to acquire more effective units and is beginning to deploy its units for longer operational periods and possibly to more extended ranges from the coast than at any time previously. The augmentation of the fleet with guided missile destroyers and destroyer escorts and with an increasing number of new attack submarines provides the Chinese with a blue wateroperational potential and the capability of seeking out and attacking enemy strategic naval forces at increasing distances from the Chinese mainland.

(c) During this period the Chinese air force underwent considerable modernization. Productionof MIG-21s and the Chinese designed F-9, believed to be destined for a ground attack role, commenced and production of the MIG-19 was accelerated. Production of the TU-16 jet medium bomber and the IL-28 light jet bomber continued, also. Deployment of these aircraft to operational units occurred and the F-9 may have been the delivery Vehicle for CHIC 13. Delivery of the TU-16/BADGER to the 4th Independent Regiment began and at present 32 of these aircraft are operational.

(d) It is believed that the Chinese have deployed in limited numbers the CSS-1 and CSS-2 surface missiles. Deployment could consist of from 15 to 30 CSS-1 launchers and 15 CSS-2 launchers. It is assumed that a large portion of such deployed missiles would be oriented against the Soviet Union. Regardless, the imminent deployment of surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) is indicated in recent satellite photography. A probable SSM-related installation at Tienwei, 53 miles north of Kunming, was detected in photographs taken on 21 January. Another missile complex revealed in the 21 January photography was 11 nautical miles southwest of Kunming. A third SSM-related installation is located near Liuchingkou in northcentral China. Five miles to the northeast of Liuchingkou another SSM-associated facility has been detected. Facilities at Kunming in South China and Liuchingkou in northwestern China appear to be constructed for such operational deploy ment. A CSS-1 MRBM {600-nm range) with a three-megaton warhead deployed at Kunming could reach targets near the Vietnamese DMZ, in northern Thailand, and India east of Bangladesh. On the other hand, the most logical missile to be deployed at Kunming would be a CSS-2 IRBM, which would bring Taiwan, all of southeast Asia, and almost half of India within range. The inland location of Liuchingkou dictates that the CSS-2 IRBM be deployed there. The CSS-1 would cover only a small portion of Mongolia, while the CSS-2 would enable China to strike targets in the USSR, India, most of Southeast Asia, Taiwan, and South Korea.

(e) Ground support equipment identified with the CSS-1 system has recently been observed in satellite photography at a military facility in the Peking Military Region.

(f) A facility for producing the new Chinese designed SUUJI, a long range early warning radar has recently been identified at Sha Sheik. The new radar, which was first seen in 1971, greatly increases China's early warning detection capability. It is believed that up to ten of these radars have been deployed to date.

(9) The Chinese appear to be well on the way to developing a nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine. The single GOLF class conventionally powered ballistic missile boat in the Chinese inventory is believed to be committed to a test platform role in developing a new missile of native design. Recent evidence of land based ejection facilities as well as construction of an off-shore tube launcher for underwater ejection tests has been detected. The Chinese designed and built HAN class submarine has been undergoing sea trials since August 1971. If not yet operational it should be in the near future. The HAN class submarine is believed to be a nuclear powered torpedo attack boat. While this class boat will greatly improve the Chinese Navy's distant defense capabilities against enemy nuclear equipped surface forces, one of its mast significant features is that it will servce as a stepping stone in the development of a Chinese nuclear powered, submarine launched ballistic missile (SSBN) force. Such a force would enhance Peking's assurance of an effective retaliatory capability, as well as strengthening her deterrent posture. It is estimated that China's first SLBN could become operational in 1976.

(2) Exercises and training.

(a) The 1969 border conflict with the Soviet Union awoke the Chinese to the need for effective military training. Although ideological training remains number one in priority, military training has been upgraded to increase combat effectiveness. Combat readiness exercises are emphasized as well as bivouac training, live ammunition firing, sea-air, and land-air joint exercises, and long distance marches. Since 1969 the largest and probably the most extensive field and command post exercises ever conducted by the Chinese have taken place and this type of training is continuing.

(b) Following an intensified and apparently successful testing of the CSS-1 (MRBM) in 1966, little activity was observed relating to this system from the fall of 1966 through early 1969. During that time there were occasional exercises and possible indications of a few firings but no firm evidence of troop training. At the Wuvei missile school, no equipment was observed and some type of construction which had begun in 1956 continued at a very slow pace through at least 1969. The picture began to change in 1969-1970, however, as evidence accumulated of renewed MRBM activity. It now appears reasonably certain that troop training, involving live firings from Shuangchengtzu, and possibly classroom and missile handling instruction at Wuwei, was underway at least by the spring of 1969 if not by August 1968. Training at both Shuangchengtzu and Wuwei has continued up to the present. The first photographic evidence of CSS-2 training was obtained in November 1970. This training which is being conducted at Wuwei is continuing at this time. Live firings of this missile have been conducted from a launch facility at Wuchai, southwest of Peking, and possibly represented training exercises beginning in mid-1969.

(3) Command and control.

(a) Littie definitive data are available on Chinese command and control procedures for nuclear weapons systems. Further, as the PRC nuclear force is just emerging as a viable force, little change in the Chinese command and control policy or strategy has been noted in response to international incidents or changes in strategy of other nuclear powers. However, the command and control communications systems for all services is being modernized with the increased use of radio printer equipment from the Ministry of National Defense level down to major field and territorial commands.

(b) In 1971, the main missile control authority moved from the test range at Shuangchengtzu to Sian in central China. This location would place this control authority in the middle of the known missile related activities. The location of probable SSM-related facilities near Kunming in southern China and Luichingchou in northcentral China would mean the new controller would be in the center of this missile activity. It is too early to predict the impact of this move on overall missile command and control procedures.

(4) Research and development. The PRC has conducted 14 nuclear weapons development tests during the period October 1964 to March 1972. The tests, designated chronologically as CHIC 1 through 14, involving four fission devices (the first, second, fourth, and thirteenth) one fission device (the nineth test), and eight thermonuclear devices, (data concerning CHIC 14 is insufficient to permit evaluation at this time). The first 11 PRC tests, CHICs 1-11, appeared to be directed at first devellopment of satisfactory low yield fission (l0s of KT) and high yield thermonuclear (3 MT) weapons. In this group of tests, two basic fission device/primary designs and one basic thermonuclear design have evolved from analysis of the test debris. The 12th - 14th tests appear to represent a new phase in the PRC nuclear weapons program. This phase may include basic studies of thermonuclear weapons phenomenology and tactical nuclear weapons development.

(5) Nuclear facilities and production. Since January 1971 a second set of new nuclear facilities have been identified. This included a gaseous diffusion plant at Chinkouho which is estimated to be able to produce more U-235 then the original plant at Lanchou. This new facility should begin partial production in late 1972 with full operation in late 1974. There is an additional reactor for production of plutonium at Kuangyuan and additional weapons grade material could enter the stockpile by 1974-75. Also, there is a possible new weapons fabrication facility located at Tzutung. All of these new facilities will give the PRC the capability of becoming the third largest nuclear power in the world. Based on their production capability, the Chinese could have as many as 120 thermonuclear warheads and 260 fission nuclear weapons in the stockpile at this time.

PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA NUCLEAR WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT POLICY AND STRATEGY

PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA
NUCLEAR WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT POLICY AND STRATEGY