North Korea's military strategy is primarily concerned
with an offensive against South Korea and defense
against a counterattack. Pyongyang has created the
most militarized peacetime society in the world today,
diverting tremendous investment resources away from
productive sectors of the economy. The North Korean
Army remains largely an infantry army adapted to
peninsular conditions and employs infantry tactics
developed during the Korean war. North Korean Army
tactical doctrine has always emphasized surprise,
firepower, mobility, and strong armor and artillery
components to meet these needs.
Focus on Enhancing Military Capabilities
The most significant development in the ground
forces has been the continued deployment of
long-range artillery systems (240-mm multiple rocket
launchers and 170-mm self-propelled guns) near the
DMZ. Although these deployments are not yet
complete, the North is continuing production of these
long-range systems. The increasing number of
long-range artillery systems gives North Korea the
ability to provide devastating indirect firepower in
support of ground force operations. Pyongyang has
deployed over 10,000 artillery systems, an increase of
almost 10 percent over the past 15 years, in addition to
over 2,300 multiple rocket launchers. Most of the
artillery is self-propelled and can support a rapidly
moving operation.
North Korea Army Personnel and Equipment.
The Army is the Largest of the Three Services. The majority of the ground forces are infantry.
Limited Navy Coastal Defense. North Korea's Navy is small and split between the east and west coasts, making mutual support nearly impossible.
The Navy's 39 guided-missile patrol boats are another
capable weapon system. North Korea possesses
several versions of the Soviet OSA-1, called the
SOJU, each equipped with four SSN-2A/STYX
antiship missile launchers. The Soviet KOMAR Class
guided-missile patrol boat and its North Korean
counterpart, the SOHUNG, are smaller and carry only
two STYX launchers.
The largest portion of the North Korean Navy consists
of small combatants: torpedo boats, patrol craft,
submarine chasers, and fast attack craft. Of the 320
torpedo boats, at least 250 are North Korean-built.
Pyongyang also has at least 60 CHAHO patrol boats
equipped with either 30- or 40-tube 122-mm multiple
rocket launchers in the center of the deck to provide
fire support to ground troops or to disable large,
slow-moving ships near the coast.
North Korea possesses approximately 130 NAMPO
amphibious landing craft, based on a Soviet P-6
torpedo boat hull, with a maximum range of 325
nautical miles and a capacity of up to 60 troops. In
1988, production of the KONG BANG II and KONG
BANG III air-cushion personnel landing craft began.
Unlike the NAMPO, which requires special
operations forces to disembark onto rubber rafts, the
KONG BANG hovercraft can offload troops directly
onto nearly all of South Korea's beaches. This
program has resulted in fielding over 130 KONG
BANGs to support numerous amphibious landings
during wartime.
Numerous operational, alternate, and secondary
airfields throughout North Korea provide more than
adequate runways for the large Air Force. Hardened
shelters at operational airfields provide increased
protection for aircraft. Unoccupied airfields in
southern regions near the DMZ can support flight
operations during war, extending the range of fighter
aircraft well into the South.
Older fighter aircraft include 160 MiG-21/FISHBEDs,
20 Su-7/FITTERs, 160 MiG-19/FARMERs, 120
MiG-17/FRESCOs, and 190 MiG-15/FAGOTs. Most
of these aircraft are daylight, clear-weather-capable
only, and carry limited weapon loads. Three regiments
totaling 80 medium-range Il-28/BEAGLEs are the
only bombers in the Air Force inventory.
The Air Force received a limited number of newer,
all-weather, air defense and ground-attack aircraft
from the Soviet Union in the 1980s. In 1985, North
Korea acquired 45 MiG-23/FLOGGERs, with
increased range and payload over other older, less
capable North Korean fighters. This aircraft can carry
the older AA-2/ATOLL and the more sophisticated
AA-7/APEX air-to-air missiles in an air intercept role.
It can also be armed with general purpose bombs and
rockets for ground-attack missions.
In 1985, North Korea also acquired 15 Soviet
MiG-29/FULCRUM fighters. The MiG-29 carries the
AA-10/ALAMO beyond-visual-range air-to-air
missile. These FULCRUMs provide Pyongyang with
a limited but much improved air defense capability.
In the late 1980s, the Air Force improved its
ground-attack capabilities when it acquired 35
Su-25/ FROGFOOT aircraft from the Soviet Union.
All-weather capable and well armored, the
FROGFOOT has a combat radius of 300 nautical
miles and carries up to 5,000 kilograms of bombs
and rockets. However, North Korea has yet to show
it has mastered the full potential of this highly
capable fighter bomber.
The bulk of North Korea's transport inventory consists
of nearly 300 1948-vintage An-2/COLTs. This
single-engine biplane can cruise at 160 kilometers per
hour. Capable of carrying up to 10 combat troops
while flying at low altitude and slow speeds to avoid
radar detection, the An-2 is uniquely suited for
delivering special operations forces behind enemy
lines.
Ground-based assets bear primary responsibility for
homeland air defense. The North deploys roughly
11,000 antiaircraft artillery guns and has over 50
surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites to provide one of
the world's most dense air defense networks. Most of
these sites are equipped with SA-2/GUIDELINE
medium-range missile launchers, but North Korea
also has some SA-3/GOA short-range and
SA-5/GAMMON long-range SAMs.
In addition, North Korean ground force units are
equipped with over 15,000 SA-7/GRAIL and
SA-16/GIMLET man-portable air defense systems.
Deployed in massive numbers, these shoulder-fired
systems present a major threat to opposing tactical
aircraft.
North Korea has also recently emphasized selected
technological improvements in developing and testing
unmanned aerial vehicles and drones. These vehicles
may be equipped with cameras for surveillance or
target acquisition or launched as decoys to fool enemy
radars.
North Korea's Three Combat Air Commands. Each sector is responsible for the air defense in its area. About 50 airfields, in various stages of use, are scattered throughout the country. Most military aircraft can be placed in underground shelters.
North Korea has a brigade-sized SCUD B/C
surface-to-surface missile (SSM) unit about 50
kilometers north of the DMZ. Several SCUD B/C
facilities have also been noted in development near the
DMZ. These facilities would provide North Korea
with additional hardened sites that could double or
triple the numbers of SSM launchers and support
equipment in the forward area.
North Korea produces an indigenous variant of the
former Soviet Union's SCUD B, known as the SCUD
C. The C model has a 700-kg warhead with an
improved range of 500 kilometers over the B model's
300 kilometers. It also has an improved inertial
guidance system for better accuracy. The North
Koreans can produce four to eight SCUDs a month for
their own armed forces or for export. For nearly a
decade, North Korea has deployed SCUD-type,
mobile SSMs capable of reaching all of South Korea.
The country continues to emphasize its ballistic
missile development program, which eventually could
provide Pyongyang with a system capable of
threatening other countries in Northeast Asia.
The No Dong is a medium-range missile based on
SCUD technology. It has a range of about 1,000
kilometers with a 1,000-kg warhead. The No Dong
was originally designed for export, but it still has not
been produced in numbers suitable either for export or for operational deployment in North Korea.
SCUD Surface-to-Surface Missile. A significant threat to US resupply efforts for the peninsula.
North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat Ranges.
The North Korean Air Force supports special
operations missions with airborne infiltration and
resupply using its An-2/COLTs. Almost one-fifth of
the Navy's assets also support special operations with
hovercraft and minisubmarines.
SCUD Missile Attack on Airfield. Diagram depicts potential weapons effects of high explosive (TNT), cluster munitions and chemical warheads.
All Army reserve and Red Guard Militia personnel
receive annual training. North Koreans usually serve
in the Red Youth Guards (15 to 17) until their
conscription into the Army (18 to 25). Upon
discharge, a former soldier is employed at a North
Korean factory, enterprise, or collective farm. He will
also serve in the reserve unit headquartered at his job
location until the age of 40. At that time, most are
reassigned to the Red Guard Militia. The quality of
military training and the soldiers' endurance, military
discipline, and party dedication support the
government's conviction that the country is indeed a
military fortress.
At the onset of hostilities, ground artillery units would launch massive preparatory fire at defensive lines along major routes of advance in South Korea. North
Korean infantry and armored elements of the forward
divisions would attempt to penetrate allied forward
defenses to provide areas for the exploitation forces to maneuver through. The exploitation forces are
responsible for penetrating deep into South Korea,
bypassing and isolating allied units to maintain their
operational tempo.
The North Korean Navy's primary wartime roles
include inserting special operations forces, inhibiting
US reinforcement of the peninsula, and defending
North Korea's coasts from attacking amphibious
forces. The Navy would use its expanding inventory
of hovercraft and its fleet of minisubmarines to insert
special operations forces into South Korea prior to
hostilities.
The North Korean Air Force would launch
time-sequenced attacks against fixed or preplanned
targets in conjunction with artillery, SSMs, and special operations forces. Since North Korea recognizes that
South Korea and the United States will quickly gain air
superiority, it would concentrate much of its initial effort at degrading air force assets in the South.
Special operations forces perform at the strategic,
operational, and tactical levels to establish a second
front in the enemy's rear during wartime. Current
force structure and deployment of North Korean
special operations forces support an easy transition
to war; sniper, light infantry, and reconnaissance
units are fully integrated into all operational North
Korean Army corps. Consequently, a shift to
wartime operations would be difficult to detect
before hostilities began.
The North remains capable of producing some higher
quality weaponry and military equipment for use by
its own forces and for export to other countries.
Several hundred factories produce military materiel,
so North Korea can manufacture most of the basic
weapons and equipment it requires. A continuing
priority for Pyongyang in recent years has been
increased production of ammunition for the offensive
weapons it has produced.
The North has either hardened many of its production
facilities or put them underground, so significant
production output could continue during conflict.
Indigenous production of weapons and parts,
stemming from President Kim Il-song's chuche
doctrine, makes North Korea much less dependent on
foreign support in case of conflict.
North Korea indigenously produces a number of
weapon systems for each of the armed services. They
continue to produce a variety of artillery systems,
self-propelled guns ranging from 122-mm to 170-mm,
and multiple rocket launchers ranging from 107-mm
to 240-mm. The North has also indigenously
produced armored personnel carriers, antitank guns,
mortars, handheld rocket-propelled grenade launchers,
and AT-1/SNAPPER and AT-3/SAGGER wire-guided
antitank missiles.
The SANGO submarine and hovercraft continue to be
priority projects for the Navy.
The North possesses a small-scale aircraft production
and assembly capability limited to tactical transports
and helicopters.
A fiber-optic cable linking Pyongyang and Hamhung
was complete by early 1995, with construction from
Pyongyang to Kangwon, North Hamgyong, and South
Pyongan Provinces almost complete by midyear. In
1995, North Korea acquired digital Chinese switching
equipment for Chongjin, Najin, and Hamhung. Large
quantities of new and used telephones from a number
of countries increased the number of telephones to 3.7
per 100 persons by 1993.
The current emphasis in the modernization program is
on upgrading communications supporting the
Najin-Sonbong Free Trade Zone in northeast North
Korea. A large communications center at Najin will be
the focal point; it will be equipped with digital
switching and other modern equipment and will offer
modern communication services to businesses
operating in the zone. Vastly improved
communications between the Free Trade Zone and
other countries will include fiber-optic cable and a
digital microwave relay link between Pyongyang,
Najin, and Vladivostok, with a shorter link between
Najin and Hunchun, China. Additional plans for the
Free Trade Zone include construction of a satellite
earth station, as well as communication center
branches, in the zone.
North Korea's military command, control, and
communications system consists of extensive
hardened wartime command facilities, supported by
redundant communication systems, which are
believed to be largely separate from systems
supporting other sectors. A modernized
telecommunications infrastructure will greatly
increase the regime's ability to perform both
peacetime and wartime management tasks, and as in
any country, could provide critical backup for military
communication systems if necessary.
Rail and road networks continue to follow a general
north-south axis with limited east-west routes,
especially in northern areas. Rugged mountainous
terrain restricts or channels supply movement to a few
routes. Rails carry 90 percent of North Korea's freight
and also would be the principal means of moving
military equipment and supplies from northern sectors
to combat forces in the staging areas. The 5,000-km
network is mostly single track. As a part of a network
upgrade, North Korea is constructing several rail lines
and electrifying additional routes. The network is
70-percent electrified, which has resulted in increased
capacity and faster service. A major logistic goal is to
electrify all primary rail lines. However, equipment
shortages and reprioritization of assets create transport
inefficiencies. North Korea has tried to circumvent
this through tighter controls and improved
management of equipment.
Insufficient roads, poor surfaces, and inadequate
maintenance hinder the 30,000-km highway system.
Although only 15 percent of the highways are paved,
North Korea is reducing its dependency on rails.
Three major multilane expressways and other
highway construction are among the completed
projects. The expressways connect Pyongyang with
key military and industrial areas of the country and
include a 200-km highway between Pyongyang and
Wonsan, a 43-km highway between Pyongyang and
the port city of Nampo, and a 100-km highway
connecting Pyongyang with Panmunjom. A fourth
expressway between Pyongyang and Huichon is
nearly complete and will serve key military and POL
facilities in the central sectors of the country.
Highways are used primarily for short-haul
operations; however, during wartime, they would
become a strategic asset in the forward area and would
supplement rails in the rear areas. Fuel constraints and the lack of private automobiles limit civilian use of
highways.
North Korean economic plans include upgrading and
expanding several primary maritime ports and
opening some to noncommunist shipping. Development of the Najin-Sonbong free economic
and trade zone is another upgrade that will promote
international trade. The zone is in the northeast, on the borders with Russia and China. It includes the ice-free
ports of Sonbong, Najin, and Chongjin, which are
scheduled for modernization.
North Korea's 32 ports are not considered critical to short-term military operations. They are used
primarily to supplement the inland system and to
support domestic production and the fishing industry.
The major ports of Chongjin, Najin, Hamhung,
Wonsan, and Nampo serve large commercial areas and
are near military installations or militarily significant facilities. Should the lines of communication become
saturated in wartime, unimpaired ports would be viable for
resupply operations.
Rail Support for Most Long-Distance Traffic. Railroads provide strategic connections with China and Russia. North Korea has spent substantial effort upgrading the rail net, including electrifying 75 percent of the lines, building new lines, double tracking, and constructing additional yards and stations.
Road Network Limitations to East-West Movements. The North uses highways primarily for short hauls between rail nodes and villages or factories. The road network is concentrated in the forward area south of Pyongyang, and 15 percent is paved. Many roads are not trafficable during adverse weather.
North Korea has 24 permanent-surfaced, jet-capable
airfields; 27 transport/utility airfields; and at least
16 highway landing strips. The landing strips
generally are near military airbases. Improvements,
including completion of new forward dispersal
airfields and expansion of taxiways and parking
aprons, have increased the North's capacity to
sustain combat operations.
North Korea is expanding its ammunition, POL, and
equipment storage capacities by building additional
hardened and underground facilities and enlarging
existing facilities. Major national-level storage
installations have been built, and construction of
unit-level storage depots continues - especially near
the DMZ. Current ammunition stockpiles are
estimated at over 1 million tons. A million tons of
military POL exist, despite the severe shortage of fuel
supplies for the civil economy. This amount would be
sufficient to run Pyongyang's economy for a
substantial part of a year. Substantial food and combat
ration war reserves exist, despite major
malnourishment in the North.
North Korea has over 200,000 vehicles, 1,000
locomotives, and over 20,000 railcars that are mostly
nonmilitary but would be mobilized to support a
conflict. Much of this normally nonmilitary transport
is tied to reserve force units that would provide a
substantial part of the logistic support required by
military forces and would move personnel,
ammunition, and supplies into the Republic of Korea
during a conflict. Truck transportation units would
provide a full range of support. Rail assets would
provide heavy-lift capacity to move armor,
self-propelled artillery, and resupply from national
depots. Merchant and fishery vessels would support
naval forces and ground troops along the peninsula's
coastal waters, and the civil air transport fleet would
be mobilized to carry troops and high-value cargo and
possibly for aerial delivery of chemical and biological
warfare agents.Ground Forces
With roughly 923,000 active-duty troops, the ground
forces are by far the largest and most formidable of
North Korea's military forces. The size, organization,
and combat capabilities of the Army provide
Pyong-yang with both an offensive military option
and the ability to protect its homeland.Organization and Disposition
The ground forces have eight conventional infantry
corps, four mechanized corps, an armored corps, an
artillery corps, and the Pyongyang Defense
Command's Capital Defense Corps dedicated to
wartime operations. The geographic dispersal of
ground forces reflects the varied terrain of the nation
and the consideration given to both defensive and
offensive operations. The most capable ground
forces are near the DMZ, where they defend the
border or could be rapidly committed to a
cross-border assault. Behind this zone, a layered
disposition of mechanized exploitation forces
provides for a speedy offensive or active defense of
Pyongyang as needed. Korean reserve forces are
positioned to defend against a sea invasion along
either coast and can quickly assume territorial
defense roles to allow for forward commitment of
active-duty forces.
Graphics not available
North Korea's Heavy Artillery Is Capable of Targeting Areas as Far South as Seoul.
Weapons and Equipment
North Korea has some 4,000 medium and light tanks
and assault guns, including over 2,000 T-54/55 main battle tanks of Soviet 1950s-era design. In addition,
North Korea has indigenously produced about 700
T-62 tanks - a more capable version of the T-55
that was the Soviet Union's main battle tank in the
1960s. Light tanks are also fielded in large numbers
and include variants of the former Soviet PT-76 and
Chinese Type 62/63. An additional tank (T-34) and
assault guns (ASU-85/100) reside with the reserve
infantry divisions.
Graphics not available
Although most of the Army is light infantry, it
contains about 2,300 armored personnel carriers.
North Korea has made a dedicated effort to expand
motorized transportation available to its infantry
forces. This provides Pyongyang with a flexible,
mobile exploitation force that would be called on to
exploit breakthroughs in defensive lines during
wartime.
Graphics not available
Navy
The 46,000-member North Korean Navy is primarily
a coastal defense force. Most naval vessels are small,
patrol-sized craft unable to operate over 50 nautical
miles from the coast but capable of policing North
Korea's territorial waters. The Navy's numerous
amphibious craft and midget submarines also can
clandestinely insert special operations forces into
South Korea.
Graphics not available
Organization and Disposition
The Navy is organized into 13 naval commands under
separate East and West Coast Fleets directly
subordinate to the Supreme Navy Command. The two
fleets do not share vessels. The East Coast Fleet is
headquartered at Toejo Dong, with major bases at
Najin and Wonsan. The West Coast Fleet is
headquartered at Nampo, with major bases at Pipa Got
and Sagon Ni. Numerous smaller bases line both
coasts.Weapons and Equipment
Since 1980, North Korean naval expansion has largely
supported special operations and submarine missions.
North Korea's 26 diesel attack submarines include
WHISKEY and ROMEO Class vessels that can be
armed with mines or torpedoes. In addition, the Navy
also maintains over 48 North Korean-built YUGO
minisubmarines, 3 SANGO coastal submarines, and 3
missile frigates. The North continues to emphasize
production of the multirole SANGOs for minelaying
and inserting special operations forces.Air Force
The North Korean Air Force has four primary
missions: air defense, transport of special operations
forces, strategic bombing, and air support to ground
forces.Organization and Disposition
Approximately 840 jet aircraft, 300 transport aircraft,
300 helicopters, and 85,000 people form the Air
Force's fighter, bomber, helicopter, and transport
regiments. Most aircraft traditionally have been
deployed in the central and northern regions of the
country. The regiments are well organized for
command and control of forces in wartime.Weapons and Equipment
About two-thirds of the Air Force's 1,100 combat
aircraft are older generation Soviet- or Chinese-made
designs incorporating 1950s and 1960s technology.Air Defense
North Korea has historically put a high emphasis on
air defense, placing military industries, aircraft
hangars, repair facilities, ammunition, fuel, and even
air defense missiles underground or in hardened
shelters. Pyongyang's interpretation of the lessons of
DESERT STORM reinforces this strategy.
Graphics not available
Ballistic Missile Forces
Despite economic problems, since the early 1980s
North Korea has spent millions of dollars annually in
an aggressive ballistic missile development program.
Pyongyang has progressed from producing
short-range SCUD missiles to the developmental
testing of a medium-range missile, the No Dong, to
early-stage development of longer range two-stage
missiles, the Taepo Dong I (TD 1) and Taepo Dong II
(TD 2).
Graphics not available
North Korea's two long-range ballistic missile
systems under development are the Taepo Dong I and
Taepo Dong II. Both are two-stage systems. The
estimated range for the TD 1 is more than 1,500
kilometers, while that of the TD 2 is more than 4,000
kilometers. At present, both systems are in the design
stage. Before they reach flyable prototype form,
Pyongyang must surmount difficulties in developing
multistaging and engine clustering. North Korea has
no experience with these significant technologies.Special Operations Forces
North Korea maintains a large, highly trained special
operations force with 100,000 troops assigned to 24
brigades and 28 reconnaissance battalions. These
forces have four basic missions: establishing a second
front in the enemy's rear area, conducting
reconnaissance, performing combat operations in
concert with conventional operations, and countering
the South's special operations in North Korean rear
areas. Like all other North Korean troops, special operations forces can be tasked with maintaining internal security if the
need arises.
Graphics not available
North Korea classifies its special operations forces as
reconnaissance, light infantry, or sniper. Team-sized
elements conduct reconnaissance to collect
intelligence or targeting information. Light infantry
forces in company- or battalion-sized units attack
military, political, or economic targets. Sniper
operations are similar to those of the light infantry, but
on a smaller scale, employing team-sized units.
Graphics not available
Reserve Forces
Lessons of the Korean war shape the North's military
planning to a large degree, and Pyongyang determined
that an inadequate reserve force for homeland defense
was a critical deficiency during the Korean war.
Therefore, North Korea's current Army reserve force
totals nearly 700,000. In addition, the Red Guard
Militia, composed of mobilization units with the
primary mission of ensuring production at facilities
and defending them from attack, numbers over 3
million. This large manpower pool can mobilize in a
short time, and mobilization is exercised in all aspects - from resource callups to evacuations of key
industrial resources to alternate sites.
Security Forces
The security forces, including the Department of State Security and the Ministry of Public Security, are
responsible for protecting the country, its leaders,
important visitors, borders, facilities, and operations. The forces number about 200,000 people, of which a
fraction have a military mission.Wartime Employment
The wartime offensive strategy of North Korean
forces is to move southward as quickly as possible to
gain control of strategic areas and prevent
reinforcement of the peninsula by allied forces. The
significance of the allied logistic buildup during the
Gulf War was not lost on North Korean operational
planners. For this reason, North Korea continues to
concentrate troops, tanks, self-propelled artillery, and logistics near the DMZ.Weapon Production
President Kim Il-song left a legacy based on chuche
ideology, which promoted a self-sufficient, closed
society. Military forces that can operate for an
extended period without outside support reflect this
ideology. Increasingly, however, questions have been
raised about Pyongyang's ability to indefinitely make
military improvements. Similarly, its efforts to
stockpile sufficient ammunition, food, and oil in
hardened underground facilities to sustain combat for
several months without outside aid entail major costs
to an economy that is buffeted by growing pressures.Command, Control, and Communications
North Korea currently is modernizing its aged
telecommunications infrastructure to improve the
speed and quality and expand the capacity of both
domestic and international communications.Transportation
North Korea has taken major steps to upgrade its
transportation system in support of its industrial and
military needs. Infrastructure improvements are
ongoing, with rail and highway construction projects
progressing rapidly during the past few years. Despite
concentrated improvements throughout the
transportation network, it has not kept pace with the
growth of the industrial base; the network is barely
adequate to support increased demands for
transporting raw materials and finished products.
Conversely, the transportation system can support
initial combat operations during wartime. However,
the infrastructure would experience numerous
difficulties supporting sustained operations. Rugged
terrain, limited east-west routes; numerous bridges,
tunnels, and other chokepoints; and inferior road
surface types would be factors during sustained
operations.
Graphics not available
Graphics not available
Civil aviation in North Korea is limited. Regularly
scheduled international connections are restricted to
flights from Sunan International Airport, north of
Pyongyang, to Russia and China. An agreement to
begin service with Japan was signed in 1990,
establishing irregular flights between Sunan and
Tokyo. Domestic flights are limited to a few routes
from Sunan to Chongjin, Hamhung, and Wonsan.
Although personnel and equipment assigned to
civilian flights do not have a direct military function, they could offer limited support during wartime.Logistics
During the Korean war, lack of adequate logistics
hampered North Korea's military forces and kept them
from completely controlling the peninsula. After the
war, sustainability of its military forces became a
primary requirement of the North's military doctrine.
Pyongyang continues to implement military doctrine
that calls for maintaining war reserves for all classes
of supply for 6 months of sustainability for regular
forces and 3 months for reserve units and paramilitary
forces. A major increase in the number of active forces
and the deployment of many new types of weapons in
the past 15 years complicate this doctrine. However,
North Korea's massive war reserve stockpiles
continue to expand despite tremendous cost to its
economic structure and hardship to its people. The
overall military sustainability required to support its
extensive firepower continues to increase.