SPECIAL ISSUES

October 1991

Chapter 7

SPECIAL ISSUES

The Nuclear Question

Concern is growing because North Korea may be developing the capability to produce nuclear weapons. In the late 1960s, it received a small reactor from the Soviets and established a nuclear research center just north of Pyongyang, at Yongbyon. Recent evidence has indicated the facility is expanding to process materials for nuclear weapons; also, it could be testing high explosives, yet another indicator of an ongoing nuclear weapon program.

North Korea signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in late 1985, but it has not signed the safeguards and inspection agreement for the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Agency granted an 18-month extension to the normal 18 months necessary to administer and sign such agreements. Although the time limit has passed, after much discussion and many questions regarding the agreement's administration, North Korea has yet to sign.

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Figure 63. Artist's Concept of the Yongbyon Nuclear Facility, About 90 Kilometers North of Pyongyang.

The North Koreans contend the plant will generate electric power. Whether it will or can be used to develop nuclear weapons is uncertain.

The degree of Pyongyang's technical competence in nuclear weapon development cannot be determined. The North depends somewhat on outside sources for equipment and technology. If North Korea overcomes these difficulties, Pyongyang will have some dangerous options; it could employ nuclear weapons during war on the peninsula, or it could export nuclear weapons or technology to other unstable countries or regions.

Chemical Weapons

North Korea is capable of producing and employing chemical weapons that virtually all the fire support systems in its inventory could deliver, including most of its artillery pieces, multiple rocket launchers (including those mounted on CHAHO-type boats), and mortars. Some bombs the Air Force employs also could deliver chemical agents, as could the FROG or the SCUD missile.

North Korea has at least eight industrial facilities that can produce chemical agents; however, the production rate and types of munitions are uncertain. North Korea has the capability to produce nerve gas, blood agents, and the mustard-gas family of chemical weapons. Some estimates of chemical stockpiles run as high as 250 metric tons.

Chemicals could increase the impact of a surprise attack. If the North should use this option, it would have an advantage over forward-deployed South Korean and US forces. Nonpersistent chemical agents also could be used to break through defensive lines or hinder a South Korean counterattack's momentum. Persistent chemical agents could be used against fixed targets in the rear areas, such as command and control elements, major lines of communications, or logistic depots. Not only do these weapons enhance North Korea's offensive capabilities, but this chemical capability could deter South Korea or the United States from using chemicals during hostilities.

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Figure 64. Military Training Using Protective Clothing and Decontamination Procedures.

North Korea plans to be able to operate on a chemically contaminated battlefield. Whether it plans to use these weapons, if they have them is uncertain.

North Korea has chemical defense units organic to their combat units down to regiment level. For example, a forward Army Corps has its own dedicated chemical defense battalion, but a regimental unit has a chemical defense platoon. These units have decontamination equipment and detection systems. Their missions include training personnel to use chemical protective gear and detecting chemical agents. Army personnel are equipped with protective masks and suits.

Chemical training and exercises have increased consistently over the years --- even civilians receive training. North Korea is aware that chemical weapons could be used during a conflict.

Biological Weapons

Biological warfare has not received the same attention as chemical or nuclear warfare. This could be because North Korea lacks the technical expertise or because the difficulty in controlling biological warfare makes it a less desirable option. North Korea realizes that biological weapons are as dangerous to its own forces as they are to South Korean or US forces, and the North's limited medical services would make the agents more lethal. Therefore, using biological agents is not a likely option. However, if North Korea did choose to employ biological weapons, it probably could use agents like anthrax, plague, or yellow fever against water and food supplies in the South's rear area.

Indigenous Weapon Production

Since the mid-1980s, North Korea has produced, deployed, and exported a SCUD-type, mobile surface-to-surface missile. From deployment locations near the Demilitarized Zone, SCUD-type missiles can target over two-thirds of South Korea. North Korea probably deploys the missiles in brigade-sized units of 12 to 18 launchers.

The SCUD-type missile is not very accurate and would be used against large, soft, area targets. The Soviet SCUD can be armed with nuclear, chemical, or conventional high-explosive weapons.

North Korea's capability to produce a SCUD-type missile not only affects the power balance on the peninsula but also affects other regions. North Korea exports SCUDS for hard currency or oil. This old but reliable system is operational in the armed forces of the USSR, many East European and Middle Eastern countries.

Continued ballistic missile technology and production development could provide Pyongyang with a system capable of threatening other countries in Northeast Asia.

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Figure 65. SCUD Surface-to-Surface Missile.

North Korea manufactures its own SCUDs. This weapon significantly extends the range of targets Pyongyang can strike, regardless of weather conditions. Although rather inaccurate, the SCUD could cause panic in the cities and could be configured to deliver chemical warheads.

Succession

Kim Chong-il emerged as the successor to his father, Kim Il-song, at the 6th Party Congress of the Korean Workers' Party in October 1980. Currently, he ranks second in the three-man Standing Committee of the Politburo and second in the party Secretariat and the Military Affairs Committee. He is the only individual, other than his father, to hold a position in the three pivotal power organs of the party. In May 1990, the Supreme People's Assembly appointed Kim Chong-il the first vice chairman of the National Defense Commission.

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Figure 66. Succession to Power.

For the last 10 years, Kim Il-song has prepared for Kim Chong-il's succession to power. If successful, the passage of power from father to son will be unique within the communist world. Most observers believe that Kim Chong-il has a large degree of power and do not foresee immediate changes when Kim Il-song dies.
Kim Chong-il, President Kim Il-song's oldest son, was born on 16 February 1942. Most sources place his birth in Khabarovsk, USSR. However, North Korean officials claim that he was born in Korea near the Manchurian border. In 1945, he returned to Korea with his family from the Soviet Union. He reportedly studied at an East European school but, for unknown reasons, did not graduate. He completed his schooling in the Political Economy Department of Kim Il-song University in 1963 and subsequently joined the Korean Workers' Party Organization Department, where he produced several movies --- a medium that is of continuing interest to him.
Kim's political role in the 1970s was largely that of chief interpreter, protector, and propagator of his father's beliefs. In 1980, North Korean officials publicly acknowledged Kim's status as heir apparent, and no evidence is present of any major internal opposition to his succession. Although the Chinese and the Soviets have accepted succession to power, neither has been enthusiastic about the arrangement. The senior Kim continues to be active in party affairs, greeting foreign visitors and probably managing international policy. The younger Kim has begun to speak out about the economy, has been noted giving "on-the-spot" guidance on various internal matters, and has been credited with directing terrorist acts against South Korea.
For the past decade, Kim Chong-il's father has gradually given him more power and responsibility to ensure that the elder Kim's name, reputation, and policies continue after his death.

The younger Kim has been in charge of day-to-day domestic affairs for several years. There is speculation that the succession may take place in 1992 when the senior Kim is 80 years old. However, if this succession takes place, it is not known how long he might maintain power or how it will impact on the North's political, economic, and military situation.

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