|
(Click on Map to see image.)
Iraqi Disposition of Forces as of
23 October 1990. |
|
30 September |
DoDJIC I&W Cell, established in early September, operates around
the clock with five analysts.
CENTCOM J2 (CENTCOM Chief of Intelligence) agrees with a DIA recommendation
to reduce coverage of Scud sites. |
September |
DX begins work on three dimensional models and a Hostage Intelligence
Support Package (HISP) covering some thirty locations in Iraq.
DX-5 begins providing daily imagery derived reports on targets identified
as possible American citizen detention areas.
DX begins to develop a BDA concept of operations, having been charged with
the responsibility for all phases of imagery exploitation in support of
BDA.
DX develops a BDA workbook containing gridded target graphics, maps,
and reporting EEI's on some 309 primary and secondary targets.
DX establishes Central Tasking Cell (CTC) in the Pentagon to facilitate
tasking coordination with the ITF and DoDJIC.
|
September -
January 1991
|
DIA BDA elements and CENTCOM/CENTAF conduct 18 BDA exercises in an effort
to ensure the efficiency and accuracy of BDA reporting and dissemination. |
2 October |
DAT-6 levies further taskings to acquire specific details, as a result
of earlier reporting, describing the Iraqi rigging of the Kuwaiti oil fields
for demolition.
DC begins acquiring baseline imagery coverage for BDA targets.
DIA sets into motion an imagery "blitz" to determine ground
order of battle. |
3 October |
DAT-6 tasks assets worldwide to provide comprehensive Iraqi
OB information for the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO -- See maps on
pages 41 and 42). |
5 October |
DIA implements crisis local area network (LAN), providing
connectivity between all VP Task Force cells. |
10 October |
DSD-3 prepares an IDB-II crisis data base (Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia, and Yemen) for the OICC to support ad hoc queries and printing reports.
IDB-II replaces older IDB-I data base. |
13 October |
CCF IMINT desk conducts BDA exercise. |
18 October |
DS ATF chairs meeting with CENTCOM representatives to discuss
BDA support, DODIIS (DoD Intelligence Information System), IDB-II support,
and CENTCOM requirements.
DAT-6 sends tasking to regional assets requesting information
on the type of warheads for the CCS-2 missile. |
20 October |
OICC begins to transfer priority intelligence information
electronically (via e-mail) to CENTCOM.
CENTCOM puts imagery blitz on hold until further evaluation
by CENTCOM J2. |
21 October |
CENTCOM approves and begins imagery blitz. |
22 October |
DIA Director begins to host Military Intelligence Board (MIB)
weekly meetings. |
24 October |
JS informs CCF that the SECDEF wants coverage of the 28 Scud
short range ballistic missile (SRBM) launchers at least every other day. |
29 October |
DSO-1 installs AIRES TELNET (Telecommunications Network) throughout
DX offices in Bldg 213, Washington Navy Yard. |
30 October |
DS ATF demonstrates to ITF the procedures to pass daily/weekly
OB messages directly to CENTCOM using e-mail and DSNET3
(Defense Integrated Secure Network 3 -- TS/SCI level). |
October |
DIA sends the former DATT Baghdad to CENTCOM to be Chief of
the Combat Analysis Cell after the CENTCOM J2 requests him by name.
DoDJIC, DX-5, and DX-6 establish imagery analytical expertise
focused to monitor and report on all SRBM equipment and activity in Iraq.
DX-6 initiates daily reporting on Iraqi merchant ship, SRBM,
CW and air activities in support of DoDJIC, CENTCOM and JS.
DX, DB, and JSJ begin meeting with USAF (CHECKMATE) personnel
in the Pentagon to facilitate OSP target development and to broaden its
insight on BDA.
DIA sends its Chief of All-Source Collection Requirements
Division (DC-4), a Navy captain, to be the CENTCOM JIC collection manager
in Riyadh.
DM-1 formulates plan for Joint Imagery Processing Center (JIPC)
concept of photo-processing in Saudi Arabia. |
1 November |
DAT-6 tasks assets worldwide for information on Iraqi forces
in the KTO with emphasis on the RGFC, special forces, Navy, logistics, and
equipment. |
6 November |
ITF sends first of daily and weekly OB update messages via
e-mail/DSNET3 to CENTCOM. |
7 November |
DAT-6 tasks assets to confirm or deny the presence of SS-12/21
missiles in Iraq. Subsequent collection determines they are not present. |
|
12 November |
DIA sponsored MIB team conducts assessment visit to CENTCOM.
|
15 November |
DIA develops draft concept of operations to integrate the entire Intelligence
Community in support of DESERT SHIELD BDA.
DI-6 requests release authority for five more Coalition allies (granted
10 Dec).
|
22 November |
CENTCOM establishes JIC Forward.
|
25 November |
DIA sponsored MIB team releases report on CENTCOM visit.
|
30 November |
DIA establishes DODIIS e-mail link between DIA and CENTCOM.
DC-1 prepares a point paper for the Director, DIA on the diversion of reconnaissance
assets from counternarcotics to DESERT SHIELD.
|
November |
DX joins the ad hoc Command, Control, and Communications (C3) Fusion
Cell in an effort to assist the DoDJIC in identifying the Iraqi C3 network
in the KTO.
JS sends his deputy (an Army colonel) to be the CENTCOM JIC Commander,
after the CENTCOM J2 requests him by name.
|
6 December |
NMIST deploys to US Special Operations Central Command (SOCCENT).
|
7 December |
Special DIA ad hoc group meets to determine Iraqi BW threat and intelligence
gaps.
|
9-12 December |
DM-1 team travels to Beale AFB, CA to review progress of deployable
photo processing/data base preparations.
|
10 December |
DIA establishes BDA Cell to provide third-phase BDA assessment.
DIA and CIA establish Iraqi Interagency Biological Warfare Working Group
(IIBWWG).
DC-1 passes tasking to CENTCOM asking them to look for SA-2s in southern
Kuwait.
Defense Intelligence College (DIC) hosts a "Conference on the
Gulf Crisis" at the request of VP and the JCS. Analysts working in
support of DESERT SHIELD attend the in-depth discussions by experts and
academicians.
|
12 December |
OSC-CI (Directorate for Counterintelligence) hosts a conference
at Clarendon for counterintelligence experts supporting Operation DESERT
SHIELD. Twenty-six specialists attend from DIA, CENTCOM, and the Services. |
13 December |
DAT-6 publishes message guidance to collectors on IIR releasability
to the Coalition members. |
17 December |
NMIST deploys to US Army Central Command (ARCENT).
IIBWWG submits interim report to Deputy Director, DIA. |
18 December |
DM-1 briefs MIB on imagery capabilities. |
21 December |
DAT-6 sends out a worldwide tasking message that provides
detailed EEIs and solicits operational information in the event of a terrorist
attack.
DX and DB complete AIF scrub after completing the update of
approximately 142,000 order of battle and facility transactions. |
26 December |
DIA deploys personnel to CENTCOM JIC in Riyadh. DIA eventually
deploys a total of 100 personnel to the JIC Forward.
USDAOs in Yemen and Jordan reduce the size of their staffs
because of increased regional tensions. For the same reason, USDAO Khartoum,
Sudan later temporarily closes. |
28 December |
OB Scrub Cell from DB and DX completes input of new records,
updates
AIF, and stands down. |
29 December |
DIA establishes Joint Intelligence Production Center, or "Desert
JIPC" in Riyadh. DIA sends an Army colonel from DX to set up and run
this organization. |
1991 |
|
2-5 January |
DIA prepares scenario for Exercise DESERT LIGHTNING. |
3 January |
Military Intelligence Detachments (MIDs) arrive at DIA for
DESERT SHIELD duty. One hundred thirtyseven reservists are incorporated
into the Task Force. |
5 January |
DM-1 begins coordination of imagery movement from Riyadh to
Washington via DCS, reproduction at DIA, and dissemination to non-theater
commands. |
8 January |
USDAOs in Bangladesh and Pakistan reduce the size of their
staffs at each embassy because of an increase in regional tensions. |
9 January |
JIPC integrates UK/CA/AS analysts. |
10 January |
NMIST deploys to VII Corps. |
11 January |
OICC ships last of 14 Operational Support Packages to CENTCOM.
DSD-3 prepares IDB-II software and data base for CENTCOM.
Daily updates provided via e-mail/DSNET3. |
12 January |
American Embassy Baghdad closes as the last six US officials,
other Western diplomats, and private citizens depart Iraq for Frankfurt
aboard a chartered Iraqi Airlines Boeing 727.
ITF modifies rotation back to three teams, six days on, three
days off, 12-hour shifts. |
15 January |
UN deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait passes.
DIA augments J2 BDA briefing team with analysts and intelligence
technicians.
DAT-6 tasks assets worldwide to seek host nation reaction
to the possible initiation of hostilities by the Coalition forces. |
16 January |
DIA establishes a Scud Cell at the DoDJIC in the Pentagon.
DESERT STORM |
17 January |
Operation DESERT STORM begins (D-Day). Coalition air campaign
commences.
DIA sends out the first of over 3,200 verbal BDA/I&W reports
via the DoDJIC "hot ring" to CENTCOM/CENTAF.
Backing up verbal BDA reports, DX inputs first of over 2,000
AIRES imagery analysis reports and over 222 first and second phase BDA summaries
during the course of the war.
DI-6 approves BDA release to UK/CA/AS.
OSC-2 counterintelligence analysts begin I&W watch for
terrorist threats to US Forces. |
18 January |
Iraq fires first Scud missiles at Israel and Saudi Arabia.
DI-3 coordinates DESERT STORM briefings to the full House
and Senate. |
|
|
BDA 24-hour and 12-hour message initiated.
VP establishes net assessment and BDA teams.
DAT-6 tasks assets for information on Scud strikes against Israel.
DC-1 receives report from CENTCOM JRC that reconnaissance over Western
Iraq located 10 Scud launchers. All 10 launchers are reported destroyed.
|
20 January |
CENTCOM JIC begins daily production of first-phase BDA reporting via
e-mail. OICC downloads reporting and passes to various cells for analysis/comparison.
DAT-6 tasks assets to acquire BDA data on targets in Kuwait through
the use of sources in the Kuwaiti resistance.
|
21 January |
DIA establishes a POW/MIA Operations Center to track Coalition POW/MIAs
and captured journalists, and to provide information to US rescue forces.
DIA publishes first glossy BDA daily publication.
DC-1 receives request from JRC Forward to clarify the architecture
and connectivity between theater surveillance systems.
|
22 January |
DIA expands BDA Cell. ITF I&W Cell displaces Counternarcotics
Facility.
DIA dedicates additional assets to the Scud problem as Iraqi Scud
attacks on Israel continue.
|
23 January |
DSD produces IDB II five-country data base for CENTCOM.
DC-1 reports that the President and CJCS have ordered airborne reconnaissance
platform JSTARS to perform dedicated reconnaissance on Scud launch areas
in western Iraq.
|
24 January |
DI-4 arranges weekly briefing for attaches in Washington, DC.
DAT disseminates guidelines to worldwide collectors on forwarding IIRs and
HUMINT operational traffic as a result of JCS-imposed restrictions on routine
messages.
|
25 January |
DIA sends requirement through DC-1 to CENTCOM for coverage over western
Iraq.
|
26 January |
DIA receives details from the Kuwaiti military resistance on the facilities
that control the oil flow to the sea terminals (after Iraq released millions
of barrels of oil into the Gulf). Using this information, two F-111 aircraft
attack the Al Ahmadi oil manifolds the next day and stop the flow of oil
into the Gulf.
|
27 January |
DAT-6 tasks collectors to acquire information on all underground facilities
in Iraq, plus information on Iran's role in the conflict given the
Iraqi air force flights to Iran.
|
28 January |
CENTCOM requests an SA-2 OB from DC-1.
|
29 January |
DIA begins baseline MSS production every night.
|
31 January |
DAT-6 tasks regional assets to report on the extent of the Persian
Gulf oil spill.
|
1-28 February |
DIA elements visit Turkey.
|
5 February |
DC-1 replies to CENTCOM request for information about MTI (moving
target indicator) and JSTARS.
|
5-12 February |
DSD-3 prepares IDB-II software and data base for CENTCOM (replaced
11 January copy due to problems with updates.
|
6 February |
DI-1 establishes Monday and Friday J2 briefs for senior OSD principals.
|
7 February |
DC-1 keeps JCS/JRC informed of SNAPSHOT platform via verbal mission
assessment briefing.
|
10 February |
BDA footage begins to arrive daily from the Joint Camera Shop at the
Pentagon. In-house distribution made for DB-6 and BDA Cells.
|
12 February |
DIA forwards studies on breaching the Iraqi defensive barriers in
southern Kuwait to CENTCOM.
DIA establishes a formal C3 Cell in the DoDJIC with CIA participation
in an effort to improve targeting of Iraqi C3.
DAT-6 tasks regional assets to report the attitudes of their host
countries concerning the US bombing of Iraq.
|
13 February |
DIA BDA analysts determine that Iraq is dispersing aircraft to historical
sites to reduce likelihood of destruction by air attacks.
|
14 February |
DIA establishes Multispectral Imagery Fusion Cell to support the Scud
Cell in the DoDJIC.
|
15 February |
DC-1 responds to JS tasker with information brief on various imagery
platforms.
|
19 February |
DAT-6 tasks worldwide collectors to provide information on any Iraqi
terrorist action against the Coalition forces.
DS produces IDB II data base for CENTCOM to replace corrupted 23 January
version.
|
|
|
Historical monuments, like the ancient temple depicted
in this DIA Public
Affairs drawing, were not targeted despite the placement of military
equipment nearby. |
|
20 February |
DC-1 reports on airborne reconnaissance surge capability for the ground
war.
|
21 February |
DIA ground forces assessment production begins.
DIA moves MSS production to NMIC.
DIA Document Exploitation (DOCEX) personnel depart for Saudi Arabia. |
22 February |
DAT-6 tasks assets in Western Europe, Middle East, Far East, and the
Soviet Union, requesting their views and national interests in the Iraqi
post-war period.
|
24 February |
Operation DESERT SABRE (G-Day), the Coalition ground campaign begins.
DIA begins production of two MSSs per day.
|
26 February |
DIA Director curtails MIB meetings to biweekly.
DIA sends a reserve augmentee who is a trained interrogator and Arab
linguist to Turkey to assist the Turkish Government in debriefing Iraqi
military defectors.
|
|
|