(Click on Map to see image.)

Iraqi Disposition of Forces as of
23 October 1990.

 

30 September DoDJIC I&W Cell, established in early September, operates around the clock with five analysts.

CENTCOM J2 (CENTCOM Chief of Intelligence) agrees with a DIA recommendation to reduce coverage of Scud sites.
September

DX begins work on three dimensional models and a Hostage Intelligence Support Package (HISP) covering some thirty locations in Iraq.

DX-5 begins providing daily imagery derived reports on targets identified as possible American citizen detention areas.

DX begins to develop a BDA concept of operations, having been charged with the responsibility for all phases of imagery exploitation in support of BDA.

DX develops a BDA workbook containing gridded target graphics, maps, and reporting EEI's on some 309 primary and secondary targets.

DX establishes Central Tasking Cell (CTC) in the Pentagon to facilitate tasking coordination with the ITF and DoDJIC.

 

September -
January 1991

 

DIA BDA elements and CENTCOM/CENTAF conduct 18 BDA exercises in an effort to ensure the efficiency and accuracy of BDA reporting and dissemination.
2 October

DAT-6 levies further taskings to acquire specific details, as a result of earlier reporting, describing the Iraqi rigging of the Kuwaiti oil fields for demolition.

DC begins acquiring baseline imagery coverage for BDA targets.

DIA sets into motion an imagery "blitz" to determine ground order of battle.

3 October

DAT-6 tasks assets worldwide to provide comprehensive Iraqi OB information for the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO -- See maps on pages 41 and 42).

5 October

DIA implements crisis local area network (LAN), providing connectivity between all VP Task Force cells.

10 October

DSD-3 prepares an IDB-II crisis data base (Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen) for the OICC to support ad hoc queries and printing reports. IDB-II replaces older IDB-I data base.

13 October

CCF IMINT desk conducts BDA exercise.

18 October

DS ATF chairs meeting with CENTCOM representatives to discuss BDA support, DODIIS (DoD Intelligence Information System), IDB-II support, and CENTCOM requirements.

DAT-6 sends tasking to regional assets requesting information on the type of warheads for the CCS-2 missile.

20 October

OICC begins to transfer priority intelligence information electronically (via e-mail) to CENTCOM.

CENTCOM puts imagery blitz on hold until further evaluation by CENTCOM J2.

21 October

CENTCOM approves and begins imagery blitz.

22 October

DIA Director begins to host Military Intelligence Board (MIB) weekly meetings.

24 October

JS informs CCF that the SECDEF wants coverage of the 28 Scud short range ballistic missile (SRBM) launchers at least every other day.

29 October

DSO-1 installs AIRES TELNET (Telecommunications Network) throughout DX offices in Bldg 213, Washington Navy Yard.

30 October

DS ATF demonstrates to ITF the procedures to pass daily/weekly OB messages directly to CENTCOM using e-mail and DSNET3
(Defense Integrated Secure Network 3 -- TS/SCI level).

October

DIA sends the former DATT Baghdad to CENTCOM to be Chief of the Combat Analysis Cell after the CENTCOM J2 requests him by name.

DoDJIC, DX-5, and DX-6 establish imagery analytical expertise focused to monitor and report on all SRBM equipment and activity in Iraq.

DX-6 initiates daily reporting on Iraqi merchant ship, SRBM, CW and air activities in support of DoDJIC, CENTCOM and JS.

DX, DB, and JSJ begin meeting with USAF (CHECKMATE) personnel in the Pentagon to facilitate OSP target development and to broaden its insight on BDA.

DIA sends its Chief of All-Source Collection Requirements Division (DC-4), a Navy captain, to be the CENTCOM JIC collection manager in Riyadh.

DM-1 formulates plan for Joint Imagery Processing Center (JIPC) concept of photo-processing in Saudi Arabia.

1 November

DAT-6 tasks assets worldwide for information on Iraqi forces in the KTO with emphasis on the RGFC, special forces, Navy, logistics, and equipment.

6 November

ITF sends first of daily and weekly OB update messages via e-mail/DSNET3 to CENTCOM.

7 November

DAT-6 tasks assets to confirm or deny the presence of SS-12/21 missiles in Iraq. Subsequent collection determines they are not present.


 

12 November

DIA sponsored MIB team conducts assessment visit to CENTCOM.

 

15 November

DIA develops draft concept of operations to integrate the entire Intelligence Community in support of DESERT SHIELD BDA.

DI-6 requests release authority for five more Coalition allies (granted 10 Dec).

 

22 November

CENTCOM establishes JIC Forward.

 

25 November

DIA sponsored MIB team releases report on CENTCOM visit.

 

30 November

DIA establishes DODIIS e-mail link between DIA and CENTCOM.

DC-1 prepares a point paper for the Director, DIA on the diversion of reconnaissance assets from counternarcotics to DESERT SHIELD.

 

November

DX joins the ad hoc Command, Control, and Communications (C3) Fusion Cell in an effort to assist the DoDJIC in identifying the Iraqi C3 network in the KTO.

JS sends his deputy (an Army colonel) to be the CENTCOM JIC Commander, after the CENTCOM J2 requests him by name.

 

6 December

NMIST deploys to US Special Operations Central Command (SOCCENT).

 

7 December

Special DIA ad hoc group meets to determine Iraqi BW threat and intelligence gaps.

 

9-12 December

DM-1 team travels to Beale AFB, CA to review progress of deployable photo processing/data base preparations.

 

10 December

DIA establishes BDA Cell to provide third-phase BDA assessment.
DIA and CIA establish Iraqi Interagency Biological Warfare Working Group (IIBWWG).

DC-1 passes tasking to CENTCOM asking them to look for SA-2s in southern Kuwait.

Defense Intelligence College (DIC) hosts a "Conference on the Gulf Crisis" at the request of VP and the JCS. Analysts working in support of DESERT SHIELD attend the in-depth discussions by experts and academicians.

 

12 December

OSC-CI (Directorate for Counterintelligence) hosts a conference at Clarendon for counterintelligence experts supporting Operation DESERT SHIELD. Twenty-six specialists attend from DIA, CENTCOM, and the Services.

13 December

DAT-6 publishes message guidance to collectors on IIR releasability to the Coalition members.

17 December

NMIST deploys to US Army Central Command (ARCENT).

IIBWWG submits interim report to Deputy Director, DIA.

18 December

DM-1 briefs MIB on imagery capabilities.

21 December

DAT-6 sends out a worldwide tasking message that provides detailed EEIs and solicits operational information in the event of a terrorist attack.

DX and DB complete AIF scrub after completing the update of approximately 142,000 order of battle and facility transactions.

26 December

DIA deploys personnel to CENTCOM JIC in Riyadh. DIA eventually deploys a total of 100 personnel to the JIC Forward.

USDAOs in Yemen and Jordan reduce the size of their staffs because of increased regional tensions. For the same reason, USDAO Khartoum, Sudan later temporarily closes.

28 December

OB Scrub Cell from DB and DX completes input of new records, updates
AIF, and stands down.

29 December

DIA establishes Joint Intelligence Production Center, or "Desert JIPC" in Riyadh. DIA sends an Army colonel from DX to set up and run this organization.

1991

2-5 January

DIA prepares scenario for Exercise DESERT LIGHTNING.

3 January

Military Intelligence Detachments (MIDs) arrive at DIA for DESERT SHIELD duty. One hundred thirtyseven reservists are incorporated into the Task Force.

5 January

DM-1 begins coordination of imagery movement from Riyadh to Washington via DCS, reproduction at DIA, and dissemination to non-theater commands.

8 January

USDAOs in Bangladesh and Pakistan reduce the size of their staffs at each embassy because of an increase in regional tensions.

9 January

JIPC integrates UK/CA/AS analysts.

10 January

NMIST deploys to VII Corps.

11 January

OICC ships last of 14 Operational Support Packages to CENTCOM.

DSD-3 prepares IDB-II software and data base for CENTCOM. Daily updates provided via e-mail/DSNET3.

12 January

American Embassy Baghdad closes as the last six US officials, other Western diplomats, and private citizens depart Iraq for Frankfurt aboard a chartered Iraqi Airlines Boeing 727.

ITF modifies rotation back to three teams, six days on, three days off, 12-hour shifts.

15 January

UN deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait passes.

DIA augments J2 BDA briefing team with analysts and intelligence technicians.

DAT-6 tasks assets worldwide to seek host nation reaction to the possible initiation of hostilities by the Coalition forces.

16 January

DIA establishes a Scud Cell at the DoDJIC in the Pentagon.

 

DESERT STORM

17 January

Operation DESERT STORM begins (D-Day). Coalition air campaign commences.

DIA sends out the first of over 3,200 verbal BDA/I&W reports via the DoDJIC "hot ring" to CENTCOM/CENTAF.

Backing up verbal BDA reports, DX inputs first of over 2,000 AIRES imagery analysis reports and over 222 first and second phase BDA summaries during the course of the war.

DI-6 approves BDA release to UK/CA/AS.

OSC-2 counterintelligence analysts begin I&W watch for terrorist threats to US Forces.

18 January

Iraq fires first Scud missiles at Israel and Saudi Arabia.

DI-3 coordinates DESERT STORM briefings to the full House and Senate.

 

BDA 24-hour and 12-hour message initiated.

VP establishes net assessment and BDA teams.

DAT-6 tasks assets for information on Scud strikes against Israel.

DC-1 receives report from CENTCOM JRC that reconnaissance over Western Iraq located 10 Scud launchers. All 10 launchers are reported destroyed.
 

20 January

CENTCOM JIC begins daily production of first-phase BDA reporting via e-mail. OICC downloads reporting and passes to various cells for analysis/comparison.

DAT-6 tasks assets to acquire BDA data on targets in Kuwait through the use of sources in the Kuwaiti resistance.

 

21 January

DIA establishes a POW/MIA Operations Center to track Coalition POW/MIAs and captured journalists, and to provide information to US rescue forces.

DIA publishes first glossy BDA daily publication.

DC-1 receives request from JRC Forward to clarify the architecture and connectivity between theater surveillance systems.

 

22 January

DIA expands BDA Cell. ITF I&W Cell displaces Counternarcotics Facility.

DIA dedicates additional assets to the Scud problem as Iraqi Scud attacks on Israel continue.

 

23 January

DSD produces IDB II five-country data base for CENTCOM.

DC-1 reports that the President and CJCS have ordered airborne reconnaissance platform JSTARS to perform dedicated reconnaissance on Scud launch areas in western Iraq.

 

24 January

DI-4 arranges weekly briefing for attaches in Washington, DC.

DAT disseminates guidelines to worldwide collectors on forwarding IIRs and HUMINT operational traffic as a result of JCS-imposed restrictions on routine messages.

 

25 January

DIA sends requirement through DC-1 to CENTCOM for coverage over western Iraq.

 

26 January

DIA receives details from the Kuwaiti military resistance on the facilities that control the oil flow to the sea terminals (after Iraq released millions of barrels of oil into the Gulf). Using this information, two F-111 aircraft attack the Al Ahmadi oil manifolds the next day and stop the flow of oil into the Gulf.

 

27 January

DAT-6 tasks collectors to acquire information on all underground facilities in Iraq, plus information on Iran's role in the conflict given the Iraqi air force flights to Iran.

 

28 January

CENTCOM requests an SA-2 OB from DC-1.

 

29 January

DIA begins baseline MSS production every night.

 

31 January

DAT-6 tasks regional assets to report on the extent of the Persian Gulf oil spill.

 

1-28 February

DIA elements visit Turkey.

 

5 February

DC-1 replies to CENTCOM request for information about MTI (moving target indicator) and JSTARS.

 

5-12 February

DSD-3 prepares IDB-II software and data base for CENTCOM (replaced 11 January copy due to problems with updates.

 

6 February

DI-1 establishes Monday and Friday J2 briefs for senior OSD principals.

 

7 February

DC-1 keeps JCS/JRC informed of SNAPSHOT platform via verbal mission assessment briefing.

 

10 February

BDA footage begins to arrive daily from the Joint Camera Shop at the Pentagon. In-house distribution made for DB-6 and BDA Cells.

 

12 February

DIA forwards studies on breaching the Iraqi defensive barriers in southern Kuwait to CENTCOM.

DIA establishes a formal C3 Cell in the DoDJIC with CIA participation in an effort to improve targeting of Iraqi C3.

DAT-6 tasks regional assets to report the attitudes of their host countries concerning the US bombing of Iraq.

 

13 February

DIA BDA analysts determine that Iraq is dispersing aircraft to historical sites to reduce likelihood of destruction by air attacks.

 

14 February

DIA establishes Multispectral Imagery Fusion Cell to support the Scud Cell in the DoDJIC.

 

15 February

DC-1 responds to JS tasker with information brief on various imagery platforms.

 

19 February

DAT-6 tasks worldwide collectors to provide information on any Iraqi terrorist action against the Coalition forces.

DS produces IDB II data base for CENTCOM to replace corrupted 23 January version.

 

 

Historical monuments, like the ancient temple depicted in this DIA Public Affairs drawing, were not targeted despite the placement of military equipment nearby.

20 February

DC-1 reports on airborne reconnaissance surge capability for the ground war.

 

21 February

DIA ground forces assessment production begins.

DIA moves MSS production to NMIC.

DIA Document Exploitation (DOCEX) personnel depart for Saudi Arabia.

22 February

DAT-6 tasks assets in Western Europe, Middle East, Far East, and the Soviet Union, requesting their views and national interests in the Iraqi post-war period.

 

24 February

Operation DESERT SABRE (G-Day), the Coalition ground campaign begins.

DIA begins production of two MSSs per day.

 

26 February

DIA Director curtails MIB meetings to biweekly.

DIA sends a reserve augmentee who is a trained interrogator and Arab linguist to Turkey to assist the Turkish Government in debriefing Iraqi military defectors.

 

 

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