Chronology of Events

   PREWAR

1984

 

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) sends a team to United States Central Command (CENTCOM) to study its intelligence support requirements and the feasibility of attaching a DIA intelligence production element to CENTCOM headquarters.

 

1985

DIA becomes one of the first national agencies to assign a permanent representative at CENTCOM. Also, an eleven-man DIA intelligence production element is attached to CENTCOM headquarters.


DIA opens a US Defense Attache Office (USDAO) in Baghdad to expand access to developments in Iraq and obtain information on the Iran-Iraq War.

1987

The Defense Attache (DATT) in Baghdad gains unprecedented access to senior Iraqi military leaders in the wake of the attack on the USS STARK and sets up procedures to deconflict Iraqi and US operations in the Gulf.


DIA establishes the Operational Intelligence Crisis Center (OICC) to enhance its capability to respond to crisis situations. DIA designed the OICC to muster resources quickly to surge on a problem and then convert analysis to operationally relevant products and support.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1988

 

 

DIA augments the Persian Gulf Working Group (PGWG) in the National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC) at the Pentagon with additional personnel to track on a 24-hour basis the tanker war, the Iran-Iraq ground war, the air threat, the SILKWORM threat, and other developments.

DIA initiates the National Military Intelligence support Team (NMIST) concept to augment intelligence support to commands during crisis operations. NMISTs are mobile support teams deployed to commands to provide analytical support and rapid dissemination of time-sensitive intelligence information and products.

DIA's all-source threat assessments provide critical intelligence for the US retaliatory strikes against the Iranian owned and occupied Rashadat oil platform.

DIA intelligence support to US forces and allies in the Persian Gulf intensifies as the Iran-Iraq War expands in a renewed "War of the Cities" and spills into the Gulf. DIA provides operational elements predeployment briefings and support for retaliatory strikes against Iran.

Iraqi ground forces launch a series of five crushing offensive operations catching the Iranians ill-prepared and destroying their will to fight.

 

Iran accepts United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 598, leading to the 20 August cease-fire that ends the bloody eight-year war with Iraq.

DIA upgrades and renovates the NMIC as an integrated, state-of-the-art intelligence facility. NMIC components include the Alert Center, Collection Coordination Facility, and intelligence tasks forces area.

1989  
April CENTCOM assesses that Iraq will be the next likely regional threat in the wake of the Iran-Iraq War and the decline of the Soviet threat.
August

DIA military capability analysts disseminate Iraqi invasion of Kuwait scenario to CENTCOM and other commands. CENTCOM concurs with analysis by late 1989. It becomes the scenario for CENTCOM¹s Command Post Exercise (CPX) INTERNAL LOOK, in July 1990.

 

November

A Defense Intelligence Brief (DIB), The Iraqi Threat to the GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] States, presents an assessment of Iraqi military capabilities and options to take military action against Kuwait, without dealing with the likelihood of such actions.

A Defense Intelligence Assessment, Iraqi Military Developments Through 1992, asserts: "Iraq is unlikely to launch military operations against any of its Arab neighbors over the next three years with the possible exception of Syria....To protect its image of moderation, Iraq is unlikely to take military action against Kuwait."

 1990  

February

DIA publishes an Intelligence Study,Iraqi Ground and Air Forces Doctrine, Tactics, and Operations, based on Iraqi Army and Air Force performance during the Iran-Iraq War.

DIA analysts participate in a war game of Iraqi invasion of the Arabian Peninsula organized by the Naval War College (NWC) Strategic Studies Group.

24 April

CENTCOM establishes Iraq Regional Warning Problem and assumes Watch Condition (WATCHCON) Level IV (defined as "potential threat" to US citizens, interests, and operating forces), and thereby increasing the intelligence collection priority against Iraq. (WATCHCON is an expression of intelligence interest and concern relative to the potential threat outlined in a Warning Problem. A Warning Problem for a country or region is a set of detectable events that might lead to a threat or crisis.)

NOTE: When a specific date is not known, a monthly entry will be indicated.

April

JSW (Directorate for Indications and Warning) adds Iraq as a "regional threat" to the Indications and Warning (I&W) System based on concerns voiced by CENTCOM and DIA. DIA and US Commands formally begin monitoring Iraqi activities for indications of war preparations.

May

DIA participates in CENTCOM's war game of Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

11 June

CENTCOM issues first status change to Warning Problem. (A status change to a Problem is made whenever detectable events arise which change the likelihood that the threat might ensue.)

July

DIA analysts participate in a three-week-long NWC war game of an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The war game mirrors reality as crisis approaches in Iraq and Kuwait.

17 July

 

 

 

Saddam Hussein delivers a strongly worded speech condemning Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) oil policies.

Intelligence Community receives first unconfirmed reports of a troop buildup in southern Iraq.

Kuwait deploys forces to defend Kuwait City and puts armed forces on full alert in response to Iraqi threats.

18 July

CENTCOM issues a Worldwide Warning and Indicator Monitoring System (WWIMS) status change to the DoD intelligence warning community and its subordinate commands concerning the Iraqi propaganda and diplomatic campaign against Kuwait.

DIA receives a request from CENTCOM for additional imagery coverage of Iraq and Kuwait after an Iraqi demarche to Kuwait.

19 July

DIA receives first reports of movement of two Iraqi divisions to deployment areas near the Kuwaiti border.

Defense Intelligence Officer (DIO) for Middle East, South Asia, and Terrorism (MESAT) sends a message to the DIA Director stating that the Iraqi activity near the Kuwaiti border is "not a rehearsal." This message is forwarded to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).

(Click on Map to see image.)
Iraq claimed the disputed island of Bubiyan and Warbah
20 July

DI-6 (Foreign Exchanges and Disclosures Division) grants authorization for CENTCOM to release data on Iraq to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

A Defense Intelligence Digest (DID) article speculates that, "Iraq is unlikely to use significant force against Kuwait, such as the occupation of Warbah and Bubiyan Islands.... Small-scale incursions are possible."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) requests DIA develop a list of targets in Iraq. OICC, located at the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC), Bolling AFB, initiates targeting support for CENTCOM.

DIA analysts detect the movement of artillery and tank battalions in southeastern Iraq, 30 miles north of the Kuwaiti border. Some are loaded on heavy equipment transports (HETs).

20-28 July CENTCOM conducts CPX INTERNAL LOOK 90 to examine new Operational Plan (OPLAN) 1002, Defense of the Arabian Peninsula, to validate operational and logistical support concepts.

21 July

DC-1 (Current Operations Division, Directorate for Collection) reports that Iraqi forces are moving closer to the border. Elements of two additional armored divisions join the original Iraqi armored brigade, but there are no logistics support units with these forces.

CENTCOM and DIA raise WATCHCON to Level III (defined as "increased threat" to US citizens, interests, and operating forces).

22 July

DIA receives reports of more than 3000 military vehicles moving south on the road from Baghdad toward Kuwait and 27 free rocket over ground (FROG) transporter erector launchers (TELs) being loaded onto railroad cars.

DC-1 reports 20 FROG rocket airframes being loaded onto trucks for transport. DIA analysts report a total of 305 T-72 tanks, 167 BMP armored personnel carriers, and 198 artillery pieces present in assembly areas north of the Kuwaiti border.

DIA activates the Iraq/Kuwait Regional Working Group (IZKUWG) at the Pentagon. (A working group is activated by DIA whenever additional manpower is needed to cover a developing crisis in a region of the world).

23 July

Kuwait deploys forces to the border area while the UAE increases its combat air patrols.

DC-1 reports that more artillery and the first surface-to-air missile unit, an SA-9 battery, have deployed to the border. DC-1 also reports a logistics site is being established near the border.

DC-1 produces the first of many collection posture statements (CPS) on the Iraq-Kuwait crisis.

23-24 July

VP (Directorate for Foreign Intelligence) and DX (Directorate for Imagery Exploitation) analysts hold videolink meetings with JSJ (Directorate for JCS Intelligence Support) and JCS J-3 (Operations Directorate) to discuss targets.

24 July

KC-135 aircraft deploy to the UAE for Exercise IVORY JUSTICE which was a demonstration of US concern and support.

CENTCOM raises WATCHCON to Level II (defined as "significant threat" to US citizens, interests, and operating forces).

DIA issues WWIMS Warning Report to policy officials and the Intelligence Community assessing Iraq to have enough military force in place to achieve its goals regarding Kuwait.

25 July

A meeting called by OPEC opens to address the Iraqi claims of continued Kuwaiti over-quota oil production and to defuse the mounting crisis at the Iraq/Kuwait border area.

Defense Special Assessment (DSA) states: "Iraq is using rhetoric, diplomatic pressure, and significant military posturing to force Kuwait to comply with recent oil and economic demands. Although unlikely to use military pressure, Iraq is marshaling forces sufficient to invade Kuwait. With forces currently in place, Iraq would be able to overwhelm Kuwaiti forces and likely occupy its limited objectives within 48 hours, or all of Kuwait in 5 days."

DIA goes to WATCHCON II and issues WWIMS Warning Report stating Iraqi military forces fully capable of military actions against Kuwait.

DI-6 asks the Secretary of Defense for permission to begin providing information on Iraq to Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE, and Qatar.

(Click on Map to see image.)

Iraqi Republican Guard Forces on the Kuwaiti border,
1 August 1990.
 

 

DI-3 (Legislative Affairs Division) arranges a briefing for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) on the Gulf crisis. When asked by senior members of the SSCI about indicators of an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, a DIA analyst replies that the indicators have already been seen.

26 July

Kuwait adopts a partial stand down of its infantry and armor units as tensions diminish because of growing confidence in successful OPEC negotiations. Saudi Arabia states it will not tolerate an Iraqi takeover of Kuwait.

27 July

DID reports the tensions between Baghdad and Kuwait are subsiding, though military forces remain deployed. Report speculates that Kuwait will give Saddam most of what he wants to avoid military confrontation.

DIA receives reports that the logistics train to support the Iraqi Republican Guard Forces Command (RGFC) is moving south toward the Kuwaiti border.

Both DIA and CENTCOM have intelligence sources on the ground in Kuwait City who subsequently report first hand on developments there.

DIO for MESAT and analysts from DB-8 (Middle East/Africa Division, Directorate for Research) meet with the Kuwaiti Ambassador to the US at the Pentagon and tell him unequivocally that Iraq is going to invade Kuwait.

29 July

OICC personnel meet with RS (Directorate for Resources) in anticipation of crisis support to prioritize resources, including: photo lab, graphics, distribution, library, and print shop support.

30 July

DID states that, "Saddam will probably maintain Iraq's military stance until Kuwait agrees to his demands. Some military action is likely if Kuwait is resolute."

DIO for MESAT sends E-mail message to the DIA Director warning that Iraq is not "...bluffing."

DIA begins producing operational support packages (OSP) on primary targets and basic target graphics (BTG) on primary and secondary targets in support of CENTCOM Target List.

CENTCOM sends DIA a request for additional imagery coverage on Iraq.

30-31 July

OICC recalls 17 VP analysts to work through the night to support a Commander in Chief, CENTCOM (CINCCENT) target briefing to the JCS.

31 July

CINCCENT briefs CJCS and the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) on deployment options.

DSA states "Unless Kuwait's negotiators can offer a sufficiently attractive package of economic aid, reparations, or grants, ...Baghdad may consider taking what the Kuwaitis are unwilling to offer at the negotiating table.

DIO for MESAT sends a message to DIA Director and Deputy Director for JCS Support (JS) warning that Saddam is not bluffing and that his force is sufficient to conquer both Kuwait and the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia.

The OPEC meeting ends in failure and the participants returned home. The situation remains unsolved but tensions seem to be at a lower level.

1 August

DIA analysts confirm the movement to forward assembly areas of artillery units required for offensive operations.

Iraqi assault operations, 2 August 1990, showing the main attack in the center, a supporting attack in the west and an airmobile assault in the east.


(Click on Map to see image.)

 

 

CENTCOM and DIA go to WATCHCON I (defined as a "clear and immediate threat" to US citizens, interests, and operating forces). This is the first time a command or agency goes to WATCHCON I in advance of a conflict.

CENTCOM and DIA issue WWIMS Warning Reports that an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is imminent.

DIA establishes Iraqi Regional Intelligence Task Force (ITF) by expanding the IZKUWG. The expanded Task Force moves into the ITF spaces in the NMIC at the Pentagon.

2 August

Iraqi forces invade Kuwait and drive to the Kuwaiti/Saudi Arabia border area.

CINCCENT presents military options to President Bush and the National Security Council (NSC).

 

CJCS issues a Warning Order alerting military units to prepare to deploy.

CENTCOM begins to develop courses of action and examine alternative force levels to respond to the crisis.

OICC establishes extended manning in response to the activation of the ITF. The OICC provides specialized targeting products, detailed and in-depth analysis, battle damage assessments for CENTCOM, ground order of battle (OB) information, special studies, and strategic estimates.

DAT-6 (Middle East/Africa Division) begins 24-hour operations at Clarendon, tasking worldwide collection.

DAT-6 Country Officer is detailed to the J-5 (JCS Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policy) Iraq Strategic Studies Group, the organization that is to draft a national policy response for senior leaders.

DI-1 (Director¹s Staff Group Division) starts Monday and Thursday briefings to Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) principals and staff.

DC compiles a list of targets in Iraq to monitor chemical warfare (CW) sites and Iraqi reinforcements.

OSC-5 (Security Programs Division) briefs JS representatives at NMIC on Iraqi intelligence services.

FBI reinforces the DIA terrorism watch with an FBI agent.

 

2-11 August

DC-1 briefs DIA Director twice on imagery intelligence (IMINT) system options. Also briefed is the National Security Advisor¹s Chief of Staff.

3 August

J-5 Iraq Strategic Studies Group, with DIA representation, forwards draft strategy paper to the CJCS. He passes it to the Secretary of Defense, who delivers it to the President. The four goals set out in this paper are identical to the four objectives mentioned by the President in his 5 and 8 August policy speeches. ITF spaces expand. VP analysts augment ITF. The ITF serves mainly as an administrative clearing house for taskings and provides numerous high-level briefings.

DX-6 (Current Imagery Division) requests coverage of Scud missile sites.

DI-3 coordinates briefing for the Defense Subcommittee and staff of the House Appropriations Committee.

4 August

The President and the NSC hear CINCCENT and Air Force Component, Central Command (CENTAF) briefings at Camp David on military options.
DM-1 (Plans, Programs, and Policy Division, Directorate for Imagery Management) receives first National Military Intelligence Support Team (NMIST) cable from CENTAF.

DI-3 coordinates briefing on the Gulf crisis for 67 senators.

5 August

President Bush states that Iraqi aggression ³shall not stand² and frames US national policy objectives:

 
  • Immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait;
  • Restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government
  • Security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf; and
  • Safety and protection of the lives of American citizens abroad.

 

 

 

 

 

 

6 August

The USS INDEPENDENCE, in the North Arabian Sea, is within range to launch air strikes against Iraqi forces, if necessary.

OICC provides VP augmentees to form NMISTs.

DX-5 (Regional Analysis Division, Directorate f or Imagery Exploitation) initiates production of an Iraqi ground forces overlay and report, providing an overview of the disposition of Iraqi forces located in southern Iraq and Kuwait.

 

UN Resolution 661 calls for restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity, and for an embargo on Iraq.

SECDEF, CINCCENT, and other CENTCOM officials travel to Jiddah, Saudi Arabia to seek King Fahd¹s agreement to deploy US forces. The King grants permission for the operation.

DAH (Operations Division, Directorate for Attaches and Operations) begins providing daily DESERT SHIELD DoD human intelligence (HUMINT) collection posture and situation updates to DIA leadership.

DIA maintains daily telephonic contact with its source in Kuwait City. This source details the Iraqi consolidation of the city and ongoing military operations.

DI-4 (Foreign Liaison Division) begins daily intelligence summary (INTSUM) distribution and briefings to selected foreign attaches.


 

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