

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

35
YEARS



A BRIEF HISTORY

**Committed
To Excellence
In Defense
Of The Nation**

THE DIA SEAL SYMBOLISM

The initial letters of **Defense Intelligence Agency** (DIA) also comprise the Greek word "dia" which means divided into two parts. In this instance, the flaming torch and its gold color represent knowledge, i.e., intelligence, "lighting" the way of the "known" light blue-green world against the darkness or unknown symbolized by the dark blue background — "the area of truth" still sought by the worldwide mission of the Agency. The two red atomic ellipses symbolize the scientific and technical aspects of intelligence today and of the future. The 13 stars and the wreath are adopted from the Department of Defense seal and are used to identify the Agency as a Department of Defense organization.



Introduction

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) became operational on 1 October 1961 as the Nation's primary producer of foreign military intelligence. It filled a critically important need for a central intelligence manager for the Department of Defense (DoD) to support the requirements of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the military forces, as well as other policymakers.

During the period following World War II until the Agency's establishment, the three Military Departments separately collected, produced, and disseminated intelligence for their individual use. The system proved duplicative, costly, and ineffective as each Service provided their estimates to the Secretary of Defense, the Unified and Specified (U&S) Commands, or other governmental agencies.

The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 sought to correct these shortcomings by assigning responsibility for U&S Command intelligence support to the J-2 of the JCS. However, DoD intelligence responsibilities remained unclear, coordination poor, and products lacked dependability and national focus. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, therefore, appointed the Joint Study Group in 1960 to determine better ways of effectively organizing the Nation's military intelligence activities.

Acting on the recommendations of the Joint Study Group, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara in February 1961 advised the JCS

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REVIEW OF THE WEEK
EDITORIAL CORRESPONDENCE
WEEK-END CABLES

The New York Times.

EDITORIALS
SPECIAL ARTICLES—SCIENCE
LETTERS—EDUCATION

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SUNDAY, JULY 30, 1961.

THE NEWS OF THE WEEK IN REVIEW

Kennedy Acts

On Soviet Challenge

This is the time-table:
In September West Germany elects a new parliament—and possibly there opens a new scene in the German drama, now focused on Berlin.

In October the Soviet Communist party holds its Twenty-second Congress—the occasion, most likely, for an assertion by Premier Khrushchev of strong leadership against the West.

In December there arrives the deadline implicit in Khrushchev's demand that the Berlin question be settled this year—or it may come earlier.

It was with this time-table in mind that President Kennedy acted last week.

On Tuesday night, the President made a much-publicized-in-advance "fireside chat" to the nation. He was confronted with a four-fold task:

- (1) To convince Khrushchev that the U. S. was in earnest in countering his challenge.
- (2) To persuade the American people that this was a time of "clear and present danger."
- (3) To assure the world in general and the uncommitted areas in particular that despite our sternness in meeting the Russian threat we were always ready to negotiate.
- (4) To secure the initiative from the Russians in the propaganda war.

In brief, these were the President's moves to fulfill these four tasks:

He called for a build-up of U. S. armed strength, drawing upon Selective Service and the reserves for new manpower. "We do not want to fight," he said, "but we have fought before."

He emphasized that the Communist threat was "worldwide" and imposed heavy burdens on the American people. "We have," he added, a "sole responsibility" to recognize the possibilities of nuclear war in the missile age."

He said the U. S. "was willing to negotiate" with any and all nations on the issues involved in

HIGH POINTS IN A CRITICAL WEEK IN THE CONFLICT OVER BERLIN AND GERMANY



THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Kennedy outlining steps to meet Soviet challenge in speech Tuesday. Heat from lights made crowded White House Oval Room almost unbearable.



on Berlin. For one thing, they argue, he may be wary of giving the East German regime too much independence of action. There have been reports that Moscow's confidence in the East German leaders has been shaken by their intensifying economic difficulties.

Furthermore, the Russians apparently have sought to keep war anxiety to a minimum at home. Mr. Khrushchev's announcement of an increase in the Soviet military budget this month won wide publicity abroad but it was played down in Russia itself. And today Soviet newspapers are scheduled to publish a massive ideological document proclaiming a long-range economic program designed to enable the Russians to overtake the United States in the next twenty years. The timing suggests the Kremlin is not expecting a major military crisis in the near future.

Summit Move Seen

In Washington there was a growing feeling that the Russian leader's primary aim was to force a new summit conference. Mr. Kennedy, in his speech last week, left the door to the summit definitely ajar.

If the Berlin dispute goes to the conference table, the Western Powers will find themselves faced with two problems of their own: First, What concessions can they reasonably offer to make in return for ironbound Russian guarantees of the freedom of Berlin? Second, Can they take the propaganda initiative away from the Russians?

These problems will engage Secretary of State Dean Rusk and the foreign ministers of Britain, France and West Germany at conferences scheduled to start in Paris next weekend. Mr. Rusk told a news conference Thursday the Allies will "try to find opportunities for a peaceful adjustment" in Berlin and that the West will "not necessarily wait for the Soviet Union to take the initiative" in negotiations on Berlin.

Mr. Rusk offered no clues as to how the West might seize the initiative, noting it was unwise to tip one's hand to the enemy. Furthermore, the situation was delicate because of the existence of

The Requirement for a DIA

"...a better mechanism...for coordinating the service intelligence agencies...should be established ..."

"...[the Secretary of Defense] must be, per se, the coordinator of intelligence...within the military establishment."

The 1st Hoover Commission, 1948

"Great strides toward a more closely integrated [intelligence] community would result from improved intelligence coordination within the DoD."

The Joint Study Group, 1960

"It appears the most effective means to accomplish the recommendations of the Joint Study Group would be the establishment of a Defense Intelligence Agency which may include the existing National Security Agency, [and] the intelligence and counter intelligence functions now handled by the military departments..."

Robert S. McNamara, 1961

of his decision to establish a Defense Intelligence Agency and tasked them with developing a concept plan that would extensively integrate the military intelligence efforts of all DoD elements. The JCS completed this assignment by July, and published DoD Directive 5105.21, "Defense Intelligence Agency" on 1 August, effective 1 October 1961.

According to the plan for the new agency, DIA reported to the Secretary of Defense through the JCS. It was a union—not a confederation of Defense intelligence and counterintelligence

activities, and it did not add administrative layering within the Defense intelligence community. The Agency's mission was the continuous task of collecting, processing, evaluating, analyzing, integrating, producing, and disseminating military intelligence for the DoD. Other objectives included more efficiently allocating scarce intelligence resources, more effectively managing all DoD intelligence activities, and eliminating redundancies in facilities, organizations, and tasks.

During the summer of 1961, as Cold War tensions flared over the Berlin Wall, Air Force Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll, soon to become DIA's first director, planned and organized this new agency. It began operations with 25 employees in borrowed office space on 1 October 1961.

Following DIA's establishment, the Services transferred intelligence functions and resources to it on a time-phased basis to avoid rapidly degrading the overall effectiveness of Defense intelligence. The principal objectives in establishing DIA were to obtain unity of effort among all DoD components in developing military intelligence, and to strengthen DoD's overall capacity for collecting, producing, and disseminating intelligence information. ■

THE 1960's

A year after its formation, the Agency faced its first major intelligence test during the superpower confrontation that developed after Soviet missiles were discovered in Cuba. Yet, even in the midst of this crisis, Agency organizational efforts continued. In late 1962, DIA established the Defense Intelligence School, and on 1 January 1963, it activated a new Production Center. Several Service elements were merged to form this production facility, which occupied the "A" and "B" buildings at Arlington Hall Station, Virginia.

The Agency also added an Automated Data Processing (ADP) Center on 19 February, a Dissemination Center on 31 March, and a Scientific and Technical Intelligence Directorate on 30 April 1963. DIA assumed the staff support functions of the J-2, Joint Staff, on 1 July 1963. Two years later, on 1 July 1965, DIA accepted responsibility for the Defense Attache System — the last function the Services initially transferred to DIA.



"B" building at Arlington Hall Station.


Impetus for DIA

Creating DIA bolstered DoD's efforts to improve the military intelligence system by merging many of its functions under a single authority. The Agency was established to:

- *Unify the intelligence efforts of the DoD and eliminate unnecessary duplication.*
- *Strengthen DoD-wide collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence.*
- *Provide more efficient management and use of resources.*

During these early years of DIA's existence, Agency attempts to establish itself as DoD's central military intelligence organization met with continuing Service opposition. At the same time, the Vietnam War severely tested the fledgling Agency's ability to produce accurate, timely intelligence. In particular, the war increased Defense intelligence's involvement in efforts to account for American Service members missing or captured in Southeast Asia.

DIA analysts focused during the 1960's on China's detonation of an atomic bomb and the launching of its cultural revolution; increasing unrest among African nations; and, fighting in Malaysia, Cyprus, and Kashmir. In the late 1960's, crises that tested Defense



John Hughes' televised briefing on Soviet missiles in Cuba.

intelligence's responsiveness included the Tet offensive in Vietnam; the Six-Day War between Egypt and Israel; continuing troubles in Africa, particularly Nigeria; North Korea's seizure of the PUEBLO; and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. ■


THE 1970's

The early 1970's were transitional years for DIA as the Agency shifted its focus from consolidating internal and external management roles to establishing itself as a credible producer of national intelligence. This proved difficult at first since sweeping manpower decrements between 1968 and 1975 had reduced Agency manpower by 31 percent and precipitated mission reductions and a broad organizational restructuring. The attache system also underwent major revisions.

Challenges facing DIA at this time included the rise of *Ostpolitik* in Germany, the emergence of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the Mideast, and growing arms control concerns. Riots in Gdansk, Poland; civil wars in Jordan and Nigeria; and the U.S. incursion into Cambodia from South Vietnam also drew intelligence interest. Other crises during this period included Idi Amin's takeover in Uganda, unrest in Pakistan, the formation of Bangladesh, and continued fighting in Southeast Asia.

On 3 November 1970, DoD created a position for an Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) (ASD/I) "to supervise Defense intelligence programs . . . and to provide the principal point for management and policy coordination with the Director of Central Intelligence, the CIA, and other intelligence officials outside the DoD." Also in November, President Nixon reorganized the national Intelligence Community and designated DIA's Director as program manager for the General Defense Intelligence Program. Of significance, the Agency established a Directorate for Estimates in November 1970.

The Agency's reputation grew considerably by the mid-1970's as its products were increasingly perceived throughout the government as valuable to decisionmaking. Meanwhile, the specially-convened Williamsburg Conference in 1972 looked closely at the effects of DIA resource reductions. Among the recommendations of conference participants were to place increased emphasis on technology in the



Aerial photo of bomb damage to a Hanoi airfield.

Agency and to upgrade the National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC). The General Counsel function was added that year as well.

Agency analysts in 1972 concentrated on Lebanon, President Nixon's visit to China, the formation of Sri Lanka, Salvador Allende's regime in Chile, and the prisoners of war (POW's) being held in Southeast Asia. Subsequent challenges involved *detente*; the development of arms control agreements; the Paris peace talks (Vietnam); the Yom Kippur War; global energy concerns; coups in Ethiopia and Portugal; and independence movements in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau.

In 1974, DIA established a J-2 Support Office to better satisfy JCS's intelligence needs. In October of that year, DIA began a comprehensive overhaul of its production functions, organization, and management. Positions for Defense Intelligence Officers (DIO's) were established in December. The DIO's were given the responsibility of acting as the DIA Director's senior staff representatives on substantive intelligence matters.

Intense Congressional review during 1975 and 1976 created turbulence in the national Intelligence Community. The Murphy and Rockefeller Commission investigations of charges of intelligence abuse ultimately led to an Executive Order that modified many of the functions the Community performed. Within DIA, the leadership adopted the "delegated production" concept to offset heavy production requirements, and a report from the Intelligence Management Study Group led to a reorganization of all DIA production activities.


With American involvement in Vietnam ending by 1975, Defense intelligence faced massive resource decrements. During this period, DIA conducted numerous studies on ways of improving its intelligence products. Ultimately, the Agency strengthened its support to consumers in OSD, the JCS, and the Unified & Specified Commands, and also modernized the National Military Intelligence Center. Faced with similar resource challenges, DoD also sought to centralize its activities. The

ASD/I was designated Director of Defense Intelligence, a Defense Intelligence Board was established, and the President set up a National Foreign Intelligence Board.

In 1977, a charter revision further clarified DIA's relationship with the JCS and the Secretary of Defense. Specifically, the Secretary assigned staff supervisory responsibility over DIA in the resource area to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, while giving the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs supervisory responsibility regarding policy matters. For a period during 1976 and 1977, DIA discontinued the positions of Deputy Director and Chief of Staff. Analytical efforts within the Agency at the time centered on the death of Mao Tse-Tung, aircraft hijackings, the Israeli raid on Entebbe Airport, unrest in South Africa, and continuing Middle East tensions.

Following the promulgation in 1979 of Executive Order 12036, which restructured the Intelligence Community and better outlined DIA's national and departmental responsibilities, the Agency was reorganized around five major directorates: production, operations, resources, external affairs, and J-2 support. Despite these and other Community-wide efforts to improve intelligence support, the loss of resources during the 1970's limited the Community's ability to collect and produce timely intelligence and ultimately contributed to intelligence shortcomings in Iran, Afghanistan, and other strategic areas.

In fact, intelligence requirements were expanding while resources were decreasing. By the late 1970's, Agency analysts were extremely busy focusing on Lebanon, China, South Africa, terrorism, and Southeast Asian POW issues. Special DIA task forces were set up to monitor crises such as the Soviet invasion of



Port of Corinto, Nicaragua.

Afghanistan, the overthrow of the Iranian monarchy, and the taking of U.S. hostages in the American Embassy in Teheran in 1979. Other events of serious concern during this period were the Vietnamese takeover in Phnom Penh; the China-Vietnam border war; the overthrow of Amin in Uganda; the North-South Yemen dispute; troubles in Pakistan; border clashes between Libya and Egypt; the Sandinista takeover in Nicaragua; and, the Soviet movement of combat troops to Cuba during the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty II. ■

THE 1980's

DIA came of age in the 1980's by focusing heavily on the intelligence needs of field commanders and national-level decision makers. At the start of the decade, the Agency provided valuable intelligence support to the newly established Rapid Deployment Force during Operation BRIGHT STAR. This was done against a backdrop of Congressional support for DoD budget increases to enhance "readiness, sustainability, and modernization." Agency analysts, meanwhile, were also closely monitoring events in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), the Iran-Iraq War, and the civil war in El Salvador.

DIA's publication in 1981 of the first in a series of white papers on the strengths and capabilities of Soviet military forces titled, "Soviet Military Power," met with wide acclaim. (Ten such booklets were published subsequently over the next decade.) In April of 1981, the Agency broke ground for the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC) at Bolling Air Force Base in Washington, D.C. World crises continued to flare and included: the downing of two Libyan SU-22's by American F-14's over the Gulf of Sidra, an Israeli F-16 raid to destroy an Iranian nuclear reactor, two Iranian hijackings, Iranian air raids on Kuwait, and the release of American hostages in Iran.

As the decade continued, DIA concentrated on enhancing its support to tactical and theater commanders, improving its capabilities to meet major wartime intelligence requirements, and strengthening DoD's indications and warning system. DIA established a position for a functional manager for intelligence processing in 1982. Two years later, the Central America Joint Intelligence Team (CAJIT) was established as an interagency analytical organization focused on Central American insurgency. DIA also created a standard intelligence communications architecture to improve DoD's ability to disseminate national-level intelligence to tactical commanders during contingency situations.



CH-53 helicopter landing in front of the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center at Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, D.C.

***"LET US NEVER FORGET
THAT GOOD INTELLIGENCE
SAVES AMERICAN LIVES AND
PROTECTS OUR FREEDOM"***

President Ronald Reagan, 1981

The concept of intelligence as a "force multiplier in crises" became a predominant theme as DIA assembled an all-source integrated data base to enable the U&S Commands to better assess the threat as it existed in the field. As a followup, the Agency established a Research Crisis Support Center at the DIAC to provide a centralized, operationally secure, all-source, crisis management center to support the NMIC and the U&S Commands.

As events deteriorated in Nicaragua, DIA analysts provided extensive support to the U.S. Southern Command. Other analysis at this time was focused on the war over the Falkland Islands and Israel's invasion of Lebanon. When 6,000 U.S. troops invaded Grenada during Operation URGENT FURY in 1983, a special DIA task force responded to numerous taskings for briefings, papers, and intelligence information. DIA also distributed a wide variety of intelligence summaries to assist field commanders during the operation.

Closer to home, many of DIA's major functional elements were finally consolidated under one roof when the Agency dedicated the DIAC at Bolling AFB on 23 May 1984. Other DIA analytical efforts during the mid-1980's centered on the attack on the Marine barracks in Lebanon, the Iran-Iraq War, the conflict in Afghanistan, the Soviet shootdown of Korean Air Lines Flight 007, the civil war in Chad, and unrest in the Philippines.

Indeed, the significantly large number of hijackings, bombings, kidnappings, murders, and other acts of terrorism led to 1985 being characterized as the "Year of the Terrorist." Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger presented DIA with the Agency's first Joint Meritorious Unit Award in 1986 for outstanding intelligence support over the previous year during a series of crises—the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 and the cruise ship ACHILLE LAURO, unrest in the Philippines, and counterterrorist operations against Libya.

It was during this period that DIA developed its Operational Intelligence Crisis Center (OICC) in the DIAC as the primary vehicle for orchestrating analytic support during volatile situations. In addition, to relieve overcrowding in the DIAC, the Agency moved several elements into a leased office building at 3100 Clarendon Avenue in Arlington, Virginia.

Also during this timeframe, the Agency concentrated on the rapidly shifting national security environment, characterized by key issues such as changes within the Soviet Union, counternarcotics, warfighting capabilities and sustainability, and low-intensity conflict. DoD moved decisively to improve its automated data bases and apply additional resources to the monitoring of terrorist groups, illegal arms shipments, and narcotics trafficking. Arms control monitoring also increased the demand for intelligence support from DIA.

Within the Agency, the National Military Intelligence Center was upgraded, renovated, and collocated with the National Military Command Center—a move that permitted the fusion of operations and intelligence during crises at the national level. Designated a "combat support agency" under the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, DIA moved quickly to increase cooperation with the U&S Commands and to begin developing a body of joint intelligence doctrine.

Intelligence support to U.S. allies in the Middle East intensified as the Iran-Iraq War spilled into the Gulf. DIA provided significant intelligence support to Operation EARNEST WILL while closely monitoring incidents such as the Iraqi missile attack on the USS STARK, the destruction of Iranian oil platforms, and Iranian attacks on Kuwaiti oil tankers. The "Toyota War" between Libya and Chad and the turmoil in Haiti added to DIA's heavy production workload, as did unrest in other parts of Latin America, Somalia, Ethiopia, Burma, Pakistan, and the Philippines.



President Bush receives briefing from DIA during Operation JUST CAUSE (Panama).

Subsequently, DIA oversaw a successful Defense intelligence effort in support of U.S. operations in Panama which demonstrated the benefits of increased cooperation between DIA and operational force planners. The Agency also provided threat data on "hot spots" throughout the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, while assessing the impact of changes in the USSR, Eastern Europe, and, to a lesser degree, Asia. In addition, DIA supported decisionmakers with intelligence concerning the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan; events surrounding the shootdown of several Libyan jets; the civil war in Liberia; the investigation of the downing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland; and, the Tienanmen Square incident in China. Weapons acquisition issues, counternarcotics, and counterterrorism, likewise, remained high priority issues. ■

THE 1990's

With the end of the Cold War, Defense intelligence began a period of reevaluation following the fall of Communism in many of the East European countries, the reunification of Germany, and ongoing economic reforms in the region. During this phase, DIA emphasized improved management of intelligence production DoD-wide as resource reductions once again threatened to negatively impact Agency objectives and manpower. Organizationally, DIA adopted the concept of functional management to better address U&S Command intelligence issues. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) was given expanded authority, direction, and control over DIA.

In response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, DIA set up an extensive, 24-hour, crisis management cell designed to tailor national-level intelligence support to the coalition forces assembled to expel Iraq from Kuwait. By the time Operation DESERT STORM began, some 2,000 Agency personnel were involved in the intelligence support effort. Most of them were associated with the national-level Joint Intelligence Center (JIC), which DIA established in the Pentagon to integrate the intelligence produced throughout the Community. DIA sent more than 100 employees into the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations to provide intelligence support, and deployed 11 National Military Intelligence Support Teams (NMISTS) overseas.

Afteraction reports later confirmed that no combat commander had ever benefited from as full and complete a view of an adversary as U.S. and coalition commanders did prior to and during DESERT STORM. This DIA-led effort remains one of the greatest examples of intelligence support to operational forces in modern times. For its achievements during the crisis and conflict, DIA earned a second DoD Joint Meritorious Unit Award. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of



Advancing US tanks during DESERT STORM.

An Intelligence Success Story

"No combat commander has ever had as full and complete a view of his adversary as did our field commander. Intelligence support to Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM was a success story."

General Colin Powell, 1991



President Clinton being briefed on Haiti.

Staff, General Colin L. Powell, attached the streamer to the DIA flag in a special outdoor ceremony at the DIAC on 26 June 1991.

DIA improved crisis management and support to the decision maker and warfighter based on experience gained during the Gulf War. The Agency created the National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC), replacing the NMIC and retaining many of the positive attributes of the wartime national-level JIC. DIA also significantly expanded its support to the Joint Staff. The Gulf War experience prompted the Agency to improve on its NMIST concept by adding CIA and NSA members to the DIA element and redesignating them National Intelligence Support Teams (NISTs). The Military Intelligence Board, chaired by the DIA Director, continued its important role after the War coordinating national intelligence support.

The Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC), and the Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC), associated with the



National Intelligence Support Team in Bosnia.

Army for over 30 and 50 years respectively, became elements of DIA in January 1992. This was part of the continuing effort to consolidate intelligence production and make it more efficient.

The most fundamental reexamination of U.S. national security policy since the 1940s—precipitated by the end of the Cold War—compelled a widespread review of DIA's role as the Intelligence Community confronted the twin challenges of a new era of regional conflict and simultaneous reductions in U.S. Defense spending.

With intelligence requirements escalating sharply, DIA undertook one of the most profound reorganizations in its history in 1993. This restructuring essentially rebuilt the Agency from the bottom up. In the process, DIA enhanced flexibility, improved cooperation with the Service intelligence organizations, severely reduced

management overhead, and returned to the basics by focusing on the common intelligence functional areas of collection, production, and infrastructure.

As DIA moved toward institutionalizing the process underlying the reorganization, it became clear that the restructuring had already brought about an unprecedented level of integration among DIA, the Military Services, and the Combatant Commands. This served the Community well as it surged to provide intelligence support to U.S. and United Nations forces involved in places such as Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and Haiti. In 1994, DIA received an unprecedented third Joint Meritorious Unit Award for intelligence support during these crises, as well as support to operations in Iraq and Korea.

The newly formed Defense HUMINT (Human Intelligence) Service (DHS) achieved its initial operating capability on 1 October 1995. DHS consolidated the HUMINT activities of all the Services under the umbrella of DIA. This new organization reflected the driving need to consolidate and focus our downsized resources to maximize the effectiveness of reduced assets. DIA was also designated as the Intelligence Community's executive agent for Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT).

Today, DIA continues to build on its proud traditions and stands as the Nation's preeminent military intelligence organization. Most importantly, the Agency's many professionals around the globe remain, as in the words of its motto, "Committed to Excellence in Defense of the Nation." ■



The Patriot's Memorial at the DIAC, dedicated to the men and women who have paid the ultimate price in service to their Country and the Defense Intelligence Agency.

"I only regret that I have but one life to lose for my country."

Captain Nathan Hale, 1776

Directors of the Defense Intelligence Agency

Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll, USAF	Oct 1961 - Sep 1969
Lieutenant General Donald V. Bennett, USA	Sep 1969 - Aug 1972
Vice Admiral Vincent P. de Poix, USN	Aug 1972 - Sep 1974
Lieutenant General Daniel O. Graham, USA	Sep 1974 - Dec 1975
Lieutenant General Eugene F. Tighe, Jr., USAF (Acting)	Jan 1976 - May 1976
Lieutenant General Samuel V. Wilson, USAF	May 1976 - Aug 1977
Lieutenant General Eugene F. Tighe, Jr., USAF	Aug 1977 - Aug 1981
Lieutenant General James A. Williams, USA	Sep 1981 - Sep 1985
Lieutenant General Leonard H. Perroots, USAF	Oct 1985 - Dec 1988
Lieutenant General Harry E. Soyster, USA	Dec 1988 - Sep 1991
Dennis M. Nagy (Acting)	Sep 1991 - Nov 1991
Lieutenant General James R. Clapper, Jr., USAF	Nov 1991 - Aug 1995
Lieutenant General Kenneth A. Minihan, USAF	Aug 1995 - Feb 1996
Lieutenant General Patrick M. Hughes, USA	Feb 1996 - Present



DIA History Office
Washington, DC, 1996