

**OPEN HEARING: NOMINATION OF
WILLIAM J. BURNS TO BE DIRECTOR OF THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 2021

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**OPEN HEARING: NOMINATION OF
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WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 2021

U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in Room SR-301, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Mark R. Warner (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Warner, Rubio, Feinstein, Wyden, Heinrich, King (via WebEx), Bennet, Casey, Gillibrand (via WebEx), Reed (Ex Officio), Burr, Risch, Collins, Blunt, Cotton, Cornyn, and Sasse.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK R. WARNER, A
U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA**

Chairman WARNER. Good morning, everyone. I would like to call this hearing to order and recognize that I think this is the first time in the history of the Intelligence Committee that we have met in the Rules Committee's space. I think we probably owe that to the distinguished former Chairman of the Rules Committee, Senator Blunt. We would hope—I know you are still the Ranking Member—but there's been a series of requests from Intel Committee staff that we would like a ship put in our SCIF as well.

Senator BLUNT. Only the Rules Committee can have a ship. No ship is available.

Chairman WARNER. Can you say NGA West?

Well, again I'd like to call this Committee to order, and again we appreciate the cooperation of our colleagues on the Rules Committee for letting us use this setting.

Welcome, Ambassador Burns.

I know as we talked in the anteroom that your wife, Lisa, is still hard at work in Geneva, and your daughters are watching remotely, but I know they are here with you in spirit. I would like to say congratulations on your nomination to be the next Director of the CIA. After a long and distinguished career in the Foreign Service, you deserve a well-earned retirement, but the country still needs your talents.

Ambassador Burns—Bill—thank you for once again being willing to serve our country.

Welcome also to our two distinguished guests who are joining us remotely: former Secretary of State James Baker and former Defense Secretary and CIA Director Leon Panetta. It's going to be a

privilege to hear from such eminent and bipartisan public servants who will introduce Ambassador Burns. Again I think is a great indication of his broad-based support.

I understand that some of our Members may be joining us remotely today as well, although I would like to acknowledge Senator Casey. He appeared yesterday remotely but is here today for his first in-person Intelligence Committee meeting. We are very glad, Bob, to have you on the Committee.

After the Vice Chairman and I give our opening statement, Secretaries Baker and Panetta will say a few words, and Ambassador Burns will then make his remarks. After this, Members' questions will be for five minutes in order of arrival.

Ambassador Burns has provided us with written responses to questions from the Committee, and today's hearing will provide Members the opportunity to thoughtfully consider his qualifications, to hear directly from the nominee, and for Ambassador Burns to share his views on how he would lead the women and men of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Bill took the Foreign Service exam in November 1979, just a few days after the seizure of our Embassy in Tehran and went on to spend over three decades in the Foreign Service working under both Democratic and Republican Presidents and ably representing America around the world and at the highest ranks of the State Department.

He's been confirmed by the Senate five times—so going for six today—and has served in both the number two and three positions at the State Department: Deputy Secretary of State and Undersecretary for Political Affairs. He's been our Nation's Ambassador to Russia, to Jordan, and held a variety of other senior national security roles. He holds the highest rank in the State Department, that of Career Ambassador.

He is currently the president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the oldest international think tank in the United States. It is safe to say that Mr. Burns is intimately familiar with the challenges and opportunities that the United States faces around the globe, in many cases with firsthand, on-the-ground experience and expertise. It is the key qualities of expertise and sound judgment that, perhaps above all others, will be most important in your role as the Director of the CIA.

After four years during which the expertise and judgment of America's civil servants were at times belittled and discounted, the next Director must lead and inspire patriotic professionals with humility and compassion, work collaboratively with allied governments, and dispassionately judge the actions of our adversaries.

CIA has in some ways been luckier than many other agencies. Director Haspel, your predecessor, has led the CIA with distinction under very difficult conditions, but I will be looking to hear your views on how to inspire CIA's intelligence professionals who often risk much, sacrifice much, and sometimes up to and including their health and lives in service of our country—and oftentimes without recognition because of their requirement to do that in secret.

I would like to hear how you plan to reinforce the credo no matter the political pressure, no matter what, that CIA officers will always do the right thing and speak truth to power. And it is up to

America's leaders, including you if you are confirmed, to ensure that CIA's officers will not face retribution or retaliation for speaking truth to power.

Beyond this basic task, our country faces a host of hazards from China's drive to surpass the United States technologically, to Russia's continued malign efforts in cyberspace and disinformation, to the ongoing threats from Iran and North Korea. Moreover, we are still in the midst of a global pandemic—although with hope on the horizon—that has taken the lives and livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of Americans.

These challenges are difficult, but with our traditionally strong network of alliances, they are surmountable. We will always rely on the CIA to be the Nation's eyes and ears, to see over the horizon, and to give us warnings of threats and challenges; not simply the ones we are facing now and in the near term, but those in the future against which we must begin to prepare today.

Fulfilling this Committee's oversight obligations will require transparency and responsiveness from your office. We may at times ask difficult questions of you and your staff, and we will expect honest, complete, and timely answers.

At the same time, we will also want you to feel free to come to the Committee with situations that warrant our partnership. You can always count on this Committee to hear you out, give you a fair shake, usually without the partisan tinge that has unfortunately affected much of the rest of this Capitol.

We will have much more to discuss during today's questions, but I would take this moment to assure you that should you be confirmed, I look forward to working closely with you to defend this Nation's security.

Thank you again for your years of service to our country and for stepping forward yet again and agreeing to serve. I look forward to your testimony, and with that, I recognized the distinguished Vice Chairman.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO, A
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA**

Vice Chairman RUBIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Ambassador thank you for being with us today. I join the Chairman in offering you and your family our congratulations, and/or condolences as you may deem appropriate, for your nomination at this important time in our Nation's history with these challenges that we face.

The role that you have been nominated to fill is without parallel in our government. If confirmed you will sit at the nexus of the Agency's intelligence collection, analysis, covert action, counter-intelligence, and liaison relationships with foreign intelligence services. Responsibility for any of these missions would be an enormous undertaking for any single one of them, let alone all of them. But the core mission of the Agency is and remains the collection of intelligence; the analysis of that intelligence to help inform policy-makers in the decisions they make; and then, of course, operations as well.

And in that context, as Director, you will be responsible for managing the CIA officers and employees of today, but also for culti-

vating the workforce that we are going to need in the years to come. So this, in my view, entails the specialized skills and expertise needed to solve today's unique intelligence challenges—our residents at the Agency—but also it involves looking ahead a decade and thinking about what the next critical skill set is going to be that the officers will need. So I appreciate your insights as to how you intend to achieve and accomplish that in your time there.

On the subject of workforce management, I want to mention that the Committee, in particular Senator Collins and others, are extremely interested and invested in ensuring that any officers who have been injured in the field are afforded access to the healthcare and the benefits that they need. And this is particularly true when it comes to injuries that seem to be consistent with symptoms of traumatic brain injury.

So, if you are confirmed, I ask for your commitment to work with the Committee so that we can find the appropriate legislative or policy changes that ensure that the CIA's commitment to the health and care of its officers is never left in doubt; and that we are applying the necessary resources to determine who was behind these things that have impacted personnel from various agencies. And I want to be clear: the Government of the United States needs to solve this problem, needs to take care of our people; but needs to also forcibly respond to whoever is responsible for hurting Americans who are serving our country overseas.

Today the United States faces an array of diverse national security threats, an array of threats that is as challenging as any in our history. The long-standing hostility from Putin's regime in Russia and from Iran, North Korea; a global pandemic moving into its second year; violent extremism; state and non-state cyber actors that infiltrate and plunder government and private sector computer networks with what seems like impunity—and with new and creative methods.

But no challenge that we face rivals the multifaceted threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party. And so, even as we continue to focus on the threats from counterterrorism and from all these other nation-states and non-state actors, the threat from the Chinese Communist Party is the most significant facing our Nation, perhaps in its history. We cannot, in my view, just be the orderly caretakers of our Nation's decline.

We must confront and, I hope, frustrate the ambitions of the Chinese Communist Party, not just to upend norms, amend boundaries, but to replace the United States. Their goal is to replace the United States as the world's most powerful and influential Nation. And achieving the goal of not letting that happen is going to involve strengthening and expanding alliances. I think it's also going to involve increased capability and a stronger resolve to meet this challenge. This is not the same system of crisis that past CIA leaders were called upon to defend against. The threats today are sudden, unpredictable, and they're happening with greater frequency, often occurring in a gray space that embraces the objectives of conflict without quite crossing the line into outright warfare.

What I think is plain to me and should be to all is that the world has changed how it chooses to engage the United States. What I'd like to hear from you today and, if confirmed, in the weeks and

months to come, is whether the CIA needs to change how it engages the world.

I hope that over the course of our open and closed sessions today you'll take the opportunity to explain not only your understanding of the Agency's unique role in America and in our government, but your vision for how that role needs to evolve in the coming years so that the Agency is positioned to defend against those emerging national security threats that have not yet even materialized.

There is no disputing the speed and unrivaled capability that the Agency can bring to bear in responding to a fully realized national security threat. But what I'm driving at, however, is an intelligence apparatus oriented toward the technological advances and the global interconnectivity that will be at the core of the next generation of threats to this Nation's security: artificial intelligence, advanced data analytics, biotechnology, disinformation, deep fakes, social network manipulation. America's adversaries have used this and all these things and will use these instruments. And they'll use other new instruments of power and technologies, some that haven't even been named yet, to close the capability gap that has advantaged us as a Nation for decades.

The refashioning of the national security threat picture by these technological and methodological advances calls into question whether the traditional constructs of espionage need to be refined, refashioned, and redesigned along with it.

So, I'd welcome your thoughts on this subject, both today and going forward, and add that this is exactly the kind of undertaking that has benefited by CIA's working partnership with this Committee and with its Members.

So, it's my hope—and, frankly, my expectation—that you will look at this Committee as a partner to the CIA's work as our Nation's first line of defense. The relationship between the Agency and this Committee is premised, obviously, on oversight, but it is most effective and most constructive when we are candid, fulsome, and talking to one another.

Ambassador, as the Chairman indicated, you have a lengthy and distinguished career of service to our country, and I thank you for your willingness to resume that service. And I certainly look forward to your testimony and your answers here today.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator Rubio.

Bill, I understand you have two of America's most distinguished public servants, former Secretary of State James Baker and former Defense and CIA Director Leon Panetta, who will present brief introductions for you. They'll be speaking remotely on your behalf today.

So, Secretary Baker, would you like to go first?

**STATEMENT BY JAMES BAKER, FORMER SECRETARY
OF STATE**

Secretary BAKER. Thank you Chairman Warner, thank you Vice Chairman Rubio and Members of the Committee, for inviting me to speak today on the nomination of William J. Burns to be Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. I am truly honored that Bill

asked me to speak on his behalf today, and I am delighted to be joined by my old friend, Leon Panetta.

Without any reservations, Members of the Committee, I can strongly recommend Bill Burns to you.

Bill, President Biden is to be congratulated for choosing you, and my reasoning in this regard is really straightforward. Bill is quite simply one of the finest and most intelligent American diplomats that I had the pleasure of working with. His unique combination of experience, skill, and character make him an outstanding choice for directorship of the CIA.

As a Secretary of State, I relied on Bill's judgment during one of the most tumultuous eras in U.S. foreign policy. He was instrumental in forging effective American policies as we worked to end the cold war peacefully, ensure the reunification of a Germany firmly embedded in the West, reverse Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, and bring together Israel and all of its neighboring Arab states for their first-ever face-to-face meeting at the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference.

Each of these complex situations was challenging, and Bill's contributions made an enormous difference. Bill was there every step of the way, even at times displaying his first-rate sense of humor by laughing at my weak jokes. Bill combined the remarkable ability to grasp broad historical trends while at the same time identifying pragmatic opportunities for the United States to advance our interests.

After I left office, I watched Bill rise to ever more senior ranks in the State Department: Executive Secretary, Ambassador to Jordan, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, Ambassador to Russia, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, and then finally Deputy Secretary of State. I wasn't surprised by his success. He is someone who seizes and surmounts every challenge that he meets.

Members of the Committee, you can be assured when it comes to the security of the United States, our country will be in capable hands. I cannot help but think about another Director of Central Intelligence, President George H. W. Bush, my close friend who served as head of the Agency in the 1970s. President Bush and Bill Burns admittedly represent contrasts in terms of age, background, and career, but they do share one important, indeed, essential characteristic: an absolute and abiding sense of responsibility and duty to the United States of America. Bill Burns is a leader and a steady hand under fire. He never hesitates to speak truth even when he knows it may be unwelcome.

He is scrupulously nonpartisan, and he has decades of experience working closely with the CIA and other intelligence agencies. He knows Washington. He knows the work. President Biden and our country would be very fortunate to have Bill Burns at the helm of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Distinguished Members of the Committee, let me close these brief remarks by simply saying that, in my opinion, this confirmation should be a bipartisan no-brainer.

Thank you very much for letting me speak to you today on behalf of Bill Burns. Thank you.

Chairman WARNER. Well, thank you, Secretary Baker, very much appreciate those comments.

Secretary Panetta?

STATEMENT BY LEON PANETTA, FORMER DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, AND FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary PANETTA. Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, Vice Chairman Rubio, distinguished Members of the Committee, it's an honor for me to once again have the opportunity to appear before this Committee that is so critical to protecting our national security.

I'm honored to be here alongside my friend, Secretary Jim Baker. He's an old friend and a colleague for many years in government, and someone who I believe is probably one of the great statesmen and public servants of our time. I'm proud to join him in introducing the President's nominee to be CIA Director, Ambassador Bill Burns.

I've known Bill for a long time. I've been in public life for probably over 50 years, and I've worked with him in many of those capacities that I've held in Congress, during my tenure as Chief of Staff to President Bill Clinton, and as Director of the CIA and Secretary of Defense in President Obama's administration.

The job of leading the extraordinary women and men of the CIA as they carry out their indispensable missions of collection, analysis, covert action—all intended to defend our Nation—that job, I believe, is one of the most important responsibilities in government. And the most important qualities that I believe a Director should have is to respect and support the professionals in the CIA who put their lives on the line in order to protect this country and do their jobs.

I think it is important for the Director to protect them from political influence, to be nonpartisan, and to always, always make sure that the CIA speaks truth to power. Bill Burns has those qualities. He understands the dedication of our brave intelligence officers. He has got the right experience, he has got the right nonpartisan approach, and he knows the importance of protecting our country from our adversaries.

In a word, he will make an outstanding Director of the CIA.

I don't need to tell this Committee that our Nation faces an increasingly complex set of challenges and threats. I think in my lifetime I have never seen as many flashpoints in the world as we have today, whether it's Russia or China or Iran or North Korea; whether it's cyberattacks; whether it's challenges that we face in the Middle East, in Afghanistan. All of these challenges demand good intelligence.

No President—no President—can make the right decisions for our Nation in protecting our national security without intelligence. This is what the CIA does by collecting and analyzing and presenting intelligence to policymakers so that they can make the best security decisions for the country and provide intelligence that can be trusted and is credible.

The challenge of President Biden and a new Director is to restore the trust and credibility of the CIA. Having worked with President

Biden, I believe that he understands that intelligence must be grounded in facts and never be politicized.

He knows our selfless and brave intelligence professionals, and they deserve nothing less than our full support. It is for these reasons that he chose Bill Burns to be the CIA Director, and I am confident that both will work to restore trust of the CIA with the National Security Team, with both Democrats and Republicans on this Committee, with our allies, and most of all, with the American people.

As Jim Baker pointed out, Bill has represented our country for decades as a dedicated, honest diplomat serving both Democratic and Republican administrations. I won't walk through his career, Jim just did that. It's been an outstanding foreign policy career. I have to say it is almost exactly 10 months ago this month, or 10 years ago this month, that Bill and I were in the Situation Room presenting intelligence to the President on the suspected whereabouts of Osama bin Laden.

Bill saw the CIA in action gathering detailed information, providing insights, explaining what we knew and also what we didn't know. And Bill was at the White House on May 1, 2011, when the courageous mission of our special operations forces unfolded. He was hand-picked by the Secretary of State to personally participate in closely held national security discussions about the mission, and to place calls to our key allies and foreign leaders informing them of the mission.

He is a public servant who has spent his life serving and protecting Americans. As CIA Director, he will certainly speak truth to power because that is what Bill does, and he has done that his entire career.

He has long known that calling it down the middle is essential even when it may not be convenient. He will also make sure he and other Agency leaders are responsive to oversight by this Committee and by the Congress. As all of you know, I'm a big believer that the CIA and this Committee have to be partners in order to fulfill the mission of protecting the American people. And he knows the array of challenges that the Agency faces dealing with major competitors, as I said, from China to so many other of those flashpoints I described, and the technological landscape in which our officers now have to operate.

In sum, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Vice Chairman and Members of the Committee, Bill Burns is the right person at the right time to lead the CIA. His experience in foreign policy and national security, his judgment, his unquestioned integrity will be assets as he leads the CIA in facing the threats that we face.

And he understands the sacrifices that are made by our intelligence professionals, often working in the shadows in dangerous places away from their families. He knows that CIA, these officers, are silent warriors—officers who put their lives on the line for our country. I trust Bill Burns to be a Director who will have their backs so that they can continue the mission to protect all Americans.

As a former Director, I am honored to introduce to the Committee Bill Burns and urge his swift confirmation. Thank you.

Chairman WARNER. Well, thank you Secretary Panetta. And let me just say it's—on a personal basis—not too bad to have Jim Baker and Leon Panetta be your introducers.

So now we will move to the Oath of Office.

Ambassador Burns, would you stand and please raise your right hand?

[Nominee stands and raises his right hand.]

Do you solemnly swear to give this Committee the truth, the full truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Ambassador BURNS. I do.

Chairman WARNER. Please be seated.

Before we move to your statement, I would ask you the five standard questions the Committee poses to each nominee who appears before us. They just require a simple yes or no answer for the record.

First, do you agree to appear before the Committee here or in other venues when invited?

Ambassador BURNS. Yes, Sir.

Chairman WARNER. If confirmed, do you agree to send officials from your office to appear before the Committee and designated staff when invited?

Ambassador BURNS. Yes.

Chairman WARNER. Do you agree to provide documents or other materials requested by the Committee in order for it to carry out its oversight and legislative responsibilities?

Ambassador BURNS. Yes, Sir.

Chairman WARNER. Will you ensure that your office and your staff provide such materials to the Committee when requested?

Ambassador BURNS. Yes.

Chairman WARNER. Do you agree to inform and fully brief to the fullest extent possible all Members of this Committee of intelligence activities and covert actions rather than only the Chairman and Vice Chairman?

Ambassador BURNS. Yes, Sir.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much.

We will now proceed to your opening statement. After that, I will recognize Members by order of appearance, but assuming that everybody was here, I think, with the exception of Senator Cotton at the gavel. So it will be basically by seniority.

Ambassador Burns, the floor is now yours.

**STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR WILLIAM J. BURNS, NOMINEE
TO BE DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

Ambassador BURNS. Thank you so much.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, Members of the Committee: I am honored and humbled to appear before you today as President Biden's nominee for Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. I am deeply grateful to the President for the opportunity to return to public service and to lead the remarkable women and men of CIA.

If confirmed, I will do everything in my power to justify the trust placed in me and to earn the trust of this Committee, Congress, and the American people. I am also deeply grateful to Secretary

Baker and Director Panetta, two of the finest public servants this country has ever produced, for their very generous introductions.

My whole life has been shaped by public service. My father, a career Army officer, fought in Vietnam in the 1960s and eventually became the Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

As my three brothers and I bounced from post to post across our remarkable country we never had to look further than my father for the best possible model of nonpartisan public service. And I never had to look further than my mother to find the best imaginable example of selflessness and commitment and a life shaped by faith, family, and hard work.

I shared 33 years in the Foreign Service with my wife, Lisa—herself, an exceptional public servant—and our two wonderful daughters, Lizzie and Sarah. Their love and support have made everything possible and have enriched my life beyond measure.

Across those decades as a diplomat in the Middle East and Russia, and as a senior official in Administrations of both parties, I developed enormous respect for my CIA colleagues. I served alongside them in hard places around the world. It was their skill at collection and analysis that often gave me an edge as a negotiator: their partnership that helped make me an effective Ambassador and their insights that helped me make thoughtful choices on the most difficult policy issues.

I learned that good intelligence delivered with honesty and integrity is America's first line of defense. I learned that intelligence professionals have to tell policymakers what they need to hear, even if they don't want to hear it. And I learned that politics must stop where intelligence work begins. That is exactly what President Biden expects of CIA. It was the first thing he told me when he asked me to take on this role. He said he wants the Agency to give it to him straight, and I pledged to do just that and to defend those who do the same.

As the President has emphasized, all of America's national security institutions will have to reimagine their roles on an international landscape that is profoundly different from the world I encountered as a young diplomat nearly 40 years ago, or even the world as it was when I left government six years ago.

Today's landscape is increasingly complicated and competitive. It's a world where familiar threats persist from terrorism and nuclear proliferation to an aggressive Russia, a provocative North Korea, and a hostile Iran.

But it's also a world of new challenges in which climate change and global health and security are taking a heavy toll on the American people; in which cyber threats pose an ever greater risk to our society; and in which an adversarial, predatory Chinese leadership poses our biggest geopolitical test. If confirmed, four crucial and interrelated priorities will shape my approach to leading CIA: China, technology, people, and partnerships.

As President Biden has underscored, out-competing China will be key to our national security in the decades ahead. That will require a long-term, clear-eyed bipartisan strategy underpinned by domestic renewal and solid intelligence. There will be areas in which it will be in our mutual self-interest to work with China, from climate

change to nonproliferation. And I am very mindful that Xi Jinping's China is not without problems and frailties of its own. There are, however, a growing number of areas in which Xi's China is a formidable authoritarian adversary, methodically strengthening its capabilities to steal intellectual property, repress its own people, bully its neighbors, expand its global reach, and build influence in American society.

For CIA, that will mean intensified focus and urgency, continually strengthening its already impressive cadre of China specialists, expanding its language skills, aligning personnel and resource allocation for the long haul, and employing a whole-of-agency approach to the operational and analytical challenges of this crucial threat.

Another priority intimately connected to competition with China is technology. As all of you know as well as I do, the revolution in technology and rapid advances in fields like artificial intelligence are transforming the ways we live, work, fight, and compete.

CIA has a rich tradition of innovation and nothing will matter more to our ability to remain the best intelligence service in the world. CIA will need to relentlessly sharpen its capabilities to understand how rivals use cyber and other technological tools; anticipate, detect, and deter their use; and keep an edge in developing them ourselves. If confirmed, I'll have no higher priority than reinforcing CIA's greatest asset, its people.

The work of CIA's men and women is often invisible to most Americans. But I have served side-by-side with them, seeing first-hand their courage, their professionalism, and their sacrifices. I was privileged to be in the White House Situation Room when CIA's brilliant work helped bring Osama bin Laden to justice. But I also remember sadder and harder days, the sorrow and pain after the tragic attack at Khost, and quiet personal moments spent in front of the Agency's memorial wall whose stars include friends with whom I served.

Honoring the sacrifice those stars represent means strengthening a workforce worthy of the CIA's seal, one that reflects the richness of our society and enables us to carry out our global mission. That means working even harder to enhance diversity, equity, and inclusion from entry-level to senior ranks. It means working even harder to retain and develop the Agency's extraordinary talent.

Equipping them with the language skills, technical tools, training, and tradecraft that they require. And it means ensuring the health and well-being of colleagues and their families through this awful pandemic and wherever and whenever they face harm or risk.

Finally, if confirmed, I'll prioritize partnerships within the Intelligence Community and across the world. I will work closely with the Director of National Intelligence, my longtime friend and colleague, Avril Haines, to make sure the Agency's efforts fit seamlessly with her vision for integrating the Intelligence Community. America's partnerships and alliances are what set our country apart from lonelier major powers like China and Russia.

For CIA, intelligence partnerships are an increasingly important means of amplifying our understanding and influence. Investing in

those liaison relationships has never been more important. It's a task for which my whole career has prepared me.

No partnership will be more important to me than the one I hope to build with all of you on this Committee. In my conversations with each of you over the last few weeks, I have been struck by your commitment to bipartisanship and sense of shared purpose. I deeply respect your crucial oversight role which allows the American people to have confidence that the Agency is working faithfully on their behalf and living up to our values.

If confirmed, I promise to do all I can to earn your trust and to be a strong partner. I'll seek your advice as well as your consent and I'll be accessible and honest, qualities I've tried hard to demonstrate throughout a lifetime in public service. I am deeply honored to be here today and I look forward to your questions.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Burns follows:]

**Statement for the Record
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence**

Director of CIA Nominee William J. Burns
February 24, 2021

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, Members of the Committee, I'm honored and humbled to appear before you today as President Biden's nominee for Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

I am deeply grateful to the President for the opportunity to return to public service and to lead the remarkable women and men of CIA. If confirmed, I will do everything in my power to justify the trust placed in me, and to earn the trust of this Committee, Congress, and the American people.

My whole life has been shaped by public service. My father, a career Army officer, fought in Vietnam in the 1960s and eventually became the director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. As my three brothers and I bounced from post to post across our remarkable country, I never had to look further than my father for the best possible model of non-partisan public service. And I never had to look further than my mother to find the best imaginable example of selflessness and commitment, and a life shaped by faith, family, and hard work.

I shared thirty-three years in the Foreign Service with my wife, Lisa, herself an exceptional public servant, and our two wonderful daughters, Lizzy and Sarah. Their love and support have made everything possible, and have enriched my life beyond measure.

Across those decades as a diplomat in the Middle East and Russia and as a senior official in Administrations of both parties, I developed enormous respect for my CIA colleagues. I served alongside them in hard places around the world. It was their skill at collection and analysis that often gave me an edge as a negotiator; their partnership that helped make me an effective ambassador; and their insights that helped me make thoughtful choices on the most difficult policy issues.

I learned that good intelligence, delivered with honesty and integrity, is America's first line of defense. I learned that intelligence professionals have to tell

policymakers what they need to hear, even if they don't want to hear it. And I learned that politics must stop where intelligence work begins.

That is exactly what President Biden expects of CIA. It was the first thing he told me when he asked me to take on this role. He said he wants the Agency to give it to him straight -- and I pledged to do just that, and to defend those who do the same.

As the President has emphasized, all of America's national security institutions will have to reimagine their roles on an international landscape that is profoundly different from the world I encountered as a young diplomat nearly forty years ago -- or even the world as it was when I left government six years ago.

Today's landscape is increasingly complicated and competitive. It's a world where familiar threats persist -- from terrorism and nuclear proliferation, to an aggressive Russia, a provocative North Korea, and a hostile Iran. But it's also a world of new challenges, in which climate change and global health insecurity are taking a heavy toll on the American people; in which cyber threats pose an ever-greater risk to our society; and in which an adversarial, predatory Chinese leadership poses our biggest geopolitical test.

If confirmed, four crucial and inter-related priorities will shape my approach to leading CIA: China, technology, people, and partnerships.

As President Biden has underscored, out-competing China will be key to our national security in the decades ahead. That will require a long-term, clear-eyed, bipartisan strategy, underpinned by domestic renewal and solid intelligence.

There will be areas in which it will be in our mutual self-interest to work with China, from climate change to nonproliferation. And I am very mindful that Xi Jinping's China is not without problems and frailties of its own. There are, however, a growing number of areas in which Xi's China is a formidable, authoritarian adversary -- methodically strengthening its capabilities to steal intellectual property, repress its own people, bully its neighbors, expand its global reach, and build influence in American society.

For CIA, that will mean intensified focus and urgency -- continually strengthening its already-impressive cadre of China specialists, expanding its language skills, aligning personnel and resource allocation for the long-haul, and employing a

whole-of-agency approach to the operational and analytical challenges of this crucial threat.

Another priority, intimately connected to competition with China, is technology. As all of you know as well as I do, the revolution in technology and rapid advances in fields like artificial intelligence are transforming the ways we live, work, fight, and compete.

CIA has a rich tradition of innovation, and nothing will matter more to our ability to remain the best intelligence service in the world. CIA will need to relentlessly sharpen its capabilities to understand how rivals use cyber and other technological tools; anticipate, detect and deter their use; and keep an edge in developing them ourselves.

If confirmed, I'll have no higher priority than reinforcing CIA's greatest asset – its people. The work of CIA's men and women is often invisible to most Americans, but I have served side by side with them, seeing firsthand their courage, their professionalism, and their sacrifices.

I was privileged to be in the White House Situation Room when CIA's brilliant work helped bring Osama Bin Laden to justice. But I also remember sadder and harder days – the sorrow and pain after the tragic attack at Khost, and quiet, personal moments spent in front of the Agency's Memorial Wall, whose stars include friends with whom I served.

Honoring the sacrifice those stars represent means strengthening a workforce worthy of the CIA seal – one that reflects the richness of our society and enables us to carry out our global mission. That means working even harder to enhance diversity, equity and inclusion, from entry-level to senior ranks. It means working even harder to retain and develop the Agency's extraordinary talent – equipping them with the language skills, technical tools, training, and tradecraft that they require. And it means ensuring the health and wellbeing of colleagues and their families, through this awful pandemic and wherever and whenever they face harm or risk.

Finally, if confirmed, I'll prioritize partnerships – within the intelligence community and across the world. I will work closely with the Director of National Intelligence, my longtime friend and colleague Avril Haines, to make sure the Agency's efforts fit seamlessly with her vision for integrating the intelligence community.

America's partnerships and alliances are what set our country apart from lonelier major powers like China and Russia. For CIA, intelligence partnerships are an increasingly important means of amplifying our understanding and influence. Investing in those liaison relationships has never been more important. It's a task for which my whole career has prepared me.

No partnership will be more important to me than the one I hope to build with all of you on this Committee. In my conversations with each of you over the last few weeks, I have been struck by your commitment to bipartisanship and sense of shared purpose. I deeply respect your crucial oversight role, which allows the American people to have confidence that the Agency is working faithfully on their behalf and living up to our values.

If confirmed, I promise to do all I can to earn your trust, and to be a strong partner. I'll seek your advice as well as your consent. And I'll be accessible and honest – qualities I've tried hard to demonstrate throughout a lifetime in public service.

I am deeply honored to be here today, and look forward to your questions. Thank you.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Ambassador Burns. And for planning purposes, if any Members of the Committee wish to submit questions for the record after today's hearing, please do so by the close of business on Friday, February 26th.

We will be going through five-minute rounds.

Can you speak with a little more specificity to how you can go about restoring some of the morale of the workforce of the CIA? You know "morale" is an ethereal term. Are there measurement techniques or things that we should look to see how the workforce is doing, feeling, operating, you know three months, six months, a year in?

Ambassador BURNS. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think in many ways the most important single thing is to reinforce—to what I hope are my future colleagues in CIA, if I'm confirmed—that their work matters more than ever, as I tried to describe in my opening statement. That their expertise, their courage, their sacrifices are respected.

And that, as I promised President Biden, we will deliver unvarnished intelligence, the best possible intelligence we can gather, the most sophisticated all-source analysis, to deliver it to policymakers without any hint of politics or any policy agenda.

To speak truth to power just as you rightly emphasize in your own opening comments, that's what President Biden expects of me. That's what I will do to the very best of my ability and, as I said, I will defend all of my colleagues who do exactly the same thing. And I think that's what's crucially important.

Chairman WARNER. I think the Committee will want to check in on this on a fairly regular basis. I think we've heard a number of concerns. A number of folks—professionals—were leaving. We've got to stanch that flow and move forward.

On that issue and related at least—and this has really been a concern of Senator Collins, and of the whole Committee—we've seen evidence now not just of Agency personnel, but State Department personnel and others become victims of mysterious attacks. It was for a while called the Havana Syndrome. And a number of us have been quite concerned that we still don't know the source of those attacks. We still don't potentially have a full medical diagnosis.

And even though we have put it into law on the last three intel authorization bills, the ability for the CIA Director to provide enhanced benefits to those individuals—the kind of first-rate quality healthcare and compensation they need and deserve—we're not sure that's really taking place. So, I want you to speak to that.

I want to also get a commitment from you that CIA personnel who may have suffered brain injury have the option of treatment in our Nation's premier TBI facilities, including Walter Reed and other facilities of the highest caliber. To date, unfortunately that has not been the case.

Ambassador BURNS. Well, Mr. Chairman, the first thing I'd say is I very much admire your leadership, the leadership of the Vice Chairman and Senator Collins, as well as other Members of the Committee on these issues. Not only do I admire and appreciate it, but I know it's deeply appreciated by the women and men of the CIA.

If I'm confirmed as Director of CIA, I will have no higher priority than taking care of people, of colleagues and their families. And I do commit to you that, if I'm confirmed, I will make it an extraordinarily high priority to get to the bottom of who's responsible for the attacks that you just described, and to ensure that colleagues and their families get the care that they deserve, including at the National Institutes of Health and at Walter Reed. And I look forward very much to working with all of you to ensure that that's the case.

Chairman WARNER. And the last question is this Committee, under the leadership of Senator Burr and Senator Rubio, in many ways I think carved out a role as the technology committee on the Hill, and we really were the group that first raised the concerns about China's technological advances. We were the Committee that called into question and then tried to formulate across government a 5G response.

On this issue of technology advancement, as Senator Rubio pointed out, China doesn't have the goal of competing with us; they have the goal of beating us in technological advancement. You may want to comment on this briefly, but continuing CIA's role to monitor China's advancement in all these technology fields is not simply a CIA directive. But we really do think the Intelligence Community has a broader view on this issue than any other part of our government.

Ambassador BURNS. No, it's hugely important, Mr. Chairman. And as I tried to emphasize in my opening statement, that connection between dealing with an adversarial China and ensuring that we can continue to compete effectively in technology is right at the top of my list of priorities, if I'm confirmed.

And I do respect the role of this Committee. And I watched the open hearing yesterday on SolarWinds, and it seemed to me to be a classic illustration of the value of a serious committee in looking at these issues. And I look forward very much to working with all of you on that.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Mr. Vice Chairman?

Vice Chairman RUBIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador, in your written questions, you acknowledge that China uses cultural and educational programs, things like the Confucius Institutes and others, to try to influence U.S. policy debates to spread pro-China propaganda. So, given this acknowledgment, I wanted to focus a little bit on your time as the president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Now, Carnegie is involved with the China-United States Exchange Foundation, an organization that you acknowledged in your written questions and answers that is part of China's United Front system, which is an effort to co-opt and neutralize sources of potential opposition in part of their efforts to encourage foreign countries to adopt positions and narratives supportive of Beijing's preferred policies.

And in this work at the Endowment, it's reported that in 2019 you invited 11 Congressional staffers on a trip to China. They met with a professor who works for the Communist Party Central Committee. They met with the president of another front group for the

Chinese Communist Party—a group that was designated last October by the State Department as a group that seeks to directly influence and actually—the quote is: “Sought to directly and malignly influence state and local leaders in the United States.”

And this group that you partnered with, the China-United States Exchange Foundation, a congressionally-appointed commission, in August 2018 said that they showed a clear intent to influence policy toward China in the United States. So, given your stated concerns about Chinese soft-power influence efforts, why while you were at the helm, did Carnegie Endowment for International Peace establish a relationship with and accept funding from this group, this China-United States Exchange Foundation?

Ambassador BURNS. Well, thanks, Senator Rubio, for the question.

The first thing I'd emphasize is the Carnegie Endowment is a proudly independent and transparent organization, and scrupulous about ensuring that whatever financial support it receives, whether it's from trustees or foundations, doesn't in any way shape the content or the conclusions of scholarly work at Carnegie. That's first.

Second, on the China-U.S. Exchange Foundation, this is a relationship that I inherited when I became president of Carnegie—and that I ended not long after I became president, precisely for the concerns that you just described, because we were increasingly worried about the expansion of Chinese influence operations.

Shortly after I ended that relationship, we began a program at the Carnegie Endowment on countering foreign influence operations, which was aimed mostly at China and Russia, and was supported in part from a grant from the Global Engagement Center at the State Department in the last Administration.

On the second issue, Senator Rubio, that you raised on the congressional staff delegation: in 2019 we did partner with the Aspen Institute, which as you know, for decades under the leadership of Dan Glickman, former Congressman Dan Glickman, has managed both Member and staff delegations to many different parts of the world. This was a trip that included senior staff members, both Republicans and Democrats, both from the House and the Senate.

It was fully approved in advance by the House Ethics Committee, and in my view was an illustration of what an institution like Carnegie should do, which is to provide congressional staff members with an opportunity to engage directly with Chinese counterparts and to express their concerns about Chinese actions and malign behavior quite directly. So in that sense, I think it was a good illustration of what a nongovernmental institution like Carnegie working with the Aspen Institute can do.

But I share your concerns about foreign influence operations. And as I said, we've tried to demonstrate in our work at Carnegie over the time that I was president our appreciation of that threat.

Vice Chairman RUBIO. My second and final question is about Tsinghua University, which has been designated by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute as a very high risk for its level of defense research and alleged involvement in cyber-attacks. Carnegie, while you were there, worked with Tsinghua University to set up the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center in Beijing, a center that features seven

individuals who work at the university as its guiding scholars, who have ties to the Communist Party.

Two of the Center's senior fellows serve in senior Chinese Communist Party roles. And the Center partnered with the Center for China and Globalization, a Beijing think tank associated and linked to the Communist Party—whose president is linked to the Communist Party's efforts via the—he plays a prominent role with the United Front, which is a group that Xi Jinping has called China's secret weapon.

I'm curious. What conditions, restrictions did the Chinese impose in order for this Center to be set up?

Ambassador BURNS. Well, Senator Rubio, you're right. I mean, the Center that Carnegie operates in Beijing—and has for more than a decade—is a partnership with Tsinghua University. During my time as president, I was extraordinarily careful to ensure that the arrangements that we had as a nongovernmental organization operating there allowed us to continue to do independent work and that has been the case over the last six years.

I have also made clear to my colleagues at Carnegie that the moment we were constrained in doing that independent work, we would cease operations because our point is not simply to exist. Carnegie's point is not to exist in centers in different parts of the world. It is to do high-quality, independent work. When that becomes impossible or our scholars are self-censoring, then that is the moment at which it becomes no longer feasible to operate there.

Vice Chairman RUBIO. Thank you.

Chairman WARNER. Senator Feinstein?

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thanks Mr. Chairman.

Over a decade ago, Mr. Burns, the CIA engaged in the use of waterboarding and other so-called enhanced interrogation techniques during interrogations. You provided straightforward answers in the pre-hearing questions, and I appreciate that, but I want to cover this topic because I believe it remains a priority to ensure that we never return to this.

So let me ask you the same types of questions that I asked Directors Coats, Pompeo, and Haspel when they were before us.

Do you agree that current law prohibits any interrogation techniques not allowed by the United States Army Field Manual on interrogation?

Ambassador BURNS. Senator Feinstein, it is good to see you.

I believe that waterboarding does constitute torture under the law. As you well know, this issue of the enhanced interrogation techniques has been a settled matter for more than a decade. They were prohibited by President Obama in 2009; and then under the leadership of Senator McCain, the Congress enshrined this in legislation to ensure that the only permissible interrogation methods were those allowed in the Army Field Manual.

I think it's fair to say we all learned some very hard lessons in the period after 9/11. It is very important—it is crucial to be mindful of those lessons and to move forward. And so it's in that spirit that I also share Director Haines's view that we should not take actions against or prejudice the careers of officers who may have worked in those programs at a time when they were operating

under Department of Justice guidelines and at the direction of the President.

So to answer your question specifically, again, I am certainly committed to what the law provides right now and to ensuring that those enhanced interrogation methods are never again used by CIA. They certainly will not be under my leadership, if I am confirmed.

Senator FEINSTEIN. Well, thank you very much for that answer. It certainly was fulsome and I greatly respect the fact that you came forward with it in the way in which you did.

As noted in the Intelligence Community's statement for the record in 2019 and our most recent worldwide threats assessment hearing, China has the ability to launch cyberattacks that cause localized temporary disruptive effects on critical infrastructure, natural gas pipelines, for days or weeks; and Russia has the ability to execute cyberattacks in the United States that generate localized temporary disruptive effects on critical infrastructure, electrical distribution networks, for at least few hours, and so on. I am concerned by this and want to know how we address this threat.

So here's the question.

What do you believe is the appropriate role for the CIA in diminishing these types of cyber threats to our critical infrastructure? And what else could the CIA be doing to help ensure the integrity of national cyber security?

Ambassador BURNS. Well, thanks, Senator. As the hearing that this Committee conducted yesterday underscored, the SolarWinds attack, that cyberattack, was a very harsh wake-up call I think for all of us about the vulnerabilities of supply chains and critical infrastructure in both the private sector and the public sector in this country. And we have seen in recent years how both the Chinese leadership as well as the Russian leadership have an aggressive determination to take advantage of those vulnerabilities.

I first saw this when I was Ambassador in Moscow in 2007, and the Russians staged—Vladimir Putin's Russia staged—a very determined cyberattack on Estonia, a small NATO ally of the United States.

So if this is a harsh wake-up call, then I think it's essential for the CIA in particular to work even harder to develop our capabilities to help detect these kind of attacks when they come from external players, from foreign players, which is the responsibility of the CIA—to help attribute those. Because without attribution, it is very difficult to deter future attacks, continue to develop our own technological and cyber capabilities as a part of that potential deterrence.

And then at the same time to deepen partnerships across the Intelligence Community with domestic agencies like FBI and the Department of Homeland Security; with the private sector, where there is a shared interest in helping to shore up these vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure; and then finally and not least, with foreign partners as well, many of whom, as I mentioned in the case of Estonia, have faced these same kind of threats. Where we can learn from their experience and working together. Not only build better defenses, but also begin to build leverage against adversaries, and over time, I have been convinced, work

with like-minded countries, allies, and partners not only to build leverage but to build rules of the road that help protect critical infrastructure—that help make clear international understandings that certain kinds of critical infrastructure are off-limits for those kind of cyberattacks.

That will take time, it will take enormous effort, but I think the CIA and intelligence can be an important part of that effort.

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WARNER. Senator Burr?

Senator BURR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador, welcome.

Ambassador BURNS. Good to see you, Sir.

Senator BURR. Hard to believe that we have known each other for over a quarter-century. I'm sure as you drove to the Hill today it reminded you of some of the battle zones you have served in. You have not been given vacation spots at your time at the State Department and I think this Committee is grateful to you for your service up until now and, more importantly, for what you are about to embark on.

Bill, as you know it is difficult for Federal agencies to recruit talent today. It is particularly difficult in an agency that requires security clearances. Do you have any idea today how you might want to restructure the recruitment process so that you can begin to onboard people earlier?

It is difficult to recruit out of a university or graduate school and say: we've got a job for you but in a year after you have cleared security clearance.

Do you see a need to revamp that in a way that allows you to bring that talent in?

Ambassador BURNS. Senator Burr, yes I do, and I have seen through my own experience at another agency at the State Department the price that you pay when security clearance processes drag on and on. You lose good people; it becomes very difficult to recruit the kind of workforce, particularly a diverse workforce, that CIA requires to be effective. And so one of my high priorities, if I am confirmed, will be to take a hard look at that issue.

I know work has gone on in the past on this. I know previous Directors have worked hard at this issue, but I agree with you on its significance, and you can't hope to have effective recruitment processes unless we find a way to streamline that process.

Senator BURR. Well, the Chairman has been outspoken on it, and I am sure he will be dogged as it relates to the way forward.

Ambassador, you speak three languages. Talk to us about how you see language requirements within the Agency going forward. Is it a priority?

Ambassador BURNS. It has to be a priority, Senator. I know it was a priority for Gina Haspel as well, and I greatly respect that.

Human intelligence cuts right to the core of CIA's unique role and responsibilities and a part of gathering that human intelligence which complements technical means that CIA and other parts of the Intelligence Community have made enormous progress on in recent years. But they are not a substitute for human intelligence. A part of that collection effort has to require, does require, a facility in foreign languages.

And so, as I discussed when I was talking about the high priority that I would attach to China if I'm confirmed as Director, a part of that intelligence—a part of that priority—requires expanding the number of Mandarin language speakers in CIA and making that a priority and continuing to work to expand other hard language facility at the Agency. It's crucially important.

Senator BURR. You've heard and you will hear Members on this Committee all talk about technology. And I think most of us would agree that the United States is behind as it relates to our ability to adapt new technologies. We're slow; we fight it.

The reason that many of our adversaries have made the gains that they have is because of their willingness to accept technology, to use technology, to leverage that against what we built.

How do you intend to use technology both in the workforce and in the tradecraft to make sure that we fully take advantage of what I think is the greatest innovative country in the world?

Ambassador BURNS. Well, Senator, I think you're exactly right. CIA has a rich history of innovation and agility and technology, but if I'm confirmed, I recognize that we're going to have to work even harder to be innovative and to be agile.

You mentioned tradecraft, one of the big challenges today in operational tradecraft is ubiquitous technical surveillance, the capacity of a number of our adversaries to make it much more complicated to conduct traditional tradecraft. And so the Agency, like so many other parts of the U.S. Government, is going to have to adapt to that kind of a challenge. I'm entirely confident that the women and men of CIA are capable of that.

It's also going to require—Senator, this is the one point I would add—greater effort to work with the private sector as well so that we cannot only keep pace with technological progress, but get out ahead of it. That's exactly what our adversaries are doing and that's what I think we need to put even greater effort into as well.

Senator BURR. Ambassador, let me remind you that the two introductions that were made for you, one thing they both highlighted, the need for the partnership with this Committee and with the CIA. I know you embrace that fully and for that, we're grateful. I look forward to your confirmation.

Ambassador BURNS. Thank you, Sir. I look forward to it as well.

Senator BURR. Thank you.

Chairman WARNER. Senator Wyden.

Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, at the risk of this becoming a full-fledged bouquet-tossing contest, I want to just register a couple of areas that you've been involved in that are especially important to me. Your track record on human rights is, I think, a real attribute for this job and of course your experience at the State Department. It is rare that we see people with that kind of background. So, we're very appreciative of having you here.

Let me start—and I think we touched on it—with respect to this matter of correcting false statements. If you or any other CIA officials says something publicly that is inaccurate, will you correct the public record?

Ambassador BURNS. Well, Senator, as we discussed, I believe it's a serious responsibility. If I'm confirmed as CIA Director—if in the

case of a policymaker making a statement that I judge later to be at variance with intelligence that we provided, to work with that policymaker to try to correct that statement and to get it right. I think, as you well know, Senator, that cuts right to the core of building credibility and building trust, which are the foundations, I think, for sound policy choices as well. So, I would certainly take that very seriously in doing everything I can to correct the record.

Senator WYDEN. Very good.

My second question deals with this question of technology and I'm glad that you staked out the ground that'll be a priority for you. A major technology challenge will be to protect sources and methods while not hiding the legal interpretations that are used to conduct operations. And I'm especially troubled by situations in which the government goes around the courts and buys Americans private records from data brokers, people who are basically unregulated. It's one of the sleaziest operations I know of.

And I'm actually introducing legislation, "The Fourth Amendment Is Not for Sale Act," here very shortly. We talked about this with Director Haines at her confirmation process, and I would like to ask you whether you would make public the circumstances under which the Intelligence Community—excuse me: under which the CIA as part of the Intelligence Community purchases commercially available information and the legal basis for doing so?

Ambassador BURNS. Yes, Senator, I share Director Haines's view that it would be very valuable to lay out a framework that makes clear to the American people the guidelines and the legal boundaries within which we would undertake those activities. So, I'm a strong believer in transparency and I share Director Haines's commitment.

Senator WYDEN. Now, with respect to accountability: in 2013, the CIA acknowledged that it had fallen short in holding people accountable for failures associated with the management of the torture program. And I want to use my words carefully here because this has been a subject of some debate.

So, my question is: the CIA then recommended, and I believe what the discussion was about was going forward, that it broadened accountability reviews to consider systemic problems and officers responsible for those systemic problems, as well as management failures. So, this was a recommendation of a long time ago, 2013.

Do you agree with the CIA's 2013 recommendation and will you implement it so that, going forward, everybody is clear about the fact that it will be followed?

Ambassador BURNS. I will, Senator.

I attach great importance to accountability. I will certainly follow-through on that if I'm confirmed as Director. I do think it's important in conducting accountability review processes to also look at ways in which you can address systemic problems as well.

Senator WYDEN. I think that's constructive and I want to work with you on the timeline. This will be something we'll talk about on another occasion; but since it was recommended in 2013, that's been a long time. We've got to get it done.

Last question is: over the years, the CIA has at times impeded congressional oversight by limiting briefings to the so-called "Gang

of Eight,” limiting staff access to important programs and operations, and failing to inform the Committee at all. Will you conduct a thorough review of where the CIA has engaged in any of these practices and report back to the full Committee so that all of us—every Member—will know how access can be expanded?

Ambassador BURNS. Well, Senator, if I’m confirmed, I certainly will be committed to trying to provide as much information as possible to the broader Committee on sensitive operations and collection. And I do commit to reviewing the practices of my predecessors with regard to what information was restricted to Gang of Eight and to working with all of you on this Committee on that issue.

Senator WYDEN. Good. I just want to tell my colleagues I’ll be supporting Ambassador Burns and look forward to working with him.

Chairman WARNER. Senator Collins.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you.

Ambassador BURNS, welcome.

Ambassador BURNS. Thank you.

Senator COLLINS. I first want to express my appreciation to you for engaging in an extensive conversation with me about the CIA officials who have been the subject of these terrible attacks that have left them with, in some cases, permanent traumatic brain injuries.

And I was very glad that both the Chairman and the Vice Chairman brought up this issue to you. I know that we have your firm commitment to ensure that those who have been injured receive the best possible—best possible—medical care without going through hassles and roadblocks. And I hope we also have your commitment to focus on identifying the perpetrator of these heinous attacks.

Ambassador BURNS. Senator, I very much appreciated our earlier conversations on these issues as well. And I just reemphasize my commitment on both of those counts to doing everything I can, if I’m confirmed as Director, to help get to the bottom of who’s responsible for those attacks and second—

Chairman WARNER. Ambassador Burns, could you scoot your mic a little bit closer?

Ambassador BURNS. Sure, is that better?

Chairman WARNER. Yes.

Ambassador BURNS.—and commit not only to trying to get to the bottom of who’s responsible, but also to ensure that my future colleagues get the care that they and their families deserve, whether it’s at Walter Reed or National Institute of Health or elsewhere. And I look forward very much to working with you on those issues.

And I know there are a range of other issues affecting the care and well-being of my future colleagues, those who, for example, have served as a paramilitary officers over the course of recent years and have made enormous sacrifices in the last two decades who also face genuine health challenges. And I also commit to trying to ensure that they get the best care possible as well.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you.

In the questions for the record, you were asked about the Confucius Institutes that are on some of our college campuses. And I was

pleased to see that you agree that the Chinese Communist Party uses these institutes as an instrument for propaganda.

Two questions. First, could you elaborate on how the Chinese Communist Party uses these Confucius Institutes to advance its goals? And second, what would be your advice to any college campus that is still hosting a Confucius Institute?

Ambassador BURNS. Senator, thanks for the question.

I think, you know, what the Confucius Institutes do—and I'm no expert on them—is to promote a narrative of Xi Jinping's China which is designed to build sympathy for what is, in my view, a quite aggressive leadership which has engaged in conduct and conducted an adversarial approach to relations with the United States. So, in that sense, that particular dimension of foreign influence operations constitutes a genuine risk.

And so, my advice for any institutions in the United States, including academic institutions, is to be extraordinarily careful of what the motives are for a variety of institutions like that and to be very careful in engaging them.

Senator COLLINS. Would you recommend that they shut them down?

Ambassador BURNS. I mean, if I were a president of a college or university and had a Confucius Institute, that's certainly what I would do.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you.

Chairman WARNER. Senator Heinrich?

Senator HEINRICH. Thank you, Chairman. Welcome, Ambassador.

Ambassador BURNS. Hi, Senator.

Senator HEINRICH. Thanks for the time that we were able to connect earlier.

You've been a customer of the CIA's intelligence for many years in your various roles at state, so you're no stranger to the Agency, to the value that it brings. But if you're confirmed, you'll be the first—and it looks like you're off to a good start, by the way—but you'll be the first career diplomat to serve as Director of the Agency.

So, you'll be in a really good position to help ensure that good intelligence is in the service of good policy.

So, talk to us a little about, at the 30,000-foot level, just how you intend to leverage your diplomatic experience in this new role that is very different from what you did before.

Ambassador BURNS. Well, thanks very much, Senator. And I enjoyed our earlier conversation as well. As you said, I've had long experience both in the field and in senior policymaking jobs in Washington in working with the CIA, and I absolutely agree with you that good intelligence delivered with honesty and integrity is the critical foundation for sound policy choices.

I had a very positive experience as a chief of mission working overseas, working with intelligence colleagues. They understood that, as the chief of mission, I was the President's representative on the ground. I led country teams, which in the case, for example, Moscow when I was Ambassador there from 2005–2008, was still one of our biggest embassies in the world. There were more than two dozen agencies in that country team.

So, they understood—CIA station chief did—their obligation to keep me fully and currently informed. In return, I respected their professionalism and trusted it, and I didn't micromanage. I can't remember one instance when I was a chief of mission either in Moscow or in Jordan where we had to elevate an issue because we had a difference to Washington.

Now, when I was Deputy Secretary of State, there were several instances, not a large number, where differences between a chief of mission and a chief of station were raised to my level. And I was able to work out with my counterpart, the Deputy Director of CIA, in virtually all of those instances a reasonable approach. I can count on less than one hand the number of times we had to elevate that even higher.

So, I raise that only because I think there's no substitute in the end for good leadership and professionalism and trust in making that relationship work, and in understanding the critical role of unvarnished intelligence in the policymaking process.

Senator HEINRICH. I think that's a helpful answer in setting up my next question as well, which is this is a remarkable agency. It has some of the most talented people in service to our country of any agency in existence. But as I mentioned in our recent conversation, when things do get awry, sometimes it is because of things that are inherent to the culture of the Agency.

It can be resistant to change, resistant to transparency, not always welcoming of outsiders. And you told me you're familiar with this concern from your time working with the Agency overseas.

I'm just curious. If you're confirmed, how would you approach, especially as an outsider, the cultural challenges that can be inherent in an agency like this?

Ambassador BURNS. Well, I'm certainly familiar with the cultural identity of different institutions. I mean, my old institution, the State Department, has its own share of tribalism and cultural challenges to be overcome. It's not a perfect institution either.

I have enormous respect for career public servants, whether it's at state—or now I hope at CIA. And, you know, you have to understand what drives different professionals in that organization. If you're a case officer overseas, that requires an enormous amount of professional skill and courage and creativity as well, and that's a huge asset for the promotion of American interests around the world. Analysts at CIA are noted for their honesty, for their willingness to speak truth to power.

And that's why it's so essential for a Director to have their backs and to defend them when they do that, and to make sure that we're trying to get the best out of all of those different roles at the Agency to keep pace with technological change as well, which is another of the great assets, I think, of CIA, and to be able to integrate all of those skills and all of those cultures in a way that serves the national interest. And that's what I'll be determined to do.

Chairman WARNER. Senator Blunt?

Senator BLUNT. Thank you, Chairman. And thank you, Senator Heinrich. I was going to cover exactly those two topics, understanding the building. I did read in some of the articles on this the CIA agents you had worked with over the years were incredibly

confident that as a consumer of this information you'd bring a lot to the job.

I think Robert Richer said: Burns knows the building. And I think your response to Senator Heinrich suggests that you've thought more about the conversation we had about the importance of being engaged in that culture in an imminent way.

I'm wondering, Ambassador, as maybe the person who's been the biggest consumer of CIA assistance and information who would have ever had this job, how would you think that would impact you structuring how the product comes out and how the Agency works as it relates to thinking about the real ultimate goal of the information is not for the CIA to make any decision, but to get it to the consumer in a way that an ambassador or somebody in the administration or a Member of Congress can fully understand the information in the best possible way?

Ambassador BURNS. Thanks so much, Senator, because it cuts right to the core of what my responsibilities will be if I'm confirmed. You know, as a senior policymaker and consumer of intelligence from the CIA, what mattered most to me was that I got their honest judgment on issues, even when it might be inconvenient or unwelcome in some ways because it just complicated what was an already complicated set of policy choices.

But what I learned, sometimes the hard way over my career, is that unless you're getting unvarnished intelligence without a hint of politics or policy agenda, it becomes impossible to have an effective policy process. You also want to get it as quickly as you can, with regard, for example, to issues of attribution, whether there is a cyber-threat like the one the Committee was discussing yesterday, being able to get to the bottom of that is absolutely crucial to trying to sort through policy choices as well.

So I think that the better the connection, in a way, between policymakers who understand what it takes to produce high-quality intelligence and produce it in a timely way, and intelligence professionals who understand what policymakers are wrestling with as they try to sort through what are almost inevitably a set of unappealing choices—I think that becomes crucial to an effective process.

Senator BLUNT. I think this has already come up before but I think you want to be sure that this Committee becomes an informed ally in the effort to be sure that the artificial intelligence, the machine learning helps you, is adequate to get things narrowed down to where an individual should be looking at them.

There is more and more information all of the time and how you get that information to the point where you can in your very best possible way analyze it is going to be, I think, increasingly important.

You know, we first met when you were in Moscow and the Ambassador there. How do you think your understanding of Moscow, of Russia, of Putin is going to be helpful as you advise both this Committee and the President?

Ambassador BURNS. Well, thanks, Senator Blunt and I remember fondly our meeting now almost 15 years ago, I think, in Moscow. You know most of my white hair came from my service in Russia

over the years, and in particular in dealing with Vladimir Putin's Russia.

What I have learned is that it is always a mistake to underestimate Putin's Russia; that while Russia may be in many ways a declining power, it can be at least as disruptive under Putin's leadership as rising powers like China. And so we have to be quite cold-eyed in our view of how those threats can emerge.

And what I have also learned, even though I will set aside my former policymaker role, is that in dealing with those threats, responding to them and deterring them, firmness and consistency is hugely important. And it's also very important to work to the maximum extent possible with allies and partners.

We have more effect sometimes on Putin's calculus when he sees responses coming—firm responses coming—not just from the United States but from our European allies and others as well. So it pays off to work hard at widening that circle of countries who are going to push back.

Senator BLUNT. Well thank you, Ambassador. I look forward to supporting your nomination and to the relationship when you are confirmed that you will have with this Committee, which is incredibly important for us and I hope it turns out to be equally important for you.

Ambassador BURNS. I look forward to it, Senator. Thank you.

Senator BLUNT. Thank you, Chairman.

Chairman WARNER. Senator King on WebEx.

Senator KING. Mr. Ambassador, welcome to the Committee.

Ambassador BURNS. Hi, Senator.

Senator KING. It's great to be with you and I realized when you were being introduced today that you and I had something in common. Both of us took the Foreign Service exam some decades ago, the only difference was that you passed and I didn't. But we won't dwell on that, but I appreciate having you here.

There's been a lot of talk today, rightly so, about truth to power. And sometimes that sounds too easy and my concern is it's more subtle than somebody mendaciously doctoring intelligence or changing it. It's human nature to want to tell the boss what they want to hear.

And so the question is: how do we build a structure to be sure that that is the ongoing policy and that we don't slip into a kind of a comfortable relationship with the President or this Committee or the Secretary of Defense where it is more of an unconscious process but the result is the same: biased intelligence that will undermine good decision-making?

Give me some thoughts on that, please.

Ambassador BURNS. Well, Senator King, it is good to see you and I think you are absolutely right. Speaking truth to power has to be more than a slogan and it is often easier said than done. You know, I think the tone gets set at the top.

I have known President Biden for a quarter century and have great respect for him and when he told me—literally almost the first thing he said when he asked me to take on this role—that he expected me and CIA to deliver intelligence to him straight. I know that he meant it and I think setting that tone at the top is crucially important.

I know it can become difficult in the press of crises and policy-making to lose sight of the importance of delivering unadulterated intelligence judgments, and it's important to remain mindful of that over time and be reminded of it as I know all of you on this Committee will remind me.

All I can say is that I am acutely aware of the importance of playing that role. I know it's a different role than the one I have played in the past as a policymaker, as an ambassador overseas. But I look forward to it because I do understand from those perspectives how crucial it is to have intelligence, the best possible intelligence that CIA can collect, delivered with honesty and integrity. And that is what I intend to do.

Senator KING. In order to effectuate that I hope that you will provide strong support to the ombudsman program, to the analytical integrity program that is ongoing so that the commitment you have from the President extends throughout the Agency.

To followup, in your memoir in 2019 you said that your greatest professional regret was your failure to effectively communicate your concerns prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It seems to me that is an example of what exactly we are talking about.

Share that experience, if you will.

Ambassador BURNS. Sure. Well, first, Senator, I do agree with you on the important role that the ombudsman plays. And if I am confirmed as Director, I will do everything I can to defend and strengthen that role because it does give analysts an opportunity if they have concerns about pressures or politicization to raise them as well.

I tried to write honestly in the memoir that I published a couple of years ago about my experience when I was serving as the head of the Near East Bureau in the State Department for Colin Powell, a leader for whom I have enormous respect, in the run-up to the Iraq War. And what I tried to do along with my colleagues was to be honest about concerns that we had about how complicated the day-after in Iraq would be, even if the U.S. military successfully overthrew Saddam Hussein—which I didn't doubt would be the case.

A couple of colleagues of mine and I, Ryan Crocker, who later became U.S. Ambassador in the hardest places around the world, and David Pierce wrote a memo in the summer of 2002 to Secretary Powell which we entitled "The Perfect Storm." We tried, imperfectly, to lay out our concerns about everything that could go wrong in the run-up to the war in Iraq and on the days after.

It was imperfect. We got it about half right and half wrong in terms of many of the problems we tried to identify. But I mention it only because it was an honest effort to express our concerns. And I think that is what is incumbent—whether you are in a policy-making role as I was then at the State Department or in a senior intelligence role—is to be straightforward about your concerns, because without that, policy choices suffer.

Senator KING. Exactly. Thank you. Well thank you Mr. Ambassador and I also will join my colleagues. I look forward to working with you. The relationship with this Committee is very important because, separately from all other agencies, most other agencies in the U.S. Government, nobody is watching the CIA except us; and

therefore, you have got to be as open as possible with us so that we can meet our responsibility to the American people to be sure that this secret organization—which is sort of an anomaly in a democracy—is being overseen and supervised by elected representatives. So I look forward to working with you.

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Ambassador BURNS. I do, too, Senator King.

Chairman WARNER. I just want to make clear for Members, the procedures we are operating with today I know it's a little different than the past. We are doing questions in order of seniority among those present when the hearing was gaveled to order.

Senator Cornyn?

Senator CORNYN. Mr. Ambassador, thank you for saying yes to President Biden and congratulations. And again, thank you for assuming this important role. I can't think of anybody that has the breadth of experience that you have had in the world, which leads me just to—I am just kind of curious. I know you have been exposed to a lot of foreign intelligence services over your 34 years or so in the Foreign Service.

Are there other intelligence services around the world—any of them that sort of stand out as having what you believe would be commendable organizations or operations or structures that are something the U.S. Government ought to consider in terms of structuring, organizing, or operating our intelligence services?

Ambassador BURNS. Well, I think there are a number of intelligence services, especially amongst our allies and partners, that I've admired over the years. Again, I've been looking at it from the perspective of a diplomat. Certainly, British intelligence service, the French, some of our closest European allies, I think, are first rate partners.

Certainly the Israeli intelligence services I've known over the years are extremely capable and have also, I think, worked hard on the technology issue that we were discussing before, which is extremely important.

We've also had intelligence services who are close partners in the war on terrorism over the last 20 years, whose capabilities, I think, at least in my experience, have been enhanced over recent years, sometimes because of the cooperation with U.S. intelligence services. And that's going to be extremely important moving forward.

So, I think there's something we could learn from those intelligence services. And we also have to pay very careful attention to the capabilities of our adversaries as well, whether it's the Russian intelligence services, which I've had experience with over the years, or Chinese intelligence services, as well.

It's important not to underestimate them. They're putting a great deal of effort into technological development and we see that on the part of smaller adversarial intelligence services, whether it's the Iranians or others as well. So, it's important not to underestimate their capabilities—and learn where we can.

Senator CORNYN. On another topic, one of the things we learned from this pandemic is our vulnerability to supply chains from overseas. And I think you and I may have talked a little bit about my interest—and Chairman Warner and actually Senator Cotton and

the whole Congress, really, now—in reassuring our ability to manufacture the most sophisticated semiconductors.

China, I understand, is building about 16 fabs, while the Taiwan semiconductor is planning on building one in Arizona. But we need to approach, I think, some of these national security challenges we have with China in a different way.

What I mean by that is, we're so ossified and stove-piped here in Congress in terms of the way we do things. Let's say the appropriations process came to providing some sort of financial incentive for the development of some technology like—well, like a semiconductor fab. That doesn't quite fit very well into our structure of appropriations and budget caps and subcommittee appropriations and the like.

But I wish you would work with us and give some thought, not only to what those vulnerabilities are and how we rack them and stack them and address them in terms of the priorities and the vulnerability that currently exists, but help us find ways to perhaps modify, change, reform, or just adapt to the new competition we have with China, where they're investing billions of dollars in everything from 5G to AI to quantum computing and others. And we can't afford to let them win.

Will you commit to working with us on the challenge?

Ambassador BURNS. I certainly will, Senator. And I do admire the work that you and Senator Cotton and others have done over the course of recent months and years to highlight that problem, supply chain vulnerability.

Semiconductors, as you mentioned, is a classic illustration of that as well. And not only do I look forward to working with you on those issues, but I promise it'll be high priority at CIA if I'm confirmed, to understand from the perspective we bring from abroad the ways in which some of our adversaries and rivals can take advantage of those vulnerabilities. And then, through intelligence partnerships with some of our allies and partners, to look at ways in which we can coordinate efforts to shore up supply chains as well because it's not a vulnerability that's unique to the United States, as you well know, Senator. So, I'll look forward very much to working with you on that.

Senator CORNYN. If the Chairman will indulge me and let me just ask one final question.

Chairman WARNER. A short question because—

Senator CORNYN. On nuclear proliferation.

Ambassador BURNS. Yes, Sir.

Senator CORNYN. Do you think Iran can ever be trusted with a nuclear weapon?

Ambassador BURNS. No, Sir. No, I think it's absolutely important for the United States to continue to do everything we can to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon.

Senator CORNYN. Thank you very much.

Chairman WARNER. Senator Bennet.

Senator BENNET. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ambassador, for your willingness to serve. We are very, very grateful that you're coming back.

You had mentioned that enhanced competition with an increasingly threatening Chinese Communist Party constitutes one of our

greatest long-term challenges. As Chairman Warner said, the Committee has been closely tracking China's assertive moves from aggressive investments in port infrastructure on some of the world's most strategic coasts to exportation of illiberal surveillance regimes to investments intended to put our advantages in space at risk.

In addition to China, you listed off, I think, nuclear proliferation, climate, global health, technology as things where we need a long-term—you said, I think, a long-term, clear-eyed approach. And you have worked in these—in countries with authoritarian regimes. We obviously are a democracy.

It was a poignant, I think, to see those two luminaries introduce you this morning as a reminder of the time when people actually could find a way to work together in this democracy. And I wanted to ask you your thoughts about how you, as the Director of the CIA, could elevate the view a little bit here to make sure that we're looking out 10 years and 20 years instead of just between the commercial breaks on the cable television at night.

How do we, as a democracy, competing in a world with totalitarian societies, seize an opportunity here to actually compete and win and succeed? I'd just be interested in your perspective about how—

Ambassador BURNS. Sure.

Senator BENNET. How you can help us elevate our view?

Ambassador BURNS. Well, Senator, first, I think it is important to approach all of those formidable challenges you just described with a sense of confidence because, while I recognize that the international landscape is changing fast, we're in a period of profound transformation.

The United States may no longer be the singular dominant player we were when I worked for Secretary Baker 30 years ago. But I would still argue we have a better hand to play than any of our major rivals. And that's because of our capacity for domestic renewal which I know has been tested in recent years. But it's hugely important and it sets us apart from authoritarian regimes around the world.

And second is our capacity to draw on allies and partners, which also sets us apart from lonelier powers like China and Russia today. The second thing I'd stress, just to pick up your point, is it is important—as pressing as immediate crises and immediate threats always are at the CIA or anywhere else in the U.S. Government—you have to be able to look over the horizon a little bit. You mentioned one very good example of that which is space, which I know is something you been very much focused on.

Here is an area in which our adversaries are working overtime to try to develop their capabilities which can threaten American critical infrastructure and lots of other things that are important to us. It's also an area where there are really no international rules of the road right now, whether it's in terms of commerce or security or anything else.

And so, I think it's incumbent upon CIA to focus on issues like that, to be able to highlight the threat that's growing for American interests. And then to try to think creatively in support of policy-makers about, you know, how you anticipate those threats and begin today to plan for the best ways to deal with them.

Senator BENNET. We look forward to working with you on all of that, I think. As you write in your book, that period of time that Baker represents was a time when we were in the Cold War and we had an organizing principle of some kind—which didn't mean that we made—didn't make—mistakes. We made mistakes all the time but we had an organizing principle. And I think we lost that at the end of the Cold War in some respects, that organizing principle. And then 9/11 happened and disoriented us.

And I think really this moment is an opportunity to reintroduce our values to the rest of the world and do it, as you say, with a sense of optimism. You know, we should have a sense of optimism. A lot of countries that you've served in have had some version of January 6th happen to them. But what they don't have is what happened on January 20th here, which was the peaceful transfer of power. And I think that that should give us some confidence going forward. I hope it gives you confidence.

Ambassador BURNS. I agree. Absolutely, Senator, I think we ought to approach, however formidable the challenges are, we ought to approach them with a sense of confidence and optimism. That's what, in my long experience serving overseas for the U.S. Government, whether people like our policies or hate them. What they expect from Americans is problem-solving, a sense of possibility, a sense of optimism.

That's what they admire most about our society when it's operating at its best, and that's what they hope to see from American leadership in the world. It is just as you said, Senator: we don't always get it right. We don't have a monopoly on wisdom. But we ought not to underestimate that core strength that American society has and brings to the world.

Senator BENNET. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Chairman WARNER. Senator Sasse?

Senator SASSE. Thank you, Chairman. Ambassador, congratulations.

Ambassador BURNS. Hi, Senator.

Senator SASSE. Thank you for the time you spent with us in the run-up to this. And I'll just say this Committee, as is well-known to the Members and to you, is different than most committees on the Hill. And it's I think usually because we don't have cameras. Usually people don't have any incentive to make grandstanding speeches. And this Committee works a lot better than most.

But I also just want to commend you on the substance of your opening statement. Confirmation hearings are usually an exercise in defense where people don't want to say anything that could get them in trouble if they look likely to be confirmed, and you actually said a ton of substantive things. I also think your answers to Senator Rubio about CCP influence operations were meaty, so thank you for that.

So, this is not a hostile question at all. It's genuinely a sympathetic question to your nomination. But you said in your opening statement that I think the biggest priorities that you have are China, tech, human capital, and—I forget the term you used. I wrote down "alliances."

Ambassador BURNS. Partnerships, yes.

Senator SASSE. Personnel and partnerships. I think that's exactly the right issues that for our IC. I think that's the right set, and I think it's the right order. So, first of all, congratulations on having a substantive view of the important calling that you face.

It's not bad that we've had to go through an evolution as a Nation on our China policy, because everybody in a bipartisan way 20 years ago had a very different view about how things might work out with the Chinese leadership. Obviously, that hasn't happened.

Could you walk us through a little bit of your evolution, because you had different positions in, say, 2013. I think I detect even an evolution from your "Atlantic" piece, which I read last June/July, to your really meaty stuff today. So, not a hostile question, but walk us through your evolution in the last two or three years of how you think about the CCP.

Ambassador BURNS. Well, thanks, Senator, very much. You know, I think the truth is that Xi Jinping's China—I mentioned the term "wake-up call" earlier in response to SolarWinds—but I think the evolution of Xi Jinping's China over the last six or seven years has been a very sharp wake-up call in a lot of ways, the kind of aggressive, undisguised ambition and assertiveness that I think has made very clear the nature of the adversary and rival that we face today.

And I think that's been true across partisan lines, not just in the Congress, but across our society. And the challenge, therefore, is how do you build a long-term—and I would emphasize the term "long-term" because we have to buckle up for the long haul, I think, in competition with China. This is not like the competition with the Soviet Union and the Cold War, which was primarily in security and ideological terms.

This is an adversary that is extraordinarily ambitious in technology and capable in economic terms, as well. And so, it's buckling up for the long term and developing a very clear-eyed bipartisan strategy, which I think is entirely possible right now.

My role, if I'm confirmed as Director of CIA, will be to try to ensure not only that we approach this issue with urgency and with a very sharp focus, expand our capabilities over the next couple of years, but then deliver the best possible intelligence about the nature of Chinese intentions and capabilities. That's the only way we'll be able to sustain that kind of long-term strategy.

And then the only other thing I'd say, Senator, as we discussed before, a critical part of that is going to be working with allies and partners, because that's where Xi Jinping's China and its wolf-warrior diplomacy has actually created opportunities for us. Because it's helped open the eyes of lots of partners and allies, not just across Asia but in other parts of the world, to the nature of that threat as well. And we need to try to take advantage of that, both in intelligence partnerships and then obviously more broadly in terms of diplomacy.

Senator SASSE. I want to transition a little bit to your bureaucratic challenges in trying to reorient the Agency's budget and personnel to the challenges of today, not the challenges of the post-9/11 moment. If we had a lot more time, though, I would also want to drill down a little bit, and I may do that in private in a followup to this during our classified time today. But a lot of us are very

worried about Secretary Kerry's undefined role, because Chairman Xi Jinping is going to lie about what they will do on climate. Like, that's not an open question. He's going to lie.

And so, it means if we have all these real technological race challenges between the CCP and freedom-loving Nations, the set of whatever the new NATO for the digital revolution is, the Trans Pacific Partnership plus technology standards—whatever that thing is, if we take the pressure off in the alliance that we're going to build because there's some climate summit going to happen in 18 or 24 months where he's going to promise a bunch of pie-in-the-sky, then everything we're saying ends up being a house of cards. So, a lot of us are worried about the climate lies that are going to come from China as a way around this.

But I would like to ask you, in the post-9/11 moment, it was right for us to be focused on the global CT threat and the spread of jihadism. That's not the biggest challenge we face right now, and yet most of our IC budget and personnel still has these lingering effects of 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010. How are you going to make sure that the pivot toward the Pacific is really operative in budget and personnel decisions under your leadership?

Ambassador BURNS. Well, thanks, Senator. I look forward to a longer conversation with you on both of the subjects.

Briefly on climate, I just think it's important for the United States to view cooperation with China on climate issues is not a favor to the United States. It's in the self-interest of China to do that. So, in other words, it's not something to be traded. It's in the self-interest of China as well to work on these issues. And it's important for us to be clear eyed about that, as I'm sure the President and Secretary Kerry will be.

On the wider question that you raised, I don't have a neat formula to offer to you about the balance between what is a continuing threat posed by terrorists groups, even though we're almost 20 years after 9/11, and what are clearly huge emerging challenges, particularly China, but all the other ones that you mentioned. So, it's going to be critical for the Agency to adapt in terms of resources, in terms of focus, and everything else.

I don't have a neat formula to offer to you today, but I look forward very much to working with you on that because that adaptation inevitably is going to require prioritizing amongst resources and people.

Senator SASSE. Thank you. I know the Chairman is going to take my mic, so I won't ask the question here but I'll just flag that I'm going to followup with you as well about the Historical Advisory Program.

Your memoir shows the importance of declassifying records. We need to protect sources and methods wherever we can. We must. It's essential. But the inertia of motion should eventually be to declassification for public trust and for scholarly purposes. And I think right now the inertia inside most of our agencies is to assume, if someone doesn't proactively declassify, it stays classified.

Chairman WARNER. Senator Casey?

Senator SASSE. And I hope you'll return it to your—to reporting—

Chairman WARNER. Senator Cotton has been extraordinarily patient when we switched the order little bit here today, so I want to make sure I don't try his patience any further.

Senator CASEY?

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, great to be with you.

Ambassador BURNS. Thank you

Senator CASEY. I come today to this hearing to express gratitude for three reasons.

Number one is for your exemplary public service. I think that's an understatement.

Number two, for your service, the service of your family starting with your father and throughout the time that your immediate family has served with you and provided their own measure of service. I'm especially grateful that your father has roots in Pennsylvania, and as I think you've told me before specifically in Scranton, Pennsylvania, which provides a special recognition for me.

But most importantly maybe for today, your recognition in your opening statement of not only the service but the sacrifices of the men and women of the CIA. You talked about those personal moments that you had in front of that agency memorial wall and knowing some of those who had lost their lives, so I appreciate the fact that you recognize them.

I wanted to ask two questions. One is country specific and one is more broadly about our national security threats. The staff drafted a very good question for a new Member that I'll use. But on China, you said it, and I'm quoting in your opening statement, "Out-competing China is key to our national security." And I agree with that.

Number two, when I consider the economic threats that China poses to a state like Pennsylvania, I've often said that when China cheats, we lose jobs in Pennsylvania. So, I guess just in terms of the threats posed by China, I guess by way of kind of itemization or prioritization, how do you rank them? Technology, economic, military?

How would you assess the basic threats that China poses?

Ambassador BURNS. Well, Senator Casey, it is good to see you again. I think as many of the Members of this Committee have argued eloquently in public, I think technology and competition and technology cuts right to the core of China's capacity to compete in military terms and economic terms as well.

So if I had to underscore the core area that's going to matter most in terms of competition with an adversarial China, I think it cuts right to that issue of technology as we look out over the next decade or more.

Senator CASEY. That is helpful and I wanted to speak more broadly now about national security threats.

Again, if you could just itemize—if that is possible in a short answer. I know we don't have a lot of time, but the major national security threats that we face. And then in particular—and I think this is an important point that the staff made in the materials—how should the CIA be positioned to predict, provide a warning about, and to mitigate these threats?

Ambassador BURNS. Well, Senator, one thing I have learned over the years is, while it's very important to have priorities, and I think I would put at the top of the list—as I mentioned in my opening statement—the challenge posed by Xi Jinping's China, by an adversarial China. It is hard for me to see a more significant threat or challenge for the United States as far out as I can see into the 21st century than that one. It is the biggest geopolitical test that we face.

Having said that, you know, in the same sentence, I would not want to give short shrift to a range of other challenges out there. As I mentioned, Putin's Russia continues to demonstrate that declining powers can be just as disruptive as rising ones and can make use of asymmetrical tools, especially cyber tools, to do that. So we can't afford to underestimate them.

The nonproliferation challenges and the other challenges posed by Iranian behavior, for example, are hugely significant and ones that we can't afford to ignore. Across the board, ballistic missile development as well as subversive and destabilizing actions in the Middle East and human rights abuses toward its own people inside Iran as well.

And then, as I said earlier, we have to look ahead as well to those emerging challenges—the problems without passports that we have to deal with that aren't confined to any one nation-state. Whether it's issues of global health insecurity—as you know the American people have faced in full measure over the course of the last year; whether it's the revolution in technology; whether it's other forms of instability or problems, they are going to create challenges for the United States down the road. So you know, if I had to put one set of challenges at the top of the list, it would certainly be China, as I mentioned before. But we just don't have the luxury of neglecting any of those other challenges, as well.

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

I look forward to supporting your confirmation.

Ambassador BURNS. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman WARNER. Senator Cotton?

Senator COTTON. Mr. Burns, welcome, thank you.

Ambassador BURNS. Thank you.

Senator COTTON. Congratulations on your nomination.

Mr. Burns I want to start by adding my voice to Senator Warner and Senator Collins concerns about the microwave attacks at our embassies around the world. I won't belabor that. I will just say that I share that and I appreciate your commitment to getting to the bottom of it and taking care of anyone who has been injured in it.

Ambassador BURNS. Thank you.

Senator COTTON. More broadly, as we discussed on the phone last week, I have taken an interest over the years in the health of our Special Activities Center inside the CIA specifically, or I should say metaphorical health, in terms of the numbers of paramilitary officers available and the workload we are asking them to bear. But also the literal health, because many of them do suffer the same kind of wounds that our service members face.

I just want to speak today publicly about what we discussed on the phone. You do commit to ensuring that these officers and their families have the very best medical care and support available.

Ambassador BURNS. Absolutely, Sir. I have seen firsthand the sacrifices that they have made, the courage they have demonstrated, especially over the last 20 years. And so I am absolutely committed to that.

Senator COTTON. And that includes continuing the work that Director Haspel and her leadership has already started to ensure that these officers have care that is equal to if not better than what we already provide our service members and veterans?

Ambassador BURNS. Yes, Sir.

Senator COTTON. Thank you.

I want to touch briefly on another point that we discussed. You are probably aware that I briefly held Director Haines's nomination to be Director of National Intelligence after an answer to one of her questions had implied that she might reconsider some actions taken on long-concluded accountability review boards related to long-closed terrorist detention programs.

I am troubled by some media reports I have seen that suggest a senior CIA officer who was detailed to the DNI has recently had his portfolio reduced because of his involvement in that program. I would just like to get your commitment that if confirmed, you will abide by the determination of the Obama administration not to resurrect any efforts to prosecute or take administrative action against, or prejudice in any way in any future promotion or selection panels, for any CIA officer involved with those programs that were conducted under DOJ guidance and Presidential direction.

Ambassador BURNS. Yes, Senator.

As I mentioned earlier, you have my commitment not to take actions against or prejudice the careers of officers who may have worked on those programs in the past when they were operating under Department of Justice guidelines and at the direction of the President. Yes, Sir.

Senator COTTON. Thank you. We also talked in our phone call about the importance of everything the CIA does but the centrality of the collection of foreign intelligence; and to put it in military terms, that collection is the main effort at the CIA.

Ambassador BURNS. Yes, Sir.

Senator COTTON. And that means primarily the department—or the Directorate of Operations, but also other elements of the Agency: in Science and Technology and the new Digital Directorate. You agree that collection of foreign intelligence is the main effort at the Central Intelligence Agency?

Ambassador BURNS. It is the core of CIA's mission. Analysis in other words, what you do with that collection to put it in a form that is going to be most useful to policymakers, is obviously critical as well. But at the core of what the CIA does is that foreign collection, in particular human intelligence.

Senator COTTON. And that is because the collection of foreign intelligence, put in laymen's terms—stealing foreign secrets—it allows those analysts to have an even richer analysis than what they would have if they were only using publicly-available sources, the way, say, an academic or a think tank scholar might?

Ambassador BURNS. That is correct. And it does involve, as you said, stealing secrets and doing it in a way that is superior to what our rivals and adversaries try to do.

Senator COTTON. Thank you.

We also talked about covert action. I shared my views that too often Administrations in the past of both parties have viewed covert action not as a supplement to policy, but as a substitute for policy.

Would you agree with that assessment?

Ambassador BURNS. Yes, and I think it is one of the big dangers. I haven't had a chance to be briefed in detail on existing covert action programs, and it is something I would look forward to talking about in closed sessions in the future. But your point about connecting covert action programs at the direction of the President to coherent policy is absolutely crucial. It cannot be a substitute for sound policy choices.

Senator COTTON. It is, however, in many cases a sound supplement to a broader foreign policy in that we should not have a reluctance to use it [Inaudible.]

Ambassador BURNS. Yes, Sir. As one tool in a coherent strategy and policy. I absolutely agree with you.

Senator COTTON. When you were out of government you said, quote: "It is simply impractical to think that the United States will provide significant sanctions relief without assurances that Iran will immediately begin negotiations on a follow-on agreement that at least extends the timelines of the deal and addresses issues of verification and intercontinental ballistic missiles."

I agree.

If confirmed, Mr. Burns, will you provide that same realistic assessment to the Administration, even if it contradicts the Administration's preferred policy approach to negotiations?

Ambassador BURNS. Yes, Sir. Senator, on Iran as well as on a whole range of other issues, it will be my obligation if confirmed to deliver those intelligence assessments in a straightforward and unvarnished way.

Senator COTTON. Thank you, Mr. Burns. I look forward to talking about some of these other matters later this afternoon.

Ambassador BURNS. Thank you, Sir.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator Cotton. We now have Senator Gillibrand on WebEx.

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Over the last year alone, according to public reports, Russia attempted to influence the 2020 election and stoke discord in our country; attempted to assassinate a prominent anticorruption activist using nerve agent; and perpetrated the SolarWinds hack, one of the largest cyber intrusions ever that breached sensitive U.S. Government systems.

Obviously, you have served as Ambassador to Moscow, you speak Russian. Where do you think we should start with the Kremlin? And if you are confirmed, what would be your approach to this profound challenge?

Ambassador BURNS. Well, Senator, it is nice to see you and I enjoyed our conversation earlier this week.

Certainly, I think it's a huge mistake, as I said earlier, not to underestimate the challenge and the threat that Vladimir Putin's Russia can pose to the United States. My own view in the past, both serving as a policymaker and then as a private citizen, has been there's no substitute for firmness and consistency in dealing with Putin's Russia, and working as closely as we can with allies and partners who share those same concerns.

I know the Biden administration is soon to produce an assessment of all of those issues that you've just mentioned, from SolarWinds to the poisoning and then the cruel absurdity, as the Chairman has put it, publicly of sentencing Alexei Navalny to years in a penal colony for failing to check in with his parole officer, when the reason he failed to check in is that he was in a coma after an attempted assassination attempt clearly sponsored by the Kremlin to poison him to death.

So, there's a whole range of issues on which I know this assessment will not only provide the best intelligence that we are capable of on exactly what happened in those instances, but also a sense of the consequences for them as well. And so, if I'm confirmed, I look forward very much to participating in that effort and what flows from it in the future.

So, the short answer, Senator, is I think there's no substitute for firmness and consistency and being clear eyed, because the reality is that, I think, in terms of American policy of U.S.-Russian relations—as long as Vladimir Putin is the leader of Russia, we're going to be operating within a pretty narrow band of possibilities, from the very sharply competitive to the very nastily adversarial.

Senator GILLIBRAND. Yes, I think we also will have a similar challenge with regard to China. And obviously, there is a great deal of strategic competition with China right now, but we also want to have some kind of engagement strategy.

Can you expand upon your views on what you would like to do to approach China?

Ambassador BURNS. Well, I think again, if I'm confirmed as the Director of CIA, my role won't be as a policymaker anymore. But I think the core of sound policy choices is the best intelligence we can provide about the intentions and capabilities of Xi Jinping's China. And that's something that we need to develop ourselves. We need to work closely with allies and partners who share many of those same concerns.

So, as I said earlier, Senator, I think it's absolutely important to be quite clear-eyed about the long-term nature of that challenge from an adversarial China under Xi Jinping's leadership; and to help policymakers think through the various ways in which those threats can emerge, to look carefully at vulnerabilities whether it's in supply chains or in other areas, and to always be mindful of the value for the United States of working closely with allies and partners in developing that intelligence, but also in developing and executing smart policy.

Senator GILLIBRAND. And your third-largest challenge, at least for the Nation and President Biden, is Iran. And I know you were instrumental in the negotiations under the Obama administration.

What do you think the approach will be with regard to Iran?

Ambassador BURNS. Well, I've always thought that the key to dealing with the variety of threats that are posed by Iran today is a comprehensive strategy, of which preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon is only one part.

It has to be a strategy that pushes back against threatening Iranian actions, whether it's developing ballistic missiles and destabilizing its region or subverting other governments or human rights abuses against its own people. And so, I think in all those areas, we have to be mindful of the fact that, even if Iran returns to full compliance with the comprehensive nuclear agreement and the United States does as well, as President Biden said he's prepared to do, that then needs to be a platform.

Secretary Blinken has emphasized a platform for building longer and stronger nuclear constraints, and also for dealing with those other areas of threatening Iranian actions that I mentioned before. I know that's easier said than done, but that needs to be the clear strategy, it seems to me. In my role, if I'm confirmed, will be to help provide the best possible intelligence as policymakers pursue that strategy.

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand.

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you, Ambassador.

Chairman WARNER. Well, Ambassador Burns, you got through the first hurdle, 15 out of 16. And if Senator Risch joins us, he will get first crack in the closed session. The hearing will go into recess and we will reconvene at one o'clock. We very much appreciate your testimony.

Ambassador BURNS. Thank you.

Vice Chairman RUBIO. And again, echoing Senator Wyden's comments, rarely does a nominee come before this Committee with this much positive approval, although rarely does a nominee also bring Jim Baker and Leon Panetta as their introducers.

So, we'll look forward to seeing you at one o'clock.

Ambassador BURNS. Thank you.

Vice Chairman RUBIO. The Committee stands in recess.

[Whereupon at 12:07 p.m. the Committee stood in recess subject to the call of the Chairman.]

Supplemental Material

SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE

UNITED STATES SENATE



QUESTIONNAIRE FOR COMPLETION BY
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEES

**SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE**

**QUESTIONNAIRE FOR COMPLETION BY
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEES**

PART A - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

1. FULL NAME: William Joseph Burns
OTHER NAMES USED: N/A
2. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 4/11/1956, Fort Bragg, North Carolina
CITIZENSHIP: USA
3. MARITAL STATUS: Married
4. SPOUSE'S NAME: Lisa Carty
5. SPOUSE'S MAIDEN NAME IF APPLICABLE: N/A
6. NAMES AND AGES OF CHILDREN:

NAME

AGE

INFORMATION REDACTED

7. EDUCATION SINCE HIGH SCHOOL:

<u>INSTITUTION</u>	<u>DATES ATTENDED</u>	<u>DEGREE RECEIVED</u>	<u>DATE OF DEGREE</u>
La Salle University	1973 – 1978	B.A.	1978
Oxford University, St. John's College	1978 – 1981	M.Phil and D. Phil	1981

8. EMPLOYMENT RECORD (LIST ALL POSITIONS HELD SINCE COLLEGE, INCLUDING MILITARY SERVICE. INDICATE NAME OF EMPLOYER, POSITION, TITLE OR DESCRIPTION, LOCATION, AND DATES OF EMPLOYMENT).

<u>EMPLOYER</u>	<u>POSITION/TITLE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATES</u>
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U.S. Department of State:

State Consular and Political Officer, Embassy Amman (1982 – 1984)

Staff Assistant to Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs, Washington, DC (1984-1985)

Special Assistant to Deputy Secretary of State, Washington, DC (1985-1986)

National Security Council Staff Director and Senior Director for Near East and South Asia and Special Assistant to President Reagan, Washington, DC (1986-1989)

Acting Director and Principal Deputy Director, Policy Planning Staff, Washington, DC (1989-1993)

Advanced Russian Language Training, Washington, DC and Garmisch, Germany (1993-1994)

Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs, Embassy Moscow (1994-1996)

Executive Secretary & Special Assistant to Secretary of State Christopher and Secretary of State Albright, Washington, DC (1996-1998)

U.S. Ambassador to Jordan, Embassy Amman (1998-2001)

Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Washington, DC (2001-2005)

U.S. Ambassador to the Russian Federation, Embassy Moscow (2005-2008)

Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Washington, DC (2008-2011)

U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Washington, DC (2011-2014)

Post-Government:

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, President, Washington, DC (2015 – present)

9. GOVERNMENT EXPERIENCE (INDICATE EXPERIENCE IN OR ASSOCIATION WITH FEDERAL, STATE, OR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING ADVISORY, CONSULTATIVE, HONORARY, OR OTHER PART-TIME SERVICE OR POSITION. DO NOT REPEAT INFORMATION ALREADY PROVIDED IN QUESTION 8).

Secretary Kerry's Foreign Affairs Advisory Board (2015-2017)
Director of National Intelligence Coats' Advisory Board (2017)

10. INDICATE ANY SPECIALIZED INTELLIGENCE OR NATIONAL SECURITY EXPERTISE YOU HAVE ACQUIRED HAVING SERVED IN THE POSITIONS DESCRIBED IN QUESTIONS 8 AND/OR 9.

I have deep national security experience, with thirty-three years as a career diplomat and senior national security official. I served as chief of mission in Russia and Jordan, and in a variety of senior policy positions in Washington, including at the National Security Council staff; as Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs; and in the number three (Under Secretary for Political Affairs) and number two (Deputy Secretary of State) jobs in the State Department.

Throughout these assignments (five of them Senate-confirmed) at home and abroad, I worked closely with CIA counterparts across a range of intelligence priorities, from intelligence collection and analysis to covert action, counterintelligence and foreign liaison relations. As a senior policy consumer, I developed a profound appreciation for the importance of good, objective intelligence as the starting point for effective policy, and a similar respect for the professionalism and courage of CIA colleagues with whom I served in hard places around the world.

In my last two positions in government and then during my tenure on DNI Coats' outside advisory board, I also focused increasingly on the growing challenge of a rising and adversarial China, and the impact of the revolution in technology on U.S. national security, including the intelligence community.

11. HONORS AND AWARDS (PROVIDE INFORMATION ON SCHOLARSHIPS, FELLOWSHIPS, HONORARY DEGREES, MILITARY DECORATIONS, CIVILIAN SERVICE CITATIONS, OR ANY OTHER SPECIAL RECOGNITION FOR OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE OR ACHIEVEMENT).

Awards and Honors

- Marshall Scholarship, Oxford University (1978 – 1981)
- Middle East Institute, Lifetime Achievement Award (2014)
- Anti-Defamation League, Distinguished Statesman Award (2014)
- American Academy of Diplomacy, Annenberg Award for Diplomatic Excellence (2015)
- National Committee on American Foreign Policy, George F. Kennan Award (2019)
- Foreign Policy Magazine Diplomat of the Year (2014)
- American Academy of Diplomacy Best Book of Year (2019)
- Foreign Policy Association Medal (2020)

Civilian Service Awards & Decorations

- Promoted to rank of Career Ambassador (2008)
- 3 Presidential Distinguished Service Awards
- 3 U.S Department of State, Secretary's Distinguished Service Awards
- U.S Department of State, Secretary's Career Achievement Award
- U.S. Department of State, James Clement Dunn Award (1991)
- U.S Department of State, Robert C. Frasure Award for Conflict Resolution and Peacemaking (2005)
- U.S Department of State, Charles E. Cobb Jr. Ambassadorial Award for Initiative and Success in Trade Development (2006)
- Department of Defense Award for Distinguished Public Service (2014)
- U.S. Intelligence Community Medallion (2014)
- Central Intelligence Agency, Agency Seal Medal (2014)

Honorary Degrees

- Amherst College, 2016
- LaSalle University, 1998
- Rocky Mountain College, 2007
- Lewis University, 2006

Foreign Government Decorations

- Commandeur, Legion of Honour (France)
- Knight Commander, Order of Merit (Germany)
- Grand Cordon, Order of the Rising Sun (Japan)
- Marshall Medal (UK)
- Commentadore, Order of Merit (Italy)
- First Order, Al Kawkab Medal (Jordan)

Academic Honors

- Cyril Foster Distinguished Lecturer, Oxford University (2009)
- Honorary Fellow, St. Johns College, Oxford University (2012 – Present)
- Sadat Lecture, University of Maryland (2015)
- Visiting Fellow, All Souls College, Oxford (2017)

12. ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS (LIST MEMBERSHIPS IN AND OFFICES HELD WITHIN THE LAST TEN YEARS IN ANY PROFESSIONAL, CIVIC, FRATERNAL, BUSINESS, SCHOLARLY, CULTURAL, CHARITABLE, OR OTHER SIMILAR ORGANIZATIONS).

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>OFFICE HELD</u>	<u>DATES</u>
Allianz	International Advisory Board Member	(2020 – present)
American Ditchley Foundation	Board of Directors	(2018 – present)
Appeal of Conscience Foundation	Board of Trustees and Advisory Council	(2017 – present)
American University of Beirut	International Advisory Board	(2018 – present)
The Atlantic	Contributing Writer	(2020)
The Atlantic Council	Board of Directors	(2015 – 2016)
Bilderberg Conference	Steering Committee	(2019 – present)
Blackstone	Senior Advisor	(2015 – 2019)
Financial Services Volunteer Corps	Board of Directors	(2016 – present)
Global Leadership Coalition	Board of Directors	(2019 – present)
International Paper	Board Member	(2015 – present)
Macro Advisory Partners	Global Advisory Board Member	(2015 – present)
Makena Capital Management LLC	Board of Directors	(2016 – 2020)
National Endowment for Democracy	Board of Directors	(2016 – 2020)
PepsiCo	Senior Advisor	(2016-2017)
US Middle East Project	International Board	(2016 – present)

13. PUBLISHED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES (LIST THE TITLES, PUBLISHERS, BLOGS AND PUBLICATION DATES OF ANY BOOKS, ARTICLES, REPORTS, OR OTHER PUBLISHED MATERIALS YOU HAVE AUTHORED. ALSO LIST ANY PUBLIC SPEECHES OR REMARKS YOU HAVE MADE WITHIN THE LAST TEN YEARS FOR WHICH THERE IS A TEXT, TRANSCRIPT, OR VIDEO). IF ASKED, WILL YOU PROVIDE A COPY OF EACH REQUESTED PUBLICATION, TEXT, TRANSCRIPT, OR VIDEO?

Yes. I will provide a copy of requested materials if requested. See links below.

Publications:

1. Chapter in "[The Future of Think Tanks and Policy Advice Around the World](#)" – James McGann, *Palgrave MacMillan* (2021)
2. Foreword for "[The Arab Cold War: Gamal' Abd Al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958-1970](#)" – Malcolm Kerr, *Oxford University Press* (2020 edition)

3. [“Reimagining Transatlantic Relations: Introduction”](#) - *CEIP* (10/6/20)
4. [“The Blob Meets the Heartland”](#) - *The Atlantic* (9/24/20)
5. [“The Transformation of Diplomacy”](#) - with Linda Thomas-Greenfield, *Foreign Affairs* (9/23/20)
6. [“America First Enters It’s Most Combustible Moment”](#) - *The Atlantic* (8/29/20)
7. [“The United States Needs a New Foreign Policy”](#) - *The Atlantic* (7/14/20)
8. [“A Message to the Carnegie Endowment Community”](#) - *CEIP* (6/4/20)
9. [“Polarized Politics Has Infected American Diplomacy”](#) - *The Atlantic* (6/6/20)
10. [“America Needs a Rebirth of Public Service”](#) - *The Atlantic* (5/4/20)
11. [“A Make-or-Break Test for American Diplomacy”](#) - *The Atlantic* (4/6/20)
12. [“A Moment to Renew American Statesmanship”](#) - *Wall Street Journal* (3/27/20)
13. [“The Damage at the State Department Is Worse Than You Can Imagine”](#) - *The Atlantic* (3/12/20)
14. [“The U.S.-India Relationship Is Bigger Than Trump and Modi”](#) - *The Atlantic* (2/22/20)
15. [“Impunity Is Triumphant Over Integrity”](#) - *The Atlantic* (2/8/20)
16. [“The Death of a Temperate Leader in an Intemperate Region”](#) - *The Atlantic* (1/13/20)
17. [“Soleimani’s Ultimate Revenge”](#) - with Jake Sullivan, *The Atlantic* (1/6/20)
18. [“How Small European Allies See Trump”](#) - *The Atlantic* (12/31/19)
19. [“An End to Magical Thinking in the Middle East”](#) - *The Atlantic* (12/8/19)
20. [“I Fear the Weak State”](#) - *The Atlantic* (11/17/19)
21. [“This is a War Trump Can End”](#) - *Washington Post* (11/4/19)
22. [“The Demolition of U.S. Diplomacy”](#) - *Foreign Affairs* (10/14/19)
23. [“It’s Time to Talk to Iran”](#) - *New York Times* (10/14/19)
24. [“We Led Successful Negotiations With Iran. Trump’s Approach Isn’t Working”](#) - with Jake Sullivan, *The Atlantic* (5/6/19)
25. [“Trump’s ‘deal of the century’ for Arab-Israeli peace is doomed by delusions”](#) - *Washington Post* (5/7/19)
26. [“US must appreciate the merits of a modest deal with North Korea”](#) - *Financial Times* (4/7/19)
27. [“The Lost Art of American Diplomacy”](#) - *Foreign Affairs* (3/27/19)
28. [“How We Tried to Slow the Rush to War in Iraq”](#) - *Politico* (3/13/19)
29. [“How to Save the Power of Diplomacy”](#) - *New York Times* (3/8/19)
30. [“How the U.S.-Russian Relationship Went Bad”](#) - *The Atlantic* (3/8/19)
31. [“The Back Channel: A Memoir of American Diplomacy and the Case for Its Renewal”](#) - *Random House* (2019)
32. Foreword for [“Think Peace: Essays for an Age of Disorder”](#) - Thomas de Waal, *CEIP* (2019)
33. Chapter in [“Letters to Andrew Carnegie”](#) - *Carnegie Corporation of New York* (2019)
34. [“The Need for Civil Courage”](#) - *CEIP* (10/18/18)
35. [“Putin Has Overplayed His Hand”](#) - *New York Times* (3/31/18)
36. [“The Iranian protests are an opportunity for Trump — just not the one he wants”](#) - with Jake Sullivan, *Washington Post* (1/8/18)
37. [“Foreword to Contain, Enforce, and Engage: An Integrated U.S. Strategy to Address Iran’s Nuclear and Regional Challenges”](#) - with Michèle Flournoy, *CEIP and CNAS* (10/26/17)
38. [“The Smart Way to Get Tough with Iran”](#) - with Jake Sullivan, *New York Times* (9/21/17)
39. [“The Value and Purpose of American Diplomacy”](#) - *Foreign Service Journal* (7/12/17)
40. [“The risks of the Trump administration hollowing out American leadership”](#) - *Washington Post* (4/19/17)
41. [“The Rules of the Brave New Cyberworld”](#) - with Jared Cohen, *Foreign Policy* (2/16/17)
42. [“How We Fool Ourselves on Russia”](#) - *New York Times* (1/7/17)
43. [“Clean Power Plan and American global leadership”](#) - *The Hill* (10/12/16)
44. [“U.S. Leadership and the Challenge of State Fragility”](#) - with Michèle Flournoy and Nancy Lindborg, *CEIP, CNAS, & USIP* (9/12/16)
45. [“Fragile States and the Next President”](#) - with Michèle Flournoy and Nancy Lindborg, *Foreign Affairs* (9/11/16)
46. [“Modi’s First Year”](#) - *CEIP* (5/26/15)
47. [“Why Corruption Matters”](#) - with Mike Mullen, *Project Syndicate* (5/16/16)
48. [“We can — and must — save Tunisia from its troubling recent descent”](#) - with Marwan Muasher, *Washington Post* (4/13/16)
49. [“Close India-US ties are crucial for shaping global order”](#) - *Hindustan Times* (4/3/16)
50. [“What Should Be the Purpose of American Power?”](#) - *National Interest* (8/24/15)
51. [“The Fruits of Diplomacy with Iran”](#) - *New York Times* (4/2/15)

52. Foreword for "[America's Other Army: The U.S. Foreign Service and 21st Century Diplomacy](#)" - Nicholas Kralev, *Createspace* (2015 edition)
53. Foreword for "[Turkey's Nuclear Future](#)" – George Perkovich and Sinan Ülgen, *CEIP* (2015)
54. "[10 Parting Thoughts for America's Diplomats](#)" – *Foreign Policy* (10/23/14)
55. *Economic Aid and American Policy Toward Egypt, 1955-1981* (State University of New York Press, 1985)

Interviews/Speeches/Podcasts:

1. "[Nader Mousavizadeh talks to Amb. Bill Burns](#)" – *Macro Advisory Partners' Mapping the World* (12/8/20)
2. "['Never More Adrift': William J. Burns on Repairing U.S. Diplomacy After Trump](#)" – *World Politics Review's Trend Lines* (6/10/20) [interview transcript [here](#)]
3. "[Remaking U.S. foreign policy in the aftermath of a president who has been 'drunk at the wheel'](#)" – *Deep State Radio* (5/28/20)
4. "[Amb. Bill Burns discusses Putin, Iran, NATO expansion, 9/11, President Trump's foreign policy, and the future of U.S. diplomacy](#)" – *Modern American Diplomacy* (4/28/20)
5. "[Bill Burns on Coronavirus, The Back Channel, and the Future of U.S. Diplomacy](#)" – *The World Unpacked* (4/2/20)
6. "[Ambassador Bill Burns](#)" – *Northwestern Buffett Institute for Global Affairs* (3/6/20)
7. "[The Career Diplomat with William J. Burns](#)" – *CNAS's Brussels Sprouts* (2/14/20)
8. "[Diplomacy in a Disordered World](#)" – *CEIP Interpreting India* (11/20/19)
9. "[A State Department Sidelined by Personal Politics](#)" – *Diane Rehm Show, WAMU 88.5* (10/25/19)
10. "[U.S. Diplomacy in the Middle East](#)" – *Babel, CSIS* (9/10/19)
11. "[Think about a career in public service](#)" – *American Diplomat, AAD* (8/12/19) (part 2)
12. "[Bill Burns – The Back Channel](#)" – *American Diplomat, AAD* (7/31/19) (part 1)
13. "[The Back Channel: A Conversation with America's Most Distinguished Diplomat About the Past & Future of U.S. Foreign Policy](#)" – *National Security Magazine, Deep State Radio Network* (7/26/19)
14. "[Ambassador William J. Burns](#)" – *Chautauqua Institution* (7/16/19)
15. "[S2 Bonus - Amb. William Burns](#)" – *Things That Go Boom, Inkstick Media/PRI* (7/8/19)
16. "[Bonus Pod: 'Situation Room' Dialogue on Responding to Iran](#)" – *Intelligence Matters, CBS News* (6/21/19; transcript available online)
17. "[The Back Channel](#):" – *Yahoo! News* (6/21/19) [[write-up available](#)]
18. "[Cooler Heads in Crisis: Why American Diplomacy Matters Today](#)" – *World Affairs Podcast* (5/27/19)
19. "[American Diplomacy, With William J. Burns](#)" – *The President's Inbox, CFR* (6/4/19)
20. "[Outtakes: William Burns on Russia](#)" – *Project Syndicate Podcast* (5/13/19)
21. "[Trump gets tougher with Iran and China; Facebook co-founder says it needs to be split](#)" – *Fareed Zakaria GPS, CNN* (5/12/19)
22. "[Ep. 325 - Bill Burns](#)" – *The Axe Files with David Axelrod, University of Chicago Institute of Politics* (5/9/19)
23. "[The Secret Openings of US Foreign Policy](#)" – *Project Syndicate Podcast* (5/7/19)
24. "[The Future of Peace](#)" – *Future State* (5/6/19)
25. "[The Case for American Diplomacy](#)" – *Commonwealth Club of California* (4/17/19)
26. "[Cover to Cover: Featuring Amb. William J. Burns on March 21, 2019](#)" – *Cover to Cover, World Affairs Councils of America* (4/3/19)
27. "[DiploPod Live: Bill Burns and American Diplomacy](#)" – *DiploPod* (3/26/19)
28. "[Bill Burns Pt. 2](#)" – *The Tea Leaves Podcast, The Asia Group* (3/25/19)
29. "[Bill Burns on the Practice and Strategic Value of American Diplomacy](#)" – *Intelligence Matters, CBS News* (3/13/19; transcript available online)
30. "[Where American Diplomacy Went Wrong](#)" – *On My Mind, WAMU* (3/12/19)
31. "[William Burns: The Back Channel](#)" – *EastWest Institute Podcast, EastWest Institute* (3/12/19)
32. "[The Masthead: Bill Burns on 'A Brief History of U.S.-Russian Missteps'](#)" – *The Masthead Podcast, The Atlantic* (3/11/19)
33. "[Bill Burns Pt. 1](#)" – *The Tea Leaves Podcast, The Asia Group* (3/11/19)
34. "[Former Deputy Secretary of State Bill Burns joins Pod Save the World to discuss his new book](#)" – *Pod Save the World, Crooked Media* (3/6/19)
35. "[Ambassador William J. Burns on a World in Transition](#)" – *Carnegie-Tsinghua Center's China in the World* (6/6/18)
36. "[Deputy Secretary of State Bill Burns](#)" – *Pod Save the World, Crooked Media* (5/31/17)

PART B - QUALIFICATIONS

14. QUALIFICATIONS (DESCRIBE WHY YOU BELIEVE YOU ARE QUALIFIED TO SERVE AS THE DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY).

I have nearly three and a half decades of experience in national security affairs, including serving as a U.S. ambassador in Russia and the Middle East, in the number two and number three positions at the State Department, and on the NSC staff. I am deeply familiar with the overseas work of the CIA, serving together with CIA officers and their families in challenging environments. And I am equally familiar with the analytical work of the CIA, as a senior policymaker in various positions in Washington over many years.

I have considerable experience leading and managing large organizations, including as Deputy Secretary of State and as U.S. ambassador in Moscow (then one of the largest American embassies in the world). I have also managed substantial budgets and complex human resource systems. Throughout my career, I attached very high priority to taking care of people -- leading, mentoring, and working hard to recruit and retain a diverse workforce and support their families. I've always tried to set a strong standard for professionalism and ethical conduct.

PART C - POLITICAL AND FOREIGN AFFILIATIONS

15. POLITICAL ACTIVITIES (LIST ANY MEMBERSHIPS OR OFFICES HELD IN OR FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS OR SERVICES RENDERED TO, ANY POLITICAL PARTY, ELECTION COMMITTEE, POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE, OR INDIVIDUAL CANDIDATE DURING THE LAST TEN YEARS).

Financial contributions to Biden-Harris campaign (2020), and to Congressional campaigns of Tom Malinowski, Andy Kim and Evelyn Farkas (2020). International Paper PAC, 2015-2020.

16. CANDIDACY FOR PUBLIC OFFICE (FURNISH DETAILS OF ANY CANDIDACY FOR ELECTIVE PUBLIC OFFICE).

No.

17. FOREIGN AFFILIATIONS

(NOTE: QUESTIONS 17A AND B ARE NOT LIMITED TO RELATIONSHIPS REQUIRING REGISTRATION UNDER THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT. QUESTIONS 17A, B, AND C DO NOT CALL FOR A POSITIVE RESPONSE IF THE REPRESENTATION OR TRANSACTION WAS AUTHORIZED BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IN CONNECTION WITH YOUR OR YOUR SPOUSE'S EMPLOYMENT IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE.)

- A. HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE EVER REPRESENTED IN ANY CAPACITY (E.G. EMPLOYEE, ATTORNEY, OR POLITICAL/BUSINESS CONSULTANT), WITH OR WITHOUT COMPENSATION, A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OR AN ENTITY CONTROLLED BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT? IF SO, PLEASE FULLY DESCRIBE SUCH RELATIONSHIP.

No.

- B. HAVE ANY OF YOUR OR YOUR SPOUSE'S ASSOCIATES REPRESENTED, IN ANY CAPACITY, WITH OR WITHOUT COMPENSATION, A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OR AN ENTITY

CONTROLLED BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT? IF SO, PLEASE FULLY DESCRIBE SUCH RELATIONSHIP.

No.

- C. DURING THE PAST TEN YEARS, HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE RECEIVED ANY COMPENSATION FROM, OR BEEN INVOLVED IN ANY FINANCIAL OR BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS WITH, A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OR ANY ENTITY CONTROLLED BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No.

- D. HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE EVER REGISTERED UNDER THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No.

18. DESCRIBE ANY LOBBYING ACTIVITY DURING THE PAST TEN YEARS, OTHER THAN IN AN OFFICIAL U.S. GOVERNMENT CAPACITY, IN WHICH YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE HAVE ENGAGED FOR THE PURPOSE OF DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY INFLUENCING THE PASSAGE, DEFEAT, OR MODIFICATION OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION, OR FOR THE PURPOSE OF AFFECTING THE ADMINISTRATION AND EXECUTION OF FEDERAL LAW OR PUBLIC POLICY.

None.

PART D - FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE AND CONFLICT OF INTEREST

19. DESCRIBE ANY EMPLOYMENT, BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP, FINANCIAL TRANSACTION, INVESTMENT, ASSOCIATION, OR ACTIVITY (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, DEALINGS WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ON YOUR OWN BEHALF OR ON BEHALF OF A CLIENT), WHICH COULD CREATE, OR APPEAR TO CREATE, A CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THE POSITION TO WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN NOMINATED.

None.

20. DO YOU INTEND TO SEVER ALL BUSINESS CONNECTIONS WITH YOUR PRESENT EMPLOYERS, FIRMS, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES AND/OR PARTNERSHIPS, OR OTHER ORGANIZATIONS IN THE EVENT THAT YOU ARE CONFIRMED BY THE SENATE? IF NOT, PLEASE EXPLAIN.

Yes.

21. DESCRIBE THE FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS YOU HAVE MADE OR PLAN TO MAKE, IF YOU ARE CONFIRMED, IN CONNECTION WITH SEVERANCE FROM YOUR CURRENT POSITION. PLEASE INCLUDE SEVERANCE PAY, PENSION RIGHTS, STOCK OPTIONS, DEFERRED INCOME ARRANGEMENTS, AND ANY AND ALL COMPENSATION THAT WILL OR MIGHT BE RECEIVED IN THE FUTURE AS A RESULT OF YOUR CURRENT BUSINESS OR PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS.

Please see Part 3 of my submitted OGE Form 278e, attached hereto as Exhibit A.

22. DO YOU HAVE ANY PLANS, COMMITMENTS, OR AGREEMENTS TO PURSUE OUTSIDE EMPLOYMENT, WITH OR WITHOUT COMPENSATION, DURING YOUR SERVICE WITH THE GOVERNMENT? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No.

23. AS FAR AS CAN BE FORESEEN, STATE YOUR PLANS AFTER COMPLETING GOVERNMENT SERVICE. PLEASE SPECIFICALLY DESCRIBE ANY AGREEMENTS OR UNDERSTANDINGS, WRITTEN OR UNWRITTEN, CONCERNING EMPLOYMENT AFTER LEAVING GOVERNMENT SERVICE. IN PARTICULAR, DESCRIBE ANY AGREEMENTS, UNDERSTANDINGS, OR OPTIONS TO RETURN TO YOUR CURRENT POSITION.

No understandings to return to current position or for any future employment.

24. IF YOU ARE PRESENTLY IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE, DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS OF SUCH SERVICE, HAVE YOU RECEIVED FROM A PERSON OUTSIDE OF GOVERNMENT AN OFFER OR EXPRESSION OF INTEREST TO EMPLOY YOUR SERVICES AFTER YOU LEAVE GOVERNMENT SERVICE? IF YES, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

N/A

25. IS YOUR SPOUSE EMPLOYED? IF YES AND THE NATURE OF THIS EMPLOYMENT IS RELATED IN ANY WAY TO THE POSITION FOR WHICH YOU ARE SEEKING CONFIRMATION, PLEASE INDICATE YOUR SPOUSE'S EMPLOYER, THE POSITION, AND THE LENGTH OF TIME THE POSITION HAS BEEN HELD. IF YOUR SPOUSE'S EMPLOYMENT IS NOT RELATED TO THE POSITION TO WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN NOMINATED, PLEASE SO STATE.

Yes. She is currently a United Nations employee (Office of Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA). She has been a senior official at that agency since 2018. She served previously at UNAIDS, another UN agency, from 2011-2018. She served from 1982-2009 as a U.S. Foreign Service Officer at the Department of State.

26. LIST BELOW ALL CORPORATIONS, PARTNERSHIPS, FOUNDATIONS, TRUSTS, OR OTHER ENTITIES TOWARD WHICH YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE HAVE FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS OR IN WHICH YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE HAVE HELD DIRECTORSHIPS OR OTHER POSITIONS OF TRUST DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS.

<u>NAME OF ENTITY</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>DATES HELD</u>	<u>SELF OR SPOUSE</u>
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INFORMATION REDACTED

27. LIST ALL GIFTS EXCEEDING \$100 IN VALUE RECEIVED DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS BY YOU, YOUR SPOUSE, OR YOUR DEPENDENTS. (NOTE: GIFTS RECEIVED FROM RELATIVES AND GIFTS GIVEN TO YOUR SPOUSE OR DEPENDENT NEED NOT BE INCLUDED UNLESS THE GIFT WAS GIVEN WITH YOUR KNOWLEDGE AND ACQUIESCENCE AND YOU HAD REASON TO BELIEVE THE GIFT WAS GIVEN BECAUSE OF YOUR OFFICIAL POSITION.)

In my role as President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a global think tank, I had regular professional contact with many officials, and occasionally received holiday gifts or attended an event with them in consultation with Carnegie.

- 2 bottles of wine, holiday gifts from French ambassador
- Holiday baskets from King of Jordan
- 3 bottles of wine, holiday gifts from Georgian ambassador
- Super Bowl group trip, gift from Saudi ambassador
- 2 bottles of wine and holiday baskets, Italian ambassador

28. LIST ALL SECURITIES, REAL PROPERTY, PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS, OR OTHER INVESTMENTS OR RECEIVABLES WITH A CURRENT MARKET VALUE (OR, IF MARKET VALUE IS NOT ASCERTAINABLE, ESTIMATED CURRENT FAIR VALUE) IN EXCESS OF \$1,000. (NOTE: THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO SCHEDULE A OF THE DISCLOSURE FORMS OF THE OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT ETHICS MAY BE INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE, PROVIDED THAT CURRENT VALUATIONS ARE USED.)

Please see parts 2, 5, and 6 of my submitted OGE Form 278e, attached hereto as Exhibit A.

29. LIST ALL LOANS OR OTHER INDEBTEDNESS (INCLUDING ANY CONTINGENT LIABILITIES) IN EXCESS OF \$10,000. EXCLUDE A MORTGAGE ON YOUR PERSONAL RESIDENCE UNLESS IT IS RENTED OUT, AND LOANS SECURED BY AUTOMOBILES, HOUSEHOLD FURNITURE, OR APPLIANCES. (NOTE: THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO SCHEDULE C OF THE DISCLOSURE FORM OF THE OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT ETHICS MAY BE INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE, PROVIDED THAT CONTINGENT LIABILITIES ARE ALSO INCLUDED.)

N/A

30. ARE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE NOW IN DEFAULT ON ANY LOAN, DEBT, OR OTHER FINANCIAL OBLIGATION? HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE BEEN IN DEFAULT ON ANY LOAN, DEBT, OR OTHER FINANCIAL OBLIGATION IN THE PAST TEN YEARS? HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE EVER BEEN REFUSED CREDIT OR HAD A LOAN APPLICATION DENIED? IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THESE QUESTIONS IS YES, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No.

31. LIST THE SPECIFIC SOURCES AND AMOUNTS OF ALL INCOME RECEIVED DURING THE LAST FIVE YEARS, INCLUDING ALL SALARIES, FEES, DIVIDENDS, INTEREST, GIFTS, RENTS, ROYALTIES, PATENTS, HONORARIA, AND OTHER ITEMS EXCEEDING \$200. (COPIES OF U.S. INCOME TAX RETURNS FOR THESE YEARS MAY BE SUBSTITUTED HERE, BUT THEIR SUBMISSION IS NOT REQUIRED.)

Please see Exhibit A.

32. IF ASKED, WILL YOU PROVIDE THE COMMITTEE WITH COPIES OF YOUR AND YOUR SPOUSE'S FEDERAL INCOME TAX RETURNS FOR THE PAST THREE YEARS?

Yes.

33. LIST ALL JURISDICTIONS IN WHICH YOU AND YOUR SPOUSE FILE ANNUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS.

State of Maryland, USA.

34. HAVE YOUR FEDERAL OR STATE TAX RETURNS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF AN AUDIT, INVESTIGATION, OR INQUIRY AT ANY TIME? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS, INCLUDING THE RESULT OF ANY SUCH PROCEEDING.

No.

35. IF YOU ARE AN ATTORNEY, ACCOUNTANT, OR OTHER PROFESSIONAL, PLEASE LIST ALL CLIENTS AND CUSTOMERS WHOM YOU BILLED MORE THAN \$200 WORTH OF SERVICES DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS. ALSO, LIST ALL JURISDICTIONS IN WHICH YOU ARE LICENSED TO PRACTICE.

N/A

36. DO YOU INTEND TO PLACE YOUR FINANCIAL HOLDINGS AND THOSE OF YOUR SPOUSE AND DEPENDENT MEMBERS OF YOUR IMMEDIATE HOUSEHOLD IN A BLIND TRUST? IF YES, PLEASE FURNISH DETAILS. IF NO, DESCRIBE OTHER ARRANGEMENTS FOR AVOIDING ANY POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST.

I will follow the recommendations of OGE on these matters, but have no current plans to create a blind trust.

37. IF APPLICABLE, LIST THE LAST THREE YEARS OF ANNUAL FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORTS YOU HAVE BEEN REQUIRED TO FILE WITH YOUR AGENCY, DEPARTMENT, OR BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT. IF ASKED, WILL YOU PROVIDE A COPY OF THESE REPORTS?

Last three in USG were 2012-2014. Glad to provide copies, if asked.

PART E - ETHICAL MATTERS

38. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN THE SUBJECT OF A DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING OR CITED FOR A BREACH OF ETHICS OR UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT BY, OR BEEN THE SUBJECT OF A COMPLAINT TO, ANY COURT, ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY, PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION, DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE, OR OTHER PROFESSIONAL GROUP? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No.

39. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN INVESTIGATED, HELD, ARRESTED, OR CHARGED BY ANY FEDERAL, STATE, OR OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY FOR VIOLATION OF ANY FEDERAL, STATE, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPAL LAW, REGULATION, OR ORDINANCE, OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC OFFENSE, OR NAMED AS A DEFENDANT OR OTHERWISE IN ANY INDICTMENT OR INFORMATION RELATING TO SUCH VIOLATION? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No.

40. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN CONVICTED OF OR ENTERED A PLEA OF GUILTY OR NOLO CONTENDERE TO ANY CRIMINAL VIOLATION OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC OFFENSE? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No.

41. ARE YOU PRESENTLY OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A PARTY IN INTEREST IN ANY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY PROCEEDING OR CIVIL LITIGATION? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No.

42. HAVE YOU BEEN INTERVIEWED OR ASKED TO SUPPLY ANY INFORMATION AS A WITNESS OR OTHERWISE IN CONNECTION WITH ANY CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION, FEDERAL, OR STATE AGENCY PROCEEDING, GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION, OR CRIMINAL OR CIVIL LITIGATION IN THE PAST TEN YEARS? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No.

43. HAS ANY BUSINESS OF WHICH YOU ARE OR WERE AN OFFICER, DIRECTOR, OR PARTNER BEEN A PARTY TO ANY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY PROCEEDING OR CRIMINAL OR CIVIL LITIGATION RELEVANT TO THE POSITION TO WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN NOMINATED? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS. (WITH RESPECT TO A BUSINESS OF WHICH YOU ARE OR WERE AN OFFICER, YOU NEED ONLY CONSIDER PROCEEDINGS AND LITIGATION THAT OCCURRED WHILE YOU WERE AN OFFICER OF THAT BUSINESS.)

No.

44. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN THE SUBJECT OF ANY INSPECTOR GENERAL INVESTIGATION? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No.

PART F - SECURITY INFORMATION

45. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DENIED ANY SECURITY CLEARANCE OR ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION FOR ANY REASON? IF YES, PLEASE EXPLAIN IN DETAIL.

No.

46. HAVE YOU BEEN REQUIRED TO TAKE A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION FOR ANY SECURITY CLEARANCE OR ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION? IF YES, PLEASE EXPLAIN.

No.

47. HAVE YOU EVER REFUSED TO SUBMIT TO A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION? IF YES, PLEASE EXPLAIN.

No.

PART G - ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

48. DESCRIBE IN YOUR OWN WORDS THE CONCEPT OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. IN PARTICULAR, CHARACTERIZE WHAT YOU BELIEVE TO BE THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES OF THE CONGRESS, RESPECTIVELY, IN THE OVERSIGHT PROCESS.

I believe congressional oversight is essential to U.S. intelligence activities in general and to the responsibilities of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in particular. The Central Intelligence Agency engages in work that often cannot be shared fully with the public due to its secret or sensitive nature, and the Members of the relevant congressional committees have a critical role in ensuring that the Agency is accountable to the interests of the American people in carrying out its work. Members of these committees have access to classified information that the American people do not have, and thus are serving as their trusted representatives to ensure that the Agency is conducting its activities with wisdom, efficacy and integrity. The Director of the CIA has a responsibility by law to ensure that the Members of the relevant committees are kept fully and currently informed of the Agency's activities so that they can conduct their essential oversight function.

49. EXPLAIN YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency is responsible for ensuring that U.S. policymakers have access to the best intelligence to inform their decision making in order to protect the American people and advance U.S. interests. The Director must lead the CIA workforce to pursue advanced collection capabilities, thorough analyses, productive foreign partnerships and covert action. In addition, the Director must strengthen, support, and protect the CIA workforce, including by prioritizing diversity, equity and inclusion initiatives.

AFFIRMATION

I, **WILLIAM JOSEPH BURNS**, DO SWEAR THAT THE ANSWERS I HAVE PROVIDED TO THIS QUESTIONNAIRE ARE ACCURATE AND COMPLETE.

9 Feb. 2021
(Date)

SIGNATURE OF WILLIAM BURNS



SIGNATURE OF NOTARY

"I was commissioned as
Dorothy Doyle Nyberg"

TO THE CHAIRMAN, SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE:

In connection with my nomination to be the Director of Central Intelligence Agency, I hereby express my willingness to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate.

SIGNATURE OF WILLIAM BURNS

Date: 9 Feb. 2021

EXHIBIT A

INFORMATION REDACTED

EXHIBIT B

Response to Question 31

INFORMATION REDACTED

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

UNITED STATES SENATE



**Additional Prehearing Questions for
William J. Burns
Upon his nomination to be
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency**

Role and Performance of the D/CIA in Senior National Security Leadership

QUESTION 1: Briefly describe how you see your role and responsibilities in relation to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), the Secretary of State, and the President's National Security Advisor. What you would bring to these relationships, and how you would change your role to improve the effectiveness of these relationships, if confirmed?

(U) The DNI serves as the head of the Intelligence Community and acts as the principal adviser to the President, to the National Security Council (NSC), and the Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters related to the national security. The DNI is also responsible for budgeting, oversight, and intelligence coordination across the elements of the Intelligence Community, including establishing objectives, priorities, and guidance for the collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence. If confirmed, I will work closely with the DNI, my longtime friend and colleague Avril Haines, to make sure the Agency's efforts complement her role as head and integrator of the Intelligence Community.

(U) The Secretary of State is a statutory member of the NSC. Under the direction of the President and through the Secretary of State, Chiefs of Mission advance the foreign policy and national security interests of the United States. CIA is required to keep Chiefs of Mission fully and currently informed with respect to all activities and operations in each country in which CIA has a presence. Through my time at the Department of State serving alongside CIA officers, I learned to deeply appreciate the vital role that the partnership between CIA and the Department plays in advancing those foreign policy and national security interests. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Secretary Blinken, with whom I have had the pleasure of working for many years, to strengthen that partnership.

(U) The NSC, through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, acts as the highest-ranking executive branch entity that provides support to the President for review of, guidance for, and direction of the conduct of all foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and covert action, and associated policies and programs. I served as a member of the NSC staff early in my career, and am intimately familiar with its critical role. NSA Sullivan and I have worked closely together in the past. If confirmed, I look forward to working with him again, and I will fully support the DNI's efforts to provide the best intelligence and advice to the NSC and the President – and to deliver it with honesty and integrity.

Post-Modernization and the Future of the CIA

QUESTION 2: The CIA underwent a major reorganization several years ago. Mission Centers were created to reinforce a “team approach” and put the focus on growing well-rounded Agency officers. Since then, how we collect intelligence has evolved. Do you believe that the CIA should remain focused on clandestine collection? Moreover, how will you maintain objective analysis as a central function of the CIA under this construct? How should the conduct of these activities be balanced and prioritized in the future at the CIA?

(U) Yes, I do believe CIA should remain focused on clandestine collection. What remains constant through technological advances is the need for human intelligence operations and the necessary clandestine global infrastructure to surface the truth and intent behind secrets. It is a fundamental and unique role of the CIA that has not changed since the enactment of the National Security Act of 1947 and issuance of Executive Order 12333. In principle, the CIA is designated the “collector of last resort,” though in practice it is widely considered the primary source across the wide range of intelligence requirements. The CIA should be focused on the most challenging requirements.

(U) The CIA, and the Directorate of Analysis (DA) specifically, remains central to providing timely, accurate, and objective all-source analysis. Ensuring the objectivity of CIA’s analytic product is at the core of the analytic mission and is deeply embedded in CIA culture. The DA’s credibility – and, by extension, the CIA’s credibility – depends in part on its ability to “call it like analysts see it” and not be influenced by, or biased toward, policy and operational goals. The reorganization undertaken several years ago was focused on improving integration across CIA. My sense is this integration of analysts and operators within Mission Centers provides national security decision advantage to our policymakers and faster collaboration on tough issues. Managers at all levels must continue to ensure that this integration strengthens analytic objectivity.

QUESTION 3: Since modernization in 2015, and now operating under limitations of COVID-19, there have been numerous efforts to improve the CIA’s management of the workforce. There have also been efforts to address training and care for officers and their families to improve the readiness of the organization. What areas of an officer's preparedness and readiness would you focus on as Director of the CIA?

(U) If confirmed, I will have no higher priority as Director than ensuring the health and wellbeing of officers and their families, through this pandemic and wherever and whenever they face harm or risk.

(U) I believe that CIA should continue to make data-driven decisions that promote the health and safety of its officers while achieving its mission, particularly given that the workforce cannot telework. It is my understanding that CIA continues to promote flexibility through additional programs and policies that further meet officers' needs during this pandemic, to include Professional Training from home and new flexible work schedules. If confirmed, I intend to further strengthen these programs and enhance policies that reinforce the resiliency and wellbeing of the workforce.

QUESTION 4: The CIA is operating in a growing number of environments subject to foreign adversary ubiquitous technical surveillance (UTS) measures. These measures threaten, and may jeopardize the clandestine nature of CIA operations. Please explain how you would address the very real and pressing challenges facing you as Director of the CIA.

(U) If confirmed, I plan to address UTS measures with a multi-pronged, integrated, comprehensive approach, leveraging all CIA elements to get ahead of the threat. I plan to engage my counterparts throughout the government, as well as our allies abroad, to share strategies and solutions for addressing how ubiquitous collection is exploited by our adversaries. This will require CIA to adapt its tradecraft, generate smarter technology, and properly leverages all available data.

HUMINT Role of the CIA

QUESTION 5: In your view, is it appropriate for the Director of the CIA to continue to be the National Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Manager?

(U) Yes, in fact it is more critical than ever for the DCIA to guide this functional community of clandestine and overt HUMINT collectors. The CIA is the only organization that is focused on HUMINT as a function and has developed a broad foundation of operational, technical, and analytic expertise on which to build and lead the HUMINT enterprise. The DCIA is well positioned to guide this functional community of clandestine and overt HUMINT collectors. The

evolving threats and opportunities that come with the ubiquitous technical surveillance environment and big data analytics require the HUMINT enterprise to come together as never before to integrate, deconflict, and evolve US efforts. The National HUMINT Enterprise is comprised of 13 different US government agencies and organizations all collecting intelligence to support the equities and informational needs of their respective organizations. The Director of CIA as the National HUMINT Manager ensures uniformity of tradecraft, collection standards, and operational activity for the US government by sharing best practices and techniques. The National HUMINT Manager also evaluates intelligence consumer satisfaction with the HUMINT Enterprise, so that if changes are needed it can be accomplished through all of the HUMINT executors. The DCIA continues to be in the best position to execute these functions successfully.

QUESTION 6: What do you consider to be the appropriate division of responsibilities for HUMINT between the CIA and the various components of the Department of Defense (DOD), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)? As the National HUMINT Manager, how would you improve sharing of HUMINT between elements within the Intelligence Community (IC), and how would you seek to benefit and enhance the collection of HUMINT within the IC?

(U) Responsibilities for each IC element are laid out in Executive Order 12333, and each have their own unique capabilities and authorities to bring to bear against the complex challenges facing our country; however, in the realm of HUMINT collection (both clandestine and overt), the actions of one HUMINT executor may impact the operations of another, making coordination of activity paramount. At the same time, the US government benefits from having appropriate redundancy in its collection capability. This overlap ensures the adversary cannot exploit any seams in the IC. To that end, it is critical for each to lean forward and share lessons learned and best practices in tradecraft and the use of technology. To do so will not only enhance the IC's capabilities as a whole, but will also enable the IC to focus the "best athlete" against the "right operation" with the most knowledge available to ensure success.

(U) As the Community HUMINT Manager, I will continue to promote greater collaboration and information sharing by IC members, create more opportunities for IC officers to serve in different IC agencies, and ensure technology advancements are agile and shared with IC partners.

QUESTION 7: As a former senior diplomat, you have been a high-volume consumer of the intelligence the CIA provides. In this regard, and with your exposure to the operational activities of the CIA, what are your views on the working relationships of the FBI, DHS, National Security Agency (NSA), and other elements of the DOD and the CIA? How could these relationships be improved at the working level, and how would you make this work as Director of the CIA?

(U) As I have known throughout my career, effective, cooperative interagency relationships are absolutely crucial, especially within the intelligence community – with each partner supporting the other. In keeping with the 9/11 Commission Report, it's essential that IC members work side-by-side, sharing usable information that benefits the US government as a whole. Now that the many of the organizational and cultural barriers to partnership and collaboration have been removed where appropriate, we must focus on improving the IT infrastructure and making other practical improvements which will continue to enhance more timely coordination and integrated efforts.

QUESTION 8: What role do you see for the CIA in paramilitary actions? How do you distinguish between the appropriate roles of the CIA and the United States Special Operations Forces in paramilitary actions?

(U) CIA necessarily must operate in hazardous and austere environments, whether to prosecute the United States' covert action mission, as directed by the President, or to collect foreign intelligence against hard targets. I would suggest that "paramilitary-style actions" should not be considered a separate category of operation, but a method by which these two broader missions may be accomplished, with increasing attention being paid to aligning more of CIA's collection capabilities against our most strategic and challenging targets.

(U) While there are some similarities between the CIA's paramilitary capabilities and the Department of Defense's Special Operations Forces (SOF), their legal authorities and objectives are different. DoD uses SOF to execute a military strategy where CIA uses its distinct authorities for its clandestine mission. Together, these activities are critical parts of supporting the President's National Security Strategy.

The CIA and Cybersecurity Posture

QUESTION 9: The issue of cybersecurity is a focus of this Committee. Public cybersecurity incidents have led to questions about the security of CIA systems writ large.

A. How would you improve the cybersecurity posture of CIA systems?

B. What are your top priorities for cybersecurity and technical counter- cyberespionage protections at the CIA in the near term?

(U) Like many organizations, CIA has been challenged by the relentless proliferation of advanced threats to its operations, information technology networks, and data. On a daily basis, Foreign Intelligence Services and cyber criminals employ sophisticated and technologically advanced capabilities and tactics in their non-stop efforts to steal the classified information collected, stored, and processed by CIA.

(U) If confirmed, I will ensure that CIA is consolidating the organizational gains made in recent years and continuing to invest in personnel, counterintelligence processes, cyber defense technology, and needed upgrades to information technology systems.

- Specifically, I will ensure CIA is making sustained investments in several key areas, such as:
 - Continued innovations in **Artificial Intelligence** technologies that help cyber defenders detect and repel the most sophisticated and difficult-to-detect attacks.
 - Emerging technologies and best practices aimed at securing the complex **supply chains** upon which CIA and other government agencies rely.
 - **Collective defense** frameworks and technologies to ensure CIA and other Intelligence Community organizations are learning and benefitting from one another.
- Finally, I would work to create a culture of accountability in which every CIA employee, at every level, is educated about cyber risk and made aware that all aspects of the business should be conducted with a focus on cybersecurity as a mission imperative.

Duty to Correct Public Statements

QUESTION 10: What is your view of the Director of the CIA's responsibility to inform senior administration policy officials or their spokespersons when the available intelligence either does not support or contradicts public statements they have made?

(U) If I became aware that a senior administration policy official or their spokesperson had made a public statement that I later learned was not supported by, or contradictory to, available intelligence, I would consult with that official and suggest ways to correct the public record unless doing so would risk disclosing sources and methods.

QUESTION 11: How would you improve the independence of CIA analytic products, and distance yourself from political sentiment sufficiently to remain dispassionate and unbiased given the current media and information environment?

(U) Throughout my career, I have understood that objective intelligence analysis, delivered with honesty and without any hint of politics or policy agenda, is foundational for sound policy choices. If confirmed, I will be deeply committed to exactly that approach.

(U) Across my years in government service, I have been impressed by the exceptional lengths CIA analysts go to ensure their analysis is objective, even when its conclusions may be unwelcome. Rigorous objectivity has always been, and must remain, the touchstone for the Agency's analysis. I am committed to protecting and defending the ability of CIA officers to provide their best, well-grounded analysis, whether or not it fits my own analytic views.

(U) Both the leadership of the Directorate of Analysis and the Agency's Ombudsman for Objectivity will continue to play vital roles in ensuring CIA analysts have recourse to raise concerns about objectivity or politicization, and in acting as conduits to ensure any concerns are surfaced and addressed.

Law Enforcement Proviso

QUESTION 12: *The National Security Act of 1947* (Section 104A (d)(1)) states that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency "*shall have no*

police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security functions.”

Explain your understanding of this proviso. Furthermore, explain whether you believe the CIA should have arrest authorities, and if so, under what conditions.

(U) The “law enforcement proviso” of the National Security Act of 1947 limits the CIA’s authority. I understand that Congress, influenced by the United States’ experience in World War II with totalitarian states such as Nazi Germany, was determined “that the CIA neither invade the FBI’s jurisdiction nor become a secret police.” I should note that while it is a significant legal constraint, the “law enforcement proviso” does not preclude certain types of CIA assistance to U.S. law enforcement agencies in various circumstances. With the exception of the authority of CIA special police officers to protect CIA installations, property, or employees, I do not believe that CIA should have the authority to arrest persons in the United States.

QUESTION 13: What principles, in your view, should govern rules pertaining to the collection and retention of U.S. person information by U.S. intelligence agencies, even if the data is in transit? Please explain if there are any special rules or exceptions necessary for the collection and retention of U.S. person information by the CIA.

(U) It is crucial that the Intelligence Community achieve the correct balance between acquiring information needed to keep our nation safe and protecting information concerning the privacy interests of U.S. persons, including their privacy interests in communications that are in transit. The CIA’s January 2017 Attorney General-approved Guidelines provide specific principles and standards that govern the collection, use, retention, and dissemination of information concerning U.S. persons, including incidentally acquired information concerning the communications of U.S. persons. These Guidelines implement the requirements of Executive Order 12333 and Section 309 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (“Procedures for the Retention of Incidentally Acquired Communications”). If confirmed, I commit to following these guidelines and procedures, and I look forward to working with the Committee in its important oversight role with respect to these authorities.

Science & Technology and Research & Development

QUESTION 14: Section 501 of the *Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021* ensures that the Director of the CIA has the legal authorities required to improve the skills in science, technology, engineering, arts, and mathematics

(collectively referred to as “STEAM”) necessary to meet long-term national security needs.

- A. Do you commit to providing the support necessary to execute these legal authorities and improve the Agency’s workforce skills related to STEAM areas of expertise?

(U) Yes. Your recent approval of the STEAM legislation will certainly enhance CIA’s ability to use appropriated funds to issue grants to colleges and universities to develop innovative ways to leverage technology through research; to narrow intelligence gaps; and to develop our STEAM workforce. I fully support CIA’s academic partnerships with Historically Black Colleges & Universities and Minority Serving Institutions to increase diversity of thought and approaches in the core disciplines of science and technology. I also look forward to leveraging CIA Labs’ established relationships with academia, industry, and other government entities to expand our STEAM outreach and workforce development. I am confident that this approach will bolster the technical skills of our existing workforce, and develop the STEAM workforce of the future.

- B. Do you commit to keeping the congressional intelligence committees currently and fully informed as to the progress that the agency is making toward improving the agency’s workforce skills related to STEAM areas of expertise, and how the agency’s workforce is improving its ability to meet long-term national security needs?

(U) Yes.

Brain Trauma Injuries

QUESTION 15: To address injuries suffered by CIA employees, section 6412 of the *Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020* authorized the Director of the CIA to provide enhanced injury benefits to a covered employee or qualifying dependents who suffer an injury overseas due to war, insurgency, hostile act, or terrorist activities. Since that time, the CIA has advised that this provision may not provide complete coverage for certain brain, heart, and back injuries.

- A. Do you commit to providing the support necessary for legislation to ensure that all qualifying brain, heart, back, and potentially other injuries

are covered?

(U) Yes. I also want to thank the Committee for its interest and advocacy on this important issue.

B. Do you commit to providing the congressional intelligence committees with ongoing, timely intelligence-related written and verbal updates on the “Havana Syndrome” and related issues?

(U) Yes.

C. Do you commit to advising the congressional intelligence committees when additional legislative, administrative, or other action is required to address the “Havana Syndrome” and related issues?

(U) Yes.

QUESTION 16: The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) has worked to find legislative solutions to the spate of brain trauma injuries that have afflicted CIA personnel in recent years. While the committee has had some success on this front, our efforts to achieve a comprehensive and enduring legislative fix to this problem would benefit greatly from your commitment to viewing the committee as a partner in this matter.

A. Can this committee count on your support for our legislative efforts to ensure CIA officers have access to the healthcare and rehabilitative services needed to treat brain trauma injuries?

(U) Yes.

B. Is it your position that the CIA’s Office of Medical Services (OMS) has an obligation to treat seriously all claims of duty-related physical injury arising from CIA personnel, to include the symptoms of brain trauma?

(U) Yes.

Classification & Transparency

QUESTION 17: Executive Order 13526 states, “*In no case shall information be classified, continue to be maintained as classified, or fail to be declassified in*

order to: (1) conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error; (2) prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency; (3) restrain competition; or (4) prevent or delay the release of information that does not require protection in the interest of national security.” Executive Orders 12958 and 13292 prohibited classification for these same factors.

A. Do you commit to fulfilling both the letter and the spirit of these prohibitions?

(U) Yes.

B. What role do you believe the CIA Inspector General should play in investigating possible violations of these prohibitions?

(U) Under the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, one of the duties and responsibilities of the CIA Inspector General is to conduct investigations relating to the programs and operations of the Agency to ensure they are conducted in accordance with law and regulations, and to keep the Director fully and currently informed concerning violations of law and regulations. I expect that possible violations of the Executive Order 13526 classification prohibitions that come to the attention of the Inspector General will be appropriately reviewed.

C. What accountability do you believe is appropriate for violations of these prohibitions?

(U) CIA employees who knowingly, willfully, or negligently violate the Executive Order 13526 classification prohibitions will be subject to appropriate sanctions as prescribed by the Executive Order.

QUESTION 18: If you or another CIA officer were to say something that was factually inaccurate in public, would you correct the public record?

(U) If I became aware that I or another CIA officer had made a public statement that I later learned was factually inaccurate, I would take action to correct the public record unless doing so would risk disclosing sources and methods. To the extent the erroneous statement was made to Congress, I would take appropriate steps to inform Congress about the correction.

QUESTION 19: *“Central intelligence Agency intelligence Activities: Procedures Approved by the Attorney General Pursuant to Executive Order 12333”* is currently posted online. Do you commit to continuing to post these procedures and to making public any modifications, superseding policies and procedures, or significant interpretations?

(U) Yes, consistent with my responsibility to protect sources and methods.

QUESTION 20: The CIA’s PPD-28 Section 4 policies and procedures are publicly available. Will you ensure that the CIA continues to post these procedures as well as any modifications, superseding policies and procedures, or significant interpretations?

(U) In accordance with the PPD-28 Section 4 publication requirements, I commit to continue making publicly available CIA’s PPD-28 Section 4 policies and procedures, which are unclassified. I also commit to make publicly available any unclassified modifications of these procedures or any superseding unclassified procedures that are promulgated.

QUESTION 21: Will you support the declassification and public release of any interpretation of law that provides a basis for intelligence activities, but is inconsistent with the public’s understanding of the law?

(U) Yes, insofar as we see a significant gap in the public’s understanding of the law and consistent with my responsibility to protect sources and methods. Additionally, the National Security Act requires that the CIA General Counsel notify the congressional intelligence committees of any significant legal interpretations of the Constitution or federal law.

QUESTION 22: During her confirmation, DNI Haines stated that *“[i]f confirmed, I will seek to articulate and make public the circumstances under which the IC purchases commercially available information and the legal basis for doing so, consistent with the protection of sources and methods.”* Will you make the same commitment?

(U) Yes, consistent with my legal obligation to protect sources and methods.

Detention, Interrogation and Rendition

QUESTION 23: Section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2016 prohibits the use of any interrogation technique or approach or treatment related to interrogation not authorized by the Army Field Manual. Is this provision of law binding on the CIA?

(U) Yes.

QUESTION 24: Do you believe that any of the CIA's former enhanced interrogation techniques are consistent with the Detainee Treatment Act, the U.S. statutory prohibition on torture, the War Crimes Act, or U.S. obligations under the Convention against Torture or Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention?

(U) I believe the CIA's former enhanced interrogation program included torture, which violates U.S. commitments and obligations.

QUESTION 25: Executive Order 13491 prohibits the CIA from operating any detention facilities other than "*facilities used only to hold people on a short-term transitory basis.*" Do you support this prohibition?

(U) Yes.

QUESTION 26: Section 1045 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2016 requires the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the DNI, the Attorney General, and the Director of the FBI, to complete a "*thorough review*" every three years of Army Field Manual 2-22.3 (Human Intelligence Collector Operations) ("AFM").

A. Do you agree to advocate for a timely review of the AFM?

(U) Yes.

B. Do you agree that the CIA's former enhanced interrogation techniques should be prohibited under the AFM?

(U) Yes.

C. Section 1045 requires that the High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group

(HIG) submit a report on best practices for interrogation and states that the review of the AFM may include recommendations for revisions based on HIG research. After reviewing the science, the HIG concluded that, *“[based on the comprehensive research and field validation studies detailed in this report, it is concluded that the most effective practices for eliciting accurate information and actionable intelligence are non-coercive, rapport-based, information-gathering interviewing and interrogation methods.”* Do you agree that the review of the AFM should be consistent with these scientific best practices?

(U) Yes.

QUESTION 27: If confirmed, will you ensure that the full, non-redacted Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program (“Study”) is made available to cleared CIA personnel, so that its lessons can be learned?

(U) The Executive Summary containing the background, summary, and conclusions of the Study is available to all CIA personnel. Should the Committee request additional access for CIA personnel for the full, unredacted Study, I will consider appropriate options with the Committee.

QUESTION 28: If confirmed, will you review the options for making the full, non-redacted Study, or relevant portions thereof, available to appropriately cleared defense counsel at the military commissions at Guantanamo Bay and report to Congress on that review?

(U) If confirmed, should the Committee request access to the report for the military commission counsels, I will, within the framework of the rules of discovery in the military commission cases, review options with the Committee for making relevant portions of the Study available to appropriately cleared defense counsel.

QUESTION 29: If confirmed, will you review the options for ensuring that medical personnel at Guantanamo Bay have access to any information in the Study relevant to the health of detainees?

(U) If confirmed, should the Committee request access to the report for medical personnel at Guantanamo Bay, I will review any information in the Study relevant to the health of detainees and consider options with the Committee for providing access to that information if not already provided.

QUESTION 30: Do you agree that CIA officers should not participate in interrogations of detainees in liaison custody when those officers witness, know of, or otherwise suspect the torture or mistreatment of detainees?

(U) Yes, I agree that CIA officers should not participate in detainee debriefings if the CIA has received credible information that detainees in liaison custody have been tortured or mistreated.

QUESTION 31: The statutory prohibition on interrogations not consistent with the AFM applies to any individual *“in the custody or under the effective control of an officer, employee, or other agent of the United States Government; or detained within a facility owned, operated, or controlled by a department or agency of the United States, in any armed conflict.”*

A. Please describe the factors that would indicate whether a detainee is in the *“effective control”* of any officer, employee, or other agent of the United States Government.

B. Please describe how you would define whether a detainee is *“detained within a facility owned, operated, or controlled by a department of agency of the United States.”*

(U) I would base an interpretation of the statutory standards on the facts of a particular situation in consultation with the General Counsel. Relevant factors may include whether the U.S. controls access to the detention facility in question, owns the land on which the facility is located, manages the operations of the facility, controls the disposition of detainees, and/or has the authority to discipline or fire the personnel running the facility.

(U) Executive Order 13491 prohibits CIA from operating any detention facilities, other than facilities used only to hold people on a short-term, transitory basis.

QUESTION 32: The United States recognizes its obligations under the Convention Against Torture, not to *“expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite a person to another state where there are substantial grounds for believing that he [or she] would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”*

A. To what extent should written “diplomatic assurances” be required for extraditions and renditions?

(U) Diplomatic assurances, and consulting with the Department of State or Chief of Mission of the relevant Embassy in assessing the reliability and credibility of assurances obtained in connection with an extradition or rendition, are important considerations in determining whether the legal standards for an extradition or rendition are met and that detainees will be treated humanely.

B. Should such assurances be accepted from countries with established records of committing torture?

(U) The reliability and credibility of any assurances would be assessed on a case-by-case basis in light of all relevant factors and credible information known to CIA at the time, including the practices of the country providing the assurances and that country's record of compliance with assurances provided in similar circumstances to the U.S. and other countries.

Accountability

QUESTION 33: On June 27, 2013, then-CIA Director Brennan submitted to the Committee a letter acknowledging that, with regard to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, the CIA "*fell short when it came to holding individuals accountable for poor performance and management failures.*" The CIA then made the following recommendation:

"Broaden the scope of accountability reviews. Direct that the Executive Director ensure that all memoranda establishing and laying out the scope of an accountability review board, including directorate level boards, explicitly call on the board to assess and make recommendations to address any systemic issues revealed by the case, and to expand the scope of the review as warranted to include officers responsible for those systemic problems."

The 2014 Accountability Board that investigated the conduct of the five individuals named in the CIA's OIG report on "*Agency Access to the SSCI-Shared Drive on RDINet*" did *not* expand its scope beyond the five individuals, nor did it address accountability for officers responsible for systemic problems.

A. As a general matter, if confirmed, how would you improve accountability within the CIA?

- B. Do you agree with the 2013 recommendation that accountability reviews at the CIA should be broadened to consider officers responsible for systemic problems?
- C. If confirmed, will you review the accountability review process at the CIA to ensure that it addresses systemic problems and includes officers responsible for those systemic problems as well as management failures?

(U) Accountability is fundamental and systemic problems are no exception. If confirmed, I will, in leading the Agency forward, explore whether CIA's current accountability review process should be broadened or otherwise improved.

Human Rights

QUESTION 34: In an August 6, 2015, letter, then-Director Brennan wrote that “[while we neither condone nor participate in activities that violate human rights standards, we do maintain cooperative liaison relationships with a variety of intelligence and security services around the world, some of whose constituent entities have engaged in human rights abuses.” If a liaison service were to use CIA-provided resources to engage in human rights abuses, with CIA’s knowledge, would the CIA bear any legal responsibility?

(U) Situations involving allegations of liaison’s misuse of CIA resources in activities that violate human rights standards would be a serious matter that would involve review by the General Counsel, notification to Congress, and possible termination of the relationship.

Chief of Mission Authority and Relations with the Department of State

QUESTION 35: Director Brennan’s August 6, 2015, letter stated that “[when we choose to continue a liaison relationship despite allegations of human rights abuses by individuals associated with liaison service, CIA policy requires that we take several steps to inform our U.S. Government partners and to mitigate the risk of future human rights abuses. First we advise the local Chief of Mission of CIA’s concerns and seek the Chief of Mission’s input on whether to continue the liaison relationship.]” Should the CIA inform the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) or other elements of the Department of State when it considers a liaison relationship despite allegations of human rights abuses?

(U) Under the direction of the President, it is vital for Chiefs of Mission to be kept fully and currently informed of intelligence activities and operations undertaken in their countries of accreditation to include matters related to human rights records of liaison partners. If a Chief of Mission were to oppose continuing the relationship, I would expect that the matter would be elevated to the headquarters components of CIA and the Department of State for further discussion and resolution, which may include consideration by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

QUESTION 36: 22 U.S.C. 3927 states that “*Under the direction of the President, the chief of mission to a foreign country ... shall have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all Government executive branch employees in that country....*” Absent direct intervention from the President, is the CIA obligated to cease intelligence activities (including, but not limited to liaison relationships) that do not have the approval of the chief of mission?

(U) Pursuant to a long-held agreement between Department of State and CIA, Chiefs of Station are required to keep Chiefs of Mission fully and currently informed about all CIA programs and activities carried out in their countries of accreditation (unless CIA has been specifically exempted from this responsibility by the President or the Secretary of State). Intelligence activities that do not have the approval of the Chief of Mission, but remain supported by the Chief of Station are referred back to CIA and the Department of State for resolution.

QUESTION 37: Please describe the appropriate process whereby covert action is reviewed by the Department of State for consistency with U.S. foreign policy, both at the outset and over the course of the program. What entities within the Department of State should be part of that review?

(U) The Secretary of State is a statutory member of the NSC. In considering and submitting to the President a policy recommendation on each proposed covert action, the NSC is required to consider and submit all dissents. The NSC also is required to conduct a periodic review of ongoing covert action activities, including an evaluation of the effectiveness and consistency with current national policy of such activities and their consistency with applicable legal requirements.

(U) The Department of State has a critical role in contributing to the policy coordination of covert action programs as senior officials serving both in Washington and as Chiefs of Mission contribute to the policy coordination process

to ensure consistency with U.S. foreign policy. The Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research is and should continue as a collaborative partner that participates in interagency working groups to ensure that foreign policy views are considered in developing and implementing the programs.

Section 702 of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)

QUESTION 38: During his confirmation process, Assistant Attorney General for National Security John Demers was asked about the prohibition on reverse targeting in Section 702 of FISA. He responded:

“As I understand it, determining whether a particular known U.S. person has been reverse targeted through the targeting of a Section 702 target necessitates a fact specific inquiry that would involve consideration of a variety of factors. For example, as the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board noted in its 2014 report, if a Section 702 tasking resulted in substantial reporting by the Intelligence Community regarding a U.S. person, but little reporting about the Section 702 target, that might be an indication that reverse targeting may have occurred.”

If confirmed, how will you ensure that this fact specific analysis is applied to the CIA's nomination of Section 702 targets?

(U) FISA Section 702 prohibits “reverse targeting” – intentionally targeting a person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States if the purpose of such acquisition is to target a particular, known person reasonably believed to be in the United States. Extensive internal and external oversight mechanisms help ensure that CIA's nomination of Section 702 targets does not violate the prohibition on reverse targeting.

(U) CIA's activities under Section 702 are subject to continuous internal oversight by CIA's FISA Program Office, Office of General Counsel, and Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties. CIA's FISA Program Office and Office of General Counsel also train CIA FISA users on the prohibition against reverse targeting.

(U) CIA's activities under Section 702 are audited every 60 days by the Department of Justice and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). During the 60-day audits, the Department of Justice reviews all Section 702 tasking decisions for compliance with statutory requirements, including the prohibition on reverse targeting. In addition, CIA's activities under Section 702

are subject to judicial oversight by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court as well as legislative oversight by both the congressional intelligence and judiciary committees.

Executive Order 12333

QUESTION 39: NSA Director Nakasone has stated that, absent consent of the U.S. person or certain emergency situations, U.S. person queries of communications collected under Executive Order 12333 “normally must be approved by the Attorney General on a case-by-case basis after a finding of probable cause.” Should the same requirement apply to the CIA?

(U) The Attorney General has recognized that CIA’s situation is different from NSA’s. CIA’s January 2017 Attorney General-approved Guidelines on the collection, retention, and dissemination of information concerning U.S. persons, issued pursuant to Executive Order 12333, state that queries of CIA information repositories “are not considered collection; rather, those queries examine previously collected information and do not require any additional approval” beyond those for the initial collection of the information.

Outsourcing of Intelligence

QUESTION 40: What rules should apply to the CIA’s receipt, use, and dissemination of communications collected by a foreign source or liaison partner that is known to include U.S. person communications?

(U) The CIA’s January 2017 Attorney General-approved Guidelines apply to CIA’s receipt, use, retention, and dissemination of communications collected by a foreign source or liaison partner. The Guidelines implement Executive Order 12333 as well as the requirements of Section 309 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, which requires procedures for any intelligence collection activity not otherwise authorized by court order, subpoena, or similar legal process when it is reasonably anticipated to result in the acquisition of nonpublic communication to or from a U.S. person. The Guidelines provide a robust set of rules governing the collection, use, retention, and dissemination of information concerning U.S. persons, including incidentally acquired information concerning the communications of

U.S. persons.

QUESTION 41: Do you agree that the CIA cannot request that a foreign entity conduct any activity that the CIA is not authorized to undertake itself?

(U) CIA cannot ask a third party to undertake activities forbidden by E.O. 12333 or to otherwise violate U.S. law.

Lethal Operations

QUESTION 42: The 22 May 2013 Direct Action Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG) (*“Procedures for Approving Direct Action Against Terrorist Targets Located Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities”*) was released to the public. Do you support transparency with regard to these policies?

(U) Yes, I do generally support being as transparent as possible with the public on U.S. direct action policy. But I believe that such transparency must be weighed against the impact of revealing to terrorists and terrorist groups key aspects of such policies that could enable them to take steps to evade counterterrorist operations and therefore continue to threaten the U.S. homeland, U.S. persons and interests, and our allies overseas.

QUESTION 43: Please describe your view of the legal and policy implications of targeting or otherwise knowingly killing a U.S. person in a U.S. Government lethal operation. What additional public transparency do you believe would be warranted in that situation?

(U) The decision to target a U.S. citizen with lethal force is one of the most serious decisions that the U.S. Government could confront and is generally contemplated by an Administration only in narrow circumstances – for example when a U.S. citizen is part of enemy forces within the scope of a force authorization. Any proposal must be lawful, authorized by the President under a framework approved by the Department of Justice, and take into account that person’s constitutional rights. I believe continued transparency is important.

QUESTION 44: On July 1, 2016, President Obama issued Executive Order 13732, *“United States Policy and Pre- and Post-Strike Measures to Address Civilian Casualties in U.S. Operations Involving the Use of Force.”* Section 3 of the Executive Order directed the DNI to publicly release an annual report on strikes undertaken by the U.S. Government against terrorist targets outside areas

of active hostilities. President Trump revoked Section 3 on March 6, 2019. Section 1723 of the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA included a similar reporting requirement.

- A. During her confirmation, DNI Haines agreed to advocate for a new or revised Executive Order that includes reporting on strikes taken by and civilian casualties caused by all U.S. Government agencies. Do you support Director Haines' position?

(U) Yes, I support the release of an annual report that provides aggregate statistics on strikes undertaken by the U.S. Government and civilian casualties.

- B. DNI Haines supported making Section 1723 permanent and ensuring compliance with Section 1723, including the requirement that the report be submitted in unclassified form. Do you support these positions?

(U) Yes.

Whistleblowers

QUESTION 45: Do you agree that any monitoring of CIA personnel for purposes of detecting insider threats must protect confidentiality of protected whistleblower communications? If so, how should that protection be assured?

(U) I fully support the statutory protections afforded to whistleblowers, the confidentiality of their protected communications, and the importance of honoring whistleblower anonymity. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the current whistleblower procedures and protections for CIA personnel to determine whether any changes are appropriate.

QUESTION 46: Do you believe that Intelligence Community (IC) whistleblowers who request access to an attorney with appropriate security clearances should have that access?

(U) Yes, where appropriate.

Saudi Arabia

QUESTION 47: A declassified August 2019 FBI Intelligence Bulletin concluded that *“Saudi Officials Almost Certainly Assist Saudi Citizens Flee the United States to Avoid Legal Issues, Undermining the US Judicial Process.”*

- A. If confirmed, will you make Saudi efforts to undermine the U.S. judicial process a collection and analytic priority?

(U) If confirmed, I will support any FBI or DOJ requirements for the intelligence community on this issue.

- B. The FBI further assessed that *“KSA officials are unlikely to alter their practice of assisting the flight of Saudi citizens in legal trouble from the United States in the near term unless the USG directly addresses this issue with the KSA.”* If confirmed, do you agree to raise this concern directly with your Saudi counterparts?

(U) If confirmed, I will support any policy requirements for the intelligence community on this issue, including if policymakers ask CIA to raise concerns through intelligence channels.

Russia Investigation

QUESTION 48: During her confirmation, DNI Haines stated that she would order a review of the Committee’s Report on Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, and in particular Volume 5, to determine whether additional declassification is possible consistent with the need to protect national security. If confirmed, will you support this review and seek to declassify the maximum amount of information consistent with the protection of sources and methods?

(U) Yes.

Historical Review Panel

QUESTION 49: Starting in the mid-1990s and for over 20 years, the Director of the CIA chartered a Historical Review Panel (HRP) to advise on declassification and other matters of historical interest. The HRP reported

directly to nine Directors, but in 2018 the CIA dissolved it with no reason given, either publicly or to HRP members. We understand that recently the CIA has decided to reconstitute a new entity to advise on declassification, the “*CIA Historical Advisory Panel*” (HAP). However, the new HAP does not report to the Director of the CIA and appears to be disconnected entirely from the CIA’s senior leadership. If confirmed, will you restore the new HAP to make it a direct report to the Director of the CIA, meet with it, and give it your full support?

(U) If confirmed, I look forward to promoting the work of the Historical Advisory Panel, supporting its relationship with CIA senior leadership, and working with the Agency’s Chief Data Officer to ensure the Panel’s advice and recommendations on declassification and other matters of historical interest are appropriately communicated to me and others in senior leadership.

China

QUESTION 50: In 2018 remarks to this committee, your prospective predecessor as Director of the CIA, Gina Haspel, referenced China’s unfair trade practices, overt and illicit efforts to steal U.S. technology and intellectual property, and efforts to diminish U.S. influence all around the world.

A. Do you agree with the assertion that China’s Confucius Institutes are an instrumentality for propagating Chinese Communist Party (CCP) influence on the campuses of America’s educational institutions?

(U) Yes. Beijing tries to advance its soft power and pro-China propaganda through cultural and educational programs at US academic institutions.

(U) Programs such as Confucius Institutes fund Chinese-language learning and provide the CCP direct access to university officials. Beijing uses this access to spread positive portrayals of China, and steer conversations from topics sensitive to the CCP.

B. Do you agree with the assertion that Beijing uses nominally private civic organizations like the China-U.S. Exchange Foundation to sway public opinion and build influence in the United States?

(U) Yes. The CCP employs a whole-of-government approach to exert influence and uses complementary overt and covert means that draw on a wide array of carrots and sticks to try and influence political, economic, and cultural developments to benefit CCP interests.

- C. Do you agree with the assertion that China's using nominally independent third-party organizations to act as the primary agents for funding and managing lobbying efforts on behalf of the CCP represents a deceptive and dangerous form of influence laundering?

(U) Yes. The CCP mobilizes and directs nongovernment Chinese actors, such as businesses, NGOs, and expatriate communities, to diversify influence efforts and transmit their views in multiple channels.

QUESTION 51: The CIA's quick adoption of technology like Artificial Intelligence (AI) will help to mitigate the numerical advantages of the Chinese intelligence services, as well as increase efficiency and exposure for its workforce - both critical, because in China the U.S. faces technological authoritarianism that threatens the U.S. technological dominance, and our more principled use of technology.

- A. How will you, as Director of the CIA, ensure that the IC's traditional inclination to favor security over new technology does not unreasonably delay adoption?
- B. How will you ensure there is a glide path to operationalize pilot projects at the CIA, to include those centered on AI, into sustainable solutions for multiple missions?

(U) China is investing considerable resources on Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning (AI/ML) technologies to enhance its intelligence collection and counterintelligence capabilities. CIA must meet this challenge by transforming how it collects, analyzes, and disseminates intelligence. I understand that CIA has devised an AI/ML strategy to achieve this goal, is working closely with the leading AI/ML firms in the country, and - with DNI to help - will drive the adoption of AI/ML technologies across the IC. As DCIA, I will make this a priority by accelerating the implementation of mission critical AI/ML capabilities and ensuring the Agency develops a mature AI/ML infrastructure.

QUESTION 52: How do you plan to hire more officers with critically needed skills like data scientists and Mandarin speakers?

(U) If confirmed, I plan to continue to seek opportunities to enhance CIA initiatives focused on attracting STEAM and mission-critical language talent. These efforts will be focused on building CIA's most important asset: its people. Some of these ongoing initiatives include an increased presence online to reach the caliber of officers needed to fill critical positions. CIA's vibrant online presence and recruitment techniques are key to connecting with the prospective workforce needed for the future. I also plan to continue leveraging recruitment bonuses focused on new hires who speak mission-critical languages such as Chinese, or who are expert in hard-to-fill STEAM occupations such as data science, cyber security, data analytics, and software developers. Academic and community outreach is also critically important, and I intend to broaden CIA engagement with STEAM professional and affinity groups. This leadership challenge will be one of my top priorities if confirmed.

SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE

UNITED STATES SENATE



Post-Hearing Questions for the Record for

William J. Burns

Upon his nomination to be

Director of the Central Intelligence Agency

[From Vice Chairman Rubio]

Nord Stream II

Ambassador Burns, as you know completion of the Nord Stream II gas pipeline linking Russia and Germany is a top priority for Vladimir Putin.

1. What do you see as the risks associated with completion of this project?

(U) I agree with Secretary Blinken's statement in his confirmation testimony that completion of Nord Stream II (NSII) is a "bad idea." In broad terms, Nord Stream II would enable Russia to accomplish one of its strategic objectives which is to bypass Ukraine as a transit state for its natural gas while retaining European market share. Russia has worked to reduce gas volumes through Ukraine with each new European pipeline project it has undertaken. Moscow views its pipeline projects as a means to stoke division in the West and boost its sway in Europe, and it has used political and economic pressure to induce European cooperation. Even with NSII, Russia's energy leverage will diminish if Europe follows through on efforts to diversify energy suppliers and routes, limit investment in some strategic sectors, and bolster anticorruption campaigns to thwart Moscow's efforts to blackmail or co-opt local and national officials.

2. How might completion of Nord Stream II affect energy security in Europe, and what would be the likely outcome for Ukraine? In answering, please provide an updated assessment on Mathias Warrnig, the CEO of Nord Stream II, on his ties to Russian and East German Intelligence. To the extent possible, the assessment should be unclassified with a classified annex.

(U) In my view, the completion of the project will have an uneven effect on Europe's energy security based on infrastructure and transit fees, with Germany being the greatest beneficiary. Countries closest to Germany—such as Austria and the Czech Republic—that have more infrastructure in place to receive and transmit volumes of NSII gas to other European consumers would be most likely to take gas from NSII if it were completed. Countries farther east—such as Ukraine—would be among those most adversely impacted because of infrastructure constraints or reduced transit revenue.

(U) At full capacity, the project would reroute 55 billion cubic meters (bcm) of existing natural gas volumes transiting Ukraine, rather than increase Russian

natural gas volumes to Europe. In addition, at full capacity the project would eventually crimp Ukraine's natural gas transit revenues—most likely reducing them by more than \$1 billion per year.

(U) Nord Stream II Chief Executive Officer Matthias Warnig began his career as an East German intelligence officer in the State Security Service (Stasi) in 1974 and served in West Germany during the same time that Vladimir Putin was a KGB officer in East Germany, according to public reporting. Also according to public reporting, the two men met during this time. If confirmed, I will provide a classified assessment on this matter.

Foreign Gifts

In your pre-hearing disclosures you disclosed holiday gifts from foreign governments that you accepted during your time as President of the Carnegie Endowment International Peace, including a “Super Bowl group trip” from the Saudi Ambassador.

3. What was the cost or total value of the trip? What year was this trip taken? Were you required to pay taxes on this gift?

(U) I accepted a gift from the Saudi ambassador to attend the Super Bowl in February 2018, along with a small group that included several Arab ambassadors in Washington. I have been transparent on this matter -- consulting with Carnegie Endowment's ethics officer, who approved the trip in advance, and filing it on my required Committee and nominee disclosure forms. I estimate the total value of the gift at over \$1000. According to my tax advisor, I was not required to pay taxes on the gift.

4. Given Saudi Arabia's track record suppressing freedom of expression, association, religion, directing unlawful killings, and detention of innocent American citizens, do you believe it was appropriate to accept such a gift from the Saudi Ambassador, even in your private capacity?

(U) I should have declined the trip and watched the game, as I have done every other year, from home. I have never pulled any punches in my sharp public criticism of the Saudi government's actions, particularly the horrific murder of Jamal Khashoggi in October 2018, whom I had met over the years and knew to be a thoughtful, honest and courageous critic of the excesses and overreach of the

Saudi leadership. I was equally direct in my condemnation of Saudi Arabia's role in the catastrophic war in Yemen. I have written and spoken often about my serious concerns about Saudi behavior, including in Senate Foreign Relations Committee testimony.

5. Do you believe the United States should press Saudi Arabia on its egregious human rights record while also working on issues critical to U.S. and Saudi security?

(U) I believe firmly that the United States should press Saudi Arabia hard on human rights abuses, while also working on issues critical to U.S. and Saudi security.

Cuba

Press reporting has indicated that Russia has long used Cuba as a platform for intelligence collection against the United States, and more recently other adversaries, including China, are doing the same by exploiting its proximity to the U.S.

6. What is your view of the Cuban regime as a threat to U.S. interests?

(U) In my view, Cuba remains a repressive, undemocratic state with a troubling human rights record and history of espionage against the United States. The most pressing and immediate concern, however, is Cuba's alliances with other countries hostile to the United States. It hosts military and intelligence personnel from these countries, and cooperates with them in ways that harm the interests of the United States and our democratic allies in the region.

7. How do you believe our adversaries, particularly Russia and China, view Cuba?

(U) China and Cuba have longtime ideological ties but recent years have seen a change in the nature of the relationship as China has moved beyond ideology and instead leveraged Cuba's dire economic situation to increase its foothold in the Western Hemisphere. Cuba has little to offer China in return for economic assistance except access to a location near the United States, which China is well-positioned to exploit. Russia also sees Cuba as a dependably autocratic partner.

8. Who are Cuba's closest intelligence partners?

(U) Cuba's intelligence relations with others tend to be transactional, but it is difficult to discount the degree to which the Cuban regime is dependent on Russian intelligence support. Cuba's historical role as a longtime client and intelligence ally of the Soviets continues now with Russia. In fact, Russian press reports indicate Cuba allowed Russia to reopen a signals intelligence collection site in Cuba aimed at the United States.

9. What is Cuba's role in supporting the Maduro regime in Venezuela, and how do you assess that contributes to instability in the Western Hemisphere?

(U) Former Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez's rise to power and his weakening of Venezuelan democratic institutions owed much to the support provided by the Castro regime. Cuban advice to Chavez and now Maduro, while solidifying the Venezuelan regime's control over public discourse and stifling dissent, also has resulted in mismanagement of the Venezuelan economy. For its part, Cuba remains dependent on Venezuelan oil for as long as Venezuelan wells continue to function. In terms of the contribution to instability in the region, among other things, the flow of Venezuelan refugees fleeing the hardships in Venezuela has created the worst refugee crisis in the region's history and has placed economic and political burdens on countries already struggling with the damaging ramifications of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The U.S. has recently added Cuba back to the list of U.S. State Sponsors of Terrorism due to the fact that Cuba provides safe haven for members of U.S. State Department-designated foreign terrorist organizations – namely the FARC and ELN.

10. Do you agree that countries that provide safe haven for terrorists should be considered sponsors of terrorism?

(U) The Secretary of State makes the policy determination for designating state sponsors of terrorism. Cuba was removed from the list in 2015 and was recently placed back on the list at the end of the previous Administration. If confirmed, I will prioritize intelligence support to policy makers on Cuba's malign activities.

Iran

Under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, the president is required to keep the appropriate congressional committees and leadership “fully and currently” informed of any initiatives or negotiations with Iran relating to its nuclear program.

11. If confirmed, do you commit to keep Congress informed of the intelligence community’s role in any negotiations with Iran?

(U) The intelligence community plays an important role in informing Congress of Iran’s activities, and to the extent CIA is involved in supporting future policy negotiations, I will keep the Committee informed.

The JCPOA is still in effect, even without the participation of the United States, and we have all read in the newspapers the steps Iran has taken recently with regard to its enrichment activities, which are prohibited under the JCPOA.

12. You told Senator Cornyn in our hearing that “the United States [should] do everything we can to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon.” As Director of the CIA, how would you provide early warning of Iran’s intention to turn years of research and preparatory work into a finished weapon? In your view, what does that look like, and how will Iran react to “everything we can do”?

(U) If confirmed, I will ensure that CIA continues to provide a clear, objective, and timely view of all relevant intelligence to policymakers and Congress on this issue. Early warning to policymakers relies on the strength of CIA’s technical and HUMINT collection capabilities, which are key to gaining the most accurate intelligence picture possible on Iranian intentions and activities across the spectrum of nuclear, ballistic missile and other destabilizing programs. If confirmed I will place a significant focus on ensuring the robustness of CIA’s capabilities, paired with collaborative opportunities with IC partners. As I emphasized in my hearing, it is crucial for the United States to do everything it can to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, and to keep up the pressure on the Iranian regime to cease hostile regional and international activities and live up to international norms. Without such a comprehensive strategy, I would not expect to see unprompted changes or a de-escalation in its destabilizing actions.

13. Would you agree Iran is the world's leading exporter and supporter of terrorism?

(U) Iran has long been designated by the United States as a state sponsor of terrorism, with good reason. Iran continues to provide financial aid, advanced weapons, and training to militant and terrorist groups in the Middle East while cultivating operative networks across the globe. During the past few years, Iran and its partners and proxies have conducted attacks against us and allied interests heightening tensions in the Middle East. Targets have included U.S. locations and personnel in Iraq, oil facilities, regional shipping, and other infrastructure.

14. Do you believe that we can trust the world's leading exporter of terrorism to honor an international agreement?

(U) Ensuring that Iran honors international agreements is not, in my view, a question of "trust," but rather of hard-headed verification and monitoring measures that enable the U.S., our partners, and international agencies to measure compliance.

15. Do you believe that providing sanctions relief to the world's leading exporter of terrorism is likely to increase terrorist activity?

(U) In my view, an increase in Iran's financial resources would enable Tehran to better fund militant and terrorist groups and may engender an increase in Iran-backed terrorist and lethal activity. However, it is notable that U.S. sanctions that have constrained the Iranian government's revenue have not caused a marked change in Iran's military and security activity.

Recent Rocket Attacks in Iraq

Three times in the past week Iran and its proxies have tried to kill Americans who are working with the Iraqi government to secure their country from ISIS. I am pleased to see the administration beginning to respond to these provocations with targeted military action.

16. What is your view of the importance of establishing attribution as a predicate to deterrence regarding Iranian proxies?

U) Establishing attribution is a critical step in combatting such threats, and I have seen over the course of my long career in government the critical role CIA plays in that effort. Iran designs its support to proxy groups to be deniable in part to limit Washington's ability to hold Iran responsible for attacks. CIA's mission to conduct objective all-source intelligence is essential in determining culpability in the wake of attacks in order to support U.S. policy.

Mission and Structure of CIA

17. A) **What is your view of the size and composition of the CIA workforce, as it stands today? What changes would you consider making? How will you improve recruitment of Americans from many backgrounds, including first and second-generation Americans and those with STEM backgrounds?**
- B) **Do you intend to evaluate CIA's organizational structure for possible changes? If you do conduct a review of the CIA's structure, will you commit to keeping the Committee apprised of the findings and your intentions?**
- C) **What are your plans for resourcing and managing the CIA's election security efforts? Do you see election security in terms of a sustained effort, or something that ebbs and flows in relation to the electoral calendar?**
- D) **If confirmed, do you commit to immediately notifying the Committee of impending leadership changes before they are publicly announced?**

(U) If confirmed, I will consider it the highest honor to lead the exceptional women and men of CIA. As I stated in my hearing, I believe it is critically important that the CIA workforce reflects the diversity of our Nation and the diverse and unique skillsets demanded by CIA's global mission. The size and structure of CIA should evolve as needed to meet that core objective, and fully evaluating the resourcing posture of CIA will be an early focus for me if confirmed. I intend to take necessary steps to ensure that CIA has the highest quality language, technical and tradecraft training complemented by the most efficient and effective recruitment, retention and career advancement practices. If confirmed, I will assess all organizational aspects of CIA, to include those associated with STEM hiring and sustainment of election security efforts, and look forward sharing my findings with the Committee. I also commit to sharing any leadership changes at the Agency with the Committee.

[From Senator Cotton]

Russia

Russia's Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline is in the final stages of construction, and last year's defense bill greatly expanded the scope of companies subject to sanctions for supporting this destabilizing activity. I understand that the State Department has been contacting these companies to make them aware of their potential sanctions exposure.

18. Will you commit, if confirmed, to immediately providing the Senate with the unclassified list of all companies involved in the project that the IC produced in response to the National Defense Authorization Act?

(U) The CIA provides classified intelligence support to the State Department and other policy agencies' reporting requirements under the National Defense Authorization Act. If confirmed, I will pursue your interest in an unclassified list of companies that CIA determined to be engaged in conduct that would make them potentially subject to sanctions.

19. Will you commit, if confirmed, to provide an updated assessment of ties between Nord Stream CEO and Russian, East German, or other hostile intelligence agencies, in unclassified form with a classified annex if necessary?

(U) If confirmed, I commit to review our available intelligence on this matter and working with the Committee on a pragmatic way forward.

Nuclear Weapons Treaties

Early this month the Commander of STRATCOM wrote that "Russia began aggressively modernizing its nuclear forces, including its non-treaty-accountable" weapons a decade ago and "China's nuclear weapons stockpile is expected to double (if not triple or quadruple) over the next decade."

20. If confirmed, will you commit to providing this committee with regular updates on Russia's and China's nuclear modernization efforts?

(U) Yes. If confirmed, I will provide regular updates on Russia's nuclear modernization efforts, as well as China's ongoing efforts to modernize the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) nuclear forces. I will ensure that CIA uses the full array of its intelligence capabilities, in conjunction with the rest of the intelligence community, to monitor and assess developments relating to China's military, particularly its nuclear forces.

In 2019 DIA Director LTG Ashley indicated that Russia is violating the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, and last year the Department of State reported that China may be doing the same.

21. If confirmed, how will you ensure that CIA is postured to collect against, evaluate, and inform policy makers about our adversaries' adherence to or violation of international arms control agreements?

(U) As I know from my prior public service, CIA plays a critical role in support of broader U.S. government efforts to monitor treaty compliance. The intelligence community's collection and analysis informs the formal determinations of verification and compliance made by the State Department in its annual report to Congress, "Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments." The DCIA must concur on this report as stipulated in 22 U.S.C. § 2593a. If confirmed, I would make collection against our adversaries' nuclear weapons program, to include China's adherence to or violation of its self-proclaimed nuclear weapons testing moratorium, one of our highest priorities.

China

Last week I released a report recommending a series of actions to confront the Chinese Communist Party's economic aggression against the United State, including more stringent visa screening to catch PRC spies. The Department of State holds an important role in the travel and visa screening system that was built to prevent terrorists from traveling to the United States.

22. What lessons should the rest of the U.S. Government take away from our successes in screening visa applicants for terrorist affiliations in recent years? Where do we still need to make improvements?

(U) I have read carefully the report you released, and its recommendations, including on visa screening. Since 9/11, CIA has intensified its efforts, working with its U.S. government partners, to prevent terrorists from entering the United States. If confirmed, I will seek opportunities to identify areas where the Intelligence Community's unique foreign intelligence and counterintelligence collection efforts can better inform U.S. Government partners in visa considerations to protect U.S. national security interests.

23. How should we share best practices and lessons learned across government to confront problems such as economic espionage? If confirmed, how would you put this into practice?

(U) A unified and collaborative approach is necessary to confront challenges posed by China's broad-scale economic espionage efforts. Through foreign intelligence and counterintelligence collection efforts, the CIA is able to provide unique information and insights to other U.S. Government partners to inform visa considerations as appropriate, including on foreign nationals who may pose a threat to U.S. national security interests. If confirmed, I look forward to further strengthening CIA's collaboration with both U.S. Government and foreign intelligence partners on this issue, as well as working with and learning from the private sector, to improve our efforts to confront China's economic espionage activities.

Iran and Middle East

In November, we were reminded that Iran maintained components of a secret nuclear weapons program within their defense establishment when the leader of their new defense research organization – curiously, the same general who lead their pre-2004 nuclear weapons program – was killed while he was under Iranian government protection near Tehran. The IAEA never interviewed this scientist before his death, or inspected his organization's facilities, but Iran's Supreme Leader vowed to continue his work in the “nuclear and defense fields.”

24. Do you agree that any Iranian military research relevant to building a nuclear weapon presents a threat to the United States as well as our allies and partners?

(U) Yes.

25. If confirmed, how would you view continued military research and development activities by Iranian nuclear weapons scientists in the context of any future agreement with the Iranian regime?

(U) If confirmed, I will work to ensure that CIA provides as clear, objective, and timely a view of all relevant activities as possible to policymakers and Congress, including any continued military research and developmental activities by Iranian nuclear weapons scientists.

You have stated that “when the [JCOPA] was in place... U.S. unmanned aircraft weren’t being shot down by Iran... [and] Gulf shipping and infrastructure weren’t being hit by Iranian mines and missiles,” but this ignores Iranian missile attacks from Yemen against a range of international ships and infrastructure, including U.S. Navy vessels, as well as the shoot-down there of an unmanned U.S. aircraft.

26. Why do you not consider Iranian-sponsored and facilitated attacks against U.S. ships and aircraft to be of concern in this case?

(U) In that commentary, I was noting the fact that there were relatively few Iranian-supported attacks against U.S. interests -- in the Gulf itself -- during the period before the U.S. decided to withdraw from compliance with the JCPOA, compared to the period that followed. I remain deeply concerned about Iran’s support for a range of militia groups across the Middle East, and the continuing potential for those groups to target U.S. ships and aircraft, including missile attacks from Yemen.

27. What role did Iranian government support to the Houthis play in that group’s ability to expand their attacks beyond Yemen, considering some of that activity occurred during your time as Deputy Secretary of State?

(U) I agree with the DNI's 2019 Annual Threat Assessment statement: "Iran's support to the Huthis, including supplying ballistic missiles, risks escalating the conflict and poses a serious threat to U.S. partners and interests in the region. Iran continues to provide support that enables Huthi attacks against shipping near the Bab el Mandel) Strait and land-based targets deep inside Saudi Arabia and the UAE, using ballistic missiles and UAVs."

On Monday, South Korean press reported that the Republic of Korea was reaching an agreement with the Biden Administration to unfreeze billions in sanctioned Iranian funds in exchange for the IRGC releasing an oil tanker that they hijacked early last month.

28. Are you concerned that the regime will use sanctions relief to fund its missile and paramilitary programs?

(U) As I stated in response to Question 15, in my view, an increase in Iran's financial resources would enable Tehran to better fund militant and terrorist groups and may engender an increase in Iran-backed terrorist and lethal activity. However, it is notable that U.S. sanctions that have constrained the Iranian government's revenue have not caused a marked change in Iran's military and security activity.

During the Obama administration, you engaged in secret negotiations with Iran without the knowledge of Congress.

29. If confirmed, will you commit to fully brief this committee on any negotiations that the agency may be engaged in with the Iranians, as required by the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act?

(U) I commit to comply with all requirements of U.S. law.

Last year, the Iranian military launched a "space vehicle," from a mobile missile launcher, with a solid-fuel engine typically used in ballistic missiles, and carrying an intelligence satellite that by their own description is unlikely to every collect any intelligence.

30. What purpose do you assess such an exercise could possibly have, if not to develop ICBM technology? Do you think this and other IRGC

missile activity is consistent with Iran's obligations under UN Security Council resolutions, including UNSCR 2231?

(U) Iran has launched space launch vehicles to place satellites into orbit. These launches are concerning because space launch vehicles share the same booster technology as ballistic missiles. The determination of whether space launch and other IRGC missile activity is consistent with UNSCR 2231 would fall to the State Department, with intelligence support from CIA. As discussed with the Committee, any comprehensive strategy to deter Iranian malign behavior must address their ballistic missile program.