[Congressional Record Volume 166, Number 47 (Wednesday, March 11, 2020)]
[House]
[Pages H1622-H1637]
{time} 1515
USA FREEDOM REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2020
Mr. NADLER. Madam Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 891, I call
up the bill (H.R. 6172) to amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978 to prohibit the production of certain business records, and
for other purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Ms. DeGette). Pursuant to House Resolution
891, the amendment printed in House Report 116-415 is adopted, and the
bill, as amended, is considered read.
The text of the bill, as amended, is as follows:
H.R. 6172
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``USA
FREEDOM Reauthorization Act of 2020''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978.
TITLE I--FISA BUSINESS RECORDS
Sec. 101. Repeal of authority to access on an ongoing basis call detail
records.
Sec. 102. Protection of certain information.
Sec. 103. Use of information.
Sec. 104. Limitation on retention of business record information.
Sec. 105. Effective date.
TITLE II--ACCURACY AND INTEGRITY OF FISA PROCESS
Sec. 201. Certifications regarding accuracy of FISA applications.
Sec. 202. Description of techniques carried out before targeting United
States person.
Sec. 203. Investigations relating to Federal candidates and elected
Federal officials.
Sec. 204. Removal or suspension of Federal officers for misconduct
before Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.
Sec. 205. Penalties for offenses related to FISA.
Sec. 206. Contempts constituting crimes.
Sec. 207. Effective date.
TITLE III--FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
Sec. 301. Declassification of significant decisions, orders, and
opinions.
Sec. 302. Appointment of amici curiae and access to information.
Sec. 303. Effective and independent advice for Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court.
Sec. 304. Transcripts of proceedings and communications regarding
applications.
Sec. 305. Information provided in annual reports.
TITLE IV--TRANSPARENCY, SUNSETS, AND OTHER MATTERS
Sec. 401. Congressional oversight.
Sec. 402. Establishment of compliance officers.
Sec. 403. Public reports on information obtained or derived under FISA
and protection of First Amendment activities.
Sec. 404. Mandatory reporting on certain orders.
Sec. 405. Report on use of FISA authorities regarding protected
activities and protected classes.
Sec. 406. Improvements to Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board.
Sec. 407. Sunsets.
Sec. 408. Technical amendments.
SEC. 2. AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE
ACT OF 1978.
Except as otherwise expressly provided, whenever in this
Act an amendment or repeal is expressed in terms of an
amendment
[[Page H1623]]
to, or a repeal of, a section or other provision, the
reference shall be considered to be made to a section or
other provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.).
TITLE I--FISA BUSINESS RECORDS
SEC. 101. REPEAL OF AUTHORITY TO ACCESS ON AN ONGOING BASIS
CALL DETAIL RECORDS.
(a) Call Detail Records.--
(1) Repeal.--Subsection (b)(2) of section 501 (50 U.S.C.
1861) is amended--
(A) by striking subparagraph (C);
(B) in subparagraph (B)--
(i) in the matter preceding clause (i), by striking ``in
the case of'' and all that follows through ``in subparagraph
(C)),''; and
(ii) in clause (iii), by striking the semicolon at the end
and inserting ``; and''; and
(C) by redesignating subparagraph (D) as subparagraph (C).
(2) Prohibition.--Section 501(a) (50 U.S.C. 1861) is
amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(4) An application under paragraph (1) may not seek an
order authorizing or requiring the production on an ongoing
basis of call detail records.''.
(b) Conforming Amendments.--
(1) Orders.--Subsection (c) of section 501 (50 U.S.C. 1861)
is amended--
(A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``with subsection
(b)(2)(D)'' and inserting ``with subsection (b)(2)(C)''; and
(B) in paragraph (2), by striking subparagraph (F) and
inserting the following:
``(F) in the case of an application for call detail
records, shall direct the Government--
``(i) to adopt minimization procedures that require the
prompt destruction of all call detail records produced under
the order that the Government determines are not foreign
intelligence information; and
``(ii) to destroy all call detail records produced under
the order as prescribed by such procedures.'';
(2) Compensation.--Subsection (j) of section 501 (50 U.S.C.
1861) is amended to read as follows:
``(j) Compensation.--The Government shall compensate a
person for reasonable expenses incurred for providing
technical assistance to the Government under this section.''.
(3) Definitions.--Subsection (k)(4)(B) of section 501 (50
U.S.C. 1861) is amended by striking ``For purposes of an
application submitted under subsection (b)(2)(C)'' and
inserting ``In the case of an application for a call detail
record''.
(4) Oversight.--Section 502(b) (50 U.S.C. 1862(b)) is
amended--
(A) by striking paragraph (4); and
(B) by redesignating paragraphs (5) through (8) as
paragraphs (4) through (7), respectively;
(5) Annual reports.--Section 603 (50 U.S.C. 1873) is
amended--
(A) in subsection (b)--
(i) by transferring subparagraph (C) of paragraph (6) to
the end of paragraph (5);
(ii) in paragraph (5)--
(I) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``; and'' and
inserting a semicolon;
(II) in subparagraph (B), by striking the semicolon and
inserting ``; and''; and
(III) in subparagraph (C), as transferred by clause (i) of
this subparagraph, by striking ``any database of'';
(iii) by striking paragraph (6) (as amended by clause (i)
of this subparagraph); and
(iv) by redesignating paragraph (7) as paragraph (6); and
(B) in subsection (d)--
(i) in paragraph (1), by striking ``any of paragraphs (3),
(5), or (6)'' and inserting ``either of paragraph (3) or
(5)''; and
(ii) in paragraph (2)(A), by striking ``Paragraphs (2)(B),
(2)(C), and (6)(C)'' and inserting ``Paragraphs (2)(B) and
(2)(C)''.
(6) Public reporting.--Section 604(a)(1)(F) (50 U.S.C.
1874(a)(1)(F)) is amended--
(A) in clause (i), by striking the semicolon and inserting
``; and'';
(B) in clause (ii), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a
period; and
(C) by striking clause (iii).
SEC. 102. PROTECTION OF CERTAIN INFORMATION.
(a) Protection.--Subsection (a) of section 501 (50 U.S.C.
1861), as amended by section 101, is further amended by
adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(5)(A) An application under paragraph (1) may not seek an
order authorizing or requiring the production of a tangible
thing under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for
law enforcement purposes.
``(B) An application under paragraph (1) may not seek an
order authorizing or requiring the production of cell site
location or global positioning system information.''.
(b) Clarification of Emergency Authority for Cell Site
Location or Global Positioning System Information.--The
Attorney General may treat the production of cell site
location or global positioning system information as
electronic surveillance rather than business records for
purposes of authorizing the emergency production of such
information pursuant to section 105(e) of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1805(e)).
(c) Conforming Amendment.--Subsection (a) of section 501
(50 U.S.C. 1861) is further amended by striking ``Subject to
paragraph (3)'' and inserting ``Subject to paragraphs (3),
(4), and (5)''.
SEC. 103. USE OF INFORMATION.
Section 501(h) (50 U.S.C. 1861(h)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``Information acquired'' and inserting the
following:
``(1) In general.--Information acquired''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
``(2) Use in trials, hearings, or other proceedings.--For
purposes of subsections (b) through (h) of section 106--
``(A) information obtained or derived from the production
of tangible things pursuant to an investigation conducted
under this section shall be deemed to be information acquired
from an electronic surveillance pursuant to title I, unless
the court or other authority of the United States finds, in
response to a motion from the Government, that providing
notice to an aggrieved person would harm the national
security of the United States; and
``(B) in carrying out subparagraph (A), a person shall be
deemed to be an aggrieved person if--
``(i) the person is the target of such an investigation;
and
``(ii) the activities or communications of the person are
described in the tangible things that the Government intends
to use or disclose in any trial, hearing, or other
proceeding.''.
SEC. 104. LIMITATION ON RETENTION OF BUSINESS RECORD
INFORMATION.
(a) Requirement.--Section 501(g) (50 U.S.C. 1861(g)) is
amended--
(1) in paragraph (2), by striking ``In this section'' and
inserting ``In accordance with paragraph (3), in this
section'';
(2) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4); and
(3) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following new
paragraph (3):
``(3) Limitation on retention.--The minimization procedures
under paragraph (1) shall ensure that tangible things, and
information therein, received under this section may not be
retained in excess of 5 years, unless--
``(A) the tangible thing or information has been
affirmatively determined, in whole or in part, to constitute
foreign intelligence or counterintelligence or to be
necessary to understand or assess foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence;
``(B) the tangible thing or information is reasonably
believed to constitute evidence of a crime and is retained by
a law enforcement agency;
``(C) the tangible thing or information is enciphered or
reasonably believed to have a secret meaning;
``(D) retention is necessary to protect against an imminent
threat to human life;
``(E) retention is necessary for technical assurance or
compliance purposes, including a court order or discovery
obligation, in which case access to the tangible thing or
information retained for technical assurance or compliance
purposes shall be reported to the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the
House of Representatives and the Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate
on an annual basis; or
``(F) retention for a period in excess of 5 years is
approved by the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, based on a determination that retention is
necessary to protect the national security of the United
States, in which case the Director shall provide to such
committees a written certification describing--
``(i) the reasons extended retention is necessary to
protect the national security of the United States;
``(ii) the duration for which the Director is authorizing
retention;
``(iii) generally the tangible things or information to be
retained; and
``(iv) the measures the Director is taking to protect the
privacy interests of United States persons or persons located
inside the United States.''.
(b) Oversight.--Section 502(b) (50 U.S.C. 1862(b)) is
amended--
(1) in paragraph (7), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a
semicolon;
(2) in paragraph (8)(E), by striking the period and
inserting ``; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(9) a description of each time that an exception to the
5-year limitation on the retention of information was made
pursuant to any of subparagraphs (C) through (E) of
subsection (g)(3) of section 501, including an explanation
for each such exception.''.
SEC. 105. EFFECTIVE DATE.
The amendments made by this title shall take effect on the
date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply with
respect to applications made under section 501 of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1861) on or
after such date.
TITLE II--ACCURACY AND INTEGRITY OF FISA PROCESS
SEC. 201. CERTIFICATIONS REGARDING ACCURACY OF FISA
APPLICATIONS.
(a) Title I.--Subsection (a) of section 104 (50 U.S.C.
1804) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (8), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a
semicolon;
(2) in paragraph (9), by striking the period at the end and
inserting ``; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(10) a certification by the applicant that, to the best
knowledge of the applicant, the
[[Page H1624]]
attorney for the Government and the Department of Justice has
been apprised of all information that might reasonably--
``(A) call into question the accuracy of the application or
the reasonableness of any assessment in the application
conducted by the department or agency on whose behalf the
application is made; or
``(B) otherwise raise doubts with respect to the findings
required under section 105(a).''.
(b) Title III.--Subsection (a) of section 303 (50 U.S.C.
1823) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (7), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a
semicolon;
(2) in paragraph (8), by striking the period at the end and
inserting ``; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(9) a certification by the applicant that, to the best
knowledge of the applicant, the attorney for the Government
and the Department of Justice has been apprised of all
information that might reasonably--
``(A) call into question the accuracy of the application or
the reasonableness of any assessment in the application
conducted by the department or agency on whose behalf the
application is made; or
``(B) otherwise raise doubts with respect to the findings
required under section 304(a).''.
(c) Title IV.--Subsection (c) of section 402 (50 U.S.C.
1842) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (2), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a
semicolon;
(2) in paragraph (3), by striking the period at the end and
inserting ``; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(4) a certification by the applicant that, to the best
knowledge of the applicant, the attorney for the Government
and the Department of Justice has been apprised of all
information that might reasonably--
``(A) call into question the accuracy of the application or
the reasonableness of any assessment in the application
conducted by the department or agency on whose behalf the
application is made; or
``(B) otherwise raise doubts with respect to the findings
required under subsection (d).''.
(d) Title V.--Subsection (b)(2) of section 501 (50 U.S.C.
1861), as amended by section 101, is further amended--
(1) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``; and'' and
inserting a semicolon;
(2) in subparagraph (C), by striking the period at the end
and inserting ``; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(D) a statement by the applicant that, to the best
knowledge of the applicant, the application fairly reflects
all information that might reasonably--
``(i) call into question the accuracy of the application or
the reasonableness of any assessment in the application
conducted by the department or agency on whose behalf the
application is made; or
``(ii) otherwise raise doubts with respect to the findings
required under subsection (c).''.
(e) Title VII.--
(1) Section 703.--Subsection (b)(1) of section 703 (50
U.S.C. 1881b) is amended--
(A) in subparagraph (I), by striking ``; and'' and
inserting a semicolon;
(B) in subparagraph (J), by striking the period at the end
and inserting ``; and''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(K) a certification by the applicant that, to the best
knowledge of the applicant, the attorney for the Government
and the Department of Justice has been apprised of all
information that might reasonably--
``(i) call into question the accuracy of the application or
the reasonableness of any assessment in the application
conducted by the department or agency on whose behalf the
application is made; or
``(ii) otherwise raise doubts with respect to the findings
required under subsection (c).''.
(2) Section 704.--Subsection (b) of section 704 (50 U.S.C.
1881c) is amended--
(A) in paragraph (6), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a
semicolon;
(B) in paragraph (7), by striking the period at the end and
inserting ``; and''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(8) a certification by the applicant that, to the best
knowledge of the applicant, the attorney for the Government
and the Department of Justice has been apprised of all
information that might reasonably--
``(A) call into question the accuracy of the application or
the reasonableness of any assessment in the application
conducted by the department or agency on whose behalf the
application is made; or
``(B) otherwise raise doubts with respect to the findings
required under subsection (c).''.
(f) Review of Case Files To Ensure Accuracy.--Not later
than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the Attorney General, in consultation with the Director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall promulgate rules
governing the review of case files, as appropriate, to ensure
that applications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court under titles I or III of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) that target
United States persons are accurate and complete.
SEC. 202. DESCRIPTION OF TECHNIQUES CARRIED OUT BEFORE
TARGETING UNITED STATES PERSON.
(a) Title I.--Section 104(a)(6) (50 U.S.C. 1804(a)(6)) is
amended--
(1) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``; and'' and
inserting a semicolon; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(F) with respect to a target who is a United States
person, including a statement describing the investigative
techniques carried out before making the application; and''.
(b) Title III.--Section 303(a)(6) (50 U.S.C. 1823(a)(6)) is
amended--
(1) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``; and'' and
inserting a semicolon; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(F) with respect to a target who is a United States
person, includes a statement describing the investigative
techniques carried out before making the application; and''.
SEC. 203. INVESTIGATIONS RELATING TO FEDERAL CANDIDATES AND
ELECTED FEDERAL OFFICIALS.
(a) Title I.--Section 104(a)(6) (50 U.S.C. 1804(a)(6)), as
amended by section 202, is further amended by adding at the
end the following new subparagraph:
``(G) if the target of the electronic surveillance is an
elected Federal official or a candidate in a Federal
election, that the Attorney General has approved in writing
of the investigation;''.
(b) Title III.--Section 303(a)(6) (50 U.S.C. 1823(a)(6)),
as amended by section 202, is further amended by adding at
the end the following new subparagraph:
``(G) if the target of the physical search is an elected
Federal official or a candidate in a Federal election, that
the Attorney General has approved in writing of the
investigation;''.
SEC. 204. REMOVAL OR SUSPENSION OF FEDERAL OFFICERS FOR
MISCONDUCT BEFORE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE COURT.
Section 103 (50 U.S.C. 1803) is amended by adding at the
end the following new subsection:
``(l) Removal or Suspension of Federal Officers for
Misconduct Before Courts.--An employee, officer, or
contractor of the United States Government who engages in
deliberate misconduct with respect to proceedings before the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review shall be subject to
appropriate adverse actions, including, as appropriate,
suspension without pay or removal.''.
SEC. 205. PENALTIES FOR OFFENSES RELATED TO FISA.
(a) False Declarations Before FISC and FISCR.--Section
1623(a) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by
inserting before ``, or both'' the following: ``or, if such
proceedings are before or ancillary to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court of Review established by section 103 of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C.
1803), imprisoned not more than eight years''.
(b) Increased Penalty for Unauthorized Use.--Section 109(c)
(50 U.S.C. 1809(c)) is amended by striking ``five years'' and
inserting ``eight years''.
(c) Unauthorized Disclosure of Applications.--
(1) In general.--Subsection (a) of section 109 (50 U.S.C.
1809) is amended--
(A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking
``intentionally'';
(B) in paragraph (1)--
(i) by inserting ``intentionally'' before ``engages in'';
and
(ii) by striking ``; or'' and inserting a semicolon;
(C) in paragraph (2)--
(i) by inserting ``intentionally'' before ``disclose or
uses''; and
(ii) by striking the period at the end and inserting ``;
or''; and
(D) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(3) is an employee, officer, or contractor of the United
States Government and intentionally discloses an application,
or classified information contained therein, for an order
under any title of this Act to any person not entitled to
receive classified information.''.
(2) Conforming amendment.--Subsection (b) of such section
is amended by striking ``under subsection (a)'' and inserting
``under paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (a)''.
SEC. 206. CONTEMPTS CONSTITUTING CRIMES.
Section 402 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by
inserting after ``any district court of the United States''
the following: ``, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of
Review established by section 103 of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803),''.
SEC. 207. EFFECTIVE DATE.
The amendments made by this title shall take effect on the
date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply with
respect to applications made under section 501 of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1861) on or
after such date.
TITLE III--FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
SEC. 301. DECLASSIFICATION OF SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS, ORDERS,
AND OPINIONS.
(a) Timing of Declassification.--Subsection (a) of section
602 (50 U.S.C. 1872) is amended by adding at the end the
following new sentence: ``The Director shall complete the
declassification review and public release of each such
decision, order, or opinion by not later than 180 days after
the date on which the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review
issues such decision, order, or opinion.''.
[[Page H1625]]
(b) Matters Covered.--Such subsection is further amended--
(1) by striking ``Subject to subsection (b)'' and inserting
``(1) Subject to subsection (b)'';
(2) by striking ``includes a significant'' and all that
follows through ``, and,'' and inserting ``is described in
paragraph (2) and,''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(2) The decisions, orders, or opinions issued by the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review described in this
paragraph are such decisions, orders, or opinions that--
``(A) include a significant construction or interpretation
of any provision of law, including any novel or significant
construction or interpretation of--
``(i) the term `specific selection term'; or
``(ii) section 501(a)(5); or
``(B) result from a proceeding in which an amicus curiae
has been appointed pursuant to section 103(i).''.
(c) Application of Requirement.--Section 602 of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1872) shall
apply with respect to each decision, order, or opinion issued
by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review before, on, or
after the date of the enactment of such section. With respect
to such decisions, orders, or opinions issued before or on
such date, the Director of National Intelligence shall
complete the declassification review and public release of
each such decision, order, or opinion pursuant to such
section by not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act.
SEC. 302. APPOINTMENT OF AMICI CURIAE AND ACCESS TO
INFORMATION.
(a) Expansion of Appointment Authority.--Subparagraph (A)
of section 103(i)(2) (50 U.S.C. 1803(i)(2)) is amended to
read as follows:
``(A) shall appoint an individual who has been designated
under paragraph (1) to serve as amicus curiae to assist such
court in the consideration of any application for an order or
review that, in the opinion of the court--
``(i) presents a novel or significant interpretation of the
law, unless the court issues a finding that such appointment
is not appropriate; or
``(ii) presents exceptional concerns about the protection
of the rights of a United States person under the first
amendment to the Constitution, unless the court issues a
finding that such appointment is not appropriate; and''.
(b) Authority To Seek Review.--Subsection (i) of section
103 (50 U.S.C. 1803) is amended--
(1) by redesignating paragraphs (7) through (11) as
paragraphs (8) through (12), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after paragraph (6) the following new
paragraph:
``(7) Authority to seek review of decisions.--
``(A) FISA court decisions.--Following issuance of an order
under this Act by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court, an amicus curiae appointed under paragraph (2) may
petition the court to certify for review to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review a question of law
pursuant to subsection (j). If the court denies such
petition, the court shall provide for the record a written
statement of the reasons for such denial. Upon certification
of any question of law pursuant to this subparagraph, the
Court of Review shall appoint the amicus curiae to assist the
Court of Review in its consideration of the certified
question, unless the Court of Review issues a finding that
such appointment is not appropriate.
``(B) FISA court of review decisions.--An amicus curiae
appointed under paragraph (2) may petition the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review to certify for
review to the Supreme Court of the United States any question
of law pursuant to section 1254(2) of title 28, United States
Code.''.
(c) Access to Information.--
(1) Application and materials.--Subparagraph (A) of section
103(i)(6) (50 U.S.C. 1803(i)(6)) is amended by striking
clause (ii) and inserting the following new clause:
``(ii) may make a submission to the court requesting access
to any particular materials or information (or category of
materials or information) that the amicus curiae believes to
be relevant to the duties of the amicus curiae.''.
(2) Consultation among amici curiae.--Such section is
further amended--
(A) by redesignating subparagraphs (B), (C), and (D) as
subparagraphs (C), (D), and (E), respectively; and
(B) by inserting after subparagraph (A) the following new
subparagraph:
``(B) Consultation.--If the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court of Review determines that it is relevant to the duties
of an amicus curiae appointed by the court under paragraph
(2), the amicus curiae may consult with one or more of the
other individuals designated by the court to serve as amicus
curiae pursuant to paragraph (1) regarding any of the
information relevant to any assigned proceeding.''.
(d) Term Limits.--
(1) Requirement.--Paragraph (1) of section 103(i) (50
U.S.C. 1803(i)) is amended by adding at the end the following
new sentence: ``An individual may serve as an amicus curiae
for a 5-year term, and the presiding judges may, for good
cause, jointly reappoint the individual to a single
additional term.''.
(2) Application.--The amendment made by paragraph (1) shall
apply with respect to the service of an amicus curiae
appointed under section 103(i) of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(i)) that occurs on
or after the date of the enactment of this Act, regardless of
the date on which the amicus curiae is appointed.
SEC. 303. EFFECTIVE AND INDEPENDENT ADVICE FOR FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT.
Section 103 (50 U.S.C. 1803), as amended by section 204, is
further amended by adding at the end the following new
subsection:
``(m) Independent Legal Advisors.--
``(1) Authority.--The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of
Review may jointly employ legal advisors to assist the courts
in all aspects of considering any matter before the courts,
including with respect to--
``(A) providing advice on issues of law or fact presented
by any application for an order under this Act;
``(B) requesting information from the Government in
connection with any such application;
``(C) identifying any concerns with any such application;
and
``(D) proposing requirements or conditions for the approval
of any such application.
``(2) Direction.--The legal advisors employed under
paragraph (1) shall be subject solely to the direction of the
presiding judges of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of
Review.''.
SEC. 304. TRANSCRIPTS OF PROCEEDINGS AND COMMUNICATIONS
REGARDING APPLICATIONS.
(a) Transcripts.--Subsection (c) of section 103 (50 U.S.C.
1803) is amended--
(1) by striking ``Proceedings under this Act'' and
inserting ``(1) Proceedings under this Act'';
(2) by inserting ``, and shall be transcribed'' before the
first period;
(3) by inserting ``, transcriptions of proceedings,'' after
``applications made''; and
(4) by adding at the end the following new sentence:
``Transcriptions of proceedings shall be stored in a file
associated with the relevant application or order.''.
(b) Requirement for Written Records of Interactions With
Court.--Such subsection, as amended by paragraph (1) of this
section, is further amended by adding at the end the
following new paragraph:
``(2) The Attorney General and the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court shall maintain all written substantive
communications between the Department of Justice and the
court, including the identity of the employees of the court
to or from whom the communications were made, regarding an
application or order made under this title in a file
associated with the application or order.''.
(c) Conforming Amendment.--Subsection (i)(2) of section 103
(50 U.S.C. 1803) is amended by striking ``subsection (c)''
and inserting ``subsection (c)(1)''.
SEC. 305. INFORMATION PROVIDED IN ANNUAL REPORTS.
(a) Reports by Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts.--Subsection (a)(1) of section 603 (50
U.S.C. 1873) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (E), by striking ``; and'' and
inserting a semicolon;
(2) in subparagraph (F), by striking the period at the end
and inserting a semicolon; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraphs:
``(G) the number of times the Attorney General required the
emergency production of tangible things pursuant to section
501(i)(1) and the application under subparagraph (D) of such
section was denied;
``(H) the number of certifications by the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review pursuant to section
103(j); and
``(I) the number of requests to certify a question made by
an amicus curiae to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of
Review pursuant to section 103(i)(7).''.
(b) Reports by Director of National Intelligence.--
Subsection (b)(5)(B) of such section, as amended by section
101, is amended by inserting before the semicolon at the end
the following: ``, including information received
electronically and through hardcopy and portable media''.
TITLE IV--TRANSPARENCY, SUNSETS, AND OTHER MATTERS
SEC. 401. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT.
(a) In General.--Section 601 (50 U.S.C. 1871) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (f); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new
subsection (e):
``(e) Congressional Oversight.--In a manner consistent with
the protection of the national security, nothing in this Act
or any other provision of law may be construed to preclude
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House
of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence
of the Senate from receiving in a timely manner, upon
request, applications submitted under this Act to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court, orders of the court, and
relevant materials relating to such applications and
orders.''.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 602(a) (50 U.S.C.
1872(a)) is amended by striking ``in section 601(e)'' and
inserting ``in section 601(f)''.
[[Page H1626]]
SEC. 402. ESTABLISHMENT OF COMPLIANCE OFFICERS.
(a) In General.--Title VI (50 U.S.C. 1871 et seq.) is
amended by adding at the end the following new section:
``SEC. 605. COMPLIANCE OFFICERS.
``(a) Appointment.--The head of each covered agency shall
appoint a single Federal officer to serve as the Compliance
Officer for that agency.
``(b) Compliance.--Each Compliance Officer appointed under
subsection (a) shall be responsible for overseeing the
compliance of the relevant covered agency with the
requirements of this Act.
``(c) Audits.--Each Compliance Officer shall conduct
routine audits of the compliance by the relevant covered
agency with--
``(1) the requirements of this Act regarding submitting
applications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court,
including with respect to the accuracy of such applications;
and
``(2) the minimization, targeting, querying, and accuracy
procedures required by this Act.
``(d) Assessments.--Each Compliance Officer shall--
``(1) conduct on a routine basis assessments of the
efficacy of the minimization, targeting, querying, and
accuracy procedures adopted by the Attorney General pursuant
to this Act; and
``(2) annually submit to the Assistant Attorney General
designated as the Assistant Attorney General for National
Security under section 507A of title 28, United States Code,
and the head of the relevant covered agency the findings of
such assessments, including any recommendations of the
Compliance Officer with respect to improving such procedures.
``(e) Remediation.--Each Compliance Officer shall ensure
the remediation of any compliance issues of the relevant
covered agency identified pursuant to this section or the
rules of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.
``(f) Inspector Generals Assessment.--On an annual basis,
and consistent with the protection of sources and methods,
each Inspector General of a covered agency shall submit to
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the
appropriate congressional committees an assessment of the
implementation of this section by the covered agency.
``(g) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
`appropriate congressional committees' means--
``(A) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and
the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives; and
``(B) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate.
``(2) Covered agency.--The term `covered agency' means a
department or agency of the United States Government that
submits applications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court under this Act.
``(3) Foreign intelligence surveillance court.--The term
`Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court' has the meaning
given that term in section 101.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the
beginning of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 is amended by inserting after the item relating to
section 604 the following new item:
``Sec. 605. Compliance officers.''.
SEC. 403. PUBLIC REPORTS ON INFORMATION OBTAINED OR DERIVED
UNDER FISA AND PROTECTION OF FIRST AMENDMENT
ACTIVITIES.
(a) Reports.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Attorney General shall make
publicly available the following reports:
(1) A report explaining how the United States Government
determines whether information is ``obtained or derived''
from activities authorized by the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) for
purposes of the notice requirements under such Act.
(2) A report explaining how the United States Government
interprets the prohibition under section 501(a) of such Act
(50 U.S.C. 1861(a)) on conducting an investigation of a
United States person ``solely upon the basis of activities
protected by the first amendment to the Constitution''.
(b) Requirements.--The Attorney General shall ensure that
the reports under subsection (a) are detailed and use
hypothetical fact patterns to describe how the United States
Government conducts the analyses covered by the reports.
(c) Form.--The reports under subsection (a) shall be made
publicly available in unclassified form.
SEC. 404. MANDATORY REPORTING ON CERTAIN ORDERS.
(a) Reporting on United States Person Queries.--Subsection
(b)(2) of section 603 (50 U.S.C. 1873), as amended by section
101, is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``the number of search
terms concerning a known United States person'' and inserting
``the number of search terms that concern a known United
States person or are reasonably likely to identify a United
States person''; and
(2) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``the number of
queries concerning a known United States person'' and
inserting ``the number of queries that concern a known United
States person or are reasonably likely to identify a United
States person''.
(b) Modification to Exceptions.--Subsection (d)(2) of such
section, as amended by section 101, is amended by striking
``(A) Federal'' and all that follows through ``(B) Electronic
mail address and telephone numbers.--''.
SEC. 405. REPORT ON USE OF FISA AUTHORITIES REGARDING
PROTECTED ACTIVITIES AND PROTECTED CLASSES.
(a) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board shall make publicly available, to the extent
practicable, a report on--
(1) the extent to which the activities and protected
classes described in subsection (b) are used to support
targeting decisions in the use of authorities pursuant to the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801
et seq.); and
(2) the impact of the use of such authorities on such
activities and protected classes.
(b) Activities and Protected Classes Described.--The
activities and protected classes described in this subsection
are the following:
(1) Activities and expression protected by the First
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
(2) Race, ethnicity, national origin, religious
affiliation, sex, and any other protected characteristic
determined appropriate by the Board.
(c) Form.--In addition to the report made publicly
available under subsection (a), the Board may submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a classified annex.
(d) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(1) the Committee on the Judiciary and the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives;
and
(2) the Committee on the Judiciary and the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate.
SEC. 406. IMPROVEMENTS TO PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
OVERSIGHT BOARD.
Paragraph (4) of section 1061(h) of the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (42 U.S.C. 2000ee(h)) is
amended to read as follows:
``(4) Term.--
``(A) Commencement.--Each member of the Board shall serve a
term of 6 years, commencing on the date of the appointment of
the member to the Board.
``(B) Reappointment.--A member may be reappointed to one or
more additional terms.
``(C) Vacancy.--A vacancy in the Board shall be filled in
the manner in which the original appointment was made.
``(D) Extension.--Upon the expiration of the term of office
of a member, the member may continue to serve, at the
election of the member--
``(i) during the period preceding the reappointment of the
member pursuant to subparagraph (B); or
``(ii) until the member's successor has been appointed and
qualified.''.
SEC. 407. SUNSETS.
(a) USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of
2005.--Section 102(b)(1) of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act of 2005 (50 U.S.C. 1805 note) is amended
by striking ``March 15, 2020'' and inserting ``December 1,
2023''.
(b) Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004.--Section 6001(b)(1) of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 1801 note) is
amended by striking ``March 15, 2020'' and inserting
``December 1, 2023''.
(c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section
shall take effect on the earlier of the date of the enactment
of this Act or March 15, 2020.
SEC. 408. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS.
(a) In General.--The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended as follows:
(1) In section 103(e) (50 U.S.C. 1803(e)), by striking
``702(h)(4)'' both places it appears and inserting
``702(i)(4)''.
(2) In section 105(a)(4) (50 U.S.C. 1805(a)(4))--
(A) by striking ``section 104(a)(7)(E)'' and inserting
``section 104(a)(6)(E)''; and
(B) by striking ``section 104(d)'' and inserting ``section
104(c)''.
(3) In section 501(a) (50 U.S.C. 1861(a)), by indenting
paragraph (3) 2 ems to the left.
(4) In section 603(b)(2)(C) (50 U.S.C. 1873(b)(2)(C)), by
inserting ``and'' after the semicolon.
(5) In section 702 (50 U.S.C. 1881a)--
(A) in subsection (h)(3), by striking ``subsection (i)''
and inserting ``subsection (j)'';
(B) in subsection (j)(1), by striking ``subsection (g)''
each place it appears and inserting ``subsection (h)''; and
(C) in the subsection heading of subsection (m), by
inserting a comma after ``Assessments''.
(6) In section 801(8)(B)(iii) (50 U.S.C. 1885(8)(B)(iii)),
by striking ``702(h)'' and inserting ``702(i)''.
(7) In section 802(a)(3) (50 U.S.C. 1885a(a)(3)), by
striking ``702(h)'' and inserting ``702(i)''.
(b) References to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review.--
(1) Definitions.--Section 101 (50 U.S.C. 1801) is amended
by adding at the end the following new subsections:
``(q) The term `Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court'
means the court established under section 103(a).
[[Page H1627]]
``(r) The terms `Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of
Review' and `Court of Review' mean the court established
under section 103(b).''.
(2) Conforming amendments.--The Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is
amended--
(A) in section 102 (50 U.S.C. 1802), by striking ``the
court established under section 103(a)'' and inserting ``the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court'';
(B) in section 103 (50 U.S.C. 1803)--
(i) in subsection (a)--
(I) in paragraph (2)(A), by striking ``The court
established under this subsection'' and inserting ``The
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court''; and
(II) by striking ``the court established under this
subsection'' each place it appears and inserting ``the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court'';
(ii) in subsection (g)--
(I) by striking ``the court established pursuant to
subsection (a)'' and inserting ``the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court'';
(II) by striking ``the court of review established pursuant
to subsection (b)'' and inserting ``the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court of Review''; and
(III) by striking ``The courts established pursuant to
subsections (a) and (b)'' and inserting ``The Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court and the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court of Review'';
(iii) in subsection (h), by striking ``a court established
under this section'' and inserting ``the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court of Review'';
(iv) in subsection (i)--
(I) in paragraph (1), by striking ``the courts established
under subsections (a) and (b)'' and inserting ``the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court and the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court of Review'';
(II) in paragraph (3)(B), by striking ``the courts'' and
inserting ``the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review'';
(III) in paragraph (5), by striking ``the court'' and
inserting ``the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, as the
case may be,'';
(IV) in paragraph (6), by striking ``the court'' each place
it appears and inserting ``the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court of Review'';
(V) by striking ``a court established under subsection (a)
or (b)'' each place it appears and inserting ``the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court of Review''; and
(VI) by striking ``A court established under subsection (a)
or (b)'' each place it appears and inserting ``The Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court of Review'';
(v) in subsection (j)--
(I) by striking ``a court established under subsection
(a)'' and inserting ``the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court''; and
(II) by striking ``the court determines'' and inserting
``the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court determines'';
(vi) by striking ``the court established under subsection
(a)'' each place it appears and inserting ``the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court''; and
(vii) by striking ``the court established under subsection
(b)'' each place it appears and inserting ``the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review'';
(C) in section 105(c) (50 U.S.C. 1805(c))--
(i) in paragraph (2)(B), by striking ``the Court'' and
inserting ``the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court'';
and
(ii) in paragraph (3), by striking ``the court'' each place
it appears and inserting ``the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court'';
(D) in section 401(1) (50 U.S.C. 1841(1)), by striking ``,
and `State' '' and inserting `` `State', `Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court', and `Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court of Review' '';
(E) in section 402 (50 U.S.C. 1842)--
(i) in subsection (b)(1), by striking ``the court
established by section 103(a) of this Act'' and inserting
``the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court''; and
(ii) in subsection (h)(2), by striking ``the court
established under section 103(a)'' and inserting ``the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court'';
(F) in section 501 (50 U.S.C. 1861)--
(i) in subsection (b)(1), by striking ``the court
established by section 103(a)'' and inserting ``the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court'';
(ii) in subsection (g)(3), by striking ``the court
established under section 103(a)'' and inserting ``the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court''; and
(iii) in subsection (k)(1), by striking ``, and `State' ''
and inserting `` `State', and `Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court' '';
(G) in section 502(c)(1)(E), by striking ``the court
established under section 103'' and inserting ``the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (as defined by section
101)'';
(H) in section 801 (50 U.S.C. 1885)--
(i) in paragraph (8)(B)(i), by striking ``the court
established under section 103(a)'' and inserting ``the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court''; and
(ii) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(10) Foreign intelligence surveillance court.--The term
`Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court' means the court
established under section 103(a).''; and
(I) in section 802(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 1885a(a)(1)), by
striking ``the court established under section 103(a)'' and
inserting ``the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court''.
(c) Updated References to Certain Individuals.--The Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et
seq.) is amended--
(1) in section 102(a) (50 U.S.C. 1802(a))--
(A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``him'' and inserting
``the Attorney General''; and
(B) in paragraph (3), by striking ``his certification'' and
inserting ``the Attorney General's certification'';
(2) in section 103(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 1803(a)(1)), by
striking ``his decision'' and inserting ``the decision of
such judge'';
(3) in section 104(a) (50 U.S.C. 1804)(a))--
(A) in the language preceding paragraph (1), by striking
``his finding'' and inserting ``the Attorney General's
finding''; and
(B) in paragraph (3), by striking ``his belief'' and
inserting ``the applicant's belief'';
(4) in section 105(a) (50 U.S.C. 1805(a)), by striking
``he'' and inserting ``the judge'';
(5) in section 106 (50 U.S.C. 1806)--
(A) in subsection (e), by striking ``he'' and inserting
``the person''; and
(B) in subsection (j), by striking ``his discretion'' and
inserting ``the discretion of the judge'';
(6) in section 109 (50 U.S.C. 1809)--
(A) in subsection (a), by striking ``he'' and inserting
``the person''; and
(B) in subsection (b), by striking ``his official duties''
and inserting ``the official duties of such officer'';
(7) in section 305 (50 U.S.C. 1825)--
(A) in subsection (f)(1), by striking ``he'' and inserting
``the person''; and
(B) in subsection (j)(1), by striking ``his discretion''
and inserting ``the discretion of the judge'';
(8) in section 307 (50 U.S.C. 1827)--
(A) in subsection (a), by striking ``he'' and inserting
``the person''; and
(B) in subsection (b), by striking ``his official duties''
and inserting ``the official duties of such officer''; and
(9) in section 403 (50 U.S.C. 1843), by striking ``his
designee'' and inserting ``a designee of the Attorney
General''.
(d) Coordination With Other Amendments Made by This Act.--
For purposes of applying amendments made by provisions of
this Act other than this section, the amendments made by this
section shall be treated as having been enacted immediately
before any such amendments by other provisions of this Act.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The bill, as amended, shall be debatable for
1 hour, equally divided among and controlled by the chair and ranking
minority member of the Committee on the Judiciary and the chair and
ranking minority member of the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence.
The gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler), the gentleman from Ohio
(Mr. Jordan), the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff), and the
gentleman from California (Mr. Nunes) each will control 15 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler).
General Leave
Mr. NADLER. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members
may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks
and insert extraneous material into the Record.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from New York?
There was no objection.
Mr. NADLER. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Madam Speaker, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA,
authorizes the government to collect foreign intelligence in the United
States under the supervision of a secret court.
It is one of the most complicated, technical statutes we handle, but
the story of FISA and how Congress reacts to its use is really very
simple.
Some measure of surveillance is necessary to keep our country safe.
Left unchecked, however, the executive branch is all too willing to
unleash its considerable surveillance capabilities on the American
people.
Our job as Members of Congress is to make sure that our intelligence
capabilities are robust, but also to provide that critical check, to
claw back authorities that go too far, and to press for changes that
protect our civil liberties to the maximum extent possible.
H.R. 6172, the USA FREEDOM Reauthorization Act, is one step in that
ongoing project of protecting our civil liberties.
It is by no means a perfect bill. There are many other changes to
FISA that I would have liked to have seen here, but this bill includes
very important reforms.
First and foremost, it ends the NSA's call detail records program,
which
[[Page H1628]]
began as part of a secret and unlawful surveillance project almost 20
years ago. This experiment has run its course, and our responsibility
is to bring it to its formal end. It should never have been permitted
to start, but now at least we can finally end it.
This bill also prohibits the use of section 215 to acquire
information that would otherwise require a warrant in the law
enforcement context. Our understanding of the Fourth Amendment has come
to recognize a privacy interest in our physical location, and this
legislation provides new protections accordingly.
As the law continues to evolve, the public will see how the
government applies these standards in the FISA court. This bill
requires the government to disclose all significant opinions of the
FISA court within 180 days.
The bill also requires a one-time historical review of all
significant opinions issued by the court since its inception. The
Department of Justice may have good cause to classify the details of
any particular case, but there is no reason that important
interpretations of the law should be kept secret. There never was, and
we finally managed to get rid of it.
Now, since we circulated the original draft of this bill, we have
heard from a wide range of stakeholders, from the most progressive
Members of the Democratic Caucus to the staunchest supporters of
President Trump, and they have convinced us to make yet additional
changes.
To address the concerns of those who seek additional guarantees of
privacy, we have added new retention limits, new reports to explain key
legal issues, and an explicit prohibition on the use of section 215 to
obtain GPS and cell site location information.
Other Members asked us to address the deep structural flaws in FISA
identified by the inspector general in the report issued late last
year. We have done just that. Working with our Republican colleagues,
we have mandated additional transparency in FISA applications, created
additional scrutiny for cases that involve elected officials, and
elevated the consequences for misrepresenting information to the FISA
court.
I should also address the Members on both sides of the aisle who
urged opposition to this bill because it does not contain every reform
we might have wanted.
Madam Speaker, I agree. It does not contain every reform that I want.
I am no fan of the underlying authorities.
I represent Lower Manhattan. I was in Congress when the World Trade
Center was hit. Then and now, I resented that the government exploited
9/11 to pass the PATRIOT Act, which was much too restrictive of civil
liberties, and other measures that I find dangerous and overbroad.
For many years, I led the opposition to reauthorization of the
business records provision of FISA, which we are finally doing
something about today.
I am a founding member of what was then called the PATRIOT Act Reform
Caucus to reform the PATRIOT Act. I have voted against every FISA bill
that did not contain significant reform.
But the measure before us today does contain significant reform--
again, not every change we would like to see, certainly not many of the
changes I would like to see, but very decisive steps in the direction
of protecting our civil rights and our civil liberties.
We are taking that step as we should--together, in a bipartisan
fashion, and in complete agreement that when it comes to safeguarding
our civil liberties, we have done what we could do, and we still have a
great deal of work to do.
Madam Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this measure, and I
reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. JORDAN. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I might
consume.
I rise in support of the reform legislation.
This bill is not perfect, as the chairman said. It does not contain
every reform that I would like to see or the reforms that I advocated
for and many others advocated for, but it is a start. Most importantly,
this bill is an improvement over what currently exists, over the status
quo.
The legislation begins to address the problems that we saw with the
FBI's illegal surveillance of Trump campaign associate Carter Page.
On December 9, 2019, the nonpartisan Justice Department inspector
general released a 400-page report detailing the FBI's misconduct and
the failures in its warrantless surveillance of Mr. Page.
Congressman Meadows and I urged our Democratic chairman to hold
hearings on this report, but they were not interested.
Still, I hope all of my colleagues had a chance to read the inspector
general's report because it should concern every single American.
Remember, if our law enforcement agencies can do this to a President,
imagine what they can do to you and me.
The Justice Department inspector general found 17 significant errors
or omissions in the FISA warrant applications for Mr. Page. Said more
plainly, they lied to the court 17 times.
They didn't tell the court important information, like the guy who
wrote the dossier was being paid for by the opposition party's
campaign. They didn't tell the court the guy who wrote the document,
the dossier, that they used to get the warrant was ``desperate'' to
stop Trump and had communicated that to the Justice Department.
The inspector general also found 51 factual assertions made to the
FISA court that were wrong or unsupported. It detailed how the FBI was
too eager to rely on phony political opposition research conducted by
Christopher Steele and, as I said, funded by the Democrats.
According to the inspector general: ``The FISA request form drew
almost entirely from Steele's reporting in describing the factual basis
to establish probable cause to believe that Page was an agent of a
foreign power,'' which was not true.
The inspector general determined that the FBI did not have
corroborating information to support the specific allegations made
against Mr. Page. In fact, Steele was feeding the FBI gossip and
innuendo as proof of wrongdoing. Then, the FBI used that information,
as I said, to spy on an American citizen, without corroborating the
information.
This is a great misuse of immense power that our Federal Government
agencies have, and it is a severe abuse of trust.
Now, there has been a lot of talk about accountability for this
misconduct, and I absolutely agree. There needs to be accountability at
all levels.
The inspector general found that an FBI attorney actually doctored a
piece of evidence. An FBI attorney did this. He doctored a piece of
evidence that he used to obtain the warrant to spy on Mr. Page.
The attorney took an email that would have cut against the
surveillance order on Mr. Page and changed its meaning. He changed its
meaning 180 degrees so that it would support the surveillance. This is
totally unacceptable.
The same FBI lawyer who the inspector general found to have shared
anti-Trump text messages with his colleagues, writing all kinds of
things--``the crazies won finally,'' ``viva la resistance''--this
attorney went on to serve on Special Counsel Robert Mueller's team
investigating the debunked allegations about Russian collusion.
The FBI's misconduct on FISA is not limited to junior staffers, as
some of my colleagues have asserted. Such rampant and flagrant abuse
can occur only because of senior leadership failures: Director Comey,
Deputy Director McCabe, and General Counsel Jim Baker.
In fact, the inspector general said as much in his report. Here are
his words: ``In our view, this was a failure of not only the
operational team, but also of the managers and supervisors, including
senior officials, in the chain of command.''
It is no coincidence that the two most senior FBI officials involved,
Director Comey and Deputy Director McCabe, were both referred for
criminal prosecution by the inspector general for wrongdoing related to
the investigations.
We cannot forget this background because that is why this reform
legislation--again, while not everything we hoped for--is a necessary
first step.
[[Page H1629]]
This bill would add several requirements to ensure a FISA application
is complete and accurate. It requires the Attorney General to sign off
on a FISA investigation of an elected official or candidate for Federal
office. It forces the Justice Department to fire anyone who knowingly
hides information from the FISA court. And the bill enhances
congressional oversight of the FISA process.
It also allows the FISA court to appoint an amicus in cases involving
political activities of a U.S. person. Because the FISA process is ex
parte--meaning, of course, the U.S. person is not represented--I hope
the appointment of the amicus will help the FISA court to protect the
civil liberties of U.S. persons.
Like I said, I think we can and should do more, and I look forward to
working with the chairman toward that end. But right now, this bill
would improve the civil liberty protections of U.S. citizens.
Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. NADLER. Madam Speaker, I include in the Record this letter from
the chairwoman of the Committee on Oversight and Reform.
House of Representatives,
Committee on Oversight and Reform,
Washington, DC, March 10, 2020.
Hon. Jerrold Nadler,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing to you concerning H.R.
6172, the ``USA Freedom Reauthorization Act.'' There are
certain provisions in the legislation which fall within the
Rule X jurisdiction of the Committee on Oversight and Reform.
In the interest of permitting your Committee to proceed
expeditiously on this bill, I am willing to waive this
Committee's right to sequential referral. I do so with the
understanding that by waiving consideration of the bill, the
Committee on Oversight and Reform does not waive any future
jurisdictional claim over the subject matters contained in
the bill which fall within its Rule X jurisdiction. I request
that you urge the Speaker to name Members of this Committee
to any conference committee which is named to consider such
provisions.
Please place this letter into the Congressional Record
during consideration of the measure on the House floor. Thank
you for the cooperative spirit in which you have worked
regarding this matter and others between our respective
Committees.
Sincerely,
Carolyn B. Maloney,
Chairwoman.
Mr. NADLER. Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from
Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee).
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Madam Speaker, as a senior member of the Judiciary
Committee, I am delighted to be able to join our Republican colleagues
and Democratic colleagues and those of us who have advocated for a
progressive mindset as it relates to civil liberties in this country in
support of the reauthorization of the USA FREEDOM Act.
With that backdrop, however, I want to say to my good friend, he
knows that the inspector general's report indicated that there was no
political motive to the beginning of the investigation. And even though
referrals have been made, none of the individuals he mentioned have
been criminally prosecuted.
That is behind us, to a certain extent, but it is a good backdrop to
make sure that anything we do, no matter who the individuals are, that
we do it with the impeccable credentials of the Constitution, civil
liberties, civil justice, and equality.
That is why I rise to support this legislation, although I know that
a more detailed review might have warranted some additional fixes.
But I think it is important to take note that we do have the
prohibition of the government from using section 215 to collect any
records that would require a warrant if the information being assessed
was for law enforcement purposes.
We are trying to contain and constrain. The bill requires the
government to provide notice to individuals whose information is
collected pursuant to 215, and it strengthens First Amendment
protections by requiring the FISA court and the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court of Review to appoint an amicus curiae in any
instance where an application by the government presents significant
concerns about impinging on the First Amendment.
The bill also strengthens the amicus curiae's ability to protect
privacy in civil liberties cases. As well, it directs the Privacy and
Civil Liberties Oversight Board to conduct a study of the way the
government's use of FISA authorities may be premised.
The bill improves transparency. The bill strengthens reporting
requirements. It strengthens, as I said, the Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board.
In further debates right after 9/11, I worked on a number of
legislative initiatives, including one bill in 2013, the FISA Court and
Sunshine Act, bipartisan legislation that provided much-needed
transparency without compromising national security to the decisions,
orders, and opinions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.
That language is in this bill, the opportunity to review those
decisions and for those decisions to be able to be reviewed as well.
I am a longstanding supporter of the USA FREEDOM Act, particularly
because section 301 of that bill, which is not in this bill, has
protections against reversed targeting.
{time} 1530
Each moment that we have an opportunity to provide security for this
Nation we also have the equal opportunity of infringing on the civil
liberties of our fellow citizens. It is important today to stand on
this floor and say to the American people that we do believe in their
constitutional rights and the Bill of Rights. This legislation is to
further contain those infringements and to protect the rights of our
citizens.
Madam Speaker, I want my colleagues to support this legislation.
Madam Speaker, as a senior member of the Judiciary Committee and as
an original co-sponsor of the USA Freedom Act, which stands for
``Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ending
Eavesdropping, Dragnet-collection, and Online Monitoring Act'', I rise
in support of the ``USA Freedom Reauthorization Act of 2020.''
I support the USA Freedom Reauthorization Act of 2020 for several
reasons:
1. The bill continues to prohibit the NSA from collecting bulk phone
records. By doing so, the government no longer has the authority to
collect large amounts of call detail records on an ongoing basis. The
Call Detail Records program not only resulted in the over-collection of
records that the NSA did not have authority to receive but also
resulted in several technical problems.
2. The USA Freedom Reauthorization Act prohibits the government from
using Section 215 to collect any records that would require a warrant
if the information being accessed were for law enforcement purposes.
This provision ensures that Section 215 can keep pace with future
developments in the law as courts interpret Carpenter v. United States
and apply it to other contexts.
3. The bill requires the government to provide notice to individuals
whose information is collected pursuant to Section 215 if the
government plans to use that information, or any information derived
from it, in a criminal case or other legal proceeding.
4. The USA Freedom Reauthorization Act strengthens First Amendment
Protections by requiring the FISC and the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court of Review to appoint an amicus curia in any instance
where an application by the government presents significant concerns
about impinging on the First Amendment activities of Americans.
5. The bill contains other measures to strengthen amici curiae's
ability to protect privacy in civil liberties in cases to which they
are appointed.
6. The USA Freedom Reauthorization Act directs the Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board to conduct a study of the way the
government's use of FISA authorities may be premised on or may impact
protected classes, including based on race, ethnicity, national origin,
religion, or sex.
7. The bill improves transparency by requiring the declassification
of significant FISC and FISC-R opinions within 180 days.
8. The USA Freedom Reauthorization Act strengthens the reporting
requirement for Section 702 queries by eliminating an existing
exemption for the FBI.
9. The bill strengthens the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight
Board (PCLOB) by allowing members to be reappointed to consecutive
terms and to continue serving after their terms have expired, should
they so choose.
The USA Freedom Act was first passed in 2015 as the House's unified
response to the unauthorized disclosures and subsequent publication in
the media in June 2013, regarding the National Security Agency's
collection from Verizon of the phone records of all of its American
customers, which was authorized by the FISA Court pursuant to Section
215 of the Patriot Act.
[[Page H1630]]
Public reaction to the news of this massive and secret data gathering
operation was swift and negative.
There was justifiable concern on the part of the public and a large
percentage of the Members of this body that the extent and scale of
this NSA data collection operation, which exceeded by orders of
magnitude anything previously authorized or contemplated, may
constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy and threat to the civil
liberties of American citizens.
To quell the growing controversy, the Director of National
Intelligence declassified and released limited information about this
program. According to the DNI, the information acquired under this
program did not include the content of any communications or the
identity of any subscriber.
The DNI stated that ``the only type of information acquired under the
Court's order is telephony meta data, such as telephone numbers dialed
and length of calls.''
The assurance given by the DNI, to put it mildly, was not very
reassuring.
In response, many Members of Congress, including then Ranking Member
Conyers, Mr. Sensenbrenner, and myself, introduced legislation in
response to the disclosures to ensure that the law and the practices of
the executive branch reflect the intent of Congress in passing the USA
Patriot Act and subsequent amendments.
For example, I introduced H.R. 2440, the ``FISA Court in the Sunshine
Act of 2013,'' bipartisan legislation, that provided much needed
transparency without compromising national security to the decisions,
orders, and opinions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or
``FISA Court.''
Specifically, my bill required the Attorney General to disclose each
decision, order, or opinion of a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court (FISC), allowing Americans to know how broad of a legal authority
the government is claiming under the PATRIOT ACT and Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act to conduct the surveillance needed to
keep Americans safe.
These requirements were then incorporated in substantial fl part in
the USA Freedom Act, which required the Attorney General to conduct a
declassification review of each decision, order, or opinion of the FISA
court that included a significant construction or interpretation of law
and to submit a report to Congress within 45 days.
As I indicated, perhaps the most important reasons for supporting
passage of the USA Freedom Reauthorization Act is the prohibition on
domestic bulk collection, as well as its enhanced First Amendment
protections, both of which seek to protect American citizens from the
NSA' s abuse of power through unlawful collection of personal data.
I was also a longstanding supporter of the USA Freedom Act,
particularly because Section 301 of the bill contained protections
against ``reverse targeting,'' which became law when an earlier Jackson
Lee Amendment was included in H.R. 3773, the RESTORE Act of 2007.
``Reverse targeting,'' a concept well known to members of this
Committee but not so well understood by those less steeped in the
arcana of electronic surveillance, is the practice where the government
targets foreigners without a warrant while its actual purpose is to
collect information on certain U.S. persons.
One of the main concerns of libertarians and classical conservatives,
as well as progressives and civil liberties organizations, in giving
expanded authority to the executive branch was the temptation for
national security agencies to engage in reverse targeting may be
difficult to resist in the absence of strong safeguards to prevent it.
The Jackson Lee Amendment, preserved in Section 301 of the USA
Freedom Act, reduced even further any such temptation to resort to
reverse targeting by making any information concerning a United States
person obtained improperly inadmissible in any federal, state, or local
judicial, legal, executive, or administrative proceeding.
Madam Speaker, I noted in an op-ed published way back in October
2007, that as Alexis DeTocqueville, the most astute student of American
democracy, observed nearly two centuries ago, the reason democracies
invariably prevail in any military conflict is because democracy is the
governmental form that best rewards and encourages those traits that
are indispensable to success: initiative, innovation, courage, and a
love of justice.
I support the USA Freedom Reauthorization Act of 2020 because it will
help keep us true to the Bill of Rights and strikes the proper balance
between cherished liberties and smart security.
I urge my colleagues to support the USA Freedom Reauthorization Act.
Mr. JORDAN. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I will just real quickly say that the gentlewoman is exactly right.
People should be prosecuted. It was so bad in the Carter Page
application. Here is what the former chief judge of the FISA court
said:
The frequency with which representations made by FBI
personnel turned out to be unsupported or contradicted by
information in their possession and with which they withheld
information detrimental to their case calls into question
whether information contained in other FBI applications is
reliable.
Put in plain English: You lied so much, how can we trust any other
representation you have made to the court?
That is what this legislation is designed to begin to address and
protect American citizens who will be in front of this court.
Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr.
Sensenbrenner), who has been a strong advocate in this area and former
chairman of the Judiciary Committee.
Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Madam Speaker, I am no stranger to this debate. In
the aftermath of 9/11, I stood on this floor to advance the USA PATRIOT
Act. I still believe, as I did at the time, in its necessity to protect
our country from terrorist attacks.
In 2015, after abuses of the surveillance authorities were brought to
light, I fought for reforms that resulted in the passage of the USA
FREEDOM Act.
Today I rise in support of this reauthorization bill. The expiring
provisions are still necessary to the national security of the United
States. However, much like in 2015, we have been made aware of
surveillance abuses that require our attention. I believe this bill
offers substantial reforms to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act, reforms that are imperative for accountability and the restoration
of Americans' confidence in our intelligence system.
The FISA abuses in the Carter Page case were staggering. We learned
about these when Inspector General Michael Horowitz released his report
on December 9, 2019. I said at the time that Congress had the
responsibility to fully examine his findings and to take corrective
actions.
Unfortunately, we have not fully examined this report. Despite being
released 3 months ago, we have not held one hearing on the House side.
There is documented evidence of errors, missteps, and omissions that
resulted in the degradation of Carter Page's constitutional rights,
and, to date, the House majority has largely ignored it.
So I am glad that the majority is finally acknowledging the abuses in
the Horowitz report by introducing corrective actions in this bill.
There are several good provisions for accountability in the bill. For
instance, the Attorney General must now approve, in writing, the FISA
investigation of an elected official or candidate for Federal office.
Also, the legislation expands the use of an amicus in cases involving
the political activities of U.S. citizens. The legislation creates
checks to ensure that information being presented to the FISC is
accurate.
It is impossible to legislate away bad behavior by malicious actors,
but this legislation places much-needed safeguards to prevent another
Carter Page-type scandal from happening again.
My colleagues who wish we should do more are right; we should do
more. But with a deadline on Sunday, we must either act now or let
these important national security authorities expire.
Since the inception of the PATRIOT Act, I have fought for oversight
of powerful surveillance apparatus. I believe that the reforms
presented in this bill are a good step to restoring the oversight.
The reauthorization reinforces essential and effective tools that
have been in place since 9/11, while also strengthening the protection
of citizen civil liberties in the United States.
Mr. NADLER. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Quigley).
Mr. QUIGLEY. Madam Speaker, I rise in strong support of this USA
FREEDOM Reauthorization Act of 2020.
This bill strikes just the right balance between protecting our
national security and strengthening civil liberties. It preserves
critical tools used by authorities to investigate international
terrorism and foreign intelligence matters, but also makes significant
reforms to enhance privacy and transparency.
I would like to quickly highlight some of the important privacy
protections included in the bill.
[[Page H1631]]
For example, the FBI may no longer be able to keep business records
collected under FISA indefinitely. Those records would have to be
destroyed after 5 years, except in very narrow circumstances.
The government will also have to provide notice to individuals whose
business records are used in a criminal case or other proceeding unless
the proceeding's adjudicator finds that disclosure would harm national
security. Individuals who receive notice would then be able to
challenge the legality of the government's collection, a right that
should be maintained when intrusive national security authorities are
used to gather evidence.
In addition to these privacy enhancements, the bill also requires
greater transparency about how the government uses FISA. The bill
imposes a 180-day clock on declassification of significant opinions
issued by the FISA court and requires the government to look further in
its historical records than it has done before.
Moreover, the bill enhances transparency in the intelligence
community's annual public reports so we get a better sense of when the
government conducts U.S. person queries into FISA data.
These are but some examples of the important transparency and private
reforms contained in this bill. These reforms are all accomplished
without negatively impacting our national security.
Madam Speaker, I urge my colleagues to join me in voting for it.
Mr. JORDAN. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Arizona (Mr. Biggs).
Mr. BIGGS. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
The recurring theme that I have heard today is that we should be
doing more to fix FISA. That is not unlike what James Madison described
in the Federalist Papers when he described parchment barriers between
the various departments of government, meaning the three branches of
government, afraid that all of it could be sucked into the vortex of
power--those are his words--of the legislative branch.
And here we are discussing parchment barriers for those who have
basically abused the FISA process so far. We are putting more parchment
barriers in place, but they don't mean anything. They don't mean
anything if you never see someone prosecuted.
So let's talk about one of the things that has been touted, a
lengthening of the time of sentencing from 5 years to 8 years if you
are found to commit abuse. How about contempt proceedings that are
being put in here?
But do you know what? We know FISA was abused. We know that people
lied to the court, and we know something else. The Inspector General
recommended criminal charges be filed on people.
These parchment barriers make no sense, have no strength and no
efficacy when we don't see someone indicted, charged, or convicted. To
say something is criminal in nature doesn't matter when you don't
prosecute them.
If you want to deter somebody, you must see prosecution so, that way,
you get specific deterrence for that individual or general deterrence
to the rest of the people who are inclined to commit bad acts.
The flaws in this bill are that we don't see application of any of
these reforms. So we can tout them all we wish--a whole litany of
them--but until you actually hold people accountable, this bill has no
efficacy. For that reason, I will be opposing.
Mr. NADLER. Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. JORDAN. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Ohio (Mr. Davidson).
Mr. DAVIDSON of Ohio. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman for
yielding.
Madam Speaker, I rise to caution my colleagues about this false
dilemma of security versus freedom and about supporting and defending
our Constitution against all enemies foreign or domestic by abridging
the rights and freedoms protected by our Constitution.
I want to applaud, frankly, the behind-the-scenes folks on the
committees who worked hard to make this bill better than the status
quo. Many of my colleagues will look at this, and, frankly, that has
been the argument by the ranking member and the chairman that this bill
really isn't that good of a bill, that it is really not what we should
do, but it is better than the status quo.
Too often that is what happens here. I think that might leave people
with the false perception that we couldn't do better. But the reality
is there is bipartisan agreement and bicameral agreement on the
Safeguarding Americans' Private Records Act.
The bill that the committee was going to move forward with was
pulled. The committee process didn't take place because there was a
bipartisan coalition of conservatives and progressives who had a plan
to amend the bill. It may, in fact, have been a completely different
bill.
We also didn't take it through committee. We also didn't allow any
amendments, so numerous good amendments weren't even able to be
considered, amendments like the confess your transgressions amendment
that would say that, of all these agencies that report, the Director of
National Intelligence would say: What has been done to discipline
people who access these records in violation of statute?
My colleague, Mr. Biggs, highlighted the real problem. There is one
standard for everyday Americans and a different one for the powerful
and connected. Our Justice Department needs to hold someone
accountable. Whether it is in my district, in a Republican district, or
one of my colleagues' districts, in a Democratic district, we get the
same question: When is someone going to jail?
We need to know that the law is being followed, that Lady Justice
does have a blindfold on, and that there is one standard. This falls
far short of that, and it is not the standard that should be used
against American citizens; therefore, it is not the standard that
should be used to secure our country.
Mr. NADLER. Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. JORDAN. Madam Speaker, may I inquire of the Chair how much time
the minority has remaining.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Ohio has 2\1/2\ minutes
remaining.
Mr. JORDAN. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
North Dakota (Mr. Armstrong).
Mr. ARMSTRONG. Madam Speaker, to my colleagues on both sides who
think that this bill doesn't go far enough, I can tell you that,
probably 3 days ago, I was 100 percent in your camp. If you would have
told me today I was going to stand up and speak in favor of this bill,
I would have told you that is not true, yet here I am.
The reason is because I think we are dealing with some issues that
are important to discuss:
One, there is no legislation that we can write that will make bad
actors not be bad actors. There is no amicus provision or any provision
that is going to allow for somebody who is going to lie to their own
superiors to not lie to somebody else.
Two, the provisions of lone wolf and roving wiretaps are incredibly
important to national security. There is not a lot of debate amongst
those things.
Three, FISA and title 1 were originally designed because of abuses to
civil rights. We know that title 1 has been abused, and that is why we
are here.
But are we better off without title 1? I don't think so. We weren't
before. We are better off with it.
So what does this bill actually do that is important, that is why a
guy like me who believes in the Fourth Amendment, believes in the First
Amendment, and believes in the privacy of our citizens, why would I
stand here? Because it increases transparency; it moves it through the
process faster; it puts real compliance checks in place; and it holds
people accountable both through a contempt proceeding and enhanced
criminal penalties.
When we are dealing with something as important as civil liberties, I
think we have to ask the question: Are we better off tomorrow than we
are today? This bill puts us in a better position tomorrow than it did
yesterday.
Mr. NADLER. Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Ohio has 1 minute
remaining.
Mr. JORDAN. Madam Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time to
close.
[[Page H1632]]
Madam Speaker, as the gentleman from North Dakota just articulated,
the bill is better than where we are currently--no call detail records,
amicus kicks in if there is a First Amendment concern of any American
citizen who is in front of the court. The penalties are real: You lie
to the court, you omit information from the court, or you go leak
information about the application you submitted to the court, there are
enhanced penalties.
There is the transcript provision. There is now a transcript that
will be given to the intelligence community. That is a good step,
knowing that somebody is going to be looking at what you are doing and
is going to see it in a real timeframe is important.
The annual assessment from the IG, the same IG who just told us 3
months ago that the FBI went to the court in the Carter Page
application and lied 17 times, that individual, Mr. Horowitz, will be
doing an annual assessment; compliance office within the Department of
Justice so that there are more people looking at the application on the
front end, hopefully, we don't have as many problems; and finally, as
the chairman indicated, no cell site GPS location indication without a
warrant--those are victories for the American citizen. It is not as
much as we would like, but it is a darn good first step.
Madam Speaker, I urge people to support the legislation, and I yield
back the balance of my time.
Mr. NADLER. Madam Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
I just want to say that I am in complete agreement with the ranking
minority member that this is a very good bill, that we do a lot of
things that we ought to do, that we don't do a lot of things,
unfortunately, that we should do, but we did what we could.
Undoubtedly, the ranking member and I have different ideas. Some of
the things which he thinks we did not enough I think we did too much
and vice versa, but we did have some of the things he thinks that we
shouldn't have done I wish we had done. But we did manage to reach
agreement.
As I said, I believe it is a very good bill. It is not as protective
of civil liberties as I would like to see it, but we got as far as we
possibly could, and so I urge everyone to vote for this bill.
I know there will be some dissent on our side of the aisle based on
civil liberties concerns. I can only say that, with most of those
concerns that I have heard voiced, I agree with them, but we just
couldn't get them.
Before I close, I want to recognize the staff on both sides of the
aisle who have worked around the clock for the past few weeks to reach
a compromise and bring this bill to the floor.
Although there are too many to name here, I should single out the
following individuals: Aaron Hiller, Sophia Brill, and Sarah Istel from
my staff; Wells Bennett, Nicolas Mitchell, Raffaela Wakeman, and
William Wu from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
majority; Ryan Breitenbach and Bobby Parmiter from the Judiciary
Republican side; Stephen Castor and Tyler Grimm from Mr. Jordan's
staff; and Laura Casulli, Meghan Green, and Allen Souza for the HPSCI
Republicans.
{time} 1545
The country should be proud of what we have all accomplished here,
what they have accomplished here, and I thank each and every one of
them.
Madam Speaker, in closing, I will simply say that it is our
responsibility to work across the aisle and across the branches of the
government to bring our national security in line with our values.
We have done so here, but that work is an ongoing project. It must
not end today, because we have a long way to go yet.
Madam Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support the USA FREEDOM
Reauthorization Act, and I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff)
and the gentleman from California (Mr. Nunes) each will control 15
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff).
Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Madam Speaker, I rise in strong support of the USA FREEDOM
Reauthorization Act of 2020.
This bill makes a number of critical and important reforms to
strengthen civil liberties and privacy protections under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act while simultaneously protecting the
national security of the United States. In addition, the bill provides
for greater transparency and increased oversight and accountability to
ensure the integrity of the FISA process.
Over the past several weeks, Chairman Nadler and I, along with
Speaker Pelosi and Majority Leader Hoyer, have worked with Members from
across the caucus and the aisle to develop a set of reforms that our
Democratic Caucus could be proud to support. This bill is a result of
that effort. It builds on the achievements of the USA FREEDOM Act of
2015, which passed with 338 votes in the House and the overwhelming
support of the Democratic Caucus to put in place long-sought reforms to
FISA.
The three expiring provisions that this bill would reauthorize are
vitally important to protecting national security. One of those
measures, the roving wiretap provision, authorizes continued court-
approved surveillance of targets, even if they change their phones or
other devices. Its expiration, or that of the other two provisions,
would be to no one's benefit. Our counterterrorism and national
security activities would be severely hamstrung, and we would have lost
the opportunity to press for reforms that we are seeking.
At the outside of this process, administration officials, like the
Attorney General, along with Senate Republican leadership, made it
clear that they preferred a clean and permanent reauthorization of
these authorities. On a bipartisan basis, this bill rejects that
demand, producing a bill that holds firm to our commitment to civil
liberties, oversight, and transparency, and, importantly, has an
important sunset.
Let me describe just a few of the reforms included in this
legislation:
The bill would end, once and for all, NSA's authority to collect call
detail records on an ongoing basis, and destroy all records previously
obtained under these authorities.
This bill would require that the government get a warrant under FISA,
if one would be needed in the law enforcement context.
This bill would prohibit the government from retaining business
records for more than 5 years, with exceptions, such as an imminent
threat to human life.
This bill would expand the appointment of amici in FISA court
proceedings, permit amici to seek access to more information, and
creating a framework for amicus to seek higher court review of
questions of law to the FISA courts.
The bill would also strengthen the requirement for the
declassification and release of FISA court opinions and apply the
requirements retroactively to prior to the enactment of the 2015 USA
FREEDOM Act.
Madam Speaker, I recognize there are additional reforms that Members
would like to see in the bill. I sought additional reforms as well. As
with any negotiation, no one side is getting everything they want, but
I believe it is important to enhance transparency and privacy
safeguards whenever possible.
But this is a strong result that makes substantial reforms that so
many members of our caucus, myself included, have worked hard to secure
for many years. And I will continue to work to secure further
protections for privacy and civil liberties and to provide vigorous
oversight of FISA.
Madam Speaker, I support the bill, which makes important reforms to
the FISA process and urge Members to vote ``yes,'' and I reserve the
balance of my time.
Mr. NUNES. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Madam Speaker, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA, is
a critical tool for thwarting terrorist plots and collecting vital
intelligence on actors who are hostile to U.S. interests.
During the FBI's 2016 Russia collusion investigation, however, FBI
officials grossly abused FISA to spy on an associate of a Presidential
campaign they opposed.
The purpose of the bill before us today is to reauthorize expiring
FISA authorities while ensuring that other
[[Page H1633]]
FISA tools can never again be turned against the American people for
political purposes.
In 2017, in the course of our own investigation on Russia, House
Intelligence Committee Republicans received strong indications that
FISA had been severely abused in order to spy on Carter Page, a former
associate of the Trump campaign.
As we investigated the matter, we were stonewalled at nearly every
juncture by top officials of the FBI and the Department of Justice.
Their denials of any wrongdoing were uniformly repeated by the media
and by political figures, who were spreading the false accusation that
Trump campaign officials colluded with the Russian Government to
interfere in the 2016 Presidential election.
Madam Speaker, I want to thank my Republican colleagues and staff on
the committee who persisted amid the most determined obstruction of any
investigation this House has seen in a long time.
I also want to thank our Republican colleagues on the House Oversight
and Judiciary Committees who worked hard to uncover the full extent of
this malfeasance.
The full scope of the abuse was eventually detailed by Inspector
General Michael Horowitz, whose December 2019 report revealed 17 major
mistakes and omissions, along with many lesser abuses.
Among many other abuses the Inspector General found, is that the FBI
had used unverified allegations from the Steele dossier to get a FISA
warrant on Carter Page; had misrepresented the reliability of those
allegations to the court; had omitted exculpatory information from
their submission; and had doctored an email to hide Page's prior
cooperation with a U.S. intelligence agency.
H.R. 6172 is the first step in imposing reforms to address these
gross abuses and restore accountability in the FISA process. These
reforms include but are not limited to:
Requiring the Attorney General's approval in order to obtain a FISA
warrant for any candidate for Federal office;
Imposing stronger penalties for those who conceal information from
the FISA court or leak FISA-derived information; and
Providing clear authorization for Congress to access FISA materials
so that elected officials can better oversee FISA cases without
obstruction.
This legislation makes strong reforms that will protect the American
people from government overreach while continuing to protect the
homeland from terrorist threats.
Close Congressional oversight of the FISA process, which will be
enhanced significantly by this bill, must continue in order to prevent
future abuses. What happened to the Trump campaign in 2016 can never be
allowed to happen again, not to a political campaign and not to an
American citizen.
I believe I speak for all Republicans when I say that our work is not
finished. We will continue to look for further ways to improve both
privacy protections as well as FISA's effectiveness in defusing
national security threats to our country.
Madam Speaker, I urge support of H.R. 6172, and I reserve the balance
of my time.
Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from
Connecticut (Mr. Himes).
Mr. HIMES. Madam Speaker, I thank and compliment the chairman and the
ranking member--and the chairman and ranking member of the Committee on
the Judiciary--for doing such good and bipartisan work at this rather
tense and polarized time around reauthorizing a number of authorities
that have been, not just important, but essential to keeping the
American public safe.
And they did that, of course, mindful of the need to balance those
authorities and those activities with the very legitimate civil
liberties interests that we all have, and with our obligation to the
Constitution, which we all swear an oath to support and defend.
Madam Speaker, as the chairman said, this bill will reauthorize, even
as it imposes additional oversight, a couple of very important
authorities, while ending the authority that I think in the last
several years was most problematic to me, to many people in this
Chamber, and to the American people, which was the bulk collection of
telephone metadata.
That was a debate that led to the original USA FREEDOM Act of 2015,
to those reforms, and gets us to where we are today where Americans can
know that the NSA, a foreign intelligence agency, will not be
collecting their records, their metadata. And I believe that that is a
very substantial achievement in today's bill.
I would like to take a moment, though, to wrestle with a charge that
was leveled by my friends and colleagues on the progressive side, and
their recommendation with respect to this bill. Their statement called
these authorities ``sweeping unconstitutional surveillance.'' And, with
respect, I would say that none of that is true.
Sweeping. Let's talk about sweeping for a second. I guess we could
argue about exactly what that means, but of the authorities that are
being discussed, we are ending the metadata program. The lone-wolf
authority, which allows us to surveil a potential terrorist who is not
affiliated with a designated terrorist group, has never been used. That
leaves, of course, the roving wiretap authority, which is used in a
pointed and careful way and has been used to save lives and prosecute
terrorists. That is not, I would suggest with respect, sweeping.
So constitutional, the charge that this is unconstitutional is
something that we should examine and take seriously. In this time of
overheated rhetoric, I think it is important that we be very clear and
very specific in the words that we use. So let me just say about the
charge that there is anything unconstitutional in these authorities:
No provision has ever been held to be unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court, by the FISA court itself, or by any other court.
And it is not just the courts, these authorities have been subject to
review by the President's Civil Liberties Oversight Board, and they
have not deemed any of these authorities unconstitutional.
They have been subject to Congressional scrutiny and, of course, most
famously and most recently, subject to review by the Inspector General,
who--yes--discovered very significant deficiencies in the way a FISA
application dealing with an American citizen was dealt with.
My friends who are concerned about the possibility of the
unconstitutional activity should remember, not a single authority has
ever been deemed to be unconstitutional. And over and over again, the
FISA court, and most recently Inspector General Horowitz, has pushed
back hard on misbehavior, on negligence in this area.
So what we are left with here is balance. And as the chairman and as
the ranking member have said, the reforms that are made in this bill
with respect to empowering an amicus, with respect to giving the
President's Civil Liberties Oversight Board additional authorities
strike that balance.
Madam Speaker, I close by urging my colleagues to accept that we have
made a lot of progress, that this was all about preserving civil
liberties, and to vote in favor of H.R. 6172, the USA FREEDOM
Reauthorization Act of 2020.
{time} 1600
Mr. NUNES. Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
California (Mr. McCarthy), the Republican leader.
Mr. McCARTHY. Madam Speaker, before I begin, I want to thank the
gentleman, the ranking member of the Intelligence Committee. He warned
the American public when he was chair. He warned them and told them
that FISA was not used correctly, that the power of the government
overstretched their arms.
But even when the other elements of government said no, they did not,
even when others got on to that exact same position and told us
everything was fine with FISA, it was not until the inspector general
got his report that the truth was known.
I thank Congressman Devin Nunes for being the truth, telling it to
the American public, and staying with it when others wanted to lie.
That is why we are here today. That is why this will not continue or
ever happen again.
Madam Speaker, at the heart of our Constitution is a simple idea, the
idea
[[Page H1634]]
of checks and balances. These principles protect Americans' freedoms by
creating safeguards against the potential of government overreach of
power.
Unfortunately, in 2016, those checks and balances were not in place
to stop individuals at the highest level of the FBI and Justice
Department from spying on Carter Page, an American citizen who could
have been one of us.
They used the secretive FISA courts, which are meant to keep
Americans safe from foreign enemies, to attempt to undermine their
domestic political opponent at that time, then-candidate Donald Trump.
After years of thorough and independent investigation, we now know
the truth: what happened in 2016 was politically motivated; it was
completely unjustified; and it must never happen again.
This bipartisan legislation addresses the need for greater accuracy
and accountability in the FISA process. It does not damage the
legitimate authorities our intelligence community relies on to keep us
safe, but it does strengthen protections for civil liberties.
Among its many reforms, this legislation increases the punishment for
unauthorized disclosure of FISA applications, authorizes an amicus to
be appointed to cases involving political activity, and enhances
oversight by Congress and creates a new Office of Compliance.
These reforms are an astonishing accomplishment in a period of
divided government. That just tells you how important FISA reforms and
checks and balances truly are.
Outside this Chamber, there are quotes from famous Americans who
dedicated their lives to preserving American freedom.
One of those individuals, Patrick Henry, was so passionate about his
defense of freedom that he famously said: ``Give me liberty or give me
death.'' We can learn a lot from Henry's total devotion to the American
cause.
We can learn a lot from those who are willing to stand up to
oppressive Big Government, who would use an arm illegally against the
check and balance just to try to have an outcome in a political race.
We could thank those like Devin, who stood for the American public
and the truth, or those in other committees who helped work on this,
the Jim Jordans, the Doug Collinses, that we would not be here today
and getting a new compliance office, a check and balance to make sure
what happened in 2016 cannot happen again.
I do urge all my colleagues to vote ``yes.'' I do urge that this is a
turning point, that even though in these committees they could have
told us, and they did, that there was nothing wrong, that we had to
continue to fight to get an inspector general to have the truth.
Now, we have a check and balance that we will not have to wait for
that. Even if somebody tries to use it in the wrong manner, it cannot
happen again.
Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Lofgren).
Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, I am especially thankful to Chairman
Schiff for yielding me this time since I have reached a different
conclusion on the bill than he has.
I would like to quote from the American Civil Liberties Union letter
received today. The American Civil Liberties Union strongly urges us to
vote ``no'' on this bill.
They say: ``Over the last several years, it has been abundantly clear
that many of our surveillance laws are broken.'' But that,
``disappointingly, the reforms contained in H.R. 6172 are minimal--in
many cases merely representing a codification of the status quo. In
addition,'' the ACLU says, ``the bill contains provisions that would be
a step back from even our flawed current law.''
The ACLU goes on to say that ``the bill fails to require that
individuals receive appropriate notice and access to information when
FISA information is used against them,'' that ``the bill fails to fully
address deficiencies with the FISA court that have led to illegal
surveillance,'' that ``the bill fails to appropriately limit the types
of information that can be collected under section 215,'' that ``the
bill fails to appropriately raise the standard for collecting
information under section 215,'' and that ``the bill fails to
appropriately limit the retention of information collected under
section 215.''
I agree with the chairman that the roving wiretap provision in the
act is important and should be renewed. But I cannot support the bill
that is before us today, and I say that with tremendous respect for
Chairman Schiff. We have had very candid and useful discussions. I
appreciate the effort that he has put into this.
I have put in a lot of effort, too. But in the end, we have a bill
that I think should not be supported. I intend to vote ``no,'' with
tremendous respect for the chairman and the effort that he has put into
this.
Mr. NUNES. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Texas (Mr. Gohmert).
Mr. GOHMERT. Madam Speaker, I appreciate my friend yielding to me,
and I appreciate my colleague, Ms. Lofgren's comments.
Any law that is based on a lie has a good chance of being a problem.
The lie starts with the initial FISA, the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act. Yet, it is not foreign.
Now, since I have been here, whether it is the PATRIOT Act or
reauthorizing the FISA court, we are told: Look, American citizens have
nothing to worry about because the only American citizen that gets
caught up through the FISA court is somebody that is dealing with a
known foreign terrorist or a known foreign organization engaged in
terrorism. You know, just avoid dealing with terrorists, and you are
going to be okay.
The problem is, I keep hearing, this is a good first step. No, this
isn't the first step. This is the last step, and as my friend Ms.
Lofgren said, it doesn't go far enough.
As my friend Michael Cloud said, under the current bill, they
ignored the penalty for lying to the judge, which was a 5-year
sentence. Now, under the new law, they can ignore an 8-year sentence.
That doesn't really help preserve anybody's rights.
This was not done in the committee. It did not have proper debate.
The secret court had the bill pulled away from the full committee, so
we couldn't debate it. We couldn't discuss it, and it was pulled into a
secret negotiation that many of us were not part of.
Look, having the Attorney General sign it doesn't work either, and it
shouldn't be a special category for Federal elected officials. In fact,
what it should be is all Americans.
Acting Attorney General Rosenstein, he signed off on one of the
applications himself. Obviously, that is not a deterrent.
We need to fix the FISA court. This doesn't do it, and I will vote
``no'' until we have adequate reforms that do.
Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Speaker, I have no further speakers. I reserve the
balance of my time.
Mr. NUNES. Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Utah (Mr. Stewart).
Mr. STEWART. Madam Speaker, let me state a fact. FISA has been abused
by those who are trusted with authority, and we can't let it happen
again.
This is what we know are also facts: An opposing campaign paid a
foreign citizen to dig up dirt on President Trump and his campaign
associates. These allegations--produced, by the way, by a foreign
citizen--came to be known as the Steele dossier. The campaign then fed
these bogus allegations through the administration, to include
leadership at the FBI, the CIA, the Department of Justice, and even the
State Department. Then, the FBI shamefully used these bogus allegations
as the basis for a secret wiretap, of course, on the famous Mr. Carter
Page.
The FBI deliberately hid the fact that these allegations were both
known to be bogus and the fact that the campaign had paid for them. The
application on Mr. Page cited a news article corroborating these
allegations, but the FBI hid from the court the fact that they knew the
source of these articles was the author of the dossier.
We discovered that the FBI and DOJ investigators in this case
demonstrated enormous bias against the Trump campaign with such words
as: we will stop him; he won't become President; viva la resistance.
Finally, the inspector general revealed that an FBI attorney altered
a
[[Page H1635]]
document to deceive the court regarding Mr. Page's relationship with
another agency.
These are shocking abuses of power, and the reforms in this bill will
stop them from ever happening again.
I am proud to have been the author of the bill that is the basis for
some of these reforms.
It requires an amicus review for applications against U.S. citizens
when their First Amendment rights are in question.
It requires the court to maintain a transcript. I have read this FISA
application. It begs for questions to be asked. We don't know if the
judges were curious or asked obvious questions because we don't have a
transcript.
It requires the government to keep a log.
It enhances penalties for up to 8 years for those who improperly
surveil or deceive the court. It allows agencies to take immediate
action, including termination, of those who do.
Madam Speaker, it is incumbent on us, as an institution, to ensure
these abuses simply don't happen again. The USA FREEDOM Reauthorization
Act will accomplish this.
Let me end by saying this: To those who oppose this bill, if you vote
against this bill, you keep the status quo. FISA remains in place. The
ability to abuse FISA doesn't change.
Vote ``yes'' on this bill or accept future abuse. That is the choice
we have before us. I hope that we don't do that.
Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. NUNES. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Arkansas (Mr. Crawford).
Mr. CRAWFORD. Madam Speaker, I rise today in support of the USA
FREEDOM Reauthorization Act of 2020.
I would also like to associate myself with the comments of my friend
and colleague from Utah (Mr. Stewart).
I also acknowledge and applaud the efforts of the distinguished
gentleman from California (Mr. Nunes), whose tenacity brought this to
bear. I appreciate his leadership on this issue.
This is a bipartisan piece of legislation that makes urgent and
necessary reforms to the FISA process, which, as Inspector General
Horowitz found 3 months ago, was misused to conduct illegal
surveillance on Carter Page, a U.S. person.
This bill enhances requirements on the FBI and DOJ to ensure all
applications are accurate and complete. This bill creates a compliance
officer at the FBI who is directly responsible for making sure FBI
agents are following the law.
This bill heightens criminal penalties to deter bad actors and other
layers of review to root them out.
Finally, the bill reauthorizes three counterterrorism tools that are
significantly important to our national security.
Madam Speaker, I rise to support this bill, and I urge a ``yes'' vote
from my colleagues.
Mr. NUNES. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Just a couple of comments for some of my colleagues who I know are
concerned that this doesn't go far enough.
One of the concerns they have is that there is an ongoing
investigation led by the U.S. attorney out of Connecticut, and there is
a lot of consternation on our side of the aisle that nothing has been
done yet.
I want to assure my colleagues that even if that gets to a point
where people are held accountable for what we believe to be criminal
activity, these reforms in this new piece of legislation where we
opened up title I, we believe that we have all the reforms that are
necessary to prevent this malfeasance from happening again in the
future.
{time} 1615
If this doesn't work and if this does happen again, I think then you
will have what some people want, which is a complete elimination of the
court and this entire system.
I hope that we don't get to that point in this country, because these
tools have worked well as long as the people who are conducting and
using these surveillance capabilities don't decide to turn them on
political opponents.
So I want to, you know, assure my colleagues on this side of the
aisle that we feel like these reforms are as far as we need to go at
this time, no matter what the ultimate conclusion is of the U.S.
attorney out of Connecticut on whether or not to bring charges against
those who perpetrated these crimes and criminal activity.
Madam Speaker, I am prepared to close at this time.
In closing, the weaponization of FISA, as exhibited in 2016, should
never have happened, and this bill aims to prevent future gross abuses
from occurring again.
I would like to thank my staff, particularly Allen Souza, Laura
Casulli, Meghan Green, Andrew House, and Betsy Hulme, for all their
efforts to reach this bipartisan compromise. They worked many, many
hours with Members of both parties and colleagues of both parties,
staff of both parties, from the Judiciary Committee and the Republican
and Democratic leadership, to reach this bipartisan compromise.
I am also fairly confident, with the remarks that have been made on
the Senate side, that this will be a rare opportunity where we actually
pass a bill, and it appears like the Senate is prepared to accept a
complete House-produced product, which I think means a lot to everyone
involved in this process, that that rarely happens, especially in this
day and age.
Madam Speaker, I urge adoption of H.R. 6172, and I yield back the
balance of my time.
Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
I want to, for my Democratic colleagues, provide a reality check on
some of what they have heard during this debate.
It is important to remember that the inspector general report--which,
by the way, doesn't go to the expiring provisions that we are here to
authorize today. But the inspector general report found no evidence of
spying on the Trump campaign.
The inspector general found no evidence of political bias influencing
decisionmaking in the investigation of the Trump campaign and its
connections to Russia during the 2016 election.
The inspector general found that the investigation, in fact, was
properly predicated, that investigation into many of the more than 100
unexplained and often falsely denied contacts between the Trump
campaign and the Russians during the 2016 campaign, including a
notorious secret meeting in Trump Tower between the President's son,
son-in-law, and campaign chairman with a Russian delegation that was
set up by a series of emails in which a Russian delegation offered dirt
on Hillary Clinton to the Trump campaign, and the President's son, on
behalf of that campaign, said that he would love it and set up that
secret meeting. Now, my colleagues don't think that is collusion; the
American people do.
Bob Mueller, for his part, much as his report has been
misrepresented, makes it clear in the very first pages of the report
that he does not address the issues of collusion, only whether he can
prove criminal conspiracy.
So it is important, with that reality check, to once again return to
the bill before us. With respect to the bill before us, we do make
important changes to strengthen the privacy protections, the civil
liberties protections. We also retain the important tools necessary to
help protect the country, the business records provision, the lone-wolf
provision, as well as the roving wiretaps.
The roving wiretap provision, for example, allows the government,
when someone, for example, in the midst of planning a crime of
terrorism uses phones disposably and goes from one phone to another, it
is not necessary to go and get a new warrant every time they change
phones. The warrant can follow the individual rather than the phone.
The business records provision has also been very important in terms
of our efforts at foreign intelligence gathering as well as
counterterrorism. Those authorities would be retained, but new
protections would be put in place such that business records couldn't
be retained more than 5 years unless certain exceptions applied,
protections where, if business records gathered in the FISA context are
used in a criminal proceeding, there is notice given to people that
they are being used in a criminal proceeding.
There is expansion of the amicus authorities so that we have the
amicus
[[Page H1636]]
involved in a broader scope of cases so the court has the advantage of
independent judgment.
Some of those reforms come out of the inspector general's
recommendations and looking into the FISA application involving Carter
Page. Many of those recommendations have nothing to do with Carter Page
and are longstanding interests of the privacy community in trying to
strengthen some of the privacy protections.
I also want to take this opportunity to thank Representative Lofgren
and Representative Jayapal. We worked extensively, have spent hours
ourselves, our staff, consulting and trying to make this a better and
stronger bill. While I regret that we couldn't get it to the point
where those two esteemed Members felt they could support the bill,
nonetheless, their input made this bill better, and I am grateful for
their hard work and advocacy on behalf of a stronger privacy and civil
liberties protection.
This vote today is the culmination of many months of negotiations.
Therefore, with our diverse Caucus, with our friends in the other party
who, as you have heard today, we have strong disagreements over the
Russia investigation, the Trump campaign's conduct, as well as the FISA
process, but, nonetheless, in the interest of our Nation's security, we
were able to get to common ground on this measure, giving the
government the critical tools it needs to protect the country while
advancing civil liberties and privacy rights.
This bill creates a much-needed change to the way government uses
FISA, ensures the government is more transparent and accountable, and I
urge my colleagues to support the bill.
Madam Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. COLLINS of Georgia. Madam Speaker, in 2016, our nation's premier
law enforcement agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, weaponized
its authority to illegally surveil a U.S. citizen for political
purposes.
What happened to Carter Page, then-candidate Trump, and the Trump
campaign was wrong, and it is our responsibility to ensure it never
happens again. The USA Freedom Reauthorization Act achieves that, but
our work is far from done.
While this bill doesn't include every reform sought by Republicans,
it does accomplish our central goal: To institute necessary safeguards
to protect the civil liberties of every American and reauthorize
critical counterterrorism provisions.
This bipartisan legislation also protects U.S. citizens from being
spied on for political purposes by requiring that the Attorney General
approve any investigation of an elected official or federal candidate.
This provision directly addresses the abuses against Carter Page and
the Trump campaign.
Some have claimed that provision prioritizes politicians over
Americans. It does not. That provision addresses the real abuse
documented by House Republicans and the DOJ Inspector General--abuse
that strikes at the core of our democratic republic.
In addition to multiple other reforms, this legislation makes it a
crime to willfully make a false statement to the court, and increases
penalties for those who abuse the system. These provisions are aimed
like a laser at the abuses that occurred in 2016 and 2017.
Madam Speaker, Congress must continue to conduct vigorous oversight
and work with our law enforcement and intelligence communities to
restore the American people's trust in these critical institutions.
Our government's primary duty is to protect its citizens and their
constitutional rights, and every American should have confidence we're
fulfilling that role.
I urge my colleagues to support this vitally important legislation.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.
Pursuant to House Resolution 891, the previous question is ordered on
the bill, as amended.
The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was
read the third time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 278,
nays 136, not voting 15, as follows:
[Roll No. 98]
YEAS--278
Adams
Aderholt
Aguilar
Allen
Allred
Amodei
Armstrong
Arrington
Axne
Babin
Bacon
Baird
Balderson
Banks
Barr
Bera
Bergman
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (UT)
Blunt Rochester
Bost
Brady
Brindisi
Brooks (IN)
Brown (MD)
Buchanan
Bucshon
Burgess
Bustos
Butterfield
Byrne
Calvert
Carbajal
Cardenas
Carson (IN)
Carter (TX)
Cartwright
Case
Casten (IL)
Castor (FL)
Chabot
Cheney
Cicilline
Cisneros
Clyburn
Cohen
Cole
Comer
Conaway
Cook
Cooper
Costa
Courtney
Cox (CA)
Craig
Crawford
Crenshaw
Crist
Crow
Cuellar
Cunningham
Curtis
Davids (KS)
Davis (CA)
Davis, Rodney
Dean
DeLauro
Delgado
Demings
Deutch
Diaz-Balart
Dunn
Engel
Escobar
Estes
Evans
Ferguson
Finkenauer
Fitzpatrick
Fleischmann
Fletcher
Foster
Foxx (NC)
Frankel
Gallagher
Gallego
Garamendi
Garcia (TX)
Gibbs
Gonzalez (OH)
Gonzalez (TX)
Gottheimer
Granger
Graves (MO)
Green (TN)
Grothman
Guest
Guthrie
Harder (CA)
Hartzler
Hastings
Hayes
Heck
Hern, Kevin
Higgins (NY)
Hill (AR)
Himes
Holding
Horn, Kendra S.
Horsford
Houlahan
Hoyer
Hudson
Hurd (TX)
Jackson Lee
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (LA)
Johnson (OH)
Johnson (SD)
Johnson (TX)
Jordan
Joyce (OH)
Joyce (PA)
Kaptur
Katko
Keating
Keller
Kelly (MS)
Kilmer
Kind
King (NY)
Kinzinger
Kirkpatrick
Krishnamoorthi
Kuster (NH)
Kustoff (TN)
LaHood
LaMalfa
Lamb
Langevin
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Latta
Lawrence
Lawson (FL)
Lee (NV)
Lesko
Levin (CA)
Lipinski
Loebsack
Lowey
Lucas
Luetkemeyer
Luria
Lynch
Malinowski
Maloney, Sean
Marshall
Matsui
McAdams
McBath
McCarthy
McCaul
McEachin
McHenry
McKinley
Meeks
Meuser
Mitchell
Moolenaar
Morelle
Moulton
Mucarsel-Powell
Murphy (FL)
Murphy (NC)
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal
Newhouse
Norcross
Nunes
O'Halleran
Olson
Palmer
Panetta
Pappas
Pascrell
Payne
Pence
Perlmutter
Peters
Peterson
Phillips
Porter
Price (NC)
Quigley
Reed
Reschenthaler
Rice (NY)
Rice (SC)
Richmond
Riggleman
Roby
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rose (NY)
Rouda
Rouzer
Roybal-Allard
Ruiz
Ruppersberger
Rutherford
Ryan
Sanchez
Sarbanes
Scalise
Scanlon
Schiff
Schneider
Schrader
Schrier
Scott (VA)
Scott, Austin
Scott, David
Sensenbrenner
Sewell (AL)
Shalala
Sherman
Sherrill
Shimkus
Simpson
Sires
Slotkin
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smucker
Soto
Spanberger
Spano
Stanton
Stauber
Stefanik
Steil
Steube
Stevens
Stewart
Stivers
Suozzi
Swalwell (CA)
Taylor
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thompson (PA)
Thornberry
Timmons
Torres Small (NM)
Trone
Turner
Underwood
Upton
Vargas
Veasey
Vela
Visclosky
Wagner
Walorski
Waltz
Wasserman Schultz
Watkins
Wenstrup
Westerman
Wexton
Wild
Wilson (FL)
Womack
Woodall
Young
NAYS--136
Abraham
Amash
Barragan
Bass
Beatty
Biggs
Bishop (NC)
Blumenauer
Bonamici
Boyle, Brendan F.
Brooks (AL)
Buck
Budd
Burchett
Carter (GA)
Castro (TX)
Chu, Judy
Clark (MA)
Clarke (NY)
Clay
Cleaver
Cline
Cloud
Connolly
Correa
Davidson (OH)
Davis, Danny K.
DeFazio
DeGette
DelBene
DeSaulnier
DesJarlais
Dingell
Doggett
Doyle, Michael F.
Duncan
Emmer
Eshoo
Espaillat
Flores
Fudge
Fulcher
Gabbard
Garcia (IL)
Gianforte
Gohmert
Golden
Gomez
Gooden
Graves (LA)
Green, Al (TX)
Griffith
Grijalva
Haaland
Hagedorn
Harris
Herrera Beutler
Hice (GA)
Higgins (LA)
Hollingsworth
Huffman
Huizenga
Jayapal
Jeffries
Kelly (IL)
Kelly (PA)
Kennedy
Khanna
Kildee
Kim
King (IA)
Lamborn
Lee (CA)
Levin (MI)
Lieu, Ted
Lofgren
Long
Loudermilk
Lowenthal
Lujan
Maloney, Carolyn B.
Marchant
Massie
Mast
McClintock
McCollum
McGovern
McNerney
Meng
Mooney (WV)
Moore
Neguse
Norman
Ocasio-Cortez
Omar
Pallone
Perry
Pingree
Pocan
Posey
Pressley
Raskin
Rodgers (WA)
Roe, David P.
Rose, John W.
Roy
Rush
Schakowsky
Schweikert
Serrano
Smith (MO)
Smith (WA)
Takano
Tipton
Titus
Tlaib
Tonko
Torres (CA)
Trahan
Van Drew
Velazquez
Walberg
Walden
Walker
Waters
Watson Coleman
Weber (TX)
Webster (FL)
Welch
Williams
Wilson (SC)
Wittman
Wright
Yarmuth
Yoho
Zeldin
[[Page H1637]]
NOT VOTING--15
Beyer
Brownley (CA)
Collins (GA)
Fortenberry
Gaetz
Gosar
Graves (GA)
Lewis
Meadows
Miller
Mullin
Palazzo
Ratcliffe
Rooney (FL)
Speier
{time} 1703
Messrs. WEBER of Texas, BLUMENAUER, LONG, Mses. VELAZQUEZ, ESHOO,
BARRAGAN, SCHAKOWSKY, Mr. DeSAULNIER, Ms. KELLY of Illinois, Mr.
CLEAVER, Ms. WATERS, Messrs. GREEN of Texas, RUSH, and Ms. PRESSLEY
changed their vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
Messrs. KELLER, TIMMONS, and NORCROSS changed their vote from ``nay''
to ``yea.''
So the bill was passed.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
Amendment Offered by Mr. Buck of Colorado
Mr. BUCK. Madam Speaker, I have an amendment at the desk to correct
the name of the bill to the ``Federal Initiative to Spy on Americans
(FISA) Act.''
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amend the title so as to read: ``A bill to be known as
the Federal Initiative to Spy on Americans (FISA) Act''.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under clause 6 of rule XVI, the amendment is
not debatable.
The question is on the amendment.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the noes appeared to have it.
Recorded Vote
Mr. BUCK of Colorado. Madam Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 35,
noes 376, not voting 18, as follows:
[Roll No. 99]
AYES--35
Abraham
Amash
Babin
Biggs
Bishop (NC)
Bishop (UT)
Brooks (AL)
Buck
Budd
Burchett
Davidson (OH)
DesJarlais
Duncan
Estes
Gohmert
Griffith
Harris
Hice (GA)
Kelly (PA)
Massie
McClintock
Mooney (WV)
Perry
Posey
Roe, David P.
Rose, John W.
Roy
Rush
Schweikert
Van Drew
Weber (TX)
Webster (FL)
Wright
Yoho
Young
NOES--376
Adams
Aderholt
Aguilar
Allen
Allred
Amodei
Armstrong
Arrington
Axne
Bacon
Baird
Balderson
Banks
Barr
Barragan
Bass
Beatty
Bera
Bergman
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Blumenauer
Blunt Rochester
Bonamici
Bost
Boyle, Brendan F.
Brady
Brindisi
Brooks (IN)
Brown (MD)
Buchanan
Bucshon
Burgess
Bustos
Butterfield
Byrne
Calvert
Carbajal
Cardenas
Carson (IN)
Carter (GA)
Carter (TX)
Cartwright
Case
Casten (IL)
Castor (FL)
Castro (TX)
Chabot
Cheney
Chu, Judy
Cicilline
Cisneros
Clark (MA)
Clarke (NY)
Clay
Cleaver
Cline
Cloud
Clyburn
Cohen
Cole
Comer
Conaway
Connolly
Cook
Cooper
Correa
Costa
Courtney
Cox (CA)
Craig
Crawford
Crenshaw
Crist
Crow
Cuellar
Cunningham
Curtis
Davids (KS)
Davis (CA)
Davis, Danny K.
Davis, Rodney
Dean
DeFazio
DeGette
DeLauro
DelBene
Delgado
Demings
DeSaulnier
Deutch
Diaz-Balart
Dingell
Doggett
Doyle, Michael F.
Dunn
Emmer
Engel
Escobar
Eshoo
Espaillat
Evans
Ferguson
Finkenauer
Fitzpatrick
Fleischmann
Fletcher
Flores
Foster
Foxx (NC)
Frankel
Fudge
Fulcher
Gabbard
Gallagher
Gallego
Garamendi
Garcia (IL)
Garcia (TX)
Gianforte
Gibbs
Golden
Gomez
Gonzalez (OH)
Gonzalez (TX)
Gooden
Gottheimer
Granger
Graves (LA)
Graves (MO)
Green (TN)
Green, Al (TX)
Grijalva
Grothman
Guest
Guthrie
Haaland
Hagedorn
Harder (CA)
Hartzler
Hastings
Hayes
Heck
Hern, Kevin
Herrera Beutler
Higgins (LA)
Higgins (NY)
Hill (AR)
Himes
Holding
Hollingsworth
Horn, Kendra S.
Horsford
Houlahan
Hoyer
Hudson
Huffman
Huizenga
Hurd (TX)
Jackson Lee
Jayapal
Jeffries
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (LA)
Johnson (OH)
Johnson (SD)
Johnson (TX)
Jordan
Joyce (OH)
Joyce (PA)
Kaptur
Katko
Keating
Keller
Kelly (IL)
Kelly (MS)
Kennedy
Khanna
Kildee
Kilmer
Kim
Kind
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kinzinger
Kirkpatrick
Krishnamoorthi
Kuster (NH)
Kustoff (TN)
LaHood
LaMalfa
Lamb
Lamborn
Langevin
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Latta
Lawrence
Lawson (FL)
Lee (CA)
Lee (NV)
Lesko
Levin (CA)
Levin (MI)
Lieu, Ted
Loebsack
Lofgren
Long
Loudermilk
Lowenthal
Lowey
Lucas
Luetkemeyer
Lujan
Luria
Lynch
Malinowski
Maloney, Carolyn B.
Maloney, Sean
Marchant
Marshall
Mast
Matsui
McAdams
McBath
McCarthy
McCaul
McCollum
McEachin
McGovern
McHenry
McKinley
McNerney
Meeks
Meng
Meuser
Mitchell
Moolenaar
Moore
Morelle
Moulton
Mucarsel-Powell
Murphy (FL)
Murphy (NC)
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal
Neguse
Newhouse
Norcross
Norman
Nunes
O'Halleran
Ocasio-Cortez
Olson
Omar
Pallone
Panetta
Pappas
Pascrell
Payne
Pence
Perlmutter
Peters
Peterson
Phillips
Pingree
Pocan
Porter
Pressley
Price (NC)
Quigley
Raskin
Reed
Reschenthaler
Rice (NY)
Rice (SC)
Richmond
Riggleman
Roby
Rodgers (WA)
Rogers (KY)
Rose (NY)
Rouda
Rouzer
Roybal-Allard
Ruiz
Ruppersberger
Rutherford
Ryan
Sanchez
Sarbanes
Scalise
Scanlon
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schneider
Schrader
Schrier
Scott (VA)
Scott, Austin
Scott, David
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Sewell (AL)
Shalala
Sherman
Sherrill
Shimkus
Simpson
Sires
Slotkin
Smith (MO)
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (WA)
Smucker
Soto
Spanberger
Spano
Stanton
Stauber
Stefanik
Steil
Steube
Stevens
Stewart
Stivers
Suozzi
Swalwell (CA)
Takano
Taylor
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thompson (PA)
Thornberry
Timmons
Tipton
Titus
Tlaib
Tonko
Torres (CA)
Torres Small (NM)
Trahan
Trone
Turner
Underwood
Upton
Vargas
Veasey
Vela
Velazquez
Visclosky
Wagner
Walberg
Walden
Walker
Walorski
Waltz
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watkins
Watson Coleman
Welch
Wenstrup
Westerman
Wexton
Wild
Williams
Wilson (FL)
Wilson (SC)
Wittman
Womack
Woodall
Yarmuth
Zeldin
NOT VOTING--18
Beyer
Brownley (CA)
Collins (GA)
Fortenberry
Gaetz
Gosar
Graves (GA)
Lewis
Lipinski
Meadows
Miller
Mullin
Palazzo
Palmer
Ratcliffe
Rogers (AL)
Rooney (FL)
Speier
Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore
The SPEAKER pro tempore (during the vote). There are 2 minutes
remaining.
{time} 1713
Mr. RUSH changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
____________________
