[Congressional Record Volume 166, Number 139 (Wednesday, August 5, 2020)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4976-S5228]
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2021
(On July 23, 2020, the Senate passed S. 4049, as follows:)
S. 4049
[...]
DIVISION F--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2021
SEC. 9001. SHORT TITLE.
This division may be cited as the ``Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021''.
SEC. 9002. DEFINITIONS.
In this division:
(1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term
``congressional intelligence committees'' has the meaning
given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
(2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence
community'' has the meaning given such term in such section.
TITLE XCI--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 9101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal
year 2021 for the conduct of the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the following elements of
the United States Government:
(1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(3) The Department of Defense.
(4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(5) The National Security Agency.
(6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force.
(7) The Coast Guard.
(8) The Department of State.
(9) The Department of the Treasury.
(10) The Department of Energy.
(11) The Department of Justice.
(12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
(14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(16) The Department of Homeland Security.
SEC. 9102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts.--The amounts authorized to
be appropriated under section 9101 for the conduct of the
intelligence activities of the elements listed in paragraphs
(1) through (16) of section 9101, are those specified in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany
this division.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of
Authorizations.--
(1) Availability.--The classified Schedule of
Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made
available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate,
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives, and to the President.
(2) Distribution by the president.--Subject to paragraph
(3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of
the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in
subsection (a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule,
within the executive branch of the Federal Government.
(3) Limits on disclosure.--The President shall not publicly
disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any
portion of such Schedule except--
(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C.
3306(a));
(B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or
(C) as otherwise required by law.
SEC. 9103. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management
Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal
year 2021 the sum of $731,200,000.
(b) Classified Authorization of Appropriations.--In
addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the
Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a),
there are authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence
Community Management Account for fiscal year 2021 such
additional amounts as are specified in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 9102(a).
TITLE XCII--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY
SYSTEM
SEC. 9201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund
$514,000,000 for fiscal year 2021.
TITLE XCIII--INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Subtitle A--General Intelligence Community Matters
SEC. 9301. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this division shall
not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any
intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by
the Constitution or the laws of the United States.
SEC. 9302. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this division for salary, pay,
retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be
increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may
be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits
authorized by law.
SEC. 9303. CLARIFICATION OF AUTHORITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
OF NATIONAL MANAGER FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS
SECURITY.
In carrying out the authorities and responsibilities of the
National Manager for National Security Telecommunications and
Information Systems Security under National Security
Directive 42 (signed by the President on July 5, 1990), the
National Manager shall not supervise, oversee, or execute,
either directly or indirectly, any aspect of the National
Intelligence Program.
SEC. 9304. CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS PLANS FOR CERTAIN
ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN THE
CASE OF A NATIONAL EMERGENCY.
(a) Definition of Covered National Emergency.--In this
section, the term ``covered national emergency'' means the
following:
(1) A major disaster declared by the President under
section 401 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5170).
(2) An emergency declared by the President under section
501 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5191).
(3) A national emergency declared by the President under
the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.).
(4) A public health emergency declared under section 319 of
the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 247d).
(b) In General.--The Director of National Intelligence, the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of
the National Reconnaissance Office, the Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National
Security Agency, and the Director of the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency shall each establish continuity of
operations plans for use in the case of covered national
emergencies for the element of the intelligence community
concerned.
(c) Submission to Congress.--
(1) Director of national intelligence and director of the
central intelligence agency.--Not later than 7 days after the
date on which a covered national emergency is declared, the
Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency shall each submit to the
congressional intelligence committees the plan established
under subsection (b) for that emergency for the element of
the intelligence community concerned.
(2) Director of national reconnaissance office, director of
defense intelligence agency, director of national security
agency, and director of national geospatial-intelligence
agency.--Not later than 7 days after the date on which a
covered national emergency is declared, the Director of the
National Reconnaissance Office, the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security
Agency, and the Director of the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency shall each submit the plan established
under subsection (b) for that emergency for the element of
the intelligence community concerned to the following:
(A) The congressional intelligence committees.
(B) The Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.
(C) The Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives.
(d) Updates.--During a covered national emergency, the
Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National
Reconnaissance Office, the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security
Agency, and the Director of the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency shall each submit any updates to the
plans submitted under subsection (c)--
(1) in accordance with that subsection; and
(2) in a timely manner consistent with section 501 of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091).
SEC. 9305. APPLICATION OF EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE LEVEL III TO
POSITION OF DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE
OFFICE.
Section 5314 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the end the following:
``Director of the National Reconnaissance Office.''.
SEC. 9306. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE UNIVERSITY.
(a) In General.--Title X of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3191 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end
the following:
``Subtitle D--National Intelligence University
``SEC. 1031. TRANSFER DATE.
``In this subtitle, the term `transfer date' means the date
on which the National Intelligence University is transferred
from the Defense Intelligence Agency to the Director of
National Intelligence under section 5324(a) of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law
116-92).
``SEC. 1032. DEGREE-GRANTING AUTHORITY.
``(a) In General.--Beginning on the transfer date, under
regulations prescribed by the Director of National
Intelligence, the President of the National Intelligence
University
[[Page S5220]]
may, upon the recommendation of the faculty of the
University, confer appropriate degrees upon graduates who
meet the degree requirements.
``(b) Limitation.--A degree may not be conferred under this
section unless--
``(1) the Secretary of Education has recommended approval
of the degree in accordance with the Federal Policy Governing
Granting of Academic Degrees by Federal Agencies; and
``(2) the University is accredited by the appropriate
academic accrediting agency or organization to award the
degree, as determined by the Secretary of Education.
``(c) Congressional Notification Requirements.--
``(1) Actions on nonaccreditation.--Beginning on the
transfer date, the Director shall promptly--
``(A) notify the congressional intelligence committees of
any action by the Middle States Commission on Higher
Education, or other appropriate academic accrediting agency
or organization, to not accredit the University to award any
new or existing degree; and
``(B) submit to such committees a report containing an
explanation of any such action.
``(2) Modification or redesignation of degree-granting
authority.--Beginning on the transfer date, upon any
modification or redesignation of existing degree-granting
authority, the Director shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report containing--
``(A) the rationale for the proposed modification or
redesignation; and
``(B) any subsequent recommendation of the Secretary of
Education with respect to the proposed modification or
redesignation.
``SEC. 1033. FACULTY MEMBERS; EMPLOYMENT AND COMPENSATION.
``(a) Authority of Director.--Beginning on the transfer
date, the Director of National Intelligence may employ as
many professors, instructors, and lecturers at the National
Intelligence University as the Director considers necessary.
``(b) Compensation of Faculty Members.--The compensation of
persons employed under this section shall be as prescribed by
the Director.
``(c) Compensation Plan.--The Director shall provide each
person employed as a professor, instructor, or lecturer at
the University on the transfer date an opportunity to elect
to be paid under the compensation plan in effect on the day
before the transfer date (with no reduction in pay) or under
the authority of this section.
``SEC. 1034. ACCEPTANCE OF FACULTY RESEARCH GRANTS.
``The Director of National Intelligence may authorize the
President of the National Intelligence University to accept
qualifying research grants in the same manner and to the same
degree as the President of the National Defense University
under section 2165(e) of title 10, United States Code.
``SEC. 1035. CONTINUED APPLICABILITY OF THE FEDERAL ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ACT TO THE BOARD OF VISITORS.
``The Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall
continue to apply to the Board of Visitors of the National
Intelligence University on and after the transfer date.''.
(b) Conforming Amendments.--Section 5324 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law
116-92) is amended--
(1) in subsection (b)(1)(C), by striking ``subsection
(e)(2)'' and inserting ``section 1032(b) of the National
Security Act of 1947'';
(2) by striking subsections (e) and (f); and
(3) by redesignating subsections (g) and (h) as subsections
(e) and (f), respectively.
(c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of the
National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after
the item relating to section 1024 the following:
``Subtitle D--National Intelligence University
``Sec. 1031. Transfer date.
``Sec. 1032. Degree-granting authority.
``Sec. 1033. Faculty members; employment and compensation.
``Sec. 1034. Acceptance of faculty research grants.
``Sec. 1035. Continued applicability of the Federal Advisory Committee
Act to the Board of Visitors.''.
SEC. 9307. REQUIRING FACILITATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF SOCIAL
MEDIA DATA AND THREAT ANALYSIS CENTER.
(a) Requirement to Facilitate Establishment.--Subsection
(c)(1) of section 5323 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116-92) is amended, by
striking ``may'' and inserting ``shall''.
(b) Deadline to Facilitate Establishment.--Such subsection
is further amended by striking ``The Director'' and inserting
``Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, the
Director''.
(c) Conforming Amendments.--
(1) Reporting.--Subsection (d) of such section is amended--
(A) in the matter before paragraph (1), by striking ``If
the Director'' and all that follows through ``the Center,
the'' and inserting ``The''; and
(B) in paragraph (1), by striking ``180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act'' and inserting ``180 days after
the date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2021''.
(2) Funding.--Subsection (f) of such section is amended by
striking ``fiscal year 2020 and 2021'' and inserting ``fiscal
year 2021 and 2022''.
(3) Clerical.--Subsection (c) of such section is amended--
(A) in the subsection heading, by striking ``Authority''
and inserting ``Requirement''; and
(B) in paragraph (1), in the paragraph heading, by striking
``Authority'' and inserting ``Requirement''.
SEC. 9308. DATA COLLECTION ON ATTRITION IN INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.
(a) Standards for Data Collection.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall establish standards for collecting data
relating to attrition in the intelligence community workforce
across demographics, specialities, and length of service.
(2) Inclusion of certain candidates.--The Director shall
include, in the standards established under paragraph (1),
standards for collecting data from candidates who accepted
conditional offers of employment but chose to withdraw from
the hiring process before entering into service, including
data with respect to the reasons such candidates chose to
withdraw.
(b) Collection of Data.--Not later than 120 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, each element of the
intelligence community shall begin collecting data on
workforce and candidate attrition in accordance with the
standards established under subsection (a).
(c) Annual Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the
Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report on workforce and candidate attrition in
the intelligence community that includes--
(1) the findings of the Director based on the data
collected under subsection (b);
(2) recommendations for addressing any issues identified in
those findings; and
(3) an assessment of timeliness in processing hiring
applications of individuals previously employed by an element
of the intelligence community, consistent with the Trusted
Workforce 2.0 initiative sponsored by the Security Clearance,
Suitability, and Credentialing Performance Accountability
Council.
SEC. 9309. LIMITATION ON DELEGATION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT OF INFORMATION-SHARING
ENVIRONMENT.
(a) In General.--Section 1016(b) of the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485(b)), as
amended by section 6402(a) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116-92),
is further amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), in the matter before subparagraph
(A), by striking ``Director of National Intelligence'' and
inserting ``President'';
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``Director of National
Intelligence'' both places it appears and inserting
``President''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(3) Delegation.--
``(A) In general.--Subject to subparagraph (B), the
President may delegate responsibility for carrying out this
subsection.
``(B) Limitation.--The President may not delegate
responsibility for carrying out this subsection to the
Director of National Intelligence.''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a)
shall take effect on October 1, 2020.
SEC. 9310. IMPROVEMENTS TO PROVISIONS RELATING TO
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
ENVIRONMENT.
Section 6312 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116-92) is amended by striking
subsections (e) through (i) and inserting the following:
``(e) Long-term Roadmap.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2021, the Director of National Intelligence
shall develop and maintain a long-term roadmap for the
intelligence community information technology environment.
``(f) Business Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2021, the Director of National Intelligence
shall develop and maintain a business plan to implement the
long-term roadmap required by subsection (e).''.
SEC. 9311. REQUIREMENTS AND AUTHORITIES FOR DIRECTOR OF THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY TO IMPROVE
EDUCATION IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ENGINEERING,
ARTS, AND MATHEMATICS.
The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3501
et seq.) is amended by adding the following:
``SEC. 24. IMPROVEMENT OF EDUCATION IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY,
ENGINEERING, ARTS, AND MATHEMATICS.
``(a) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Eligible entity.--The term `eligible entity' includes
a department or agency of the Federal Government, a State, a
political subdivision of a State, an individual, and a not-
for-profit or other organization in the private sector.
``(2) Educational institution.--The term `educational
institution' includes any public or private elementary school
or secondary
[[Page S5221]]
school, institution of higher education, college, university,
or any other profit or nonprofit institution that is
dedicated to improving science, technology, engineering, the
arts, mathematics, business, law, medicine, or other fields
that promote development and education relating to science,
technology, engineering, the arts, or mathematics.
``(3) State.--The term `State' means each of the several
States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and
any other territory or possession of the United States.
``(b) Requirements.--The Director shall, on a continuing
basis--
``(1) identify actions that the Director may take to
improve education in the scientific, technology, engineering,
arts, and mathematics (known as `STEAM') skills necessary to
meet the long-term national security needs of the United
States for personnel proficient in such skills; and
``(2) establish and conduct programs to carry out such
actions.
``(c) Authorities.--
``(1) In general.--The Director, in support of educational
programs in science, technology, engineering, the arts, and
mathematics, may--
``(A) award grants to eligible entities;
``(B) provide cash awards and other items to eligible
entities;
``(C) accept voluntary services from eligible entities;
``(D) support national competition judging, other
educational event activities, and associated award ceremonies
in connection with such educational programs; and
``(E) enter into one or more education partnership
agreements with educational institutions in the United States
for the purpose of encouraging and enhancing study in
science, technology, engineering, the arts, and mathematics
disciplines at all levels of education.
``(2) Education partnership agreements.--
``(A) Nature of assistance provided.--Under an education
partnership agreement entered into with an educational
institution under paragraph (1)(E), the Director may provide
assistance to the educational institution by--
``(i) loaning equipment to the educational institution for
any purpose and duration in support of such agreement that
the Director considers appropriate;
``(ii) making personnel available to teach science courses
or to assist in the development of science courses and
materials for the educational institution;
``(iii) providing sabbatical opportunities for faculty and
internship opportunities for students;
``(iv) involving faculty and students of the educational
institution in Agency projects, including research and
technology transfer or transition projects;
``(v) cooperating with the educational institution in
developing a program under which students may be given
academic credit for work on Agency projects, including
research and technology transfer for transition projects; and
``(vi) providing academic and career advice and assistance
to students of the educational institution.
``(B) Priorities.--In entering into education partnership
agreements under paragraph (1)(E), the Director shall
prioritize entering into education partnership agreements
with the following:
``(i) Historically Black colleges and universities and
other minority-serving institutions, as described in section
371(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C.
1067q(a)).
``(ii) Educational institutions serving women, members of
minority groups, and other groups of individuals who
traditionally are involved in the science, technology,
engineering, arts, and mathematics professions in
disproportionately low numbers.
``(d) Designation of Advisor.--The Director shall designate
one or more individuals within the Agency to advise and
assist the Director regarding matters relating to science,
technology, engineering, the arts, and mathematics education
and training.''.
Subtitle B--Reports and Assessments Pertaining to Intelligence
Community
SEC. 9321. ASSESSMENT BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES ON EFFORTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO
IDENTIFY AND MITIGATE RISKS POSED TO THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND THE DEPARTMENT BY
THE USE OF DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER GENETIC TESTING
BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA.
(a) Assessment Required.--The Comptroller General of the
United States shall assess the efforts of the intelligence
community and the Department of Defense to identify and
mitigate the risks posed to the intelligence community and
the Department by the use of direct-to-consumer genetic
testing by the Government of the People's Republic of China.
(b) Report Required.--
(1) Definition of united states direct-to-consumer genetic
testing company.--In this subsection, the term ``United
States direct-to-consumer genetic testing company'' means a
private entity that--
(A) carries out direct-to-consumer genetic testing; and
(B) is organized under the laws of the United States or any
jurisdiction within the United States.
(2) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General shall
submit to Congress, including the congressional intelligence
committees, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate,
and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives, a report on the assessment required by
subsection (a).
(3) Elements.--The report required by paragraph (2) shall
include the following:
(A) A description of key national security risks and
vulnerabilities associated with direct-to-consumer genetic
testing, including--
(i) how the Government of the People's Republic of China
may be using data provided by personnel of the intelligence
community and the Department through direct-to-consumer
genetic tests; and
(ii) how ubiquitous technical surveillance may amplify
those risks.
(B) An assessment of the extent to which the intelligence
community and the Department have identified risks and
vulnerabilities posed by direct-to-consumer genetic testing
and have sought to mitigate such risks and vulnerabilities,
or have plans for such mitigation, including the extent to
which the intelligence community has determined--
(i) in which United States direct-to-consumer genetic
testing companies the Government of the People's Republic of
China or entities owned or controlled by the Government of
the People's Republic of China have an ownership interest;
and
(ii) which United States direct-to-consumer genetic testing
companies may have sold data to the Government of the
People's Republic of China or entities owned or controlled by
the Government of the People's Republic of China.
(C) Such recommendations as the Comptroller General may
have for action by the intelligence community and the
Department to improve the identification and mitigation of
risks and vulnerabilities posed by the use of direct-to-
consumer genetic testing by the Government of the People's
Republic of China.
(4) Form.--The report required by paragraph (2) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
(c) Cooperation.--The heads of relevant elements of the
intelligence community and components of the Department
shall--
(1) fully cooperate with the Comptroller General in
conducting the assessment required by subsection (a); and
(2) provide any information and data required by the
Comptroller General to conduct the assessment.
SEC. 9322. REPORT ON USE BY INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY OF HIRING
FLEXIBILITIES AND EXPEDITED HUMAN RESOURCES
PRACTICES TO ASSURE QUALITY AND DIVERSITY IN
THE WORKFORCE OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report on how elements of the intelligence
community are exercising hiring flexibilities and expedited
human resources practices afforded under section 3326 of
title 5, United States Code, and subpart D of part 315 of
title 5, Code of Federal Regulations, or successor
regulation, to assure quality and diversity in the workforce
of the intelligence community.
(b) Obstacles.--The report submitted under subsection (a)
shall include identification of any obstacles encountered by
the intelligence community in exercising the authorities
described in such subsection.
SEC. 9323. REPORT ON SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE PRIORITIES AND
REQUIREMENTS.
(a) Report Required.--Not later than 30 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report on signals intelligence priorities and
requirements subject to Presidential Policy Directive 28.
(b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall
cover the following:
(1) The implementation of the annual process for advising
the Director on signals intelligence priorities and
requirements described in section 3 of Presidential Policy
Directive 28.
(2) The signals intelligence priorities and requirements as
of the most recent annual process.
(3) The application of such priorities and requirements to
the signals intelligence collection efforts of the
intelligence community.
(4) The contents of the classified annex referenced in
section 3 of Presidential Policy Directive 28.
(c) Form.--The report submitted under subsection (a) shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
SEC. 9324. ASSESSMENT OF DEMAND FOR STUDENT LOAN REPAYMENT
PROGRAM BENEFIT.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the head of each element of the
intelligence community shall--
(1) calculate the number of personnel of that element who
qualify for a student loan repayment program benefit;
(2) compare the number calculated under paragraph (1) to
the number of personnel who apply for such a benefit;
[[Page S5222]]
(3) provide recommendations for how to structure such a
program to optimize participation and enhance the
effectiveness of the benefit as a retention tool, including
with respect to the amount of the benefit offered and the
length of time an employee receiving a benefit is required to
serve under a continuing service agreement; and
(4) identify any shortfall in funds or authorities needed
to provide such a benefit.
(b) Inclusion in Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Submission.--The
Director of National Intelligence shall include in the budget
justification materials submitted to Congress in support of
the budget for the intelligence community for fiscal year
2022 (as submitted with the budget of the President under
section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code) a report on
the findings of the elements of the intelligence community
under subsection (a).
SEC. 9325. ASSESSMENT OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY DEMAND FOR
CHILD CARE.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of the elements
of the intelligence community specified in subsection (b),
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
report that includes--
(1) a calculation of the total annual demand for child care
by employees of such elements, at or near the workplaces of
such employees, including a calculation of the demand for
early morning and evening child care;
(2) an identification of any shortfall between the demand
calculated under paragraph (1) and the child care supported
by such elements as of the date of the report;
(3) an assessment of options for addressing any such
shortfall, including options for providing child care at or
near the workplaces of employees of such elements;
(4) an identification of the advantages, disadvantages,
security requirements, and costs associated with each such
option;
(5) a plan to meet, by the date that is 5 years after the
date of the report--
(A) the demand calculated under paragraph (1); or
(B) an alternative standard established by the Director for
child care available to employees of such elements; and
(6) an assessment of needs of specific elements of the
intelligence community, including any Government-provided
child care that could be collocated with a workplace of
employees of such an element and any available child care
providers in the proximity of such a workplace.
(b) Elements Specified.--The elements of the intelligence
community specified in this subsection are the following:
(1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) The National Security Agency.
(3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(4) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(5) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(6) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
SEC. 9326. OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE STRATEGIES AND PLANS FOR
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) Requirement for Survey and Evaluation of Customer
Feedback.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence,
in coordination with the head of each element of the
intelligence community, shall--
(1) conduct a survey of the open source intelligence
requirements, goals, monetary and property investments, and
capabilities for each element of the intelligence community;
and
(2) evaluate the usability and utility of the Open Source
Enterprise by soliciting customer feedback and evaluating
such feedback.
(b) Requirement for Overall Strategy and for Intelligence
Community, Plan for Improving Usability of Open Source
Enterprise, and Risk Analysis of Creating Open Source
Center.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director, in coordination with the
head of each element of the intelligence community and using
the findings of the Director with respect to the survey
conducted under subsection (a), shall--
(1) develop a strategy for open source intelligence
collection, analysis, and production that defines the
overarching goals, roles, responsibilities, and processes for
such collection, analysis, and production for the
intelligence community;
(2) develop a plan for improving usability and utility of
the Open Source Enterprise based on the customer feedback
solicited under subsection (a)(2); and
(3) conduct a risk and benefit analysis of creating an open
source center independent of any current intelligence
community element.
(c) Requirement for Plan for Centralized Data Repository.--
Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act and using the findings of the Director with respect
to the survey and evaluation conducted under subsection (a),
the strategy and plan developed under subsection (b), and the
risk and benefit analysis conducted under such subsection,
the Director shall develop a plan for a centralized data
repository of open source intelligence that enables all
elements of the intelligence community--
(1) to use such repository for their specific requirements;
and
(2) to derive open source intelligence advantages.
(d) Requirement for Cost-sharing Model.--Not later than 1
year after the date of the enactment of this Act and using
the findings of the Director with respect to the survey and
evaluation conducted under subsection (a), the strategy and
plan developed under subsection (b), the risk and benefit
analysis conducted under such subsection, and the plan
developed under subsection (c), the Director shall develop a
cost-sharing model that leverages the open source
intelligence investments of each element of the intelligence
community for the beneficial use of the entire intelligence
community.
(e) Congressional Briefing.--Not later than 1 year after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of
National Intelligence, the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency, the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency, and the Director of the National Security Agency
shall jointly brief the congressional intelligence committees
on--
(1) the strategy developed under paragraph (1) of
subsection (b);
(2) the plan developed under paragraph (2) of such
subsection;
(3) the plan developed under subsection (c); and
(4) the cost-sharing model developed under subsection (d).
TITLE XCIV--SECURITY CLEARANCES AND TRUSTED WORKFORCE
SEC. 9401. EXCLUSIVITY, CONSISTENCY, AND TRANSPARENCY IN
SECURITY CLEARANCE PROCEDURES, AND RIGHT TO
APPEAL.
(a) Exclusivity of Procedures.--Section 801 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3161) is amended by adding at
the end the following:
``(c) Exclusivity.--Except as provided in subsection (b)
and subject to sections 801A and 801B, the procedures
established pursuant to subsection (a) and promulgated and
set forth under subpart A of title 32, Code of Federal
Regulations, or successor regulations, shall be the exclusive
procedures by which decisions about eligibility for access to
classified information are governed.''.
(b) Transparency.--Such section is further amended by
adding at the end the following:
``(d) Publication.--
``(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this subsection, the President shall--
``(A) publish in the Federal Register the procedures
established pursuant to subsection (a); or
``(B) submit to Congress a certification that the
procedures currently in effect that govern access to
classified information as described in subsection (a)--
``(i) are published in the Federal Register; and
``(ii) comply with the requirements of subsection (a).
``(2) Updates.--Whenever the President makes a revision to
a procedure established pursuant to subsection (a), the
President shall publish such revision in the Federal Register
not later than 30 days before the date on which the revision
becomes effective.''.
(c) Consistency.--
(1) In general.--Title VIII of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3161 et seq.) is amended by inserting after
section 801 the following:
``SEC. 801A. DECISIONS RELATING TO ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION.
``(a) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Agency.--The term `agency' has the meaning given the
term `Executive agency' in section 105 of title 5, United
States Code.
``(2) Classified information.--The term `classified
information' includes sensitive compartmented information,
restricted data, restricted handling information, and other
compartmented information.
``(3) Eligibility for access to classified information.--
The term `eligibility for access to classified information'
has the meaning given such term in the procedures established
pursuant to section 801(a).
``(b) In General.--Each head of an agency that makes a
determination regarding eligibility for access to classified
information shall ensure that in making the determination,
the head of the agency or any person acting on behalf of the
head of the agency--
``(1) does not violate any right or protection enshrined in
the Constitution of the United States, including rights
articulated in the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments;
``(2) does not discriminate for or against an individual on
the basis of race, ethnicity, color, religion, sex, national
origin, age, or handicap;
``(3) is not carrying out--
``(A) retaliation for political activities or beliefs; or
``(B) a coercion or reprisal described in section
2302(b)(3) of title 5, United States Code; and
``(4) does not violate section 3001(j)(1) of the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50
U.S.C. 3341(j)(1)).''.
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents in the
matter preceding section 2 of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3002) is amended by inserting after the item
relating to section 801 the following:
``Sec. 801A. Decisions relating to access to classified information.''.
(d) Right to Appeal.--
[[Page S5223]]
(1) In general.--Such title, as amended by subsection (c),
is further amended by inserting after section 801A the
following:
``SEC. 801B. RIGHT TO APPEAL.
``(a) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Agency.--The term `agency' has the meaning given the
term `Executive agency' in section 105 of title 5, United
States Code.
``(2) Covered person.--The term `covered person' means a
person, other than the President and Vice President,
currently or formerly employed in, detailed to, assigned to,
or issued an authorized conditional offer of employment for a
position that requires access to classified information by an
agency, including the following:
``(A) A member of the Armed Forces.
``(B) A civilian.
``(C) An expert or consultant with a contractual or
personnel obligation to an agency.
``(D) Any other category of person who acts for or on
behalf of an agency as determined by the head of the agency.
``(3) Eligibility for access to classified information.--
The term `eligibility for access to classified information'
has the meaning given such term in the procedures established
pursuant to section 801(a).
``(4) Need for access.--The term `need for access' has such
meaning as the President may define in the procedures
established pursuant to section 801(a).
``(5) Reciprocity of clearance.--The term `reciprocity of
clearance', with respect to a denial by an agency, means that
the agency, with respect to a covered person--
``(A) failed to accept a security clearance background
investigation as required by paragraph (1) of section 3001(d)
of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(d));
``(B) failed to accept a transferred security clearance
background investigation required by paragraph (2) of such
section;
``(C) subjected the covered person to an additional
investigative or adjudicative requirement in violation of
paragraph (3) of such section; or
``(D) conducted an investigation in violation of paragraph
(4) of such section.
``(6) Security executive agent.--The term `Security
Executive Agent' means the officer serving as the Security
Executive Agent pursuant to section 803.
``(b) Agency Review.--
``(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2021, each head of an agency shall, consistent
with the interest of national security, establish and publish
in the Federal Register a process by which a covered person
to whom eligibility for access to classified information was
denied or revoked by the agency or for whom reciprocity of
clearance was denied by the agency can appeal that denial or
revocation within the agency.
``(2) Elements.--The process required by paragraph (1)
shall include the following:
``(A) In the case of a covered person to whom eligibility
for access to classified information or reciprocity of
clearance is denied or revoked by an agency, the following:
``(i) The head of the agency shall provide the covered
person with a written--
``(I) detailed explanation of the basis for the denial or
revocation as the head of the agency determines is consistent
with the interests of national security and as permitted by
other applicable provisions of law; and
``(II) notice of the right of the covered person to a
hearing and appeal under this subsection.
``(ii) Not later than 30 days after receiving a request
from the covered person for copies of the documents that
formed the basis of the agency's decision to revoke or deny,
including the investigative file, the head of the agency
shall provide to the covered person copies of such documents
as--
``(I) the head of the agency determines is consistent with
the interests of national security; and
``(II) permitted by other applicable provisions of law,
including--
``(aa) section 552 of title 5, United States Code (commonly
known as the `Freedom of Information Act');
``(bb) section 552a of such title (commonly known as the
`Privacy Act of 1974'); and
``(cc) such other provisions of law relating to the
protection of confidential sources and privacy of
individuals.
``(iii)(I) The covered person shall have the opportunity to
retain counsel or other representation at the covered
person's expense.
``(II) Upon the request of the covered person, and a
showing that the ability to review classified information is
essential to the resolution of an appeal under this
subsection, counsel or other representation retained under
this clause shall be considered for access to classified
information for the limited purposes of such appeal.
``(iv)(I) The head of the agency shall provide the covered
person an opportunity, at a point in the process determined
by the agency head--
``(aa) to appear personally before an adjudicative or other
authority, other than the investigating entity, and to
present to such authority relevant documents, materials, and
information, including evidence that past problems relating
to the denial or revocation have been overcome or
sufficiently mitigated; and
``(bb) to call and cross-examine witnesses before such
authority, unless the head of the agency determines that
calling and cross-examining witnesses is not consistent with
the interests of national security.
``(II) The head of the agency shall make, as part of the
security record of the covered person, a written summary,
transcript, or recording of any appearance under item (aa) of
subclause (I) or of any calling or cross-examining of
witnesses under item (bb) of such subclause.
``(v) On or before the date that is 30 days after the date
on which the covered person receives copies of documents
under clause (ii), the covered person may request a hearing
of the decision to deny or revoke by filing a written appeal
with the head of the agency.
``(B) A requirement that each review of a decision under
this subsection is completed on average not later than 180
days after the date on which a hearing is requested under
subparagraph (A)(v).
``(3) Agency review panels.--
``(A) In general.--Each head of an agency shall establish a
panel to hear and review appeals under this subsection.
``(B) Membership.--
``(i) Composition.--Each panel established by the head of
an agency under subparagraph (A) shall be composed of at
least three employees of the agency selected by the agency
head, two of whom shall not be members of the security field.
``(ii) Terms.--A term of service on a panel established by
the head of an agency under subparagraph (A) shall not exceed
2 years.
``(C) Decisions.--
``(i) Written.--Each decision of a panel established under
subparagraph (A) shall be in writing and contain a
justification of the decision.
``(ii) Consistency.--Each head of an agency that
establishes a panel under subparagraph (A) shall ensure that
each decision of the panel is consistent with the interests
of national security and applicable provisions of law.
``(iii) Overturn.--The head of an agency may overturn a
decision of the panel if, not later than 30 days after the
date on which the panel issues the decision, the agency head
personally exercises the authority granted by this clause to
overturn such decision.
``(iv) Finality.--Each decision of a panel established
under subparagraph (A) or overturned pursuant to clause (iii)
of this subparagraph shall be final.
``(D) Access to classified information.--The head of an
agency that establishes a panel under subparagraph (A) shall
afford access to classified information to the members of the
panel as the agency head determines--
``(i) necessary for the panel to hear and review an appeal
under this subsection; and
``(ii) consistent with the interests of national security.
``(4) Representation by counsel.--
``(A) In general.--Each head of an agency shall ensure
that, under this subsection, a covered person appealing a
decision of the head's agency under this subsection has an
opportunity to retain counsel or other representation at the
covered person's expense.
``(B) Access to classified information.--
``(i) In general.--Upon the request of a covered person
appealing a decision of an agency under this subsection and a
showing that the ability to review classified information is
essential to the resolution of the appeal under this
subsection, the head of the agency shall sponsor an
application by the counsel or other representation retained
under this paragraph for access to classified information for
the limited purposes of such appeal.
``(ii) Extent of access.--Counsel or another representative
who is cleared for access under this subparagraph may be
afforded access to relevant classified materials to the
extent consistent with the interests of national security.
``(5) Publication of decisions.--
``(A) In general.--Each head of an agency shall publish
each final decision on an appeal under this subsection.
``(B) Requirements.--In order to ensure transparency,
oversight by Congress, and meaningful information for those
who need to understand how the clearance process works, each
publication under subparagraph (A) shall be--
``(i) made in a manner that is consistent with section 552
of title 5, United States Code, as amended by the Electronic
Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996 (Public Law
104-231);
``(ii) published to explain the facts of the case,
redacting personally identifiable information and sensitive
program information; and
``(iii) made available on a website that is searchable by
members of the public.
``(c) Period of Time for the Right to Appeal.--
``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), any
covered person who has been the subject of a decision made by
the head of an agency to deny or revoke eligibility for
access to classified information shall retain all rights to
appeal under this section until the conclusion of the appeals
process under this section.
``(2) Waiver of rights.--
``(A) Persons.--Any covered person may voluntarily waive
the covered person's right to appeal under this section and
such waiver shall be conclusive.
``(B) Agencies.--The head of an agency may not require a
covered person to waive the covered person's right to appeal
under this section for any reason.
[[Page S5224]]
``(d) Waiver of Availability of Procedures for National
Security Interest.--
``(1) In general.--If the head of an agency determines that
a procedure established under subsection (b) cannot be made
available to a covered person in an exceptional case without
damaging a national security interest of the United States by
revealing classified information, such procedure shall not be
made available to such covered person.
``(2) Finality.--A determination under paragraph (1) shall
be final and conclusive and may not be reviewed by any other
official or by any court.
``(3) Reporting.--
``(A) Case-by-case.--
``(i) In general.--In each case in which the head of an
agency determines under paragraph (1) that a procedure
established under subsection (b) cannot be made available to
a covered person, the agency head shall, not later than 30
days after the date on which the agency head makes such
determination, submit to the Security Executive Agent and to
the congressional intelligence committees a report stating
the reasons for the determination.
``(ii) Form.--A report submitted under clause (i) may be
submitted in classified form as necessary.
``(B) Annual reports.--
``(i) In general.--Not less frequently than once each
fiscal year, the Security Executive Agent shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on the
determinations made under paragraph (1) during the previous
fiscal year.
``(ii) Contents.--Each report submitted under clause (i)
shall include, for the period covered by the report, the
following:
``(I) The number of cases and reasons for determinations
made under paragraph (1), disaggregated by agency.
``(II) Such other matters as the Security Executive Agent
considers appropriate.
``(e) Denials and Revocations Under Other Provisions of
Law.--
``(1) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this section shall
be construed to limit or affect the responsibility and power
of the head of an agency to deny or revoke eligibility for
access to classified information or to deny reciprocity of
clearance in the interest of national security.
``(2) Denials and revocation.--The power and responsibility
to deny or revoke eligibility for access to classified
information or to deny reciprocity of clearance pursuant to
any other provision of law or Executive order may be
exercised only when the head of an agency determines that an
applicable process established under this section cannot be
invoked in a manner that is consistent with national
security.
``(3) Finality.--A determination under paragraph (2) shall
be final and conclusive and may not be reviewed by any other
official or by any court.
``(4) Reporting.--
``(A) Case-by-case.--
``(i) In general.--In each case in which the head of an
agency determines under paragraph (2) that a determination
relating to a denial or revocation of eligibility for access
to classified information or denial of reciprocity of
clearance could not be made pursuant to a process established
under this section, the agency head shall, not later than 30
days after the date on which the agency head makes such a
determination under paragraph (2), submit to the Security
Executive Agent and to the congressional intelligence
committees a report stating the reasons for the
determination.
``(ii) Form.--A report submitted under clause (i) may be
submitted in classified form as necessary.
``(B) Annual reports.--
``(i) In general.--Not less frequently than once each
fiscal year, the Security Executive Agent shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on the
determinations made under paragraph (2) during the previous
fiscal year.
``(ii) Contents.--Each report submitted under clause (i)
shall include, for the period covered by the report, the
following:
``(I) The number of cases and reasons for determinations
made under paragraph (2), disaggregated by agency.
``(II) Such other matters as the Security Executive Agent
considers appropriate.
``(f) Relationship to Suitability.--No person may use a
determination of suitability under part 731 of title 5, Code
of Federal Regulations, or successor regulation, for the
purpose of denying a covered person the review proceedings of
this section where there has been a denial or revocation of
eligibility for access to classified information or a denial
of reciprocity of clearance.
``(g) Preservation of Roles and Responsibilities Under
Executive Order 10865 and of the Defense Office of Hearings
and Appeals.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to
diminish or otherwise affect the procedures in effect on the
day before the date of the enactment of this Act for denial
and revocation procedures provided to individuals by
Executive Order 10865 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to
safeguarding classified information within industry), or
successor order, including those administered through the
Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals of the Department of
Defense under Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, or
successor directive.
``(h) Rule of Construction Relating to Certain Other
Provisions of Law.--This section and the processes and
procedures established under this section shall not be
construed to apply to paragraphs (6) and (7) of section
3001(j) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(j)).''.
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents in the
matter preceding section 2 of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3002), as amended by subsection (c), is
further amended by inserting after the item relating to
section 801A the following:
``Sec. 801B. Right to appeal.''.
SEC. 9402. ESTABLISHING PROCESS PARITY FOR SECURITY CLEARANCE
REVOCATIONS.
Subparagraph (C) of section 3001(j)(4) of the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C.
3341(j)(4)) is amended to read as follows:
``(C) Burdens of proof.--
``(i) In general.--Subject to clause (iii), in determining
whether the adverse security clearance or access
determination violated paragraph (1), the agency shall find
that paragraph (1) was violated if the individual has
demonstrated that a disclosure described in paragraph (1) was
a contributing factor in the adverse security clearance or
access determination taken against the individual.
``(ii) Circumstantial evidence.--An individual under clause
(i) may demonstrate that the disclosure was a contributing
factor in the adverse security clearance or access
determination taken against the individual through
circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that--
``(I) the official making the determination knew of the
disclosure; and
``(II) the determination occurred within a period such that
a reasonable person could conclude that the disclosure was a
contributing factor in the determination.
``(iii) Defense.--In determining whether the adverse
security clearance or access determination violated paragraph
(1), the agency shall not find that paragraph (1) was
violated if, after a finding that a disclosure was a
contributing factor, the agency demonstrates by clear and
convincing evidence that it would have made the same security
clearance or access determination in the absence of such
disclosure.''.
SEC. 9403. FEDERAL POLICY ON SHARING OF DEROGATORY
INFORMATION PERTAINING TO CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEES
IN THE TRUSTED WORKFORCE.
(a) Policy Required.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Security Executive
Agent, in coordination with the principal members of the
Performance Accountability Council and the Attorney General,
shall issue a policy for the Federal Government on sharing of
derogatory information pertaining to contractor employees
engaged by the Federal Government.
(b) Consent Requirement.--
(1) In general.--The policy issued under subsection (a)
shall require, as a condition of accepting a security
clearance with the Federal Government, that a contractor
employee provide prior written consent for the Federal
Government to share covered derogatory information with the
chief security officer of the contractor employer that
employs the contractor employee.
(2) Covered derogatory information.--For purposes of this
section, covered derogatory information--
(A) is information that--
(i) contravenes National Security Adjudicative Guidelines
as specified in Security Executive Agent Directive 4 (10
C.F.R. 710 app. A), or any successor Federal policy;
(ii) a Federal Government agency certifies is accurate and
reliable;
(iii) is relevant to a contractor's ability to protect
against insider threats as required by section 1-202 of the
National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual
(NISPOM), or successor manual; and
(iv) may have a bearing on the contractor employee's
suitability for a position of public trust or to receive
credentials to access certain facilities of the Federal
Government; and
(B) shall include any negative information considered in
the adjudicative process, including information provided by
the contractor employee on forms submitted for the processing
of the contractor employee's security clearance.
(c) Elements.--The policy issued under subsection (a)
shall--
(1) require Federal agencies, except under exceptional
circumstances specified by the Security Executive Agent, to
share with the contractor employer of a contractor employee
engaged with the Federal Government the existence of
potentially derogatory information and which National
Security Adjudicative Guideline it falls under, with the
exception that the Security Executive Agent may waive such
requirement in circumstances the Security Executive Agent
considers extraordinary;
(2) require that covered derogatory information shared with
a contractor employer as described in subsection (b)(1) be
used by the contractor employer exclusively for risk
mitigation purposes under section 1-202 of the National
Industrial Security Program Operating Manual, or successor
manual;
(3) require Federal agencies to share any mitigation
measures in place to address the derogatory information;
(4) establish standards for timeliness for sharing the
derogatory information;
(5) specify the methods by which covered derogatory
information will be shared with the contractor employer of
the contractor employee;
[[Page S5225]]
(6) allow the contractor employee, within a specified
timeframe, the right--
(A) to contest the accuracy and reliability of covered
derogatory information;
(B) to address or remedy any concerns raised by the covered
derogatory information; and
(C) to provide documentation pertinent to subparagraph (A)
or (B) for an agency to place in relevant security clearance
databases;
(7) establish a procedure by which the contractor employer
of the contractor employee may consult with the Federal
Government prior to taking any remedial action under section
1-202 of the National Industrial Security Program Operating
Manual, or successor manual, to address the derogatory
information the Federal agency has provided;
(8) stipulate that the chief security officer of the
contractor employer is prohibited from sharing or discussing
covered derogatory information with other parties, including
nonsecurity professionals at the contractor employer; and
(9) require companies in the National Industrial Security
Program to comply with the policy.
(d) Consideration of Lessons Learned From Information-
sharing Program for Positions of Trust and Security
Clearances.--In developing the policy issued under subsection
(a), the Director shall consider, to the extent available,
lessons learned from actions taken to carry out section
6611(f) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2020 (Public Law 116-92).
TITLE XCV--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS
SEC. 9501. REPORT ON ATTEMPTS BY FOREIGN ADVERSARIES TO BUILD
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND CYBERSECURITY EQUIPMENT
AND SERVICES FOR, OR TO PROVIDE SUCH EQUIPMENT
AND SERVICES TO, CERTAIN ALLIES OF THE UNITED
STATES.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the Committee on Armed Services and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.
(2) Five eyes country.--The term ``Five Eyes country''
means any of the following:
(A) Australia.
(B) Canada.
(C) New Zealand.
(D) The United Kingdom.
(E) The United States.
(b) Report Required.--Not later than 90 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security
Agency, and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency
shall jointly submit to the appropriate committees of
Congress a report on attempts by foreign adversaries to build
telecommunications and cybersecurity equipment and services
for, or to provide such equipment and services to, Five Eyes
countries.
(c) Elements.--The report submitted under subsection (b)
shall include the following:
(1) An assessment of United States intelligence sharing and
intelligence and military force posture in any Five Eyes
country that currently uses or intends to use
telecommunications or cybersecurity equipment or services
provided by a foreign adversary of the United States,
including China and Russia.
(2) A description and assessment of mitigation of any
potential compromises or risks for any circumstance described
in paragraph (1).
(d) Form.--The report required by subsection (b) shall
include an unclassified executive summary, and may include a
classified annex.
SEC. 9502. REPORT ON THREATS POSED BY USE BY FOREIGN
GOVERNMENTS AND ENTITIES OF COMMERCIALLY
AVAILABLE CYBER INTRUSION AND SURVEILLANCE
TECHNOLOGY.
(a) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report on the threats posed by the use by
foreign governments and entities of commercially available
cyber intrusion and other surveillance technology.
(b) Contents.--The report required by subsection (a) shall
include the following:
(1) Matters relating to threats described in subsection (a)
as they pertain to the following:
(A) The threat posed to United States persons and persons
inside the United States.
(B) The threat posed to United States personnel overseas.
(C) The threat posed to employees of the Federal
Government, including through both official and personal
accounts and devices.
(2) A description of which foreign governments and entities
pose the greatest threats from the use of technology
described in subsection (a) and the nature of those threats.
(3) An assessment of the source of the commercially
available cyber intrusion and other surveillance technology
that poses the threats described in subsection (a), including
whether such technology is made by United States companies or
companies in the United States or by foreign companies.
(4) An assessment of actions taken, as of the date of the
enactment of this Act, by the Federal Government and foreign
governments to limit the export of technology described in
subsection (a) from the United States or foreign countries to
foreign governments and entities in ways that pose the
threats described in such subsection.
(5) Matters relating to how the Federal Government,
Congress, and foreign governments can most effectively
mitigate the threats described in subsection (a), including
matters relating to the following:
(A) Working with the technology and telecommunications
industry to identify and improve the security of consumer
software and hardware used by United States persons and
persons inside the United States that is targeted by
commercial cyber intrusion and surveillance software.
(B) Export controls.
(C) Diplomatic pressure.
(D) Trade agreements.
(c) Form.--The report submitted under subsection (a) shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
SEC. 9503. REPORTS ON RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CYBERSPACE
SOLARIUM COMMISSION.
(a) Appropriate Committees of Congress.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Select Committee
on Intelligence, the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, and the Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Homeland
Security, the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of
Representatives.
(b) Reports Required.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, each head of an agency
described in subsection (c) shall submit to the appropriate
committees of Congress a report on the recommendations
included in the report issued by the Cyberspace Solarium
Commission under section 1652(k) of the John S. McCain
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019
(Public Law 115-232).
(c) Agencies Described.--The agencies described in this
subsection are the following:
(1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) The Department of Homeland Security.
(3) The Department of Energy.
(4) The Department of Commerce.
(5) The Department of Defense.
(d) Contents.--Each report submitted under subsection (b)
by the head of an agency described in subsection (c) shall
include the following:
(1) An evaluation of the recommendations in the report
described in subsection (b) that the agency identifies as
pertaining directly to the agency.
(2) A description of the actions taken, or the actions that
the head of the agency may consider taking, to implement any
of the recommendations (including a comprehensive estimate of
requirements for appropriations to take such actions).
SEC. 9504. ASSESSMENT OF CRITICAL TECHNOLOGY TRENDS RELATING
TO ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, MICROCHIPS, AND
SEMICONDUCTORS AND RELATED SUPPLY CHAINS.
(a) Assessment Required.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall complete a detailed assessment of critical
technology trends relating to artificial intelligence,
microchips, and semiconductors and related supply chains.
(b) Elements.--The assessment required by subsection (a)
shall include the following:
(1) Export controls.--
(A) In general.--An assessment of efforts by partner
countries to enact and implement export controls and other
technology transfer measures with respect to artificial
intelligence, microchips, advanced manufacturing equipment,
and other artificial intelligence enabled technologies
critical to United States supply chains.
(B) Identification of opportunities for cooperation.--The
assessment under subparagraph (A) shall identify
opportunities for further cooperation with international
partners on a multilateral and bilateral basis to strengthen
export control regimes and address technology transfer
threats.
(2) Semiconductor supply chains.--
(A) In general.--An assessment of global semiconductor
supply chains, including areas to reduce United States
vulnerabilities and maximize points of leverage.
(B) Analysis of potential effects.--The assessment under
subparagraph (A) shall include an analysis of the potential
effects of significant geopolitical shifts, including those
related to Taiwan.
(C) Identification of opportunities for diversification.--
The assessment under subparagraph (A) shall also identify
opportunities for diversification of United States supply
chains, including an assessment of cost, challenges, and
opportunities to diversify manufacturing capabilities on a
multinational basis.
(3) Computing power.--An assessment of trends relating to
computing power and the effect of such trends on global
artificial intelligence development and implementation, in
consultation with the Director of the Intelligence Advanced
Research Projects Activity, the Director of the Defense
Advanced
[[Page S5226]]
Research Projects Agency, and the Director of the National
Institute of Standards and Technology, including forward-
looking assessments of how computing resources may affect
United States national security, innovation, and
implementation relating to artificial intelligence.
(c) Report.--
(1) Definition of appropriate committees of congress.--In
this subsection, the term ``appropriate committees of
Congress'' means--
(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on
Armed Services, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate; and
(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the
Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Financial
Services, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
of Representatives.
(2) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress a report on the findings
of the Director with respect to the assessment completed
under subsection (a).
(3) Form.--The report submitted under paragraph (2) shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
SEC. 9505. COMBATING CHINESE INFLUENCE OPERATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES AND STRENGTHENING CIVIL LIBERTIES
PROTECTIONS.
(a) Updates to Annual Reports on Influence Operations and
Campaigns in the United States by the Chinese Communist
Party.--Section 1107(b) of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 3237(b)) is amended--
(1) by redesignating paragraph (8) as paragraph (9); and
(2) by inserting after paragraph (7) the following:
``(8) An identification of influence activities and
operations employed by the Chinese Communist Party against
the United States science and technology sectors,
specifically employees of the United States Government,
researchers, scientists, and students in the science and
technology sector in the United States.''.
(b) Plan for Federal Bureau of Investigation to Increase
Public Awareness and Detection of Influence Activities by the
Government of the People's Republic of China.--
(1) Plan required.--Not later than 90 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a plan--
(A) to increase public awareness of influence activities by
the Government of the People's Republic of China; and
(B) to publicize mechanisms that members of the public can
use--
(i) to detect such activities; and
(ii) to report such activities to the Bureau.
(2) Consultation.--In carrying out paragraph (1), the
Director shall consult with the following:
(A) The Director of the Office of Science and Technology
Policy.
(B) Such other stakeholders outside the intelligence
community, including professional associations, institutions
of higher education, businesses, and civil rights and
multicultural organizations, as the Director determines
relevant.
(c) Recommendations of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
to Strengthen Relationships and Build Trust With Communities
of Interest.--
(1) In general.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, in consultation with the Assistant Attorney
General for the Civil Rights Division and the Chief Privacy
and Civil Liberties Officer of the Department of Justice,
shall develop recommendations to strengthen relationships
with communities targeted by influence activities of the
Government of the People's Republic of China and build trust
with such communities through local and regional grassroots
outreach.
(2) Submittal to congress.--Not later than 1 year after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit
to Congress the recommendations developed under paragraph
(1).
(d) Technical Corrections.--The National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended--
(1) in section 1107 (50 U.S.C. 3237)--
(A) in the section heading, by striking ``communist party
of china'' and inserting ``chinese communist party''; and
(B) by striking ``Communist Party of China'' both places it
appears and inserting ``Chinese Communist Party''; and
(2) in the table of contents before section 2 (50 U.S.C.
3002), by striking the item relating to section 1107 and
inserting the following new item:
``Sec. 1107. Annual reports on influence operations and campaigns in
the United States by the Chinese Communist Party.''.
SEC. 9506. ANNUAL REPORT ON CORRUPT ACTIVITIES OF SENIOR
OFFICIALS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY.
(a) Definition of Appropriate Committees of Congress.--In
this section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means--
(1) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
the Committee on Finance, the Committee on Foreign Relations,
and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.
(b) Annual Report Required.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter through
2025, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on
the corruption and corrupt activities of senior officials of
the Chinese Communist Party.
(2) Elements.--
(A) In general.--Each report under paragraph (1) shall
include the following:
(i) A description of the wealth of, and corruption and
corrupt activities among, senior officials of the Chinese
Communist Party.
(ii) A description of any recent actions of the officials
described in clause (i) that could be considered a violation,
or potential violation, of United States law.
(iii) A description and assessment of targeted financial
measures, including potential targets for designation of the
officials described in clause (i) for the corruption and
corrupt activities described in that clause and for the
actions described in clause (ii).
(B) Scope of reports.--The first report under paragraph (1)
shall include comprehensive information on the matters
described in subparagraph (A). Any succeeding report under
paragraph (1) may consist of an update or supplement to the
preceding report under that subsection.
(3) Coordination.--In preparing each report, update, or
supplement under this subsection, the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency shall coordinate as follows:
(A) In preparing the description required by clause (i) of
paragraph (2)(A), the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency shall coordinate with the head of the Office of
Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury
and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(B) In preparing the descriptions required by clauses (ii)
and (iii) of such paragraph, the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency shall coordinate with the head of the
Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the
Treasury.
(4) Form.--Each report under paragraph (1) shall include an
unclassified executive summary, and may include a classified
annex.
(c) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the United States should undertake every effort and pursue
every opportunity to expose the corruption and illicit
practices of senior officials of the Chinese Communist Party,
including President Xi Jinping.
SEC. 9507. REPORT ON CORRUPT ACTIVITIES OF RUSSIAN AND OTHER
EASTERN EUROPEAN OLIGARCHS.
(a) Definition of Appropriate Committees of Congress.--In
this section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means--
(1) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
the Committee on Finance, the Committee on Foreign Relations,
and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.
(b) Report Required.--Not later than 100 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to the appropriate
committees of Congress and the Undersecretary of State for
Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs a report on the
corruption and corrupt activities of Russian and other
Eastern European oligarchs.
(c) Elements.--
(1) In general.--Each report under subsection (b) shall
include the following:
(A) A description of corruption and corrupt activities
among Russian and other Eastern European oligarchs who
support the Government of the Russian Federation, including
estimates of the total assets of such oligarchs.
(B) An assessment of the impact of the corruption and
corrupt activities described pursuant to subparagraph (A) on
the economy and citizens of Russia.
(C) A description of any connections to, or support of,
organized crime, drug smuggling, or human trafficking by an
oligarch covered by subparagraph (A).
(D) A description of any information that reveals
corruption and corrupt activities in Russia among oligarchs
covered by subparagraph (A).
(E) A description and assessment of potential sanctions
actions that could be imposed upon oligarchs covered by
subparagraph (A) who support the leadership of the Government
of Russia, including President Vladimir Putin.
(2) Scope of reports.--The first report under subsection
(a) shall include comprehensive information on the matters
described in paragraph (1). Any succeeding report under
subsection (a) may consist of an update or supplement to the
preceding report under that subsection.
(d) Coordination.--In preparing each report, update, or
supplement under this section, the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency shall coordinate as follows:
(1) In preparing the assessment and descriptions required
by subparagraphs (A) through (D) of subsection (c)(1), the
Director
[[Page S5227]]
of the Central Intelligence Agency shall coordinate with the
head of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the
Department of the Treasury and the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.
(2) In preparing the description and assessment required by
subparagraph (E) of such subsection, the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency shall coordinate with the head of
the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of
the Treasury.
(e) Form.--
(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), each report
under subsection (b) shall include an unclassified executive
summary, and may include a classified annex.
(2) Unclassified form of certain information.--The
information described in subsection (c)(1)(D) in each report
under subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form.
SEC. 9508. REPORT ON BIOSECURITY RISK AND DISINFORMATION BY
THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on
Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, and the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of
the Senate; and
(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the
Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Energy and
Commerce, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee
on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives.
(2) Critical infrastructure.--The term ``critical
infrastructure'' has the meaning given such term in section
1016(e) of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001 (42 U.S.C. 5195c(e)).
(b) Report Required.--Not later than 90 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of
Congress a report identifying whether and how officials of
the Chinese Communist Party and the Government of the
People's Republic of China may have sought--
(1) to suppress information about--
(A) the outbreak of the novel coronavirus in Wuhan;
(B) the spread of the virus through China; and
(C) the transmission of the virus to other countries;
(2) to spread disinformation relating to the pandemic; or
(3) to exploit the pandemic to advance their national
security interests.
(c) Assessments.--The report required by subsection (b)
shall include assessments of reported actions and the effect
of those actions on efforts to contain the novel coronavirus
pandemic, including each of the following:
(1) The origins of the novel coronavirus outbreak, the time
and location of initial infections, and the mode and speed of
early viral spread.
(2) Actions taken by the Government of China to suppress,
conceal, or misinform the people of China and those of other
countries about the novel coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan.
(3) The effect of disinformation or the failure of the
Government of China to fully disclose details of the outbreak
on response efforts of local governments in China and other
countries.
(4) Diplomatic, political, economic, intelligence, or other
pressure on other countries and international organizations
to conceal information about the spread of the novel
coronavirus and the response of the Government of China to
the contagion, as well as to influence or coerce early
responses to the pandemic by other countries.
(5) Efforts by officials of the Government of China to deny
access to health experts and international health
organizations to afflicted individuals in Wuhan, pertinent
areas of the city, or laboratories of interest in China,
including the Wuhan Institute of Virology.
(6) Efforts by the Government of China, or those acting at
its direction or with its assistance, to conduct cyber
operations against international, national, or private health
organizations conducting research relating to the novel
coronavirus or operating in response to the pandemic.
(7) Efforts to control, restrict, or manipulate relevant
segments of global supply chains, particularly in the sale,
trade, or provision of relevant medicines, medical supplies,
or medical equipment as a result of the pandemic.
(8) Efforts to advance the economic, intelligence, national
security, and political objectives of the Government of China
by exploiting vulnerabilities of foreign governments,
economies, and companies under financial duress as a result
of the pandemic or to accelerate economic espionage and
intellectual property theft.
(9) Efforts to exploit the disruption of the pharmaceutical
and telecommunications industries as well as other industries
tied to critical infrastructure and bilateral trade between
China and the United States and between China and allies and
partners of the United States in order to advance the
economic and political objectives of the Government of China
following the pandemic.
(d) Form.--The report required under subsection (b) shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
SEC. 9509. REPORT ON EFFECT OF LIFTING OF UNITED NATIONS ARMS
EMBARGO ON ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN.
(a) Definition of Appropriate Committees of Congress.--In
this section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means--
(1) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate; and
(2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the
Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives.
(b) Report Required.--Not later than 90 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, in consultation with such heads of other
elements of the intelligence community as the Director
considers appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate
committees of Congress a report on--
(1) the plans of the Government of the Islamic Republic of
Iran to acquire military arms if the ban on arms transfers to
or from such government under United Nations Security Council
resolutions are lifted; and
(2) the effect such arms acquisitions may have on regional
security and stability.
(c) Contents.--The report submitted under subsection (b)
shall include assessments relating to plans of the Government
of the Islamic Republic of Iran to acquire additional
weapons, the intention of other countries to provide such
weapons, and the effect such acquisition and provision would
have on regional stability, including with respect to each of
the following:
(1) The type and quantity of weapon systems under
consideration for acquisition.
(2) The countries of origin of such systems.
(3) Likely reactions of other countries in the region to
such acquisition, including the potential for proliferation
by other countries in response.
(4) The threat that such acquisition could present to
international commerce and energy supplies in the region, and
the potential implications for the national security of the
United States.
(5) The threat that such acquisition could present to the
Armed Forces of the United States, of countries allied with
the United States, and of countries partnered with the United
States stationed in or deployed in the region.
(6) The potential that such acquisition could be used to
deliver chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.
(7) The potential for the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran to proliferate weapons acquired in the
absence of an arms embargo to regional groups, including
Shi'a militia groups backed by such government.
(d) Form.--The report submitted under subsection (b) shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
SEC. 9510. REPORT ON IRANIAN ACTIVITIES RELATING TO NUCLEAR
NONPROLIFERATION.
(a) Definition of Appropriate Committees of Congress.--In
this section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means--
(1) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate; and
(2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the
Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives.
(b) Report Required.--Not later than 90 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of
Congress a report assessing--
(1) any relevant activities potentially relating to nuclear
weapons research and development by the Islamic Republic of
Iran; and
(2) any relevant efforts to afford or deny international
access in accordance with international nonproliferation
agreements.
(c) Assessments.--The report required by subsection (b)
shall include assessments, for the period beginning on
January 1, 2018, and ending on the date of the submittal of
the report, of the following:
(1) Activities to research, develop, or enrich uranium or
reprocess plutonium with the intent or capability of creating
weapons-grade nuclear material.
(2) Research, development, testing, or design activities
that could contribute to or inform construction of a device
intended to initiate or capable of initiating a nuclear
explosion.
(3) Efforts to receive, transmit, store, destroy, relocate,
archive, or otherwise preserve research, processes, products,
or enabling materials relevant or relating to any efforts
assessed under paragraph (1) or (2).
(4) Efforts to afford or deny international access, in
accordance with international nonproliferation agreements, to
locations, individuals, and materials relating to activities
described in paragraph (1), (2), or (3).
(d) Form.--The report required under subsection (b) shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
SEC. 9511. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THIRD OPTION FOUNDATION.
It is the sense of the Congress that--
(1) the work of the Third Option Foundation to heal, help,
and honor members of the special operations community of the
Central
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Intelligence Agency and their families is invaluable; and
(2) the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency should
work closely with the Third Option Foundation in implementing
section 19A of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949
(50 U.S.C. 3519b), as added by section 6412 of the Damon Paul
Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (Public Law 116-
92).
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.
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