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**NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES
AND U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITY IN
NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA**

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

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**NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES AND U.S. MILITARY
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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, May 1, 2019.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. All right, then. We will call the meeting to order. Thank you all for being here.

This morning we have testimony from the Northern Command and the Southern Command, and it is a very topical time to have both of them in. There is a lot going on in both areas. We will have four witnesses with opening testimony.

We have General Terrence O'Shaughnessy, who is the commander of the U.S. Northern Command; Admiral Craig Faller, who is the commander of the U.S. Southern Command; the Honorable Kathryn Wheelbarger, who is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; and the Honorable Kenneth Rapuano, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security.

And as I was mentioning when I went out with these two gentlemen earlier, we do not have to say this will probably be your last time before you testify before us. We have had a lot of turnover and a lot of folks coming before us for the last time. But both of you, I think, far as we know, going to be here for a little while.

Before we begin, an apology. Didn't want to start on a sad note.

Some of us up here served with Ellen Tauscher, who was a member of the Armed Services Committee for a little over 12 years. She passed away this week, very sadly. I came into Congress actually in 1996 with Ellen, served in this committee with her for her whole time before she moved over to the Obama administration to engage in arms control discussion with the Russians.

Ellen was a terrific person and a great member of this committee. She will be missed by many and I just want to express my condolences and sympathies for her family and friends and just mention what a great pleasure it was serving with her and appreciate her service to our country and to her district.

Mac, did you want to say anything?

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, sir.

I would just add that I think Ellen reflects the best of the bipartisan traditions of this committee. She worked on both sides of the aisle, especially on nuclear arms control issues. A wonderful, warm, caring person, and I think we are all going to miss her but also continue to benefit from the example she set for both of us. And I appreciate the opportunity to say that.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. And with that, as I mentioned, we are having the testimony from the Southern Command and the Northern Command. And it is a very, very interesting time. I think the most topical thing right at the moment to hear from the Southern Command is on the issue of Venezuela, and what is happening down there, really, minute by minute.

There is a lot going on in that area, and I do want to emphasize how important it is to get a stable government in Venezuela and, in my belief, that the Maduro government is not legitimate. The facts, I think, make that clear, and the devastation throughout Venezuela shows how their leadership has impacted that country.

The statistics are staggering. The incredible rise in poverty and malnutrition, the people who are displaced. It is devastating for Venezuela, but it is also devastating for the region. Some of us were on this committee when we passed Plan Colombia and we have worked with Colombia for literally decades now to try to combat the narcoterrorists down there and really made an enormous amount of progress.

That progress is threatened by the instability in Venezuela as refugees pour across the border and as various criminals, terrorists, and violent organizations take advantage of that instability. You know, trying to get back to a more stable situation in Venezuela is enormously important.

We will also be very interested by the role that both Cuba and Russia are playing in that region, as Russia in particular attempts to expand their reach. We have seen, obviously, what they have done meddling in Europe and in the Middle East, but I think this is instructive of just how ambitious President Putin's plans are to spread Russia's malign influence throughout the globe. We will be interested in hearing about that.

And the broader, overarching issue with Southern Command is almost always the drug trafficking. How we can contain the drugs that flow south to north. And the one piece, and I spoke yesterday with Admiral Faller about this, is we have to focus on a, I believe, total approach to this and look at the demand side of this.

If there was not the demand in the United States of America for these drugs, they wouldn't come, and as long as the demand remains as high as it is, it is going to be incredibly expensive and difficult to stop them. So I think it would be instructive not to just try to stop the drug cartels from shipping them north but what can we do to combat the entire problem? A whole-of-government approach. You know, working with people here domestically in the United States to try to reduce the demand for drugs.

And Northern Command, obviously, we are very focused on the southern border. I have given speeches about that before. I won't take this moment to do that. But we do have a significant challenge on the southern border right now.

The sheer number of people who are flowing towards the border is overwhelming our ability to process the asylum-seekers that are coming. And we need to come up with a plan for that because, right now, the only thing that I would hope we can all agree on is what we are doing now is not working.

So I would appreciate some insights about how we can change that to try to address the situation. I would only offer one specific thought—again, you know, like with the drugs, focusing on stopping them from coming in as opposed to stopping the demand is perhaps the wrong approach.

When it comes to the border, folks say, how can we stop these people once they get here?

We have to figure out some way to change the equation so that they don't want to come. The best way to do that is to have greater prosperity and stability in the countries that they are coming from. They are fleeing violence, poverty, and hopelessness. Until we replace those things, it is hard to imagine that they are going to stop making that choice.

So we are going to, again, need a comprehensive approach to addressing that problem and challenge, and I look forward to the testimony from all four of our witnesses.

And with that, I will turn it over to the ranking member, Mr. Thornberry.

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. "MAC" THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming our witnesses. Appreciate each of you being here.

All of us are intensely focused on the developments in Venezuela.

A week before last, I had the opportunity to be there on the border and to listen to some of the thousands of people who are streaming across that border every day and hear their desire to be freed from oppression and to have a chance for a better life. As you said, I think we all have something at stake here.

I am also very disturbed by the reports of Russian, Cuban, Chinese, other interference there. For example, I think the Secretary of State has said that Maduro was ready to leave yesterday but the Russians wouldn't let him. So there is a tremendous concern not only about the people of Venezuela but about foreign manipulation that prevents the people of Venezuela from having a better life. And of course, a lot of that is directed against us.

I would also just say that my takeaway from visiting at least three of the countries in South America was we have tremendous opportunities there. Tremendous economic, security, all sorts of opportunities, but we also have significant concerns. Chinese involvement and the Russian, Iranian, other things that you have mentioned.

A lot of issues to talk today and, obviously, protecting the homeland is absolutely central to the purpose of the Department of Defense and the Federal Government, and there are a variety of concerns that we have.

Last thing I would say is, and it goes beyond the scope of this committee and this hearing, but I completely agree with your state-

ment that we need a more comprehensive approach to deal with the challenges at the southern border. Part of that is helping the countries of Central America so that people have a safer place to stay. Part of it, in my opinion, is the asylum laws in the United States. Part of it is doing better for the Department of Homeland Security so they can do their job, rather than rely on the military.

A lot of that is beyond our scope. I know we will talk about some of those aspects. The key thing is, maybe more so than at any time I have been on this committee, our own hemisphere is at stake with American national security in ways that I think it hasn't been before.

And so, I think it is appropriate to have these witnesses and I look forward to hearing their testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Rapuano, we will start with you.

STATEMENT OF KENNETH P. RAPUANO, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND GLOBAL SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Secretary RAPUANO. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thornberry, and distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to be here with General O'Shaughnessy, Admiral Faller, and Assistant Secretary Wheelbarger.

For the Department of Defense, defending the homeland is our highest priority. Our homeland, once a sanctuary, is threatened by potential adversaries that are developing a wide range of capabilities to threaten the homeland. Our adversaries are developing these capabilities to threaten or to commit acts of aggression against the United States. Their actions are intended to limit U.S. response options, thus preventing us from our defending our allies and partners.

China and Russia, by far our most advanced potential adversaries, increasingly developing 21st century technologies to hold the U.S. homeland at risk; employing systems intended to deny our advantages, delay our warning time, and likely target our civil infrastructure. These capabilities include anti-satellite systems, hypersonic glide vehicles, and advanced cyber capabilities.

While North Korea has not conducted any nuclear-capable missile tests in more than a year, it retains weapons of mass destruction. North Korea also possesses cyber capabilities and has demonstrated its intent to use them to threaten the U.S. homeland. Iran continues to work on a space launch vehicle, reducing the timeline to development of intercontinental-range ballistic missiles.

Although our focus is on great power competition and rogue states, we must continue to address the threat posed by violent extremist organizations. ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] and others continue to strive for opportunities to strike the U.S. homeland. The defense of the homeland is not restricted to adversaries abroad. In providing defense support to civil authorities, my office coordinates the Department's role for disaster relief and border security support to the Department of Homeland Security.

To meet this range of challenges, the administration released its National Security Strategy. This informed the National Defense Strategy, which in turn helped shape the National Military Strat-

egy. A common thread throughout all these documents is the need to strengthen homeland defense by enhancing our deterrence and assurance posture, improving our ability to respond if deterrence fails, and strengthening our negotiating position against adversaries.

To that end, every element of my team is focused on strengthening U.S. homeland defense. I would like to highlight outer space. Space is a key domain for our national and homeland defense; however, the space domain is changing, and we must address growing foreign counter-space threats.

Thus, the Department provided Congress a legislative proposal for the establishment of the U.S. Space Force as a new branch of our Armed Forces. The Space Force will catalyze the Department's transformation of space as a warfighting domain to ensure we are postured to deter aggression and, if necessary, are prepared to defend our vital interests in space.

Cyber policy's development of the Defense Cyber Strategy and first ever Cyber Posture Review has put the Department of Defense [DOD] on a path to fight and win against a capable adversary, enhance the effectiveness of the joint force, defend critical infrastructure, secure DOD information anywhere, and prioritize cyber cooperation with partners and allies. These objectives, along with our intent to defend forward, puts the United States in a far better position to protect the homeland and counter adversary aggression.

Additionally, the Department is enhancing its missile defenses for the homeland and improving its ability to counter unmanned aircraft systems to further deny potential adversaries any potential advantage of using these capabilities against the homeland. Support to the homeland is not limited to countering foreign adversaries. We must also be prepared to support civil authorities.

DOD actively supports the DHS [Department of Homeland Security] mission on the border because border security is a core element of national security. The immigration crisis on the southwest border poses significant national security and humanitarian challenges for the Nation and threatens to overwhelm the Department of Homeland Security.

In the last 6 months, over 430,000 undocumented aliens have been apprehended on the southwest border, which already surpasses the total number of aliens apprehended in the entire fiscal year of 2018. Last month alone, over 92,000 undocumented aliens were apprehended on the border.

DHS will continue to need DOD support into the foreseeable future until they have the necessary resources and tools to properly exercise their responsibilities. Each of these missions have greatly contributed to homeland defense and are pivotal to enhancing U.S. deterrence and assurance posture, improving our ability to respond should deterrence fail, and strengthening our ability to deter or defeat potential adversaries that threaten our way of life.

Thank you again, and I look forward to your questions.

[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Rapuano and Ms. Wheelbarger can be found in the Appendix on page 55.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ms. Wheelbarger.

STATEMENT OF KATHRYN WHEELBARGER, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Ms. WHEELBARGER. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thornberry, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify this morning. We enjoy enormous potential in our hemisphere, given the significant cooperation we receive from our partners and the democratic values we share with most nations in the region. Our vision is for a hemisphere that is collaborative, prosperous, and secure.

But we face significant challenges as well, and Venezuela is the foremost example. Yet we have unprecedented regional unity at this historical moment, and the United States and our international partners continue to harness diplomatic information and economic means to encourage a peaceful transition of power.

For the Department of Defense, we have responded to Interim President Guaidó's call for humanitarian aid by assisting USAID [United States Agency for International Development] in those efforts to pre-position aid in Colombia. We face other challenges in the region as well, including autocratic regimes in Cuba and Nicaragua, terrorist and criminal organizations, trafficking, natural disasters, and external actors seeking undue influence over countries' decisions.

For the Department, our partnerships are paramount. We deepen our relationships to address shared challenges and focus on interoperability, intelligence sharing, science and technology cooperation, advancing cyber defenses, and expanding exercises.

We counter illicit trafficking by supporting law enforcement agencies and emphasizing human rights training. We prioritize regional cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and we emphasize defense institution building, because strong institutions and anti-corruption measures encourage efficiency and support legitimate government.

And as we see in Venezuela, the Western Hemisphere is a region of great power competition. We counter Chinese and Russian influence by gaining the trust of our partners to achieve objectives together. Unlike relationships with Russia and China, our cooperation is built on respect, collaboration, and a desire to bolster prosperity and security for all.

With that, I will simply conclude by saying the Department takes a global view of the challenges we face and remains committed to the region. Thank you for your time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. And let me just say, you told me beforehand that your statement would be 2 minutes and it was exactly 2 minutes. That is incredibly impressive in this line of work, so I appreciate that.

General O'Shaughnessy.

STATEMENT OF GEN TERENCE J. O'SHAUGHNESSY, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Chairman Smith and Ranking Member Thornberry and distinguished members of the committee, I am truly honored to be here today as the commander of the United States Northern Command [NORTHCOM] and the U.S.-Canadian

bi-national command, North American Aerospace Defense Command [NORAD].

I am also proud to testify this morning alongside my good friend, Craig Faller, and Craig and the USSOUTHCOM [Southern Command] team are vital partners and continue to bring our commands closer together to better defend our Nation.

And I am also proud to appear with our great OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] partners, Assistant Secretaries Rapuano and Wheelbarger.

USNORTHCOM and NORAD are two complementary but distinct commands driven by a single, unyielding priority: defending the homeland from attack. In this era of rapidly evolving technology and renewed great power competition, the need for energized and active defense of the homeland cannot be overstated.

Revisionist powers of Russia and China have given every indication that their security strategies are based on holding the United States at risk with both conventional and nuclear weapons, and they have signaled that we must anticipate attacks against our civilian and defense infrastructure in the event of a conflict.

Russia has modernized its aviation and submarine fleets and fielded long-range cruise missiles designed to evade radar detection. Russia and China continue their efforts to penetrate our networks while developing and testing hypersonic glide vehicles, and both have also established a noticeably stronger foothold in the Arctic along the northern approaches to the United States and Canada.

As a result, the strategic value of the Arctic as our first line of defense has re-emerged, and USNORTHCOM and NORAD are taking active measures to ensure our ability to detect, track, and defeat potential threats in that region. Our adversaries have engaged in deliberate, focused efforts over a number of years to exploit our perceived weaknesses. As a result, it is clear that our homeland is not a sanctuary.

Our mission to deter our adversaries is dependent on our ability to detect and defeat potential threats to our homeland, and I am grateful to the committee for your strong support of USNORTHCOM and NORAD. Along the lines of the efforts, for example, fielding AESA [active electronically scanned array] radars for our Aerospace Control Alert fighters and improving the capability and capacity of our missile defense sensors and interceptors clearly demonstrates our shared sense of urgency.

In that same spirit, we must take prudent steps now to ensure our next-generation defensive capabilities, to include a space-based sensing layer for missile defense, are not too late to need. We must develop an integrated family of systems, including undersea, terrestrial, airborne, and space-based sensors, with a sense of urgency.

Given the fact that our adversaries are already developing and testing these weapons, time is of the utmost importance. And while the challenges facing us are significant, I have great faith that through collaboration with industry in harnessing the power of innovation in the United States of America, we will restore our competitive advantage and continue to outpace any adversary that might threaten our homeland.

And I sincerely appreciate the committee's work to provide much-needed predictability and stability with an on-time budget in fiscal year 2019. And I am also grateful for the committee's ongoing efforts to ensure that we avoid the devastating, deep-cutting impacts that a return to sequestration would bring to the Department of Defense.

USNORTHCOM and NORAD work every day with our partners to keep our citizens safe while confronting challenges emanating from multiple approaches and in all domains. I especially want to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to the amazing men and women in the National Guard, who are great partners and critical to our ability to perform our missions.

And whether intercepting Russian bombers off the coast of Alaska or providing much-needed support along our Federal law enforcement partners along our southern border, the airmen, soldiers, sailors, Marines, coastguardsmen, and civilians of USNORTHCOM and NORAD are deeply committed to defending our Nation and I am honored to represent them today. And we have the watch.

Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General O'Shaughnessy can be found in the Appendix on page 72.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Admiral Faller.

**STATEMENT OF ADM CRAIG S. FALLER, USN, COMMANDER,
U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND**

Admiral FALLER. Good morning, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thornberry. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today with my shipmates, General O'Shaughnessy, Assistant Secretary of Defense Rapuano, and Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense Wheelbarger. Also, thanks to this committee for the steadfast support you provide our men and women every day.

Western Hemisphere is our shared home, our neighborhood. We are connected to the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean by sheer democratic traditions, culture, and geography. From my headquarters in Doral, Florida, it takes me longer to travel to DC than it does to many countries in my area of responsibility.

We are connected to our neighbors in every domain—sea, air, land, space, and cyber. And, most importantly, shared values.

Only by working together can we meet current and future global challenges. Ultimately, what we want is enemies to fear us, friends to partner with us, and the Western Hemisphere to shine as a beacon of peace, democracy, and prosperity.

To ensure the security of our homeland, SOUTHCOM works closely with our interagency teammates from the Department of State, USAID, Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Justice, to name just a few. This teamwork, especially with Northern Command and the U.S. Coast Guard, is critical to mission accomplishment.

Over the past 5 months, I have travelled throughout Central America, South America, and the Caribbean to get a firsthand view of the opportunities and the challenges that directly impact the security of our hemisphere and our homeland. Criminal organizations, narco-trafficking, illegal migration, violent extremist, corrup-

tion all enabled by weak governments are principal among these challenges.

The most disturbing insight, however, that I have garnered in my time in command has been the degree to which external state actors have been rapidly expanding their presence and influence in the Western Hemisphere; across the world to include in our neighborhood democratic values are under assault by China, Russia, and Iran. So, how do we best counter these threats to our neighborhood?

Security cooperation is our best tool, to continue building on the strong partnerships in the region and turn the challenges of the hemisphere into opportunities. Our partners are doing great things every day. In this hemisphere, in our neighborhood, a little goes a long way. We need the right focus and consistent military presence. We cannot achieve positive results and influence outcomes without being on the playing field.

But every security challenge and threat in our hemisphere is compounded by the crisis in Venezuela. Russia provides lifelines through loans, technical and military support, and rhetoric. China is Venezuela's single largest state creditor, saddling the Venezuelan people with more than \$50 billion in debt and exporting surveillance technology used to monitor and repress the Venezuelan people.

Iran is restoring direct flights from Tehran and reinvigorated diplomatic ties. Ever-present Cuba provides critical personnel and resources to prop up a corrupt and illegitimate dictator. In the face of this malign influence, the rest of the world unites in support of Venezuela's legitimate leader, Interim President Guaidó.

A transition to legitimate democracy is underway and I have a message for the professionals in the Venezuelan military and security forces. The brutal dictatorship of Maduro has led to this man-made crisis. Cuba and Russia have invaded your country and disgraced your sovereignty.

You have a chance to do the right thing and alleviate the suffering of your people and your families, those you have sworn an oath to protect. When a legitimate democracy has been restored, we look forward to having you return to the profession of arms, including attendance in United States military training and education.

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Thornberry, thank you again for the opportunity to testify. The SOUTHCOM team, our civilians, and military members, and our families appreciate the support Congress has provided. We will continue to honor your trust and our fellow citizens have placed in us.

I look forward to your questions.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Faller can be found in the Appendix on page 97.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, all.

Admiral, I will start with you, and picking up where you left off on Venezuela. What is sort of the military's role in what is going on down there because I agree with your statement that Maduro is not a legitimate president. We need to have a transition to a, you know, true democracy and legitimate leader in Venezuela.

I am concerned, though, that we would think that there is some sort of role of the U.S. military, given our history down there and given what we have learned about using the military to sort of change governments. What role do you see for our military in what is going on in Venezuela and where do you see the limits of that role?

Admiral FALLER. We have been focused on working with our regional partners, intelligence sharing, information sharing, gathering and generate a shared appreciation for the complexities associated with a problem: the impacts both in Venezuela; the horrific starvation, over 90 percent of population starving; and the impacts of security with partners, and we are looking a way to apply our security assistance in a mutually beneficial way, that has been the primary line of effort.

Secondary line of effort has been focused on planning for non-combatant evacuation and protection of American citizens and lives within Venezuela. Prudent planning, as you would expect, Chairman, for a combatant commander. The look in support of USAID was mentioned by our colleagues here. USAID, we have supported the delivery of humanitarian aid, and we are working and planning with USAID.

And then, more broadly, we are looking at a day after when we have a democratic Venezuela. How do we work with their militaries and security cooperation that is representative of a normal mil-to-mil relationship? Those have been of our priorities, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But you do not see a role for the U.S. military in actually overthrowing the Maduro government, correct?

Admiral FALLER. Our leadership has been clear. It should be primarily a democratic transition. We are in total support of the diplomacy and we stand ready to support that effort, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And one final question, sir, on the sanctions. Obviously, Venezuela has many challenges. You have outlined some of them. What role do you see U.S. sanctions on Venezuela having played in the economic difficulties that are there? And how do you balance sort of the pressure we want to put on the regime to change with the potential impact of those sanctions?

Admiral FALLER. The misery of the people of Venezuela came about as a result of the illegitimate dictator's actions and inept way with which he has run the country, and China and Cuba's complete inclusion in that problem set. The sanctions have been a necessary tool to help apply pressure to accelerate the diplomatic efforts. The misery began and ends with Maduro.

The CHAIRMAN. And it is worth noting that, you know, much like Putin in Russia, huge part of problem is that Maduro and his cronies take all the money. They don't care about the people whatsoever. They are, you know, running a kleptocracy there, and the people are the ones who are paying the price for that.

Couple of quick questions on the border side of it—and I will shift over to the—the policy folks. It seems, you know, if you go back before the Trump administration started implementing its immigration policies, we are in much worse shape now than we were when that started. Do you see any connection between a variety of those policies and what is happening on the border? And if so, have

you started to talk about how you might do things differently? And I guess that is for Mr. Rapuano.

Secretary RAPUANO. So we do not deeply assess the causation in terms of the desire of individuals to immigrate to the United States and how that contributes to illegal immigration. Our support is to Department of Homeland Security, which is responsible for that mission, and we are providing support in that role, the support that is appropriate for the Department of Defense to provide.

The CHAIRMAN. But surely, you are around for the conversations about what policy might make sense. So I am just curious, you know, as someone who is involved in this and the Department of Defense is now deeply into what is going on in the border because Homeland Security has asked for a lot of money and a lot of human resources. What is your thought about how we can adjust that policy to improve the situation?

Secretary RAPUANO. Well, I can certainly say the administration has been very focused on looking at the diplomatic, the legal, the engagement with nations that are the primary sources of illegal immigration to the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. The only thing I have heard is the administration talking about how they want to cut off money from those places, which doesn't strike me as a particularly productive approach. So, if you could drill down a little bit, what is the administration doing to try to look at—in specifically Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador—to say how can we help them towards a more stable, less desperate situation?

Secretary RAPUANO. Well I really cannot speak for the administration's efforts associated with engaging with the countries south of the border. That is outside of my portfolio and my writ.

The CHAIRMAN. Anybody else want to take a stab at it?

Ms. WHEELBARGER. I will say it from the perspective of the regional policy shop in OSD, we continue to focus on security cooperation efforts with Central American countries. The President has made a decision with respect to looking at our cooperation in the region.

But from the DOD perspective, DOD activities are going to continue forward because the mil-to-mil relationships, we find—and I will defer to Admiral Faller as well—are a significant source of security and stability in those countries but in the region at large—

The CHAIRMAN. And I guess that is the point I want to make. There are other tools in our toolbox other than the military. In fact, we are already confronting this with the request for more mil-to-mil cooperation around Venezuela, whereas the cutoff on State Department and the USAID remains in place.

I just, frankly, do not get this administration's complete and total blind spot towards the notion that international affairs involve more than just the military. That USAID and diplomatic—you know, cutting them off and focusing only on the military, saying to Central America we are not going to give you any more money, just encourages more people to flow forward.

That is more a message for you to deliver back to the people at the White House than anything you need to answer, but it is contributing to the problem because, the irony for me is, when the

President started talking about there being an emergency at the border, there wasn't.

Now there is, and I think the two are connected, so I hope we will figure out those policies because nobody on this committee wants the Department of Defense to have to have their resources drained out to go to Department of Homeland Security missions. And DOD has enough to do. So we are in serious trouble down there, and we need to figure out how to better confront it.

I want to give General O'Shaughnessy and Admiral Faller a chance if you have any response, any ideas for how we can improve that situation. Don't go on for too long because I am over my time and I want to turn it over to somebody else. But just curious if you have any quick thoughts on that.

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Chairman, I would just say, from our vantage point, we have a role to support our CBP [U.S. Customs and Border Protection] partners. And from the NORTHCOM perspective, we are executing that role in the mission that we have been given to support CBP.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay.

Admiral FALLER. I will be in Honduras Monday next week as co-host of a Central America security conference with all the Central American countries, including some of the—the neighbors. This will be a topic of what we can do working mutually together to better the security of both our countries and the United States homeland.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Again, I hope we can include more folks than just on the security side. There is a very complex humanitarian problem down there. I think there are a lot of tools in our toolbox. We have a lot of, you know, allies and neighbors throughout the region who could help. We need to start employing all of those tools because it is a serious situation, as we all know.

Mr. Thornberry.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Admiral, I appreciate the statement you made, particularly at the end, making an appeal to the Venezuelan military. It seems to me that a relatively small number of people have the future of their country in their hands.

One of these days, the Venezuelan people are going to have a say. And the question is, how long the suffering has got to go on. And there are folks now who are making decisions for which they may be held accountable someday. And so, I appreciate that appeal.

General, I wanted to ask you briefly, you mentioned space-based sensors. Can you just, again, briefly describe why it is important that we have space-based sensors to defend the homeland?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Thank you for that opportunity. Clearly, as we look at the advanced threats that we are facing, both from Russia and China, they are of a changing nature. And our current sensors that we have are just not situated to be able to be effective against that. Part of it is just a pure—the track that a weapon would take is not conducive to a terrestrial-based sensing grid.

And therefore, if we look at the space-based sensors, it gives you the opportunity, for example, a hypersonic track, that you could maintain the track from birth to death, right? You could see it from the time it launched to the time that we are able to take that out

with an interceptor or directed energy or some sort of ability to defend against it.

Right now, if we just put more money into just what we are doing today, with the terrestrial-based sensors, we will never get to the point where we can actively defend against them. So, the space-based sensing layer, to me, is absolutely critical if we are going to be able to defend against these advanced threats.

Mr. THORNBERRY. I appreciate it. I suspect there is more detail we can get into in a classified session, but I think that is helpful.

Mr. Rapuano, chairman said this—I think we all agree—we face an unprecedented situation at the border. The Border Patrol is completely overwhelmed. Reports this week are that military folks are going to be asked to do more tasks at the border than they have been doing before.

My question to you is, why can we not use contractors for these support activities that we are now asking the military to do? Any time any of us visit Afghanistan, other places around the world, a lot of the people doing the cooking, the cleaning, the driving, monitoring sensors are often contractors. Why can't we use contractors?

Secretary RAPUANO. Sir, the Department of Homeland Security and CBP have been using contractors. But what they describe to us is there is a practical limit in terms of availability of contractors in the areas where they seek to have the work done and the timelines associated with getting those contractors on-task.

In addition to that, there are certain functions that are DOD military capabilities. Sensors, the barrier construction in terms of the concertina wire, for which we do have ready capabilities. In the other areas—and you described some of them, in terms of the logistics management for migrant processing—that are not necessarily a lead military skill, but it certainly is a capability that we can provide in exigent circumstances, such as being experienced today.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, I hope that as DOD considers requests from the Department of Homeland Security that you look at, independently, the availability of contractors to perform some of these functions, especially as the task-ask of our military expand.

I know we can do it. The question is, are U.S. military people the best entity to be deploying wire? As I say, contractors run sensors all over the world and the other logistical support. I think that is maybe a better way forward than to continue to expand the job of our military. I yield back.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank our witnesses for your testimony today and your service to the country. Just to follow up on the chairman's discussion on Venezuela, just so we are clear. First of all, I agree with where the discussion was going, that we need to apply maximum diplomatic pressure and resolve the situation within Venezuela diplomatically.

But just so we don't leave anything hanging out there, we are not missing something, have any of you in any way, shape, or form been given instruction by your leadership to prepare for any type military conflict? I just want to make sure that we are clear on that. So, pre-positioning troops or any kind of forces? Can we run down the line?

Ms. WHEELBARGER. We, of course, always review available options and plan for contingencies. But in this case, we have not been given the sort of orders that you are discussing, no.

Mr. LANGEVIN. General, Admiral, or Mr. Secretary?

Admiral FALLER. The mission sets that I discussed with respect to the chairman's question, our principal focus, really focusing on building those partnerships, leveraging our partners, making sure that whatever happens in the future—and we know we won't be able to predict it, that we are ready to approach this together as a united region and working with our military. It has been our principal line of focus.

Mr. LANGEVIN. General.

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Sir, we are in support of Admiral Faller in the SOUTHCOM aspect, but nothing directly. Just helping Admiral Faller.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. Mr. Secretary, anything you want to add?

Secretary RAPUANO. No. Nothing to add.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. Thanks. Okay. Thank you. Just wanted to get that on the record.

General O'Shaughnessy, if I could? I am pleased the DHS has assigned a liaison officer to NORTHCOM headquarters, and I hope that the interagency partnership will enhance the resilience of U.S. critical infrastructure, particularly in a time of crisis.

What I wanted to ask is how are you and your counterparts institutionalizing the relationship, though, so it is not just personality-driven or public-attention-driven, and that you are exercising the various scenarios under which CISA [Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency] may call on NORTHCOM for support?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Well, thank you for the opportunity to highlight the close coordination and collaboration we have with the Department of Homeland Security and specifically with respect to CISA.

As you mentioned, literally within the first week of it standing up, we actually had exchanged liaisons back and forth that are full-time within each other's headquarters. And these are well-seasoned professionals who truly understand the nature of the threats that we face.

Part of the way, as we go forward, is we are inserting ourselves and have inserted ourselves inside the battle rhythm of each other's headquarters. And so, every day we have integration and coordination in the various issues that we are working.

Under Secretary Nielsen—and we will continue on, no doubt, with Acting Secretary McAleenan. I actually met with them on a—on a biweekly basis where we talked about not only support to the border but things like we are doing to support the critical infrastructure.

And to the point of, how do we institutionalize it? We are bringing it into our exercises. We are bringing into both our annual exercises as well as the longer-term exercises to make sure that we do it all the way from a tabletop exercise to a full interagency exercise. That we do this together because you simply can't separate homeland defense and homeland security. They are intertwined in ways that we need to collaborate together. Not on a one-off event, not when a crisis happens, but every day.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Excellent. Thank you. The exercising part of that is essential, I agree especially. How are you working with U.S. CYBERCOM [Cyber Command] also to ensure that it is prepared to support you if you are called upon in a DSCA [Defense Support of Civil Authorities] role and I am thinking particularly of coordination with the national mission teams?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Yes. Thank you for that. We have a kind of twofold interaction with our Cyber Command in this area. One is for our own systems, right? We have our own systems designed to defend the United States and Canada that we want to make sure are able to survive any attacks, any attempts to take them down not only in crisis but day to day.

And so, we have a day-to-day engagement with Cyber Command and their cyber teams that are actually in support of us on a regular basis. We have two actively engaged as we speak right now.

In addition to that, though, as we look at the broader protection of the Nation, we also, to your point, use the DSCA model of how we can work with Cyber Command to present that force to both our state—for example, within the elections was an example, in 2018, how we present the force throughout the Nation, both on a critical infrastructure, things like election.

And that DSCA model with us is essentially the DOD synchronizer, has proven to be quite effective in hurricanes, wildfires, and so we are approaching that with the same model as we look at the cyber. And we have had great success already and look forward to maturing that as we go forward.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you very much.

Secretary RAPUANO. I would just add to that that, at the departmental level, the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security now have a memorandum of agreement signed last year by Secretary Madison, Secretary Nielsen in which we are working with them across the board, starting with defense critical infrastructure, as well as civil infrastructure, how are we prioritizing between the Department of Defense and DHS and the sector lead agencies. And then how are we looking at where and how we support them best—

The CHAIRMAN. I am sorry. The gentleman's time has expired. And I apologize. Should have warned the witnesses. We try to keep it to 5 minutes. I will not cut you off in mid-sentence or anything. But once we hit 5 minutes, we do try to move on to other folks, even if you are in mid-question. At that point, we take it for the record. If you have an answer you want to submit to the member, you can do that then.

Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. And thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank each of you for being here and your service to our country.

Admiral Faller, I am grateful for the relationship of the U.S. Southern Command maintains with the Republic of Colombia as part of the National Guard State Sponsorship Program.

Since 2012, South Carolina and Colombia have partnered to enhance military cooperation with the rotary wing and air defense capabilities. As Colombia continues to expand its NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] Global Partner, how do you judge the strategies for Plan Colombia? Specifically, what are the invest-

ments DOD is making to combat terrorist activities and drug trafficking to continue the successes?

Admiral FALLER. We will start with the South Carolina Guard, a fantastic partner. In fact, they are down there this week working with the Colombians. They will be down later this summer for an air defense exercise with some of high-end capability exercising with Colombians. And we are very appreciative of the National Guard, what they do across the range of security cooperation. It is absolutely a wonderful partnership.

Colombia, their military and security forces are making a difference. And they are taking the attack to the narcotraffickers. They are taking it to the ELN [National Liberation Army], the FARC [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia] dissidents. And the results that we will see and the eradication plateau in coca production, high interdiction rates, these are going to have an impact on both the internal security of Colombia and the United States security.

A very capable partner, I have the utmost trust for the Colombian armed forces and what they do as professionals and what they do in terms of their warfighting ability.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much.

And Ms. Wheelbarger, Russia and China are expanding their presence in Latin America. They are using economic and military influence to strategically compete against the U.S. in this vital region and systematically engage with the autocratic regimes.

Admiral Faller has already cited Russia and Cuba are increasing military intelligence activities in Venezuela. What types of equipment, aircraft, or capabilities are you most concerned about?

Ms. WHEELBARGER. I will defer to Admiral Faller for the specific technical concerns. But in terms of Russia and Chinese influence who are at large in the region, we are very focused on countering that influence with our own productive activities with building partner capacity.

As I discussed in the opening, our National Defense Strategy encourages us as a department to look at these as global threats. And that includes countering the influence in our hemisphere. Therefore, we are consistently and continuously looking for opportunities to build our partners and build new relationships, and we have significant opportunity right now to do so.

With respect to their specific activity in Venezuela, as it was cited at the beginning this morning with respect to Secretary Pompeo's statements, it is not just technical concerns that we have, but it is just the overall influence that they can have and bear on the decision making of these countries. And that is why we, as an international community, call on Russia and China, in particular, to cease their support to the Maduro regime.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you. General O'Shaughnessy, the North American Aerospace Command is improving the defense coverage for the National Capital Region. The South Carolina National Guard currently has personnel in the region to support this mission. What is your timeline of the three-phase plan to expand the National Capital Region architecture to protect the rest of the country? And are you working with our neighbor, Canada?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Yes. Thank you for the question. And as you highlight, the Guard participation in all the defense within NORAD and NORTHCOM is significant. An example you used, the National Capital Region, as we sit right here today we have guardsmen protecting us literally as we sit here today. And so, my hat is off to the great support that we get from them.

Now, with respect to, specifically, the Homeland Defense design, Phase I and Phase II are actually funded, and Phase I in place, Phase II ongoing now. As we look to Phase III, it becomes significantly more complicated as the threat has continued to develop as well.

And so, we are continuing to refine what that Homeland Defense design should look like going into the future with the advanced threats, hypersonics, et cetera, cruise missiles that we know we have to defend against. And we are using the basis from the Homeland Defense Phase I and II as the starting point, but in a much more complicated and complex manner to defend both the United States and Canada.

Mr. WILSON. And the level of synchronization with Canada?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Extreme. NORAD's 60 years of history of the great relationship with NORAD and the modernization within NORAD, we are trying to look bi-nationally. I can submit for the record some studies that we are doing bi-nationally with Canada, in the interest of time, but we are looking at this together with Canada.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Larsen.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you.

General, the Coast Guard came out with their Arctic strategy a few weeks ago. It was called Protecting Sovereignty. The administration, under General Mattis at the time, said that you had an updated military strategy in June. Will we have that by June?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. I will defer to OSD on that. We have been working with the OSD office that is working that strategy.

Mr. LARSEN. All right. OSD, is it going to be done by June?

Ms. WHEELBARGER. I currently understand that it will be. I was seeing sort of final deliberations over the last couple of weeks. So we will get you an update if we think it is going to not be delayed for any reason.

Mr. LARSEN. Please do that. Thank you.

Back to General, then. Could you talk a little bit—in your testimony on pages 11 through 12-ish or so, you are the duty advocate for Arctic capabilities and combatant commander response for defending approach to the homeland. Rather than getting into what Russia and China are doing, could you just review your testimony a little bit for us on what we are doing?

The Arctic has been, obviously, of interest for us for a long time. What are doing that isn't in response to Russia and China? What are we doing because we ought to be doing it for the—for our own reasons?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Right. And really, as we look at the Arctic, it is a very difficult operating environment. And so we feel that we need the ability to operate in that environment. And so,

for example, the working we are doing in the JPARC [Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex] range in Alaska gives us the ability to train our force in ways that we haven't been getting after for the last several decades.

If you look at the work that we are doing, the U.S. Navy, for example, sail the *Harry S. Truman* in the high north that we hadn't in literally decades. And so, we are really trying to—from exposing our team—our airmen, soldiers, sailors, Marines—to that environment and making sure that we are prepared to operate.

Just last week, I personally went out to Thule Air Base in Greenland, I went up to Inuvik and higher areas of Canada and I will tell you firsthand, those conditions that we are going to ask our force to operate in are extreme and you can't go there without the adequate preparation and training.

The second thing we are looking on is actually, what do we need to be able to operate there? So we look at domain awareness, we look at our ability to communicate. Many of the traditional means of communication simply don't work in the Arctic. We are looking at our ability to sustain those operations there so that once we have the training, we will have the ability to actually have a force with an infrastructure that will actually support them in a sustained way.

The way we are looking to advocate for that is we are working closely with EUCOM [U.S. European Command] and PACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command] so that we can be the lead, but it is not something that is just done alone at NORTHCOM and NORAD. It is done in coordination with our sister combatant commands, but it is also done, for example, with the Coast Guard.

And as they are looking to get the heavy icebreaker, critically important for us. And so, it is that coordination and doing these things together. We are running symposiums. We are trying to be a little bit of the vocal advocate for it, not only within DOD but within the interagency as well. And we will continue to take those measures.

Mr. LARSEN. How are you using the CONUS [contiguous United States] bases as platforms for deployment?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Well, I think as we look at some of the places here within the CONUS, we have, for example, the Air National Guard, the 109th, has the LC-130s that have capability that is absolutely critical for us. And so, being able to use that—in fact, they were up at Greenland last week as well. They are up there for about a 4-month tour. They will also go down to Antarctica. But making sure we use that capability and that expertise.

Now, as far as other bases within the U.S. in the CONUS, we try to take advantage of some of the experiences that we have, that we can leverage forward. What we see right now is that—look at, for example, some of the operations that we see are just a lack of experience of being in those environments.

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. Thanks.

So, Secretary Wheelbarger, we will expect then—maybe just by the end of the week get us an update on a more precise timeline?

Ms. WHEELBARGER. Yes. We will get you an update by the end of the week.

Mr. LARSEN. That would be great. Thank you.

And I will yield back to myself and recognize Mrs. Hartzler for 5 minutes.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Well, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General O'Shaughnessy, the F-15C fleet based within the U.S. is tasked with, as you know, supporting our top mission of defending the homeland. And the Air Force plans to refresh the F-15C fleet with the F-15EX and has requested funding for eight aircraft in the fiscal year 2020 budget. So, how would bringing advanced F-15s into these units impact NORTHCOM in terms of the capacity and capabilities available for the homeland defense?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Ma'am, I think you know, the Air Force has very publicly talked about they need 72 aircraft a year in their procurement in order to sustain and grow the Air Force to the size that it needs to be. We are one of those requirements, right? We are one of the forcing agents for the U.S. Air Force to respond to that demand signal.

And so, we are very supportive of the work that they are doing to maintain a capability and capacity to support all of the requirements. We also understand that they are committed to fifth-gen and that hasn't changed as we do go forward. But as we look at the readiness capability of a sustained fourth-gen fleet, it needs to be refreshed and, as such, we are looking forward to continuing to work with the Air Force, make sure they provide us with the capability and capacity we need, and we support the Air Force's initiatives going forward.

Mrs. HARTZLER. So, you support their plan to buy more F-15Es?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. We are fairly agnostic to the platform in the sense of a capacity that we need them to have, and so I do support General Goldfein, Secretary Wilson in the approach that they have taken to have both readiness and capability and capacity available for us as a combatant commander.

Mrs. HARTZLER. So the Air Force has testified that converting the F-15C squadrons to the F-15EX will better support the needs of the Air Force and combatant commands by minimizing the downtime of mission conversion. Compared to the years it would take to convert to an entirely new platform, the Air Force believes units transitioning between F-15 variants would take just months. Looking at the forces available to NORTHCOM today, how important is that mission conversion timeline to meeting your requirements?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Well, ma'am, the service will be ultimately responsible for that but what we can't afford is a gap, right? We cannot have a gap in the capability and the capacity. As we sit here today, you know, we have five different F-15 units that support us within NORAD. It is an important platform for us. And in the end, we can't afford to have any detriment in the capacity or capability that we have supporting NORAD.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. In your written testimony, you discussed the challenges of unmanned aerial systems in the U.S. airspace and the importance of the authorities provided to DOJ [Department of Justice] and DHS in the recent FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] Reauthorization Act. DOD has also received counter UAS [unmanned aircraft system] authorities in both the fiscal year 2017 and fiscal year 2018 NDAA's [National Defense Authorization

Acts]. How is NORTHCOM using the granted DOD authorities and have any gaps been identified from a COCOM [combatant command] perspective?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Ma'am, I would first like to start by thanking you and your team for the great support that we have had with respect to these authorities over the last several years. And not only for the DOD because it is an important aspect for us, for our authorities. But, as you mentioned, the interagency is equally as important.

And so as we work closely with Department of Homeland Security and as you worked to help get them the similar authorities that we have within DOD, that has been extremely helpful. The example I use is right here within the National Capital Region where we are working closely with many sub organizations within DHS, but also DOJ, the Capitol Police, the local police, and the individual services, as we work an exercise here in about 2 weeks to try to bring all that together. And it is very complex.

And so, it is a question of the authorities we have and then the tools and the kit that we have to actually defeat any threat that we have with the counter UAS. So the exercises that we are doing are driving us to better understand if there are additional authorities or requirements that we might have and we will stay in close coordination and collaboration with your team and this committee as we go forth to speak with more authorities that we will be seeking.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Yes. Appreciate your work on that, and look forward to continuing to work with you on it because it is such a very important mission. And lastly, another question. I am proud to, as you know, represent Fort Leonard Wood in my district, which contributes vital capabilities to NORTHCOM by training service members for specialties such as military police and the CBRN [chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear] response.

In your written testimony, you discussed NORTHCOM's defense support of civil authority's mission and provided many examples of interagency coordination. Can you talk in more detail about coordination and training activities among DOD CBRN specialists and civilian CBRN experts aimed at protecting the homeland?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Yes, ma'am. And let me first thank you. Actually, Fort Leonard Wood is—is instrumental to our ability to have this capability. We have about 18,000 personnel at any given time that are committed to the chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response efforts. We have 57 CST [civil support team] or teams that are designed within the States to be able to respond.

To a person, they are trained at Fort Leonard Wood. And it is also—the training they do is also within the interagency and the local law enforcement officials and the first responders that they will work with. And so, I know we are short on time, but I will just say, absolutely critical and we would not be able to do it without the expertise resident there and it is not—

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

General O'SHAUGHNESSY [continuing]. Just within DOD but within—

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

General O'SHAUGHNESSY [continuing]. The broader response.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you—

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Courtney.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all the witnesses for being here today. Again, looking at the, sort of, mission of Southern Command—and I think it has been referenced by some prior remarks. Obviously, the migration issue, in terms of where there is instability, is certainly the issue of the day. The administration's decision to cut aid to the Northern Triangle countries, again, I think has just totally flabbergasted people in terms of, you know, how that possibly helped stabilize that situation.

Mr. Chairman, I have a statement that was signed by five combatant commanders of the U.S. Southern Command—General Craddock, General Hill, General McCaffery, Admiral Stavridis, General Wilhelm—who all basically make the point that the solution, in terms of the drivers that cause people to leave their country and move north, that cutting aid to the region will only increase the drivers and will be even more costly to deal with our border. I would ask that it be admitted to the record.

The CHAIRMAN. That is five former combatant commanders.

Mr. COURTNEY. Correct.

The CHAIRMAN. But, yes, without objection, so ordered.

[The statement referred to was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. Yes. No slight intended, Admiral. And I want to thank you for being here today. It is good to see you back on the Hill.

Again, maybe Ms. Wheelbarger or Mr. Rapuano can respond to that question.

How on earth cutting aid—which doesn't go to the governments. They actually go to NGOs [non-governmental organizations], faith-based groups, you know, all the folks who are trying to help individuals who are definitely in crisis in economies and almost failed states in those regions.

How that is going to help us at the border deal with this problem?

Ms. WHEELBARGER. I will just start by saying, as I explained before, we are continuing our mil-to-mil and MOD [Ministry of Defense] to DOD partnerships in the region as much as we can. You know, we will inevitably be impacted somewhat by the ending or the pausing of State Department support.

We agree that it is important to do all we can to bring stability and security to the regions, both to the Central Region but also around the hemisphere. And that a key part of that, again, is an interagency process that uses a whole-of-government approach. I think our perspective is that we will be reviewing what our security cooperation is in light of the decision and reviewing foreign assistance writ large in the region over the coming weeks and months.

Mr. COURTNEY. Well, as those former combatant commanders stated pretty powerfully is that military alone cannot strengthen the investments for development and the other whole of government has to be part of the effort. Otherwise, you know, you are

just, you know, chasing something that you will never catch in terms of trying to deal with this issue.

Admiral, we talked yesterday about the flow of drugs into our country, particularly in New England, which has been hard hit by the addiction issue. Maybe you could talk a little bit about your efforts with the Coast Guard, in terms of interdiction.

Admiral FALLER. The drugs and the deaths as a result of drugs in this—

Mr. COURTNEY. Right.

Admiral FALLER [continuing]. Country is certainly a national security crisis. The flow of those drugs—cocaine principally from Colombia, heroin from Mexico, and then fentanyl from China and other sources—all mix together in a concoction that is killing our citizens.

The Coast Guard is our number one partner. And our Joint Interagency Task Force South in Key West, we have 20 partner nations and all elements of the U.S. Government laser-focused on this across both the NORTHCOM and the SOUTHCOM boundaries because, as you know, sir, the drug traffickers know no seams. They exploit them.

The Coast Guard's presence any given day is six to eight cutters, assets beyond that, and our Navy's now stepping up. This fall, we will have a littoral combat ship. But keep in mind, we are talking about covering an area the size of the United States with from 6 to 10 ships. And so the interdiction percentage with the current assets we have is about 6 percent of the detections.

So we need more ships, we need more intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to include maritime patrol aircraft. The Navy's contributed two P-8s. The Customs and Borders Protection has some P-3s in the hunt. And those are our critical needs.

Mr. COURTNEY. And you mentioned the littoral combat ship as being an additional asset that maybe can be brought to this mission. I mean, could you talk quickly about where that stands.

Admiral FALLER. We will get our—

The CHAIRMAN. By quickly, he means 5 seconds.

Admiral FALLER. We will get our first one this fall. The Navy needs more ships. We welcome those ships in SOUTHCOM.

The CHAIRMAN. Very good.

Mr. Lamborn.

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for being here.

General O'Shaughnessy, always good to see you and welcome to our community. I would like to ask a question about missile defense, and then a more Colorado-based question. But, first of all—

And, Mr. Rapuano, if you want to weigh in on this, also, you would be welcome to. Given that the Redesigned Kill Vehicle [RKV] schedule continues to slide to the right, do you think it makes sense to consider next-generation solutions—and I am thinking of the MOKV, the Multiple Object Kill Vehicle—because the threat is out there and we don't want to get caught with the threats—not being able to address the threats? So, MOKV, should we start working on that and accelerate our work on that?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Well, thank you, sir. First, I would say, with respect to the RKV, I do have a concern, as you would expect, from the operational perspective of the delay as it hit the critical design review and was not ready to move forward. So, we have been working closely with General Greaves, MDA [Missile Defense Agency], in fact, immediately after that was highlighted.

I went down to the headquarters personally, met not only with General Greaves but the technical experts to better understand not just the RKV but the broader system of systems and things that we could do. From my perspective, I am very concerned about the overall capacity and capability.

In other words, if we look at North Korea as an example, there is a capability that we need to have to be able to intercept any missiles they shoot, but there is also a capacity that we need to maintain. And so we want to make sure that, between the radars, between the kill vehicles, that we maintain ahead of that capacity.

So, without getting into technical discussion, which, of course, would have to go classified, I would say it is really a bit of both. In other words, I don't know that you can just skip the RKV, but certainly the MOKV needs to be continued to be pursued because, as you highlighted, it does give you the ability to go after multiple objects. And so, I think as we go forward, we can have a follow-on discussion in classified, but I do believe we need to continue to pursue the RKV but also look at the MOKV—

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay.

General O'SHAUGHNESSY [continuing]. MOKV going forward.

Mr. LAMBORN. Well, thank you, General.

Mr. Rapuano, would you want to weigh in on that?

Secretary RAPUANO. I think General O'Shaughnessy covered it quite well. It is really what the trade space is in terms of time as well as capabilities between RKV and MOKV. And those are the things that we are looking at because we see adversaries continuing to develop their capabilities, but we want to make sure that the trade we make is a balanced trade.

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Thank you.

And lastly, General O'Shaughnessy, I want to ask you about a Colorado-specific question. As you know, in northwest Colorado, we have the HAATS site, or the High-Altitude Army and National Guard Aviation Training Site, and that is on public land. There has been legislation introduced by some of the Colorado delegation to declare large areas of Colorado wilderness.

And I am sure this is unintentional, but it could have the effect of shutting down that aviation training site because wilderness use is very limited, very stringently controlled. So, do you have concerns about this legislation, which is H.R. 823, and how it might affect the HAATS site and affect firefighting as well?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Yes. Thank you, sir. I don't have a direct involvement in that as a NORTHCOM or NORAD, but I clearly understand the dilemma that this would put us in within the services. And so, I would look forward to working with your team going forward to see if there is something we can do together to address this issue.

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. We will stay in touch with you on that. It is a work in progress. I just wanted to get you to weigh in on that because it is a concern in our State.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Garamendi.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Faller, you indicated that one of your responsibilities is drug interdiction. Is that correct?

Admiral FALLER. It is detection, monitoring, and then the interdiction as well, yes, sir.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. How do most drugs enter the United States?

Admiral FALLER. Most drugs come through the United States crossing in through Central America, up through Mexico, across border, and also through the other means—containers, the mails, the ports—particularly the fentanyl, which has been the latest trend.

Mr. GARAMENDI. How about the oceans or the Caribbean and the Pacific?

Admiral FALLER. Sir, both the Caribbean and the Pacific are high transit areas as the drugs flow out of—

Mr. GARAMENDI. Those drugs that enter from Mexico, enter through the ports of entry or through unsealed border—

Admiral FALLER. Sir, I would defer to General O'Shaughnessy on the entry.

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Sir, I would say both. And as we work with our Customs and Border Protection, we certainly see it through the ports of entry, we certainly see it through the containers, but we also see it through the open border.

Mr. GARAMENDI. I see. How best can we spend \$6 to \$8 billion? On border fences, or on Coast Guard activities, littoral combat ships, improvement of our detection at the port of entries? How would we best spend \$6 to \$8 billion?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Sir, from my perspective it is not one silver bullet that is going to defeat this threat to our Nation.

Mr. GARAMENDI. So, how much would you apply to border walls versus ports of entry?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. I would defer to policy on the specifics of that, but what I would say is—

Mr. GARAMENDI. And the policy, Mr.—

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Really needs to be a little bit of everything.

Secretary RAPUANO. So, border barriers is one approach in terms of—

Mr. GARAMENDI. No. The question was, where would we best spend the money?

Secretary RAPUANO. So, if we were solely considering counter-narcotics as the primary function that we are investing in and addressing versus all the other dynamics associated with the border?

Mr. GARAMENDI. My question is, drugs. How best could we spend the money?

Secretary RAPUANO. Well, I can't speak—

Mr. GARAMENDI. Would you spend it on the Coast Guard, would you spend it on ports of entry, or would you spend it on walls?

Secretary RAPUANO. I don't have the counterdrug portfolio—

Mr. GARAMENDI. It is your task. You are not going to answer the question?

Secretary RAPUANO. No. I simply don't have the information to answer the question in terms of looking at drugs solely versus looking at border security or operational control of the border, which are two primary—

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. But you are not answering the question. Could you please provide me with the data? Thank you.

General O'Shaughnessy, we have missile threats, we have cyber threats. What is the most imminent of those two threats?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Sir, I think the near term, cyber threats are happening every day. Quite literally. That said, I do have significant concern on the kinetic or missile threats as well.

Mr. GARAMENDI. So, cyber threat is the most imminent, that is, here and now?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Yes, sir.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Okay. And with regard to the cyber threat, amongst those threats, what is the most imminent of those threats?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Sir, I think as we look at what is happening every day within our infrastructure—when I say our infrastructure I mean as a Nation, not as the Department of Defense, clearly, we see both Russia, China working in malicious ways.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Okay. Including things like elections. Therefore, where should we apply our money and our talent and task? To the immediate problem or to the long-term problem? I understand we will probably do both, but is there a relationship?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Well, again, sir, I do believe it is not one silver bullet that is going to take care of all the threats that we are faced with. So, it is both. I know from our Cyber Command is working diligently on the cyber threat.

Mr. GARAMENDI. I guess the point—thank you. And I will just get back on it here. We have an imminent threat, immediate threat. We need to attend to that immediately. The long-term threat, missile defense and so forth, are also out there. I understand that.

What is the single point of failure in the American system of our electronic systems? It is GPS [Global Positioning System]. It has been identified by the Federal Government for the last 25 years as the single point of failure. We lose GPS, these lights go out, your cellphone won't work, nothing will work. Most of the military equipment won't work. Is there a backup system to GPS?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. And, sir, what I would like to do, is address that in a classified environment with you.

Mr. GARAMENDI. My time is out. The answer is there is one available but does not yet exist and it is a problem for the continental United States. It is called E-LORAN [Enhanced Long-Range Navigation].

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Byrne.

Mr. BYRNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, lady and gentlemen, for being here and thank you for the work that you do. I wasn't here earlier, and you may have already addressed this—and

if you did, if you would just quickly summarize it. But I would like to know, from your perspective—I know you are not the Department of State—where we are today with regard to the situation in Venezuela.

Ms. WHEELBARGER. I will start. I think, from our perspective, we continue to see the policy and our strategy of multilateral international diplomatic and economic pressure on the Maduro clique as working. The kind of regional support we see in rallying against him and for the interim president is a historical moment.

We will be watching over the course of today as events unfold, because there have been calls for further protests. I think yesterday was a significant day, but we are watching what is unfolding today as well because they have called for further protest and we are seeing further pressure put on Maduro around their international community but also from within his own system.

Mr. BYRNE. Are there concerns that what is happening in Venezuela might destabilize some of their neighbors who are allies of ours in that region?

Ms. WHEELBARGER. Of course. That is a significant challenge we face, and we focus on, particularly given the migrant flows into Colombia and Brazil in particular. These are solid, important partners in the region for us and for regional stability, so we remain focused and concerned about the potential spillover effects to the region.

Mr. BYRNE. All right. Thank you.

Admiral, let me ask you about China in Latin America. They seem to be growing their footprint there: One Belt, One Road. Other things that they are doing there. I know you can't address all of that from your perspective. But from your perspective, what can you address and tell me about what you can do, and what we can do to help you try to push back against China in our own neighborhood?

Admiral FALLER. The National Defense Strategy rightly calls out China as a competitor. It is—it has gone beyond that around the world, frankly. We are in conflict with China in the information space and for the values in democracy.

We see that in this hemisphere. Over 60 port projects—that includes what we see in the NORTHCOM and the SOUTHCOM: 56 in SOUTHCOM in the Caribbean. They have locked up big development areas, both sides of the Panama Canal, significant IT [information technology] infrastructure investments. They have military dimensions to their involvement in space stations in a couple of the nations. Any discussion by China that this is soft power is simply not the truth.

In the information space, we see where China—the state spokesman is outright just blatantly lying about some of the causality in Venezuela with respect to the electrical infrastructure, which was clearly Maduro's ineptness is the reason why the country doesn't have electrical power, and China blaming it on the U.S.

So, across the front—democracy, human rights, rule of law, sovereignty—our partners and the values that this neighborhood has are aligned on those dimensions. And I know how China's don't align across those dimensions.

And so, the best response for us is to be that strong, reliable, consistent partner, to be able to deliver our security assistance on time with a program that has return on investment for America and enhances the security of our partners. That starts with intelligence sharing.

I get my best insights from the Chief of Defense; yesterday, for example, on the phone with the Brazilian Chief of Defense and the Colombian Chief of Defense with respect to insights on the Venezuela situation. But again, back to China. Completely unhelpful in Venezuela and across the hemisphere. The One Belt, One Road in front of that term certainly epitomizes what they are up to. One way for China's way.

Mr. BYRNE. Well, I get concerned sometimes. We look at China, and we think about the South China Sea and places over there in the Western Pacific, and we forget that they are present in our own hemisphere and I am concerned about that. I think a lot of us are very concerned about that.

And we want to make sure that we are giving you the resources you need to accomplish what you have to accomplish in your mission: that is, to protect us and protect our neighbors in this hemisphere. So please let us know in the future what you need for us to give to you that you need to do your job. And I would like for us to do it.

General, if we could, very quickly—I am going to run out of time. I would like to know if a space sensor would address NORTHCOM's requirements for missile detection and tracking for both ballistic and hypersonic missiles.

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Yes, sir. My view is that it is absolutely critical for us to have a space-based sensing layer, an approach to get after the advancing threats that we see with both ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and hypersonics, as you mentioned.

Mr. BYRNE. Good. Mr. Chairman, my time is about to run out, but I would make this observation. It is pretty easy to look around the world and think that our greatest threats are in Asia or the Middle East or, you know, with Russia. But we see a lot of those same threats visiting themselves here in North America and in South America.

And I hope that we will never forget that it is our homeland that makes the most importance to her and our neighbors to our south. So, I hope you will let us know what we can do to be supportive of you. Thank you, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. And that point is worth emphasizing. We have had, obviously, a focus on the National Security, Armed Services Committee on the Middle East, and while Afghanistan and Iraq, you know, dominated in the Middle East and Asian region. And as a consequence—and we haven't touched on this yet today—a lot of assets are not available to the Southern Command. They have been redirected.

Now, that is coming back a little bit since we have drawn down completely out of Iraq—or, we were completely out of Iraq. Drawn down considerably in Iraq and Afghanistan. But it is a challenge for all of these missions that we're talking about, that you have

kind of been at the back of the buffet line here in terms of assets. So we need to I think re-emphasize the importance of this region.

Mr. Gallego.

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield my time to Representative Cisneros.

Mr. CISNEROS. Thank you, Mr. Gallego.

Thank you all for being here today. I just want to follow up on Mr. Courtney's question regarding the letter from the former SOUTHCOM commanders. You know, Secretary Pompeo dismissed the State Department statistics that suggested U.S. aid programs in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, you know, had an impact on reducing homicide rates and migrants fleeing their countries, suggesting that the aid programs really had no positive impact that all.

Admiral Faller, I know you are new to the position, but can I just get your assessment on what impact you think those aid programs will have on how you can do your job and be successful down there in those three countries?

Admiral FALLER. Had the opportunity to visit Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala within weeks of taking command because of the importance that that region has and the connection with the United States, our neighborhood, and I will be in Honduras next week again.

I had the opportunity in each country to go visit some of the poorest neighborhoods and I wanted to talk to people and find out what was on their minds, what was influencing them to make decisions, whether to turn to organized crime or to travel to the United States.

And one conversation with a young man who had gone all the way to the border of Mexico and the U.S. and come back just resonates with me. And I said to him, Well, why did you leave? And he said, Well, my neighbors had some food because they had family in the United States to send them money back.

We were starving, and I knew how dangerous this was. The government was broadcasting the messages. But I wanted to keep my family from starving, so I went anyway. And I said, Why would you come back? He said, Because it was really, really dangerous when I got up on the border.

So there is not one solution set, sir. It is got to be a broad series of kits that work, a suite. And the nations have to play and participate as well. And so, all those dynamics got to fit together and create sustainable security at home. And here, we forget sometimes that these are fragile democracies that are less than a generation old, that were going through civil war in our lifetime, so that plays into this, too.

I will say with respect to mil-to-mil, the programs are working. I can't assess USAID versus everything else. But in Guatemala, the special forces that we have trained are stopping drugs that are flowing to the United States. And as Secretary Wheelbarger said, those programs are going to be permitted to continue at the mil-to-mil level.

Mr. CISNEROS. So would you say you agree with the statement from your predecessors that diplomacy and U.S. aid is an important part, and that it is needed there down in those regions?

Admiral FALLER. Those are highly esteemed mentors I respect. From a fundamental principle, around the world, it is important to have diplomacy and all the toolkits available. But I also would pivot to say, I think ensuring that our partners are doing their part and putting pressure on them is an important part of the equation. And so, I have actually seen evidence that the additional pressure we are placing on this being a true partnership, two-way, is changing some dynamics in a helpful way.

Mr. CISNEROS. Mr. Rapuano, news reports indicate that the acting Secretary of Defense in a memo to the comptroller, requesting by May 10th a list of military construction projects of sufficient value to provide up to \$3.6 billion in funding for its consideration to defer in favor of the President's border wall. This committee has yet to receive that memo. Can you assure me that the memo will be shared with this committee? And when will it be shared?

Secretary RAPUANO. I can assure you the memo will be shared as soon as possible. You are talking about the memo in which he makes a decision with regard to 2808?

Mr. CISNEROS. Yes.

Secretary RAPUANO. Yes. He fully intends, and he has stated so that he will be sharing this with Congress.

Mr. CISNEROS. All right. And is the comptroller is in process of identifying specific projects. Has he made a determination yet that the border wall is necessary to support troops?

Secretary RAPUANO. He is still awaiting the Joint Staff assessment with regard to the role that the barriers play. And when he receives that assessment, he will make the decision.

Mr. CISNEROS. All right. So have you been involved in those conversations regarding what criteria, beyond simple no forms of military housing projects that have been already awarded or will be awarded this fiscal year, will be followed to identify military construction projects that will be delayed to pay for the President's wall? If so, what are that criteria?

The CHAIRMAN. And that we are going to have to take for—

Mr. CISNEROS. Oh.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. The record because—

Mr. CISNEROS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. We are just completely out of time. And I am pretty sure the answer—

Secretary RAPUANO. We will provide it for the record.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 121.]

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Wouldn't be terribly satisfactory anyway. Just for the committees, we have not yet been told what projects the money is going to be taken from. We continue to ask that question in a variety of different forms. And the sooner we can get that answer—I wouldn't go so far as to say the happier we're all going to be, but at least the more informed we will all be about what our challenges are. So, we are still waiting to find out exactly where that money is going to—

Secretary RAPUANO. And that decision has not been made by the Secretary yet.

The CHAIRMAN. Apparently. But as soon as it is, we would like to know what it is.

Ms. Stefanik.

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you, Chairman Smith.

General O'Shaughnessy, thank you for visiting my office yesterday. Can you describe NORTHCOM's role in the Missile Defense Agency's decision-making process for determining the benefits and location of potential third continental interceptor site on the East Coast?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Yes, ma'am. And thank you for the time yesterday to talk about this and other issues. NORTHCOM as the operator, if you will, has a significant input with MDA relative to what that future would look like.

We started with over 50 different locations that we are looking at. We work closely with MDA for our operational criteria that we wanted to be included in that. We provided an assessment to MDA and work with MDA for that. And that has been incorporated into the MDA's ongoing work in this regard.

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you. Can you expand upon the operational criteria?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Sure. Without going into great classified detail, but broadly what we are looking at is, as you know, we have two interceptor sites already at—one at Fort Greely and one in California at Vandenberg. One of the opportunities this would provide us is a dispersal for that.

It would potentially give us the opportunity for a shoot-look-shoot. And that is just pure geometry and geography, if you look at what that would allow us to do. And of course, we need other sensors to be able to actually be able to take full advantage of that. And of course, we want to look at what is the effectiveness of the location in order to defend our defended area, which obviously includes United States.

Ms. STEFANIK. And in terms of your assessment, we are working with the Secretary of Defense to get a timeline as to when the preferred site would be announced. So without getting into the specific site, can you expand upon how the recommendation and assessment was given to MDA?

And by that I mean, did you rank the three sites? Did you look at specific operational capabilities and say what sites meet those capabilities? How did the assessment—how was that formed?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Our input is early in that process in the sense of we are providing the input into MDA, who then collocates our—takes all of those inputs and puts them together into a recommendation that they will ultimately give to OSD through Dr. Griffin's office.

Ms. STEFANIK. Okay. Thank you very much. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Gallego. Or, sorry, Mr. Carbajal. Sorry.

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And thank you to all of you for being here today. In California and the Central Coast, we now experience a year-round fire season. It is no longer for a smaller period of time.

Throughout California, and again in my district specifically, every time we experience one of these major events, we depend on the Defense Department—to be specific the California National

Guard. We recently were successful in helping them get more equipped with Black Hawk helicopters.

But as we rely on the California National Guard, one thing has become evident. In order for us to use some equipment, they have now identified a challenge. Governors have requested the use of unmanned systems for emergency, disaster, search and rescue, and defense support to Federal and other civil authorities, like the Coast Guard.

However, unlike all other assets in the National Guard inventory, there is a restriction on their use, requiring under DOD policy that the Secretary of Defense himself must sign off on each individual use, a far too long of a process that is potentially life-threatening for our communities. NORTHCOM is a part of that domestic use chain, and we understand you have worked with incident commanders in California several times to employ them when approved.

General O'Shaughnessy, do you see any reason to continue prohibiting Governors' immediate access to unmanned systems to help protect our citizens during emergencies? And two, how can we help expedite this process to ensure timely response to disasters.

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Yes. Thank you for highlighting the great work that the Guard is doing in support of those wildfires. In fact, we work closely with Dave Baldwin, your TAG [The Adjutant General] General Baldwin. And in fact, I have ridden on those very helicopters you mentioned, looking at some of the fires that were happening in California earlier this year.

One of the things I will say is the UASs that you mentioned are a high-demand, low-density asset. My sister combatant commanders do not have the ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] that they require. And as such, it has been trying to look at those assets on the global front to see where is it needed.

And it is not just the asset themselves, but also the work that has to be done on the back end, that we call it the PED [processing, exploitation, and dissemination]. You know, you have to process the information that comes from that UAS. And so that is why we keep that at a very high level.

What I will say is I pledge to continue to work with Dave Baldwin. In fact, last year there was an occurrence during a fire season when he called me directly to ask for assistance to get the clearance from the Secretary of Defense. And within hours of his call, we actually got the Secretary of Defense's approval to use that asset.

And so, I think the processes are in place. We can continue to expedite it, and I commit to work closely with the Guard. But I am not opposed to the system as it sits today. And the OSD and Secretary of Defense office has been responsive to the request that we have made in the past.

Mr. CARBAJAL. Well, that sounds great. But as long as it works as we think it does, can we put in some kind of performance that, when that communication comes from various jurisdictions, there is some kind of response period so that we know within what time period we can get some kind of an answer that that will take place?

Because when these incidences are happening, every minute, every hour, is essential and critical. And if it is going to take days,

well, you might as well as not have this in place, not even have that asset available. Is there any way we can look at the system, the chain of command and communication, to make sure that there is a timely decision-making point so that communities can get the help they deserve and need?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Yes. We can't commit to what the answer would be at the end of that, but I do believe it would be prudent for us to put a timeline to make sure that we are held accountable for getting a decision, whether the decision is yes or no: yes, it is available; or, no, it is not available; yes, it can be used; no, it won't. So, I will work with both you, I will work with General Baldwin, and work with OSD to determine what that timeline ought to look like.

Mr. CARBAJAL. Great. I would appreciate your office following up with mine. Thank you very much.

Secretary RPUANO. I would just quickly add that, to my knowledge, when those requests are delayed, it is because there is a multiple demand signal for the high-demand, low-density asset. When the system is available, the decisions are made very quickly.

Mr. CARBAJAL. Well, it would be great to look at the past 20 times that has been requested to see how efficient the system is working and where we need to make improvement. So, thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Gallagher.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Faller, I want to commend your very strong statement on the brutal Maduro regime at the start of this hearing and the way in which Cuba and Russia have violated Venezuelan sovereignty. In simple terms, what tools do you have in the kit to prevent enhanced Russian meddling or even Chinese meddling or Cuban meddling in Venezuela as we try and shape a positive outcome?

Admiral FALLER. Clearly, the reason this crisis has gone so long, responsibility squarely rests, as you pointed at, Congressman, on Cuba, Russia, and, to some extent, China. China has an opportunity, I think, in the international community to step up and help with this and they haven't.

In the information space, in the intelligence space, in our partner, in our security cooperation, we have the tools we need and we are using the full range of those tools, from cyber to public messaging and information security cooperation. We are using assets diligently and quietly in a number of ways to help paint the picture of what is going on inside and outside the country. And then we are sharing that with the interagency in full cooperation in a manner that matters. The region has been exceptionally united.

Last week, I was in Colombia, and the Colombian Chief of Defense and myself hosted a multinational border meeting with Peru, Ecuador, Brazil, and Colombia. We discussed the range of challenges that affect the region. Central to all of those was Venezuela, and to the extent to which Venezuela complicates and magnifies every single problem that affects the region, and the extent to how these external state actors are meddling in a way that is unhelpful to democracy.

So, those discussions lead to coordinated calls for action. And we are all united and we are all standing firmly behind diplomacy and the need for this democratic process to work. And it will.

Mr. GALLAGHER. President Trump suggested a complete embargo of Cuba if Cuban troops don't cease their activities in support of Maduro. If you were to get such an order, do you have the assets necessary to effectuate such an embargo?

Admiral FALLER. Again, back to Cuba's centrality in all things bad in this hemisphere, including how they are just simply completely protecting Maduro, all the inner circle Praetorian Guard around Maduro, the intelligence service all infiltrated. And so, putting pressure on Cuba is a good thing. Maximum pressure a good thing.

We are aware of the embargo—those orders and we are carefully looking at plans and what it would take to do that, and I am not prepared to discuss in open setting what it would take.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Fair enough. Fair enough. Looking more broadly to Chinese investment in SOUTHCOM AOR [area of responsibility], how should Congress think about or be concerned with Chinese investment in and around the Panama Canal?

Admiral FALLER. Looking around the world, we have to think globally about China, certainly the South China Sea and the INDOPACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command] area are a central piece of this, but they are a global power and they are acting globally. Their investments are global. The number of agreements that China's signed with government of Panama, the extent to which they have locked up contracts for infrastructure for IT, for port facilities, is an area of concern.

Panama still wants to partner with us, and we still share much more in common than they do with China, but they have turned to an economic partner of necessity vice choice. And so we have to look at that more broadly in our strategy in the Department of Defense, as part of the whole government strategy, is looking at those high leverage points around the world where we need to insure the access and influence that the United States needs as a global leader.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Sure. Quickly, Assistant Secretary Rapuano, first of all, I want to thank you for your help with getting the Cyberspace Solarium Commission off the ground. I know it has been a bureaucratic struggle, but I think we are on a good path and I want to thank you for your participation in that.

You know, we have talked a lot about future of 5G and some of the decisions our allies are making in terms of excluding Huawei and ZTE from their network, debating that. But it seems like we still have a little bit more work to do here at home. Could you just talk briefly about your concern, if any, about Huawei's activity in the United States in general, particularly in rural networks where we really don't have good visibility?

Secretary RAPUANO. Well, thank you. And thank you very much for the role that you played with the Solarium Commission, and it has been very productive thus far and I look forward to it.

With regard to 5G, obviously, we have very significant concerns. We have concerns about Huawei. We have concerns about allies and partners, in particular, in terms of systems that may be allow-

ing Chinese access and the accessibility of information that we are sharing with partners and allies. So that is an ongoing effort, engaging with them to give them a better appreciation for what the risk and threat is—

The CHAIRMAN. And if I could follow—the gentleman’s time expired.

We are going to do a couple things which are on this point within the bill. One is to try to take further steps to make sure that we cut off Huawei and ZTE from participating in—having any part of our 5G going forward.

But one critical part of that is to develop the domestic capability because one of our problems is, we don’t have any domestic capability—and I forget the technological term, but the stuff that makes it go from the device out into the—we don’t build that. There are a couple European companies—Nokia and Ericsson, and Samsung—we are trying to develop a domestic capability, which DOD is—they’re buying their own 5G piece so it could help with.

So that is something we are going to be really interested in, blocking Huawei and ZTE, but also making sure that we have a domestic capability, so we have that alternative because, regrettably, those other three that I mentioned aren’t necessarily providing what we need. So look forward to working with you.

And I know, Congressman Gallagher, you have a big interest in this, so we will certainly loop you in the work on that as well.

With that, Ms. Speier.

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to all of our witnesses this morning.

General O’Shaughnessy, the President’s budget is proposing reallocating a billion dollars in funding for military construction, including funds intended to repair hurricane-damaged installations along the east coast, for construction of a border wall.

During the recess, I toured five of our bases, one of which was Camp Lejeune, that is filled with buildings that are tarped. And I remember them saying they had about 3 billion dollars’ worth of damage there. In your estimation, what poses a greater security challenge to our homeland? Asylum seekers and economic migrants on foot, or ill-equipped Marines and soldiers living and training in unsafe buildings?

General O’SHAUGHNESSY. Ma’am, the individual services are the ones who—in this case, the Commandant of the Marine Corps is the one who is actually working the recovery efforts for Camp Lejeune. It doesn’t fall under the NORTHCOM responsibility.

Ms. SPEIER. Okay. Then, Secretary Rapuano, there has been an analysis from the Brookings Institute that a strategy centered around capturing high-value targets in counternarcotics operations intensifies violence by fomenting turf wars, which lead to corruption of law enforcement officers. What strategies is the U.S. engaged in, counternarcotics operations employing in order to ensure that they do not perpetuate corruption and further destabilize the region?

Secretary RAPUANO. So, I will turn to Secretary Wheelbarger to address that issue.

Ms. WHEELBARGER. Thank you, ma’am. I don’t directly have responsibility for counternarcotics policy, but I do have responsibility,

obviously, for the region. From the Department of Defense's perspective, both counternarcotics activities as well as counter-trafficking activities is a major line of effort for the Department.

We do this in support of local law enforcement as well as our interagency partners, the Coast Guard in particular. But part and parcel of everything we do as a partner in the region is, again, developing the capability and capacity of these local governments to defend themselves against their external as well as internal threats.

Earlier this morning, the chairman brought up Plan Colombia. I just want to highlight that the success of Plan Colombia over a couple of decades is because it had bipartisan support from Congress for decades. The kind of sustained partner capacity programs we need to be successful across the host of threats in the region not just counternarcotics or counter-trafficking or the drug cartels really it takes our sustained commitment to these partners.

And so, you know, the strategy is a whole-of-government one in terms of addressing the challenges of the region. But with respect to our particular capabilities in the Department, it is really ensuring that our partners have resources and capabilities to secure themselves internally.

Ms. SPEIER. So who should I talk to specifically within your Department on this issue, then?

Ms. WHEELBARGER. Assistant Secretary Owen West has responsibility for our counternarcotics programs.

Ms. SPEIER. All right. Thank you—

Secretary RAPUANO. I just would note that no funding has been taken from the 284 counterdrug programs for barrier construction, either to NORTHCOM or Southern Command.

Ms. SPEIER. No. I was asking a different question. Thank you, Secretary.

Secretary Wheelbarger, in your written statement, you described the need to address great power competition with China and Russia in the Western Hemisphere as they seek to expand their political, economic, and military influence throughout Latin America. The initiatives by China are pretty widespread around the world.

According to Pew polls, in 2016, 66 percent of Latin America held favorable views of the United States. But by 2017, the favorability had dropped by 19 points. Given this considerable and rapid decline, are we still able to appeal to militaries in the region as a source of training, equipment, and leadership? Are we still well-positioned on the field that you mentioned?

Ms. WHEELBARGER. Yes, thank you. Global competition with China is, as the National Defense Strategy indicated, one of our key priorities as a department. We stressed to our partners, as Admiral Faller mentioned earlier, it is not just what equipment you can get or what training you can get, but actually how much you can trust the partner that you are partnering with. And the United States continues to be well-positioned throughout the region to be the security partner of choice.

I think from the day-to-day activities throughout the ranks of our government, whether it be our training in the United States or in the region, we continue to be well-positioned to compete and grow in our competition in the region.

And I would defer to Admiral Faller, if you have any other thoughts.

Admiral FALLER. Thanks for the question. From the mil-to-mil perspective in my travels—and I have met with almost every single Chief of Defense or Minister of Defense, and we try to get out beyond that. When my wife goes with me, the people still want to and value that relationship with the United States above all. So, whatever the polls say, ma'am, what I am seeing in person and what my team is seeing is an affinity to work with us and trust us.

Ms. SPEIER. I know my time is expired but while you may dismiss the polls based on your personal interactions with people, I think it is very important to recognize that there has been slippage and what are we going to do to raise it.

Thank you, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Bacon.

Mr. BACON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks to all of you for being here today. And it is nice to see General O'Shaughnessy again. I used to serve with him a few years ago.

My first question is to Admiral Faller. You know, Venezuela used to be the richest, wealthiest country in South America and in the region, but the dictatorship and the socialist policies have broken it. Can you give us, you know, your feedback on just how bad it is for the average Venezuelan?

Admiral FALLER. Shortly after I assumed command, I had the opportunity to go out on the United States Naval Ship *Comfort*, which we had deployed to the region to provide comfort, medical support, lifesaving stability to—the entire region was impacted by this crisis. And I got to see some small children, 8-year-old, 9-year-old kids.

The average Venezuelan has lost 20 pounds in the last year. These kids were emaciated. It is the first time they had received any medical treatment in their lives. I don't think they knew who I was or what I was about. Their mother certainly did. And the look in her eye, and the conditions that she represented impacts the entire region.

Over 3 million people have been migrated out of Venezuela. It is on track to be worse than the Syria migration crisis by the end of this year. That is affecting all aspects of life. Ninety percent of the people are malnourished and starving. Most of the country's without power; we see that daily. And it is a dictatorship and brutal in all ways.

Mr. BACON. The governance has devastated its own people, is what I am hearing.

Admiral FALLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. BACON. On a different tack, it seems to me that Colombia and Chile's been sort of the pillars of our engagement in South America, or at least our closest relationships. Do I have that characterized right?

Admiral FALLER. Colombia's an example, when we have a long view, we stick to a plan over 20 years, as Secretary Wheelbarger stated, with people committed to their democracy, their own security, where we can have impacts. Colombia this year is on track to train over 1,000 security personnel in Central America.

Those security personnel are going to contribute to the security of their countries—Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, and beyond—and the United States. They are a capable and willing partner. Chile stepped up and has stepped up consistently. They have participated in some of our international exercises at a leadership level, and they remain a very capable and committed partner.

Mr. BACON. I sense from what I am hearing from Brazil that there is a desire to draw closer with us, which is, I think, good news. Could you just give us your views or your perspective on the potential of what we can do with the stronger ties of Brazil?

Admiral FALLER. Brazil's a resource-rich country that has the same values of us, the second-largest democracy in the hemisphere. They are all in. We have been down to Brazil. They have been to see us. We are integrating our staffs, we are sharing information. They are looking for ways to strengthen intelligence sharing, exercises, education.

Part of our security assistance program is so important is this International Military Education and Training, IMET that it is referred to. It is State Department-funded in foreign assistance. It is a foundation. We build life-long friends. I am looking to double that this year, but I will need the support of Congress to raise that level of assistance. And Brazil's all in. They want to double the number of people they send to our schools.

Mr. BACON. Thank you.

General O'Shaughnessy, you have such an important mission, so does STRATCOM [U.S. Strategic Command], so does the future of Space Command. And it seems like there is some overlapping potential there, or mission areas. How do you deconflict and what are some of the challenges there? Thank you.

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Yes. It may be looked at as a challenge, but it is also an opportunity. And we are clearly—STRATCOM has morphed over several years—if you look at Cyber Command coming out now, look at Space Command—and that has given us an opportunity to really look at all of the mission sets and try to determine what is the best organizational construct there.

What I will say and report, without a doubt, it is a collaborative perspective that we are taking. And if you look at all of the players—whether it be General Hyten, whether it will be—at least on Air Force Space Command is being worked by Jay Raymond. How do we best do this? That is the only question that is being asked. I think we will be able to work our way through this. But in the end, I think we will end up being stronger than we are today.

Mr. BACON. Turn my mike back on. Are we where we need to be when it comes to speediness of response? NORTHCOM detects threats, then STRATCOM would have to respond. Do we have that as seamless as possible?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. I would say we do. And actually, it is NORTHCOM responds as well as the operational—we are actually the ones who do the ballistic missile defense. STRATCOM—and we are tied on the same conferences in literally seconds, not minutes in the way we respond together.

Mr. BACON. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ms. Hill.

Ms. HILL. Thank you. Thank you all for your service.

General O'Shaughnessy, you spend a great deal of time talking about Russian threats, including their investments in long-range, low-radar, cross-section cruise missiles that can be fired from aircraft or subs against targets within the United States. And in particular, about advanced long-range cruise missiles capable of flying through the northern approaches.

Can you talk about the potential capability of the F-35 in missile defense?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Certainly. And as we look at these threats that you mentioned, one of the reasons that we are most concerned about is, we see not only a capability and a capacity, we see a doctrine where their very strategy, as they articulate it, is to take attacks on our infrastructure. And then we look at the patterns of behavior that they do. For example, their fly of the missions that are clearly flying practice attacks against North America.

So, to that end, we want to make sure we have the most advanced capability that we can possibly have. F-35 has proven itself. In fact, we just heard in the news—it just dropped in combat within the last 24 or 48 hours. But more importantly, it is the ability for it to fuse all of the capability together that becomes critically important because it is not just the endgame is how you get after the cruise missiles. It is the sensors that have to all fuse together for that to work.

And whether it be from Red Flag scenarios that we see, the exercises that we do, we see the F-35's real capability and capacity is its ability to essentially be the quarterback, if you will, to bring all that together. So, we see it as vital going forward.

Ms. HILL. So you need them.

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. We need them and as many as we can procure.

Ms. HILL. Great. Okay. And then along the same lines, what is your biggest challenge when dealing with Russian military aircraft in the U.S. and Canadian air defense identification zones?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Our biggest challenge we have right now is domain awareness. Many of our systems were designed in the Cold War era. And as the Russians have advanced their capability, we need to stay ahead of that and advance our capability and be able to understand what is happening. In the Arctic, as an example, we are currently challenged and need to advance our capabilities.

Ms. HILL. So I think you mentioned there has been an increase in these interactions in the last few years. Is that correct?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. It is increased in the number but, really, they have been up and down as they have gone through a modernization with their bombers. But more importantly, it is the complexity of the events that we are seeing. Very complex, very much more integrated with multiple platforms that has us concerned.

Ms. HILL. Thank you. Are there resources that you need that you are not currently receiving to execute this part of the homeland defense strategy?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. As always, much like my partner here in SOUTHCOM, we are always looking to make sure that we have

the adequate resources to defend our Nation. We do. But I will say that, going forward, as this becomes more and more advanced weaponry, we want to make sure that we maintain the ability to stay ahead of those threats is probably our most pressing concern.

Ms. HILL. So as we move to an all fifth-generation fleet, is it fair to say the F-35 would be used for these missions as well?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Yes.

Ms. HILL. Okay. Admiral Faller, in your statement, you mentioned a Russian spy ship with the capability to map undersea cables. Are you able to tell us in this setting what is being done to harden and protect the fiberoptic systems that connect our world?

Admiral FALLER. I can speak broadly about Russia and the region. The specifics would not be able to go into in this setting. But around the world, Russia is advancing their interests in ways that are harmful. And we see this around the world, and we see it in Latin America and the Caribbean as well.

Ms. HILL. So, I guess that kind of leads to a simple summary from you all. Would you say just in terms of North and South America who is our most dangerous and eminent threat?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. I would say in the long term it is China, without a doubt, as a nation, I think, as we look at the threat that China presents us. But in the short term, we have significant concerns about the Russian capability and their patterns of behavior and what they have shown to be an intent.

Admiral FALLER. China, without a doubt. And our best defense is to ensure that our defense remains strong, that our people are ready, that we invest in it appropriately, and we don't overlook the home game here in this hemisphere, with security cooperation being key. It is a small dollar value with a high return on investment.

Ms. HILL. And, Ms. Wheelbarger, would you agree? And Mr. Rapano?

Ms. WHEELBARGER. Yes. Absolutely. I sometimes describe it as, I think China is our chronic threat and, in some ways, Russia is our acute threat right now, given their misbehavior around the world. But we have to make sure we address them equally as well as ensure stability around the world, so we don't get distracted as we maintain that long-term focus.

Secretary RAPUANO. I also strongly agree. And just on the partnerships and alliances, they are tremendous force multipliers for us. And the United States is unique in our history and ability to leverage those partnerships.

Ms. HILL. Thank you, all. Yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Gaetz.

Mr. GAETZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, if the DOD was prohibited from contracting with any persons that had business operations with an authority of Venezuela that is not recognized as the legitimate government of Venezuela by the Government of the United States, which capabilities would you expect could be impaired from our standpoint?

Admiral FALLER. More broadly, I think anything we can do to impact and pressure Venezuela and continue this necessary transition to democracy, we should be doing. And I know we are looking

at that across the full range. My suspicion is we haven't done it yet, we just haven't thought of it because the full-court press from our leadership on.

To the specifics of your question, I am not aware or understanding of any impacts on those, but we would have to look at them case by case.

Mr. GAETZ. Well, thank you for that response. And if you could take that for the record and—and provide responses, because I believe my colleague Mr. Waltz and I are going to introduce an amendment to the NDAA to assist you in achieving that pressure. But in doing so, we don't want to have the inadvertent effect of hamstringing DOD. I don't expect that it would do that. Your clarification that you can't think of a circumstance where it would, is similarly helpful.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 121.]

Mr. GAETZ. I want to now ask about how the United States is interacting with and engaging in the ongoing crisis in Venezuela. If the United States were to have uniform military in Venezuela, engaging in operations, have we modeled out or planned or conducted analysis regarding how some of the other ALBA [Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas] nations would react to such an action?

Admiral FALLER. First, looking at the range of things we are thinking about, discussing with our partners, our allies within the interagency, we are looking at ways to be helpful to the inevitable rise of legitimate Guaidó government. And then how do we set the table afterwards to ensure that those professional military forces get the training, the assistance they need. This will be a regionally led issue.

The countries in the region that aren't democracies—Nicaragua, Bolivia, Cuba—and the external actors that don't believe in democracy, although they may say they do, they are not going to be happy about anything we do. I mean, Russian news agencies had repeated reports of—

Mr. GAETZ. Other than unhappiness, which I appreciate and understand, are there other activities that we have had to analyze or plan for? For example, if we were to put uniform military on the ground in Caracas, do we have contingency plans for mass protests in other Latin American capitals?

Because, as I have analyzed how the region perceives the possibility of U.S. involvement—and I understand we've got to keep every option on the table, that U.S. involvement is very popular right now in Venezuela and with the Venezuelan diaspora. But U.S. direct involvement with uniformed military is very unpopular with every other Latin American country. If you are aware of information that is different or more up-to-date, I would love to hear it.

But I just wonder whether or not our military—and I know we are involved in a lot of train-and-equip missions with these other partner nations—if we are planning for the potential of the Venezuelan crisis erupting into a broader regional crisis, if the arrival of American troops on the ground gives Maduro the ability to externalize his conflict, to scapegoat his own failures, and then to deny the organic efforts of the Venezuelan people to fight for a brighter future.

Admiral FALLER. I wouldn't want to speculate anything that Maduro's thinking. I am not sure he does. But the details of the different course of action, things we are looking at, I would take in a closed session. Broadly, we are looking at—as I have said, the leadership has been clear. Our job is to be ready and we are on the balls of our feet.

Mr. GAETZ. And I have no doubt, as the Congressman for the 7th Special Forces Group, that we are ready, and we can take the fight to the enemy and we can win it. I just want to make sure that if we are going to have that fight and if it becomes necessary, that we have really thought out all the options when, in my experience, there is a good amount of latent resentment in some pockets of Latin America that date back to prior administrations and their involvement in—in the continent.

And so, I certainly am proud of that state of readiness. And I would similarly add that, over the last decade or so, the great work at SOUTHCOM has greatly enhanced the capabilities of our partner nations. The Colombians, the Peruvians, they are no joke. They can bring the fight and I think that that is a consequence of the great work that has been done at SOUTHCOM.

And I hope that, you know, as circumstances continue to change in Venezuela, that we leverage the great work that we have done so that we have, as you described, a regional approach and not a unilateral approach by the United States.

Admiral FALLER. I would like to commend the 7th Special Forces Group and our teammates in your district that are ready, they are ready to go and they have a focus on the region. And we actually need more of their presence. Thank you.

Mr. GAETZ. Thank you. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Moulton.

Mr. MOULTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And thank you, all, for everything you do to keep us safe. A lot of American lives are entrusted in your care. I want to actually pick up where Mr. Gaetz left off and ask a similar question. This kind of harkens back to the Iraq experience. You say you have contingency plans if we were to do something in Venezuela.

Do we have any plans for what happens on the day after not just in other countries but in Venezuela itself? We have obviously been through the experience of having great invasion plans and no plans for what to do next in recent conflicts.

Admiral FALLER. The complexity of the situation, the magnitude of the misery, is going to require every element of international unity that currently exists to focus on recovery of the economic infrastructure, the oil infrastructure, port facilities, electrical infrastructure that Maduro has ruined.

There are ongoing efforts to look at all aspects as—at my headquarters, we call it Day Now because there is going to be a day when the legitimate government takes over and it is going to come when we least expect it and it could be right now. So, we are calling it Day Now planning.

Mr. MOULTON. And do those plans exist in the contingency of U.S. military intervention as well, Admiral?

Admiral FALLER. Our ability to be ready for anything that the President has been clear might be on the table is things we are looking at. We are on the balls of our feet. Details of what those plans look like I would take in closed session.

Mr. MOULTON. Okay. I would like to shift to Mr. Gallagher's question about Panama. And I understand you answered it briefly. But just tell me in general, here. You have all stated the influence of China is the greatest long-term threat to the security and safety of the United States. I would agree with you. What is the worst-case scenario with the Chinese presence in Panama?

Admiral FALLER. I would like to start by pointing out what Panama is doing for us. So, the canal remains open and free, and the canal authority remains independent and operational. Panama has stepped up their game in the drug interdiction through our security cooperation—

Mr. MOULTON. Admiral, with all due respect, I am asking about the worst cases, not the best—

Admiral FALLER. The worst case is that I can't answer that question in that way a year, 2 years, 5, or a generation from now because Panama Canal, both the zone and the ends of the canal are controlled by Chinese and they actually influence Panama in a way that is counter to any international interest.

Mr. MOULTON. So since we are heading in that direction, maybe quickly, maybe slowly, what can we do to stop it? What should we be doing to turn Chinese influence away, because right now it just seems to be increasing?

Admiral FALLER. Military dimension that has to stay strong. Our partnerships must be consistent. We must be responsive in our security cooperation. Some of the tools that Congress has given us are good, but they are not responsive enough. The current way that we have implemented our 333 authorities are too slow. A lot of that is on the Department to look itself in the mirror and figure out how to speed it up.

Some of this could be better if we had 2-year money and combatant commanders had some additional authority to deliver on small things that can help both our partners and return on investment for the security of the United States.

Mr. MOULTON. Admiral, in general, do you think we are doing enough as the United States of America to deter the Russian and Chinese influence in our hemisphere?

Admiral FALLER. We are doing everything we can and that will never be enough or fast enough, so we have to act with a speed of urgency—

Mr. MOULTON. I mean, frankly, if their presence in the region were decreasing, I would say it is probably enough. I mean, it is headed in the right direction. But it doesn't seem to be headed in that direction.

General, do you have any comment on this? Do you think we are doing enough to deter Russian and Chinese influence in our hemisphere?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Well, I would agree with Admiral Faller in that we do need to continue to—I will just use our own within NORTHCOM AOR. Look at the Bahamas. It is a nation 50 miles off the coast of Florida, yet we are seeing Chinese influence right

there. And it does not take a significant amount of dollars, frankly, for a very positive affect.

And so, the more that we can look at it within this hemisphere and focus our efforts not just with China and the Asia-Pacific region, but in the Western Hemisphere as well, I think we will see the fruits of that pay off fairly quickly.

Mr. MOULTON. Well, I hope you will be a partner with us with the development of the NDAA to help in that mission.

Ms. Wheelbarger, we don't have much time left, but I just wanted to ask you, do you think Plan Colombia should be a model? Should Plan Colombia be a model that we duplicate elsewhere?

Ms. WHEELBARGER. I think it is dangerous to always think about duplicating programs in—in countries or locations that are not exactly the same. But I will say as a model of a whole-of-government approach and interbranch approach to a particular problem set, it is a model.

And I have used it as one of the examples I give of our security cooperation truly working because it was long-term, it was sustained, it had bipartisan support, and it didn't just focus on tactics and operations. It focused on true defense institution building and that is the sort of thing we need to be doing around the world.

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Moulton.

And I would say, you know, when we look back to the Central American countries where most of the migrants are coming from, whether Plan Colombia is the exact model or not but some sort of comprehensive plan in that region is probably the best thing we could do to deal with the migrant crisis that we have.

Before I call on Mr. Waltz, I want to welcome him to the adults' table. For those of you who don't know, we had to reconfigure the room here. He used to be all by himself down there in front, right next to the witnesses. And now he has joined the rest of us.

So, welcome. And you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. WALTZ. Mr. Chairman, I have spent a little bit of time on forward outposts and I like to consider it the forward combat post up there but thank you for that and thank you all for coming today. And just to add to my colleague Seth Moulton's comment there, I do think Plan Colombia—as a Green Beret, I am a little bit invested in that one, as the tip of the spear in Plan Colombia. I do think it is a model for advise and assist and whole-of-government operations.

Admiral, thank you for coming by yesterday. You know, as a number of my colleagues have stated, I think I had a back-and-forth with my good friend Tucker Carlson of Fox News on why should the American people care, really, of what is going on down in Venezuela?

And I reminded him that the migration problem, the refugee problem from Venezuela is approaching the levels that we saw in Syria, and that we are approaching 3 to 5 million refugees by the end of 2019, destabilizing the area. I think that it is important for us to really take that message out on what this can do, what the Cubans, Russians, and Chinese are doing, not only in Venezuela but doing it in Nicaragua as well, where we are also seeing a refugee flow.

So, given that dynamic, do you think it is a time, Admiral Faller, for a coalition, humanitarian, forcible if necessary intervention? Do you think from a logistics and military standpoint that the Colombians, the Brazilians, possibly the French and Dutch are ready with U.S. leadership to have that intervention? And do you think it would do more harm than—I mean, do you think it would do more good than harm?

Admiral FALLER. I would start with the level above that, Congressman, where it is time for a plan for the hemisphere. We talked about Plan Colombia, we need a plan for this hemisphere, and an initiative that recognizes the importance of this hemisphere, with all the various security dimensions that have been discussed today, including the impact that this Venezuela crisis particularly has on all of us; this mass migration.

To the point of the partner unity, extremely important that the partners are unified partners, and the allies—the Dutch, the French, the U.K. [United Kingdom], the Canadians—to the extent that the diplomatic solution needs that kind of bulk that militaries can bring to humanitarian intervention, I know in the U.S. we are prepared to support. So, diplomatically led and—

Mr. WALTZ. And I completely agree with you. We need a broader Plan Latin America. But in the immediate term, while we are at an inflection, a crisis point in Venezuela, do you think that intervening with a humanitarian, coalition-led, is a viable option at this point?

Admiral FALLER. There is a—

Mr. WALTZ. Would you recommend it?

Admiral FALLER. There is a need for humanitarian assistance; it ought to have an international and USAID or an Organization of American States face. And if asked, militaries would be our military and partners, I think, willing and ready to help support the—

Mr. WALTZ. Do you think that the—

Admiral FALLER. We have seen that already with the staging in Colombia and Brazil.

Mr. WALTZ. Do you assess that the Cuban security forces—which I have seen estimates ranging from 3,000 upwards of 20,000—Cuban security forces on the ground, protecting Maduro, do you think they would oppose militarily a coalition intervention, particularly with Colombian and Brazilian involvement?

Admiral FALLER. I wouldn't want to speculate what the Cubans would or wouldn't do. I think they are as—as likely as unpredictable as the Russians. There would have to be some level of cooperation and invitation from the legitimate Guaidó government to make this work.

Mr. WALTZ. Do you think it would be—completely agree. Do you think it would be helpful if Guaidó offered amnesty and more overtly offered amnesty?

Admiral FALLER. Well, the—

Mr. WALTZ. In terms of peeling away Maduro-loyal military officers?

Admiral FALLER. The amnesty offer is open. And as I understand it, they are moving forward towards enacting that in legislation. That would be very helpful if the National Assembly passed that

as part of the package. But I think there is plenty of teeth to the amnesty. And again, the message I would have for the military is, believe in us. The world is united. There will be amnesty. There will be a place in our schools. There will be a place to partner with us when there is a legitimate democracy.

Mr. WALTZ. What do you assess is the Russian presence on the ground in terms of either military, Wagner Group, you know, surrogates, and what is their current mission and guidance and role?

Admiral FALLER. We saw recently additional flights in, 100 or so—technical, special forces, other advisors. There are other Russians present. I wouldn't want to discuss in an open hearing what our estimate of their presence are, but it is significant and it is contributing to the devastation.

Mr. WALTZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Ms. Escobar.

Ms. ESCOBAR. Thank you, Chairman, and good morning. Thank you all so much for your testimony this morning. And, gentlemen, thank you especially for your service. Very grateful for it.

Mr. Rapuano, the fiscal year 2016 NDAA had a provision in it entitled, Section 1059, Department of Defense Authority to Provide Assistance to Secure the Southern Land Border of the United States. In communications with Congress, the Department of Defense has cited this as one of their authorities for deploying service members to the southern border, including my community, El Paso, Texas.

This authority requires a DOD report every 3 months. And yet, as we approach 6 months of Active Duty support at the southern border, this committee has not received a single one of these reports. The first report would have been due the first week of February. Why hasn't the Department adhered to the law that they are citing and submitted the required report?

Secretary RAPUANO. Congresswoman, I am familiar with 1059. I will get more familiar with the reporting requirement. I will follow up on that and ensure that we follow up if we are not complying with our obligations.

Ms. ESCOBAR. Great. And would you be able to have a timeline for when this committee and myself, in particular, would receive a copy of this report?

Secretary RAPUANO. As fast as I can help make it happen.

Ms. ESCOBAR. Okay. Thank you. I would appreciate that.

Admiral, I so appreciated your perspective on having a plan for the hemisphere. As I mentioned, I represent El Paso, and we have seen a significant influx of, essentially, asylum seekers arriving at our front doorstep. And I agree with the chairman when he says that really the best way to address what is a significant humanitarian challenge is to address what is happening in the Northern Triangle.

I, myself, have called for hemispheric collaboration and cooperation. This is a shared responsibility and duty. So with that in mind, and because I so appreciated that comment you made, can you speak to the effort SOUTHCOM is engaged in in the critical Northern Triangle region to address the root causes of these immigration

flows? Do you think you can positively impact this humanitarian challenge that we are facing?

Admiral FALLER. We are working with our partners in Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, Belize—not traditionally considered part of the Northern Triangle, but part of that region—to work on professional forces. Professional forces have legitimacy with their people.

We have a human rights program that is now in its 20th year. We talk about human rights at every venue. We hold training and I have found them very receptive. But it is a long process and there is a history to everything. We also have noncommissioned officer, NCO, training and development.

The backbone of our forces are our enlisted. And to the extent that we can grow that and build that in our partner is very important. And they are in, from our perspective. They are all-in. But again, it is something you have to really work on with a longer view.

Another aspect of this is just general professional military education and training. The Western Hemisphere Institute for Security at Fort Benning, we put upwards of about 2,000 enlisted officers through that school a year. Range of courses that deal at the heart and sharing common doctrine, training, and tactics with our partners that helps them go back and be more interoperable with us on drug enforcement missions, security/stability-type missions.

At the institution level, the Perry Center here in Washington, DC, is a place where they teach the classes in Spanish. It is over at—in adjunct with the National Defense University. And we bring through—at the institutional level, we are trying to teach our partners the best practices in budgeting and programming and planning so that the important security dollars that they have or that we contribute can be used effectively and appropriately.

All these tools, we are working each and every day that—it is not very high dollar, but it has high impact. And we can measure and see that impact over time. It is working.

Ms. ESCOBAR. And so, Admiral, I take it that you believe that the aid that we provide to the Northern Triangle is crucial to that success.

Admiral FALLER. The mil-to-mil security cooperation that we are working is showing demonstrated results that are improving the security of the homeland of the United States. Can our partners do more? They can. I have spoken to all their Chiefs of Defense in recent weeks and their ministers. They are committed to do more. And next week, we will host a security conference to ask them to do more. And we will work towards that goal.

Ms. ESCOBAR. Thank you. Chairman, I yield back my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Brooks.

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Doing a little bit of research, Nicolas Maduro is quite clearly a socialist, but he was elected to the National Assembly as far back as the year 2000 and then was elected again with Chavez in 2012/2013, this time as vice president. And finally, in 2013, was elected president with 50.6 percent of the vote, more or less. Of course,

there is always debate about legitimacy of elections that we are familiar with.

When we look at Juan Guaidó, he helped found the social-democratic Popular Will party. The research suggests that that is also a socialist organization. Certainly, it is a supporter of the Socialist International entity. He was elected in 2015 to the National Assembly with 26 percent of the vote. And the National Assembly later promoted him to the status that he has now.

Given that it appears that the fight is between two different sets of socialists, both of whom, at least in the original day in which they got into politics, were elected, is there anything that suggests to you—and feel free, any of you that wish to answer—is there anything that suggests to any of you that Guaidó, if he does assume power in Venezuela, will not also turn out to be a dictator, much like Maduro ended up being?

Ms. WHEELBARGER. I think the important thing to recognize, too, in the recent history of when you talk about these are both elected officials, is the clear indications of illegitimacy of the last election. And the international community recognizing that there weren't just questions about the elections, but that it was pretty clear that Maduro secured himself a continued position.

And that is unique now in this particular time versus previous periods of protests within Venezuela, where Maduro clearly didn't have the support of his people, is now we do actually have a recognized alternative opposition that can replace him. Whereas, in the future, you don't ever know what in the future can bring.

What we do know is right now we are living under a regional disaster caused by one man's desire to continue to rule that population illegitimately. And as Admiral Faller has described in the great detail the level of, you know, harm he has brought to his own citizenry is not something that we could sit back and just ignore.

And so the fact that we do have an opposition leader who we recognize as the legitimate interim president, that the international community and the people in Venezuela can rally behind is a significant difference from the past few years.

Mr. BROOKS. Well, we know that Maduro has become a dictator, but we also know that it's economic policies founded in socialism that have wreaked havoc with that economy as socialism has done with so many economies around the world at various periods of time.

Do you know anything about Guaidó that would suggest that he ultimately would not become dictatorial, too, which is the essence of socialism, where the government is dictating to the populace what they can and cannot do in an economic ballpark. Anything about Guaidó that would suggest that he ultimately would not follow that same dictatorial path?

Ms. WHEELBARGER. I don't think we should assume that he would follow a dictator path. So, I think the evidence that we have of hope in him is the communications and the relationship we already have between him, his people, and most directly our Department of State.

Mr. BROOKS. All right. And again, this is a different question. Any of you all want to chime in, please do so. There have been different suggestions that China, Russia, and Cuba have been in-

volved economically, perhaps even militarily in trying to prop up the Maduro regimes. Is there some way that you all can try to quantify how much each of these three nations are propping up Maduro?

Admiral FALLER. I will take that. The estimates of Cuban military strength range between 2,000 and 20,000. Those are accurate. All the guards that surround Maduro are all Cuban—

Mr. BROOKS. That is a pretty big gap, 2,000 to 20,000.

Admiral FALLER. It is a big gap. It is—

Mr. BROOKS. All right. I am sorry. Keep going.

Admiral FALLER. The Russian strength is significant. Recently saw 100 personnel fly in, special forces that are involved in cyber, they are involved in air defense, they are involved in technical training aspect. They recently commissioned a helicopter maintenance facility. Most of the gear—the kit that Venezuelan military uses, a lot of it is Russian. And China's in there a way that goes far beyond soft power. As I mentioned in my opening statement, in the information space as well.

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I see my time has expired.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Brooks.

Ms. LURIA.

Mrs. LURIA. So, Admiral Faller, on Sunday of this week, you relieved Admiral Ring as the commander of the Joint Task Force overseeing the prison at Guantanamo Bay. This happened a day after The New York Times published a story where he was critical of the long-term plans for the prison. Was his firing a result of this criticism?

Admiral FALLER. The relief for cause of Admiral Ring was in no way related to any media reporting.

Mrs. LURIA. Okay.

Admiral FALLER. It was a result of loss of confidence and an investigation that completed long before any of the—

Mrs. LURIA. Did anyone outside of Southern Command direct or encourage you to fire Admiral Ring?

Admiral FALLER. No. That decision was mine.

Mrs. LURIA. Okay. So, for the record, you are saying his firing was unrelated to anything reported in The New York Times.

Admiral FALLER. Correct.

Mrs. LURIA. Switching subjects, what percentage of your 2019 request for forces, specifically for surface combatants, was met?

Admiral FALLER. We received no Navy ships in our 2019 request.

Mrs. LURIA. Okay.

Admiral FALLER. After the request, we did receive some fills for exercises, and Navy came through with littoral combat ship.

Mrs. LURIA. So, to move on, on the impact of that, you previously said today that only 6 percent of the drug shipments that are known are actually interdicted. I can only assume that this low level is a direct result of the fact that you don't have any, specifically, Navy assets to help intercept those.

And in your comments, you also said all elements of the U.S. Government are laser-focused on this problem of, you know, stopping drugs flowing into our country. But would you agree that we are not allocating an appropriate amount of naval assets to work

in conjunction with the U.S. Coast Guard, potentially LEDETs [law enforcement detachments] on Navy platforms in order to help this problem?

Admiral FALLER. The area is the size of the United States, as you know, and we have, on any given day, 6 to 10 Coast Guard cutters. And now we do have a Navy PC [Patrol Coastal ship] and a USNS [United States Naval Ship] fast transport ship, so not—not adequate enough forces—

Mrs. LURIA. So, you mentioned the EPF [expeditionary fast transport], the fast transport ship, do you find that an effective platform in conjunction with Coast Guard LEDETs to be able to help for a much lower cost than, say, a DDG [guided-missile destroyer] or cruiser operating in the area to be able to get after this problem?

Admiral FALLER. Congresswoman, the finishing part of that discussion on the Navy's readiness, which I have knowledge of, is certainly impacted here, too. So, when we look globally, there is just not enough naval assets. The EPF is a good platform. There needs to be some fixes made, Military Sealift Command and the Navy, to a couple of the systems that assist in—

Mrs. LURIA. Okay.

Admiral FALLER [continuing]. Seakeeping and boat launching. We get past those shortfalls, that platform will be a good platform for a detection and monitoring drug interdiction operation.

Mrs. LURIA. Thank you. And a final topic. We have talked a lot about Chinese and investment in the Panama Canal region and within South America. And some in the current administration have invoked the Monroe Doctrine when speaking of Latin America. Do you think the United States should use the concept of the Monroe Doctrine or an approach similar in Latin America regarding the increasing Chinese influence and Russian influence?

Admiral FALLER. I would leave the application of the Monroe Doctrine to policy and policy makers. The committed, enduring promise of partnership is what we ought to focus on and that is what we are focused on.

Mrs. LURIA. Would you see that any differently if this economic expansion and investment in port facilities and the different activities that you have described was expanded to an actual military base within South America?

Admiral FALLER. If we make the right investments in time, people, location, training, education, the full range of security cooperation, I am convinced that we will be the partner of choice and we will maintain those long-term relationships. It troubles me that China is on a path to have permanent bases in this hemisphere. I believe that they are, based on my own assessments of their intent and capability around the world.

Mrs. LURIA. So, to dovetail further on the discussion about naval assets and your ability to conduct drug interdiction mission, I would only assume the fact that you had zero assets, you know, intentionally, deliberately allocated to you for your mission last year, the same thing would apply that you don't feel like you have the sufficient naval assets to show presence in the region or to do theater security cooperation with our allies as far as naval assets is concerned.

Admiral FALLER. Congresswoman, absolutely. The two go hand in hand. We have created a concept with our 4th Fleet to build a combined maritime task force with U.S. naval leadership and naval assets. We believe that will bring more out of our partners as we work and train together, both for the drug mission and across all the range of missions that we have in this hemisphere.

Mrs. LURIA. But just to clarify, it is a little bit hard to do that if you don't actually have any ships assigned to the 4th Fleet.

Admiral FALLER. You absolutely can't win a football game without players on the field.

Mrs. LURIA. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. That concludes our hearing. I thank you for your testimony and all the members for their questions. And we are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

MAY 1, 2019

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MAY 1, 2019

Statement by
The Honorable Kenneth Rapuano
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security
and Kathryn Wheelbarger
Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

Before the 116th Congress
Committee on Armed Services
U.S. House of Representatives
May 1, 2019

Introduction

Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thornberry, distinguished Members of the Committee: Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I am honored to be here in the company of General O'Shaughnessy, the Commander of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), Admiral Faller, the Commander of U.S. Southern Command, and Kathryn Wheelbarger, the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

As the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security, I am the principal civilian policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on a diverse range of matters, including Homeland Defense, Cyber, Space, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, Mission Assurance, and Defense Support to Civil Authorities.

I would like to emphasize two key points for you today: (1) the U.S. homeland is not a sanctuary, rather, the homeland is a target in a complex global security environment in which every domain is contested; and (2) we have taken action, guided by key strategies, supported by analyses, and strengthened by partnerships, to ensure that our nation will prevail in this security environment.

Strategic Environment

The National Defense Strategy (NDS) depicts an increasingly complex global security environment, characterized by challenges to the free and open international order and the re-focusing on long-term, strategic competition. Every domain is contested—air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace. During, or preceding conflict, we can anticipate attacks against the United States homeland, including our critical defense, government, and economic infrastructure. Prior to hostilities, adversaries will conduct activities below the threshold of armed conflict designed to delay, degrade, and deny action by the United States and its allies and partners. While counter-terrorism will remain a core challenge, conflicts with near-peer nations will be radically different from the wars our nation has fought since the Soviet Union's collapse.

China and Russia

China and Russia challenge United States power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode our national security and prosperity. Both Russia and China have studied the capabilities that gave the United States over-match in Desert Storm, and are building militaries to counter them, in order to dramatically reducing our advantage. The degradation of our competitive edge against China and Russia continues to be a central challenge for the Department of Defense (DoD). To deter conflict and preserve peace, we must be prepared to prevail against near-peer competitors.

In its efforts to coerce the U.S., China has fielded its first aircraft carrier; developed anti-satellite capabilities; advanced its short, medium, and long-range missiles; deployed anti-ship ballistic missiles; continued development of an increasingly sophisticated integrated air and missile defense system; successfully tested hypersonic glide vehicles; modernized and expanded its nuclear capabilities; and claimed, or created, and militarized islands in the South China Sea.

As these developments indicate, wars of the future will be waged not just on the land, in the air, and at sea, but also in space and cyberspace – we must anticipate multi-dimensional attacks targeted not just against our military forces, but on critical infrastructure at home.

Additionally, the Arctic is fast becoming a front line of defense for the United States and Canada as China and Russia compete for economic and military control in the region. Defense of the U.S. homeland increasingly depends on our ability to deter, detect, and defeat threats both in and passing through the Arctic. DoD must ensure the security of U.S. Arctic interests, including open sea lanes of communications, while promoting cooperation with our competitors.

North Korea and Iran

Rogue regimes such as North Korea and Iran pose threats to the United States, its allies, and its partners. They have demonstrated an interest in weapons of mass destruction (WMD), as well as long range missile capabilities. They have also given missile capabilities to malign actors, as demonstrated by Iranian ballistic missile exports. Both are also developing cyber

capabilities to target our defense capabilities, civilian critical infrastructure, and economy. Iran continues to use state-sponsored terrorism, a growing network of proxies, and its missile program to achieve its objectives.

Violent Extremist Organizations

While ISIS's physical caliphate has been defeated, threats across the globe persist. Despite our successes, terrorists still actively seek to harm the United States and its citizens, its allies, and its partners. Terrorists also continue to pursue WMD, made easier by the spread of nuclear weapon technology and advanced manufacturing capabilities. The continued emergence of dangerous naturally occurring pathogens coupled with advances in bioengineering increase the potential for, expand the variety of, ease access to biological agents, and challenge our ability to defend against them. Along with novel approaches to delivery, this increases the potential for the use of pathogens as a weapon, including by terrorists. Also, terrorists, trans-national criminal organizations, cyber hackers, and other malicious non-state actors threaten us with increasingly sophisticated capabilities, including tools of mass disruption, such as cyber capabilities.

Support of Civil Authorities

The National Security Strategy (NSS) states that our nation must "take steps to respond quickly to meet the needs of the American people in the event of natural disaster or attack on our homeland." The NSS also directs that "[re]establishing lawful control of our borders is a first step toward protecting the American homeland and strengthening American sovereignty." In support of the NSS, DoD is answering the call to support civil authorities: in response to natural disasters such as hurricanes, earthquakes, wildfires, floods, and pandemic diseases and man-made threats such as terrorism and terrorist use of WMD; to secure special events such as the State of the Union Address and the United Nations General Assembly; to protect our nation's elections against malign foreign influence; to secure our borders, and to respond to other national security threats.

Strategic Approach

In this strategic environment and with its challenges, we are not sitting idly by. Three strategies guide and synchronize our approach: the 2017 NSS, the 2018 NDS, and the 2019 National Military Strategy (NMS).

The NSS directs the U.S. Government to “protect the American people, the homeland, and the American way of life.” In support of the NSS, the NDS directs the DoD to be prepared to defend the U.S. homeland, remain the preeminent military power globally, ensure the balances of power remains in our favor, and advance an international order most conducive to our security and prosperity. The defense objectives of the NDS include: defending the U.S. homeland from attack in all domains; dissuading, preventing, or deterring state adversaries and non-state actors from acquiring, proliferating, or using WMD; and preventing terrorists from directing or supporting external operations against the U.S. homeland and our citizens, allies, and partners. The NMS *operationalizes* the NDS by establishing a framework to inform force employment prioritization, force development and force design. It also explains how the joint force will maintain its advantage now and in the future and, should deterrence fail, be prepared to win.

Collectively, these National and Defense strategies emphasize the need to: enhance our ability to deter adversary aggression; strengthen and diversify our response options should deterrence fail; and pursue advanced technology development at the speed of relevance.

We Are Acting To Implement Strategy

DoD is improving its defensive capabilities. Our actions will: deny adversary benefits from aggression; impose costs on adversaries should they commit acts of aggression against the U.S. and its strategic interests; and, better protect our surge capabilities when projecting power.

Air and Missile Defense

To improve our defensive capabilities, we are investing in air and missile defense. In 2017 the President directed the fielding of an additional 20 ground-based interceptors (GBI) in Alaska; increasing the number of GBIs protecting the homeland from 44 to 64. The 2019 Missile Defense Review directs DoD to, among other things: develop a new kill vehicle for the GBI; deploy new missile tracking sensors in Alaska, Hawaii, and the Pacific; and, bolster U.S.

homeland defenses against cruise missile threats to the National Capital Region while examining technologies and concepts to expand this defense. The Commander, NORAD and USNORTHCOM, is currently reevaluating Phase 3 of the Homeland Defense Design to ensure that the DoD is appropriately postured. Enhancing missile defense capabilities will strengthen our position against adversaries.

Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems

In the face of the proliferation and operation of unmanned aircraft, we appreciate the vital support of Congress for the Department's ability to protect its installations, activities, and personnel in the U.S. homeland. The Department is integrating and accelerating its research, development, testing, evaluation, and deployment of counter unmanned aircraft systems capabilities. In support of this effort, the Department is requesting that Congress continue to enhance the Department's authority to protect its facilities and assets from the growing threat posed by the malevolent use of unmanned aircraft in the U.S. homeland.

The Arctic

The Department is also improving its defensive posture in the approaches to North America, especially the Arctic. A joint U.S. and Canadian effort is identifying technology options that could modernize the North Warning System – the radars that provide threat warning and surveillance for the northern approaches to North America. In October 2018, DoD demonstrated use of the NDS's Dynamic Force Employment concept by deploying a carrier strike group north of the Arctic Circle for the first time in 20 years.

Space

Space capabilities underpin the U.S. way-of-life and way-of-war. The United States faces serious and growing challenges to its freedom to operate in space. China and Russia have studied how the U.S. joint force operates and are developing, testing, and fielding counter-space capabilities to defeat U.S. and allied space capabilities. The President's National Strategy for Space directs the transformation of our space posture to expand our margin of dominance through: resilient, diverse, and defensible systems; and deterrence and warfighting capabilities. The President's 2020 Budget Request increases the Department's Space budget by more than 15

percent to \$14.1 billion. DoD is also building the organizational structures needed to fight and win in Space, including: the Space Force to organize, train, and equip joint forces; U.S. Space Command to employ joint warfighting forces; and the Space Development Agency to accelerate the fielding of advanced and needed space capabilities. The Department is also leveraging its partnerships and alliances to prepare for combined space operations.

Cyberspace

The President has given clear direction through the National Cyber Strategy and streamlined interagency decision-making processes. DoD's Defense Cyber Strategy and first-ever Cyber Posture Review chart a path forward for the Department to compete successfully with adversaries by improving response options below and above the threshold of armed conflict. The elevation of U.S. Cyber Command and the buildup of the Cyber Mission Force provide the organization and force structure to achieve U.S. national security objectives. The President's 2020 Budget Request increases DoD's cyberspace budget by more than 10 percent to \$9.6 billion to focus on implementing the 2018 Defense Cyber Strategy.

To enhance our cyber defenses, we have strengthened interagency collaboration. In particular, DoD and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) are cooperating to secure and defend the U.S. homeland from cyber threats, capitalizing on our departments' mutually reinforcing roles. The DoD, in collaboration with interagency and private financial and energy sector partners, is developing a "Pathfinder" process for real-time sharing of actionable cyber threat information. We will build on Pathfinder lessons as we expand this effort to include other critical infrastructure sectors.

The Department leveraged all of these cyber tools last year as it worked with its interagency partners to defend the 2018 U.S. midterm elections from external interference.

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction

Against the spread of WMD, the Department is focused on: preventing proliferation globally, working with U.S. and foreign partners, and ensuring U.S. military forces are prepared to respond to WMD incidents and operate in WMD environments. In the Western Hemisphere,

we engage with U.S. and foreign partners through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a global effort to stop trafficking of WMD and their delivery systems. As the WMD threat has evolved and increased, so too has the need to measure our success and look for process efficiencies, international partnerships, and new technologies that can improve homeland defense capabilities. In 2018, we established the Countering WMD Unity of Effort Council to: share information; improve cooperation; identify challenges and generate solutions; and inform actions consistent with the NDS and the Department's Strategy for Countering WMD. These efforts strengthen DoD's ability to detect and respond to WMD threats.

Protecting Critical Infrastructure

We are working with our Federal partners, and with the public and private sectors to share threat information affecting Defense Critical Infrastructure and the Defense Industrial Base. The Department's Mission Assurance Strategy identifies and prioritizes our most critical assets, evaluates their vulnerabilities, and emplaces risk mitigation measures to enhance their resilience. In particular, the Department's RESILIENT EAGLE pilot project is designed to extend the mission assurance process into the Defense Industrial Base supply chains.

Within the framework of the NDS's Global Operating Model and the NMS, we are implementing initiatives to build resilience into the Joint Force. We are ensuring our ability to flow forces within and from the U.S., a key component of overcoming adversary aggression. DoD's initiatives to reinforce homeland defense will improve resiliency, supporting U.S. national objectives and ensuring the DoD can project power during any crisis or conflict.

Defense Support of Civil Authorities

DoD is better prepared to assist civil authorities to respond to threats to the homeland than at any other time in our Nation's history. We maintain this level of preparedness by continual and integrated planning, training, exercises, and real-world experience.

To that end, the Department continues to support civil authorities. In 2018, DoD responded to 154 requests for assistance. So far in 2019, DoD has responded to 25 requests for assistance, including from DHS, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the

Department of Health and Human Services to assist with: the safety and security of special events; responding to natural disasters such as a typhoon, flooding in Nebraska, and continued assistance to DHS to secure the U.S. southern border.

In his April 4, 2018, memorandum, “Securing the Southern Border of the United States”, the President recognized that “security of the United States is imperiled by a drastic surge of illegal activity on the southern border.” The President directed the Secretary of Defense to support “the Department of Homeland Security in securing the southern border and taking other necessary actions to stop the flow of deadly drugs and other contraband, gang members and other criminals, and illegal aliens into this country”; and work with the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Attorney General, to determine what other resources and actions are necessary to protect the southern border.

On February 15, 2019, the President determined that the “current situation at the southern border presents a border security and humanitarian crisis that threatens core national security interests and constitutes a national emergency” and “requires the use of the armed forces.” In doing so, the President invoked section 2808 of title 10, U.S. Code, and made available, according to its terms, to the Secretary of Defense the authority to undertake military construction projects, not otherwise authorized by law, that are necessary to support such use of the armed forces in connection with the national emergency.

Conclusion

Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thornberry, distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Committee. I appreciate the critical role Congress plays in ensuring that the Department is prepared to compete, deter, and win in every contested domain – air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace.

Driven and focused by key strategies, supported by analyses, and strengthened by partnerships, we continue to improve our ability to defend the U.S. homeland in all domains, counter the WMD threat, and develop capabilities to defend the nation’s interests globally.

I especially thank the men and women of the DoD – military and civilian, Active, Guard, and Reserve – and their families for all that they do every day to keep our nation safe and secure.

Introduction for Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense Wheelbarger

Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thornberry, distinguished Members of the Committee: Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I am honored to be here in the company of General O’Shaughnessy, Admiral Faller, and Assistant Secretary of Defense Rapuano.

As the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, I am the principal civilian policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on international security strategy and defense policy issues relating to the nations and international organizations in Europe, Russia, the Middle East, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere. I also am responsible for oversight of security cooperation programs, and for defense policy related to the campaign to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in these regions.

It is an honor to be with you to share the Defense Department’s regional policy objectives and our perspectives on defense in the Americas. We are perhaps at an unprecedented time of cooperation and shared vision among the nations in our hemisphere. Our hemisphere is a region of great opportunity where, with a few notable exceptions, we support shared values, including the defense of democracy, respect for fundamental human rights, the rule of law, and peace.

Although we enjoy enormous potential, we face some very real dangers. The tragedy that is occurring in Venezuela is a prime example. The corrupt Maduro regime – with support from Russia, Cuba, and China – deny Venezuelans food and medicine, and has made a once proud and prosperous country destitute. In response to this crisis, there is regional unity in support of the Venezuelan people. Most governments of the region recognize the Venezuelan National Assembly’s recognized leader, Interim President Juan Guaidó. Neighboring countries provide generous refuge to Venezuelans fleeing their country. The Lima Group has led in denouncing the dictatorship of Maduro. The U.S. Government, along with our partners, is using diplomatic, and economic means to pressure Maduro and is responding to Interim President Guaidó’s call for

humanitarian assistance for the Venezuelan people. We in the Department of Defense have assisted in delivering more than 120 Metric Tons of aid from the U.S. Agency for International Development in Colombia to be ready to help Venezuelans. The United States will stand with the people of Venezuela until their democracy and liberty are restored.

Venezuela is the most striking challenge to stability in the region today, but we cannot ignore other challenges. The failed models of Cuba and Nicaragua fall further behind as other countries in our hemisphere implement democratic reforms. Terrorist organizations, such as the ELN and FARC remnants that find harbor in Venezuela, and other criminal organizations, threaten Colombian citizens. Illicit trafficking corrupts societies in many countries and exacerbates violence. External actors, such as China and Russia, do not share our interest in a prosperous and peaceful region, but instead threaten sovereignty and seek undue influence over other countries' political, diplomatic, and economic decisions. Finally, natural disasters pose significant risks and devastate our region, requiring a coordinated response among all nations concerned with the suffering of the citizens of our hemisphere.

These challenges are real, and the Department of Defense takes the long view in how we, together with our regional partners, can best address them. Our vision is that this hemisphere remains a collaborative, prosperous, and secure region. It is a region where nations prefer to work with the United States, and together we advance shared interests both regionally and globally. The Department of Defense has several primary objectives for the region:

1. **Collaborating with our Partners:** Our ability to work together with our partners is paramount. In the Department of Defense, we work to deepen our relationships with our NATO and NORAD ally Canada, and with other partner nations that can and will contribute to our shared regional and global security challenges. These relationships are not limited to our traditional train and equip programs, but focus on a strategic level of cooperation. We strive for interoperability among our forces and seek to improve our abilities to share vital intelligence, increase our defense science and technology and trade cooperation, build increased capacity in cyber, and increase the complexity and frequency of our bilateral and multilateral exercises. We are stronger together, and our emphasis in this area ensures that the threats and challenges we face together can be resolved together.

2. **Addressing Great Power Competition:** The Western Hemisphere is also a region of Great Power competition. China and Russia continue their efforts to deepen influence in the Western Hemisphere through predatory economic practices, offers of security cooperation, and by propping up repressive regimes. By contrast, the United States works to gain the trust of our partners, build their capacity, and utilize our respective expertise to enhance our bilateral and multilateral operations together. We seek to share information with our partners across all domains, whether it be in the air, maritime, land, space, and cyber realms built upon a foundation of respect, collaboration, and shared desire to bolster prosperity and security throughout the Hemisphere.

The authoritarian model offered by China and Russia is one where they often seek to use economic, diplomatic, and security means to gain undue influence over the sovereign decisions of others. This model is not consistent with the values we share with our partners in the region. Yet, both have a growing Spanish language media presence that spreads misinformation about U.S. activities and intentions. Left unchecked, China and Russia's aggressive marketing of information technology and cyber cooperation creates dependencies and vulnerabilities that could limit DoD's ability to deepen cooperation with our partners and risk the security of the region's communications.

As China expands access to markets, natural resources, and port infrastructure in the region, it uses predatory economic policies to exert leverage, gain access to key infrastructure, and create extractive relationships. Chinese destabilizing influence, includes drug trafficking and illegal fishing. Chinese infrastructure investment has been pursued in ways that undermine host nation oversight and sovereignty, as well as the security and values of its people, including in its development of regional commercial and governmental telecommunications systems, the Panama Canal facilities, and the satellite facility in Argentina. China has also used its economic might to diminish international recognition of Taiwan by pressuring those Latin American countries that still recognize Taiwan.

Russia is focused on increasing its role as a provider of military training and arms sales while demonstrating military presence near the United States by deploying warships and bombers

to the region. Russia has increased support the Maduro regime at the expense of the Venezuelan people and its neighbors, sending weapons, materiel, and disinformation support. China remains a key financial backer of the region while also embedding telecommunications support and personnel that could help monitor citizens' behavior. Instead, the United States has provided hundreds of humanitarian assistance and deployed a hospital ship that treated thousands of people.

The United States will continue to pursue collaborative, transparent means to highlight the differences between U.S. engagement and that of our competitors. We will work to ensure our partners are aware of the threats to their sovereignty posed, for instance, by China's acquisition of critical infrastructure, predatory loans, and illegal fishing, or by the dependence created through security relationships with Russia.

3. **Illicit Trafficking:** The Department of Defense wants to counter illicit trafficking, which not only impacts the United States, but affects the safety, security, and prosperity of the citizens of the region. Drug cartels and criminal organizations create fear, promote corruption, increase instability, and negatively impact legitimate economies. The Department of Defense helps to counter trafficking by supporting our law enforcement agencies and providing monitoring and detection capabilities. USSOUTHCOM's Joint Inter-Agency Task Force leads a multi-national effort for interdiction operations. Our capacity building programs with partner countries contribute to this success. Beyond simply conducting maritime interdiction activities, we also improve the security of citizens in their own countries. We work closely with our colleagues from the Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Justice to promote cooperation among the militaries and law enforcement agencies of our partners. We also continue our strong emphasis on human rights training as fundamental to the basic security of citizens and the effectiveness of military and police actions.
4. **Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR):** We also prioritize regional cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts. Natural disasters, including earthquakes, hurricanes, and infectious disease outbreaks, affect the hemisphere on a yearly basis. We strive to respond in a unified way to address these threats and reduce human

suffering, reduce pressures on migration and associated instability, and promote military and security force interoperability for regional HA/DR operations. The Conference of the Defense Ministers of the Americas last year decided to promote regional humanitarian assistance and disaster relief cooperation as a permanent topic for the agenda of the Conference. The Inter-American Defense Board is also playing a critical role in facilitating this cooperation. Last year's deployment of the USNS COMFORT to South and Central America exemplified strong multilateral cooperation and commitment to the region, providing much needed medical assistance to nations affected by the influx of Venezuelan refugees.

5. **Defense Institution Building:** We emphasize defense institution building as an increasingly important aspect of our efforts in the hemisphere. A pillar of the U.S. National Defense Strategy is institutional reform. Strong institutions and anti-corruption efforts are intended to make efficient use of limited budgets and sustain warfighting capabilities over time. In conducting defense institution building initiatives with our partners, we seek to share experiences and help them implement processes that magnify the effectiveness of all other aspects of our cooperation. We have defense institution building efforts underway now with Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Guatemala, at both the strategic and operational levels, and we seek to expand those efforts to a broader number of countries, given increasing demand. The William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies is one of the Department's lead implementers of defense institution building efforts and has fostered numerous regional and bilateral strategic policy-level discussions on this topic.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I would like to note that we in the Department of Defense take a global view of the challenges facing the United States. We know that not only our partners, but also our competitors, watch closely how the United States faces the challenges in our hemisphere. Some actively promote a narrative of U.S. decline and disengagement. That narrative is false. The Department of Defense will sustain and sharpen our engagements with partners, gaining trust and proving our value as the partner of choice. We will build on the unique opportunities we now have, and work to build the capabilities of all partners willing and able to contribute to our shared objectives.

Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thornberry, distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Committee.

Kenneth P. Rapuano
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security

Mr. Kenneth P. Rapuano is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security. Previously Mr. Rapuano was a Senior Vice President at the ANSER Corporation, and the Director of the Studies and Analysis Group which provided multi-disciplinary studies and operational analysis for a broad array of government clients in the national security, homeland security areas. Up until November of 2016, Mr. Rapuano Directed the Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute (HSSAI), a Federally Funded Research and Development Corporation (FFRDC) operated by ANSER, a mission oriented not-for-profit organization.

Prior to joining ANSER Mr. Rapuano was the Director of Advanced Systems at the MITRE Corporation. He was responsible for guiding crosscutting strategic national and homeland security mission initiatives, with particular focus on counterterrorism, intelligence, aviation security, crisis management/decision support, national preparedness, and CWMD.

Previously, Mr. Rapuano served at the White House as Deputy Homeland Security Advisor to President George W. Bush from 2004-2006. He was responsible for managing the development and implementation of homeland security policies among departments and agencies, chaired the Homeland Security Council Deputies Committee, and co-chaired the White House Counterterrorism Security Group. He left the White House in 2006 to volunteer for deployment as a Marine Corps officer to Afghanistan with a Joint Special Operations Task Force, establishing and directing a targeting fusion center tracking high-value terrorists and insurgents. He also served in Iraq in 2003, commanding the Joint Interrogations and Debriefing Center of the Iraq Survey Group established to conduct the mission of surveying and exploiting possible weapons of mass destruction activities across Iraq.

In 2003, Mr. Rapuano was appointed Deputy Under Secretary for Counter Terrorism at the Department of Energy, responsible for nuclear counter terrorism, homeland security, emergency response, and all related special access programs for DOE and the National Nuclear Security Administration. Previous to that, he was the National Security Advisor to the Secretary of Energy. Mr. Rapuano has also served as Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Policy. He served 21 years on active duty and in the reserves as a Marine Corps infantry officer and intelligence officer.

Mr. Rapuano has also served as a Distinguished Research Fellow at the National Defense University's Center for the Study of WMD, as a member of the Defense Science Board Task Force on the Role of DoD in Homeland Defense, the Pacific Northwest National Lab's National Security Advisory Committee, the FBI's Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate Advisory Group, the DHS Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Advisory Committee, and the DHS Science and Technology Advisory Committee.

Mr. Rapuano received a bachelor's degree in Political Science from Middlebury College, a master's degree in National Security Studies from Georgetown University, and has attended the Marine Corps Air-Ground Task Force Intelligence Officer Course at the Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence School.

Kathryn Wheelbarger
Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

Kathryn Wheelbarger is the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. She performed the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from July 2017 to November 2017. She oversees policy issues related to the nations and international organizations of Europe (including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), Russia, the Middle East, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere.

Previously, Ms. Wheelbarger served as Vice President for Litigation and Chief Compliance Officer at CSRA Inc. In this position, Ms. Wheelbarger managed CSRA's litigation and investigations portfolio as well as oversaw the company's Ethics and Compliance Office.

From 2011–2017, Ms. Wheelbarger served within Congress as Policy Director and Counsel on the Senate Armed Services Committee, where she specifically handled the Committee's intelligence portfolio for Chairman John McCain; and as Deputy Staff Director and Senior Counsel on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, where she performed budget and policy reviews of IC programs, led investigations, and developed policy positions for Chairman Mike Rogers.

Prior to working in Congress, Ms. Wheelbarger served as Counsel to Vice President Richard Cheney and general counsel to the Vice President's 80-person staff from 2007–2009, and as Counselor to Secretary Chertoff and Associate General Counsel at the Department of Homeland Security from 2005-2007. Before entering the Executive Branch, Ms. Wheelbarger was a litigator with two law firms and served as a judicial clerk on the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in Boise, Idaho. Ms. Wheelbarger is a Summa Cum Laude graduate from UCLA and Cum Laude graduate from Harvard Law School.

**STATEMENT OF
GENERAL TERENCE J. O'SHAUGHNESSY, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
COMMANDER
UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND
AND
NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND**



**BEFORE THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
1 MAY 2019**

Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thornberry, and distinguished members of the Committee, I am honored to appear today as the Commander of United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)—two complementary but distinct commands.

USNORTHCOM is the Geographic Combatant Command laser-focused on defending our homeland from an increasingly assertive set of competitors who are committed to holding the United States at risk in multiple domains. USNORTHCOM is also responsible for defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) and theater security cooperation (TSC) within our area of responsibility. Nested under the broader homeland defense mission, DSCA and TSC play a critical and visible role in protecting our citizens and enhancing security for the United States and our international partners.

NORAD is the bi-national U.S.-Canadian command that deters, detects, and, if necessary, defeats air threats to the United States and Canada while also providing aerospace warning and maritime warning. The six decades of NORAD's unmatched experience and shared history are proving more vital than ever as we face the most complex security environment in generations. This unique and longstanding command serves as both a formidable deterrent to our adversaries and a clear symbol of the unbreakable bond between the United States and Canada.

USNORTHCOM and NORAD are driven by a single unyielding priority: defending the homeland from attack. Revisionist powers Russia and China have changed global strategic dynamics by fielding advanced long-range weapons systems and engaging in increasingly aggressive efforts to expand their global presence and influence, including in the approaches to the United States and Canada. Our competitors currently hold our citizens and national interests

at risk, and we must anticipate attacks against our defense and civilian infrastructure in the event of a conflict. As a result, it is clear that the homeland is no longer a sanctuary.

For that reason, improving our ability to detect and defeat cruise missile attacks is among my highest priorities. Russia has made its strategic intentions clear by investing heavily in long-range, low radar cross section cruise missiles that can be fired from aircraft or submarines against targets well inside the borders of the United States and Canada. To safeguard our citizens and critical infrastructure, and to preserve our ability to rapidly project power abroad, it will be necessary to take deliberate and focused measures to improve our cruise missile defenses.

These shifting global military and political dynamics will be with us for the foreseeable future. Our competitors have fielded weapons systems and employed new methods in a concerted effort to exploit perceived vulnerabilities and erode our strategic advantage. The successful defense of our homeland today relies more than ever on constant vigilance by USNORTHCOM and NORAD, tightly coupled with a reinvigorated emphasis on close integration with our fellow combatant commands, the intelligence community, and our allies and partners. Collectively, these dynamics reinforce the importance of nuclear deterrence to our national security, given that nuclear deterrence backstops all U.S. military operations and diplomacy across the globe.

The threats facing our nation are not hypothetical; our competitors' reach is now global, and they are conspicuously undermining international norms and standards of behavior while possessing the capability to strike targets in North America with both nuclear and advanced non-nuclear weapons launched from well beyond our territory. In light of this reality, the homeland defense mission is more essential than ever, and USNORTHCOM and NORAD must be energized, proactive, and determined to actively shape our strategic environment. Together with

our Department of Defense (DOD), interagency, and international partners, we have taken active measures to ensure the homeland defense enterprise is globally integrated, well-exercised, and positioned to take quick, decisive action to protect our interests and preserve the ability to project all of the elements of our national power. And, should deterrence fail, USNORTHCOM and NORAD stand always ready to defeat any threat to our nations.

Our collective ability to confront these challenges is dependent on a national commitment to protecting and defending the homeland. Budget stability and predictability are essential underpinnings of this commitment, and I ask for the committee's support of the President's budget for FY20—and specifically for relief from the budget caps directed in the Budget Control Act of 2011. A return to sequestration will devastate total force readiness and delay or terminate modernization efforts that are necessary to maintaining our strategic and technological advantage. Simply put, sequestration will make it impossible for USNORTHCOM and NORAD to advance necessary homeland defense efforts and shape our changing national security environment as articulated in the National Defense Strategy.

Threat

Russia:

Russia has posed a nuclear threat to North America for over half a century, but has only recently developed and deployed capabilities to threaten us below the nuclear threshold. Russia continues to hone and flex its offensive cyber capabilities, and its new generation of air- and sea-launched cruise missiles feature significantly greater standoff ranges and accuracy than their predecessors, allowing them to strike North America from well outside NORAD radar coverage.

Since 2015, Russia has employed its new air- and sea-launched cruise missiles against anti-regime targets in Syria, providing real-world training for Russian crews and demonstrating its

growing precision-strike capabilities to the West. In a parallel effort, Russia has implemented a modernization program for its heavy bombers that will ensure their ability to perform nuclear and non-nuclear deterrence and strike missions in the coming decades.

Russian heavy bombers such as the Tu-95MS BEAR and Tu-160 BLACKJACK continue to conduct regular air patrols in the international airspace along the coastlines of other countries to underscore Russia's capabilities. Russian bomber crews are demonstrating increasing proficiency in their flight activities, developing a new generation of air crews capable of employing this highly visible implement of Russian deterrence and messaging in peacetime, crisis, and war.

Patrols by Russian military aircraft off the coasts of the United States and Canada have grown increasingly complex in recent years. NORAD fighter aircraft routinely intercept Russian military aviation missions inside the U.S. and Canadian Air Defense Identification Zones, and there is no indication that Russian leadership intends to reduce the number of these missions in the near future.

In addition to its highly capable cruise missiles that enable its anti-ship and land-attack missions, Russia has introduced the Severodvinsk-class guided missile submarine, which is armed with advanced land-attack cruise missiles and is much quieter and more lethal than previous generations of Russian attack submarines. Russia's growing non-nuclear capabilities provide Moscow a range of options to dissuade an adversary from escalating and to terminate a conflict on terms favorable to Moscow, increasing the potential for miscalculation or opportunistic actions.

Russia has demonstrated a willingness to conduct disruptive cyberattacks and cyber-enabled influence operations against its competitors, as it demonstrated during the 2016 election cycle in

the United States. In a crisis or conflict, we would expect Russia to conduct cyber operations against critical infrastructure in an attempt to compel de-escalation.

In the Arctic, Moscow is planning to deploy surface vessels armed with the modular KALIBR-NK cruise missile system that will offer highly precise land-attack capabilities and introduce a new cruise missile threat from our northern approaches. Separately, Moscow continues to bolster its military defenses in the Arctic with the deployment of a K-300P Bastion coastal defense cruise missile system on the New Siberian Islands, significantly increasing Russia's ability to defend and control a large stretch of the Northern Sea Route.

Finally, Russia is developing multiple weapon systems specifically designed to circumvent U.S. missile defenses and hold our homeland at risk. This includes the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)-delivered AVANGARD hypersonic glide vehicle, which was highlighted in a speech by Vladimir Putin in March 2018 and is expected to become operational in the next few years, complicating our missile warning mission.

China:

China is pursuing a comprehensive military modernization program that includes a rapid expansion of its strategic nuclear capabilities while working to improve the survivability of its nuclear forces and increase their ability to ensure a credible second-strike capability. Over the last decade, China has supplemented its modest silo-based ICBM force with dozens of road-mobile ICBMs capable of delivering multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles that could significantly increase the number of survivable warheads available for a retaliatory strike. During that same timeframe, China operationalized its first class of ballistic missile submarines, adding a second leg to its strategic deterrent. China maintains its longstanding no-first-use nuclear policy, but its growing nuclear, conventional, and cyber capabilities are significant.

China's military strategy and ongoing People's Liberation Army (PLA) reforms reflect the abandonment of its historically land-centric mentality, as evidenced by emerging doctrinal references to strategies that would move potential conflicts away from Chinese territory, suggesting that PLA strategists envision an increasingly global role for their military.

On the economic front, China plans to invest heavily in infrastructure projects in Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Africa through its Belt and Road Initiative in a major effort to develop stronger economic ties with other countries and shape their interests to align with China's, simultaneously seeking to deter confrontation or international criticism of China's approach to sensitive issues.

In the cyber domain, Chinese leaders view computer network operations as a low-cost deterrent that demonstrates capabilities and resolve to an adversary and allows them to manage the escalation of a conflict by targeting critical military and civilian infrastructure. Ongoing military reforms are aimed at accelerating the incorporation of information systems that enable forces and commanders to carry out missions and tasks more effectively.

Advanced Threat Technologies:

Defending the United States and Canada against long-range weapons systems capable of striking targets in the homeland is a major focus of both USNORTHCOM and NORAD. Russian aircraft and submarines are now armed with long-range cruise missiles designed to evade radar detection, while both Russia and China are developing and testing maneuverable hypersonic glide vehicles. In the cyber domain, our adversaries continue their non-stop efforts to penetrate defense and civilian networks. Collectively, these advanced technologies could be capable of creating strategic effects with non-nuclear weapons, potentially affecting national decision making and limiting response options in both peacetime and crisis.

North Korea:

After decades of research and development activity marked more by failure than success, North Korea's ICBM program turned the corner in 2017 when North Korea successfully flight-tested multiple ICBMs capable of ranging the continental United States and detonated a thermonuclear device, increasing the destructive yield of its weapons by a factor of ten. Following these successes, Kim Jong Un declared the completion of his nuclear ICBM research and development program, implying the production and deployment of these systems would soon follow.

Kim Jong Un developed these strategic weapons to deter the U.S. from overthrowing his regime, and he almost certainly has plans to use them against our Homeland should a conflict erupt on the Peninsula. Meanwhile, North Korea's cyber capabilities continue to grow, as does the country's willingness to employ them during peacetime, as North Korea demonstrated by its cyber attacks on Sony Pictures in 2014.

Iran:

Iran is not yet able to strike the United States with strategic weapons, and its leaders have declared a unilateral 2000 kilometer range restriction that limits its missile force to threatening only regional targets in the Near East. Iran's SIMORGH space launch vehicle has yet to successfully place a satellite in orbit, but its most recent launch in January 2019 demonstrated continued progress on long-range missile technologies. Although we have no information to indicate that Iran intends to test and deploy an ICBM, the SIMORGH would be capable of ICBM ranges if configured for that purpose, and progress on the vehicle could enable Iran to field an ICBM in as a little as a few years if its leaders chose to pursue that objective.

However, Iran has the largest ballistic missile arsenal in the region and has expended significant resources on its space launch and civil nuclear capabilities that could enable it to develop a nuclear-armed ICBM relatively quickly if its leaders chose to do so. In the meantime, Iran retains the ability to conduct attacks abroad via covert operations, terrorist proxies, and its growing cyber capabilities. Iran considers disruptive and destructive cyberspace operations as a valid instrument of statecraft and a means of imposing costs on its adversaries, even during peacetime.

Violent Extremist Organizations:

The terrorist threat to our homeland has grown more diffuse, typified by simple attacks inspired from afar and carried out by individuals or small networks that are difficult to detect and interdict. Foreign terrorist groups remain committed to attacking the United States, either directly or by inspiring homegrown violent extremists to act in their stead. Despite their territorial losses, the Islamic State and their counterparts in al-Qa'ida remain highly adaptive foes committed to attacking the United States.

Commercial aviation persists as a preferred target, probably because of the potential for large numbers of casualties, economic damage, and widespread media coverage generated by such attacks. I am concerned that terrorists could also continue to pursue 9/11-style fly-and-crash attacks or the use of unmanned aerial systems against soft targets. Meanwhile, terrorists continue to target U.S. military personnel both on and off base, compounding our force protection challenges.

Defending the Homeland

Homeland defense is USNORTHCOM's essential mission and the number one priority of the DOD per the 2018 National Defense Strategy. In light of the complex and significant threats

to our homeland, USNORTHCOM and NORAD take assertive, proactive measures each day to shape our strategic environment, deter aggression, and ensure that we are always ready to defeat any adversary should deterrence fail. As the Commander of USNORTHCOM and NORAD, I view everything the commands do through the lens of homeland defense, and I am committed to ensuring that each of our missions help to preserve decision space and maintain the ability for our national leaders to project power and exert influence in the best interest of our nations.

In pursuit of their own perceived national and ideological interests, our competitors have developed advanced capabilities and demonstrated their intent to hold our homeland at risk in multiple domains and along numerous avenues of approach to North America. In light of that reality, we simply do not have the luxury of waiting for others to act before we formulate a response. Instead, USNORTHCOM and NORAD work constantly to shape our theater while making it obvious to potential adversaries that they will face overlapping dilemmas and extraordinary costs should they choose to challenge us. This active and continuous enterprise requires strong relationships and close coordination with our fellow combatant commands, the military Services, the U.S. Federal interagency community, and our international allies and partners.

The diverse threats arrayed against the United States and Canada challenge our defenses in a number of domains and along multiple avenues of approach. The men and women of USNORTHCOM and NORAD work around the clock to monitor those approaches and are ready to respond at a moment's notice should our adversaries chose to challenge our defenses.

Ballistic Missile Defense:

USNORTHCOM continues to prioritize our mission to defend the United States against potential intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) attacks from North Korea and Iran, should

Iran develop that capability. I remain cautiously optimistic that the ongoing negotiations will lead North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons and ICBM programs. But, in the meantime, I continue to emphasize the necessity of fielding improved discriminating radars, a more survivable sensor network, and improving the reliability and lethality of our interceptor fleet in order to remain well ahead of North Korea or Iran's capability to strike the defended area.

I am confident in the ability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense System to defend the United States against ICBMs fired from North Korea or Iran, if Iran develops an ICBM, but that confidence is contingent on our continued pursuit of system-wide enhancements to outpace our adversaries' rapid technological advancements.

The success of the Ballistic Missile Defense mission is also dependent on strong cooperation between USNORTHCOM as the supported warfighting command and the technical experts of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). The MDA Director, Lt Gen Sam Greaves, is an outstanding partner, and I am grateful to him and the entire MDA team for their dedicated support of this enormously complex, no-fail mission. I fully support MDA's plans to field the Long-Range Discriminating Radar, Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii, and Pacific Radar, along with the Redesigned Kill Vehicle and a selectable 2- or 3- stage interceptor booster. Additionally, I believe we must pursue space-based sensors to detect and track advanced threats from Russia and China. Each of these improvements to our sensor network and interceptor fleet will help to ensure our ability to defend the United States against an ICBM attack now and into the foreseeable future.

To counter the rapid evolution of our adversaries' missile technologies, we will require advanced defensive technologies such as space-based sensors and directed-energy missile defeat technology in the near future. A space-based sensor network, in particular, will provide far

greater coverage, survivability, and persistence—all of which are necessary to maintaining confidence in our ability to deter, detect, and defeat missile threats to the homeland.

At present, I believe the DOD is striking an effective balance between ensuring our ability to defend against current and near-term threats while simultaneously investing in the research and development of advanced technologies capable of defeating future threats. This vision for meeting anticipated requirements is well articulated in the recently published Missile Defense Review, and I fully support the plan for defending the homeland.

Arctic Northern Approaches:

It has become clear that defense of the homeland depends on our ability to detect and defeat threats operating both *in* the Arctic and passing *through* the Arctic. Russia's fielding of advanced, long-range cruise missiles capable of flying through the northern approaches and striking targets in the United States and Canada has emerged as the dominant military threat in the Arctic, while diminished sea ice and the potential for competition over resources present overlapping challenges in this strategically significant region. Meanwhile, China has declared that it is not content to remain a mere observer in the Arctic and has taken action to normalize its naval and commercial presence in the region in order to increase its access to lucrative resources and shipping routes.

I view the Arctic as the front line in the defense of the United States and Canada, and as the DOD Advocate for Arctic Capabilities and the Combatant Commander responsible for defending the approaches to the homeland, I constantly assess the changing environmental and strategic conditions throughout the region—across borders and operational boundaries—in an ongoing, active, and collaborative effort to mitigate the risks associated with increased civilian and military presence in the northern approaches to North America.

The effort to rapidly adapt to the evolving strategic landscape and associated challenges in the Arctic includes a deliberate and ongoing effort to fully assess our collective missions and associated requirements in the region. As one key example of those ongoing assessments, in 2018, USNORTHCOM planners conducted a Homeland Defense Mission Analysis for the Arctic Region. This comprehensive, classified assessment of our capability to operate in the far north revalidated a number of known capability gaps in the region and provided an updated overview of current and future requirements.

As confirmed by our Mission Analysis, civil and military operations in the Arctic continue to be impeded by limited communications capability, harsh environmental conditions, and vast distances between population centers. Improving communications and domain awareness in the region are among my top priorities for the region, and the DOD and the military Services have demonstrated their support of those requirements through investment in programs such as the Multi User Objective System (MUOS)—a satellite-based communications network that significantly expands the ability of U.S. and Canadian assets to operate in the far north.

To detect and track potential airborne threats, to include Russian long-range bombers and cruise missiles, USNORTHCOM and NORAD both rely on radar systems such as the North Warning System (NWS), a network of aerospace surveillance radars in northern Canada. In August 2018, NORAD, working in close coordination with USNORTHCOM, the Canadian NORAD Region, and the U.S. Navy's Naval Air Warfare Center, conducted an operational assessment of the NWS against representative targets, and the data collected from the test will inform the design for the air domain defense of the United States and Canada for years to come.

And, in recognition that the number of military and civilian activities in Alaska and the Canadian Arctic will only continue to grow, USNORTHCOM is working hand-in-glove with the

U.S. Air Force and the National Guard Bureau (NGB) to procure additional Arctic Sustainment Packages (ASPs) for use by the Alaska National Guard. Each ASP is a palletized, air-droppable shelter kit that provides shelter, heat, and other life support capability for several weeks in Arctic environments in the event that weather or other environmental factors delay a rescue operation.

The ability of the joint force to fight and win in the extreme cold and isolation of the far north increasingly depends on placing specialized technology in the hands of military personnel who routinely train and operate in the region. Fortunately, there are units and DOD installations who are already well positioned to share that expertise. Essential experience resides in the units stationed in the far north—from the airborne brigade and fighter wings stationed in Alaska to the LC-130 Skibird pilots and crewmembers of the New York Air National Guard, we have a solid foundation to build on as we continue to increase Arctic experience across the force.

The military Services have committed to building on that that foundational experience and expertise through a number of efforts that will further the ability of the joint force to operate, fight, and win in the far north. In a key example, between 3,000 and 5,000 personnel will participate in the next iteration of USNORTHCOM's premier Arctic exercise, ARCTIC EDGE 2020, more than doubling the number of troops who participated in 2018. Arctic Edge 2020 will take advantage of the vast training area and unmatched training opportunities afforded by the Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC) and will integrate personnel and platforms from all four Services—to include ground, air, and cyber operations. This deliberate evolution sends the clear signal that USNORTHCOM, strongly supported by the Services, is fundamentally committed to expanding the ability of the joint force to defend our Arctic approaches and our vital interests in the region.

Air Domain:

Variants of the advanced cruise missiles that could fly through our northern approaches also present a threat along our coasts. Russian Severodvinsk-class submarines are capable of firing low radar cross section cruise missiles against critical targets along our coasts. This emerging threat requires advanced capabilities to ensure surveillance, detection, identification, targeting, and destruction to protect the homeland and key strategic targets in the United States and Canada.

The Homeland Defense Design will be a phased approach to employ advanced detection and tracking technologies to defeat a cruise missile attack against the homeland. However, the rapidity of our competitors' development of advanced cruise missile technology demands a continued, aggressive, and focused commitment to ensure our ability to defeat a cruise missile attack.

In addition, small unmanned aerial systems (UAS) continue to present challenges to safety and security within U.S. airspace. NORAD has the capability to address larger UAS, but systems that are readily available in the commercial marketplace are difficult to detect and track due to their small size and relatively slow speeds. While we work to enhance our ability to detect, and—if necessary—neutralize potential threat UAS in the national airspace, the authorities provided by the FY19 Federal Aviation Administration Reauthorization Bill that extend counter-UAS authorities to the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reflect the need for a whole-of-government approach to address the potential security challenges presented by this rapidly emerging technology.

As with emerging military cruise missile technologies, the proliferation of small UAS requires us to consider new approaches for how best to defend the homeland. We cannot address

these new capabilities with outdated technology or with old ways of thinking, and I look forward to working with the Committee to develop innovative technology and strategies to ensure that we are capable of outpacing the threat.

Southern Approaches:

The threats to our nation from our southern border are significant and deadly. The flow of illegal narcotics into the United States continues to inflict a heavy toll on our citizens, as clearly demonstrated by the 70,000 Americans who were killed by drug overdoses in 2017. USNORTHCOM is proud of our role in the counter narcotics fight in support of Federal law enforcement and our military partners in Mexico and The Bahamas as they battle transnational criminal organizations that have inflicted such harm on both sides of the border.

USNORTHCOM personnel actively collaborate with partners throughout the U.S. interagency and in Mexico to illuminate the networks used by the cartels to transport drugs, victims of human trafficking, and other illicit goods in a strategic effort to strike at the heart of these massive and well-financed criminal enterprises.

On the U.S. side of our southern border, USNORTHCOM's subordinate element Joint Task Force North (JTF-N) supports U.S. Federal law enforcement efforts to interdict narcotics shipments into the United States. Employing military personnel, unique technologies, and specialized skill sets developed in contingency operations overseas, JTF-N provides critical support to Federal law enforcement interdiction missions operations.

Theater Security Cooperation

USNORTHCOM's theater security cooperation mission pays enormous dividends for our defense of the homeland as well as for our relationships with our international partners. These collaborative efforts with our international partners seek to sustain our strategic advantage in the

Western Hemisphere while always seeking to strengthen our regional security and reinforce our defense in depth throughout the region.

In particular, USNORTHCOM's relationship with the Mexican military is strong. USNORTHCOM supports Mexico's efforts to expand its role as a regional defense and security leader. The ties between USNORTHCOM and our Mexican military partners are close at every level of leadership and continue to grow thanks to concerted efforts by commanders on both sides of the border. I am proud of the fact that every Mexican Marine has trained with a U.S. Marine, just as I am honored to share close relationships with the Mexican Secretary of National Defense (SEDENA), General Luis C. Sandoval Gonzalez, and the Secretary of the Navy (SEMAR), Admiral Jose Rafael Ojeda Duran. I am proud to work with partners who share our commitment to regional stability and security throughout North America.

The Bahamas remains a willing partner with whom the United States enjoys a deep and long-standing bi-national relationship, and our shared theater security cooperation focus is improving The Bahamas' air and maritime domain awareness. In 2018, the United States provided the first maritime surveillance system to The Bahamas and secured funding for two more systems that will be networked with existing surveillance assets, generating a significant increase to The Bahamas' maritime surveillance capacity. The Bahamas remains a strong partner in the defense of North America as they invest heavily in new capabilities that will make them a more significant contributor to our shared defense and security.

Finally, Canada continues to be our indispensable partner in reinforcing the defense and security of our countries. USNORTHCOM's security cooperation activities with Canada are extensive and reflect many years of shared effort and common cause with our allies to the North. In June 2017, Canada announced a new approach to defense investment that will provide

significant benefit to the common defense of our nations. This approach, titled “Strong, Secure, Engaged,” acknowledges the significant shifts in the global strategic environment and commits accordingly to an active and renewed NORAD partnership and investments that will directly benefit the security of both our nations.

In a military-to-military context, the tri-command partnership between USNORTHCOM, NORAD, and the Canadian Joint Operations Command is of tremendous importance to all three commands. The bond between these organizations reflects the cooperative approach we share with our Canadian partners as we work together to outpace the threats arrayed against the United States and Canada, maintain a credible deterrent, and take steps forward together to ensure the combined defense of our nations.

Defense Support of Civil Authorities

USNORTHCOM’s mission to provide defense support of civil authorities provides military personnel and assets to support Federal law enforcement and disaster relief agencies in times of need. In the nine months since I assumed command, USNORTHCOM has supported DHS, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the National Interagency Firefighting Center during hurricane relief operations, wildland firefighting missions, interagency collaboration to ensure that our elections were free from cyber interference, and presidentially-directed efforts to secure our southern border. For each of these events, USNORTHCOM rapidly delivered military-unique capabilities and skilled personnel to augment and enable our Federal partners.

In September 2018, Hurricane Florence provided USNORTHCOM the first opportunity to execute the Commander of USNORTHCOM’s expanded role as the DOD Synchronizer for defense support of civil authorities. The consolidation of the DOD effort under one Synchronizer

enabled significantly improved coordination and collaboration across the entire spectrum of the DOD response and consolidated the responsibility for collecting and delivering timely and accurate information to the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the DOD Synchronizer role increased the coordination and information exchange amongst the DOD agencies with major roles in the response, to include the National Guard Bureau, the Defense Logistics Agency, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).

USNORTHCOM support of hurricane relief operations had barely ended last fall, when, in response to requests for assistance from DHS and U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the Command was directed by the Secretary of Defense to deploy active duty military personnel and equipment to support Federal law enforcement operations along the southern border of the United States. Beginning in October 2018, this operation has demonstrated the close partnership between USNORTHCOM and our Federal law enforcement partners, as well as the outstanding support provided by each of the military Services and the Joint Staff in response to a USNORTHCOM request for forces.

Within hours of notification, Airmen, Soldiers, Sailors, and Marines from installations across the United States were on the move to support our DHS partners, and they have performed their assigned tasks with extraordinary professionalism and skill. From laying over 70 miles of concertina wire to reinforce existing border obstacles, flying support missions, delivering medical care, and providing security, the USNORTHCOM border support mission has improved our nation's border security while providing our forces with training and real-world experience that will serve them well in both peace and conflict.

Every mission presents unique challenges, and each is dependent on collaboration, strong partnerships, and close relationships throughout the Federal interagency and between the active

and reserve component. In a key demonstration of the strong collaboration between the components in the combined response to Hurricane Florence, North Carolina and South Carolina established Dual Status Commanders and successfully integrated National Guard and Title 10 personnel and assets in a wide variety of rescue and recovery operations.

I am proud of the great partnership demonstrated by USNORTHCOM and the National Guard Bureau before and during each of those responses. My friend and wingman Gen Joe Lengyel and the citizen Airmen and Soldiers he leads are a tremendous group of professionals who proved time and again their selflessness and readiness to respond whenever and wherever needed.

While hurricane relief operations may have been the most visible DSCA mission for the Command over the last several years, USNORTHCOM serves as the designated DSCA synchronizer for the DOD in a variety of other efforts. In a notable example of innovative interagency collaboration, prior to the 2018 midterm election season, USNORTHCOM partnered with U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) to determine how best to provide DOD cyber support to the DHS-led mission to secure the elections infrastructure. The partnership between USCYBERCOM, USNORTHCOM, the National Guard Bureau, and DHS was groundbreaking, and each of the agencies involved learned a number of important lessons for future interagency efforts.

Interagency cooperation in the defense of our critical cyber infrastructure will remain an enduring necessity as networks throughout the United States continue to weather near-constant attacks and infiltration attempts. In light of this need, I am grateful to the Congress for its strong support for the establishment of the DHS Cyber Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). Although CISA was only established in November 2018, it is already clear that we have an

energized, high-level interagency partner dedicated to our shared mission to address and mitigate cyber threats against civilian networks and critical infrastructure. Within weeks of its establishment, CISA assigned a senior liaison officer to the USNORTHCOM headquarters to work alongside the rest of our whole-of-government team, and I look forward to many years of close collaboration with our newest partner in the defense of our nation's vital interests.

Whenever our assistance is requested by our Federal partners, USNORTHCOM relies on the military Services to provide trained and ready personnel and assets whenever and wherever needed. As we saw firsthand in the days before Hurricane Florence made landfall in September 2018 and in the initial stages of our support to U.S. Customs and Border Protection along the southern border, the Joint Staff and all four of the military Services worked around the clock to identify, source, and deploy the personnel and equipment necessary to fulfill all anticipated requests for support from our Federal partners.

Due to the unhesitating support of the Joint Staff and each of the Service Chiefs, the requested forces were on station and ready to execute their support missions in a matter of hours and days following notification. In both scenarios, the remarkable men and women of our armed forces were ready to deploy on short notice and executed their assigned missions thanks to their training, professionalism, and discipline. USNORTHCOM will continue to work closely with the Joint Staff and the Services to exercise our response forces in anticipation of future needs, and I am grateful to the Committee for your ongoing support of the Services' modernization and readiness requirements.

United Efforts to Defend the Homeland

USNORTHCOM's defense of the homeland would not be possible without cooperation, collaboration, and a fundamental commitment to mission success across a remarkable

interagency and intergovernmental enterprise. Over 27 unique Federal agencies, to include DHS, the U.S. Coast Guard, the Federal Aviation Administration and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, have permanently-assigned liaisons and representatives in our USNORTHCOM and NORAD headquarters in Colorado Springs. Nearly 150 Canadian military personnel are assigned to NORAD billets in our headquarters, and we are proud to host two permanently assigned Mexican military liaison officers, along with liaison officers and representatives from a host of DOD agencies and commands to include the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), the Defense Intelligence Agency, and U.S. Strategic Command. National Guard personnel are also fully integrated into our headquarters staff and maintain a full-time office specifically dedicated to coordinating actions between our headquarters and the National Guard Bureau. The National Guard continues to be an essential and integral part of our USNORTHCOM and NORAD team.

Our command's integration with the U.S. interagency community is a requirement for success, which is why those interagency representatives are not simply assigned to the headquarters; they are truly integrated members of the USNORTHCOM team. Whenever possible, they are invited to participate in command briefings and updates, and I rely on their subject matter expertise and professional judgment on a daily basis as we work hand in glove to address the challenges and threats facing the command.

The commitment to cooperation shared by each of our interagency partners has contributed immeasurably to the broader USNORTHCOM mission. For example, during the 2018 hurricane season, DTRA provided around-the-clock modeling support that located all of the hazardous material production and storage facilities in the storms' paths and allowed our

planners to develop well-researched plans to mitigate potential impacts if the sites were damaged.

Our collective ability to meet threats head on and to provide a rapid, effective response in the wake of natural and manmade disasters is absolutely dependent on constant communication, routine interagency exercises, and close working relationships between each and every one of the civilian and military professionals who strive each day to keep our nation and our citizens safe from harm.

From USNORTHCOM's components and subordinates to NORAD, which has served as the absolute gold standard for international collaboration for over 60 years, and our locktight relationship with FEMA, we work every day to exercise the interagency and inter-DOD processes required to ensure that we are always ready to deliver the right assets in the right place at the right time to meet whatever mission we are assigned. To ensure USNORTHCOM and our interagency partners are ready at a moment's notice in the event of a crisis, we conduct regular command-led exercises in each of our mission sets, such as ARDENT SENTRY for DSCA and VIGILANT SHIELD for homeland defense.

Finally, I would like to make special note of USNORTHCOM's support to the state funeral of former President George H. W. Bush in December 2018. The men and women of USNORTHCOM's Joint Task Force – National Capital Region, under the superb leadership of MG Mike Howard, demonstrated exemplary professionalism and decorum throughout a three-day program in Texas and Washington, DC. The flawless execution of this mission was made possible by many months of rigorous planning, close communication with President Bush and his family, coordination with dozens of Federal, state, and local agencies, and multiple rehearsals to ensure no detail was overlooked. USNORTHCOM's support of this historic event was both a

profound honor for all involved and a conspicuous example of the no-fail nature of all USNORTHCOM missions.

Conclusion

Today and every day, the men and women of USNORTHCOM and NORAD are standing watch over our homeland. These dedicated professionals work around the clock surveilling our skies, monitoring our oceans, and ensuring that we are always ready to counter a staggering range of threats to our homeland, ranging from intercontinental ballistic missiles and long-range bombers to lethal opioids and cyberattacks. The strategic and technological innovation that will be required to defend our nation in the coming years depends entirely on the quality and experience of our people.

Today and always, our people are our strength, and I am proud to lead the outstanding Airmen, Sailors, Soldiers, Marines, and civilians of USNORTHCOM and NORAD. While the threats facing our nation can be daunting, I have absolute confidence in our ability to meet any challenge and defeat any adversary because of the dedicated professionals I am honored to lead. We Have the Watch.

General Terrence J. O'Shaughnessy

General Terrence J. O'Shaughnessy is Commander, United States Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command. USNORTHCOM partners to conduct homeland defense, civil support and security cooperation to defend and secure the United States and its interests. NORAD conducts aerospace warning, aerospace control and maritime warning in the defense of North America.

General O'Shaughnessy is a 1986 distinguished graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy. He has commanded at the squadron, group, wing, NAF and MAJCOM levels, including the 57th Wing, Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, the 35th Fighter Wing at Misawa Air Base, Japan, and the 613th Air and Space Operations Center, Hickam AFB, Hawaii.

General O'Shaughnessy has served as the U.S. Pacific Command Director of Operations responsible for joint operations in a region encompassing more than half the globe and 36 nations. General O'Shaughnessy's joint experience also extends to his time as the Joint Staff J5 Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs for Asia where he shaped regional planning and policy in the Asia-Pacific and Central Asia regions, supporting the commanders of U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Central Command. Prior to his current assignment, General O'Shaughnessy was Deputy Commander, United Nations Command Korea; Deputy Commander, U.S. Forces Korea; Commander, Air Component Command, Republic of Korea/U.S. Combined Forces Command; and Commander, 7th Air Force, Pacific Air Forces, Osan AB, South Korea and Commander, Pacific Air Forces and Air Component Commander for U.S. Pacific Command, Joint Base Pearl Harbor- Hickam, Hawaii.

General O'Shaughnessy is a command pilot with more than 3,000 hours in the F-16 Fighting Falcon, including 168 combat hours.

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**POSTURE STATEMENT OF
ADMIRAL CRAIG S. FALLER
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
BEFORE THE 116TH CONGRESS
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
MAY 1, 2019**



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Introduction. I want to thank the Congress, and especially this Committee, for your support to United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). The men and women of our team work every day to earn the trust of partners in Latin America and the Caribbean. We are friends and neighbors, bound together by shared values and a shared stake in our common future. The nations of this neighborhood are connected in every domain—sea, air, land, space, and cyberspace. Our partnerships are vital to security and prosperity in this hemisphere, and to our collective ability to meet complex global challenges. We recognize that the success and security of future generations depend on how effectively we build trust with allies and partners in the hemisphere today, working with and through interagency partners like the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Department of Justice (DOJ). Ultimately, we want enemies to fear us, friends to partner with us, and the Western Hemisphere to shine as a beacon of peace, prosperity, and potential.

The strengths and opportunities of our hemisphere—democracy, respect for human rights and rule of law, and military-to-military relationships rooted in education, culture, and values—are matched with a troubling array of challenges and threats to global security and to our homeland. These include natural and man-made disasters, weak government institutions, corruption, under-resourced security organizations, violent crime, criminal organizations, and violent extremist cells. China has accelerated expansion of its Belt and Road Initiative at a pace that may one day overshadow its expansion in Southeast Asia and Africa. Russia supports multiple information outlets spreading its false narrative of world events and U.S. intentions. Iran has deepened its anti-U.S. Spanish language media coverage and has exported its state support for terrorism into our hemisphere. Russia and China also support the autocratic regimes in Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua, which are counter to democracy and U.S. interests. We are

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monitoring the latest events in Venezuela and look forward to welcoming that country back into the hemisphere's community of democracies. Where threats are transregional, multi-domain, and global, the United States must renew focus on our neighbors and our shared Western Hemisphere neighborhood.

Partnerships. Modest, smart, and focused investments in U.S. forces and security assistance continue to yield meaningful returns in the form of partners who are ready to address threats shoulder-to-shoulder with us. Strengthening partnerships is at the heart of everything we do. USSOUTHCOM's mission is about the smart, focused use of force—not economy of force.

Working from a foundation of mutual respect and shared interests in regional cooperation and interoperability, we are enhancing our partnerships with Brazil, Colombia, and Chile, which are forces for regional and global security. Argentina has reinvigorated military-to-military interaction, and co-hosted our annual South American Defense Conference. Peru continues a tradition of strong liaison officer exchanges with USSOUTHCOM and recently conducted training with a Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF). We reinitiated security cooperation with Ecuador, and are moving forward with a renewed military-to-military partnership.

In Central America, partners like El Salvador and Panama have stepped up cooperation in the area of counter-narcotics (CN); in addition, El Salvador co-hosted our Central American Security Conference last year. Honduras hosts our Joint Task Force (JTF) Bravo at Soto Cano, providing a regionally-based security cooperation platform, the presence of which allows a rapid response capability. Our support to Guatemala's defense institution building efforts has helped its Ministry of Defense increase efficiency, transparency, and sustainability of its investments.

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Across the Caribbean, our partners continue to look at USSOUTHCOM as their security partner of choice. Trinidad and Tobago co-hosted our annual Caribbean Nations Security Conference, and thwarted a terror attack with the support of U.S. special operations forces (USSOF). Jamaica has stepped up its CN efforts, recently purchasing a maritime patrol aircraft that will support regional drug interdiction operations.

We continue to expand our cooperation with allies and partners in humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR) missions and counter-threat efforts, such as drug detection and monitoring, and support to interdiction operations in Central America and the Caribbean. Allies and partners contributed to nearly half of the successful drug seizures credited to Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S) last year. In addition to continuing cooperation in traditional areas like peacekeeping and drug interdiction, we are building interoperability for high-end expeditionary operations and in the space and cyber mission sets. In the past year, Brazil became the first Latin American country to sign a Space Situational Awareness Agreement, Colombia became NATO's first global partner in Latin America, and Chile led the maritime component of the world's largest international naval exercise, Rim of the Pacific—a first for a Latin American sea power. Later this year, Brazil will send a Major General to serve as U.S. Army South's next Deputy Commander for Interoperability, the first Brazilian officer to serve in this role.

The majority of nations in this hemisphere share democratic values—including respect for human rights and adherence to the rule of law—and interests in advancing democracy and countering radical ideologies. These shared values and interests are the foundation of our military-to-military relationships. We reinforce and build on these shared values and interests through institutional capacity building efforts, information and intelligence sharing, education,

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personnel exchanges, and exercises. In the past year, we have improved the quality, depth, and frequency of information and intelligence exchanges with partners, producing joint products on transnational issues of mutual concern.

We also build on those shared values by working with our partners to elevate and integrate all elements of professionalism as a foundational component of every security conference we conduct. The professionalism of U.S. armed forces is the bedrock of our legitimacy, both as a fighting force and in our ability to build trust with our own people. Professionalism encompasses human rights, jointness, gender integration, and non-commissioned officer development.

Education and training—funded by the Department of Defense’s William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies and the Department of State’s International Military Education and Training (IMET) program—and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) purchases made possible by Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants are force multipliers. Our partners prefer U.S. education and training, and these exchanges facilitate mutual understanding of values, doctrine, and culture that enable us to operate together more effectively. Our participation in multinational exercises like UNITAS (a naval integration exercise), PANAMAX (defense of the Panama Canal), and Brazil’s CRUZEIRO DO SUL (regional air exercise) is another important way we increase mutual understanding, interoperability, and collective readiness.

In the absence of an enduring U.S. military presence in most of Latin America and the Caribbean, recurring rotations of small teams of USSOF, soldiers, Marines, and National Guard personnel¹ play central roles in building trust and enabling the exchange of critical expertise. By

¹ The State Partnership Program (SPP) links a unique component of the Department of Defense – a state’s National Guard – with the armed forces or equivalent of a partner nation, leveraging National Guard capabilities for engagements that build enduring relationships and advance mutual defense and security goals. 24 of the SPP’s 75 partnerships worldwide are in the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility, including a partnership with Venezuela that is currently inactive.

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carefully tailoring these rotations, we ensure they build the readiness of U.S. forces as well as building partner nations' capabilities. On any given day, small USSOF teams conduct over 30 missions in support of about 12 partner nations throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. Many live and work alongside regional forces, building the trust, confidence, and lasting relationships that reinforce our status as the partner of choice and enhance our ability to respond quickly to contingencies.

Humanitarian support efforts like medical engagements, civil affairs activities, and the recent deployment of the hospital ship USNS COMFORT demonstrate our enduring solidarity and friendship with neighbors, while countering negative messaging by adversarial nations. The international medical team aboard COMFORT treated more than 26,000 patients in Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and Honduras. This team conducted more than 100 training engagements, relieving pressure on regional health systems caused by the Venezuelan migration crisis and giving local medical providers more flexibility to deliver care. The integration of more than 100 military and non-governmental organization (NGO) personnel from 10 other nations helped us build trust, tell our story effectively, and enhance regional perceptions of the United States. The U.S. military medical and command staff also returned from the deployment more ready, able to operate with foreign partners, and prepared to provide critical care to U.S. warfighters. These impacts will far outlast COMFORT's 70-day deployment.

Strengthening our partnerships is our best bid for addressing regional and global threats. We work by, with, and through partners to enhance the security of both the United States and our partners, and to help grow bilateral security relationships into regional and global security initiatives. Our networked approach to countering threats recognizes that nothing happens without robust and enduring partnerships across the U.S. interagency, region, and civil society.

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Our ultimate advantage is using the power of our ideals, ideas, and people to build trust with friends and create dilemmas for competitor nations. This is the primary dimension in which we expand the competitive space.

Threats. Six state actors (Russia, China, Iran, and their authoritarian allies in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela) and a system of interrelated threats challenge the security of our partners and the region. Threats like natural and man-made disasters and criminal networks feed and fuel drivers of instability, including weak institutions, poverty, corruption, and violent crime. Addressing these challenges requires whole-of-government efforts, led by partner nations at a pace they can sustain, to strengthen democratic institutions and expand economic opportunity. Often, improving security is the first step.

Nation State Competition and Malign Actors. Russia and China are expanding their influence in the Western Hemisphere, often at the expense of U.S. interests. Both enable—and are enabled by—actions in Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba that threaten hemispheric security and prosperity, and the actions of those three states in turn damage the stability and democratic progress across the region. As the leading state sponsor of terrorism in the world, Iran’s activities in the region are also concerning.

Russia continues to use Latin America and the Caribbean to spread disinformation, collect intelligence on the United States, and project power. Russia’s deployment of two nuclear capable bombers to the Western Hemisphere was intended as a demonstration of support for the Maduro regime and as a show of force to the United States. Russia has also deployed intelligence collection ships to the region, as well as an underwater research ship to Latin America capable of mapping undersea cables—information it could use to cut critical lines of communication during a future crisis. Additionally, Russia is establishing joint space projects

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with partners in the region, which it could eventually leverage for counter-space purposes in the event of a global conflict.

China utilizes the same predatory, non-transparent foreign lending practices it has implemented around the world to exert political and economic leverage in certain countries. China has pledged at least \$150 billion in loans to countries in the hemisphere,² and 17 nations now participate in the Belt and Road Initiative. However, many countries are beginning to recognize the long-term consequences of mortgaging their future to China, as we've seen in Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Sierra Leone, Djibouti, and the Maldives. In the future, China could use its control of deep water ports in the Western Hemisphere to enhance its global operational posture. Particularly concerning is China's effort to exert control over key infrastructure associated with the Panama Canal.

China's presence and activities at Argentina's deep space tracking facility is also concerning. Beijing could be in violation of the terms of its agreement with Argentina to only conduct civilian activities, and may have the ability to monitor and potentially target U.S., Allied, and partner space activities. Additionally, Chinese firms like Huawei and ZTE have aggressively penetrated the region, placing intellectual property, private data, and government secrets at risk. If governments in Latin America and the Caribbean continue to gravitate toward using Chinese information systems, our ability and willingness to share information over compromised networks is likely to suffer.

Russia and China aggressively court students from Latin America and the Caribbean to attend their military schools, offering free training in cyber, policing, and CN. Since 2012,

² Gallagher, Kevin P. and Margaret Myers (2017) "China-Latin America Finance Database." Washington, DC: Inter-American Dialogue

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security officials from nearly all Central American countries and nearly half of South American countries have received Russian CN training. These engagements, combined with Russia's Counter Transnational Organized Crime Training Center (CTOC) in Nicaragua, potentially provide Moscow with a regional platform to recruit intelligence sources and collect information.

Russia and China also support their authoritarian partners in Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, often through propaganda and other information-related tools. Moscow, for example, provides positive media coverage of its authoritarian allies, papering over repression and socioeconomic inequity in Nicaragua. Moscow also seeks to undercut U.S. policies and regional relationships through information operations and intelligence collection, and by influencing political systems, public opinion, and decision makers. Russia published hundreds of articles last year in its Spanish and Portuguese-language media that deliberately distorted our defense engagements.

The linkages between these malign actors are negatively reinforcing. Emboldened by Russian and Chinese³ support, Venezuela is engaging in increasingly provocative actions, threatening Guyana's sovereign rights and jurisdiction and providing sanctuary for National Liberation Army (ELN) fighters that threaten Colombian stability. Russia and Cuba are both complicit in Venezuela's descent into dictatorship, but Cuba is particularly influential in supporting Maduro. Following the Cuban government's advice and assisted by its intelligence machinery, Maduro is adhering to the autocratic blueprint Cuban leaders have ruthlessly executed for over six decades. Nicaragua appears to be going down a similar path following Cuba's playbook, with Cuba, Russia, and Venezuela enabling President Ortega's repression of

³ For example, China is Venezuela's single largest state creditor, saddling the Venezuelan people with more than \$50 billion in debt, even as their democracy vanishes.

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his political opposition. These relationships give Russia, in particular, a foothold close to our homeland. As tensions increase with Russia in Europe, Moscow may leverage these longstanding regional partners to maintain asymmetric options, to include forward deploying military personnel or assets.

Iran is also looking to reenergize its outreach after reducing its efforts in Latin America and the Caribbean in recent years. It has deepened its anti-U.S. influence campaign in Spanish-language media, and its proxy Lebanese Hezbollah maintains facilitation networks throughout the region that cache weapons and raise funds, often via drug trafficking and money laundering. Last September, Brazil arrested a Hezbollah financier in the tri-border area near Paraguay and Argentina, and in recent years Paraguay, Peru, and Bolivia have arrested multiple Hezbollah-linked suspects.

What we're doing. We are increasing cooperation with partners to better understand, expose, and counter the malign activities of Russia, China, and their authoritarian allies. We are also working more closely with other U.S. combatant commands and the Joint Staff to ensure that globally integrated plans and operations are informed by threats and opportunities in this hemisphere. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's globally integrated planning is exactly the right approach for addressing the transregional, transnational nature of today's threat environment.

Within the region, we have to be on the playing field to compete. The same presence that strengthens our partnerships sends a powerful signal to Russia, China, Iran, Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua (the six negative state actors) that the United States is committed to the region and to the security of our neighborhood.

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Strong partnerships—founded in effective and transparent institutions, intelligence and information exchanges, institutional capacity building, education, exercises, and presence—are our primary bulwark against the influence of malign actors in the hemisphere and are bolstered by our work together on military professionalism. Our work with partners to reinforce the hemisphere’s substantial, but incomplete, progress in human rights is even more critical in light of Russia and China’s own disregard for human rights. USSOUTHCOM’s Human Rights Initiative—which just celebrated its 20th anniversary—has conducted more than 200 human rights engagements that have enhanced the ability of partner nations to build professional forces that have legitimacy in the eyes of their populations.

As I have discussed in previous testimony, the Department of State’s security assistance programs—like IMET and FMF—are strategic game changers. Since 2009, IMET has provided opportunities for over 55,000 students from the region to attend schools like the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC), the Inter-American Air Force Academy (IAAFA), and the Inter-American Defense College (IADC). These numbers aren’t just seats in a classroom. They represent lifelong relationships with future leaders⁴ who trust us, understand our culture and doctrine, and are prepared to work with us on a range of challenges.

In addition to strengthening partnerships, we support interagency efforts to hold individuals accountable for supporting the activities of negative actors. For example, in collaboration with the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), we provided information that supported the development of sanctions against Venezuelan

⁴ IMET has trained numerous individuals who have gone on to serve in key leadership positions, including the former President of Chile, Trinidad and Tobago’s Chief of the Defense Staff, and Argentina’s Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who helped foster our reengagement with the Argentine military after the political dynamics changed.

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government officials involved in drug smuggling, money laundering, corruption, and serious human rights abuses.

Drugs and Transnational Criminal Organizations. Drug trafficking threatens our national security and that of our regional partners. Drug overdoses killed more than 70,000 Americans last year, and nearly half a million people across the world in 2017.⁵ Fueled by drug demand—especially ours—drug traffickers transported enough metric tons of cocaine (that we know of) from South America by air, land, and sea last year to cover four football fields—and the majority of it was headed for our streets. Upon landfall, this bulk cocaine is broken down into multiple smaller loads and smuggled into the United States, making large interdictions exponentially more difficult. In addition to cocaine, traffickers also transport heroin, synthetic opioids like fentanyl, and precursor chemicals from China. While Mexico remains the primary source for heroin smuggled into the U.S. (and China the prime source of fentanyl), the Dominican Republic is emerging as a regional transit point for opioid trafficking into major U.S. cities like Philadelphia, Boston, and Miami.

Established drug trafficking routes and techniques provide opportunities for the illegal movement of other commodities and people—including terrorists. Several years ago, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) dedicated an article to a scenario in which its followers could leverage established trafficking networks to make their way to our border. This remains a potential vulnerability we watch as closely as we can.

Drug trafficking comes with significant costs, in more ways than one. After marijuana,

⁵ Centers for Disease Control, National Health Statistics; United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), *2018 World Drug Report*. Geneva.

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cocaine remains the second most valuable commodity in the global drug trade,⁶ generating dirty money that flows directly into the hands of criminal groups. In many cases, these groups are better funded than the security organizations confronting them. Dirty money fosters corruption and insecurity that tear at the fabric of communities, erode institutions of governance, and drain the region's potential. The vicious side effects of illicit trade also cost American taxpayers billions of dollars every year. This is more than a national security threat; it's also an economic one that affects every nation in our neighborhood.

What we're doing. Leveraging capabilities like information-sharing, network analysis, and the Department of Defense Rewards Program, we support operations by DHS and the DOJ's Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to interdict drug shipments and disrupt transnational criminal networks. For example, our intelligence support—enabled by our Army Military Intelligence Brigade—to operations by Homeland Security Investigations and other interagency partners helped dismantle one of the largest maritime illicit smuggling networks in Central America last year.

At the tactical level, JIATF-S continues to deliver steady returns on investment and improve its efficiency in targeting drug movements. Last year, it helped keep the equivalent of 600 minivans full of cocaine off U.S. streets. But even this isn't enough to keep pace with the increasing demand and the volume of drugs flowing north through the Eastern Pacific and Caribbean. While improving efficiency, we still only successfully interdicted about six percent of known drug movements.⁷ Doing more would require additional ships and maritime patrol aircraft and greater participation by interagency and international partners that form the

⁶ Global Financial Integrity, "Transnational Crime and the Developing World," March 2017.
⁷ Figure based on JIATF South utilization of Consolidated Counterdrug DataBase (CCDB) data.

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backbone of JIATF-S. The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) provide the bulk of JIATF-S's maritime and air capabilities. The United Kingdom, Canada, France, and the Netherlands lead multiple interdiction operations in the Caribbean, while we focus U.S. assets on the Eastern Pacific. Last year, 17 international partners conducted nearly half of the interdictions supported by JIATF-S. U.S. Northern Command remains our closest and best Department of Defense partner and we continuously look for ways to enhance our teamwork, recognizing that threats exploit our geographic combatant command boundaries.

Our capacity-building activities, whether at the tactical, operational, or institutional level, play a key role in this fight. For example, after years of USSOF training, Guatemala's Fuerzas Especiales Navales (FEN) is now among Central America's most competent and responsive maritime interdiction units. U.S. training, equipment, and interagency teamwork have also enabled Costa Rican and Panamanian forces to partner seamlessly with the USCG in interdiction operations. Partners are also working with us to address their ability to sustain capabilities that we have developed together. For example, Colombia has increased its eradication and interdiction efforts while also conducting increased operations against the ELN.

Drivers of Migration. Violence, unemployment, corruption, poverty, and impunity for gangs and transnational criminal organizations are some of the main drivers of insecurity that fuel migration to our southern border. 14 of the top 20 most violent countries in the world are in Latin America and the Caribbean.⁸ Migration challenges are exacerbated by weak institutions, corruption, violence and instability wrought by authoritarian governments. Migration from Venezuela is on track to approach the scale of the Syrian refugee crisis, straining the capacity

⁸ Igarapé Institute (Regional think tank), "The World's Most Dangerous Cities," March 31, 2017 (available at <https://igarape.org.br/en/the-worlds-most-dangerous-cities/>)

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and resources of its neighbors. The United Nations estimates that 5.3 million Venezuelans will have fled their country by the end of 2019—with over 2 million leaving this year alone.⁹ Last year, thousands of Nicaraguans fled to Costa Rica and other neighboring countries to seek protection, a number that will likely grow as President Ortega keeps a tight grip on power. Many Haitians continue to leave their country in hopes of finding economic opportunity elsewhere.

What we're doing. We are working closely with Central American and other partners to share information and provide training and equipment that enhance their ability to secure their borders. We assist partners in developing strong institutional foundations needed for legitimate, effective, and sustainable defense sectors through organizations like the William J. Perry Center¹⁰, the Center for Civil Military Relations, and the Defense Institute for International Legal Studies, which help our partners build trust and confidence with their citizens. Through collaboration with the Department of State, USAID, and non-governmental partners, our civil affairs teams execute low cost, high impact civic action projects that help partner nations and extend governance to vulnerable communities.

Terrorism. As Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan recently noted, transnational terrorism poses an immediate threat to the Western Hemisphere.¹¹ Groups like Lebanese Hezbollah, ISIS, and al-Qaida operate wherever they can garner support, raise funds, and pursue their terrorist agendas. ISIS and other groups have demonstrated their ability to inspire and recruit violent extremists to plan attacks in South America and the Caribbean. While the travel of foreign fighters from Latin America and the Caribbean to Iraq and Syria has diminished, the

⁹ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and International Organization for Migration (IOM), December 14, 2018.

¹⁰ The Washington, DC-based William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, one of DoD's five regional centers, develops and engages the Western Hemisphere's community of defense and security professionals to seek mutually supportive approaches to common challenges in order to develop effective and sustainable institutional capacity, and promote a greater understanding of U.S. regional policy.

¹¹ Remarks at the Western Hemisphere Ministerial on Counterterrorism, December 11, 2018.

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potential return of battle-trained extremists remains a threat. Another potential threat is posed by smuggling networks that move Special Interest Aliens from East Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia through the hemisphere to attempt entry into the United States.

What we're doing. USSOUTHCOM leads several annual exercises with interagency partners and partner nations to improve interoperability, preparedness, and response for a possible terrorist attack. Our neighbors are taking increasing steps to address the threat of terrorism in the hemisphere, as evidenced by the Caribbean Community's (CARICOM) development of a regional counter terrorism strategy in collaboration with the U.S. Department of State and USSOUTHCOM. In addition to these efforts, we work with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency to help regional partners build their capacity to combat weapons of mass destruction, another issue of growing interest to several partners.

We work closely with lead federal agencies and regional partners to detect and disrupt terrorist activity and strengthen counter-terrorism (CT) legislation. Trinidad and Tobago recently strengthened its CT legislation (including the creation of several new terrorism-related criminal offenses), and other countries are also updating theirs. In collaboration with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), DHS, and other interagency partners, we work with Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Chile, and others to share information and strengthen regional capacity to manage extremist threats. U.S. training and biometrics equipment are improving the ability of partners to control their borders, and in the past two years, we've helped interagency partners stop individuals with known or suspected ties to terrorism. Additionally, our small civil affairs teams work closely with U.S. embassies and USAID to counter radicalization and recruitment and amplify moderate voices in local communities.

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Detention operations also play an important role in the global fight against violent extremism by keeping enemy combatants off the battlefield. The medical and guard teams at Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO) continue to conduct safe, legal, and humane detention operations. In line with Executive Order 13823, we are examining ways to address medical support, capacity, and infrastructure issues associated with continued detention operations.

Natural disasters. Our ability to respond rapidly in crisis is an important aspect of USSOUTHCOM's mission. Our neighborhood experiences approximately 50 natural disasters every year, of almost every type—from hurricanes to earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, wildfires, mudslides, and more. Protecting citizens before and after disaster strikes is a core mission for every military in our hemisphere. The question is not whether, but when, we will face the next disaster, and we must be ready.

What we're doing. Last October at the Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas in Cancun, Mexico, the U.S. Secretary of Defense and his counterparts from across the hemisphere committed to strengthening regional military cooperation on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in support of lead civilian agencies. In support, USSOUTHCOM works closely with partner nations, Department of State, USAID, NGOs, and multinational organizations like CARICOM's Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA) and the Regional Security System (RSS) to build national and regional response capacities. Our training, exercises, and low-cost humanitarian projects have helped our partners to be more prepared to respond to emergencies in their own countries, and more able to assist their neighbors in crisis. As an example, last year the Jamaican Defense Force deployed a team to Dominica for 60 days to provide medical aid and other emergency assistance in the wake of

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Hurricane Maria. We are assessing our authorities to ensure we can provide the necessary support for our partners to take on increasing responsibility for disaster responses.

When U.S. military support is required, our forward-deployed JTF-Bravo in Honduras, along with our annual SPMAGTF deployment, provide operational flexibility and agility. I'm proud to note that last year we integrated Chilean and Colombian officers into the SPMAGTF leadership team for the first time. Brazil will join the SPMAGTF this year, in addition to co-leading our UNITAS AMPHIB multinational naval exercise. This iteration of UNITAS will practice the establishment of a multinational task force to support humanitarian response, a capability we haven't employed since the Haiti earthquake in 2010. Building on this initiative, we are working with allies and partners to develop a concept for a scalable multinational task force that works within existing security cooperation frameworks to enhance our collective ability to respond rapidly to crises.

Congressional support for USSOUTHCOM's mission and this neighborhood. I invite you to visit our neighbors and reinforce the message that we value this region—the only region that is tied to our homeland by all domains—and the role our partners play in keeping our neighborhood safe.

I also thank the Congress for providing the Department's FY 2019 appropriations prior to the start of FY 2019, which minimized the impacts of the current partial government shutdown to the Department of Defense. As we look ahead, confidence in stable budgets and ensuring all of our U.S. government security partners, like our USCG, are open for business will reassure friendly nations that we are reliable security partners.

Support for our people. After several years of running the detention facility at JTF-GTMO as a temporary mission, we have been directed to keep the facility open. Much of the

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current infrastructure used by the JTF has long outlived its useful lifespan. We are undertaking a comprehensive review of the existing facilities to determine requirements for mission success, the safety of our forces, and operational efficiency. Closer to home, we are working to find ways to better support our personnel, including exploring ways to mitigate the limited military support services in the Miami area. I will keep this Committee informed of our progress.

Capabilities to defend our homeland. We appreciate the support of the Congress to ensure the continued operations of the USCG, which provides the majority of U.S. maritime assets supporting JIATF-S operations. The new National Security Cutters have proven very effective in the drug detection and monitoring mission, leveraging increased intelligence collection capability and on-scene endurance. Maritime patrol aircraft are also crucial to detection, monitoring, and interdiction by the USCG and partner nations. Continued congressional support for the new Offshore Patrol Cutter will enable the USCG to maintain its capacity in the hemisphere. While those new ships are beginning construction, maintenance funding is essential to keep the aging Medium Endurance Cutters—some of which are close to doubling their planned 30-year service lives—hard at work supporting JIATF-S. We also appreciate the support of the Congress to resource our intelligence capabilities like human intelligence (HUMINT) and innovative analytic tools utilized by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency's (DTRA) Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization (JIDO) that allow us to exploit publicly available information and intelligence.

Thanks to congressional support, we contracted a Multi Mission Support Vessel (MMSV) to help fill capability gaps. True to its name, the MMSV was used for SOF training exercises and will now be employed to support U.S. and partner nation law enforcement in CN and CT operations. Increased U.S. joint and naval presence in regional operations and exercises will

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encourage partner forces, to include navies, to participate in regional security efforts such as HA/DR, CN, and CT. The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is mission fit for this region and we welcome its deployment this year. We are also leveraging our growing science and technology portfolio—including innovative projects like small-satellite and aerostat surveillance programs—to mitigate our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance gaps, and help the Services to test new capabilities that hone the U.S. military's technological advantage.

Capabilities to strengthen our partnerships. We appreciate congressional support for initiatives that streamline security cooperation processes and help ensure we remain the security partner of choice. Your continued support to programs and capabilities that help build trust and long-term relationships with partners enhances our ability to defend the homeland by providing more capacity for defeating threats and sending a visible signal to our partners (and our competitors) about the depth of our commitment.

Conclusion. Partnership goes a long way in this part of the world. The right focused and modest investments in this hemisphere yield a solid rate of return for the United States and our partners. Our competitors benefit when we don't invest in our neighborhood.

Our partners share our vision of a hemisphere that is a beacon of peace, prosperity, and opportunity. They want to work with us to achieve this vision. It is in our national interest to work with them. Thank you.

Admiral Craig Faller

Admiral Craig Faller is a native of Fryburg, Pennsylvania and 1983 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy with a Bachelor of Science in Systems Engineering. He is also a 1990 graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School with a Master's in National Security Affairs (Strategic Planning).

At sea, Admiral Faller served as Reactor Electrical Division Officer, Electrical Officer and Reactor Training Assistant aboard USS South Carolina (CGN 37); Operations Officer aboard USS Peterson (DD 969); Station Officer aboard USS Enterprise (CVN 65), and Executive Officer of USS John Hancock (DD 981). As Commanding Officer of USS Stethem (DDG 63), he deployed to the Arabian Gulf and participated in maritime interception operations in support of United Nations sanctions against Iraq. During his tour as Commanding Officer of USS Shiloh (CG 67), he assisted victims of the devastating tsunami off Indonesia. Finally, as Commander, John C. Stennis Strike Group / Carrier Strike Group 3, he deployed to the Middle East supporting Operations New Dawn (Iraq) and Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan).

Ashore, Admiral Faller served as a D1G Prototype Staff Officer at the Nuclear Power Training unit in Ballston Spa, NY; Action Officer in Navy Strategy and Concepts Branch (N513); Legislative Fellow on the staff of Senator Edward M. Kennedy; Program Manager, Surface Nuclear Officer Programs and Placement; Executive Assistant to the Commander U.S. Pacific Command; Executive Assistant to Commander U.S. Central Command; Executive Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations; Commander, Navy Recruiting Command; Director of Operations (J3) U.S. Central Command; Chief of Navy Legislative Affairs; and Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.

Admiral Faller has earned various personal, unit, service and campaign awards.

- Updated: 28 November 2018

**WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING**

MAY 1, 2019

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. GAETZ

Admiral FALLER. At this time, we are unable to determine how this type of prohibition would impact our capabilities or operations. It will take some time to develop and coordinate a list of people or companies with ties to the Maduro regime and to work with other U.S. Government agencies to prevent the award of new contracts and terminate pre-existing business relationships. [See page 40.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CISNEROS

Secretary RAPUANO. The projects under consideration for possible deferral do not include family housing, barracks, or dormitory projects; projects that have already been awarded; or projects that are expected to have fiscal year 2019 award dates. Furthermore, the Acting Secretary directed that the Comptroller's review of projects under consideration for possible deferral rely heavily on prioritization from DOD Components. The Department is also confirming that projects have award dates in fiscal year 2020 or later to minimize effects on readiness and to be consistent with the strategic approach in the National Defense Strategy. [See page 29.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

MAY 1, 2019

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

Mr. LANGEVIN. In your written testimony, you noted that NORTHCOM worked with the Department of Homeland Security to prepare for Hurricane Florence in September 2018, which decimated Camp Lejeune. Considering that you, Admiral Faller, commented in your testimony that we live in a neighborhood that “experiences approximately 50 natural disasters every year, of almost every type” I am concerned that 2018 was just a preview of the climate change intensified weather events that are to come. What are you doing to prepare for this eventuality, prepare our installations, and support our partners?

Admiral FALLER. USSOUTHCOM takes a variety of measures to prepare for adverse weather events and natural disasters that impact our area of responsibility every year. We work to maintain and build readiness of U.S. forces for a range of missions by tailoring bilateral and regional exercises and training events, including humanitarian assistance and disaster response. During the TRADEWINDS and FAHUM annual exercises, U.S., Partner Nations, and Regional organizations practice collaboration and coordination to limit the impacts of the weather systems often attributed to climate change. We work closely with our partner nations and regional coordination mechanisms such as the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA), the Regional Security System (RSS), the Coordination Center for the Prevention of Natural Disaster in Central America (CPREDENAC), and support to the development of the Multinational Caribbean Coordination Center to build our collective capacity to respond to and/or coordinate disaster relief efforts. We’ve seen a decrease in requests for assistance following these disasters because our partners are increasingly prepared to handle the responses themselves. USSOUTHCOM also considers environmental challenges such as earthquakes, hurricanes and flooding in its planning. Additionally, to ensure our own personnel and families are ready, SOUTHCOM conducts annual hurricane preparedness training for all personnel assigned to our headquarters in Miami. Furthermore, USSOUTHCOM also focuses deployments of its limited forces during hurricane season. This includes the deployment of the USNS COMFORT when it’s available and a Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force that is sourced for six months every year. Knowing these are not permanent presence in the region, we opt to employ them during hurricane season so they are already pre-positioned in the event of a disaster response. Finally, USSOUTHCOM invests DOD humanitarian assistance funds to build partner nation capacity to prepare for and respond to natural disasters. We constantly assess the underlying factors that predispose a country to disasters and the effectiveness of the partner nation’s disaster response enterprise to develop targeted projects to build their resilience to withstand shocks and disruptions resulting from disasters.

Mr. LANGEVIN. In your opinion, will additional operational capacity and capability at CISA aid in coordination with your command? Will it help ensure DOD personnel are better able to continue DOD missions even in a time of crisis?

General O’SHAUGHNESSY. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) provides additional capacity and capability essential to defense of critical infrastructure that is outside of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) control. This critical infrastructure supports USNORTHCOM’s homeland defense mission. Further, CISA’s capabilities reduce the demand signal to DOD to provide forces that execute under CISA authorities. These high demand DOD forces can instead be applied to directly defend DOD infrastructure and further enable USNORTHCOM’s homeland defense mission.

Mr. LANGEVIN. In your testimony you acknowledge the changing nature of missile defense and the need to look increasingly to directed energy systems. These technologies are vital to our nation’s ability to defend itself from all manner of threats. As we transition to these technologies, how do you expect to employ them in defense of the nation and what are you doing to prepare for this change?

General O’SHAUGHNESSY. Due to the complexity and evolution of missile threats, I believe we need missile defense technology that is lethal, reliable, and resilient in order to defend the homeland now and keep pace with the future threats. I will remain fully engaged with the Missile Defense Agency as directed energy and other advanced weapons concepts mature, as the capabilities would be complementary to

the existing Ground-based Midcourse Defense system and enhance our homeland defense. Using advanced technologies to destroy missiles in the early stages of flight also provides the potential to reduce the cost per shot for intercepting missiles. Specifically, as part of an ongoing layered approach for missile defense in the future, I will consider each weapon's contribution to the broader ballistic missile defense system for an optimal employment strategy.

Mr. LANGEVIN. In your written testimony, you noted that NORTHCOM worked with the Department of Homeland Security to prepare for Hurricane Florence in September 2018, which decimated Camp Lejeune. I am concerned that 2018 was just a preview of the climate change intensified weather events that are to come. What are you doing to prepare for this eventuality, prepare our installations, and support our partners?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. In my role as the Department's Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) Synchronizer, I coordinate and collaborate across the whole-of-government to ensure application of effective and efficient military capability in order to fulfill a lead federal agency request for assistance. Annually, USNORTHCOM conducts a week-long DSCA preparedness workshop with over 400 DOD and interagency participants. The focus of this workshop is to increase our preparedness prior to a disaster so that we are more effective in our response when a disaster does occur. We conduct two annual exercises per year and conduct a thorough after action review assessing best practices, lessons learned, and ways to improve our response efforts. Following both hurricane and wildland firefighting seasons, we also conduct after action reviews to assess what we did right and determine ways we could have supported our partners more effectively in anticipation of future events. Additionally, through our Joint Interagency Coordination Group, we regularly partner with industry and other Government organizations to increase and develop a common operating picture how we will seamlessly be required to respond when disaster occurs. All of these efforts increase the level of preparedness for both Department of Defense personnel and our partner organizations, resulting in a more timely and effective response to natural disaster occurrences.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CISNEROS

Mr. CISNEROS. Aside from parameters stating that military housing and projects that have been already awarded or will be awarded in fiscal year 2019 will be excluded from consideration, what are the criteria by which military construction projects will be selected for deferment in order to pay for a border wall?

Secretary RAPUANO. The projects under consideration for possible deferral do not include family housing, barracks, or dormitory projects; projects that have already been awarded; or projects that are expected to have fiscal year 2019 award dates. Furthermore, the Acting Secretary directed that the Comptroller's review of projects under consideration for possible deferral rely heavily on prioritization from DOD Components. The Department is also confirming that projects have award dates in fiscal year 2020 or later to minimize effects on readiness and to be consistent with the strategic approach in the National Defense Strategy.

Mr. CISNEROS. Last year, the World Bank reported that climate change could lead at least 1.4 million people to flee their homes in Mexico and Central America and migrate during the next three decades. Does the Department believe climate change is one of the factors driving migration patterns and how has the Department accounted for climate change in its approach to the region? What are the national security implications of climate change on the region?

Ms. WHEELBARGER. I defer this question to the appropriate Executive Branch departments and agencies as DOD is not responsible for projecting migration flows. DOD works with the Mexican and Central American militaries to address humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities most effectively in response to man-made and natural disasters.