[Congressional Record Volume 165, Number 199 (Thursday, December 12, 2019)]
[House]
[Pages H10237-H10254]
EXPLANATORY MATERIAL STATEMENT ON INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION MEASURES
FOR FISCAL YEARS 2018, 2019, AND 2020, SUBMITTED BY MR. SCHIFF,
CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
The following is the explanation of the Damon Paul Nelson
and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (hereinafter, ``the Act'').
This explanation reflects the result of negotiations and
disposition of issues reached between the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) and the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) (hereinafter, ``the
Agreement''). The explanation shall have the same effect with
respect to the implementation of the Act as if it were a
joint explanatory statement of a conference committee.
The explanation comprises three parts: an overview of the
application of the annex to accompany this statement;
unclassified congressional direction; and a section-by-
section analysis of the legislative text.
Part I: Application of the Classified Annex
The classified nature of U.S. intelligence activities
prevents the HPSCI and SSCI (collectively, the
``congressional intelligence committees'') from publicly
disclosing many details concerning the conclusions and
recommendations of the Agreement. Therefore, a classified
Schedule of Authorizations and a classified annex have been
prepared to describe in detail the scope and intent of the
congressional intelligence committees' actions. The Agreement
authorizes the Intelligence Community (IC) to obligate and
expend funds not altered or modified by the classified
Schedule of Authorizations as requested in the President's
budget, subject to modification under applicable
reprogramming procedures.
The classified annex is the result of negotiations between
the congressional intelligence committees. They reconcile the
differences between the congressional intelligence
committees' respective versions of the bill for the National
Intelligence Program (NIP) for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and
2020. The Agreement also makes recommendations for the
Military Intelligence Program (MIP) and the Information
Systems Security Program (ISSP), consistent with the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, and provides
certain direction for these two programs. The Agreement
applies to IC activities for Fiscal Year 2020.
The classified Schedule of Authorizations is incorporated
into the bill pursuant to Section 5102 of Subdivision 1. It
has the status of law. The classified annex supplements and
adds detail to clarify the authorization levels found in the
bill and the classified Schedule of Authorizations. The
congressional intelligence committees view direction and
recommendations, whether contained in this explanation or in
the classified annex, as requiring compliance by the
Executive Branch.
Part II: Select Unclassified Congressional Direction
Unclassified Direction related to Subdivision 1 of the Act
relates to Fiscal Year 2020. Unclassified Direction related
to Subdivision 2 originated in Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019.
The term ``Committees'' refers to both SSCI and HPSCI.
[[Page H10238]]
Unclassified Direction Related to Subdivision 1
Plans for Operations During Government Shutdowns by All
Elements of the Intelligence Community.
The Committees have an active interest in the impact of
government shutdowns on the intelligence mission. Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-11, Section 124,
outlines how agencies are supposed to plan for operations
during government shutdowns, and Section 124.2 provides that
agencies must share those plans with OMB. Additionally,
Section 323 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2014 requires the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
and IC elements within the Department of Defense (DoD) to
share those same plans with specified congressional
committees, including the congressional intelligence
committees.
These requirements, however, omit IC elements that are not
separate ``agencies'' for the purposes of OMB Circular A-11,
Section 124, and are not ODNI, CIA, or elements within the
DoD for the purposes of the IAA for Fiscal Year 2014. As a
result, no such reporting requirement currently exists for IC
elements within the Departments of Justice, Treasury, Energy,
State, and Homeland Security. For that reason, when portions
of the federal government were shut down between December
2018 and February 2019, the Committees had little to no
insight into the effects of the shutdown on these and other
important segments of the IC.
Therefore, the Committees direct IC elements within the
Departments of Justice, Treasury, Energy, State, and Homeland
Security to submit to the congressional intelligence
committees--on the same day as the host department's issuance
of any plan for a government shutdown--the number of
personnel in their respective elements that will be
furloughed.
Program Manager-Information Sharing Environment Review.
Section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Protection Act of 2004 (IRTPA) created a Program Manager-
Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE), administered from
within the ODNI, to better facilitate the interagency sharing
of terrorism-related information. Section 1016 also
designated the PM-ISE as a presidentially-appointed position.
Section 6402 of Subdivision 2 of the Act amends the IRTPA, so
that the PM-ISE is subject to appointment by the Director of
National Intelligence (DNI), not the President. Since the
establishment of the PM-ISE, the Federal government has
created entities, procedures, and processes to address
directly the mandate for improved terrorism information
sharing. Accordingly, the Committees find it appropriate to
reconsider the future of the PM-ISE's mission.
Therefore, the Committees direct the ODNI, in consultation
with appropriate Federal departments, agencies, and
components, within 180 days of enactment of this Act, to
conduct a review of the PM-ISE's terrorism information
sharing mission, associated functions, and organizational
role within the ODNI and provide findings and recommendations
on the future of the PM-ISE to Congress.
Leveraging Academic Institutions in the Intelligence
Community.
The Committees encourage the DNI and the Director of the
DIA to ensure that IC elements continue to forge tighter
partnerships with leading universitiesand their affiliated
research centers in order to enhance mutual awareness of
domestic and international challenges, leverage subject
matter experts from higher education in a manner that uses
cutting edge technologies and methods, and bolsters the
recruitment of top-notch, diverse, and technically proficient
talent into the IC's workforce.
The Committees further believe that IC-sponsored academic
programs such as the Intelligence Community Centers for
Academic Excellence (IC-CAE) should work closely with
educational institutions that offer interdisciplinary courses
of study and learning opportunities in national and
international security; geopolitical affairs, international
relations and national security; interdisciplinary courses of
study in the culture, history, languages, politics, and
religions of major world regions; foreign language
instruction; computer and data science; or cybersecurity.
The DNI shall ensure that such programs are facilitated via
the streamlining of the security clearance process for
graduating students from such universities who receive offers
of employment from IC elements, provide for the temporary
exchange of faculty and IC professionals, including as
visiting fellows, and technical training opportunities for
faculty, students, and IC personnel.
Therefore, the Committees direct all IC agencies to support
the IC-CAE effort by tracking recruits and new hires who have
graduated from IC-CAE-designated institutions, promptly
reporting these numbers to the office in charge of IC-CAE
implementation, and increasing all IC agencies' efforts to
recruit from such institutions.
Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities.
The Committees remain concerned about impediments for
companies with appropriately cleared personnel being able to
perform work for government entities and the effects of these
impediments on IC access to innovative products and services.
For example, businesses without access to a Sensitive
Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF), which includes
many small businesses and non-traditional contractors, find
it difficult to perform classified work for the IC.
Construction and accreditation of SCIF spaces may be cost-
prohibitive for small business and non-traditional government
contractors.
Additionally, SCIF construction timelines often exceed the
period of performance of a contract. A modern trend for
innovative and non-traditional government contractors is the
use of co-working space environments. Additionally, public
and private entities are partnering to create emerging
regional innovation hubs to help identify technology
solutions and products in the private sector that can be
utilized by the DoD and IC. These innovation hubs currently
produce an agile, neutral, but largely unclassified,
development environment.
Therefore, the Committees direct the ODNI to submit a
report to the congressional intelligence committees on:
1. Processes and procedures necessary to build, certify,
and maintain certifications for multi-use sensitive
compartmented facilities not tied to a single contract and
where multiple companies can securely work on multiple
projects at different security levels;
2. Analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of issuing
DoD Contract Security Specification (DD Form 254s) to
Facilities'' as opposed to Contracts'';
3. Options for classified co-use and shared workspace
environments such as innovation, incubation, catalyst, and
accelerator environments;
4. Pros and cons for public, private, government, or
combination owned facilities that can operate at different
classification levels; and
5. Any other opportunities to support companies with
appropriately cleared personnel but without effective access
to a neutral SCIF.
Inclusion of Security Risks in Program Management Plans
Required for Acquisition of Major Systems in the National
Intelligence Program.
Section 5305 of Subdivision 1 of the Act adds security risk
as a factor for the DNI to include in the annual Program
Management Plans for major system acquisitions submitted to
the congressional intelligence committees pursuant to Section
102A(q)(1)(A) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3024(q)(1)(A)). The Committees are increasingly concerned
with the security risks to IC acquisitions. The Joint
Explanatory Statement accompanying the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 directed updates to
Intelligence Community Directive 731, Supply Chain Risk
Management, and Committee leadership has engaged senior
industry representatives about the threats to the national
security industrial base posed by adversaries and
competitors, including China. Over the past few years, the
Department of Defense has been elevating security as a
``fourth pillar'' (to complement cost, schedule, and
performance) in reviewing defense acquisitions, embodied in
the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence's ``Deliver
Uncompromised'' initiative.
Section 5305 of the Act extends that focus to the IC,
requiring the annual Program Management Plans to include
security risks in major system acquisitions, in addition to
cost, schedule, and performance. The Committees recognize
that security can be applied across a number of areas
(facilities, personnel, information, and supply chain) and
may vary by program, to appropriately ensure system integrity
and mission assurance.
Therefore, for the purposes of implementing section 5305 of
the Act, the Committees direct the Director of National
Intelligence, with the Director of the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center, to develop
parameters for including security risks (and risk management
measures) in the annual Program Management Plans to assist
congressional oversight.
Intelligence Community Public-Private Talent Exchange.
The Committees fully support section 5306 of Subdivision
1's implementation in accordance with applicable federal
ethics laws, regulations, and policies.
Expansion of Scope of Protections for Identities of Covert
Agents.
Section 5303 of Subdivision 1 of the Act removes temporal
and geographic limitations on the definition of ``covert
agent'', as that term was defined by Section 606 of the
Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982, P.L. 97-200
(Jun. 23, 1982) (IIPA).
Such limitations originally carved out of the IIPA
unauthorized disclosures of certain kinds of classified
identity information--those generally involving persons who
have not served or acted abroad in the last five years--on
grounds that such disclosures are generally less harmful to
national security, and therefore undeserving of IIPA
protections. But experience since then has proven otherwise.
With the benefit of experience, the Committees have concluded
that any disclosure of currently classified identity
information, without regard to the location or recency of the
activities of the person whose information is disclosed, can
risk serious harm to national security. That being the case,
such disclosures should potentially present a basis, under
appropriate circumstances, for prosecution under the IIPA.
[[Page H10239]]
The Committees wish to stress, however, that the change
does not imply any enhanced risk of IIPA liability for
journalists.
In the thirty-seven years since enactment, the statute has
never been used to prosecute members of the media. In fact,
prosecutors have charged violations of the IIPA in only two
cases, both of which involved unauthorized disclosures by
former federal government employees of classified information
obtained during their employment. The Committees view this
spare record, so far as traditional newsgathering and
publication is concerned, as reflecting the heavy,
constraining influence of the First Amendment's Press Clause.
Journalists continue to this day to report aggressively on
intelligence matters.
The IIPA's enforcement history also reflects the narrowness
of Section 601(c), a provision which some have interpreted to
expose traditional journalists to the risk of liability under
the statute. But in the Committees' view, that provision does
not cover responsibly investigating and reporting news in the
public interest. There is a high burden for conviction under
Section 601(c). It requires a prosecutor to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt, among other things, that a defendant
engaged in a ``pattern of activities'': a series of acts with
the common purpose or objective of identifying and publicly
exposing covert agents. Such conduct entails ``engag[ing] in
a purposeful enterprise of revealing covert identities'' or
being in the ``business of naming names,'' as the Conference
Report to the IIPA put it in 1982. H.R. Rep. No. 97-580, at 9
(1982).
Traditional news gathering and publication--including on
abuses of power, violations of law and civil liberties, and
other controversial activity--does not require, or even
typically involve, such conduct. Indeed, as the Conferees
illustrated the point:
The reporters who have investigated the activities of
Wilson and Terpil, former CIA employees who allegedly
supplied explosives and terrorist training to Libya, would
not be covered even if they revealed the identity of covert
agents if their pattern of activities was intended to
investigate illegal or controversial activities, and not to
identify covert agents. Similarly, David Garrow would not be
within the scope of the statute even though he purported to
give the identity of covert agents in his book, ``The FBI and
Martin Luther King, Jr.: from `Solo' to Memphis.'' His intent
presumably was to explain what drove the FBI to wiretap
Martin Luther King and not to identify and expose covert
agents.
H.R. Rep. No. 97-580, at 10. The same holds true for
traditional, responsible journalists today. Even after
amendments made by the Act, their work does not risk
liability under the revised IIPA.
Furthermore, section 5303 has no effect on what information
may be withheld under the Freedom of Information Act, 5
U.S.C. Sec. 552 (FOIA). Section 5303 expands the universe of
``covert agents'' whose classified relationship with the
United States Government is protected by the criminal law.
All of the people protected by the expanded ``covert agent''
definition have a relationship with the United States
government that is already classified. If an individual's
relationship with the government is classified, it may be
withheld under FOIA. Consequently, even before passage of
section 5303, identifying information for all of the
individuals covered by the IIPA expansion could already have
been withheld under FOIA's (b)(1) exemption for national
security information. In general, when justifying withholding
under FOIA information that tends to identify covert agents,
agencies should use (b)(1) classification exemptions, not
(b)(3) exemptions regarding the IIPA and other statutes. 5
U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 552(b)(1), (3).
Section 5303 is not intended to--and does not--affect
Congress' authority to oversee the IC. Section 5303 is not
intended to--and does not--affect the protections afforded to
whistleblowers to disclose violations of law and waste,
fraud, and abuse to Inspectors General or to Congress.
Intelligence Community Cooperation with the Government
Accountability Office.
The Committees believe the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) adds significant value to the Committees' oversight
efforts. For example, the GAO's designation in 2018 of the
government-wide Personnel Security Clearance process to its
high-risk list of federal areas needing reform to prevent
waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement, was important to the
Committees' efforts to legislate on security clearance
reform, including in this Act. The Committees expect that all
IC elements will fully and promptly comply with requests from
the GAO made to support studies requested by, or of interest
to, the Committees.
Clarification of Death Benefits for Survivors of Central
Intelligence Agency Personnel.
The Committees concur with the Executive Branch that
section 5341 of Subdivision 1 of the Act shall apply
retroactively from the date of enactment of this Act.
Intelligence Community Leave Policies.
The Committees find it imperative that the federal
government, to include the IC, recruit, hire, and retain a
highly qualified workforce. That depends in part on offering
federal personnel a competitive benefits package--including
with respect to parental leave and related benefits. Toward
that end, the Committees strongly believe the federal
government must align such benefits to the fullest extent
possible with those of leading U.S. private sector companies
and other industrialized countries.
In furtherance of that objective, the Committees in their
respective bills supported a provision to provide twelve
weeks of paid parental leave to all IC employees. The
Committees further support the succeeding provision in the
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year
2020 that provides government employees, to include those in
the IC, with twelve weeks of paid administrative leave in the
event of birth of a child, or the placement of a child for
purposes of adoptive or foster care. This is consistent with,
and supersedes, provisions that were contained in the House-
passed and Senate-passed Intelligence Authorization Acts for
Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020. Importantly, that NDAA
provision does not modify or otherwise affect the eligibility
of an IC employee for benefits relating to leave under any
other provision of law, to include the provisions of the
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 2601, et
seq.
Moreover, so far as concerns the provision's
implementation, the Committees direct the DNI, within 180
days after enactment of this Act, to provide a briefing for
the Committees on how each element of the IC will implement 5
U.S.C. section 6382(d)(2), as provided by this Act.
Transfer of National Intelligence University.
The Committees have been closely watching the evolution of
how the IC provides for advanced intelligence education. The
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has hosted an intelligence
college since 1962, which has been academically accredited
since 1983. When the ODNI was created in the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, ODNI created a
separate National Intelligence University (NIU) under its
auspices as a complement to DIA's intelligence effort. In
response to a report from the President's Intelligence
Advisory Board that accused the ODNI of being inadequately
focused, the ODNI in 2011 transferred the NIU to DIA's
intelligence college and rebranded the new combined
institution as NIU.
Pursuant to the Joint Explanatory Statement to the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, an
independent panel offered alternative governance models to
enhance NIU, to include a more prominent role for ODNI. In
parallel, analyses of DIA by the Secretary of Defense and the
HPSCI during the 115th Congress concluded that DIA would
benefit from moving NIU elsewhere in the IC.
The Committees believe transferring NIU to ODNI is now
appropriate if certain conditions, contained in section 5324
of Subdivision 1 of the Act, are met. The Committees believe
that clear commitment from the DNI and Principal Deputy DNI
is critical to NIU's success at ODNI. The Committees look
forward to working with ODNI and DoD on the successful
transfer of NIU.
Associate Degree Program Eligibility.
The Committees are concerned that students enrolled in, or
who have graduated from, Associate Degree programs have
insufficient opportunities to gain employment in the IC.
Therefore, the Committees direct the ODNI to submit a report
to the congressional intelligence committees on how to expand
the number of opportunities for students pursuing or having
earned an Associate Degree eligible for IC academic programs.
The Committees also direct the ODNI to make information about
these academic programs publicly available.
Exposing Predatory and Anticompetitive Foreign Economic
Influence.
The Committees are concerned about the significant threat
posed by foreign governments that engage in predatory and
anticompetitive behaviors aimed to undercut critical sectors
of the United States economy. Therefore, the Committees
direct the DNI, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary
of the Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis, to submit to
the congressional intelligence committees a report
identifying top countries that pose a substantial threat to
the United States economy regarding technology transfer
issues, predatory investment practices, economic espionage,
and other anticompetitive behaviors. The report shall be
submitted in unclassified form to the greatest extent
possible, but may include a classified annex.
Furthermore, the DNI, in consultation with the Department
of the Treasury and other agencies that the Director deems
appropriate,shall submit a report to the congressional
intelligence committees assessing the costs and benefits of
requiring a foreign person or entity that invests in the
United States (and is subject to the jurisdiction of a
country that poses a substantial threat to the United States
economy) to submit annual disclosures to the Federal
Government. Such disclosures would include all investments
that the foreign person or entity made in the United States
during the preceding year; the ownership structure of the
entity; and any affiliation of the entity with a foreign
government. The report should detail how such information
could be used by the IC and other elements of the Federal
government working to identify and combat foreign threats to
the United States economy, and the appropriate scope and
thresholds for such disclosures. The report shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
Increasing Data Security.
The Committees are aware the IC faces challenges while
trying to balance mission
[[Page H10240]]
and enterprise needs with IT modernization, including the
migration of data and applications to the cloud. With this in
mind, the Committees encourage the IC to identify and utilize
technologies that increase the security posture of data and
workloads and reduce cyber risks.
The Committees further recommend that:
1. IC elements identify, develop, and implement tools for
bi-directional data migration and division interoperability
between data center and cloud environments;
2. These tools include, but are not limited to, encryption
of data while both at rest and in motion, and micro-
segmentation of networks and workloads; and
3. IC elements prioritize shifting resources towards
automation as a way to respond more quickly to cyber threats.
Anonymous Annual Survey Regarding Workplace Climate.
IC elements obtain mission-critical information from the
results of anonymous, annual surveys of their employees, on
issues related to workplace climate and retention. As
necessary as they are to the elements' own activities, survey
results are also vital to the Committees' continuing
oversight of elements' efforts to address workplace climate
and retention issues, and to propose legislative and other
remedies where appropriate.
The need for reliable information is especially acute with
respect to sexual harassment and discrimination, given that--
established policy and legal protections notwithstanding--an
employee may fear that directly raising concerns about such
matters risks exposing the employee to retaliatory personnel,
security clearance, or other actions. The anonymous survey
affords the element, and the Committees, a mechanism for
inquiring further about the extent of this well-documented
chilling effect against reporting; and about the
effectiveness (or not) of ongoing programs to uncover and
root out sexual harassment, discrimination, and other illegal
and/or inappropriate activities at the workplace.
Therefore, the Committees direct that no later than 180
days after enactment of this Act, the DNI must certify in
writing to the congressional intelligence committees that:
1. At least once a year, each element of the IC submits a
survey to its employees regarding workplace climate and
retention matters, and affords employees completing such
surveys the option to remain anonymous;
2. Such survey includes questions regarding employees'
experiences with sexual assault, discrimination, harassment,
including sexual harassment, and related retaliation,
including, at a minimum, the questions covering the following
topics:
a. Have you witnessed sexual harassment or sexual assault?
i. Did you report it?
ii. If not, why not?
b. Have you experienced sexual harassment or sexual
assault?
i. Did you report it?
ii. If not, why not?
c. Have you experienced retaliation for reporting
harassment, discrimination, or sexual assault?
i. Have you faced retribution for taking leave for family,
medical, or other personal reasons?
ii. Did you fear retribution for taking leave?
3. Each element includes in its survey questions regarding
the job series, position, age, gender, race or ethnicity,
field, and job location at the time of the survey's
completion;
4. Each element tracks employees' responses according to
job series, position, age, gender, race or ethnicity, field,
and location at the time of the survey's completion; and
5. Each element reports the results of its survey annually
to the congressional intelligence committees.
Report to Congress on the Representation of Women and
Minorities in the Workforce.
The Committees continue to strongly support IC efforts to
identify, recruit, and retain a highly diverse and highly
qualified workforce--including, in particular, its efforts to
increase the representation within elements of the IC of
women and minorities.
This is a data driven exercise. Bolstering and adjusting IC
workforce diversity programs depends in part on the
Committees' regularly obtaining current, detailed, and
reliable information, and about specific matters relevant to
the broader subject of workforce diversity--such as rates and
areas of promotion of women and minority employees. However,
some elements may produce such information only from time to
time; others may make regular submissions to the Committees
but include only general information.
Therefore, the Committees direct that every six months, the
head of each element of the IC shall submit to the Committees
a written report that shall include, at a minimum:
1. The total number of women and minorities hired by that
element during the reporting period and a calculation of that
figure as a percentage of the agency's total hiring for that
period;
2. The distribution of women and minorities at that element
by grade level and by job series in the element's total
workforce during the reporting period, together with
comparisons from the immediately preceding two years;
3. The number of women and minorities who applied for
promotion at the element and the final number selected for
promotion during the reporting period;
4. The proportion of the total workforce of the element
occupied by each group or class protected by law, as of the
last day of the reporting period;
5. The numbers of minorities and women serving in positions
at the element requiring advanced, specialized training or
certification, as well as the proportion of the workforce
those groups occupy; and
6. To the extent that such element deploys civilian
employees to hazardous duty locations, the number of women
and minority employees who departed government service
subsequent to a deployment undertaken by an employee in
the previous two years.
Report on Geospatial Commercial Activities for Basic and
Applied Research and Development.
The Committees direct the Director of the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), in coordination with
the DNI, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), and the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office
(NRO), within 90 days of enactment of this Act, to submit to
the congressional intelligence and defense committees a
report on the feasibility, risks, costs, and benefits of
providing the private sector and academia, on a need-driven
and limited basis--consistent with the protection of sources
and methods, as well as privacy and civil liberties--access
to data in the possession of the NGA for the purpose of
assisting the efforts of the private sector and academia in
basic research, applied research, data transfers, and the
development of automation, artificial intelligence, and
associated algorithms. Such report shall include:
1. Identification of any additional authorities that the
Director of NGA would require to provide the private sector
and academia with access to relevant data on a need-driven
and limited basis, consistent with applicable laws and
procedures relating to the protection of sources, methods,
privacy and civil liberties; and
2. Market research to assess the commercial and academic
interest in such data and determine likely private-sector
entities and institutions of higher education interested in
public-private partnerships relating to such data.
NRO Contracting Restrictions.
The Committees continue to be very concerned that NRO
imposes unnecessary contractual restrictions that prohibits
or discourages a contractor from contacting or meeting with a
congressional intelligence committee or intelligence
committee Member offices. Therefore, the Committees direct
NRO to remove all restrictions that impacts contractors from
contacting or meeting with the congressional intelligence
committees or member offices in all current and future
contracts to include pre-coordination with executive branch
agencies.
Enhancing Automation at the National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency.
The Committees strongly support efforts to leverage
commercial advances in automation of imagery such as electro-
optical, infrared, Wide Area Motion Imagery (WAMI), Full
Motion Video (FMV), and Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR)
products to reduce manual processing and improve information
flow to users. However, the Committees are concerned that NGA
does not dedicate adequate resources to integrate new
automation techniques, which have resulted in years of
research into the issue, but limited operation gains during
day-to-day imagery processing.
Therefore, the Committees direct NGA, within 90 days of
enactment of this Act, to brief the congressional
intelligence and defense committees on an updated plan to
reduce manual processing of imagery such as electro-optical,
infrared, WAMI, FMV, and SAR to improve information flow to
users. The briefing shall also address:
1. NGA's strategy to leverage commercial advances;
2. The various GEOINT automated exploitation development
programs across the National System for Geospatial-
Intelligence, and the associated funding and specific purpose
of said programs;
3. Any similar efforts by government entities outside the
National System for Geospatial-Intelligence of which NGA is
aware; and
4. Which of these efforts may be duplicative.
Redundant Organic Software Development.
The Committees are concerned that NGA is developing
software solutions that are otherwise available for purchase
on the commercial market. This practice often increases the
time it takes to deliver new capabilities to the warfighter;
increases the overall cost of the solution through expensive
operational and maintenance costs; and undermines the U.S.
software industrial base.
Therefore, the Committees direct NGA, within 60 days of
enactment of this Act, to brief the Committees, to identify
all NGA developed software programs and explain why they are
being developed organically instead of leveraging
commercially available products.
Critical Skills Recruiting for Automation.
Although cutting edge sensors have provided the IC and
Department of Defense with exquisite imagery, full motion
video (FMV), and wide area motion imagery (WAMI),
intelligence analysts are unable to keep pace with the volume
of data being generated. This demands a transformation in the
way the intelligence enterprise processes, organizes, and
presents data. For that reason, the
[[Page H10241]]
Committees fully support the NGA's efforts to attract,
recruit, and retain a highly competent workforce that can
acquire and integrate new data automation tools.
Therefore, the Committees direct NGA, within 60 days of
enactment of this Act, to brief the congressional
intelligence and defense committees on NGA's efforts to
recruit critical skills such as mathematicians, data
scientists, and software engineers that possess critical
skills needed to support NGA's objectives in automation.
Common Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility.
The Committees have become aware of several major
impediments to companies performing work for agencies and
organizations like the NRO. For example, businesses without
ownership of a SCIF find it very difficult to perform
classified work. Additionally, these small businesses are
challenged with basic obstacles such as becoming aware of
classified work opportunities because it is difficult to
obtain access to the IC's and DoD's classified marketplaces
such as the Acquisition Resource Center (ARC). Construction
and accreditation of SCIF spaces is cost-prohibitive for
small business and non-traditional government contractors.
Additionally, construction timeline often exceeds the period
of performance of a contract.
A modern trend for innovative and non-traditional
government contractors is the increased use of co-working
space environments. Additionally, public and private entities
are partnering to create emerging regional innovation hubs to
help identify technology solutions and products in the
private sector that can be utilized by the IC and DoD. These
innovation hubs currently produce an agile, neutral, but
largely unclassified development environment.
Therefore, the Committees direct the DNI, within 90 days of
enactment of this Act, to brief the congressional
intelligence committees on the following:
1. Steps necessary to establish new `Common SCIFs' in areas
of high demand;
2. What approaches allow for SCIF spaces to be certified
and accredited outside of a traditional contractual
arrangement;
3. Analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of issuing
Department of Defense Contract Security Specification (DD
Form 254s) to ``Facilities,'' as opposed to ``Contracts'';
4. Options for classified co-use and shared workspace
environments such as: innovation, incubation, catalyst, and
accelerator environments;
5. Pros and cons for public, private, government, or
combination owned classified neutral facilities; and
6. Any other opportunities to support those without
ownership of a SCIF effective access to a neutral SCIF.
Improving Use of the Unclassified Marketplaces.
Another area where the Committees have become aware of
major impediments for companies to perform work for agencies
and organizations like the NRO are unclassified marketplaces
such as the Acquisition Resource Center (ARC). Instead of
posting data to unclassified marketplaces, unclassified NRO
postings often refer to the classified side for critical yet
unclassified information. If the NRO is serious about
embracing commercial innovation, unclassified marketplace
postings should remain on the unclassified side.
Therefore, the Committees direct NRO, within 90 days of
enactment of this Act, to brief the Committees on options for
improving the unclassified marketplace process.
Satellite Servicing.
No later than one year after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the DNI, in consultation with the Secretary of
Defense, shall jointly provide the to the congressional
intelligence and defense committees a briefing detailing the
costs, risks, and operational benefits of leveraging
commercial satellite servicing capabilities for national
security satellite systems. The briefing shall include the
following:
1. A prioritized list, with a rationale, of operational and
planned assets of the Intelligence Community that could be
enhanced by satellite servicing missions;
2. The costs, risks, and benefits of integrating satellite
servicing capabilities as part of operational resilience; and
3. Potential strategies that could allow future national
security space systems to leverage commercial in-orbit
servicing capabilities where appropriate and feasible.
Commercial RF Mapping and SAR.
U.S. commercial companies are now offering space-based
geolocation and geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) analysis of
radio frequency (RF) emitters as well as synthetic aperture
radar (SAR) products. These companies can identify, locate,
and analyze previously undetected activity, providing new
insights for U.S. national security and defense. The IC
currently has contracts that leverage commercial electro-
optical satellites, however it does not have a program in
place to take full advantage of these emerging commercial
space-based RF GEOINT and SAR capabilities.
Therefore, the Committees direct the NRO and NGA to brief
the Committees on how it will leverage these commercial
companies in Fiscal Year 2020 and beyond, to include funding
for, as well as testing and evaluation efforts.
Commercial Remote Sensing.
The Committees support efforts to establish a light-touch
regulatory structure that enables the rapidly evolving
commercial space-based imagery, RF sensing, and radar
industry markets to promote U.S. leadership in these areas.
However, the Committees also support the needs of the U.S.
Government to protect both IC and DoD personnel and assets.
The Committees believe there can be a balance that supports
both national security interests and the promotion of U.S.
innovation and leadership.
Therefore, the Committees direct the DNI, in consultation
with the Secretary of Defense, to brief the Committees within
60 days of the date of enactment of the Act, on efforts that
help address this balance and which streamline the IC and DoD
involvement in the rapidly evolving U.S. commercial space-
based imagery, RF sensing, and radar industries.
Deception Detection Techniques.
The U.S. Government does not have sufficient security
screening capabilities available to determine deception in
individuals that intend to harm the United States. The
polygraph has been an effective investigative tool to detect
deception, but the cost and time required to administer a
polygraph examination is a major cause for security clearance
backlogs, and often limits the frequency of periodic
examinations to every 5-7 years. Entities within DoD and the
IC including DIA, Special Operations Command, NGA, Defense
Counterintelligence and Security Agency, U.S. Air Force and
others have expressed a desire to begin piloting new systems
such as ocular deception detection systems. However, progress
is being hindered by DoD Directive 5210.91 and ODNI Security
Agent Directive 2, which direct some oversight of new
deception detection technologies to the DoD National Center
of Credibility Assessment (NCCA), which does not have
sufficient budget or other resources to expeditiously
evaluate non-polygraph technologies.
Therefore, the Committees direct the DNI in coordination
with the DoD to provide the congressional intelligence and
defense committees with a briefing on what steps they are
taking to ensure pilot programs are established to evaluate
these new technologies to help reduce our backlog, improve
efficiency, and reduce overall cost. Pilot programs shall
evaluate current and emerging technologies to efficiently and
rapidly verify the accuracy and truthfulness of statements of
candidates for employment within the DoD/IC, including for
interim security clearances, for periodic screening of
cleared DoD/IC personnel, to screen foreign national
collaborators and contractors overseas to prevent ``Green-on-
Blue'' attacks, for immigration screening and for other
purposes.
List of Foreign Entities That Pose a Threat to Critical
Technologies.
The Committees direct the DNI, in consultation with the
Secretary of Defense, to identify, compose, and maintain a
list of foreign entities, including governments,
corporations, nonprofit and for-profit organizations, and any
subsidiary or affiliate of such an entity, that the Director
determines pose a threat of espionage with respect to
critical technologies or research projects, including
research conducted at institutions of higher education.
Maintenance of this list will be critical to ensuring the
security of the most sensitive projects relating to U.S.
national security, such as defense and intelligence-related
research projects. The initial list shall be available to the
head of each qualified agency funding applicable projects and
will include the following entities already identified as
threatening: Huawei Technologies Company, ZTE Corporation,
Hytera Communications Corporation, Hangzhou Hikvision Digital
Technology Company, Dahua Technology Company, and Kaspersky
Lab. The DNI and the Secretary of Defense, or a delegate from
each agency, shall brief the findings to the congressional
intelligence and defense committees no later than 180 days
after the enactment of the Act.
Protection of National Security Research.
The Committees believe that institutes of higher learning,
laboratories, and other entities and organizations play
critical roles in advancing national security within the U.S.
science and technology ecosystem that is charged with
delivering the best capabilities to the warfighter in the
near, mid, and long-term. The Committees understand that
near-peer competitors such as China and Russia attempt to
exploit and benefit from the open and collaborative global
research environment created by the Reagan Administration's
National Security Decision Directive 189 on the National
Policy on the transfer of Scientific, Technical and
Engineering Information. This directive established that the
products of ``fundamental research''--defined as ``basic and
applied research in science and engineering, the results of
which ordinarily are published and shared''--should remain
unrestricted.
The Committees are also aware that academia is not always
kept apprised by the interagency of a complete picture of
potential activities and threats in the research community,
such as improper technology transfer, intellectual property
theft, and cyber-attacks directly attributed to nation-state
governments. Elsewhere in this bill and report, the
Committees include measures to promote increased information
sharing across the interagency and with academia.
Therefore, the Committees direct the Secretary of Defense
to provide the congressional intelligence and defense
committees,
[[Page H10242]]
within 90 days of enactment of the Act, a report listing
Chinese and Russian academic institutions that have a history
of improper technology transfer, intellectual property theft,
cyber espionage, or operate under the direction of their
respective armed forces or intelligence agencies. The report
should be in unclassified form, but may contain a classified
annex.
Investments in Scientific and Technological Intelligence.
The Committees remain interested in the continued efforts
of the DoD to improve scientific and technological
intelligence (S&TI) capabilities and tradecraft across the
Defense Intelligence Enterprise (DIE). The Committees
recognize S&TI is critical to strategic competition with
near-peer competitors by ensuring comprehensive understanding
of adversary capabilities and ability to inform development
of joint force fifth-generation advanced weapons systems and
other emerging technologies.
Therefore, the Committees direct the USD(I) in
collaboration with the Director of the DIA, to provide a
briefing to the Committees and the congressional defense
committees within 75 days of enactment of the Act, on the
alignment of current and planned DIE S&TI investments and
activities to DoD operational and strategic requirements.
The briefing shall also include information on how the DoD
will continue the maturation of S&TI capabilities and
tradecraft across the DIE.
Intelligence Support to Defense Operations in the Information
Environment.
The Committees support DoD efforts to improve capabilities
and tradecraft to operate in the information environment. The
Committees are concerned about the Defense Intelligence
Enterprise's (DIE) ability to provide the information
operations community with all-source intelligence support,
consistent with the support provided to operations in other
domains.
Therefore, the Committees direct the USD(I), in
coordination with the Joint Staff's Director for Intelligence
and the DNI, to provide a briefing to the congressional
intelligence and defense committees within 30 days of
enactment of the Act, on intelligence support to information
operations. The briefing should include standardized defense
intelligence lexicon for intelligence preparation of the
battlefield for information operations, efforts to develop a
process to ensure the full scope of emerging defense
information operations threat requirements are structured to
be addressed through the entirety of DIE capabilities, and
how the DIE perceives the future of defense operations in the
information environment.
The briefing shall also include a description of how the
IC, through the National Intelligence Priorities Framework,
will account for a more dynamic use of defense intelligence
capabilities to augment and enhance support to DoD operations
in the information environment.
ROTC IC Recruitment Trial Program.
The Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) program,
with units or affiliates at approximately 1,600 U.S. colleges
and universities, is DoD's largest commissioning source,
providing approximately 6,500 new active duty officers to the
military each year.
Officer candidates enrolled in ROTC programs must meet all
graduation requirements of their academic institutions,
enroll in military, naval, or aerospace education courses,
and attend summer military training, making them ideal
candidates for IC placement. Currently, ROTC cadets only have
the option to utilize their training by joining one of the
military services. The Committees believe the government can
find cost savings and provide a wider range of opportunities
to ROTC recruits by leveraging the ROTC's existing training
program for the IC.
Therefore, the Committees direct the USD(I), in
coordination with ODNI, to conduct a feasibility study on
creating a pathway for ROTC recruits to find employment in
the IC, on a reimbursable basis. The study should examine:
1. Pros and cons of instituting an ROTC IC recruitment
pipeline;
2. Approximate reimbursement cost per recruit; and
3. Legislative requirements for program execution.
The Committees direct that the study results be submitted
via report to the Committees and the congressional defense
committees within 90 days of enactment of the Act.
Explosive Ordinance Disposal Intelligence.
The Committees are concerned that the expertise of
Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) personnel is not
adequately accessible and therefore, not sufficiently
utilized by the Defense Intelligence Enterprise and IC to
provide the combatant commands with the required intelligence
to identify, combat, and deter violent extremism and other
asymmetric threats.
Explosive ordnance includes all munitions, improvised
explosive devices, devices containing explosives,
propellants, nuclear fission or fusion materials, biological,
and chemical agents. The primary consumer of this information
are military tactical explosive ordnance disposal units that
employ the data for threat identification and neutralization.
However, the required analysis to determine appropriate
render-safe capabilities requires operational and strategic
intelligence to process and analyze the data, and data
management processes to promulgate the resulting information.
The Committees believe DoD should modernize the processes and
procedures to more comprehensively track, manage, and
coordinate the capability and capacity of EOD intelligence
within the IC and the DIE to support all levels of render-
safe capabilities.
Therefore, the Committees direct the USD(I), in
coordination with the ODNI, to provide a briefing to the
congressional intelligence and defense committees within 120
days of enactment of the Act on the capability and capacity
of EOD intelligence expertise across the DIE and IC. The
briefing shall include:
1. An assessment of the coordination and integration of
defense and national intelligence capabilities against EOD
intelligence requirements, to include a mitigation strategy
to address any identified gaps or deficiencies, information-
sharing challenges, or any other impediments to integration
of EOD expertise across the defense and intelligence
communities; and
2. An assessment of the technical skills needed to address
EOD intelligence requirements, while identifying any gaps or
deficiencies in current personnel hiring and training
structures, and a long-term plan to develop proficiency of
EOD intelligence expertise in the defense and intelligence
communities.
Information-Sharing Arrangements with India, Japan, and the
Republic of Korea.
International alliances and partnerships are critical to
the pursuit and sustainment of the United States national
security objectives, built upon foundations of shared values
and intent. The Committees recognize the importance of the
DoD sharing information with international allies and
partners in support of the planning and execution of the
National Defense Strategy, as allies and third-party
international partners enhance strategic stability across the
Department's purview while increasing effectiveness of
operations. The Committees believe the mechanisms to share
information across the ``Five Eyes'' alliance continue to
mature through established exercises, exchange of personnel,
and virtual data sharing, while that cooperation is
potentially less robust with third-party partners.
The Committees support the roles and contributions of
third-party partners such as India, Japan, and the Republic
of Korea, and recognizes their ongoing contribution toward
maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region.
The Committees are interested in understanding the policies
and procedures governing the collaboration and information
sharing with India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the
``Five Eyes'' allies, and whether opportunities exist to
strengthen those arrangements.
Therefore, the Committees direct the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), in coordination with the
ODNI, to provide a briefing to the congressional intelligence
and defense committees within 60 days of enactment of the
Act, on the benefits, challenges, and risks of broadening the
information-sharing mechanisms between India, Japan, the
Republic of Korea, and the ``Five Eyes'' allies.
Transitioning the Function of Background Investigations to
the Department of Defense.
Executive Order 13869 transitions the background
investigation functions of the Federal Government from the
Office of Personnel Management (OPM), National Background
Investigations Bureau, to the DoD, Defense
Counterintelligence and Security Agency. The Committees
recognize the importance of ensuring timely and efficient
background investigations to overcome workforce staffing
challenges of cleared individuals across the whole of
government and private sector, and to vet personnel who come
into contact with the Department's personnel, installations,
and technology. The Committees are aware of the temporary
establishment of the Personnel Vetting Transformation Office
in the OUSD(I) to manage the transition of this activity from
OPM to the Department and improve the processes and
procedures related to vetting personnel for clearances across
the whole of government and private sector.
However, the Committees are concerned about the potential
risks to personnel management and mission such a transfer may
present, and believes that appropriate protections of civil
liberties and privacy must be prioritized throughout the
transition, through the implementation of modern and
efficient vetting measures. The Committees recognize the
Department's leadership, through sharing best practices with
ODNI, in reforming the vetting process using modern
techniques such as continuous evaluation, and expects regular
updates on the Department's progress in addressing the
current background investigations backlog.
Therefore, the Committees direct the USD(I), in
coordination with the Director of the Defense
Counterintelligence and Security Agency, to provide a
briefing to the congressional intelligence and defense
committees within 90 days of enactment of the Act, on how the
DoD will transfer the background investigation mission and
establish an effective personnel vetting capability to
provide for the security of the Department, while maintaining
the civil liberties and privacy protections of personnel
under consideration to receive a clearance.
Joint Intelligence Operations Center Staffing.
The Committees recognize the evolving operational and
strategic priorities of the
[[Page H10243]]
DoD will impact Defense Intelligence Enterprise capabilities
and resources. The Committees recognize the ongoing efforts
by the USD(I) to comply with direction specified by the John.
S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2019 (Public Law 115-232) to reduce and prevent imbalances in
priorities and mitigate against insufficient or misaligned
resources within the Defense Intelligence Enterprise.
While the Committees support the efforts by the USD(I) to
create efficiencies across the Defense Intelligence
Enterprise organizations, to include the Service Intelligence
Centers and combatant command Joint Operations Intelligence
Centers, and enable those elements to plan and posture
staffing requirements accordingly, the Committees are
concerned that the shifts in current and future resourcing
lack coherence to support the global mandate of the
Department.
Therefore, the Committees direct the USD(I), in
coordination with DIA, to provide a briefing to the
congressional intelligence and defense committees within 90
days of enactment of the Act on how the OUSD(I) and DIA are
managing resourcing requirements to the combatant command
Joint Intelligence Operations Centers to meet current and
future needs of the combatant commanders and DoD.
China's Biological Weapons Program.
The Committees remain interested in ensuring the Defense
Intelligence Enterprise is providing timely, accurate, and
effective intelligence to support information needs of the
DoD, and are aware of a recent GAO report on long-range
emerging threats facing the United States that highlighted
potential pursuit by near-peer competitors of biological
weapons using genetic engineering and synthetic biology.
Therefore, the Committees direct the USD(I), in
coordination with the Director of the DIA, to provide a
briefing to the congressional intelligence and defense
committees within 30 days of enactment of the Act with an
assessment of China's current and projected biological
weapons program, the risks presented to the joint force, and
the mitigation strategies to protect U.S. military forces
against said threats.
Machine-assisted Analytic Rapid Repository System Government
Accountability Office Review.
The re-emergence of great power competition will stress
DIA's ability to provide foundational military intelligence
for the IC and warfighters. As such, the Committees are
supportive of DIA's intent to replace the Modernized
Integrated Database (MIDB) with the Machine-assisted Analytic
Rapid Repository System (MARS).
However, the Committees are concerned that MARS's
development and procurement will entail a complex and
extensive transformation that will impact the DIA's delivery
of foundational military intelligence.
Therefore, the Committees direct the GAO to provide a
report to the congressional intelligence and defense
committees within one year of enactment of the Act that
describes:
1. The envisioned users and customer base and how they will
use MARS;
2. An assessment of the transition plan from MIDB to MARS
with input from current and historic MIDB users, as well as
customers;
3. An assessment of the resources necessary to fully
implement MARS, to include funding and personnel
implications;
4. An assessment of DIA's acquisition strategy for MARS to
include the use of any rapid acquisition or prototyping
authorities; and
5. The challenges DIA has identified that it will face in
transitioning from MIDB to MARS and whether its migration
plans are sufficient for addressing these challenges.
The Committees expect DIA's full cooperation with the GAO
study.
Update on the DIA Strategic Approach.
In September 2018, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
adopted a Strategic Approach to enhance workforce
development, improve foundational military intelligence data
management, address perennial intelligence issues and realign
roles and missions. Improvements in these issue areas will
enhance the Agency's ability to support both the National
Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy.
The Committees support the DIA's initiative to improve
those structures it assesses are critical to providing
warfighters the information needed to prevent and, if
necessary, decisively win wars, such as intelligence on
foreign militaries' capabilities.
Therefore, the Committees direct DIA to provide quarterly
briefings, beginning 45 days after enactment of the Act, to
the congressional intelligence and defense committees on its
efforts to enhance workforce development, improve
foundational military intelligence data management, address
perennial intelligence issues, and realign roles and
missions.
Report on Chinese Efforts Targeting Democratic Elections and
U.S. Alliances and Partnerships and Strategy to Counter
Chinese Election Interference.
The Committees direct the DNI, in coordination with the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the
Secretary of Homeland Security, to provide a report to the
Committees, the congressional defense committees, the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, the House Committee on Homeland Security, and the
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs on the Chinese government's influence operations and
campaigns targeting democratic elections.
The report shall be divided into two sections, which
respectively address influence operations and campaigns
targeting: (1) recent and upcoming elections in the United
States (dating back to January 1, 2017), and (2) military
alliances and partnerships of which the United States is a
member. The report should also include a strategy to counter
these activities. The Committees further direct the Secretary
of Defense to provide an interim report within 30 days of
enactment of the Act, and a final report within a year of
enactment of the Act.
The report shall be unclassified and appropriate for
release to the public but may include a classified annex. At
a minimum, the report should include:
1. An assessment of China's objectives in influence
operations and campaigns targeting democratic elections and
military alliances and partnerships of which the United
States is a member, and how such objectives relate to the
China's broader strategic aims;
2. The United States' strategy and capabilities for
detecting, deterring, countering, and disrupting such Chinese
influence operations (including recommended authorities and
activities) and campaigns and a discussion of the DoD's and
the IC's respective roles in the strategy;
3. A comprehensive list of specific Chinese state and non-
state entities involved in supporting such Chinese influence
operations and campaigns and the role of each entity in
supporting them;
4. An identification of the tactics, techniques, and
procedures used in previous Chinese influence operations and
campaigns;
5. A comprehensive identification of countries with
democratic election systems that have been targeted by
Chinese influence operations and campaigns since January 1,
2017;
6. An assessment of the impact of previous Chinese
influence operations and campaigns targeting democratic
elections and military alliances and partnerships of which
the United States is a member, including the views of senior
Chinese officials about their effectiveness in achieving
Chinese objectives;
7. An identification of countries with democratic elections
systems that may be targeted in future Chinese influence
operations and campaigns and an assessment of the likelihood
that each such country will be targeted;
8. An identification of all U.S. military alliances and
partnerships that have been targeted by Chinese influence
operations and campaigns since January 1, 2017;
9. An identification of all U.S. military alliances and
partnerships that may be targeted in future Chinese influence
operations and campaigns and an assessment of the likelihood
that each such country will be targeted; and
10. An identification of tactics, techniques, and
procedures likely to be used in future Chinese influence
operations and campaigns targeting democratic elections and
military alliances and partnerships of which the United
States is a member.
Report on Russian Efforts Targeting Democratic Elections and
U.S. Alliances and Partnerships and Strategy to Counter
Russian Election Interference.
The Committees direct the DNI, in coordination with the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the
Secretary of Homeland Security, to provide a report to the
Committees, the congressional defense committees, the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, the House Committee on Homeland Security, and the
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs on Russia's influence operations and campaigns
targeting democratic elections.
The report shall be divided into two sections, which
respectively address influence operations and campaigns
targeting: (1) recent and upcoming elections in the United
States (dating back to January 1, 2017) and (2) military
alliances and partnerships of which the United States is a
member. The report should also include a strategy to counter
these activities. The Committees further direct the Secretary
of Defense to provide an interim report within 30 days of
enactment of the Act, and a final report within a year of
enactment of the Act.
The report shall be unclassified and appropriate for
release to the public but may include a classified annex. At
a minimum, the report should include:
1. An assessment of Russia's objectives in influence
operations and campaigns targeting democratic elections and
military alliances and partnerships of which the United
States is a member, and how such objectives relate to
Russia's broader strategic aims;
2. The United States strategy and capabilities for
detecting, deterring, countering, and disrupting such Russian
influence operations (including recommended authorities and
activities) and campaigns and a discussion of the DoD's and
IC's respective roles in the strategy;
3. A comprehensive list of specific Russian state and non-
state entities involved in supporting such Russian influence
operations and campaigns and the role of each entity in
supporting them;
4. An identification of the tactics, techniques, and
procedures used in previous Russian influence operations and
campaigns;
[[Page H10244]]
5. A comprehensive identification of countries with
democratic election systems that have been targeted by
Russian influence operations and campaigns since January 1,
2017;
6. An assessment of the impact of previous Russian
influence operations and campaigns targeting democratic
elections and military alliances and partnerships of which
the United States is a member, including the views of senior
Russian officials about their effectiveness in achieving
Russian objectives;
7. An identification of countries with democratic elections
systems that may be targeted in future Russian influence
operations and campaigns and an assessment of the likelihood
that each such country will be targeted;
8. An identification of all U.S. military alliances and
partnerships that have been targeted by Russian influence
operations and campaigns since January 1, 2017;
9. An identification of all U.S. military alliances and
partnerships that may be targeted in future Russian influence
operations and campaigns and an assessment of the likelihood
that each such country will be targeted; and
10. An identification of tactics, techniques, and
procedures likely to be used in future Russian influence
operations and campaigns targeting democratic elections and
military alliances and partnerships of which the United
States is a member.
UNCLASSIFIED DIRECTION RELATED TO SUBDIVISION 2
Management of Intelligence Community Workforce.
The Committees repeat direction from the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 that IC elements
should build, develop, and maintain a workforce appropriately
balanced among its civilian, military, and contractor
workforce sectors to meet the missions assigned to it in law
and by the president. Starting in Fiscal Year 2019, the
Committees no longer authorize position ceiling levels in the
annual Schedule of Authorizations.
The Committees look forward to working with the ODNI as it
develops an implementation strategy and sets standards for
workforce cost analysis tools.
Countering Russian Propaganda.
The Committees support the IC's role in countering Russian
propaganda and other active measures. The Committees are
committed to providing the appropriate legal authorities,
financial resources, and personnel necessary to address these
hostile acts. The Committees specifically find that language
capabilities are important to the IC's efforts in countering
Russia's hostile acts. The Committees encourage the IC to
commit considerable resources in the future to bolstering
officers' existing Russian language skills, recruiting
Russian language speakers, and training officers in Russian,
in particular key technical language skills. This effort will
require strategic planning both in recruiting and rotating
officers through language training. The Committees expect to
see these priorities reflected in future IC budget requests.
Protection of the Supply Chain in Intelligence Community
Acquisition Decisions.
The Committees continue to have significant concerns about
risks to the supply chain in IC acquisitions. The Committees
encourage the Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk
Management Task Force recommendations to support continued
efforts to develop an open, interoperable information
security-sharing platform to enable real-time cross-domain
sharing for the IC to effectively share and analyze
information on supply chain, cybersecurity vulnerabilities,
and counterintelligence risks.
The report to accompany the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2017 directed the DNI to review and consider
changes to Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 801
(``Acquisition'') to reflect the issuance of ICD 731
(``Supply Chain Risk Management'') in 2013 and the issues
associated with cybersecurity. It specifically recommended
the review examine whether to: expand risk management
criteria in the acquisition process to include cyber and
supply chain threats; require counterintelligence and
security assessments as part of the acquisition and
procurement process; propose and adopt new education
requirements for acquisition professionals on cyber and
supply chain threats; and factor in the cost of cyber and
supply chain security. This review was due in November 2017,
with a report on the process for updating ICD 801 in December
2017. The report was completed on June 18, 2018.
As a follow-on to this review, the Committees direct DNI to
address three other considerations: changes in the Federal
Acquisition Regulation that may be necessary; how changes
should apply to all acquisition programs; and how security
risks must be addressed across development, procurement, and
operational phases of acquisition. The Committees further
direct the DNI to submit a plan to implement necessary
changes within 60 days of completion of this review.
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency use of VERA and VSIP
Authorities.
The Committees encourage the use by the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) of Voluntary Early
Retirement Authority (VERA) and Voluntary Separation
Incentive Program (VSIP) offers to meet future goals of
building a workforce more attuned to automation of data
production, automation of analytic processes, and
establishment of development and operations (DevOps) software
development processes.
Therefore, the Committees direct the NGA to report to the
Committees, within 120 days of enactment of the Act, on its
use to date of VERA and VSIP incentives, to include how they
have been used to develop an acquisition cadre skilled in
``DevOps'' software development processes, as well as a plan
for further use of these incentives. The report should
specify metrics for retooling its workforce, including how it
measures data literacy and computational skills in potential
hires, and an accounting of the numbers of new hires who have
met these higher standards.
Report on Engagement of National Reconnaissance Office with
University Community.
The Committees recognize that the survivability and
resiliency of United States satellites is critically
important to the United States intelligence and defense
communities. While the NRO engages with the university
community in support of basic research and developing an
education workforce pipeline to help advance new technologies
and produce skilled professionals, it can do more in this
regard to focus on space survivability.
Therefore, the Committees direct the NRO to report, within
120 days of enactment of the Act, on NRO's current efforts
and future strategies to engage with university partners that
are strategically located, host secure information
facilities, and offer a strong engineering curriculum, with a
particular focus on space survivability and resiliency. This
report should provide a summary of NRO's current and planned
university engagement programs, levels of funding, and
program research and workforce objectives and metrics. The
report should also include an assessment of the strategic
utility of chartering a University Affiliated Research Center
in this domain.
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Facilities.
Consistent with section 2401 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, the Committees
authorize the President's request for $447.8 million in
Fiscal Year 2019 for phase two construction activities of the
Next National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency West (N2W)
facility in St. Louis, Missouri. The Committees are pleased
that the second phase of this $837.2 million project was
included in the Fiscal Year 2019 President's budget.
Clarification of Oversight Responsibilities.
The Committees reinforce the requirement for all IC
agencies funded by the NIP to respond in a full, complete,
and timely manner to any request for information made by a
member of the congressional intelligence committees. In
addition, the Committees direct the DNI to issue guidelines,
within 90 days of enactment of the Act, to ensure that the
intent of section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 3091) is carried out.
Clarification on Cooperation with Investigation on Russian
Influence in the 2016 Election.
The Committees continue to reinforce the obligation for all
IC agencies to cooperate in a full, complete, and timely
manner with the Committees' ongoing investigations into
Russian meddling in the 2016 Presidential election and
cooperation with the declassification process.
Supervisory Feedback as Part of Continuous Vetting Program.
The Committees direct the DNI to review the results of
ongoing pilot programs regarding the use of supervisory
feedback as part of the periodic reinvestigation and
continuous vetting process and report, within 180 days of
enactment of the Act, on the establishment of a policy for
its use across the IC.
National Security Threats to Critical Infrastructure.
The Committees are aware of significant threats to our
critical infrastructure and industrial control systems posed
by foreign adversaries. The sensitive nature of the
information related to these threats make the role of the IC
of vital importance to United States defensive efforts. The
Committees have grave concerns that current IC resources
dedicated to analyzing and countering these threats are
neither sufficient nor closely coordinated. The Committees
include provisions within this legislation to address these
concerns.
Framework for Cybersecurity and Intelligence Collection
Doctrine.
The Committees direct the ODNI, in coordination with
appropriate IC elements, to develop an analytic framework
that could support the eventual creation and execution of a
Government-wide cybersecurity and intelligence collection
doctrine. The ODNI shall provide this framework, which may
contain a classified annex, to the congressional intelligence
committees, within 180 days of enactment of the Act.
This framework shall include:
1. An assessment of the current and medium-term cyber
threats to the protection of the United States' national
security systems and critical infrastructure;
2. IC definitions of key cybersecurity concepts, to include
cyberespionage, cyber theft, cyber acts of aggression, and
cyber deterrence;
3. Intelligence collection requirements to ensure
identification of cyber actors targeting U.S. national
security interests, and
[[Page H10245]]
to inform policy responses to cyber-attacks and computer
network operations directed against the United States;
4. The IC's methodology for assessing the impacts of cyber-
attacks and computer network operations incidents directed
against the United States, taking into account differing
levels of severity of incidents;
5. Capabilities that the IC could employ in response to
cyber-attacks and computer network operations incidents,
taking into account differing levels of severity of
incidents;
6. A policy and architecture for sharing cybersecurity-
related intelligence with government, private sector, and
international partners, including existing statutory and
other authorities which may be exercised in pursuit of that
goal; and
7. Any necessary changes in IC authorities, governance,
technology, resources, and policy to provide more capable and
agile cybersecurity.
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community Role and
Responsibilities.
The position of the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community (IC IG) was codified by the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. Among other things,
the IC IG's statutory purposes include ``conduct[ing]
independent reviews investigations, inspections, audits, and
reviews on programs and activities within the responsibility
and authority of the Director of National Intelligence;''
keeping the Committees fully and currently informed of
significant problems and deficiencies; and leading efforts of
inspectors general within the IC.
The Committees have included provisions intended to
strengthen the IC IG's role. The Committees will insist on
full cooperation from the Director, ODNI offices, as well as
those of inspectors general across the IC, in ensuring that
the IC IG's prescribed functions are carried out to the
fullest extent possible. The Committees further reiterate
Congress's intent that the IC IG is obligated to identify and
inform the Committees of significant problems and
deficiencies ``relating to'' all intelligence programs and
activities.
The Committees also remain seriously concerned about the
undermining of protections and rights afforded to
whistleblowers within the IC and the level of insight
congressional committees have into the handling of lawful
disclosures. Without exception, the Committees must be made
aware of lawful disclosures made to any inspector general
within the IC, consistent with provisions added to Title 50
by sections 5331-5335 of Subdivision 1 of the Act; and of all
lawful disclosures made pursuant to ICWPA and Title 50
procedures, which Intelligence Community personnel intend to
be submitted to the Committees. The Committees underscore in
the strongest terms that all elements of the IC are
obligated, as a categorical matter, to comply with both
existing law as well as direction provided elsewhere in the
Act and this Explanation, with respect to inspector general
and whistleblower matters.
Space Launch Facilities.
The Committees continue to believe it is critical to
preserve a variety of launch range capabilities to support
national security space missions, and encourage planned
launches such as the U.S. Air Force Orbital/Sub-Orbital
Program (OSP)-3 NRO-111 mission, to be launched in 2019 on a
Minotaur 1 from the Mid-Atlantic Regional Spaceport at
Wallops Flight Facility. In the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2017, the Committees directed a brief
from the ODNI, in consultation with the DoD and the U.S. Air
Force, on their plans to utilize state-owned and operated
spaceports, which leverage non-federal public and private
investments to bolster United States launch capabilities and
provide access to mid-to-low or polar-to-high inclination
orbits for national security missions.
The Committees direct that the ODNI supplement this brief
with how state investments in these spaceports may support
infrastructure improvements, such as payload integration and
launch capabilities, for national security launches.
Acquisition Research Center Postings.
The Committees support a flexible NRO acquisition process
that allows the NRO to choose the most appropriate
contracting mechanism, whether for small research and
development efforts or large acquisitions. The NRO's
Acquisition Research Center (ARC), a classified contracting
and solicitation marketplace that NRO and other agencies use,
enables this flexible acquisition process for classified
efforts.
The Committees direct the NRO, within 60 days of enactment
of the Act, to brief the congressional intelligence and
defense committees on options for modifying ARC posting
procedures to ensure fair and open competition. Those options
should include ensuring that unclassified NRO solicitations
are posted on the unclassified FEDBIZOPS website, and
identifying ways to better utilize the ARC to encourage
contract opportunities for a more diverse industrial base
that includes smaller and non-traditional companies.
Ensuring Strong Strategic Analytical Tradecraft.
The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) Office of
Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) has taken steps to improve
the quality of its analysis, to identify its core customers,
and to tailor its production to meet customer needs. The
Committees concur with I&A's implementation of analytic
standards and review mechanisms that have improved the
tradecraft behind I&A products. The bedrock of these efforts
has been the development of a yearly program of analysis
(POA) and key intelligence questions, which are essential
tools for providing a roadmap and boundaries for the office's
production efforts.
Therefore, the Committees direct the Office of I&A to
continue to prioritize, develop and hone its strategic
intelligence capabilities and production, including the
annual development of a POA. Within 90 days of enactment of
the Act, and on an annual basis thereafter for two years, I&A
shall brief the congressional intelligence committees on the
development and execution of its POA. These briefings should
provide an overview of the POA, how customer needs have been
incorporated into the POA, and an update on execution against
the POA.
Cyber/Counterintelligence Analysis.
DHS's Office of I&A's Counterintelligence Mission Center
analysis focuses on counterintelligence threats posed by
foreign technology companies and fills a gap in IC
intelligence production. Advanced technologies are
increasingly ubiquitous and necessary to the function of
modern society. Consequently, the scope of the threats from
countries intent on using these technologies as a vector for
collecting intelligence from within the United States will
continue to expand. The Office of I&A is positioned to
conduct a niche analysis critical to national security that
combines foreign intelligence with domestic threat
information.
The Committees strongly support I&A's Counterintelligence
Mission Center's continued focus on these topics and the
increased resources dedicated to this analysis in Fiscal Year
2019. Therefore, the Committees direct the I&A, in
coordination with ODNI, to provide an update within 90 days
of enactment of the Act on its recent analytic production
related to counterintelligence threats posed by foreign
technology companies, including a review of the countries and
companies that present the greatest risks in this regard.
Intelligence Support to the Export Control Process.
The Committees have significant concerns that China poses a
growing threat to United States national security, due in
part to its relentless efforts to acquire United States
technology. China purposely blurs the distinction between its
military and civilian activities through its policy of
``military-civilian fusion,'' which compounds the risks of
diversion of United States technology to the Chinese
military.
The Committees conclude that the United States Government
currently lacks a comprehensive policy and the tools needed
to address this problem. China exploits weaknesses in
existing U.S. mechanisms aimed at preventing dangerous
technology transfers, including the U.S. export control
system, which is run by the U.S. Department of Commerce's
Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). The Committees have
specific concerns about the lack of adequate and effective IC
support to BIS's export license application review process
and believe more robust IC support could have prevented many
of the ill-advised technology transfers that have occurred in
recent years.
Therefore, the Committees directs the DNI to submit a plan,
within 120 days of enactment of the Act, to describe how the
IC will provide BIS with, at a minimum, basic but timely
analysis of any threat to U.S. national security posed by any
proposed export, re-export, or transfer of export-controlled
technology. The plan shall include detailed information on
the appropriate organizational structure, including how many
IC personnel would be required, where they would be located
(including whether they would be embedded at BIS to
coordinate IC support), and the amounts of necessary funding.
In formulating the plan, the DNI should study the ``National
Security Threat Assessment'' process that the National
Intelligence Council uses to inform the actions of the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. The DNI
shall submit the plan to the congressional intelligence
committees in classified form.
Social Media.
The Committees encourage the IC, notably the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI), to both continue and enhance its
efforts to assist in detecting, understanding, and warning
about foreign influence operations using social media tools
to target the United States. Additionally, within the scope
of the IC's authorities, and with all necessary protections
for U.S. person information, the Committees encourage the IC
to augment and prioritize these ongoing efforts.
Trade-Based Money Laundering.
Threats to our national security posed by trade-based money
laundering are concerning. Therefore, the Committees direct
the DNI, within 90 days of enactment of the Act, to submit a
report to the congressional intelligence committees on these
threats, including an assessment of the severity of the
threats posed to the United States' national security by
trade-based money laundering conducted inside and outside the
United States; an assessment of the scope of the financial
threats to the U.S. economy and financial systems posed by
trade-based money laundering; a description of how terrorist
financing and drug trafficking organizations are advancing
their illicit activities through
[[Page H10246]]
the use of licit trade channels; an assessment of the
adequacy of the systems and tools available to the Federal
Government for combating trade-based money laundering; and a
description and assessment of the current structure and
coordination between Federal agencies, as well as with
foreign governments, to combat trade-based money laundering.
The report shall be submitted in classified form with an
unclassified summary to be made available to the public.
Expansions of Security Protective Service Jurisdiction of the
Central Intelligence Agency.
The Committees direct the CIA, in connection with the
expansion of its security protective service jurisdiction as
set forth in section 6413 of Subdivision 2 of the Act, to
engage with Virginia state and local law enforcement
authorities to ensure that a memorandum of understanding,
akin to those in place at other agencies setting forth the
appropriate allocation of duties and responsibilities, is in
effect.
Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information.
The Committees are concerned by the recent widespread media
reports that purport to contain unauthorized disclosures of
classified information. Protecting the nation's secrets from
unauthorized disclosure is essential to safeguarding our
nation's intelligence sources and methods. An unlawful
disclosure of classified information can destroy sensitive
collection capabilities and endanger American lives,
including those individuals who take great personal risks to
assist the United States in collecting vital foreign
intelligence.
Federal law prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of
classified information, but enforcement is often lacking or
inconsistent. Accordingly, the Committees desire to better
understand the number of potential unauthorized disclosures
discovered and investigated on a routine basis. Moreover, the
Committees have little visibility into the number of
investigations initiated by each IC agency or the number of
criminal referrals to the Department of Justice. Accordingly,
section 6718 of Subdivision 2 of the Act requires all IC
agencies to provide the congressional intelligence committees
with a semi-annual report of the number of investigations of
unauthorized disclosures to journalists or media
organizations, including subsequent referrals made to the
United States Attorney General.
Additionally, the Committees wish to better understand the
role of IGs within elements of the IC, with respect to
unauthorized disclosures of classified information at those
elements.
Therefore, the Committees direct the IC IG, within 180 days
of enactment of the Act, to provide the congressional
intelligence committees with a report regarding the role of
IGs with respect to investigating unauthorized disclosures.
The report shall address: the roles of IC elements' security
personnel and law enforcement regarding unauthorized
disclosures; the current role of IGs within IC elements
regarding such disclosures; what, if any, specific actions
could be taken by such IGs to increase their involvement in
the investigation of such matters; any laws, rules or
procedures that currently prevent IGs from increasing their
involvement; and the benefits and drawbacks of increased IG
involvement, to include potential impacts to IG's roles and
missions.
Presidential Policy Guidance.
The Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG) dated May 22, 2013,
and entitled ``Procedures for Approving Direct Action Against
Terrorist Targets Located Outside the United States and Areas
of Active Hostilities'' provides for the participation by
elements of the IC in reviews of certain proposed
counterterrorism operations. The Committees expect to remain
fully and currently informed about the status of the PPG and
its implementation.
Therefore, the Committees direct ODNI, within five days of
any change to the PPG, or to any successor policy guidance,
to submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
written notification thereof, that shall include a summary of
the change and the specific legal and policy justifications
for the change.
Centers for Academic Excellence.
The Committees commend the commitment demonstrated by the
program managers of the IC's Centers for Academic Excellence
(IC-CAE), IC agencies that sponsored CAE interns, and all
other personnel who contributed to the inaugural edition of
the CAE Internship Program in summer 2017.
The Committees expect the IC-CAE Program to build on this
foundation by showing measurable, swift progress, and
ultimately fulfilling Congress's intent that the Program
serve as a pipeline of the next generation of IC
professionals.
Therefore, the Committees direct that the IC take all
viable action to expand the IC-CAE Program by increasing, to
the fullest extent possible:
1. The number and racial and gender diversity of IC-CAE
interns;
2. The number of IC-CAE academic institutions and their
qualified internship candidates participating in the IC-CAE
Program; and
3. The number of IC elements that sponsor IC-CAE interns.
Report on Violent Extremist Groups.
Violent extremist groups like ISIS continue to exploit the
Internet for nefarious purposes: to inspire lone wolves; to
spread propaganda; to recruit foreign fighters; and to plan
and publicize atrocities. As a former Director of the
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) has stated publicly:
[W]e need to counter our adversaries' successful use of
social media platforms to advance their propaganda goals,
raise funds, recruit, coordinate travel and attack plans, and
facilitate operations. . . . Our future work must focus on
denying our adversaries the capability to spread their
messages to at-risk populations that they can reach through
the use of these platforms.
Section 403 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2017 required the DNI, consistent with the
protection of sources and methods, to assist public and
private sector entities in recognizing online violent
extremist content--specifically, by making publicly available
a list of insignias and logos associated with foreign
extremist groups designated by the Secretary of State. The
Committees believe the IC can take additional steps.
Therefore, the Committees direct the Director of NCTC, in
coordination with other appropriate officials designated by
the DNI, within 180 days of enactment of the Act, to brief
the congressional intelligence committees on options for a
pilot program to develop and continually update best
practices for private technology companies to quickly
recognize and lawfully take down violent extremist content
online. Such briefing shall address:
1. The feasibility, risks, costs, and benefits of such a
program;
2. The U.S. Government agencies and private sector entities
that would participate; and
3. Any additional authorities that would be required by the
program's establishment.
South China Sea.
The South China Sea is an area of great geostrategic
importance to the United States and its allies. However,
China's controversial territorial claims and other actions
stand to undercut international norms and erode the region's
stability. It is thus imperative the United States uphold
respect for international law in the South China Sea.
Fulfilling that objective in turn will require an optimal
intelligence collection posture.
Therefore, the direct the DoD, in coordination with DNI,
within 30 days of enactment of the Act, to brief the
congressional intelligence and defense committees on known
intelligence collection gaps, if any, with respect to
adversary operations and aims in the South China Sea. The
briefing shall identify the gaps and whether those gaps are
driven by lack of access, lack of necessary collection
capabilities or legal or policy authorities, or by other
factors. The briefing shall also identify IC judgments that
assess which intelligence disciplines would be best-suited to
answer the existing gaps, and current plans to address the
gaps over the Future Years Defense Program.
Policy on Minimum Insider Threat Standards.
Executive Order 13587 and the National Insider Threat Task
Force established minimum insider threat standards. Such
standards are required for the sharing and safeguarding of
classified information on computer networks while ensuring
consistent, appropriate protections for privacy and civil
liberties. The Committees understand there are policies in
place to attempt implementation of such standards; however,
the Committees have found that several elements of the IC
have not fully implemented such standards. Therefore, given
the several high-profile insider threat issues, the
Committees emphasize the importance of such minimums by
statutorily requiring the DNI to establish a policy on
minimum insider threat standards, consistent with the
National Insider Threat Policy and Minimum Standards for
Executive Branch Insider Threat Programs, and IC elements
should expeditiously establish their own policies and
implement the DNI guidance.
Further, referring to the directive language found in the
committee report accompanying H.R. 5515, the Fiscal Year 2019
NDAA reported by the House Armed Services Committee (HASC),
the Committees direct the Chief Management Officer to provide
a briefing to the congressional intelligence and defense
committees, no later than 90 days after enactment of the Act,
on the outcomes of its cost and technical analyses required
by this report, and the DoD's efforts to implement
enterprise-wide programs and policies for insider threat
detection, user activity monitoring, and cyber-attack
detection and remediation.
Intelligence Community Information Technology Environment.
The Committees remain supportive of the goals of
Intelligence Community Information Technology Environment (IC
ITE) and the importance of the common, secure sharing
infrastructure it creates. The Committees further understand
that the path to implement a complex, technical environment
such as IC ITE needs to be sufficiently flexible and agile.
However, the Committees remain concerned with the lack of
consistency and substance in previous reports and briefings
on IC ITE. Therefore, section 6312 of Subdivision 2 of the
Act requires a long-term roadmap, business plan, and security
plan that shall be reported to the congressional intelligence
committees at least quarterly with additional notifications
as necessary.
Intelligence Community Chief Financial Officer.
The Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act of 1990 mandated
best practices for decision-
[[Page H10247]]
making and accountability, as well as improved decision-
makers' access to reliable and timely financial and
performance information. The CFO Act, as amended, requires
that the chief financial officers of 24 departments and
agencies ``report directly to the head of the agency
regarding financial management matters.'' Section 6404 of
Subdivision 2 of the Act brings the ODNI in line with the
best practices implemented in the CFO Act.
Intelligence Community Chief Information Officer.
As codified in 44 U.S.C. 3506(a)(1)(A), each federal agency
head is responsible for ``carrying out the information
resources management activities to improve agency
productivity, efficiency, and effectiveness.'' Accordingly,
section 6405 of Subdivision 2 of the Act expresses the
Committee's intent to emphasize the importance of the IC
Chief Information Officer (CIO), as defined in 50 U.S.C.
3032(a), in assisting the DNI with information resource
management by requiring the IC CIO to report directly to
the DNI.
Central Intelligence Agency Subsistence for Personnel
Assigned to Austere Locations.
Section 6411 of Subdivision 2 of the Act permits the
Director of the CIA to allow subsistence for personnel
assigned to austere locations. Although the statute does not
define ``austere,'' the Committees believe that utilization
of this authority should be minimal. Therefore, within 180
days after the enactment of the Act, the CIA shall brief the
Committees on the CIA's definition of ``austere'' and the CIA
regulations in place governing this authority.
Collocation of Certain Department of Homeland Security
Personnel at Field Locations.
The Committees support DHS I&A's intent to integrate into
operations across the broader DHS enterprise. Accordingly,
section 6434 of Subdivision 2 of the Act requires I&A to
identify opportunities for collocation of I&A field officers
and to submit to the Committees a plan for their deployment.
Limitations on Intelligence Community Elements'
Communications with Congress.
Effective oversight of the IC requires unencumbered
communications between representatives of the agencies,
members of Congress, and congressional staff. The Committees
direct the DNI not to limit any element of the IC from having
interactions with the congressional intelligence committees,
including but not limited to, preclearance by the DNI of
remarks, briefings, discussions of agency resources or
authorities requirements, or mandatory reports to the DNI on
conversations with the Committees.
Intelligence Community Support to the National Vetting
Center.
On February 6, 2018, the President issued National Security
Policy Memorandum (NSPM)-9, ''Presidential Memorandum on
Optimizing the Use of Federal Government Information in
Support of National Vetting Enterprise.'' The memorandum
directs the DHS, in coordination with the ODNI and other
agencies, to establish the National Vetting Center. The
memorandum also requires agencies to ``provide the Center
access to relevant biographic, biometric, and related
derogatory information.'' It further directs DNI, in
coordination with the heads of relevant IC elements, to
``establish a support element to facilitate, guide, and
coordinate all IC efforts to use classified intelligence and
other relevant information within the IC holdings in support
of the center.'' The Committees wish to obtain regular
updates and the most current information about the activities
of that support element.
Therefore, no later than 180 days after the enactment of
the Act and annually thereafter, the Committees direct the
DNI and the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis at
DHS to brief the Committees on the status of IC support to
the National Vetting Center, as established by NSPM-9.
Update on Status of Attorney General-Approved U.S. Person
Procedures under Executive Order 12333.
The Committees acknowledge the difficult, labor-intensive
work undertaken by certain IC elements, to ensure the current
effectiveness of, and in some cases to substantially revise,
final Attorney General-approved procedures regarding the
collection, dissemination, and retention of United States
persons information. The Committees wish to better understand
the status of this project, throughout the IC.
Therefore, the Committees direct that, not later than 60
days after enactment of the Act, the DNI and the Attorney
General shall brief the Committees on the issuance of final,
Attorney General-approved procedures by elements of the IC.
Specifically, the briefing shall identify (1) any such
elements that have not yet issued final procedures; and (2)
with respect to such elements, the status of the procedures'
development, and any interim guidance or procedures on which
those elements currently rely.
Homegrown Violent Extremists Imprisoned in Department of
Defense Facilities.
The Committees are concerned about an evident gap in
information sharing about individuals imprisoned in DoD
facilities who are categorized by the FBI as homegrown
violent extremists (HVEs). A recent FBI report underscores
this gap, highlighting the case of an individual who has been
convicted and sentenced to death by a U.S. military court
martial and remains incarcerated in a U.S. military facility.
The Committees understand that, despite his incarceration,
this inmate openly communicates with the outside world
through written correspondence and has continued to inspire
extremists throughout the world. The Committees further
understand that the FBI is unable to determine the full scope
of this inmate's contacts with the outside world because only
a portion of his communications have been provided by the
DoD.
Therefore, no later than 180 days after the enactment of
the Act, the Committees direct the FBI to work with the DoD
to create a process by which the DoD provides to the FBI the
complete communications of individuals imprisoned in DoD
facilities and who are categorized by the FBI as HVEs.
Naming of Federal Bureau of Investigation Headquarters.
According to statute enacted in 1972, the current FBI
headquarters building in Washington, D.C. must be ``known and
designated'' as the ``J. Edgar Hoover FBI Building.'' That
tribute has aged poorly. It should be reconsidered, in view
of Hoover's record on civil liberties--including the effort
to disparage and undermine Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Even
today, Hoover's name evokes the FBI's sordid ``COINTELPRO''
activities.
The Committees believe Congress should consider repealing
the provision requiring the existing Pennsylvania Avenue
building to be known as the ``J. Edgar Hoover FBI Building.''
A new name should be determined, through a joint dialogue
among Bureau leadership, law enforcement personnel, elected
officials, and civil rights leaders.
Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math careers in Defense
Intelligence.
Referring to the directive language found in the committee
report accompanying H.R. 5515, the HASC-reported Fiscal Year
2019 NDAA, the Committees direct the Director of DIA to
provide, within 90 days after enactment of the Act, a
briefing to the congressional intelligence committees and the
congressional defense committees on a plan to develop a
Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math career program
that attracts and maintains the defense intelligence cadre of
Science and Technical Intelligence analysts to meet
tomorrow's threats.
Security and Intelligence Role in Export Control.
Referring to the directive language found in the committee
report accompanying H.R. 5515, the HASC-reported Fiscal Year
2019 NDAA, the Committees direct the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy, in coordination with the USD(I), within
60 days of enactment of the Act, to brief the congressional
intelligence and defense committees, on security support to
export control.
Security Clearance Background Investigation Reciprocity.
Referring to the directive language found in the committee
report accompanying H.R. 5515, the HASC-reported Fiscal Year
2019 NDAA, the Committees direct the Secretary of Defense, in
coordination with the DNI and the Director of the Office of
Personnel Management, within 60 days of enactment of the Act,
to brief the Committees and the congressional defense
committees on efforts to ensure seamless transition of
investigations between authorized investigative agencies, as
required by law.
Further, referring to the directive language found in the
committee report accompanying H.R. 5515, the HASC-reported
Fiscal Year 2019 NDAA, the Committees direct the Secretary of
Defense, in coordination with the DNI and the Director of the
Office of Personnel Management, within 90 days of enactment
of the Act, to brief the congressional intelligence
committees on efforts to ensure reciprocity is a
consideration for implementation of continuous evaluation and
continuous vetting across the federal government.
Foreign Influence Task Force.
The IC has warned of active measures taken by foreign
actors to interfere with and undermine the U.S. democratic
process, most recently and brazenly by the Russian
Federation. The Committees appreciate FBI efforts to confront
this challenge in part through creation of its Foreign
Influence Task Force. The Committees believe that confronting
foreign influence directed at the United States is of
fundamental importance, and thus desire to engage in a close
and regular dialogue with the FBI about the task force's
activities.
Therefore, the Committees direct the FBI to provide
detailed, quarterly briefings to the Committees regarding the
task force's activities, to include its progress and any
significant challenges.
Enhanced Oversight of IC Contractors.
A topic of sustained congressional intelligence committee
interest has been improving the federal government's
oversight of IC acquisition and procurement practices,
including activities by poorly performing IC contractors.
A framework exists to ensure that IC elements do not award
IC contracts to businesses that engage in negligence or even
gross negligence, consistently fail to appropriately
safeguard classified information, maintain poor financial
practices, or other issues. For example, an IC element may
maintain a list of contractors of concern, in order to ensure
that proposals from such contractors are rejected or
subjected to additional scrutiny. The Committees wish to
build on these practices and are concerned about the existing
framework's adequacy.
Therefore, the Committees direct all elements of the IC, to
the fullest extent consistent with applicable law and policy,
to
[[Page H10248]]
share with one another information about contractors with
track records of concern--such as the commission of
negligence or gross negligence in the performance of IC
contracts, or the repeated failure to appropriately safeguard
classified information in a fashion that the contractor
reasonably could have been expected to prevent.
Additionally, no later than 30 days after enactment of the
Act, the DNI shall brief the Committees on the authorities of
IC elements with respect to contractors with track records of
concern--before, during, and after procurement. An objective
of the briefing will be to discuss information sharing
practices in this regard, and to identify specific areas
where the oversight framework can be strengthened.
Security Clearance Reporting Requirements.
The Agreement directs the Office of Management and Budget,
in coordination with members of the Performance
Accountability Council, to report to Congress, within 90 days
of enactment of the Act, on recommendations for harmonizing
and streamlining reporting requirements related to security
clearances that have been set forth in legislation.
Part III: Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation of Legislative
Text
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS AND EXPLANATION
The following is a section-by-section analysis and
explanation of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young
Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018,
2019, and 2020 (the ``Act'').
SUBDIVISION 1--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2020
Section 5100. Table of contents.
Title LI--Intelligence Activities
Section 5101. Authorization of appropriations.
Section 5101 lists the United States Government
departments, agencies, and other elements for which the Act
authorizes appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-
related activities for Fiscal Year 2020.
Section 5102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Section 5102 provides that the details of the amounts
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities for Fiscal Year 2020 are
contained in the classified Schedule of Authorizations and
that the classified Schedule of Authorizations shall be made
available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate
and House of Representatives and to the President.
Section 5103. Intelligence Community Management Account.
Section 5103 authorizes appropriations for the Intelligence
Community Management Account (ICMA) of the ODNI for Fiscal
Year 2020.
Title LII--Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System
Section 5201. Authorization of appropriations.
Section 5201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of
$514,000,000 for the CIA Retirement and Disability Fund for
Fiscal Year 2020.
Title LIII--Intelligence Community Matters
Subtitle A--General Intelligence Community Matters
Section 5301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence
activities.
Section 5301 provides that the authorization of
appropriations by the Act shall not be deemed to constitute
authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity that
is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of
the United States.
Section 5302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits
authorized by law.
Section 5302 provides that funds authorized to be
appropriated by the Act for salary, pay, retirement, and
other benefits for federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for
increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law.
Section 5303. Expansion of scope of protections for
identities of covert agents.
Section 5303 amends the definition of ``covert agent'' in
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3126(4)) to
protect the identities of all undercover intelligence
officers, and United States citizens whose relationship to
the United States is classified, regardless of the location
of the individuals' government service or time since
separation from government service.
Section 5304. Required counterintelligence assessments,
briefings, notifications, and reports.
Section 5304 requires the DNI, in consultation with other
appropriate agencies, to conduct an assessment following a
United States election of any foreign government
interference. Section 5304 requires the DNI to post publicly
advisory reports on foreign counterintelligence and
cybersecurity threats to federal election campaigns. It also
requires quarterly briefings to the congressional
intelligence committees regarding the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's counterintelligence activities and prompt
notification of an investigation carried out regarding a
counterintelligence risk related to a federal election or
campaign.
Section 5305. Inclusion of security risks in program
management plans required for acquisition of major
systems in National Intelligence Program.
Section 5305 amends the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3024(q)(1)(A)) to require that the annual program
management plans on major system acquisitions that the DNI
submits to Congress address security risks, in addition to
cost, schedule, performance goals, and program milestone
criteria.
Section 5306. Intelligence community public-private talent
exchange.
Section 5306 requires the DNI to develop policies,
processes, and procedures to facilitate IC personnel
rotations to the private sector and vice versa, to bolster
skill development and collaboration. Section 5306 further
sets forth requirements with which agreements governing such
rotations must address, including terms and conditions,
including termination, duration, employment status, pay, and
benefits.
Section 5307. Assessment of contracting practices to identify
certain security and counterintelligence concerns.
Section 5307 requires the DNI to conduct an assessment of
the authorities, policies, processes, and standards used by
the IC to ensure that the IC is weighing security and
counterintelligence risks in contracting with companies that
contract--or carry out joint research and development--with
the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or the Islamic
Republic of Iran.
Subtitle B--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Section 5321. Establishment of Climate Security Advisory
Council.
Section 5321 requires the DNI to establish an advisory
council to assist analytic components of the IC with
incorporating analysis of climate security into their work.
The council will also facilitate coordination and sharing of
data between the IC and non-IC elements related to climate
change.
Section 5322. Foreign Malign Influence Response Center.
Section 5322 establishes a Foreign Malign Influence
Response Center within the ODNI to analyze and integrate all
U.S. Government intelligence pertaining to hostile efforts
undertaken by, at the direction of, or on behalf of or with
the substantial support of, the government of the Russian
Federation, Iran, North Korea, China, or any other country
that the Director of the Center determines appropriate, to
influence U.S.-based policies, activities, or public opinion.
Section 5323. Encouragement of cooperative actions to detect
and counter foreign influence operations.
Section 5323 provides the DNI, in coordination with the
Secretary of Defense, with the necessary authorities and
ability to use up to $30 million of NIP funds, to establish
an independent, non-profit Social Media Data and Threat
Analysis Center (``Center''). Section 323 further provides
that this Center shall establish a central portal for social
media data analysis, enabling: (1) social media companies to
voluntarily share data on foreign influence operations; (2)
researchers to analyze that data; and (3) information sharing
between and among government and private companies. Section
5323 also requires the Director of the Center to produce
quarterly public reports on trends in foreign influence and
disinformation operations, including any threats to campaigns
and elections, as well as an annual report to Congress on the
degree of cooperation and commitment from the social media
companies.
Section 5324. Transfer of National Intelligence University to
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Section 5324 requires the Director of the DIA to transfer
to the DNI the National Intelligence University, upon
submission of required joint certifications to appropriate
congressional committees by the Secretary of Defense and the
DNI.
Subtitle C--Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
Section 5331. Definitions.
Section 5331 provides definitions for terminology used
throughout this Subtitle.
Section 5332. Inspector General external review panel.
Section 5332 codifies the whistleblower protections
contained in Part C of Presidential Policy Directive-19 to
ensure an effective appeals process through external review
panels and the reporting of waste, fraud, and abuse. Section
5332 further requires the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community (IC IG) to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a recommendation on how to ensure
that a whistleblower with a complaint against an Inspector
General of an IC agency has equal access to adjudication,
appellate review, and external review panels.
Section 5333. Harmonization of whistleblower processes and
procedures.
Section 5333 requires the IC IG, in coordination with the
IC Inspectors General Forum, to develop recommendations
applicable to Inspectors Generals for all IC elements
regarding the harmonization, where appropriate, of policies
and directives related to whistleblower claims and appeals
processes and procedures. Section 5333 further requires the
IC IG to maximize transparency regarding these processes and
procedures.
Section 5334. Oversight by Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community over intelligence community
whistleblower matters.
Section 5334 requires the IC IG, in consultation with the
IC Inspectors General
[[Page H10249]]
Forum, to establish a system whereby the IC IG is provided in
near real time of whistleblower complaints relating to the
programs and activities under the DNI's jurisdiction, as well
as any IG actions relating to such complaints.
Section 5335. Report on cleared whistleblower attorneys.
Section 5335 requires the IC IG to submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on access to
cleared attorneys by whistleblowers in the IC, including any
recommended improvements to the limited security agreement
process and such other options as the IC IG considers
appropriate.
Subtitle D--Central Intelligence Agency
Section 5341. Clarification of certain authority of the
Central Intelligence Agency.
Section 5341 clarifies current CIA authorities related to
death benefits, requires the Director of the CIA to submit a
report if the CIA does not modify relevant regulations, and
requires a briefing on certain health care services for CIA
personnel.
Title LIV--Security Clearances
Section 5401. Improving visibility into the security
clearance process.
Section 5401 requires the DNI, acting as the Security
Executive Agent, to issue a policy requiring the head of each
Federal agency to create an electronic portal whereby the
agency and its workforce applicants can review the status of
their security clearance processing. An enterprise solution
that is accessible to multiple agencies may meet this
objective. Any portal should have appropriate security
safeguards.
Section 5402. Making certain policies and execution plans
relating to personnel clearances available to industry
partners.
Section 5402 requires each head of a Federal agency to
share security clearance policies and plans with directly
affected industry partners, consistent with national security
and with National Industrial Security Program (NISP) goals.
Section 5402 further requires the DNI, acting as the Security
Executive Agent, jointly with the Director of the NISP, to
develop policies and procedures for sharing this information.
Title LV--Matters Relating to Foreign Countries
Subtitle A--Matters Relating to Russia
Section 5501. Annual reports on influence operations and
campaigns in the United States by the Russian Federation.
Section 5501 requires the Director of the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center to submit an annual
report to the congressional intelligence committees
concerning the influence operations and campaigns in the
United States conducted by the Russian Federation.
Section 5502. Assessment of legitimate and illegitimate
financial and other assets of Vladimir Putin.
Section 5502 expresses the sense of Congress that the
United States should do more to expose the corruption of
Russian President Vladimir Putin and directs the DNI to
submit to appropriate congressional committees an assessment
on the net worth and financial and other assets of President
Putin and his family members.
Section 5503. Assessments of intentions of political
leadership of the Russian Federation.
Section 5503 directs the IC to submit assessments to
certain congressional committees of the current intentions of
the political leadership of the Russian Federation concerning
potential military action against members of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), responses to an enlarged
United States or NATO military presence in Eastern Europe,
and potential actions taken for the purpose of exploiting
perceived divisions among the governments of Russia's Western
adversaries.
Subtitle B--Matters Relating to China
Section 5511. Annual reports on influence operations and
campaigns in the United States by the Communist Party of
China.
Section 5511 requires the Director of the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center to submit an annual
report to the congressional intelligence committees
concerning the influence operations and campaigns in the
United States conducted by the Communist Party of China.
Section 5512. Report on repression of ethnic Muslim
minorities in the Xinjiang region of the People's
Republic of China.
Section 5512 requires the Director of National Intelligence
to submit a report to the congressional intelligence
committees concerning activity by the People's Republic of
China to repress ethnic Muslim minorities in the Xinjiang
region of China.
Section 5513. Report on efforts by People's Republic of China
to influence election in Taiwan.
Section 5513 requires the DNI to submit a report within 45
days of the 2020 Taiwan Presidential and Vice Presidential
elections concerning any influence operations by China to
interfere in or undermine the election and efforts by the
United States to disrupt those operations.
Subtitle C--Matters Relating to Other Countries
Section 5521. Sense of Congress and report on Iranian efforts
in Syria and Lebanon.
Section 5521 requires the DNI, in coordination with the
Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, to submit a
report that assesses Iran's efforts to establish influence in
Syria, Iran's support of proxy forces, and the resulting
threats to U.S. interests and allies.
Section 5522. Assessments regarding the Northern Triangle and
Mexico.
Section 5522 requires the DNI, in coordination with other
IC officials, to submit a comprehensive assessment of drug
trafficking, human trafficking, and human smuggling
activities in the Northern Triangle and Mexico. Section 508
further requires the DNI to provide a briefing on the IC's
collection priorities and activities in these areas.
Title LVI--Federal Efforts Against Domestic Terrorism
Section 5601. Definitions.
Section 5601 provides definitions for terminology used
throughout this Title.
Section 5602. Strategic intelligence assessment of and
reports on domestic terrorism.
Section 5602 requires the Director of the FBI and the
Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the DNI,
to submit a report on standardization of terminology and
procedures relating to domestic terrorism, and a report
containing strategic intelligence assessment and data on
domestic terrorism, together with required documents and
materials, with annual updates for 5 years thereafter.
Title LVII--Reports and Other Matters
Subtitle A--Reports and Briefings
Section 5701. Modification of requirements for submission to
Congress of certain reports.
Section 5701 amends or cancels numerous reporting
requirements under current law.
Section 5702. Increased transparency regarding
counterterrorism budget of the United States.
Section 5702 makes several findings regarding the
transparency of the IC's counterterrorism budget and directs
a briefing from the executive branch on the feasibility of
releasing additional information to the public concerning the
IC's efforts on counterterrorism.
Section 5703. Study on role of retired and former personnel
of intelligence community with respect to certain foreign
intelligence operations.
Section 5703 requires the DNI to conduct a study on former
IC personnel providing intelligence assistance to foreign
governments, and to provide a report on the findings and a
plan for recommendations.
Section 5704. Collection, analysis, and dissemination of
workforce data.
Section 5704 requires the DNI to provide a publicly
available annual report on diversity and inclusion efforts of
the IC's workforce.
Section 5705. Plan for strengthening the supply chain
intelligence function.
Section 5705 requires the Director of the NCSC, in
coordination with interagency partners, to submit a plan for
strengthening supply chain intelligence function.
Section 5706. Comprehensive economic assessment of investment
in key United States technologies by companies or
organizations linked to China.
Section 5706 requires the DNI, in coordination with other
designated agencies, to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a comprehensive economic assessment
of investment in key United States technologies, by companies
or organizations linked to China, as well as the national
security implications of Chinese-backed investments to the
United States.
Section 5707. Report by Director of National Intelligence on
fifth-generation wireless network technology.
Section 5707 directs the DNI to submit to the appropriate
committees a report on the threat to the national security of
the United States posed by adoption of fifth-generation
wireless network built by foreign companies and possible
efforts to mitigate the threat.
Section 5708. Report on use by intelligence community of
facial recognition technology.
Section 5708 requires the DNI to submit a report on the
IC's use of facial recognition technology.
Section 5709. Report on deepfake technology, foreign
weaponization of deepfakes, and related notifications.
Section 5709 requires the DNI to submit a report on the
potential national security impacts of machine-manipulated
media and the use of machine-manipulated media by foreign
governments to spread disinformation or engage in other
malign activities.
Section 5710. Annual report by Comptroller General of the
United States on cybersecurity and surveillance threats
to Congress.
Section 5710 requires the Comptroller General, in
consultation with the DNI, Secretary of Homeland Security,
and the Sergeant at Arms, to submit a report to the
Committees on cybersecurity and surveillance threats to
Congress.
Section 5711. Analysis and periodic briefings on major
initiatives of intelligence community in artificial
intelligence and machine learning.
Section 5711 requires the DNI, in coordination with other
appropriate IC elements, to provide briefings to the
congressional intelligence committees on the IC's major
initiatives in artificial intelligence and machine learning.
Section 5712. Report on best practices to protect privacy and
civil liberties of Chinese Americans.
Section 5712 requires the DNI, through the Office of Civil
Liberties, Privacy, and Transparency, and in coordination
with other IC
[[Page H10250]]
civil liberty and privacy officers, to submit a report on how
IC policies targeting China affect the privacy and civil
liberties of certain Americans of Chinese descent, along with
recommendations for necessary protections.
Section 5713. Oversight of foreign influence in academia.
Section 5713 requires the DNI, in consultation with other
appropriate IC elements, to submit a report on the risks to
sensitive research subjects posed by foreign entities.
Section 5713 further requires the report to identify specific
national security-related threats to research conducted at
institutions of higher education.
Section 5714. Report on death of Jamal Khashoggi.
Section 5714 requires the DNI to submit to Congress an
unclassified report on the death of Jamal Khashoggi,
consistent with protecting sources and methods. The report
shall include identification of those who carried out,
participated in, ordered, or were otherwise complicit in, or
responsible for, Mr. Khashoggi's death.
Section 5715. Report on terrorist screening database.
Section 5715 requires the DNI and the Secretary of State to
jointly submit a report on the FBI's terrorist screening
database.
Section 5716. Report containing threat assessment of
terrorist use of conventional and advanced conventional
weapons.
Section 5716 requires the Under Secretary of Homeland
Security for I&A, in coordination with the Director of the
FBI, to develop and submit a threat assessment regarding the
availability of certain conventional weapons in support of
terrorism activities.
Section 5717. Assessment of homeland security vulnerabilities
associated with certain retired and former personnel of
the intelligence community.
Section 5717 requires the DNI to submit an assessment of
the homeland security vulnerabilities associated with retired
and former personnel of the IC providing covered intelligence
assistance.
Section 5718. Study on feasibility and advisability of
establishing Geospatial-Intelligence Museum and learning
center.
Section 5718 requires the Director of the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) to complete a study and
report the findings on the feasibility and advisability of
establishing a Geospatial-Intelligence Museum and learning
center.
Subtitle B--Other Matters
Section 5721. Whistleblower disclosures to Congress and
committees of Congress.
Section 5721 enables whistleblowers to provide classified
disclosures to appropriate committees of Congress.
Section 5722. Task force on illicit financing of espionage
and foreign influence operations.
Section 5722 requires the DNI to establish a task force to
study and assess the illicit financing of espionage and
foreign influence operations directed at the United States
and requires the task force to issue a report on this subject
to the appropriate congressional committees.
Section 5723. Establishment of fifth-generation technology
prize competition.
Section 5723 establishes a program to award prizes to
stimulate research and development relevant to fifth-
generation wireless technology.
Section 5724. Establishment of deepfakes prize competition.
Section 5724 establishes a program to award prizes to
stimulate the research, development, or commercialization of
technologies to automatically detect machine-manipulated
media.
Section 5725. Identification of and countermeasures against
certain International Mobile Subscriber Identity-
Catchers.
Section 5725 requires the DNI and the Director of the FBI,
in collaboration with the Under Secretary of DHS for I&A, and
other appropriate heads of Federal agencies, to undertake an
effort to identify and, when appropriate, develop
countermeasures against, International Mobile Subscriber
Identity-Catchers operated within the United States by
criminals and hostile foreign governments.
Section 5726. Securing energy infrastructure.
Section 5726 requires the Secretary of Energy, within 180
days of enactment of the Act, to establish a two-year control
systems implementation pilot program within the National
Laboratories. This pilot program will partner with covered
entities in the energy sector to identify new security
vulnerabilities, and for purposes of researching, developing,
testing, and implementing technology platforms and standards
in partnership with such entities. Section 5726 also requires
the Secretary to establish a working group composed of
identified private and public sector entities to evaluate the
technology platforms and standards for the pilot program, and
develop a national cyber-informed engineering strategy to
isolate and defend covered entities from security
vulnerabilities. Section 5726 requires the Secretary, within
180 days after the date on which funds are first disbursed,
to submit to specified committees an interim report that
describes the pilot program's results, provides a feasibility
analysis, and describes the working group's evaluations.
Section 5726 further requires the Secretary, within two years
of funding, to submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a progress report on the pilot program and an
analysis of the feasibility of the methods studied, and a
description of the working group's evaluation results.
SUBDIVISION 2--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR FISCAL YEARS 2018 AND
2019
Section 6100. Table of contents.
Title LXI--Intelligence Activities
Section 6101. Authorization of appropriations.
Section 6101 lists the United States Government
departments, agencies, and other elements for which the Act
deems authorized appropriations for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities for Fiscal Years 2018 and
2019.
Section 6102. Intelligence Community Management Account.
Section 6102 provides that the amounts that were
appropriated for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019 are deemed
authorized.
Title LXII--Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability
System
Section 6201. Authorization of appropriations.
Section 6201 deems authorized the appropriations for the
CIA Retirement and Disability Fund for Fiscal Years 2018 and
2019.
Section 6202. Computation of annuities for employees of the
Central Intelligence Agency.
Section 6202 makes technical changes to the CIA Retirement
Act to conform with various statutes governing the Civil
Service Retirement System.
Title LXIII--General Intelligence Community Matters
Section 6301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence
activities.
Section 6301 provides that the authorization of
appropriations by the Act shall not be deemed to constitute
authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity that
is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws
of the United States.
Section 6302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits
authorized by law.
Section 6302 provides that funds authorized to be
appropriated by the Act for salary, pay, retirement, and
other benefits for federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for
increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law.
Section 6303. Modification of special pay authority for
science, technology, engineering, or mathematics
positions and addition of special pay authority for cyber
positions.
Section 6303 provides an increased yearly cap for Science,
Technology, Engineering, or Mathematics (STEM) employee
positions in the IC that support critical cyber missions.
Section 6303 also permits the National Security Agency (NSA)
to establish a special rate of pay for positions that perform
functions that execute the agency's cyber mission.
Section 6304. Modification of appointment of Chief
Information Officer of the Intelligence Community.
Section 6304 changes the position of IC Chief Information
Officer from being subject to presidential appointment to
being subject to appointment by the DNI.
Section 6305. Director of National Intelligence review of
placement of positions within the intelligence community
on the Executive Schedule.
Section 6305 requires the DNI, in coordination with the
Office of Personnel Management, to conduct a review of the
positions within the IC that may be appropriate for inclusion
on the Executive Schedule, and the appropriate levels for
inclusion.
Section 6306. Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk
Management Task Force.
Section 6306 requires the DNI to establish a task force to
standardize information sharing between the IC and the United
States Government acquisition community with respect to
supply chain, cybersecurity, and counterintelligence risks.
Section 6306 further provides requirements for membership,
security clearances, and annual reports.
Section 6307. Consideration of adversarial telecommunications
and cybersecurity infrastructure when sharing
intelligence with foreign governments and entities.
Section 6307 requires the IC, when entering into foreign
intelligence sharing agreements, to consider the
pervasiveness of telecommunications and cybersecurity
infrastructure, equipment, and services provided by United
States adversaries or entities thereof.
Section 6308. Cyber protection support for the personnel of
the intelligence community in positions highly vulnerable
to cyber attack.
Section 6308 permits the DNI to provide cyber protection
support for the personal technology devices and personal
accounts of IC personnel whom the DNI determines to be highly
vulnerable to cyber attacks and hostile information
collection activities.
Section 6309. Elimination of sunset authority relating to
management of supply-chain risk.
Section 6309 extends certain IC procurement authorities to
manage and protect against supply chain risks.
Section 6310. Limitations on determinations regarding certain
security classifications.
Section 6310 prohibits an officer of the IC who is
nominated to a Senate-confirmed position from making certain
classification determinations posing potential conflicts of
interest regarding that nominee.
[[Page H10251]]
Section 6311. Joint Intelligence Community Council.
Section 6311 amends Section 101A of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3022(d)) as to the Joint Intelligence
Community Council meetings and to require a report on its
activities.
Section 6312. Intelligence community information technology
environment.
Section 6312 defines the roles and responsibilities for the
performance of the Intelligence Community Information
Technology Environment (IC ITE). Section 6312 requires
certain reporting and briefing requirements to the
congressional intelligence committees regarding the IC's
ongoing implementation of IC ITE.
Section 6313. Report on development of secure mobile voice
solution for intelligence community.
Section 6313 requires the DNI, in coordination with the
Directors of the CIA and NSA, provide the congressional
intelligence committees with a classified report on the
feasibility, desirability, cost, and required schedule
associated with the implementation of a secure mobile voice
solution for the IC.
Section 6314. Policy on minimum insider threat standards.
Section 6314 requires the DNI to develop minimum insider
threat standards to be followed by each element of the IC,
consistent with the National Insider Threat Policy and
Minimum Standards for Executive Branch Insider Threat
Programs.
Section 6315. Submission of intelligence community policies.
Section 6315 requires the DNI to make all ODNI policies and
procedures available to the congressional intelligence
committees. Section 6315 also requires ODNI to notify the
congressional committees of any new or rescinded policies.
Section 6316. Expansion of intelligence community recruitment
efforts.
Section 6316 requires the DNI, in consultation with IC
elements, to submit a plan to the congressional intelligence
committees as to each element's efforts in recruitment from
rural and underrepresented regions.
Title LXIV--Matters Relating to Elements of the Intelligence Community
Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Section 6401. Authority for protection of current and former
employees of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.
Section 6401 amends Title 50, section 3506, to provide
protection for current and former ODNI personnel and
designated immediate family members, if there is a national
security threat that warrants such protection.
Section 6402. Designation of the program manager-information
sharing environment.
Section 6402 amends the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Protection Act of 2004 so that the Program Manager-
Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE) is subject to
appointment by the DNI, not the President.
Section 6403. Technical modification to the executive
schedule.
Section 6403 amends the Executive Schedule to make the
Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security
Center a Level IV position on the Executive Schedule.
Section 6404. Chief Financial Officer of the Intelligence
Community.
Section 6404 amends the National Security Act of 1947 by
requiring the Chief Financial Officer of the IC to directly
report to the DNI.
Section 6405. Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence
Community.
Section 6405 amends the National Security Act of 1947 by
requiring the Chief Information Officer of the IC to directly
report to the DNI.
Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency
Section 6411. Central Intelligence Agency subsistence for
personnel assigned to austere locations.
Section 6411 authorizes the Director of the CIA to approve,
with or without reimbursement, subsistence to personnel
assigned to an austere overseas location.
Section 6412. Special rules for certain monthly workers'
compensation payments and other payments for Central
Intelligence Agency personnel.
Section 6412 authorizes the Director of the CIA to provide
enhanced injury benefits to a covered employee or qualifying
dependents who suffer an injury overseas due to war,
insurgency, hostile act, or terrorist activities.
Section 6413. Expansion of security protective service
jurisdiction of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Section 6413 expands the security perimeter jurisdiction at
CIA facilities from 500 feet to 500 yards.
Section 6414. Repeal of foreign language proficiency
requirement for certain senior level positions in the
Central Intelligence Agency.
Section 6414 repeals Title 50, section 3036(g), with
conforming amendments to section 611 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-487).
Subtitle C--Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the
Department of Energy
Section 6421. Consolidation of Department of Energy Offices
of Intelligence and Counterintelligence.
Section 6421 amends the Department of Energy Organization
Act to consolidate the offices of intelligence and
counterintelligence into the DOE Office of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence.
Section 6422. Repeal of Department of Energy Intelligence
Executive Committee and budget reporting requirement.
Section 6422 amends the Department of Energy Organization
Act by repealing the Department of Energy Intelligence
Executive Committee, as well as certain budgetary reporting
requirements.
Subtitle D--Other Elements
Section 6431. Plan for designation of counterintelligence
component of the Defense Security Service as an element
of intelligence community.
Section 6431 directs the DNI and the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence, in coordination with the Director
of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, to
provide the congressional intelligence and defense committees
with an implementation plan to make the Defense Security
Service's (DSS's) Counterintelligence component an element of
the IC as defined in paragraph(4) of section 3 of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)), by January
1, 2020. Section 6431 further mandates that the plan shall
not address the DSS's personnel security functions.
Section 6432. Notice not required for private entities.
Section 6432 provides a Rule of Construction that the
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is not
required to provide notice to private entities before issuing
directives on agency information security policies and
practices.
Section 6433. Establishment of advisory board for National
Reconnaissance Office.
Section 6433 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to
authorize the Director of the NRO to establish an advisory
board to study matters related to space, overhead
reconnaissance, acquisition, and other matters. Section 6433
provides that the board shall terminate 3 years after the
Director declares the board's first meeting.
Section 6434. Collocation of certain Department of Homeland
Security personnel at field locations.
Section 6434 requires the Under Secretary of Homeland
Security for Intelligence & Analysis (DHS I&A) to identify
opportunities for collocation of I&A field officers and to
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a plan
for deployment.
Title LXV--Election Matters
Section 6501. Report on cyber attacks by foreign governments
against United States election infrastructure.
Section 6501 directs the DHS Under Secretary for I&A to
submit a report on cyber attacks and attempted cyber attacks
by foreign governments on United States election
infrastructure, in connection with the 2016 presidential
election. Section 6501 further requires this report to
include identification of the States and localities affected
and include efforts to attack voter registration databases,
voting machines, voting-related computer networks, and the
networks of Secretaries of State and other election
officials.
Section 6502. Review of intelligence community's posture to
collect against and analyze Russian efforts to influence
the Presidential election.
Section 6502 requires the DNI to submit to the
congressional intelligence committees, within one year of
enactment of the Act, a report on the Director's review of
the IC's posture to collect against and analyze Russian
efforts to interfere with the 2016 United States presidential
election. Section 6502 further requires the review to include
assessments of IC resources, information sharing, and legal
authorities.
Section 6503. Assessment of foreign intelligence threats to
Federal elections.
Section 6503 requires the DNI, in coordination with the
Director of the CIA, Director of the NSA, Director of the
FBI, Secretary of DHS, and heads of other relevant IC
elements, to commence assessments of security vulnerabilities
of State election systems one year before regularly scheduled
Federal elections. Section 6503 further requires the DNI to
submit a report on such assessments 180 days before regularly
scheduled Federal elections, and an updated assessment 90
days before regularly scheduled Federal elections.
Section 6504. Strategy for countering Russian cyber threats
to United States elections.
Section 6504 requires the DNI, in coordination with the
Secretary of DHS, Director of the FBI, Director of the CIA,
Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of
the Treasury, to develop a whole-of-government strategy for
countering Russian cyber threats against United States
electoral systems and processes. Section 6504 further
requires this strategy to include input from solicited
Secretaries of State and chief election officials.
Section 6505. Assessment of significant Russian influence
campaigns directed at foreign elections and referenda.
Section 6505 requires the DNI to provide a report assessing
past and ongoing Russian influence campaigns against foreign
elections and referenda, to include a summary of the means by
which such influence campaigns have been or are likely to be
conducted, a summary of defenses against or responses to such
Russian influence campaigns, a summary of IC activities to
assist
[[Page H10252]]
foreign governments against such campaigns, and an assessment
of the effectiveness of such foreign defenses and responses.
Section 6506. Information sharing with State election
officials.
Section 6506 requires the DNI, within 30 days of enactment
of the Act, to support security clearances for each eligible
chief election official of a State, territory, or the
District of Columbia (and additional eligible designees), up
to the Top Secret level. Section 6506 also requires the DNI
to assist with sharing appropriate classified information
about threats to election systems.
Section 6507. Notification of significant foreign cyber
intrusions and active measure campaigns directed at
elections for Federal offices.
Section 6507 requires the Director of the FBI, and the
Secretary of Homeland Security to brief the congressional
intelligence committees, congressional leadership, the armed
services committees, the appropriations committees, and the
homeland security committees (consistent with sources and
methods) not later than 14 days after a determination has
been made with moderate or high confidence that a significant
foreign cyber intrusion or active measures campaign intended
to influence an upcoming election for any Federal office has
taken place by a foreign state or foreign non-state person,
group, or other entity. The briefing shall provide a
description of the significant foreign cyber intrusion or
active measures campaign, including an identification of the
foreign state or foreign non-state person or group.
Section 6508. Designation of counterintelligence officer to
lead election security matters.
Section 6508 requires the DNI to designate a national
counterintelligence officer within the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center to lead, manage, and
coordinate election security-related counterintelligence
matters, including certain risks from foreign power
interference.
Title LXVI--Security Clearances
Section 6601. Definitions.
Section 6601 provides definitions for terminology used
throughout this Title.
Section 6602. Reports and plans relating to security
clearances and background investigations.
Section 6602 requires the interagency Performance
Accountability Council (Council) to provide plans to reduce
the background investigation inventory and best align the
investigation function between DoD and the National
Background Investigation Bureau. Section 6602 further
requires the Council to report on the future of the clearance
process and requires the DNI to notify the appropriate
committees of responding to official requests to change
clearance standards, and the status of those requests'
disposition. As with other reports in this title, these
reports can be met in a consolidated format and potentially
through the regularly scheduled quarterly Council briefings.
Section 6603. Improving the process for security clearances.
Section 6603 requires the DNI to review the Questionnaire
for National Security positions (SF-86 or any current
instantiation thereof) and the Federal Investigative
Standards to determine potential unnecessary information
required and assess whether revisions are necessary to
account for insider threats. Section 6603 further requires
the DNI, in coordination with the Council, to establish
policies on interim clearances and consistency between the
clearance process for contract and government personnel.
Section 6604. Goals for promptness of determinations
regarding security clearances.
Section 6604 requires the Council to implement a plan to be
able to process 90 percent of clearance requests at the
Secret level in 30 days, and at the Top Secret-level in 90
days. The provision provides the Council with latitude to
issue equivalent metrics that similarly improve the
timeliness of the clearance process. The plan shall also
address how to recognize reciprocity in accepting clearances
among agencies within two weeks, and to require that ninety
percent of clearance holders not be subject to a time-based
periodic investigation.
Section 6605. Security Executive Agent.
Section 6605 establishes the DNI as the government's
Security Executive Agent, consistent with Executive Order
13467, and sets forth relevant authorities.
Section 6606. Report on unified, simplified, Governmentwide
standards for positions of trust and security clearances.
Section 6606 directs the DNI and the Director of the Office
of Personnel Management to report on the advisability and
implications of consolidating the tiers for positions of
trust and security clearances from 5 to 3 tiers.
Section 6607. Report on clearance in person concept.
Section 6607 requires the DNI to submit a report on a
concept whereby an individual can maintain eligibility for
access to classified information for up to 3 years after
access may lapse.
Section 6608. Reports on reciprocity for security clearances
inside of departments and agencies.
Section 6608 requires each federal agency to submit a
report to the DNI that identifies the number of clearances
that take more than two weeks to reciprocally recognize and
set forth the reason for any delays. Section 6608 further
requires the DNI to submit an annual report summarizing
reciprocity.
Section 6609. Intelligence community reports on security
clearances.
Section 6609 requires the DNI to submit a report on each IC
element's security clearance metrics, segregated by Federal
employees and contractor employees.
Section 6610. Periodic report on positions in the
intelligence community that can be conducted without
access to classified information, networks, or
facilities.
Section 6610 requires the DNI to submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on positions
that can be conducted without access to classified
information, networks, or facilities, or may require only a
Secret-level clearance.
Section 6611. Information-sharing program for positions of
trust and security clearances.
Section 6611 requires the Security Executive Agent and the
Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agents to establish a
program to share information between and among government
agencies and industry partners to inform decisions about
positions of trust and security clearances.
Section 6612. Report on protections for confidentiality of
whistleblower-related communications.
Section 6612 requires the Security Executive Agent, in
coordination with the IC IG, to submit a report detailing the
IC's controls used to ensure continuous evaluation programs
protect the confidentiality of whistleblower-related
communications.
Section 6613. Reports on costs of security clearance
background investigations.
Section 6613 requires the DNI to provide an annual report
for three years after enactment on the resources expended by
each government agency for processing security clearance
background investigations and continuous evaluation programs,
disaggregated by tier and employment status.
Title LXVII--Reports and Other Matters
Subtitle A--Matters Relating to Russia and Other Foreign Powers
Section 6701. Limitation relating to establishment or support
of cybersecurity unit with the Russian Federation.
Section 6701 prohibits the Federal government from
expending any funds to establish or support a cybersecurity
unit or other cyber agreement that is jointly established or
otherwise implemented by the United States Government and the
Russian Federation, unless the DNI submits a report to the
appropriate congressional committees at least 30 days prior
to any such agreement. The report shall include the
agreement's purpose, intended shared intelligence, value to
national security, counterintelligence concerns, and any
measures taken to mitigate such concerns.
Section 6702. Assessment of threat finance relating to
Russia.
Section 6702 requires the DNI, in coordination with the
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and
Analysis, to submit to the congressional intelligence
committees, within 60 days of enactment of the Act, an
assessment of Russian threat finance, based on all-source
intelligence from both the IC and the Office of Terrorism and
Financial Intelligence of the Treasury Department. Section
6702 further requires the assessment to include global nodes
and entry points for Russian money laundering; United States
vulnerabilities; connections between Russian individuals
involved in money laundering and the Russian Government;
counterintelligence threats to the United States posed by
Russian money laundering and other forms of threat finance;
and challenges to United States Government efforts to enforce
sanctions and combat organized crime.
Section 6703. Notification of an active measures campaign.
Section 6703 requires the DNI to notify congressional
leadership, and the Chairman and Vice Chairman or Ranking
Member of the appropriate congressional committees, each time
the DNI has determined there is credible information that a
foreign power has attempted, is attempting, or will attempt
to employ a covert influence or active measures campaign with
regard to the modernization, employment, doctrine, or force
posture of the United States' nuclear deterrent or missile
defense. Section 6703 further requires that such notification
must include information on any actions that the United
States has taken to expose or halt such attempts.
Section 6704. Notification of travel by accredited diplomatic
and consular personnel of the Russian Federation in the
United States.
Section 6704 requires the Secretary of State to ensure that
the Russian Federation provides notification at least two
business days in advance of all travel that is subject to
such requirements by accredited diplomatic and consular
personnel of the Russian Federation in the United States, and
take necessary action to secure full compliance by Russian
personnel and address any noncompliance.
Section 6705. Report and annual briefing on Iranian
expenditures supporting foreign military and terrorist
activities.
Section 6705 requires the DNI to submit a report to
Congress describing Iranian expenditures on military and
terrorist activities outside the country.
[[Page H10253]]
Section 6706. Expansion of scope of committee to counter
active measures.
Section 6706 amends a provision in the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 to expand the scope of
the interagency committee to counter active measures by the
Russian Federation to add China, Iran, North Korea, and other
nation states.
Subtitle B--Reports
Section 6711. Technical correction to Inspector General
study.
Section 6711 amends Title 50, section 11001(d), by
replacing the IC IG's ``audit'' requirement for Inspectors
General with employees having classified material access,
with a ``review'' requirement.
Section 6712. Reports on authorities of the Chief
Intelligence Officer of the Department of Homeland
Security.
Section 6712 requires the Secretary of DHS, in consultation
with the Under Secretary for I&A, to submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on the
adequacy of the Under Secretary's authorities required as the
Chief Intelligence Officer to organize the Homeland Security
Intelligence Enterprise, and the legal and policy changes
necessary to coordinate, organize, and lead DHS intelligence
activities.
Section 6713. Review of intelligence community whistleblower
matters.
Section 6713 directs the IC IG, in consultations with the
IGs of other IC agencies, to conduct a review of practices
and procedures relating to IC whistleblower matters.
Section 6714. Report on role of Director of National
Intelligence with respect to certain foreign investments.
Section 6714 directs the DNI to submit a report on ODNI's
role in preparing analytic materials in connection with the
United States Government's evaluation of national security
risks associated with potential foreign investments.
Section 6715. Report on surveillance by foreign governments
against United States telecommunications networks.
Section 6715 requires the DNI, in coordination with the
Director of the CIA, Director of the NSA, Director of the
FBI, and Secretary of DHS, to submit to the congressional
intelligence, judiciary, and homeland security committees,
within 180 days of enactment of the Act, a report on known
attempts by foreign governments to exploit cybersecurity
vulnerabilities in United States telecommunications networks
to surveil United States persons, and any actions that the IC
has taken to protect United States Government agencies and
personnel from such surveillance.
Section 6716. Biennial report on foreign investment risks.
Section 6716 requires the DNI to establish an IC working
group on foreign investment risks and prepare a biennial
report that includes an identification, analysis, and
explanation of national security vulnerabilities, foreign
investment trends, foreign countries' strategies to exploit
vulnerabilities through the acquisition of either critical
technologies (including components or items essential to
national defense), critical materials (including physical
materials essential to national security), or critical
infrastructure (including physical or virtual systems and
assets whose destruction or incapacity would have a
debilitating impact on national security), and market
distortions caused by foreign countries. Technologies,
materials, and infrastructure are deemed to be ``critical''
under this provision if their exploitation by a foreign
government could cause severe harm to the national security
of the United States.
Section 6717. Modification of certain reporting requirement
on travel of foreign diplomats.
Section 6717 amends a provision in the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, to require reporting
of ``a best estimate'' of known or suspected violations of
certain travel requirements by accredited diplomatic and
consular personnel of the Russian Federation.
Section 6718. Semiannual reports on investigations of
unauthorized disclosures of classified information.
Section 6718 requires the Assistant Attorney General for
National Security at the Department of Justice, in
consultation with the Director of the FBI, to submit to the
congressional intelligence and judiciary committees a
semiannual report on the status of IC referrals to the
Department of Justice regarding unauthorized disclosures of
classified information. Section 6718 also directs IC elements
to submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
semiannual report on the number of investigations opened and
completed by each agency regarding an unauthorized public
disclosure of classified information to the media, and the
number of completed investigations referred to the Attorney
General.
Section 6719. Congressional notification of designation of
covered intelligence officer as persona non grata.
Section 6719 requires, not later than 72 hours after a
covered intelligence officer is designated as persona non
grata, that the DNI, in consultation with the Secretary of
State, submit to the designated committees a notification of
that designation, to include the basis for the designation
and justification for the expulsion.
Section 6720. Reports on intelligence community participation
in vulnerabilities equities process of Federal
Government.
Section 6720 requires the DNI to submit, within 90 days of
enactment of the Act, to the congressional intelligence
committees a report describing the Vulnerabilities Equities
Process (VEP) roles and responsibilities for each IC element.
Section 6720 further requires each IC element to report to
the congressional intelligence committees within 30 days of a
significant change to that respective IC element's VEP
process and criteria. Section 6720 also requires the DNI to
submit an annual report to the congressional intelligence
committees with specified information on certain VEP metrics.
Section 6721. Inspectors General reports on classification.
Section 6721 requires each designated IG to submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on the
accuracy in the application of classification and handling
markings on a representative sample of finished products, to
include those with compartments. Section 6721 also directs
analyses of compliance with declassification procedures and a
review of the effectiveness of processes for identifying
topics of public or historical importance that merit
prioritization for declassification review.
Section 6722. Reports on global water insecurity and national
security implications and briefing on emerging infectious
disease and pandemics.
Section 6722 requires the DNI to submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on the
implications of global water insecurity on the United States'
national security interests. Section 6722 further requires
the DNI to provide a briefing to appropriate congressional
committees on the geopolitical effects of emerging infectious
disease and pandemics, and their implications on the United
States' national security.
Section 6723. Annual report on memoranda of understanding
between elements of intelligence community and other
entities of the United States Government regarding
significant operational activities or policy.
Section 6723 amends a provision in the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, instead requiring
each IC element to submit an annual report to the Committees
that lists each significant memorandum of understanding or
other agreement entered into during the preceding fiscal
year. Section 6723 further requires each IC element to
provide such documents if an intelligence committee so
requests.
Section 6724. Study on the feasibility of encrypting
unclassified wireline and wireless telephone calls.
Section 6724 requires the DNI to complete a study on the
feasibility of encrypting unclassified wireline and wireless
telephone calls between personnel in the IC.
Section 6725. Reports on intelligence community loan
repayment and related programs.
Section 6725 requires the DNI, in cooperation with the
heads of the elements of the IC, to submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on potentially
establishing an IC-wide program for student loan repayment
and forgiveness.
Section 6726. Repeal of certain reporting requirements.
Section 6726 repeals certain IC reporting requirements.
Section 6727. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
report on senior executives of the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence.
Section 6727 directs the IC IG to submit a report to the
congressional intelligence committees regarding senior
executive service staffing at the ODNI.
Section 6728. Briefing on Federal Bureau of Investigation
offering permanent residence to sources and cooperators.
Section 6728 directs the FBI within 30 days of enactment of
this Act to provide a briefing to the congressional
intelligence committees regarding the FBI's ability to
provide permanent U.S. residence to foreign individuals who
serve as cooperators in national security-related
investigations.
Section 6729. Intelligence assessment of North Korea revenue
sources.
Section 6729 requires the DNI, in coordination with other
relevant IC elements, to produce to the congressional
intelligence committees an intelligence assessment of the
North Korean regime's revenue sources.
Section 6730. Report on possible exploitations of virtual
currencies by terrorist actors.
Section 6730 requires the DNI, in consultation with the
Secretary of the Treasury, to submit to Congress a report on
the possible exploitation of virtual currencies by terrorist
actors.
Subtitle C--Other Matters
Section 6741. Public Interest Declassification Board.
Section 6741 permanently reauthorizes the Public Interest
Declassification Board administered by the National Archives
and Records Administration.
Section 6742. Technical and clerical amendments to the
National Security Act of 1947.
Section 6742 makes certain edits to the National Security
Act of 1947 as amended for technical or clerical purposes.
Section 6743. Bug bounty programs.
Section 6743 directs the Secretary of DHS, in consultation
with the Secretary of Defense, to submit a strategic plan to
implement bug bounty programs at appropriate
[[Page H10254]]
agencies and departments of the United States Government.
Section 6743 further requires the plan to include an
assessment of the ``Hack the Pentagon'' pilot program and
subsequent bug bounty programs. Section 6743 also requires
the plan to provide recommendations on the feasibility of
initiating bug bounty programs across the United States
Government.
Section 6744. Technical amendments related to the Department
of Energy.
Section 6744 provides technical corrections to certain
provisions regarding the Department of Energy's Office of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence.
Section 6745. Sense of Congress on notification of certain
disclosures of classified information.
Section 6745 expresses the sense of Congress that, pursuant
to the requirement for the IC to keep the congressional
intelligence committees ``fully and currently informed'' in
Section 502 of the National Security Act of 1947, IC agencies
must submit prompt written notification after becoming aware
that an individual in the executive branch has disclosed
certain classified information outside established
intelligence channels to foreign adversaries--North Korea,
Iran, China, Russia, or Cuba.
Section 6746. Sense of Congress on consideration of espionage
activities when considering whether or not to provide
visas to foreign individuals to be accredited to a United
Nations mission in the United States.
Section 6746 provides a Sense of Congress that, as to
foreign individuals to be accredited to a United Nations
mission, the Secretary of State should consider known and
suspected intelligence and espionage activities, including
activities constituting precursors to espionage, carried out
by such individuals against the United States, or against
foreign allies or partners of the United States. Section 6746
further provides that the Secretary of State should consider
an individual's status as a known or suspected intelligence
officer for a foreign adversary.
Section 6747. Sense of Congress on WikiLeaks.
Section 6747 provides a Sense of Congress that WikiLeaks
and its senior leadership resemble a non-state hostile
intelligence service, often abetted by state actors, and
should be treated as such.
____________________
