[Congressional Record Volume 165, Number 119 (Tuesday, July 16, 2019)]
[House]
[Pages H5858-H5910]
DAMON PAUL NELSON AND MATTHEW YOUNG POLLARD INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION
ACT FOR FISCAL YEARS 2018, 2019, AND 2020
General Leave
Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members
may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their
remarks and include extraneous material on the Intelligence
Authorization Act.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from California?
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 491 and rule
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House
on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 3494.
The Chair appoints the gentleman from California (Mr. Huffman) to
preside over the Committee of the Whole.
{time} 1900
In the Committee of the Whole
Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the
Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill
(H.R. 3494) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2020 for
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other
purposes, with Mr. Huffman in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIR. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered read the
first time.
General debate shall be confined to the bill and amendments specified
in the first section of House Resolution 491, and shall not exceed 1
hour equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking minority
member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
The gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff) and the gentleman from
California (Mr. Nunes) each will control 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff).
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself as much time as I may
consume.
Along the wall in the upper lobby of the CIA headquarters building is
a large picture of the head and torch of the Statue of Liberty
accompanied by the following words: ``We are the Nation's first line of
defense. We accomplish what others cannot accomplish and go where
others cannot go.''
These two sentences distill the essence of America's intelligence
community and the quiet sense of mission that tens of thousands of our
fellow citizens bring to their jobs every day.
H.R. 3494, the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020,
is our contribution to the work of the IC.
This is a bipartisan bill, reported unanimously out of the
Intelligence Committee and embodying the collective efforts of
Democratic and Republican members.
Though H.R. 3494 contains many new initiatives authored during my
chairmanship, it also preserves provisions developed during Ranking
Member Nunes' tenure as chairman as well.
Despite disagreements over the Russia investigation, the committee
has come together to support our intelligence community.
HPSCI oversees highly sensitive, highly classified activities, and we
collaborate with the IC to ensure that it has the resources and
authorities necessary to collect vital intelligence. That won't work,
however, unless the committee trusts the IC elements it oversees, and
those same elements trust the committee.
At the same time, HPSCI must ensure that legal and policy constraints
are vigorously enforced. That requires us to maintain both a
professional distance and a healthy skepticism about the activities we
oversee. When warranted, the committee must impose additional checks
and limitations, at times over intelligence community objections.
It is a delicate balance, which HPSCI strikes through use of many
different oversight tools. The most important by far is our annual
Intelligence Authorization Act.
H.R. 3494 gets the balance right. It authorizes funding for the IC at
roughly 1.4 percent above the President's budget request for the coming
year. It prioritizes the IC's collection and analytic capabilities
against China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, while sustaining critical
intelligence capabilities that support counterterrorism and
counterproliferation.
The bill also ensures that the men and women of the IC have what they
need to collect and analyze the intelligence that policymakers require.
At the same time, H.R. 3494 ensures close oversight by Congress,
rejecting the funding of legacy IC programs with overseas contingency
operation resources, or OCO, funding; and requiring, for the first
time, the submission to the intelligence committees of detailed
information on unfunded IC programs.
Another provision authored by Representative Welch calls for more
information in the IC's budget for counterterrorism matters to be
released to the public consistent with the protection of national
security. Still another authorizes the Public Interest Declassification
Board, which plays a vital role in ensuring that historical documents
about IC programs are declassified appropriately.
The legislation is especially strong in three other areas. The first
has to do with foreign malign activities, including those by Russia.
The bill calls for extensive IC reporting and creates new notification
requirements regarding covert or overt efforts by foreign governments
to undermine trusted institutions or to interfere in the democratic
process, our own or those of other nations.
This bill also strongly supports the IC workforce. H.R. 3494 obliges
the IC elements to offer their employees 12 weeks of paid parental
leave on top of the unpaid leave already guaranteed to them by law.
Other language ensures that the families of CIA personnel who are
killed or injured as a result of wars, hostile acts, or other incidents
can be appropriately compensated.
The bill also bolsters the IC's ability to recruit, hire, retain, and
promote a workforce that represents the diversity of the Nation that it
serves.
Lastly, technology. Many have sounded alarms about the rise of so-
called ``deep fake'' algorithms and the transition in our country and
elsewhere to a fifth-generation telecommunications network. To help the
IC address both challenges, H.R. 3494 instructs the DNI to hold
competitions and to award prizes for cutting-edge research into deep
fake and 5G technologies.
H.R. 3494 is not perfect; it is the result of negotiation and
compromise. I am pleased that, despite our public differences, we have
once again been able to put those aside to focus on the important work
of overseeing the intelligence community. The result is a strong,
bipartisan bill, which I am proud to support.
Mr. Chair, let me conclude by thanking Ranking Member Nunes, my
committee colleagues, and the entire HPSCI staff for their
collaborative efforts.
Mr. Chair, I urge all Members of the House to join me in voting for
H.R. 3494.
Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
[[Page H5859]]
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of H.R. 3494, the Damon Paul
Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020.
Passing an annual intelligence authorization bill is the most
important tool Congress has to conduct effective oversight of the
intelligence activities of the United States.
Today, Chairman Schiff and I are bringing the tenth consecutive
intelligence authorization bill to the floor. I am pleased that, as in
years past, this bill is a bipartisan product that reflects the
contributions of all the committee's members. It was reported out of
the committee by a unanimous voice vote.
This legislation is the product of bipartisan work by the majority
and the minority and provides the intelligence community the necessary
resources and authorities to ensure the IC remains capable of
protecting and defending the United States.
The bill folds in many priorities from fiscal year 2018 and 2019,
including the defense of elections from foreign threats, enhanced
injury benefits to CIA employees, and bolsters intelligence oversight
by improving the IC accountability to Congress.
Additionally, the bill protects all CIA covert intelligence officers'
identities, establishes a paid parental leave program for the IC, and
it mandates counterintelligence briefings and notifications to the
intelligence committees by the FBI on a quarterly basis and prompt
notification when an investigation is carried out regarding a
counterintelligence risk related to a Federal election or campaign.
This bill supports critical national security programs, particularly
those focused on countering threats from hard targets, such as China.
Lastly, the bill continues to ensure that the dedicated men and women
of our intelligence community have the funding, authorities, and
support they need to carry out their mission and to keep us safe.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I am proud to yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Quigley).
Mr. QUIGLEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
I rise in support of H.R. 3494.
As the United States learned in 2016, there are few things more
important to our democracy than ensuring that our electoral system is
kept free from outside interference.
We also have a responsibility to educate our partners and our allies
about the threat from foreign interference, as well as share our best
practices with those nations that face similar threats.
Taiwan, one of Asia's most vibrant democracies, is acutely aware of
the risks posed by foreign influence. The Chinese Communist Party,
angry that another nation has the audacity to prove that a culturally
Chinese democracy can thrive, will stop at nothing to degrade Taiwan's
political independence.
This year's Intelligence Authorization Act requires the Director of
National Intelligence to report on influence operations China conducts
to interfere in Taiwan's upcoming 2020 elections and find out what
assistance the U.S. government provided to counter these operations and
provide a comprehensive list of the specific organizations that
conducted these influence operations.
The U.S. is in a unique position to share the tools and techniques
with others that we are implementing to safeguard our own democratic
elections.
In line with our obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act, we urge
the administration to do all it can to assist Taipei with creating
conditions for a free, fair, and secure election that is free from
interference.
This provision brings us one step closer to that goal.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I yield as much time as she may consume to
the gentlewoman from New York (Ms. Stefanik).
Ms. STEFANIK. Mr. Chair, I am proud to rise in support of this year's
Intelligence Authorization Act.
After the recent partisan NDAA debate and vote, it is an
accomplishment that this committee came together to produce a
bipartisan bill that supports our intelligence community and provides
the warfighter with the intelligence support needed to protect the
United States and our allies.
I am particularly pleased that this bill contains the
Counterintelligence Accountability Act that I introduced earlier this
year that I wanted to take a moment to highlight for the American
public.
This bill amends the National Security Act by requiring the FBI to
provide quarterly counterintelligence briefings to the congressional
intelligence committees, which is not only necessary for us to conduct
meaningful oversight over the FBI's counterintelligence operations, but
also provides the American people with the comfort that the FBI is
subject to the same types of scrutiny as other intelligence agencies.
Importantly, this bill also mandates that the FBI notify the
congressional intelligence committees when the FBI has a
counterintelligence investigation open related to a CI risk to an
election or campaign for Federal office.
Given former FBI Director Comey's testimony in 2017, I am still
deeply concerned that the FBI failed to provide notification to the
congressional intelligence committees regarding the investigation
opened into the Trump campaign in 2016 until well after the election.
This bill ensures that Congress is kept fully and currently informed
of these types of counterintelligence activities. This is good,
accountable governance.
Mr. Chair, I appreciate the chair and ranking member's support in
adding my legislation into this bill and urge my colleagues to vote
``yes'' on final passage.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I am proud to yield 3 minutes to the
gentleman from Washington State (Mr. Heck).
Mr. HECK. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chair of the committee for
yielding.
Mr. Chair, I rise to strongly support the David Paul Nelson and
Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act.
In the last year we have made some pretty incredible progress in
reducing the security clearance backlog, yet, frankly, after all the
progress we have made, we are still--and you are hearing this number
correctly--left with nearly a half a million people on the waiting list
for security clearance.
Earlier this year, the average wait time for top secret security
clearance was reduced to 468 days, down from 534 days.
So, in other words, when we are out there competing for young talent
to come in and be a member of the intelligence community, say in a
field such as cyber, we are told we have to tell them, ``Cool your
jets. We will get back to you in a year, year and a half or so.''
Indeed, closer to home, my senior military adviser is a distinguished
graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served
not one, but two tours in Afghanistan, where he had a security
clearance, and yet when he joined a staff in the House of
Representatives, to again earn a security clearance, it took 20 months,
nearly 2 years.
We are losing good people when we subject them to that long of a wait
time.
This bill makes some progress. It will build on the progress we made
this year by providing needed reform to this mission. It creates a
system of accountability and clear goals for how the process should
run.
Furthermore, the bill allows for innovation on using digital tools,
and reciprocity among agencies to improve our efficiencies when
clearances are needed to be transferred from one agency to another.
Our government can and must efficiently and effectively review
security clearance applicants. We owe our national security workforce
at least that much. This bill will help us to do that, to further
reduce it, so that the intelligence community can compete for the best
and the brightest in a timely fashion.
Mr. Chair, for that reason, among many, I urge Members' support for
the Intelligence Authorization Act.
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Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
[[Page H5860]]
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from
Alabama (Ms. Sewell).
Ms. SEWELL of Alabama. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 3494,
the Intelligence Authorization Act.
Mr. Chairman, as the chair of the Defense Intelligence and Warfighter
Support Subcommittee, I believe this bill will ensure our warfighters
retain the information and decisionmaking advantages to which we have
grown accustomed and improve the intelligence community's ability to
attract and retain a diverse workforce.
The bill includes provisions that authorize increased intelligence
funding for combatant commanders and our growing strategic competition
with China, Russia, and other malign actors; supports the Defense
Intelligence Agency's ongoing assessment of its roles and missions; and
provides the Director of National Intelligence with the necessary
authority to manage intelligence community-wide academic programs.
This bill also includes language I authored which will improve
Federal campaign election security. My provision will require the
Director of National Intelligence to work with the FBI and the
Department of Homeland Security to make available an advisory report on
foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to those
campaigns. Additionally, my language requires the Director to publish a
summary of best practices and provide information to campaigns to help
thwart these attacks.
This legislation also continues the committee's longstanding and
bipartisan work to promote increased diversity within the intelligence
community's workforce. This bill contains language directing the
intelligence community to expand its annual demographic hiring report
by adding grade level, years of service, career categories, gender
identity, and sexual orientation reporting categories. These changes
will improve the IC's ability to track how well it retains and promotes
persons of diverse backgrounds.
Finally, for the first time in many years, the Intelligence
Authorization Act will provide significant funding for programs that
will improve the IC's ability to introduce students from diverse
backgrounds to its mission.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to voting in support of this
legislation. I commend the chairman and ranking member on working
together to provide these important authorizations. I encourage my
colleagues to do the same and vote for this bill.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I continue to reserve the balance of my
time.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Swalwell).
Mr. SWALWELL of California. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman of our
committee for working with the minority to put together a bipartisan
piece of legislation that serves our national security purposes.
I also want to acknowledge both of the individuals for whom the bill
is named, but particularly Damon Paul Nelson, the former staff director
for the then-majority at the time, someone whom I and my colleagues saw
put his heart and soul into the committee and someone who was able to
keep many lines of communication that were necessary open during some
of our most trying times. This is a fitting recognition of his service
to our country.
As chairman of the Intelligence Modernization and Readiness
Subcommittee, I celebrate this bipartisan bill and the patriotic young
people who enter service in the intelligence community, sometimes
immediately after college, despite extraordinary student debt. For that
reason, we have included measures to enhance intelligence community-
wide student loan repayment and forgiveness programs.
Reducing the financial burden on intelligence community workers helps
us recruit and retain a talented and diverse workforce to remain
competitive with the private sector. To that aim, we have also included
a measure to authorize 12 weeks of paid parental leave for intelligence
community employees in the event of a birth or adoption.
This authority would supplement the 12 weeks of unpaid leave
currently afforded to intelligence community employees and other
government personnel under existing law, sending a strong message to
the intelligence community workforce that they do not need to choose
between their career, serving our country, and their family.
These will help the intelligence community recruit and retain
individuals capable of meeting the security goals of the United States
and will set the example for other Federal agencies seeking pro-worker
policies.
Our goal on the subcommittee is to anticipate the needs of the
intelligence community workforce. Reaching across the aisle for our
intelligence community is how we will secure a next-generation
intelligence community workforce.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I continue to reserve the balance of my
time.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, it is now a pleasure to yield 3 minutes to
the gentleman from New York (Mr. Sean Patrick Maloney).
Mr. SEAN PATRICK MALONEY of New York. Mr. Chairman, I thank the
chairman for yielding.
Mr. Chairman, I rise today to offer support for this bill, which
includes my legislation, the Gregg Wenzel Clandestine Heroes Parity
Act.
Mr. Chairman, my bill honors an unsung son of the Hudson Valley, CIA
Officer Gregg Wenzel, who died in Ethiopia on July 9, 2003. He was only
33 years old.
Gregg was inspired to join the Clandestine Service after September 11
and dedicated his life to making the United States stronger in our
fight against terrorism. That is what CIA officers do; they put their
lives on the line for our freedoms. But because of the nature of their
work, they rarely get the recognition they deserve.
This bill simply ensures that the families of fallen CIA officers
receive the death benefits their loved ones earned laying down their
lives in service of our Nation.
Gregg was born in the Bronx and graduated from Monroe-Woodbury High
School in Orange County, New York. He went on to earn degrees from the
State University of New York at Binghamton and then the University of
Miami School of Law.
After joining the CIA, he was assigned his first overseas tour as an
operations officer in the Horn of Africa. The assignment was
challenging, but Gregg was known for his grit and good spirit.
After his death, Gregg was awarded the CIA's Intelligence
Commendation Medal and the Exceptional Service Medallion. You can find
his star, number 81, on the CIA Memorial Wall in Langley. And we even
honored his service in 2015 by renaming the Monroe, New York, post
office the Gregg David Wenzel Memorial Post Office, which is the first
such honor ever to be bestowed on a CIA officer.
But even with these distinctions, Gregg's family was never able to
access the death benefits he had earned in life. A loophole currently
blocks benefits for all CIA officers who don't have dependents or who
are not killed by a known act of terrorism. My bill simply changes that
and rights this wrong.
I am so thankful to Gregg's parents, Gladys and Mitch Wenzel, for
never giving up on this fight. This bill is an opportunity for us, as a
grateful nation, to honor Gregg and his family and to honor all of our
fallen CIA officers and the families they have left behind.
Mr. Chairman, I urge all Members to vote ``yes'' on this bill.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, this year's IA is named after Damon Nelson and Matthew
Pollard, two staffers who passed away unexpectedly last year.
Matt Pollard was a staffer with the Senate Intelligence Committee,
and he is remembered fondly by staff and members who had the pleasure
of working with him.
Damon Nelson was a former Republican staff director on the House
Intelligence Committee and a personal friend. Damon would be happy with
the bill today, and I am happy that this committee was able to produce
a bipartisan product.
In closing, I want to take a moment to thank the men and women who
serve in our intelligence community. I am honored to get to know so
many of them in the course of the committee's oversight work.
I also thank my colleagues on the Intelligence Committee for their
contributions to our oversight over the past year.
[[Page H5861]]
I also thank all of the staff on the committee for their hard work on
the bill and their daily oversight of the intelligence community. In
particular, I thank the professional oversight staff from the minority,
especially Nick Ciarlante, Laura Casulli, Meghan Green, Andrew House,
Lisa Major, Bill Flanigan, Steve Keith, Marissa Skaggs, Betsy Hulme,
Jack Langer, and Allen Souza.
I would also like to take just a moment to thank our fellow from Los
Alamos National Laboratory, Scott Miller. Scott joined the committee in
2016 and, in a few weeks, will be finishing up his midcareer
educational program with the House and will be returning to New Mexico.
Mr. Chairman, I wish Scott all the best as he, his wife, Rebecca, and
daughter, Sarah, return home.
All the staff members spent long hours working on the legislative
text and its classified annex, and the bill is stronger for it.
Mr. Chairman, I thank Chairman Schiff and all of his staff for the
bipartisan work product.
Mr. Chairman, I urge passage of H.R. 3494, as amended, and I yield
back the balance of my time.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I wish to say only a few words of recognition before
concluding my remarks on the Intelligence Authorization Act.
First, my HPSCI colleagues and I remember HPSCI's Damon Nelson and
SSCI's Matthew Pollard, two dedicated staffers and public servants who
passed away last year. The legislation is named in their honor.
I also express my tremendous thanks and support to the men and women
of the intelligence community. They strive quietly and tirelessly every
day, and their work helps keep the Nation safe.
I greatly appreciate the work of Ranking Member Nunes, as well as my
other HPSCI colleagues.
And I would be remiss if I did not recognize these members of my
staff who worked tirelessly together with their minority colleagues to
produce this bipartisan legislation: Wells Bennett, Timothy Bergreen,
Maher Bitar, Carly Blake, Patrick Boland, Kris Breaux, Linda Cohen,
Thomas Eager, Will Evans, Patrick Fallon, Daniel Goldman, Abby Grace,
Nicolas Mitchell, Daniel Noble, Diana Pilipenko, Lucian Sikorskyj,
Conrad Stosz, Kathy Suber, Amanda Rogers Thorpe, Aaron Thurman, Rheanne
Wirkkala, Raffaela Wakeman, and William Wu.
One more personnel note: I want to recognize the exemplary
contributions of Brandon Smith, who has been a member of HPSCI's staff
for 18 years. Brandon has announced that he will be leaving HPSCI soon.
We are deeply grateful for his work and his longstanding and continuing
service to the Nation.
Let me conclude by urging all Members of the House to join me in
voting for H.R. 3494 and in supporting the measure as it proceeds to
the Senate and, after that, to the President's desk.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIR. All time for general debate has expired.
Pursuant to the rule, the bill shall be considered for amendment
under the 5-minute rule.
In lieu of the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, printed in the bill,
the amendment in the nature of a substitute consisting of the text of
Rules Committee Print 116-22, modified by the amendment printed in part
A of House Report 116-154, shall be considered as adopted. The bill, as
amended, shall be considered as an original bill for purpose of further
amendment under the 5-minute rule and shall be considered as read.
The text of the bill, as amended, is as follows:
H.R. 3494
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Damon Paul Nelson and
Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020''.
SEC. 2. DIVISIONS AND TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Divisions.--This Act is organized into two divisions as
follows:
(1) Division A--Intelligence Authorizations for Fiscal Year
2020.
(2) Division B--Intelligence Authorizations for Fiscal
Years 2018 and 2019.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title.
Sec. 2. Divisions and table of contents.
Sec. 3. Definitions.
DIVISION A--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2020
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 103. Intelligence community management account.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Sec. 301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
Sec. 303. Paid parental leave.
Sec. 304. Unfunded requirements of the intelligence community.
Sec. 305. Extending the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982.
Sec. 306. Intelligence community public-private talent exchange.
Sec. 307. Assessment of contracting practices to identify certain
security and counterintelligence concerns.
Sec. 308. Required counterintelligence briefings and notifications.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Sec. 401. Establishment of Climate Security Advisory Council.
Sec. 402. Transfer of National Intelligence University to the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence.
TITLE V--MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES
Sec. 501. Annual reports on influence operations and campaigns in the
United States by the Communist Party of China.
Sec. 502. Report on repression of ethnic Muslim minorities in the
Xinjiang region of the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 503. Report on efforts by People's Republic of China to influence
election in Taiwan.
Sec. 504. Assessment of legitimate and illegitimate financial and other
assets of Vladimir Putin.
Sec. 505. Assessments of intentions of political leadership of the
Russian Federation.
Sec. 506. Report on death of Jamal Khashoggi.
TITLE VI--FEDERAL EFFORTS AGAINST DOMESTIC TERRORISM
Sec. 601. Definitions.
Sec. 602. Annual strategic intelligence assessment of and comprehensive
report on domestic terrorism.
TITLE VII--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS
Sec. 701. Modification of requirements for submission to Congress of
certain reports.
Sec. 702. Increased transparency regarding counterterrorism budget of
the United States.
Sec. 703. Task force on illicit financing of espionage and foreign
influence operations.
Sec. 704. Study on role of retired and former personnel of intelligence
community with respect to certain foreign intelligence
operations.
Sec. 705. Report by Director of National Intelligence on fifth-
generation wireless network technology.
Sec. 706. Establishment of 5G prize competition.
Sec. 707. Establishment of deepfakes prize competition.
DIVISION B--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR FISCAL YEARS 2018 AND 2019
TITLE XXI--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 2101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 2102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 2103. Intelligence Community Management Account.
TITLE XXII--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY
SYSTEM
Sec. 2201. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 2202. Computation of annuities for employees of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
TITLE XXIII--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Sec. 2301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 2302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
Sec. 2303. Modification of special pay authority for science,
technology, engineering, or mathematics positions and
addition of special pay authority for cyber positions.
Sec. 2304. Modification of appointment of Chief Information Officer of
the Intelligence Community.
Sec. 2305. Director of National Intelligence review of placement of
positions within the intelligence community on the
Executive Schedule.
Sec. 2306. Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk Management Task
Force.
[[Page H5862]]
Sec. 2307. Consideration of adversarial telecommunications and
cybersecurity infrastructure when sharing intelligence
with foreign governments and entities.
Sec. 2308. Cyber protection support for the personnel of the
intelligence community in positions highly vulnerable to
cyber attack.
Sec. 2309. Elimination of sunset of authority relating to management of
supply-chain risk.
Sec. 2310. Limitations on determinations regarding certain security
classifications.
Sec. 2311. Joint Intelligence Community Council.
Sec. 2312. Intelligence community information technology environment.
Sec. 2313. Report on development of secure mobile voice solution for
intelligence community.
Sec. 2314. Policy on minimum insider threat standards.
Sec. 2315. Submission of intelligence community policies.
Sec. 2316. Expansion of intelligence community recruitment efforts.
TITLE XXIV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Sec. 2401. Authority for protection of current and former employees of
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 2402. Designation of the program manager-information sharing
environment.
Sec. 2403. Technical modification to the executive schedule.
Sec. 2404. Chief Financial Officer of the Intelligence Community.
Sec. 2405. Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community.
Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency
Sec. 2411. Central Intelligence Agency subsistence for personnel
assigned to austere locations.
Sec. 2412. Special rules for certain monthly workers' compensation
payments and other payments for Central Intelligence
Agency personnel.
Sec. 2413. Expansion of security protective service jurisdiction of the
Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 2414. Repeal of foreign language proficiency requirement for
certain senior level positions in the Central
Intelligence Agency.
Subtitle C--Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of
Department of Energy
Sec. 2421. Consolidation of Department of Energy Offices of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence.
Sec. 2422. Establishment of Energy Infrastructure Security Center.
Sec. 2423. Repeal of Department of Energy Intelligence Executive
Committee and budget reporting requirement.
Subtitle D--Other Elements
Sec. 2431. Plan for designation of counterintelligence component of
Defense Security Service as an element of intelligence
community.
Sec. 2432. Notice not required for private entities.
Sec. 2433. Establishment of advisory board for National Reconnaissance
Office.
Sec. 2434. Collocation of certain Department of Homeland Security
personnel at field locations.
TITLE XXV--ELECTION MATTERS
Sec. 2501. Report on cyber attacks by foreign governments against
United States election infrastructure.
Sec. 2502. Review of intelligence community's posture to collect
against and analyze Russian efforts to influence the
Presidential election.
Sec. 2503. Assessment of foreign intelligence threats to Federal
elections.
Sec. 2504. Strategy for countering Russian cyber threats to United
States elections.
Sec. 2505. Assessment of significant Russian influence campaigns
directed at foreign elections and referenda.
Sec. 2506. Information sharing with State election officials.
Sec. 2507. Notification of significant foreign cyber intrusions and
active measures campaigns directed at elections for
Federal offices.
Sec. 2508. Designation of counterintelligence officer to lead election
security matters.
TITLE XXVI--SECURITY CLEARANCES
Sec. 2601. Definitions.
Sec. 2602. Reports and plans relating to security clearances and
background investigations.
Sec. 2603. Improving the process for security clearances.
Sec. 2604. Goals for promptness of determinations regarding security
clearances.
Sec. 2605. Security Executive Agent.
Sec. 2606. Report on unified, simplified, Governmentwide standards for
positions of trust and security clearances.
Sec. 2607. Report on clearance in person concept.
Sec. 2608. Reports on reciprocity for security clearances inside of
departments and agencies.
Sec. 2609. Intelligence community reports on security clearances.
Sec. 2610. Periodic report on positions in the intelligence community
that can be conducted without access to classified
information, networks, or facilities.
Sec. 2611. Information sharing program for positions of trust and
security clearances.
Sec. 2612. Report on protections for confidentiality of whistleblower-
related communications.
TITLE XXVII--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS
Subtitle A--Matters Relating to Russia and Other Foreign Powers
Sec. 2701. Limitation relating to establishment or support of
cybersecurity unit with the Russian Federation.
Sec. 2702. Report on returning Russian compounds.
Sec. 2703. Assessment of threat finance relating to Russia.
Sec. 2704. Notification of an active measures campaign.
Sec. 2705. Notification of travel by accredited diplomatic and consular
personnel of the Russian Federation in the United States.
Sec. 2706. Report on outreach strategy addressing threats from United
States adversaries to the United States technology
sector.
Sec. 2707. Report on Iranian support of proxy forces in Syria and
Lebanon.
Sec. 2708. Annual report on Iranian expenditures supporting foreign
military and terrorist activities.
Sec. 2709. Expansion of scope of committee to counter active measures
and report on establishment of Foreign Malign Influence
Center.
Subtitle B--Reports
Sec. 2711. Technical correction to Inspector General study.
Sec. 2712. Reports on authorities of the Chief Intelligence Officer of
the Department of Homeland Security.
Sec. 2713. Review of intelligence community whistleblower matters.
Sec. 2714. Report on role of Director of National Intelligence with
respect to certain foreign investments.
Sec. 2715. Report on surveillance by foreign governments against United
States telecommunications networks.
Sec. 2716. Biennial report on foreign investment risks.
Sec. 2717. Modification of certain reporting requirement on travel of
foreign diplomats.
Sec. 2718. Semiannual reports on investigations of unauthorized
disclosures of classified information.
Sec. 2719. Congressional notification of designation of covered
intelligence officer as persona non grata.
Sec. 2720. Reports on intelligence community participation in
vulnerabilities equities process of Federal Government.
Sec. 2721. Inspectors General reports on classification.
Sec. 2722. Reports on global water insecurity and national security
implications and briefing on emerging infectious disease
and pandemics.
Sec. 2723. Annual report on memoranda of understanding between elements
of intelligence community and other entities of the
United States Government regarding significant
operational activities or policy.
Sec. 2724. Study on the feasibility of encrypting unclassified wireline
and wireless telephone calls.
Sec. 2725. Modification of requirement for annual report on hiring and
retention of minority employees.
Sec. 2726. Reports on intelligence community loan repayment and related
programs.
Sec. 2727. Repeal of certain reporting requirements.
Sec. 2728. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community report on
senior executives of the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence.
Sec. 2729. Briefing on Federal Bureau of Investigation offering
permanent residence to sources and cooperators.
Sec. 2730. Intelligence assessment of North Korea revenue sources.
Sec. 2731. Report on possible exploitation of virtual currencies by
terrorist actors.
Subtitle C--Other Matters
Sec. 2741. Public Interest Declassification Board.
Sec. 2742. Technical and clerical amendments to the National Security
Act of 1947.
Sec. 2743. Technical amendments related to the Department of Energy.
Sec. 2744. Sense of Congress on notification of certain disclosures of
classified information.
Sec. 2745. Sense of Congress on consideration of espionage activities
when considering whether or not to provide visas to
foreign individuals to be accredited to a United Nations
mission in the United States.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term
``congressional intelligence committees'' has the meaning
given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
(2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence
community'' has the meaning given such term in section 3 of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
[[Page H5863]]
DIVISION A--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2020
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal
year 2020 for the conduct of the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the following elements of
the United States Government:
(1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(3) The Department of Defense.
(4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(5) The National Security Agency.
(6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force.
(7) The Coast Guard.
(8) The Department of State.
(9) The Department of the Treasury.
(10) The Department of Energy.
(11) The Department of Justice.
(12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
(14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(16) The Department of Homeland Security.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts.--The amounts authorized to
be appropriated under section 101 for the conduct of the
intelligence activities of the elements listed in paragraphs
(1) through (16) of section 101, are those specified in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany
this Act.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of
Authorizations.--
(1) Availability.--The classified Schedule of
Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made
available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate,
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives, and to the President.
(2) Distribution by the president.--Subject to paragraph
(3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of
the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in
subsection (a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule,
within the executive branch.
(3) Limits on disclosure.--The President shall not publicly
disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any
portion of such Schedule except--
(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C.
3306(a));
(B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or
(C) as otherwise required by law.
SEC. 103. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management
Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal
year 2020 the sum of $565,637,000.
(b) Classified Authorization of Appropriations.--In
addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the
Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a),
there are authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence
Community Management Account for fiscal year 2020 such
additional amounts as are specified in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability fund
$514,000,000 for fiscal year 2020.
TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
SEC. 301. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not
be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any
intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by
the Constitution or the laws of the United States.
SEC. 302. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay,
retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be
increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may
be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits
authorized by law.
SEC. 303. PAID PARENTAL LEAVE.
(a) Purpose.--The purpose of this section is to--
(1) help the intelligence community recruit and retain a
dynamic, multi-talented, and diverse workforce capable of
meeting the security goals of the United States; and
(2) establish best practices and processes for other
elements of the Federal Government seeking to pursue similar
policies.
(b) Authorization of Paid Parental Leave for Intelligence
Community Employees.--
(1) In general.--Title III of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3071 et seq.) is amended by inserting after
section 304 the following:
``SEC. 305. PAID PARENTAL LEAVE.
``(a) Paid Parental Leave.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, a civilian employee of an element of the
intelligence community shall have available a total of 12
administrative workweeks of paid parental leave in the event
of the birth of a child of the employee, or placement of a
child with the employee for adoption or foster care in order
to care for such son or daughter. Such paid parental leave
shall be used during the 12-month period beginning on the
date of the birth or placement. Nothing in this section shall
be construed to modify or otherwise affect the eligibility of
an employee of an element of the intelligence community for
benefits relating to leave under any other provision of law.
``(b) Treatment of Parental Leave Request.--Notwithstanding
any other provision of law--
``(1) an element of the intelligence community shall
accommodate an employee's leave request under subsection (a),
including a request to use such leave intermittently or to
create a reduced work schedule, to the extent that the
requested leave schedule does not unduly disrupt operations;
and
``(2) to the extent that an employee's requested leave
described in paragraph (1) arises out of medical necessity
related to a serious health condition connected to the birth
of a child, the employing element shall handle the scheduling
consistent with the treatment of employees who are using
leave under subparagraph (C) or (D) of section 6382(a)(1) of
title 5, United States Code.
``(c) Rules Relating to Paid Leave.--Notwithstanding any
other provision of law--
``(1) an employee may not be required to first use all or
any portion of any unpaid leave available to the employee
before being allowed to use the paid parental leave described
in subsection (a); and
``(2) paid parental leave under subsection (a)--
``(A) shall be payable from any appropriation or fund
available for salaries or expenses for positions within the
employing element;
``(B) may not be considered to be annual or vacation leave
for purposes of section 5551 or 5552 of title 5, United
States Code, or for any other purpose;
``(C) if not used by the employee before the end of the 12-
month period described in subsection (a) to which the leave
relates, may not be available for any subsequent use and may
not be converted into a cash payment;
``(D) may be granted only to the extent that the employee
does not receive a total of more than 12 weeks of paid
parental leave in any 12-month period beginning on the date
of a birth or placement;
``(E) may not be granted--
``(i) in excess of a lifetime aggregate total of 30
administrative workweeks based on placements of a foster
child for any individual employee; or
``(ii) in connection with temporary foster care placements
expected to last less than 1 year;
``(F) may not be granted for a child being placed for
foster care or adoption if such leave was previously granted
to the same employee when the same child was placed with the
employee for foster care in the past;
``(G) shall be used in increments of hours (or fractions
thereof), with 12 administrative workweeks equal to 480 hours
for employees with a regular full-time work schedule and
converted to a proportional number of hours for employees
with part-time, seasonal, or uncommon tours of duty; and
``(H) may not be used during off-season (nonpay status)
periods for employees with seasonal work schedules.
``(d) Implementation Plan.--Not later than 1 year after the
date of the enactment of this section, the Director of
National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees an implementation plan that
includes--
``(1) processes and procedures for implementing the paid
parental leave policies under subsections (a) through (c);
``(2) an explanation of how the implementation of
subsections (a) through (c) will be reconciled with policies
of other elements of the Federal Government, including the
impact on elements funded by the National Intelligence
Program that are housed within agencies outside the
intelligence community; and
``(3) all costs or operational expenses associated with the
implementation of subsections (a) through (c).
``(e) Directive.--Not later than 180 days after the
Director of National Intelligence submits the implementation
plan under subsection (d), the Director of National
Intelligence shall issue a written directive to implement
this section, which directive shall take effect on the date
of issuance.
``(f) Annual Report.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees an
annual report that--
``(1) details the number of employees of each element of
the intelligence community who applied for and took paid
parental leave under subsection (a) during the year covered
by the report;
``(2) details the number of--
``(A) employees of each element of the intelligence
community stationed abroad who applied for and took paid
parental leave under subsection (a) during the year covered
by the report; and
``(B) employees of each element of the intelligence
community stationed abroad who applied for paid parental
leave but such application was not granted because of an
undue impact on operations as specified in subsection (b)(1);
and
``(3) includes updates on major implementation challenges
or costs associated with paid parental leave.
``(g) Definition of Child.--For purposes of this section,
the term `child' means a biological, adopted, or foster
child, a stepchild, a legal ward, or a child of a person in
loco parentis, who is--
``(1) under 18 years of age; or
``(2) 18 years of age or older and incapable of self-care
because of a mental or physical disability.''.
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents in the
matter preceding section 2 of the
[[Page H5864]]
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3002) is amended by
inserting after the item relating to section 304 the
following:
``Sec. 305. Paid parental leave.''.
(c) Applicability.--Section 305 of the National Security
Act of 1947, as added by subsection (b), shall apply with
respect to leave taken in connection with the birth or
placement of a child that occurs on or after the date on
which the Director of National Intelligence issues the
written directive under subsection (e) of such section 305.
SEC. 304. UNFUNDED REQUIREMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.
(a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end
the following new section:
``SEC. 512. UNFUNDED PRIORITIES OF THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.
``(a) Briefings.--Upon the request of an appropriate
congressional committee, the Director of National
Intelligence shall provide to the committee a briefing on the
unfunded priorities of an element of the intelligence
community.
``(b) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
`appropriate congressional committees' means--
``(A) the congressional intelligence committees; and
``(B) the Committees on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives and the Senate.
``(2) Unfunded priority.--The term `unfunded priority', in
the case of a fiscal year, means a program, activity, or
other initiative of an element of the intelligence community
that--
``(A) was submitted by the head of the element to the
Director of National Intelligence in the budget proposal for
the element for that fiscal year, but was not included by the
Director in the consolidated budget proposal submitted to the
President for that fiscal year; or
``(B) was submitted by the Director in the consolidated
budget proposal submitted to the President for that fiscal
year, but was not included in the budget of the President
submitted to Congress for that fiscal year pursuant to
section 1105 of title 31, United States Code.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections in the first
section of such Act is amended by inserting after the item
relating to section 511 the following new item:
``Sec. 512. Unfunded priorities of the intelligence community.''.
SEC. 305. EXTENDING THE INTELLIGENCE IDENTITIES PROTECTION
ACT OF 1982.
Section 605(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3126(4)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (A)--
(A) by striking clause (ii);
(B) in clause (i), by striking ``, and'' and inserting
``;''; and
(C) by striking ``agency--'' and all that follows through
``whose identity'' and inserting ``agency whose identity'';
and
(2) in subparagraph (B)(i), by striking ``resides and acts
outside the United States'' and inserting ``acts''.
SEC. 306. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PUBLIC-PRIVATE TALENT
EXCHANGE.
(a) Policies, Processes, and Procedures Required.--Not
later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall develop
policies, processes, and procedures to facilitate the
rotation of personnel of the intelligence community to the
private sector, and personnel from the private sector to the
intelligence community.
(b) Detail Authority.--Under policies developed by the
Director pursuant to subsection (a), pursuant to a written
agreement with a private-sector organization, and with the
consent of the employee, a head of an element of the
intelligence community may arrange for the temporary detail
of an employee of such element to such private-sector
organization, or from such private-sector organization to
such element under this section.
(c) Agreements.--
(1) In general.--A head of an element of the intelligence
community exercising the authority of the head under
subsection (a) shall provide for a written agreement among
the element of the intelligence community, the private-sector
organization, and the employee concerned regarding the terms
and conditions of the employee's detail under this section.
The agreement--
(A) shall require that the employee of the element, upon
completion of the detail, serve in the element, or elsewhere
in the civil service if approved by the head of the element,
for a period that is at least equal to the length of the
detail;
(B) shall provide that if the employee of the element fails
to carry out the agreement, such employee shall be liable to
the United States for payment of all non-salary and benefit
expenses of the detail, unless that failure was for good and
sufficient reason, as determined by the head of the element;
(C) shall contain language informing such employee of the
prohibition on sharing, using, or otherwise improperly
handling classified of unclassified non-public information
for the benefit or advantage of the private-sector
organization;
(D) shall contain language governing the handling of
classified information by such employee during the detail;
and
(E) shall contain language requiring the employee to
acknowledge the obligations of the employee under section
1905 of title 18, United States Code.
(2) Amount of liability.--An amount for which an employee
is liable under paragraph (1) shall be treated as a debt due
the United States.
(3) Waiver.--The head of an element of the intelligence
community may waive, in whole or in part, collection of a
debt described in paragraph (2) based on a determination that
the collection would be against equity and good conscience
and not in the best interests of the United States, after
taking into account any indication of fraud,
misrepresentation, fault, or lack of good faith on the part
of the employee.
(d) Termination.--A detail under this section may, at any
time and for any reason, be terminated by the head of the
element of the intelligence community concerned or the
private-sector organization concerned.
(e) Duration.--
(1) In general.--A detail under this section shall be for a
period of not less than 3 months and not more than 2 years,
renewable up to a total of 3 years.
(2) Longer periods.--A detail under this section may be for
a period in excess of 2 years, but not more than 3 years, if
the head of the element making the detail determines that
such detail is necessary to meet critical mission or program
requirements.
(3) Limitation.--No employee of an element of the
intelligence community may be detailed under this section for
more than a total of 5 years, inclusive of all such details.
(f) Status of Federal Employees Detailed to Private-sector
Organizations.--
(1) In general.--An employee of an element of the
intelligence community who is detailed to a private-sector
organization under this section shall be considered, during
the period of detail, to be on a regular work assignment in
the element. The written agreement established under
subsection (c)(1) shall address the specific terms and
conditions related to the employee's continued status as a
Federal employee.
(2) Requirements.--In establishing a temporary detail of an
employee of an element of the intelligence community to a
private-sector organization, the head of the element shall--
(A) certify that the temporary detail of such employee
shall not have an adverse or negative impact on mission
attainment or organizational capabilities associated with the
detail; and
(B) in the case of an element of the intelligence community
in the Department of Defense, ensure that the normal duties
and functions of such employees are not, as a result of and
during the course of such temporary detail, performed or
augmented by contractor personnel in violation of the
provisions of section 2461 of title 10, United States Code.
(g) Terms and Conditions for Private-sector Employees.--An
employee of a private-sector organization who is detailed to
an element of the intelligence community under this section--
(1) shall continue to receive pay and benefits from the
private-sector organization from which such employee is
detailed and shall not receive pay or benefits from the
element, except as provided in paragraph (2);
(2) is deemed to be an employee of the element for the
purposes of--
(A) chapters 73 and 81 of title 5, United States Code;
(B) sections 201, 203, 205, 207, 208, 209, 603, 606, 607,
643, 654, 1905, and 1913 of title 18, United States Code;
(C) sections 1343, 1344, and 1349(b) of title 31, United
States Code;
(D) chapter 171 of title 28, United States Code (commonly
known as the ``Federal Tort Claims Act'') and any other
Federal tort liability statute;
(E) the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.);
and
(F) chapter 21 of title 41, United States Code;
(3) may perform work that is considered inherently
governmental in nature only when requested in writing by the
head of the element;
(4) may not be used to circumvent any limitation or
restriction on the size of the workforce of the element;
(5) shall be subject to the same requirements applicable to
an employee performing the same functions and duties proposed
for performance by the private sector employee; and
(6) in the case of an element of the intelligence community
in the Department of Defense, may not be used to circumvent
the provisions of section 2461 of title 10, United States
Code.
(h) Prohibition Against Charging Certain Costs to the
Federal Government.--A private-sector organization may not
charge an element of the intelligence community or any other
agency of the Federal Government, as direct costs under a
Federal contract, the costs of pay or benefits paid by the
organization to an employee detailed to an element of the
intelligence community under this section for the period of
the detail and any subsequent renewal periods.
(i) Additional Administrative Matters.--In carrying out
this section, the Director, pursuant to procedures developed
under subsection (a)--
(1) shall, to the degree practicable, ensure that small
business concerns are represented with respect to details
authorized by this section;
(2) may, notwithstanding any other provision of law,
establish criteria for elements of the intelligence community
to use appropriated funds to reimburse small business
concerns for the salaries and benefits of its employees
during the periods when the small business concern agrees to
detail its employees to the intelligence community under this
section;
(3) shall take into consideration the question of how
details under this section might best be used to help meet
the needs of the intelligence community, including with
respect to the training of employees;
(4) shall take into consideration areas of private-sector
expertise that are critical to the intelligence community;
and
(5) shall establish oversight mechanisms to determine
whether the public-private exchange authorized by this
section improves the efficiency and effectiveness of the
intelligence community.
(j) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Detail.--The term ``detail'' means, as appropriate in
the context in which such term is used--
[[Page H5865]]
(A) the assignment or loan of an employee of an element of
the intelligence community to a private-sector organization
without a change of position from the intelligence community
element that employs the individual; or
(B) the assignment or loan of an employee of a private-
sector organization to an element of the intelligence
community without a change of position from the private-
sector organization that employs the individual.
(2) Private-sector organization.--The term ``private-sector
organization'' means--
(A) a for-profit organization; or
(B) a not-for-profit organization.
(3) Small business concern.--The term ``small business
concern'' has the meaning given such term in section
3703(e)(2) of title 5, United States Code.
SEC. 307. ASSESSMENT OF CONTRACTING PRACTICES TO IDENTIFY
CERTAIN SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
CONCERNS.
(a) Assessment.--
(1) Contracting practices.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall conduct an assessment of the authorities,
policies, processes, and standards used by the elements of
the intelligence community to ensure that the elements
appropriately weigh security and counterintelligence risks in
awarding a contract to a contractor that--
(A) carries out any joint research and development
activities with a covered foreign country; or
(B) performs any contract or other agreement entered into
with a covered foreign country.
(2) Elements.--The assessment under paragraph (1) shall
include the following:
(A) An assessment of whether the authorities, policies,
processes, and standards specified in paragraph (1)
sufficiently identify security and counterintelligence
concerns.
(B) Identification of any authority gaps in such
authorities, policies, processes, and standards that prevent
the intelligence community from considering the activities
specified in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (1) when
evaluating offers for a contract.
(3) Consultation.--In carrying out paragraph (1), the
Director shall consult with each head of an element of the
intelligence community.
(b) Report.--
(1) Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on the
assessment under subsection (a)(1).
(2) Matters included.--The report under paragraph (1) shall
include the following:
(A) The assessment under subsection (a)(1).
(B) An identification of any known contractors that have--
(i) carried out activities specified in subparagraphs (A)
and (B) of subsection (a)(1); and
(ii) submitted an offer for a contract with an element of
the intelligence community.
(C) A description of the steps that the Director and the
heads of the elements of the intelligence community took to
identify contractors under subparagraph (B).
(3) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
(c) Covered Foreign Country Defined.--In this section, the
term ``covered foreign country'' means the government, or any
entity affiliated with the military or intelligence services
of, the following foreign countries:
(1) The People's Republic of China.
(2) The Russian Federation.
(3) The Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
(4) The Islamic Republic of Iran.
SEC. 308. REQUIRED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRIEFINGS AND
NOTIFICATIONS.
(a) Foreign Counterintelligence and Cybersecurity Threats
to Federal Election Campaigns.--
(1) Reports required.--
(A) In general.--As provided in subparagraph (B), for each
Federal election, the Director of National Intelligence, in
coordination with the Under Secretary of Homeland Security
for Intelligence and Analysis and the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, shall make publicly available on an
Internet website an advisory report on foreign
counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to election
campaigns for Federal offices. Each such report shall
include, consistent with the protection of sources and
methods, each of the following:
(i) A description of foreign counterintelligence and
cybersecurity threats to election campaigns for Federal
offices.
(ii) A summary of best practices that election campaigns
for Federal offices can employ in seeking to counter such
threats.
(iii) An identification of any publicly available
resources, including United States Government resources, for
countering such threats.
(B) Schedule for submittal.--A report under this subsection
shall be made available as follows:
(i) In the case of a report regarding an election held for
the office of Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives during 2018, not later than the date that is
60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(ii) In the case of a report regarding an election for a
Federal office during any subsequent year, not later than the
date that is 1 year before the date of the election.
(C) Information to be included.--A report under this
subsection shall reflect the most current information
available to the Director of National Intelligence regarding
foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats.
(2) Treatment of campaigns subject to heightened threats.--
If the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and
Analysis jointly determine that an election campaign for
Federal office is subject to a heightened foreign
counterintelligence or cybersecurity threat, the Director and
the Under Secretary, consistent with the protection of
sources and methods, may make available additional
information to the appropriate representatives of such
campaign.
(b) Briefings on Counterintelligence Activities of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.--
(1) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.), as amended by section 304, is
further amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
``SEC. 513. BRIEFINGS AND NOTIFICATIONS ON
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.
``(a) Quarterly Briefings.--In addition to, and without any
derogation of, the requirement under section 501 to keep the
congressional intelligence committees fully and currently
informed of the intelligence and counterintelligence
activities of the United States, not less frequently than
once each quarter, the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation shall provide to the congressional intelligence
committees a briefing on the counterintelligence activities
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Such briefings shall
include, at a minimum, an overview and update of--
``(1) the counterintelligence posture of the Bureau;
``(2) counterintelligence investigations; and
``(3) any other information relating to the
counterintelligence activities of the Bureau that the
Director determines necessary.
``(b) Notifications.--In addition to the quarterly
briefings under subsection (a), the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation shall promptly notify the
congressional intelligence committees of any
counterintelligence investigation carried out by the Bureau
with respect to any counterintelligence risk or threat that
is related to an election or campaign for Federal office.
``(c) Guidelines.--
``(1) Development and consultation.--The Director shall
develop guidelines governing the scope of the briefings
provided under subsection (a), the notifications provided
under subsection (b), and the information required by section
308(a)(2) of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019,
and 2020. The Director shall consult the congressional
intelligence committees during such development.
``(2) Submission.--The Director shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees--
``(A) the guidelines under paragraph (1) upon issuance; and
``(B) any updates to such guidelines by not later than 15
days after making such update.''.
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents at the
beginning of such Act, as amended by section 304, is further
amended by inserting after the item relating to section 512
the following new item:
``Sec. 513. Briefings and notifications on counterintelligence
activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.''.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
SEC. 401. ESTABLISHMENT OF CLIMATE SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL.
(a) Establishment.--Title I of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end
the following new section:
``SEC. 120. CLIMATE SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL.
``(a) Establishment.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall establish a Climate Security Advisory Council for the
purpose of--
``(1) assisting intelligence analysts of various elements
of the intelligence community with respect to analysis of
climate security and its impact on the areas of focus of such
analysts;
``(2) facilitating coordination between the elements of the
intelligence community and elements of the Federal Government
that are not elements of the intelligence community in
collecting data on, and conducting analysis of, climate
change and climate security; and
``(3) ensuring that the intelligence community is
adequately prioritizing climate change in carrying out its
activities.
``(b) Composition of Council.--
``(1) Members.--The Council shall be composed of the
following individuals appointed by the Director of National
Intelligence:
``(A) An appropriate official from the National
Intelligence Council, who shall chair the Council.
``(B) The lead official with respect to climate and
environmental security analysis from--
``(i) the Central Intelligence Agency;
``(ii) the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the
Department of State;
``(iii) the National Geospacial-Intelligence Agency;
``(iv) the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence
of the Department of Energy;
``(v) the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence; and
``(vi) the Defense Intelligence Agency.
``(C) Three appropriate officials from elements of the
Federal Government that are not elements of the intelligence
community that are responsible for--
``(i) providing decision-makers with a predictive
understanding of the climate;
``(ii) making observations of our Earth system that can be
used by the public, policymakers, and to support strategic
decisions; or
``(iii) coordinating Federal research and investments in
understanding the forces shaping the global environment, both
human and natural, and their impacts on society.
[[Page H5866]]
``(D) Any other officials as the Director of National
Intelligence or the chair of the Council may determine
appropriate.
``(2) Responsibilities of chair.--The chair of the Council
shall have responsibility for--
``(A) identifying agencies to supply individuals from
elements of the Federal Government that are not elements of
the intelligence community;
``(B) securing the permission of the relevant agency heads
for the participation of such individuals on the Council; and
``(C) any other duties that the Director of National
Intelligence may direct.
``(c) Duties and Responsibilities of Council.--The Council
shall carry out the following duties and responsibilities:
``(1) To meet at least quarterly to--
``(A) exchange appropriate data between elements of the
intelligence community and elements of the Federal Government
that are not elements of the intelligence community;
``(B) discuss processes for the routine exchange of such
data and implementation of such processes; and
``(C) prepare summaries of the business conducted at each
meeting.
``(2) To assess and determine best practices with respect
to the analysis of climate security, including identifying
publicly available information and intelligence acquired
through clandestine means that enables such analysis.
``(3) To assess and identify best practices with respect to
prior efforts of the intelligence community to analyze
climate security.
``(4) To assess and describe best practices for identifying
and disseminating climate security indicators and warnings;
``(5) To recommend methods of incorporating analysis of
climate security and the best practices identified under
paragraphs (2) through (4) into existing analytic training
programs.
``(6) To consult, as appropriate, with other elements of
the intelligence community that conduct analysis of climate
change or climate security and elements of the Federal
Government that are not elements of the intelligence
community that conduct analysis of climate change or climate
security, for the purpose of sharing information about
ongoing efforts and avoiding duplication of existing efforts.
``(7) To work with elements of the intelligence community
that conduct analysis of climate change or climate security
and elements of the Federal Government that are not elements
of the intelligence community that conduct analysis of
climate change or climate security--
``(A) to exchange appropriate data between such elements,
establish processes, procedures and practices for the routine
exchange of such data, discuss the implementation of such
processes; and
``(B) to enable and facilitate the sharing of findings and
analysis between such elements.
``(8) To assess whether the elements of the intelligence
community that conduct analysis of climate change or climate
security may inform the research direction of academic work
and the sponsored work of the United States Government.
``(9) At the discretion of the chair of the Council, to
convene conferences of analysts and non-intelligence
community personnel working on climate change or climate
security on subjects that the chair shall direct.
``(d) Sunset.--The Council shall terminate on the date that
is 4 years after the date of the enactment of this section.
``(e) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Climate security.--The term `climate security' means
the effects of climate change on the following:
``(A) The national security of the United States, including
national security infrastructure.
``(B) Subnational, national, and regional political
stability.
``(C) The security of allies and partners of the United
States.
``(D) Ongoing or potential political violence, including
unrest, rioting, guerrilla warfare, insurgency, terrorism,
rebellion, revolution, civil war, and interstate war.
``(2) Climate intelligence indications and warnings.--The
term `climate intelligence indications and warnings' means
developments relating to climate security with the potential
to--
``(A) imminently and substantially alter the political
stability or degree of human security in a country or region;
or
``(B) imminently and substantially threaten--
``(i) the national security of the United States;
``(ii) the military, political, or economic interests of
allies and partners of the United States; or
``(iii) citizens of the United States abroad.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first
section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by
inserting after the item relating to section 119B the
following new item:
``Sec. 120. Climate Security Advisory Council.''.
(c) Initial Appointments.--Not later than 90 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall appoint the members of the Council under
section 120 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by
subsection (a).
SEC. 402. TRANSFER OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE UNIVERSITY TO THE
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE.
(a) Transfer.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency shall transfer to the Director of
National Intelligence the National Intelligence University,
including the functions, personnel, assets, and liabilities
of the University.
(b) Degree-granting Authority.--
(1) Regulations.--Under regulations prescribed by the
Director of National Intelligence, the President of the
National Intelligence University may, upon the recommendation
of the faculty of the University, confer appropriate degrees
upon graduates who meet the degree requirements.
(2) Limitation.--A degree may not be conferred under this
section unless--
(A) the appropriate head of a Department of the Federal
Government has recommended approval of the degree in
accordance with any Federal policy applicable to the granting
of academic degrees by departments and agencies of the
Federal Government; and
(B) the University is accredited by the appropriate
civilian academic accrediting agency or organization to award
the degree, as determined by such appropriate head of a
Department.
(c) Congressional Notification Requirements.--
(1) Notification.--When seeking to establish degree-
granting authority under this section, the Director shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees--
(A) a copy of the self-assessment questionnaire required by
the Federal policy specified in subsection (b)(2)(A); and
(B) any subsequent recommendations and rationale of the
appropriate head of a Department specified in such subsection
regarding establishing such degree-granting authority.
(2) Modification.--Upon any modification or redesignation
of existing degree-granting authority, the Director shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report
containing the rationale for the proposed modification or
redesignation and any subsequent recommendation described in
paragraph (1)(B) with respect to the proposed modification or
redesignation.
(3) Actions on nonaccreditation.--The Director shall submit
to the congressional intelligence committees a report
containing an explanation of any action by the appropriate
academic accrediting agency or organization not to accredit
the University to award any new or existing degree.
(d) Conforming Repeal.--Effective 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, section 2161 of title 10, United
States Code, is repealed, and the table of sections at the
beginning of chapter 108 of such title is amended by striking
the item relating to such section 2161.
SEC. 403. DEATH BENEFITS FOR SURVIVORS OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY PERSONNEL.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) officers of the Central Intelligence Agency who die
during a period of assignment to a duty station in a foreign
country should receive death benefits, regardless of whether
the officers--
(A) were killed on or off duty;
(B) were killed due to an act of terrorism; or
(C) have surviving dependents;
(2) section 8 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 (50 U.S.C. 3510) has provided the Agency an appropriate
authority for compensating officers who die abroad who fall
into any gaps in existing death benefit regulations of the
Agency, even before the clarifying amendments made by this
Act;
(3) notwithstanding that the improved authority provided by
section 11(c) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3511(c)), as added by
subsection (e) of this section, is permissive, the Director
of the Agency should promptly use such authority to modify
the regulations on death benefits of the Agency to implement
such section 11(c);
(4) the Director should not modify such regulations in a
manner that limits or reduces the individuals covered by such
regulations as in effect on the day before the date of the
enactment of this Act; and
(5) upon modifying such regulations, the Director should
submit such regulations to the congressional intelligence
committees pursuant to section 11(b) of such Act.
(b) Clarification of Current Authority.--Section 8 of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3510) is
amended by inserting before ``rental of'' the following:
``payment of death benefits in cases in which the
circumstances of the death of an employee of the Agency is
not covered by section 11, other similar provisions of
Federal law, or any regulation issued by the Director
providing death benefits, but that the Director determines
such payment appropriate;''.
(c) Improvements to Benefits.--
(1) Requirements.--Section 11 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3511)
is amended by adding at the end the following new
subsections.
``(C) Payments.--(1) In carrying out subsection (a), the
Director may pay to the survivor of a deceased covered
individual an amount equal to one year's salary 5313 of title
5, United States Code.
``(2) A covered individual may designate one or more
persons to receive all or a portion of the amount payable to
a survivor under paragraph (1). The designation of a person
to receive a portion of the amount shall indicate the
percentage of the amount, to be specified only in 10 percent
increments, that the designated person may receive. The
balance of the amount, if any, shall be paid in accordance
with subsection (f)(2)(B).
``(d) Exception.--The Director may not make a payment under
subsection (a) if the Director determines that the death was
by reason of willful misconduct by the decedent.
``(e) Finality.--Any determination made by the Director
under this section is final and may not be reviewed.
``(f) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) The term `covered individual' means any of the
following individuals who die during a period of assignment
to a duty station in a foreign country, regardless of whether
the death is the result of injuries sustained while in the
performance of duty:
``(A) An employee of the Agency.
``(B) An employee of an element of the Federal Government
other than the Agency who is detailed or assigned to the
Agency at the time of death.
[[Page H5867]]
``(C) An individual affiliated with the Agency, as
determined by the Director.
``(2) The term `State' means each of the several States,
the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and any
territory or possession of the United States.
``(3) The term `survivor' means, with respect to the death
of a covered individual--
``(A) a person designated by the covered individual under
subsection (c)(2); or
``(B) if a covered individual does not make such a
designation--
``(i) the surviving spouse of the covered individual, if
any;
``(ii) if there is no surviving spouse, any surviving
children of the covered individual and the descendants of any
deceased children by representation;
``(iii) if there is none of the above, the surviving
parents of the covered individual or the survivor of the
parents.
``(iv) if there is none of the above, the duly-appointed
executor or administrator of the estate of the covered
individual; or
``(v) if there is none of the above, other next of kin of
the covered individual entitled under the laws of the last
State if which the covered individual was domiciled before
the covered individual's death.''.
(2) Application.--Section 11 of such Act, as amended by
paragraph (1), shall apply with respect to the following:
(A) Deaths occurring during the period beginning on
September 11, 2001, and ending on the day before the date of
the enactment of this Act for which the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency has not paid a death benefit to
the survivors of the decedent equal to or greater than the
amount specified in subsection (c)(1) of such section 11,
except that the total of any such death benefits may not
exceed such amount specified in subsection (c)(1) of such
section 11.
(B) Deaths occurring on or after the date of the enactment
of this Act.
(3) Designations.--If the Director carries out subsection
(c) of section 11 of such Act, as added by paragraph (1), the
Director shall--
(A) request all covered individuals (as defined in such
section 11) to make a designation under paragraph (2) of such
subsection (c); and
(B) ensure that any new covered individual may make such a
designation at the time at which the individual becomes a
covered individual.
(d) Briefing on Provision of VA and DOD Health Care
Services to CIA Officers.--
(1) Findings.--Congress finds that officers of the Central
Intelligence Agency--
(A) serve, and have served, overseas in dangerous areas or
austere environments;
(B) may be wounded, incur brain or psychological trauma, or
suffer from other chronic injuries as a result of such
service; and
(C) face challenges in getting the expert medical and
psychological care the officers need when the officers return
to the United States.
(2) Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the General Counsel of the Central
Intelligence Agency and the Deputy Director of the Agency for
Operations, in coordination with the Under Secretary of
Veterans Affairs for Health and the Director of the Defense
Health Agency of the Department of the Defense, shall jointly
provide to the appropriate congressional committees a
briefing on--
(A) the extent to which the Director of the Agency believes
that the officers of the Agency could benefit from health
care services provided by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs,
the Secretary of Defense, or both;
(B) the legal and policy constraints with respect to
providing such services to such officers; and
(C) recommendations with respect to the legislative or
regulatory actions that Congress, the Secretary of Veterans
Affairs, and the Secretary of Defense could implement to
facilitate the provision of such services.
(3) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--In this
subsection, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on
Veterans' Affairs of the House of Representatives; and
(C) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on
Veterans' Affairs of the Senate.
TITLE V--MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES
SEC. 501. ANNUAL REPORTS ON INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND
CAMPAIGNS IN THE UNITED STATES BY THE COMMUNIST
PARTY OF CHINA.
(a) Reports.--Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 3231 et seq.), as amended by section 2718, is
further amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
``SEC. 1106. ANNUAL REPORTS ON INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND
CAMPAIGNS IN THE UNITED STATES BY THE COMMUNIST
PARTY OF CHINA.
``(a) Requirement.--On an annual basis, consistent with the
protection of intelligence sources and methods, the Director
of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives,
and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report
on the influence operations and campaigns in the United
States conducted by the Communist Party of China.
``(b) Contents.--Each report under subsection (a) shall
include the following:
``(1) A description of the organization of the United Front
Work Department of the People's Republic of China, or the
successors of the United Front Work Department, and the links
between the United Front Work Department and the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of China.
``(2) An assessment of the degree to which organizations
that are associated with or receive funding from the United
Front Work Department, particularly such entities operating
in the United States, are formally tasked by the Chinese
Communist Party or the Government of China.
``(3) A description of the efforts by the United Front Work
Department and subsidiary organizations of the United Front
Work Department to target, coerce, and influence foreign
populations, particularly those of ethnic Chinese descent.
``(4) An assessment of attempts by the Chinese Embassy,
consulates, and organizations affiliated with the Chinese
Communist Party (including, at a minimum, the United Front
Work Department) to influence the United States-based Chinese
Student Scholar Associations.
``(5) A description of the evolution of the role of the
United Front Work Department under the leadership of the
President of China.
``(6) An assessment of the activities of the United Front
Work Department designed to influence the opinions of elected
leaders of the United States, or candidates for elections in
the United States, with respect to issues of importance to
the Chinese Communist Party.
``(7) A listing of all known organizations affiliated with
the United Front Work Department that are operating in the
United States as of the date of the report.
``(8) With respect to reports submitted after the first
report, an assessment of the change in goals, tactics,
techniques, and procedures of the influence operations and
campaigns conducted by the Chinese Communist Party.
``(c) Coordination.--In carrying out subsection (a), the
Director shall coordinate with the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security
Agency, and any other relevant head of an element of the
intelligence community.
``(d) Form.--Each report submitted under subsection (a)
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first
section of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by
section 2718, is further amended by inserting after the item
relating to section 1105 the following new item:
``Sec. 1106. Annual reports on influence operations and campaigns in
the United States by the Communist Party of China.''.
(c) Initial Report.--The Director of the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate the first report
under section 1106 of the National Security Act of 1947, as
added by subsection (a), by not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 502. REPORT ON REPRESSION OF ETHNIC MUSLIM MINORITIES IN
THE XINJIANG REGION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA.
(a) Report.--Not later than 150 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, consistent with the protection of
intelligence sources and methods, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of
the Senate a report on activity by the People's Republic of
China to repress ethnic Muslim minorities in the Xinjiang
region of China.
(b) Contents.--The report under subsection (a) shall
include the following:
(1) An assessment of the number of individuals detained in
``political reeducation camps'', and the conditions in such
camps for detainees, in the Xinjiang region of China,
including whether detainees endure torture, forced
renunciation of faith, or other mistreatment.
(2) A description, as possible, of the geographic location
of such camps.
(3) A description, as possible, of the methods used by
China to ``reeducate'' detainees and the elements of China
responsible for such ``reeducation''.
(4) A description of any forced labor in such camps, and
any labor performed in regional factories for low wages under
the threat of being sent back to ``political reeducation
camps''.
(5) An assessment of the level of access China grants to
foreign persons observing the situation in Xinjiang and a
description of measures used to impede efforts to monitor the
conditions in Xinjiang.
(6) An assessment of the surveillance, detection, and
control methods used by China to target ethnic minorities,
including new ``high-tech'' policing models and a description
of any civil liberties or privacy protections provided under
such models.
(c) Coordination.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall carry out subsection (a) in coordination with the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of
the National Security Agency, the Director of the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the head of any other
agency of the Federal Government that the Director of
National Intelligence determines appropriate.
(d) Form.--The report submitted under subsection (a) shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
SEC. 503. REPORT ON EFFORTS BY PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TO
INFLUENCE ELECTION IN TAIWAN.
(a) Report.--Consistent with section 3(c) of the Taiwan
Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3302(c)), and
consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and
methods, not later than 45 days after the date of the
election
[[Page H5868]]
for the President and Vice President of Taiwan in 2020, the
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on
any--
(1) influence operations conducted by China to interfere in
or undermine such election; and
(2) efforts by the United States to disrupt such
operations.
(b) Elements.--The report under subsection (a) shall
include the following:
(1) A description of any significant efforts by the
intelligence community to coordinate technical and material
support for Taiwan to identify, disrupt, and combat influence
operations specified in subsection (a)(1).
(2) A description of any efforts by the United States
Government to build the capacity of Taiwan to disrupt
external efforts that degrade a free and fair election
process.
(3) An assessment of whether and to what extent China
conducted influence operations specified in subsection
(a)(1), and, if such operations occurred--
(A) a comprehensive list of specific governmental and
nongovernmental entities of China that were involved in
supporting such operations and a description of the role of
each such entity; and
(B) an identification of any tactics, techniques, and
procedures used in such operations.
(c) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
SEC. 504. ASSESSMENT OF LEGITIMATE AND ILLEGITIMATE FINANCIAL
AND OTHER ASSETS OF VLADIMIR PUTIN.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the United States should do more to expose the corruption of
Vladimir Putin, whose ill-gotten wealth is perhaps the most
powerful global symbol of his dishonesty and his persistent
efforts to undermine the rule of law and democracy in the
Russian Federation.
(b) Assessment.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, consistent with the protection of
intelligence sources and methods, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees an assessment, based on all sources of
intelligence, on the net worth and financial and other
assets, legitimate as well as illegitimate, of Russian
President Vladimir Putin and his family members, including--
(1) the estimated net worth of Vladimir Putin and his
family members;
(2) a description of their legitimately and illegitimately
obtained assets, including all real, personal, and
intellectual property, bank or investment or similar
accounts, and any other financial or business interests or
holdings, including those outside of Russia;
(3) the details of the legitimately and illegitimately
obtained assets, including real, personal, and intellectual
property, bank or investment or similar accounts, and any
other financial or business interests or holdings, including
those outside of Russia, that are owned or controlled by,
accessible to, or otherwise maintained for the benefit of
Vladimir Putin, including their nature, location, manner of
acquisition, value, and publicly named owner (if other than
Vladimir Putin);
(4) the methods used by Vladimir Putin or others acting at
his direction, with his knowledge, or for his benefit, to
conceal Putin's interest in his accounts, holdings, or other
assets, including the establishment of ``front'' or shell
companies and the use of intermediaries; and
(5) an identification of the most significant senior
Russian political figures, oligarchs, and any other persons
who have engaged in activity intended to conceal the true
financial condition of Vladimir Putin.
(c) Form.--The assessment required under subsection (b)
shall be submitted either--
(1) in unclassified form to the extent consistent with the
protection of intelligence sources and methods, and may
include a classified annex; or
(2) simultaneously as both an unclassified version and a
classified version.
(d) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(1) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on
Foreign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate;
and
(2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial
Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of
Representatives.
SEC. 505. ASSESSMENTS OF INTENTIONS OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, consistent with the protection of
intelligence sources and methods, the Director of National
Intelligence, and the head of any element of the intelligence
community that the Director determines appropriate, shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees each of
the assessments described in subsection (b).
(b) Assessments Described.--The assessments described in
this subsection are assessments based on intelligence
obtained from all sources that assess the current intentions
of the political leadership of the Russian Federation with
respect to the following:
(1) Potential military action against members of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
(2) Potential responses to an enlarged United States or
NATO military presence in eastern Europe or to increased
United States military support for allies and partners in the
region, such as the provision of additional lethal military
equipment to Ukraine or Georgia.
(3) Potential actions taken for the purpose of exploiting
perceived divisions among the governments of Russia's Western
adversaries.
(c) Form.--Each assessment required under subsection (a)
may be submitted in classified form but shall also include an
unclassified executive summary, consistent with the
protection of intelligence sources and methods.
(d) Appropriate Congressional Committees.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(1) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Armed
Services of the House of Representatives; and
(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on
Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Armed Services of the
Senate.
SEC. 506. REPORT ON DEATH OF JAMAL KHASHOGGI.
(a) In General.--Not later than 30 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, consistent with the protection of
intelligence sources and methods, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of
the Senate a report on the death of Jamal Khashoggi. Such
report shall include identification of those who carried out,
participated in, ordered, or were otherwise complicit in or
responsible for the death of Jamal Khashoggi, to the extent
consistent with the protection of sources and methods.
(b) Form.--The report submitted under subsection (a) shall
be submitted in unclassified form.
TITLE VI--FEDERAL EFFORTS AGAINST DOMESTIC TERRORISM
SEC. 601. DEFINITIONS.
In this title:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the
Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee on the
Judiciary of the House of Representatives; and
(B) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee
on the Judiciary of the Senate.
(2) Domestic terrorism.--The term ``domestic terrorism''
has the meaning given that term in section 2331 of title 18,
United States Code.
(3) Hate crime.--The term ``hate crime'' means a criminal
offense under--
(A) sections 241, 245, 247, and 249 of title 18, United
States Code; and
(B) section 3631 of title 42, United States Code.
(4) International terrorism.--The term ``international
terrorism'' has the meaning given that term in section 2331
of title 18, United States Code.
(5) Terms in attorney general's guidelines for domestic fbi
operations.--The terms ``assessments'', ``full
investigations'', ``enterprise investigations'',``predicated
investigations'', and ``preliminary investigations'' have the
meanings given those terms in the most recent, approved
version of the Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic FBI
Operations (or successor).
(6) Terms in fbi budget materials.--The terms
``Consolidated Strategy Guide'', ``Field Office Strategic
Plan'', ``Integrated Program Management Process'', and
``Threat Review and Prioritization'' have the meanings given
those terms in the materials submitted to Congress by the
Attorney General in support of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation budget for fiscal year 2020.
(7) Terrorism.--The term ``terrorism'' includes domestic
terrorism and international terrorism.
(8) Terrorism information.--The term ``terrorism
information'' has the meaning given that term in section
1016(a) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485).
(9) Time utilization and recordkeeping data.--The term
``time utilization and recordkeeping data'' means data
collected on resource utilization and workload activity of
personnel of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in
accordance with Federal law.
SEC. 602. ANNUAL STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT OF AND
COMPREHENSIVE REPORT ON DOMESTIC TERRORISM.
(a) Report Required.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter through
2025, the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Under Secretary
of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis shall
jointly submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
report on domestic terrorism containing the following:
(A) Strategic intelligence assessment under subsection (b).
(B) Discussion of activities under subsection (c).
(C) Data on domestic terrorism under subsection (d).
(2) Responsibilities.--
(A) Coordination of reports and integration of
information.--The Director of National Intelligence, acting
through the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center,
shall be the lead official for coordinating the production of
and integrating terrorism information into--
(i) each report under paragraph (1); and
(ii) each strategic intelligence assessment under
subsection (b).
(B) Information sharing.--The Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and the Under Secretary of Homeland
Security for Intelligence and Analysis shall provide to the
Director of the National Counterterrorism Center all
[[Page H5869]]
appropriate information requested by the Director of the
National Counterterrorism Center to carry out this section.
(b) Strategic Intelligence Assessment.--The Director of
National Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and the Under Secretary of Homeland Security
for Intelligence and Analysis shall include--
(1) in the first report under subsection (a)(1), a
strategic intelligence assessment of domestic terrorism in
the United States during fiscal years 2017, 2018, and 2019;
and
(2) in each subsequent report under such subsection, a
strategic intelligence assessment of domestic terrorism in
the United States during the prior fiscal year.
(c) Discussion of Activities.--Each report under subsection
(a)(1) shall discuss and compare the following:
(1) The criteria for opening, managing, and closing
domestic and international terrorism investigations by the
Federal Government.
(2) Standards and procedures for the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the
Department of Homeland Security, and the National
Counterterrorism Center, with respect to the review,
prioritization, and mitigation of domestic and international
terrorism threats in the United States.
(3) The planning, development, production, analysis, and
evaluation by the United States Government of intelligence
products relating to terrorism, including both raw and
finished intelligence.
(4) The sharing of information relating to domestic and
international terrorism by and between--
(A) the Federal Government;
(B) State, local, Tribal, territorial, and foreign
governments;
(C) the appropriate congressional committees;
(D) non-governmental organizations; and
(E) the private sector.
(5) The criteria and methodology used by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of
the Department of Homeland Security, and the National
Counterterrorism Center, to identify or assign terrorism
classifications to incidents of terrorism or investigations
of terrorism, including--
(A) a comparison of the criteria and methodology used with
respect to domestic terrorism and international terrorism;
(B) the identification of any changes made to investigative
classifications; and
(C) a discussion of the rationale for any changes
identified under subparagraph (B).
(d) Data on Domestic Terrorism.--
(1) Data required.--The Director of National Intelligence,
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the
Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and
Analysis shall include in each report under subsection (a)(1)
the following data:
(A) For each completed or attempted incident of domestic
terrorism that has occurred in the United States during the
applicable period--
(i) a description of such incident;
(ii) the number and type of completed and attempted Federal
non-violent crimes committed during such incident;
(iii) the number and type of completed and attempted
Federal and State property crimes committed during such
incident, including an estimate of economic damages resulting
from such crimes; and
(iv) the number and type of completed and attempted Federal
violent crimes committed during such incident, including the
number of people injured or killed as a result of such
crimes.
(B) For the applicable period--
(i) an identification of each assessment, preliminary
investigation, full investigation, and enterprise
investigation with a nexus to domestic terrorism opened,
pending, or closed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
(ii) the number of assessments or investigations identified
under clause (i) associated with each domestic terrorism
investigative classification (including subcategories);
(iii) the number and domestic terrorism investigative
classification (including subcategories) with respect to such
investigations initiated as a result of a referral or
investigation by a State, local, Tribal, territorial, or
foreign government of a hate crime;
(iv) the number of Federal criminal charges with a nexus to
domestic terrorism, including the number of indictments and
complaints associated with each domestic terrorism
investigative classification (including subcategories), a
summary of the allegations contained in each such indictment,
the disposition of the prosecution, and, if applicable, the
sentence imposed as a result of a conviction on such charges;
(v) referrals of incidents of domestic terrorism by State,
local, Tribal, or territorial governments to departments or
agencies of the Federal Government for investigation or
prosecution, including the number of such referrals
associated with each domestic terrorism investigation
classification (including any subcategories), and a summary
of each such referral that includes the rationale for such
referral and the disposition of the applicable Federal
investigation or prosecution;
(vi) intelligence products produced by the intelligence
community relating to domestic terrorism, including--
(I) the number of such products associated with each
domestic terrorism investigative classification (including
any subcategories); and
(II) with respect to the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
at a minimum, all relevant data available through the
Integrated Program Management Process;
(vii) with respect to the National Counterterrorism Center,
the number of staff (expressed in terms of full-time
equivalents and positions) working on matters relating to
domestic terrorism described in clauses (i) through (vi); and
(viii) with respect to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation--
(I) the number of staff (expressed in terms of full-time
equivalents and positions) working on matters relating to
domestic terrorism described in clauses (i) through (vi); and
(II) a summary of time utilization and recordkeeping data
for personnel working on such matters, including the number
or percentage of such personnel associated with each domestic
terrorism investigative classification (including any
subcategories) in the FBI Headquarters Operational Divisions
and Field Divisions.
(2) Applicable period.--For purposes of this subsection,
the applicable period is the following:
(A) For the first report required under subsection (a)(1)--
(i) with respect to the data described in paragraph (1)(A)
of this subsection, the period on or after April 19, 1995;
and
(ii) with respect to the data described in paragraph (1)(B)
of this subsection, each of fiscal years 2017, 2018, and
2019.
(B) For each subsequent report required under subsection
(a)(1), the prior fiscal year.
(e) Provision of Other Documents and Materials.--
(1) In general.--Together with each report under subsection
(a)(1), the Director of National Intelligence, the Director
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Under
Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis
shall also submit to the appropriate congressional committees
the following documents and materials:
(A) With respect to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, at
a minimum, the most recent, approved versions of--
(i) the Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic FBI
Operations (or any successor);
(ii) the FBI Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide
(or any successor);
(iii) the FBI Counterterrorism Policy Guide (or any
successor);
(iv) materials relating to terrorism within the Threat
Review and Prioritization process for the headquarters and
field divisions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
(v) the Consolidated Strategy Guide (or any successor); and
(vi) the Field Office Strategic Plans (or any successor).
(B) With respect to the intelligence community, each
finished intelligence product described in subsection
(d)(1)(B)(vi).
(2) Nonduplication.--If any documents or materials required
under paragraph (1) have been previously submitted to the
appropriate congressional committees under such paragraph and
have not been modified since such submission, the Director of
National Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and the Under Secretary of Homeland Security
for Intelligence and Analysis may provide a list of such
documents or materials in lieu of making the submission under
paragraph (1) for those documents or materials.
(f) Format.--The information required under subsection (d)
may be provided in a format that uses the marking associated
with the Central Records System (or any successor system) of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(g) Classification and Public Release.--Each report under
subsection (a) shall be--
(1) unclassified, but may contain a classified annex;
(2) with respect to the unclassified portion of the report,
made available on the public internet website of the National
Counterterrorism Center in an electronic format that is fully
indexed and searchable; and
(3) with respect to a classified annex, submitted to the
appropriate congressional committees in an electronic format
that is fully indexed and searchable.
TITLE VII--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS
SEC. 701. MODIFICATION OF REQUIREMENTS FOR SUBMISSION TO
CONGRESS OF CERTAIN REPORTS.
(a) Modification of Reports Relating to Guantanamo Bay.--
(1) Modification.--Section 506I(b) of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3105(b)) is amended by striking ``once
every 6 months'' and inserting ``annually''.
(2) Modification.--Section 319(a) of the Supplemental
Appropriations Act, 2009 (10 U.S.C. 801 note) is amended by
striking ``every 90 days'' and inserting ``annually''.
(3) Repeal.--Section 601 of the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (division N of Public Law 115-31;
131 Stat. 827) is repealed.
(b) Modification to Reports on Analytic Integrity.--
Subsection (c) of section 1019 of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3364) is
amended--
(1) in the heading, by striking ``Reports'' and inserting
``Briefings''; and
(2) by striking ``submit to the congressional intelligence
committees, the heads of the relevant elements of the
intelligence community, and the heads of analytic training
departments a report containing'' and inserting ``provide to
the congressional intelligence committees, the heads of the
relevant elements of the intelligence community, and the
heads of analytic training departments a briefing with''.
(c) Repeal of Reports Relating to Intelligence Functions.--
Section 506J of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3105a) is repealed and the table of contents in the first
section of such Act is amended by striking the item relating
to section 506J.
(d) Repeal of Reports Relating to Cuba.--Section 108 of the
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of
1996 (22 U.S.C. 6038) is repealed.
(e) Repeal of Reports Relating to Entertainment Industry.--
Section 308 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2017 (50 U.S.C. 3332) is amended--
[[Page H5870]]
(1) in subsection (b)(2)--
(A) by striking ``paragraph (1) shall--'' and all that
follows through ``permit an element'' and insert ``paragraph
(1) shall permit an element'';
(B) by striking ``approval; and'' and inserting
``approval.''; and
(C) by striking subparagraph (B); and
(2) by striking subsection (c).
SEC. 702. INCREASED TRANSPARENCY REGARDING COUNTERTERRORISM
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) Consistent with section 601(a) of the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C.
3306(a)), the recent practice of the intelligence community
has been to release to the public--
(A) around the date on which the President submits to
Congress a budget for a fiscal year pursuant to section 1105
of title 31, United States Code, the ``top-line'' amount of
total funding requested for the National Intelligence Program
for such fiscal year; and
(B) the amount of requested and appropriated funds for the
National Intelligence Program and Military Intelligence
Program for certain prior fiscal years, consistent with the
protection of intelligence sources and methods.
(2) The Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning of
the National Counterterrorism Center is responsible for
producing an annual National Counterterrorism Budget report,
which examines the alignment of intelligence and other
resources in the applicable fiscal year budget with the
counterterrorism goals and areas of focus in the National
Strategy for Counterterrorism.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) despite the difficulty of compiling and releasing to
the public comprehensive information on the resource
commitments of the United States to counterterrorism
activities and programs, including with respect to such
activities and programs of the intelligence community, the
United States Government could take additional steps to
enhance the understanding of the public with respect to such
resource commitments, in a manner consistent with the
protection of intelligence sources and methods and other
national security interests; and
(2) the United States Government should release to the
public as much information as possible regarding the funding
of counterterrorism activities and programs, including
activities and programs of the intelligence community, in a
manner consistent with the protection of intelligence sources
and methods and other national security interests.
(c) Briefing on Public Release of Information.--
(1) Requirement.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and not later than 90 days after
the beginning of each fiscal year thereafter, the President
shall ensure that the congressional intelligence committees
receive a briefing from appropriate personnel of the United
States Government on the feasibility of releasing to the
public additional information relating to counterterrorism
efforts of the intelligence community.
(2) Elements.--Each briefing required by paragraph (1)
shall include a discussion of the feasibility of--
(A) subject to paragraph (3), releasing to the public the
National Counterterrorism Budget report described in
subsection (a)(2) for the prior fiscal year; and
(B) declassifying other reports, documents, or activities
of the intelligence community relating to counterterrorism
and releasing such information to the public in a manner
consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and
methods and other national security interests.
(3) Release of national counterterrorism budget report.--
The President may satisfy the requirement under paragraph
(2)(A) during a fiscal year by, not later than 90 days after
the beginning of the fiscal year, releasing to the public the
National Counterterrorism Budget report (with any redactions
the Director determines necessary to protect intelligence
sources and methods and other national security interests)
for the prior fiscal year.
SEC. 703. TASK FORCE ON ILLICIT FINANCING OF ESPIONAGE AND
FOREIGN INFLUENCE OPERATIONS.
(a) Establishment.--Not later than 30 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall establish a task force to study and assess
the illicit financing of espionage and foreign influence
operations directed at the United States.
(b) Membership.--The task force shall be composed of the
following individuals (or designees of the individual):
(1) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(3) The Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for
Intelligence and Analysis.
(4) The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and
Research.
(5) Such other heads of the elements of the intelligence
community that the Director of National Intelligence
determines appropriate.
(c) Chairperson; Meetings.--
(1) Chairperson.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall appoint a senior official within the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence to serve as the chairperson
of the task force.
(2) Meetings.--The task force shall meet regularly but not
less frequently than on a quarterly basis.
(d) Reports.--
(1) Initial report.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the task force shall submit to
the appropriate congressional committees a report on the
illicit financing of espionage and foreign influence
operations directed at the United States. The report shall
address the following:
(A) The extent of the collection by the intelligence
community, from all sources (including the governments of
foreign countries), of intelligence and information relating
to illicit financing of espionage and foreign influence
operations directed at the United States, and any gaps in
such collection.
(B) Any specific legal, regulatory, policy, or other
prohibitions, or financial, human, technical, or other
resource limitations or constraints, that have affected the
ability of the Director of National Intelligence or other
heads of relevant elements of the intelligence community in
collecting or analyzing intelligence or information relating
to illicit financing of espionage and foreign influence
operations directed at the United States.
(C) The methods, as of the date of the report, by which
hostile governments of foreign countries or foreign
organizations, and any groups or persons acting on behalf of
or with the support of such governments or organizations,
seek to disguise or obscure relationships between such
governments, organizations, groups, or persons and United
States persons, for the purpose of conducting espionage or
foreign influence operations directed at the United States,
including by exploiting financial laws, systems, or
instruments, of the United States.
(D) The existing practices of the intelligence community
for ensuring that intelligence and information relating to
the illicit financing of espionage and foreign influence
operations is analyzed and shared with other elements of the
intelligence community, and any recommendations for improving
such analysis and sharing.
(2) Annual update.--Not later than November 1, 2020, and
each year thereafter through the date specified in subsection
(e), the task force shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees an update on the report under
paragraph (1).
(3) Form.--Each report submitted under this subsection may
be submitted in classified form, but if submitted in such
form, shall include an unclassified summary.
(e) Termination.--The task force shall terminate on January
1, 2025.
(f) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means the following:
(1) The congressional intelligence committees.
(2) The Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Financial Services of the House of Representatives.
(3) The Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.
SEC. 704. STUDY ON ROLE OF RETIRED AND FORMER PERSONNEL OF
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS.
(a) Study.--The Director of National Intelligence shall
conduct a study on former intelligence personnel providing
covered intelligence assistance.
(b) Elements.--The study under subsection (a) shall include
the following:
(1) An identification of, and discussion of the
effectiveness of, existing laws, policies, procedures, and
other measures relevant to the ability of elements of the
intelligence community to prevent former intelligence
personnel from providing covered intelligence assistance--
(A) without proper authorization; or
(B) in a manner that would violate legal or policy controls
if the personnel performed such assistance while working for
the United States Government; and
(2) Make recommendations for such legislative, regulatory,
policy, or other changes as may be necessary to ensure that
the United States consistently meets the objectives described
in paragraph (1).
(c) Report and Plan.--Not later than 90 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to
the congressional intelligence committees--
(1) a report on the findings of the Director with respect
to each element of the study under subsection (a); and
(2) a plan to implement any recommendations made by the
Director that the Director may implement without changes to
Federal law.
(d) Form.--The report and plan under subsection (c) may be
submitted in classified form.
(e) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Covered intelligence assistance.--The term ``covered
intelligence assistance'' means assistance--
(A) provided by former intelligence personnel directly to,
or for the benefit of, the government of a foreign country or
indirectly to, or for the benefit of, such a government
through a company or other entity; and
(B) that relates to intelligence or law enforcement
activities of a foreign country, including with respect to
operations that involve abuses of human rights, violations of
the laws of the United States, or infringements on the
privacy rights of United States persons.
(2) Former intelligence personnel.--The term ``former
intelligence personnel'' means retired or former personnel of
the intelligence community, including civilian employees of
elements of the intelligence community, members of the Armed
Forces, and contractors of elements of the intelligence
community.
SEC. 705. REPORT BY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ON
FIFTH-GENERATION WIRELESS NETWORK TECHNOLOGY.
(a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
report on--
(1) the threat to the national security of the United
States posed by the global and regional adoption of fifth-
generation wireless network
[[Page H5871]]
(in this section referred to as ``5G wireless network'')
technology built by foreign companies; and
(2) possible efforts to mitigate the threat.
(b) Contents.--The report under subsection (a) shall
include--
(1) the timeline and scale of global and regional adoption
of foreign 5G wireless network technology;
(2) the implications of such global and regional adoption
on the cyber and espionage threat to the United States, the
interests of the United States, and the cyber and collection
capabilities of the United States; and
(3) the effect of possible mitigation efforts, including
with respect to--
(A) a policy of the United States Government promoting the
use of strong, end-to-end encryption for data transmitted
over 5G wireless networks;
(B) a policy of the United States Government promoting or
funding free, open-source implementation of 5G wireless
network technology;
(C) subsidies or incentives provided by the United States
Government that could be used to promote the adoption of
secure 5G wireless network technology developed by companies
of the United States or companies of allies of the United
States; and
(D) a strategy by the United States Government to reduce
foreign influence and political pressure in international
standard-setting bodies.
(c) Form.--The report submitted under subsection (a) shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
SEC. 706. ESTABLISHMENT OF 5G PRIZE COMPETITION.
(a) Prize Competition.--Pursuant to section 24 of the
Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980 (15 U.S.C.
3719), the Director of National Intelligence, acting through
the Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects
Agency, shall carry out a program to award prizes
competitively to stimulate research and development relevant
to 5G technology.
(b) Prize Amount.--In carrying out the program under
subsection (a), the Director may award not more than a total
of $5,000,000 to one or more winners of the prize
competition.
(c) Consultation.--In carrying out the program under
subsection (a), the Director may consult with the heads of
relevant departments and agencies of the Federal Government.
(d) 5G Technology Defined.--In this section, the term ``5G
technology'' means hardware, software, or other technologies
relating to fifth-generation wireless networks.
SEC. 707. ESTABLISHMENT OF DEEPFAKES PRIZE COMPETITION.
(a) Prize Competition.--Pursuant to section 24 of the
Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980 (15 U.S.C.
3719), the Director of National Intelligence, acting through
the Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects
Agency, shall carry out a program to award prizes
competitively to stimulate the research, development, or
commercialization of technologies to automatically detect
machine-manipulated media.
(b) Prize Amount.--In carrying out the program under
subsection (a), the Director may award not more than a total
of $5,000,000 to one or more winners of the prize
competition.
(c) Consultation.--In carrying out the program under
subsection (a), the Director may consult with the heads of
relevant departments and agencies of the Federal Government.
(d) Machine-manipulated Media Defined.--In this section,
the term ``machine-manipulated media'' means video, image, or
audio recordings generated or substantially modified using
machine-learning techniques in order to falsely depict
events, to falsely depict the speech or conduct of an
individual, or to depict individuals who do not exist.
DIVISION B--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR FISCAL YEARS 2018 AND 2019
TITLE XXI--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 2101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
(a) Fiscal Year 2019.--Funds are hereby authorized to be
appropriated for fiscal year 2019 for the conduct of the
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the
following elements of the United States Government:
(1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(3) The Department of Defense.
(4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(5) The National Security Agency.
(6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force.
(7) The Coast Guard.
(8) The Department of State.
(9) The Department of the Treasury.
(10) The Department of Energy.
(11) The Department of Justice.
(12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
(14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(16) The Department of Homeland Security.
(b) Fiscal Year 2018.--Funds that were appropriated for
fiscal year 2018 for the conduct of the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the elements of the United
States set forth in subsection (a) are hereby authorized.
SEC. 2102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts.--The amounts authorized to
be appropriated under section 2101 for the conduct of the
intelligence activities of the elements listed in paragraphs
(1) through (16) of section 2101, are those specified in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany
this Act.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of
Authorizations.--
(1) Availability.--The classified Schedule of
Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made
available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate,
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives, and to the President.
(2) Distribution by the president.--Subject to paragraph
(3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of
the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in
subsection (a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule,
within the executive branch.
(3) Limits on disclosure.--The President shall not publicly
disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any
portion of such Schedule except--
(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C.
3306(a));
(B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or
(C) as otherwise required by law.
SEC. 2103. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management
Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal
year 2019 the sum of $522,424,000.
(b) Classified Authorization of Appropriations.--In
addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the
Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a),
there are authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence
Community Management Account for fiscal year 2019 such
additional amounts as are specified in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 2102(a).
TITLE XXII--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY
SYSTEM
SEC. 2201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund
$514,000,000 for fiscal year 2019.
SEC. 2202. COMPUTATION OF ANNUITIES FOR EMPLOYEES OF THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
(a) Computation of Annuities.--
(1) In general.--Section 221 of the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2031) is amended--
(A) in subsection (a)(3)(B), by striking the period at the
end and inserting ``, as determined by using the annual rate
of basic pay that would be payable for full-time service in
that position.'';
(B) in subsection (b)(1)(C)(i), by striking ``12-month''
and inserting ``2-year'';
(C) in subsection (f)(2), by striking ``one year'' and
inserting ``two years'';
(D) in subsection (g)(2), by striking ``one year'' each
place such term appears and inserting ``two years'';
(E) by redesignating subsections (h), (i), (j), (k), and
(l) as subsections (i), (j), (k), (l), and (m), respectively;
and
(F) by inserting after subsection (g) the following:
``(h) Conditional Election of Insurable Interest Survivor
Annuity by Participants Married at the Time of Retirement.--
``(1) Authority to make designation.--Subject to the
rights of former spouses under subsection (b) and section
222, at the time of retirement a married participant found by
the Director to be in good health may elect to receive an
annuity reduced in accordance with subsection (f)(1)(B) and
designate in writing an individual having an insurable
interest in the participant to receive an annuity under the
system after the participant's death, except that any such
election to provide an insurable interest survivor annuity to
the participant's spouse shall only be effective if the
participant's spouse waives the spousal right to a survivor
annuity under this Act. The amount of the annuity shall be
equal to 55 percent of the participant's reduced annuity.
``(2) Reduction in participant's annuity.--The annuity
payable to the participant making such election shall be
reduced by 10 percent of an annuity computed under subsection
(a) and by an additional 5 percent for each full 5 years the
designated individual is younger than the participant. The
total reduction under this subparagraph may not exceed 40
percent.
``(3) Commencement of survivor annuity.--The annuity
payable to the designated individual shall begin on the day
after the retired participant dies and terminate on the last
day of the month before the designated individual dies.
``(4) Recomputation of participant's annuity on death of
designated individual.--An annuity that is reduced under this
subsection shall, effective the first day of the month
following the death of the designated individual, be
recomputed and paid as if the annuity had not been so
reduced.''.
(2) Conforming amendments.--
(A) Central intelligence agency retirement act.--The
Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2001 et
seq.) is amended--
(i) in section 232(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 2052(b)(1)), by
striking ``221(h),'' and inserting ``221(i),''; and
(ii) in section 252(h)(4) (50 U.S.C. 2082(h)(4)), by
striking ``221(k)'' and inserting ``221(l)''.
(B) Central intelligence agency act of 1949.--Subsection
(a) of section 14 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 (50 U.S.C. 3514(a)) is amended by striking ``221(h)(2),
221(i), 221(l),'' and inserting ``221(i)(2), 221(j),
221(m),''.
[[Page H5872]]
(b) Annuities for Former Spouses.--Subparagraph (B) of
section 222(b)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2032(b)(5)(B)) is amended by
striking ``one year'' and inserting ``two years''.
(c) Prior Service Credit.--Subparagraph (A) of section
252(b)(3) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act
(50 U.S.C. 2082(b)(3)(A)) is amended by striking ``October 1,
1990'' both places that term appears and inserting ``March
31, 1991''.
(d) Reemployment Compensation.--Section 273 of the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2113) is
amended--
(1) by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections
(c) and (d), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following:
``(b) Part-Time Reemployed Annuitants.--The Director shall
have the authority to reemploy an annuitant on a part-time
basis in accordance with section 8344(l) of title 5, United
States Code.''.
(e) Effective Date and Application.--The amendments made by
subsection (a)(1)(A) and subsection (c) shall take effect as
if enacted on October 28, 2009, and shall apply to
computations or participants, respectively, as of such date.
TITLE XXIII--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
SEC. 2301. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this division shall
not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any
intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by
the Constitution or the laws of the United States.
SEC. 2302. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this division for salary, pay,
retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be
increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may
be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits
authorized by law.
SEC. 2303. MODIFICATION OF SPECIAL PAY AUTHORITY FOR SCIENCE,
TECHNOLOGY, ENGINEERING, OR MATHEMATICS
POSITIONS AND ADDITION OF SPECIAL PAY AUTHORITY
FOR CYBER POSITIONS.
Section 113B of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3049a) is amended--
(1) by amending subsection (a) to read as follows:
``(a) Special Rates of Pay for Positions Requiring
Expertise in Science, Technology, Engineering, or
Mathematics.--
``(1) In general.--Notwithstanding part III of title 5,
United States Code, the head of each element of the
intelligence community may, for 1 or more categories of
positions in such element that require expertise in science,
technology, engineering, or mathematics--
``(A) establish higher minimum rates of pay; and
``(B) make corresponding increases in all rates of pay of
the pay range for each grade or level, subject to subsection
(b) or (c), as applicable.
``(2) Treatment.--The special rate supplements resulting
from the establishment of higher rates under paragraph (1)
shall be basic pay for the same or similar purposes as those
specified in section 5305(j) of title 5, United States
Code.'';
(2) by redesignating subsections (b) through (f) as
subsections (c) through (g), respectively;
(3) by inserting after subsection (a) the following:
``(b) Special Rates of Pay for Cyber Positions.--
``(1) In general.--Notwithstanding subsection (c), the
Director of the National Security Agency may establish a
special rate of pay--
``(A) not to exceed the rate of basic pay payable for level
II of the Executive Schedule under section 5313 of title 5,
United States Code, if the Director certifies to the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, in consultation with
the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness,
that the rate of pay is for positions that perform functions
that execute the cyber mission of the Agency; or
``(B) not to exceed the rate of basic pay payable for the
Vice President of the United States under section 104 of
title 3, United States Code, if the Director certifies to the
Secretary of Defense, by name, individuals that have advanced
skills and competencies and that perform critical functions
that execute the cyber mission of the Agency.
``(2) Pay limitation.--Employees receiving a special rate
under paragraph (1) shall be subject to an aggregate pay
limitation that parallels the limitation established in
section 5307 of title 5, United States Code, except that--
``(A) any allowance, differential, bonus, award, or other
similar cash payment in addition to basic pay that is
authorized under title 10, United States Code, (or any other
applicable law in addition to title 5 of such Code, excluding
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.))
shall also be counted as part of aggregate compensation; and
``(B) aggregate compensation may not exceed the rate
established for the Vice President of the United States under
section 104 of title 3, United States Code.
``(3) Limitation on number of recipients.--The number of
individuals who receive basic pay established under paragraph
(1)(B) may not exceed 100 at any time.
``(4) Limitation on use as comparative reference.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, special rates of
pay and the limitation established under paragraph (1)(B) may
not be used as comparative references for the purpose of
fixing the rates of basic pay or maximum pay limitations of
qualified positions under section 1599f of title 10, United
States Code, or section 226 of the Homeland Security Act of
2002 (6 U.S.C. 147).'';
(4) in subsection (c), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by
striking ``A minimum'' and inserting ``Except as provided in
subsection (b), a minimum'';
(5) in subsection (d), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by
inserting ``or (b)'' after ``by subsection (a)''; and
(6) in subsection (g), as redesignated by paragraph (2)--
(A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``Not later than 90 days
after the date of the enactment of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017'' and inserting ``Not
later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of the
Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019''; and
(B) in paragraph (2)(A), by inserting ``or (b)'' after
``subsection (a)''.
SEC. 2304. MODIFICATION OF APPOINTMENT OF CHIEF INFORMATION
OFFICER OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
Section 103G(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3032(a)) is amended by striking ``President'' and
inserting ``Director''.
SEC. 2305. DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REVIEW OF
PLACEMENT OF POSITIONS WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY ON THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE.
(a) Review.--The Director of National Intelligence, in
coordination with the Director of the Office of Personnel
Management, shall conduct a review of positions within the
intelligence community regarding the placement of such
positions on the Executive Schedule under subchapter II of
chapter 53 of title 5, United States Code. In carrying out
such review, the Director of National Intelligence, in
coordination with the Director of the Office of Personnel
Management, shall determine--
(1) the standards under which such review will be
conducted;
(2) which positions should or should not be on the
Executive Schedule; and
(3) for those positions that should be on the Executive
Schedule, the level of the Executive Schedule at which such
positions should be placed.
(b) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the date on which
the review under subsection (a) is completed, the Director of
National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees, the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, and the Committee on
Oversight and Reform of the House of Representatives an
unredacted report describing the standards by which the
review was conducted and the outcome of the review.
SEC. 2306. SUPPLY CHAIN AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE RISK
MANAGEMENT TASK FORCE.
(a) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means the following:
(1) The congressional intelligence committees.
(2) The Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate.
(3) The Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Homeland Security, and the Committee on Oversight and Reform
of the House of Representatives.
(b) Requirement to Establish.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall establish a Supply Chain and
Counterintelligence Risk Management Task Force to standardize
information sharing between the intelligence community and
the acquisition community of the United States Government
with respect to the supply chain and counterintelligence
risks.
(c) Members.--The Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk
Management Task Force established under subsection (b) shall
be composed of--
(1) a representative of the Defense Security Service of the
Department of Defense;
(2) a representative of the General Services
Administration;
(3) a representative of the Office of Federal Procurement
Policy of the Office of Management and Budget;
(4) a representative of the Department of Homeland
Security;
(5) a representative of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation;
(6) the Director of the National Counterintelligence and
Security Center; and
(7) any other members the Director of National Intelligence
determines appropriate.
(d) Security Clearances.--Each member of the Supply Chain
and Counterintelligence Risk Management Task Force
established under subsection (b) shall have a security
clearance at the top secret level and be able to access
sensitive compartmented information.
(e) Annual Report.--The Supply Chain and
Counterintelligence Risk Management Task Force established
under subsection (b) shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees an annual report that describes the
activities of the Task Force during the previous year,
including identification of the supply chain and
counterintelligence risks shared with the acquisition
community of the United States Government by the intelligence
community.
SEC. 2307. CONSIDERATION OF ADVERSARIAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
AND CYBERSECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE WHEN SHARING
INTELLIGENCE WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND
ENTITIES.
Whenever the head of an element of the intelligence
community enters into an intelligence sharing agreement with
a foreign government or any other foreign entity, the head of
the element shall consider the pervasiveness of
telecommunications and cybersecurity infrastructure,
equipment, and services provided by adversaries of the United
States, particularly China
[[Page H5873]]
and Russia, or entities of such adversaries in the country or
region of the foreign government or other foreign entity
entering into the agreement.
SEC. 2308. CYBER PROTECTION SUPPORT FOR THE PERSONNEL OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN POSITIONS HIGHLY
VULNERABLE TO CYBER ATTACK.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Personal accounts.--The term ``personal accounts''
means accounts for online and telecommunications services,
including telephone, residential Internet access, email, text
and multimedia messaging, cloud computing, social media,
health care, and financial services, used by personnel of the
intelligence community outside of the scope of their
employment with elements of the intelligence community.
(2) Personal technology devices.--The term ``personal
technology devices'' means technology devices used by
personnel of the intelligence community outside of the scope
of their employment with elements of the intelligence
community, including networks to which such devices connect.
(b) Authority to Provide Cyber Protection Support.--
(1) In general.--Subject to a determination by the Director
of National Intelligence, the Director may provide cyber
protection support for the personal technology devices and
personal accounts of the personnel described in paragraph
(2).
(2) At-risk personnel.--The personnel described in this
paragraph are personnel of the intelligence community--
(A) who the Director determines to be highly vulnerable to
cyber attacks and hostile information collection activities
because of the positions occupied by such personnel in the
intelligence community; and
(B) whose personal technology devices or personal accounts
are highly vulnerable to cyber attacks and hostile
information collection activities.
(c) Nature of Cyber Protection Support.--Subject to the
availability of resources, the cyber protection support
provided to personnel under subsection (b) may include
training, advice, assistance, and other services relating to
cyber attacks and hostile information collection activities.
(d) Limitation on Support.--Nothing in this section shall
be construed--
(1) to encourage personnel of the intelligence community to
use personal technology devices for official business; or
(2) to authorize cyber protection support for senior
intelligence community personnel using personal devices,
networks, and personal accounts in an official capacity.
(e) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on the
provision of cyber protection support under subsection (b).
The report shall include--
(1) a description of the methodology used to make the
determination under subsection (b)(2); and
(2) guidance for the use of cyber protection support and
tracking of support requests for personnel receiving cyber
protection support under subsection (b).
SEC. 2309. ELIMINATION OF SUNSET OF AUTHORITY RELATING TO
MANAGEMENT OF SUPPLY-CHAIN RISK.
Section 309 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-87; 50 U.S.C. 3329 note) is
amended by striking subsection (g).
SEC. 2310. LIMITATIONS ON DETERMINATIONS REGARDING CERTAIN
SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONS.
(a) Prohibition.--An officer of an element of the
intelligence community who has been nominated by the
President for a position that requires the advice and consent
of the Senate may not make a classification decision with
respect to information related to such officer's nomination.
(b) Classification Determinations.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), in a
case in which an officer described in subsection (a) has been
nominated as described in such subsection and classification
authority rests with the officer or another officer who
reports directly to such officer, a classification decision
with respect to information relating to the officer shall be
made by the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) Nominations of director of national intelligence.--In a
case described in paragraph (1) in which the officer
nominated is the Director of National Intelligence, the
classification decision shall be made by the Principal Deputy
Director of National Intelligence.
(c) Reports.--Whenever the Director or the Principal Deputy
Director makes a decision under subsection (b), the Director
or the Principal Deputy Director, as the case may be, shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report
detailing the reasons for the decision.
SEC. 2311. JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COUNCIL.
(a) Meetings.--Section 101A(d) of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3022(d)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``regular''; and
(2) by inserting ``as the Director considers appropriate''
after ``Council''.
(b) Report on Function and Utility of the Joint
Intelligence Community Council.--
(1) In general.--No later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence, in coordination with the Executive Office of
the President and members of the Joint Intelligence Community
Council, shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report on the function and utility of the Joint
Intelligence Community Council.
(2) Contents.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall
include the following:
(A) The number of physical or virtual meetings held by the
Council per year since the Council's inception.
(B) A description of the effect and accomplishments of the
Council.
(C) An explanation of the unique role of the Council
relative to other entities, including with respect to the
National Security Council and the Executive Committee of the
intelligence community.
(D) Recommendations for the future role and operation of
the Council.
(E) Such other matters relating to the function and utility
of the Council as the Director considers appropriate.
(3) Form.--The report submitted under paragraph (1) shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
SEC. 2312. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
ENVIRONMENT.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Core service.--The term ``core service'' means a
capability that is available to multiple elements of the
intelligence community and required for consistent operation
of the intelligence community information technology
environment.
(2) Intelligence community information technology
environment.--The term ``intelligence community information
technology environment'' means all of the information
technology services across the intelligence community,
including the data sharing and protection environment across
multiple classification domains.
(b) Roles and Responsibilities.--
(1) Director of national intelligence.--The Director of
National Intelligence shall be responsible for coordinating
the performance by elements of the intelligence community of
the intelligence community information technology
environment, including each of the following:
(A) Ensuring compliance with all applicable environment
rules and regulations of such environment.
(B) Ensuring measurable performance goals exist for such
environment.
(C) Documenting standards and practices of such
environment.
(D) Acting as an arbiter among elements of the intelligence
community related to any disagreements arising out of the
implementation of such environment.
(E) Delegating responsibilities to the elements of the
intelligence community and carrying out such other
responsibilities as are necessary for the effective
implementation of such environment.
(2) Core service providers.--Providers of core services
shall be responsible for--
(A) providing core services, in coordination with the
Director of National Intelligence; and
(B) providing the Director with information requested and
required to fulfill the responsibilities of the Director
under paragraph (1).
(3) Use of core services.--
(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B),
each element of the intelligence community shall use core
services when such services are available.
(B) Exception.--The Director of National Intelligence may
provide for a written exception to the requirement under
subparagraph (A) if the Director determines there is a
compelling financial or mission need for such exception.
(c) Management Accountability.--Not later than 90 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of
National Intelligence shall designate and maintain one or
more accountable executives of the intelligence community
information technology environment to be responsible for--
(1) management, financial control, and integration of such
environment;
(2) overseeing the performance of each core service,
including establishing measurable service requirements and
schedules;
(3) to the degree feasible, ensuring testing of each core
service of such environment, including testing by the
intended users, to evaluate performance against measurable
service requirements and to ensure the capability meets user
requirements; and
(4) coordinate transition or restructuring efforts of such
environment, including phaseout of legacy systems.
(d) Security Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall develop and maintain a security plan for
the intelligence community information technology
environment.
(e) Long-term Roadmap.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, and during each of the
second and fourth fiscal quarters thereafter, the Director of
National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a long-term roadmap that shall
include each of the following:
(1) A description of the minimum required and desired core
service requirements, including--
(A) key performance parameters; and
(B) an assessment of current, measured performance.
(2) implementation milestones for the intelligence
community information technology environment, including each
of the following:
(A) A schedule for expected deliveries of core service
capabilities during each of the following phases:
(i) Concept refinement and technology maturity
demonstration.
(ii) Development, integration, and demonstration.
(iii) Production, deployment, and sustainment.
(iv) System retirement.
[[Page H5874]]
(B) Dependencies of such core service capabilities.
(C) Plans for the transition or restructuring necessary to
incorporate core service capabilities.
(D) A description of any legacy systems and discontinued
capabilities to be phased out.
(3) Such other matters as the Director determines
appropriate.
(f) Business Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, and during each of the second
and fourth fiscal quarters thereafter, the Director of
National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a business plan that includes each of
the following:
(1) A systematic approach to identify core service funding
requests for the intelligence community information
technology environment within the proposed budget, including
multiyear plans to implement the long-term roadmap required
by subsection (e).
(2) A uniform approach by which each element of the
intelligence community shall identify the cost of legacy
information technology or alternative capabilities where
services of the intelligence community information technology
environment will also be available.
(3) A uniform effort by which each element of the
intelligence community shall identify transition and
restructuring costs for new, existing, and retiring services
of the intelligence community information technology
environment, as well as services of such environment that
have changed designations as a core service.
(g) Quarterly Presentations.--Beginning not later than 180
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Director of National Intelligence shall provide to the
congressional intelligence committees quarterly updates
regarding ongoing implementation of the intelligence
community information technology environment as compared to
the requirements in the most recently submitted security plan
required by subsection (d), long-term roadmap required by
subsection (e), and business plan required by subsection (f).
(h) Additional Notifications.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall provide timely notification to the
congressional intelligence committees regarding any policy
changes related to or affecting the intelligence community
information technology environment, new initiatives or
strategies related to or impacting such environment, and
changes or deficiencies in the execution of the security plan
required by subsection (d), long-term roadmap required by
subsection (e), and business plan required by subsection (f).
(i) Sunset.--The section shall have no effect on or after
September 30, 2024.
SEC. 2313. REPORT ON DEVELOPMENT OF SECURE MOBILE VOICE
SOLUTION FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the National
Security Agency, shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a classified report on the
feasibility, desirability, cost, and required schedule
associated with the implementation of a secure mobile voice
solution for the intelligence community.
(b) Contents.--The report required by subsection (a) shall
include, at a minimum, the following:
(1) The benefits and disadvantages of a secure mobile voice
solution.
(2) Whether the intelligence community could leverage
commercially available technology for classified voice
communications that operates on commercial mobile networks in
a secure manner and identifying the accompanying security
risks to such networks.
(3) A description of any policies or community guidance
that would be necessary to govern the potential solution,
such as a process for determining the appropriate use of a
secure mobile telephone and any limitations associated with
such use.
SEC. 2314. POLICY ON MINIMUM INSIDER THREAT STANDARDS.
(a) Policy Required.--Not later than 60 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall establish a policy for minimum insider
threat standards that is consistent with the National Insider
Threat Policy and Minimum Standards for Executive Branch
Insider Threat Programs.
(b) Implementation.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the head of each element of the
intelligence community shall implement the policy established
under subsection (a).
SEC. 2315. SUBMISSION OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY POLICIES.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Electronic repository.--The term ``electronic
repository'' means the electronic distribution mechanism, in
use as of the date of the enactment of this Act, or any
successor electronic distribution mechanism, by which the
Director of National Intelligence submits to the
congressional intelligence committees information.
(2) Policy.--The term ``policy'', with respect to the
intelligence community, includes unclassified or classified--
(A) directives, policy guidance, and policy memoranda of
the intelligence community;
(B) executive correspondence of the Director of National
Intelligence; and
(C) any equivalent successor policy instruments.
(b) Submission of Policies.--
(1) Current policy.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees using the electronic repository all nonpublicly
available policies issued by the Director of National
Intelligence for the intelligence community that are in
effect as of the date of the submission.
(2) Continuous updates.--Not later than 15 days after the
date on which the Director of National Intelligence issues,
modifies, or rescinds a policy of the intelligence community,
the Director shall--
(A) notify the congressional intelligence committees of
such addition, modification, or removal; and
(B) update the electronic repository with respect to such
addition, modification, or removal.
SEC. 2316. EXPANSION OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY RECRUITMENT
EFFORTS.
In order to further increase the diversity of the
intelligence community workforce, not later than 90 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of
National Intelligence, in consultation with heads of elements
of the Intelligence Community, shall create, implement, and
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a written
plan to ensure that rural and underrepresented regions are
more fully and consistently represented in such elements'
employment recruitment efforts. Upon receipt of the plan, the
congressional committees shall have 60 days to submit
comments to the Director of National Intelligence before such
plan shall be implemented.
TITLE XXIV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
SEC. 2401. AUTHORITY FOR PROTECTION OF CURRENT AND FORMER
EMPLOYEES OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
Section 5(a)(4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 (50 U.S.C. 3506(a)(4)) is amended by striking ``such
personnel of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence as the Director of National Intelligence may
designate;'' and inserting ``current and former personnel of
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and their
immediate families as the Director of National Intelligence
may designate;''.
SEC. 2402. DESIGNATION OF THE PROGRAM MANAGER-INFORMATION
SHARING ENVIRONMENT.
(a) Information Sharing Environment.--Section 1016(b) of
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
(6 U.S.C. 485(b)) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``President'' and
inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``President'' both places
that term appears and inserting ``Director of National
Intelligence''.
(b) Program Manager.--Section 1016(f)(1) of the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6
U.S.C. 485(f)(1)) is amended by striking ``The individual
designated as the program manager shall serve as program
manager until removed from service or replaced by the
President (at the President's sole discretion).'' and
inserting ``Beginning on the date of the enactment of the
Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019 and 2020, each
individual designated as the program manager shall be
appointed by the Director of National Intelligence.''.
SEC. 2403. TECHNICAL MODIFICATION TO THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE.
Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the end the following:
``Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security
Center.''.
SEC. 2404. CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER OF THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.
Section 103I(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3034(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following
new sentence: ``The Chief Financial Officer shall report
directly to the Director of National Intelligence.''.
SEC. 2405. CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER OF THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.
Section 103G(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3032(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following
new sentence: ``The Chief Information Officer shall report
directly to the Director of National Intelligence.''.
Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency
SEC. 2411. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SUBSISTENCE FOR
PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO AUSTERE LOCATIONS.
Subsection (a) of section 5 of the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3506) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``(50 U.S.C. 403-4a).,''
and inserting ``(50 U.S.C. 403-4a),'';
(2) in paragraph (6), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(3) in paragraph (7), by striking the period at the end and
inserting ``; and''; and
(4) by adding at the end the following new paragraph (8):
``(8) Upon the approval of the Director, provide, during
any fiscal year, with or without reimbursement, subsistence
to any personnel assigned to an overseas location designated
by the Agency as an austere location.''.
SEC. 2412. SPECIAL RULES FOR CERTAIN MONTHLY WORKERS'
COMPENSATION PAYMENTS AND OTHER PAYMENTS FOR
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY PERSONNEL.
(a) In General.--The Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 (50 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) is amended by inserting after
section 19 the following new section:
``SEC. 19A. SPECIAL RULES FOR CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS INJURED BY
REASON OF WAR, INSURGENCY, HOSTILE ACT, OR
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.
``(a) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Covered dependent.--The term `covered dependent'
means a family member (as defined
[[Page H5875]]
by the Director) of a covered employee who, on or after
September 11, 2001--
``(A) accompanies the covered employee to an assigned duty
station in a foreign country; and
``(B) becomes injured by reason of a qualifying injury.
``(2) Covered employee.--The term `covered employee' means
an officer or employee of the Central Intelligence Agency
who, on or after September 11, 2001, becomes injured by
reason of a qualifying injury.
``(3) Covered individual.--The term `covered individual'
means an individual who--
``(A)(i) is detailed to the Central Intelligence Agency
from other agencies of the United States Government or from
the Armed Forces; or
``(ii) is affiliated with the Central Intelligence Agency,
as determined by the Director; and
``(B) who, on or after September 11, 2001, becomes injured
by reason of a qualifying injury.
``(4) Qualifying injury.--The term `qualifying injury'
means the following:
``(A) With respect to a covered dependent, an injury
incurred--
``(i) during a period in which the covered dependent is
accompanying the covered employee to an assigned duty station
in a foreign country;
``(ii) in connection with war, insurgency, hostile act,
terrorist activity, or other incident designated by the
Director; and
``(iii) that was not the result of the willful misconduct
of the covered dependent.
``(B) With respect to a covered employee or a covered
individual, an injury incurred--
``(i) during a period of assignment to a duty station in a
foreign country;
``(ii) in connection with a war, insurgency, hostile act,
terrorist activity, or other incident designated by the
Director; and
``(iii) that was not the result of the willful misconduct
of the covered employee or the covered individual.
``(b) Adjustment of Compensation for Certain Injuries.--
``(1) Increase.--The Director may increase the amount of
monthly compensation paid to a covered employee under section
8105 of title 5, United States Code. Subject to paragraph
(2), the Director may determine the amount of each such
increase by taking into account--
``(A) the severity of the qualifying injury;
``(B) the circumstances by which the covered employee
became injured; and
``(C) the seniority of the covered employee.
``(2) Maximum.--Notwithstanding chapter 81 of title 5,
United States Code, the total amount of monthly compensation
increased under paragraph (1) may not exceed the monthly pay
of the maximum rate of basic pay for GS-15 of the General
Schedule under section 5332 of such title.
``(c) Costs for Treating Qualifying Injuries.--The Director
may pay the costs of treating a qualifying injury of a
covered employee, a covered individual, or a covered
dependent, or may reimburse a covered employee, a covered
individual, or a covered dependent for such costs, that are
not otherwise covered by chapter 81 of title 5, United States
Code, or other provision of Federal law.
``(d) Treatment of Amounts.--For purposes of section 104 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, amounts paid pursuant to
this section shall be treated as amounts paid under chapter
81 of title 5, United States Code.''.
(b) Regulations.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency shall--
(1) prescribe regulations ensuring the fair and equitable
implementation of section 19A of the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949, as added by subsection (a); and
(2) submit to the congressional intelligence committees
such regulations.
(c) Application.--Section 19A of the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949, as added by subsection (a), shall apply
with respect to--
(1) payments made to covered employees (as defined in such
section) under section 8105 of title 5, United States Code,
beginning on or after the date of the enactment of this Act;
and
(2) treatment described in subsection (b) of such section
19A occurring on or after the date of the enactment of this
Act.
SEC. 2413. EXPANSION OF SECURITY PROTECTIVE SERVICE
JURISDICTION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY.
Subsection (a)(1) of section 15 of the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3515(a)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``500 feet;'' and
inserting ``500 yards;''; and
(2) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``500 feet.'' and
inserting ``500 yards.''.
SEC. 2414. REPEAL OF FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY REQUIREMENT
FOR CERTAIN SENIOR LEVEL POSITIONS IN THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
(a) Repeal of Foreign Language Proficiency Requirement.--
Section 104A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3036) is amended by striking subsection (g).
(b) Conforming Repeal of Report Requirement.--Section 611
of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005
(Public Law 108-487) is amended by striking subsection (c).
Subtitle C--Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of
Department of Energy
SEC. 2421. CONSOLIDATION OF DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OFFICES OF
INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.
(a) In General.--Section 215 of the Department of Energy
Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7144b) is amended to read as
follows:
``office of intelligence and counterintelligence
``Sec. 215. (a) Definitions.--In this section, the terms
`intelligence community' and `National Intelligence Program'
have the meanings given such terms in section 3 of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
``(b) In General.--There is in the Department an Office of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence. Such office shall be
under the National Intelligence Program.
``(c) Director.--(1) The head of the Office shall be the
Director of the Office of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence, who shall be an employee in the Senior
Executive Service, the Senior Intelligence Service, the
Senior National Intelligence Service, or any other Service
that the Secretary, in coordination with the Director of
National Intelligence, considers appropriate. The Director of
the Office shall report directly to the Secretary.
``(2) The Secretary shall select an individual to serve as
the Director from among individuals who have substantial
expertise in matters relating to the intelligence community,
including foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.
``(d) Duties.--(1) Subject to the authority, direction, and
control of the Secretary, the Director shall perform such
duties and exercise such powers as the Secretary may
prescribe.
``(2) The Director shall be responsible for establishing
policy for intelligence and counterintelligence programs and
activities at the Department.''.
(b) Conforming Repeal.--Section 216 of the Department of
Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7144c) is hereby repealed.
(c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents at the
beginning of the Department of Energy Organization Act is
amended by striking the items relating to sections 215 and
216 and inserting the following new item:
``Sec. 215. Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence.''.
SEC. 2422. ESTABLISHMENT OF ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY
CENTER.
Section 215 of the Department of Energy Organization Act
(42 U.S.C. 7144b), as amended by section 2421, is further
amended by adding at the end the following:
``(e) Energy Infrastructure Security Center.--(1)(A) The
President shall establish an Energy Infrastructure Security
Center, taking into account all appropriate government tools
to analyze and disseminate intelligence relating to the
security of the energy infrastructure of the United States.
``(B) The Director of Intelligence and Counterintelligence
shall appoint the head of the Energy Infrastructure Security
Center.
``(C) The Energy Infrastructure Security Center shall be
located within the Office of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence.
``(2) In establishing the Energy Infrastructure Security
Center, the Director of the Office of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence shall address the following missions and
objectives to coordinate and disseminate intelligence
relating to the security of the energy infrastructure of the
United States:
``(A) Establishing a primary organization within the United
States Government for analyzing and integrating all
intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States
pertaining to the security of the energy infrastructure of
the United States.
``(B) Ensuring that appropriate departments and agencies
have full access to and receive intelligence support needed
to execute the plans or activities of the agencies, and
perform independent, alternative analyses.
``(C) Establishing a central repository on known and
suspected foreign threats to the energy infrastructure of the
United States, including with respect to any individuals,
groups, or entities engaged in activities targeting such
infrastructure, and the goals, strategies, capabilities, and
networks of such individuals, groups, or entities.
``(D) Disseminating intelligence information relating to
the security of the energy infrastructure of the United
States, including threats and analyses, to the President, to
the appropriate departments and agencies, and to the
appropriate committees of Congress.
``(3) The President may waive the requirements of this
subsection, and any parts thereof, if the President
determines that such requirements do not materially improve
the ability of the United States Government to prevent and
halt attacks against the energy infrastructure of the United
States. Such waiver shall be made in writing to Congress and
shall include a description of how the missions and
objectives in paragraph (2) are being met.
``(4) If the President decides not to exercise the waiver
authority granted by paragraph (3), the President shall
submit to Congress from time to time updates and plans
regarding the establishment of an Energy Infrastructure
Security Center.''.
SEC. 2423. REPEAL OF DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY INTELLIGENCE
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND BUDGET REPORTING
REQUIREMENT.
Section 214 of the Department of Energy Organization Act
(42 U.S.C. 7144a) is amended--
(1) by striking ``(a)''; and
(2) by striking subsections (b) and (c).
Subtitle D--Other Elements
SEC. 2431. PLAN FOR DESIGNATION OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
COMPONENT OF DEFENSE SECURITY SERVICE AS AN
ELEMENT OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Director of National Intelligence and Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, in coordination with
the Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security
Center, shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate,
and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives a plan to designate the counterintelligence
component of the Defense Security Service of the Department
of Defense as an element of the intelligence community by not
later than January 1, 2021. Such plan shall--
[[Page H5876]]
(1) address the implications of such designation on the
authorities, governance, personnel, resources, information
technology, collection, analytic products, information
sharing, and business processes of the Defense Security
Service and the intelligence community; and
(2) not address the personnel security functions of the
Defense Security Service.
SEC. 2432. NOTICE NOT REQUIRED FOR PRIVATE ENTITIES.
Section 3553 of title 44, United States Code, is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (j) as subsection (k); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (i) the following:
``(j) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall
be construed to require the Secretary to provide notice to
any private entity before the Secretary issues a binding
operational directive under subsection (b)(2).''.
SEC. 2433. ESTABLISHMENT OF ADVISORY BOARD FOR NATIONAL
RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE.
(a) Establishment.--Section 106A of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3041a) is amended by adding at the end
the following new subsection:
``(d) Advisory Board.--
``(1) Establishment.--There is established in the National
Reconnaissance Office an advisory board (in this section
referred to as the `Board').
``(2) Duties.--The Board shall--
``(A) study matters relating to the mission of the National
Reconnaissance Office, including with respect to promoting
innovation, competition, and resilience in space, overhead
reconnaissance, acquisition, and other matters; and
``(B) advise and report directly to the Director with
respect to such matters.
``(3) Members.--
``(A) Number and appointment.--
``(i) In general.--The Board shall be composed of 5 members
appointed by the Director from among individuals with
demonstrated academic, government, business, or other
expertise relevant to the mission and functions of the
National Reconnaissance Office.
``(ii) Notification.--Not later than 30 days after the date
on which the Director appoints a member to the Board, the
Director shall notify the congressional intelligence
committees and the congressional defense committees (as
defined in section 101(a) of title 10, United States Code) of
such appointment.
``(B) Terms.--Each member shall be appointed for a term of
2 years. Except as provided by subparagraph (C), a member may
not serve more than 3 terms.
``(C) Vacancy.--Any member appointed to fill a vacancy
occurring before the expiration of the term for which the
member's predecessor was appointed shall be appointed only
for the remainder of that term. A member may serve after the
expiration of that member's term until a successor has taken
office.
``(D) Chair.--The Board shall have a Chair, who shall be
appointed by the Director from among the members.
``(E) Travel expenses.--Each member shall receive travel
expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in
accordance with applicable provisions under subchapter I of
chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code.
``(F) Executive secretary.--The Director may appoint an
executive secretary, who shall be an employee of the National
Reconnaissance Office, to support the Board.
``(4) Meetings.--The Board shall meet not less than
quarterly, but may meet more frequently at the call of the
Director.
``(5) Reports.--Not later than March 31 of each year, the
Board shall submit to the Director and to the congressional
intelligence committees a report on the activities and
significant findings of the Board during the preceding year.
``(6) Nonapplicability of certain requirements.--The
Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not
apply to the Board.
``(7) Termination.--The Board shall terminate on the date
that is 3 years after the date of the first meeting of the
Board.''.
(b) Initial Appointments.--Not later than 180 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the
National Reconnaissance Office shall appoint the initial 5
members to the advisory board under subsection (d) of section
106A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3041a),
as added by subsection (a).
SEC. 2434. COLLOCATION OF CERTAIN DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY PERSONNEL AT FIELD LOCATIONS.
(a) Identification of Opportunities for Collocation.--Not
later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for
Intelligence and Analysis shall identify, in consultation
with the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection,
the Administrator of the Transportation Security
Administration, the Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, and the heads of such other elements of the
Department of Homeland Security as the Under Secretary
considers appropriate, opportunities for collocation of
officers of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis in the
field outside of the greater Washington, District of
Columbia, area in order to support operational units from
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the Transportation
Security Administration, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, and other elements of the Department of Homeland
Security.
(b) Plan for Collocation.--Not later than 120 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
report that includes a plan for collocation as described in
subsection (a).
TITLE XXV--ELECTION MATTERS
SEC. 2501. REPORT ON CYBER ATTACKS BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS
AGAINST UNITED STATES ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs of the Senate;
(C) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of
Representatives;
(D) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
(E) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives.
(2) Congressional leadership.--The term ``congressional
leadership'' includes the following:
(A) The majority leader of the Senate.
(B) The minority leader of the Senate.
(C) The Speaker of the House of Representatives.
(D) The minority leader of the House of Representatives.
(3) State.--The term ``State'' means any State of the
United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession of the United
States.
(b) Report Required.--Not later than 60 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of Homeland
Security for Intelligence and Analysis shall submit to
congressional leadership and the appropriate congressional
committees a report on cyber attacks and attempted cyber
attacks by foreign governments on United States election
infrastructure in States and localities in connection with
the 2016 Presidential election in the United States and such
cyber attacks or attempted cyber attacks as the Under
Secretary anticipates against such infrastructure. Such
report shall identify the States and localities affected and
shall include cyber attacks and attempted cyber attacks
against voter registration databases, voting machines,
voting-related computer networks, and the networks of
Secretaries of State and other election officials of the
various States.
(c) Form.--The report submitted under subsection (b) shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
SEC. 2502. REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S POSTURE TO
COLLECT AGAINST AND ANALYZE RUSSIAN EFFORTS TO
INFLUENCE THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.
(a) Review Required.--Not later than 1 year after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall--
(1) complete an after action review of the posture of the
intelligence community to collect against and analyze efforts
of the Government of Russia to interfere in the 2016
Presidential election in the United States; and
(2) submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
report on the findings of the Director with respect to such
review.
(b) Elements.--The review required by subsection (a) shall
include, with respect to the posture and efforts described in
paragraph (1) of such subsection, the following:
(1) An assessment of whether the resources of the
intelligence community were properly aligned to detect and
respond to the efforts described in subsection (a)(1).
(2) An assessment of the information sharing that occurred
within elements of the intelligence community.
(3) An assessment of the information sharing that occurred
between elements of the intelligence community.
(4) An assessment of applicable authorities necessary to
collect on any such efforts and any deficiencies in those
authorities.
(5) A review of the use of open source material to inform
analysis and warning of such efforts.
(6) A review of the use of alternative and predictive
analysis.
(c) Form of Report.--The report required by subsection
(a)(2) shall be submitted to the congressional intelligence
committees in a classified form.
SEC. 2503. ASSESSMENT OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE THREATS TO
FEDERAL ELECTIONS.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs of the Senate; and
(C) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of
Representatives.
(2) Congressional leadership.--The term ``congressional
leadership'' includes the following:
(A) The majority leader of the Senate.
(B) The minority leader of the Senate.
(C) The Speaker of the House of Representatives.
(D) The minority leader of the House of Representatives.
(3) Security vulnerability.--The term ``security
vulnerability'' has the meaning given such term in section
102 of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (6
U.S.C. 1501).
(b) In General.--The Director of National Intelligence, in
coordination with the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, and the heads of other
relevant elements of the intelligence community, shall--
(1) commence not later than 1 year before any regularly
scheduled Federal election occurring after December 31, 2018,
and complete not later than 180 days before such election, an
assessment of security vulnerabilities of State election
systems; and
(2) not later than 180 days before any regularly scheduled
Federal election occurring after
[[Page H5877]]
December 31, 2018, submit a report on such security
vulnerabilities and an assessment of foreign intelligence
threats to the election to--
(A) congressional leadership; and
(B) the appropriate congressional committees.
(c) Update.--Not later than 90 days before any regularly
scheduled Federal election occurring after December 31, 2018,
the Director of National Intelligence shall--
(1) update the assessment of foreign intelligence threats
to that election; and
(2) submit the updated assessment to--
(A) congressional leadership; and
(B) the appropriate congressional committees.
SEC. 2504. STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING RUSSIAN CYBER THREATS TO
UNITED STATES ELECTIONS.
(a) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means the following:
(1) The congressional intelligence committees.
(2) The Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate.
(3) The Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on
Homeland Security of the House of Representatives.
(4) The Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
(5) The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives.
(b) Requirement for a Strategy.--Not later than 90 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of
National Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of
Homeland Security, the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and
the Secretary of the Treasury, shall develop a whole-of-
government strategy for countering the threat of Russian
cyber attacks and attempted cyber attacks against electoral
systems and processes in the United States, including
Federal, State, and local election systems, voter
registration databases, voting tabulation equipment, and
equipment and processes for the secure transmission of
election results.
(c) Elements of the Strategy.--The strategy required by
subsection (b) shall include the following elements:
(1) A whole-of-government approach to protecting United
States electoral systems and processes that includes the
agencies and departments indicated in subsection (b) as well
as any other agencies and departments of the United States,
as determined appropriate by the Director of National
Intelligence and the Secretary of Homeland Security.
(2) Input solicited from Secretaries of State of the
various States and the chief election officials of the
States.
(3) Technical security measures, including auditable paper
trails for voting machines, securing wireless and Internet
connections, and other technical safeguards.
(4) Detection of cyber threats, including attacks and
attempted attacks by Russian government or nongovernment
cyber threat actors.
(5) Improvements in the identification and attribution of
Russian government or nongovernment cyber threat actors.
(6) Deterrence, including actions and measures that could
or should be undertaken against or communicated to the
Government of Russia or other entities to deter attacks
against, or interference with, United States election systems
and processes.
(7) Improvements in Federal Government communications with
State and local election officials.
(8) Public education and communication efforts.
(9) Benchmarks and milestones to enable the measurement of
concrete steps taken and progress made in the implementation
of the strategy.
(d) Congressional Briefing.--Not later than 90 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of
National Intelligence and the Secretary of Homeland Security
shall jointly brief the appropriate congressional committees
on the strategy developed under subsection (b).
SEC. 2505. ASSESSMENT OF SIGNIFICANT RUSSIAN INFLUENCE
CAMPAIGNS DIRECTED AT FOREIGN ELECTIONS AND
REFERENDA.
(a) Russian Influence Campaign Defined.--In this section,
the term ``Russian influence campaign'' means any effort,
covert or overt, and by any means, attributable to the
Russian Federation directed at an election, referendum, or
similar process in a country other than the Russian
Federation or the United States.
(b) Assessment Required.--Not later than 60 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report containing an analytical assessment of
the most significant Russian influence campaigns, if any,
conducted during the 3-year period preceding the date of the
enactment of this Act, as well as the most significant
current or planned such Russian influence campaigns, if any.
Such assessment shall include--
(1) a summary of such significant Russian influence
campaigns, including, at a minimum, the specific means by
which such campaigns were conducted, are being conducted, or
likely will be conducted, as appropriate, and the specific
goal of each such campaign;
(2) a summary of any defenses against or responses to such
Russian influence campaigns by the foreign state holding the
elections or referenda;
(3) a summary of any relevant activities by elements of the
intelligence community undertaken for the purpose of
assisting the government of such foreign state in defending
against or responding to such Russian influence campaigns;
and
(4) an assessment of the effectiveness of such defenses and
responses described in paragraphs (2) and (3).
(c) Form.--The report required by subsection (b) may be
submitted in classified form, but if so submitted, shall
contain an unclassified summary.
SEC. 2506. INFORMATION SHARING WITH STATE ELECTION OFFICIALS.
(a) State Defined.--In this section, the term ``State''
means any State of the United States, the District of
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory
or possession of the United States.
(b) Security Clearances.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall support the Under Secretary of Homeland
Security for Intelligence and Analysis, and any other
official of the Department of Homeland Security designated by
the Secretary of Homeland Security, in sponsoring a security
clearance up to the top secret level for each eligible chief
election official of a State or the District of Columbia, and
additional eligible designees of such election official as
appropriate, at the time that such election official assumes
such position.
(2) Interim clearances.--Consistent with applicable
policies and directives, the Director of National
Intelligence may issue interim clearances, for a period to be
determined by the Director, to a chief election official as
described in paragraph (1) and up to 1 designee of such
official under such paragraph.
(c) Information Sharing.--
(1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall assist the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for
Intelligence and Analysis and the Under Secretary responsible
for overseeing critical infrastructure protection,
cybersecurity, and other related programs of the Department
(as specified in section 103(a)(1)(H) of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 113(a)(1)(H))) with sharing
any appropriate classified information related to threats to
election systems and to the integrity of the election process
with chief election officials and such designees who have
received a security clearance under subsection (b).
(2) Coordination.--The Under Secretary of Homeland Security
for Intelligence and Analysis shall coordinate with the
Director of National Intelligence and the Under Secretary
responsible for overseeing critical infrastructure
protection, cybersecurity, and other related programs of the
Department (as specified in section 103(a)(1)(H) of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 113(a)(1)(H))) to
facilitate the sharing of information to the affected
Secretaries of State or States.
SEC. 2507. NOTIFICATION OF SIGNIFICANT FOREIGN CYBER
INTRUSIONS AND ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGNS
DIRECTED AT ELECTIONS FOR FEDERAL OFFICES.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Active measures campaign.--The term ``active measures
campaign'' means a foreign semi-covert or covert intelligence
operation.
(2) Candidate, election, and political party.--The terms
``candidate'', ``election'', and ``political party'' have the
meanings given those terms in section 301 of the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 30101).
(3) Congressional leadership.--The term ``congressional
leadership'' includes the following:
(A) The majority leader of the Senate.
(B) The minority leader of the Senate.
(C) The Speaker of the House of Representatives.
(D) The minority leader of the House of Representatives.
(4) Cyber intrusion.--The term ``cyber intrusion'' means an
electronic occurrence that actually or imminently
jeopardizes, without lawful authority, electronic election
infrastructure, or the integrity, confidentiality, or
availability of information within such infrastructure.
(5) Electronic election infrastructure.--The term
``electronic election infrastructure'' means an electronic
information system of any of the following that is related to
an election for Federal office:
(A) The Federal Government.
(B) A State or local government.
(C) A political party.
(D) The election campaign of a candidate.
(6) Federal office.--The term ``Federal office'' has the
meaning given that term in section 301 of the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 30101).
(7) High confidence.--The term ``high confidence'', with
respect to a determination, means that the determination is
based on high-quality information from multiple sources.
(8) Moderate confidence.--The term ``moderate confidence'',
with respect to a determination, means that a determination
is credibly sourced and plausible but not of sufficient
quality or corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher
level of confidence.
(9) Other appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``other appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee
on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Homeland Security, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
House of Representatives.
(b) Determinations of Significant Foreign Cyber Intrusions
and Active Measures Campaigns.--The Director of National
Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall
jointly carry out subsection (c) if such Directors and the
Secretary jointly determine--
(1) that on or after the date of the enactment of this Act,
a significant foreign cyber intrusion
[[Page H5878]]
or active measures campaign intended to influence an upcoming
election for any Federal office has occurred or is occurring;
and
(2) with moderate or high confidence, that such intrusion
or campaign can be attributed to a foreign state or to a
foreign nonstate person, group, or other entity.
(c) Briefing.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 14 days after making a
determination under subsection (b), the Director of National
Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall
jointly provide a briefing to the congressional leadership,
the congressional intelligence committees and, consistent
with the protection of sources and methods, the other
appropriate congressional committees. The briefing shall be
classified and address, at a minimum, the following:
(A) A description of the significant foreign cyber
intrusion or active measures campaign, as the case may be,
covered by the determination.
(B) An identification of the foreign state or foreign
nonstate person, group, or other entity, to which such
intrusion or campaign has been attributed.
(C) The desirability and feasibility of the public release
of information about the cyber intrusion or active measures
campaign.
(D) Any other information such Directors and the Secretary
jointly determine appropriate.
(2) Electronic election infrastructure briefings.--With
respect to a significant foreign cyber intrusion covered by a
determination under subsection (b), the Secretary of Homeland
Security, in consultation with the Director of National
Intelligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, shall offer to the owner or operator of any
electronic election infrastructure directly affected by such
intrusion, a briefing on such intrusion, including steps that
may be taken to mitigate such intrusion. Such briefing may be
classified and made available only to individuals with
appropriate security clearances.
(3) Protection of sources and methods.--This subsection
shall be carried out in a manner that is consistent with the
protection of sources and methods.
SEC. 2508. DESIGNATION OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OFFICER TO LEAD
ELECTION SECURITY MATTERS.
(a) In General.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall designate a national counterintelligence officer within
the National Counterintelligence and Security Center to lead,
manage, and coordinate counterintelligence matters relating
to election security.
(b) Additional Responsibilities.--The person designated
under subsection (a) shall also lead, manage, and coordinate
counterintelligence matters relating to risks posed by
interference from foreign powers (as defined in section 101
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50
U.S.C. 1801)) to the following:
(1) The Federal Government election security supply chain.
(2) Election voting systems and software.
(3) Voter registration databases.
(4) Critical infrastructure related to elections.
(5) Such other Government goods and services as the
Director of National Intelligence considers appropriate.
TITLE XXVI--SECURITY CLEARANCES
SEC. 2601. DEFINITIONS.
In this title:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(C) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(D) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs of the Senate;
(E) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives;
(F) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives;
(G) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of
Representatives; and
(H) the Committee on Oversight and Reform of the House of
Representatives.
(2) Appropriate industry partners.--The term ``appropriate
industry partner'' means a contractor, licensee, or grantee
(as defined in section 101(a) of Executive Order 12829 (50
U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to National Industrial Security
Program)) that is participating in the National Industrial
Security Program established by such Executive Order.
(3) Continuous vetting.--The term ``continuous vetting''
has the meaning given such term in Executive Order 13467 (50
U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to reforming processes related to
suitability for government employment, fitness for contractor
employees, and eligibility for access to classified national
security information).
(4) Council.--The term ``Council'' means the Security,
Suitability, and Credentialing Performance Accountability
Council established pursuant to such Executive Order, or any
successor entity.
(5) Security executive agent.--The term ``Security
Executive Agent'' means the officer serving as the Security
Executive Agent pursuant to section 803 of the National
Security Act of 1947, as added by section 2605.
(6) Suitability and credentialing executive agent.--The
term ``Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent'' means
the Director of the Office of Personnel Management acting as
the Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent in
accordance with Executive Order 13467 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note;
relating to reforming processes related to suitability for
government employment, fitness for contractor employees, and
eligibility for access to classified national security
information), or any successor entity.
SEC. 2602. REPORTS AND PLANS RELATING TO SECURITY CLEARANCES
AND BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) ensuring the trustworthiness and security of the
workforce, facilities, and information of the Federal
Government is of the highest priority to national security
and public safety;
(2) the President and Congress should prioritize the
modernization of the personnel security framework to improve
its efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability;
(3) the current system for security clearance, suitability
and fitness for employment, and credentialing lacks
efficiencies and capabilities to meet the current threat
environment, recruit and retain a trusted workforce, and
capitalize on modern technologies; and
(4) changes to policies or processes to improve this system
should be vetted through the Council to ensure
standardization, portability, and reciprocity in security
clearances across the Federal Government.
(b) Accountability Plans and Reports.--
(1) Plans.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Council shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees and make available to
appropriate industry partners the following:
(A) A plan, with milestones, to reduce the background
investigation inventory to 200,000, or an otherwise
sustainable steady-level, by the end of year 2020. Such plan
shall include notes of any required changes in investigative
and adjudicative standards or resources.
(B) A plan to consolidate the conduct of background
investigations associated with the processing for security
clearances in the most effective and efficient manner between
the National Background Investigation Bureau and the Defense
Security Service, or a successor organization. Such plan
shall address required funding, personnel, contracts,
information technology, field office structure, policy,
governance, schedule, transition costs, and effects on
stakeholders.
(2) Report on the future of personnel security.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Chairman of the Council, in
coordination with the members of the Council, shall submit to
the appropriate congressional committees and make available
to appropriate industry partners a report on the future of
personnel security to reflect changes in threats, the
workforce, and technology.
(B) Contents.--The report submitted under subparagraph (A)
shall include the following:
(i) A risk framework for granting and renewing access to
classified information.
(ii) A discussion of the use of technologies to prevent,
detect, and monitor threats.
(iii) A discussion of efforts to address reciprocity and
portability.
(iv) A discussion of the characteristics of effective
insider threat programs.
(v) An analysis of how to integrate data from continuous
evaluation, insider threat programs, and human resources
data.
(vi) Recommendations on interagency governance.
(3) Plan for implementation.--Not later than 180 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Chairman of the
Council, in coordination with the members of the Council,
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and
make available to appropriate industry partners a plan to
implement the report's framework and recommendations
submitted under paragraph (2)(A).
(4) Congressional notifications.--Not less frequently than
quarterly, the Security Executive Agent shall make available
to the public a report regarding the status of the
disposition of requests received from departments and
agencies of the Federal Government for a change to, or
approval under, the Federal investigative standards, the
national adjudicative guidelines, continuous evaluation, or
other national policy regarding personnel security.
SEC. 2603. IMPROVING THE PROCESS FOR SECURITY CLEARANCES.
(a) Reviews.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Security Executive Agent, in
coordination with the members of the Council, shall submit to
the appropriate congressional committees and make available
to appropriate industry partners a report that includes the
following:
(1) A review of whether the information requested on the
Questionnaire for National Security Positions (Standard Form
86) and by the Federal Investigative Standards prescribed by
the Office of Personnel Management and the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence appropriately supports the
adjudicative guidelines under Security Executive Agent
Directive 4 (known as the ``National Security Adjudicative
Guidelines''). Such review shall include identification of
whether any such information currently collected is
unnecessary to support the adjudicative guidelines.
(2) An assessment of whether such Questionnaire, Standards,
and guidelines should be revised to account for the prospect
of a holder of a security clearance becoming an insider
threat.
(3) Recommendations to improve the background investigation
process by--
(A) simplifying the Questionnaire for National Security
Positions (Standard Form 86) and increasing customer support
to applicants completing such Questionnaire;
(B) using remote techniques and centralized locations to
support or replace field investigation work;
(C) using secure and reliable digitization of information
obtained during the clearance process;
(D) building the capacity of the background investigation
labor sector; and
(E) replacing periodic reinvestigations with continuous
evaluation techniques in all appropriate circumstances.
[[Page H5879]]
(b) Policy, Strategy, and Implementation.--Not later than
180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Security Executive Agent shall, in coordination with the
members of the Council, establish the following:
(1) A policy and implementation plan for the issuance of
interim security clearances.
(2) A policy and implementation plan to ensure contractors
are treated consistently in the security clearance process
across agencies and departments of the United States as
compared to employees of such agencies and departments. Such
policy shall address--
(A) prioritization of processing security clearances based
on the mission the contractors will be performing;
(B) standardization in the forms that agencies issue to
initiate the process for a security clearance;
(C) digitization of background investigation-related forms;
(D) use of the polygraph;
(E) the application of the adjudicative guidelines under
Security Executive Agent Directive 4 (known as the ``National
Security Adjudicative Guidelines'');
(F) reciprocal recognition of clearances across agencies
and departments of the United States, regardless of status of
periodic reinvestigation;
(G) tracking of clearance files as individuals move from
employment with an agency or department of the United States
to employment in the private sector;
(H) collection of timelines for movement of contractors
across agencies and departments;
(I) reporting on security incidents and job performance,
consistent with section 552a of title 5, United States Code
(commonly known as the ``Privacy Act of 1974''), that may
affect the ability to hold a security clearance;
(J) any recommended changes to the Federal Acquisition
Regulations (FAR) necessary to ensure that information
affecting contractor clearances or suitability is
appropriately and expeditiously shared between and among
agencies and contractors; and
(K) portability of contractor security clearances between
or among contracts at the same agency and between or among
contracts at different agencies that require the same level
of clearance.
(3) A strategy and implementation plan that--
(A) provides for periodic reinvestigations as part of a
security clearance determination only on an as-needed, risk-
based basis;
(B) includes actions to assess the extent to which
automated records checks and other continuous evaluation
methods may be used to expedite or focus reinvestigations;
and
(C) provides an exception for certain populations if the
Security Executive Agent--
(i) determines such populations require reinvestigations at
regular intervals; and
(ii) provides written justification to the appropriate
congressional committees for any such determination.
(4) A policy and implementation plan for agencies and
departments of the United States, as a part of the security
clearance process, to accept automated records checks
generated pursuant to a security clearance applicant's
employment with a prior employer.
(5) A policy for the use of certain background materials on
individuals collected by the private sector for background
investigation purposes.
(6) Uniform standards for agency continuous evaluation
programs to ensure quality and reciprocity in accepting
enrollment in a continuous vetting program as a substitute
for a periodic investigation for continued access to
classified information.
SEC. 2604. GOALS FOR PROMPTNESS OF DETERMINATIONS REGARDING
SECURITY CLEARANCES.
(a) Reciprocity Defined.--In this section, the term
``reciprocity'' means reciprocal recognition by Federal
departments and agencies of eligibility for access to
classified information.
(b) In General.--The Council shall reform the security
clearance process with the objective that, by December 31,
2021, 90 percent of all determinations, other than
determinations regarding populations identified under section
2603(b)(3)(C), regarding--
(1) security clearances--
(A) at the secret level are issued in 30 days or fewer; and
(B) at the top secret level are issued in 90 days or fewer;
and
(2) reciprocity of security clearances at the same level
are recognized in 2 weeks or fewer.
(c) Certain Reinvestigations.--The Council shall reform the
security clearance process with the goal that by December 31,
2021, reinvestigation on a set periodicity is not required
for more than 10 percent of the population that holds a
security clearance.
(d) Equivalent Metrics.--
(1) In general.--If the Council develops a set of
performance metrics that it certifies to the appropriate
congressional committees should achieve substantially
equivalent outcomes as those outlined in subsections (b) and
(c), the Council may use those metrics for purposes of
compliance within this provision.
(2) Notice.--If the Council uses the authority provided by
paragraph (1) to use metrics as described in such paragraph,
the Council shall, not later than 30 days after communicating
such metrics to departments and agencies, notify the
appropriate congressional committees that it is using such
authority.
(e) Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Council shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees and make available to
appropriate industry partners a plan to carry out this
section. Such plan shall include recommended interim
milestones for the goals set forth in subsections (b) and (c)
for 2019, 2020, and 2021.
SEC. 2605. SECURITY EXECUTIVE AGENT.
(a) In General.--Title VIII of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3161 et seq.) is amended--
(1) by redesignating sections 803 and 804 as sections 804
and 805, respectively; and
(2) by inserting after section 802 the following:
``SEC. 803. SECURITY EXECUTIVE AGENT.
``(a) In General.--The Director of National Intelligence,
or such other officer of the United States as the President
may designate, shall serve as the Security Executive Agent
for all departments and agencies of the United States.
``(b) Duties.--The duties of the Security Executive Agent
are as follows:
``(1) To direct the oversight of investigations,
reinvestigations, adjudications, and, as applicable,
polygraphs for eligibility for access to classified
information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position made
by any Federal agency.
``(2) To review the national security background
investigation and adjudication programs of Federal agencies
to determine whether such programs are being implemented in
accordance with this section.
``(3) To develop and issue uniform and consistent policies
and procedures to ensure the effective, efficient, timely,
and secure completion of investigations, polygraphs, and
adjudications relating to determinations of eligibility for
access to classified information or eligibility to hold a
sensitive position.
``(4) Unless otherwise designated by law, to serve as the
final authority to designate a Federal agency or agencies to
conduct investigations of persons who are proposed for access
to classified information or for eligibility to hold a
sensitive position to ascertain whether such persons satisfy
the criteria for obtaining and retaining access to classified
information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position, as
applicable.
``(5) Unless otherwise designated by law, to serve as the
final authority to designate a Federal agency or agencies to
determine eligibility for access to classified information or
eligibility to hold a sensitive position in accordance with
Executive Order 12968 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to
access to classified information).
``(6) To ensure reciprocal recognition of eligibility for
access to classified information or eligibility to hold a
sensitive position among Federal agencies, including acting
as the final authority to arbitrate and resolve disputes
among such agencies involving the reciprocity of
investigations and adjudications of eligibility.
``(7) To execute all other duties assigned to the Security
Executive Agent by law.
``(c) Authorities.--The Security Executive Agent shall--
``(1) issue guidelines and instructions to the heads of
Federal agencies to ensure appropriate uniformity,
centralization, efficiency, effectiveness, timeliness, and
security in processes relating to determinations by such
agencies of eligibility for access to classified information
or eligibility to hold a sensitive position, including such
matters as investigations, polygraphs, adjudications, and
reciprocity;
``(2) have the authority to grant exceptions to, or waivers
of, national security investigative requirements, including
issuing implementing or clarifying guidance, as necessary;
``(3) have the authority to assign, in whole or in part, to
the head of any Federal agency (solely or jointly) any of the
duties of the Security Executive Agent described in
subsection (b) or the authorities described in paragraphs (1)
and (2), provided that the exercise of such assigned duties
or authorities is subject to the oversight of the Security
Executive Agent, including such terms and conditions
(including approval by the Security Executive Agent) as the
Security Executive Agent determines appropriate; and
``(4) define and set standards for continuous evaluation
for continued access to classified information and for
eligibility to hold a sensitive position.''.
(b) Report on Recommendations for Revising Authorities.--
Not later than 30 days after the date on which the Chairman
of the Council submits to the appropriate congressional
committees the report required by section 2602(b)(2)(A), the
Chairman shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees such recommendations as the Chairman may have for
revising the authorities of the Security Executive Agent.
(c) Conforming Amendment.--Section 103H(j)(4)(A) of such
Act (50 U.S.C. 3033(j)(4)(A)) is amended by striking ``in
section 804'' and inserting ``in section 805''.
(d) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the
matter preceding section 2 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3002) is
amended by striking the items relating to sections 803 and
804 and inserting the following:
``Sec. 803. Security Executive Agent.
``Sec. 804. Exceptions.
``Sec. 805. Definitions.''.
SEC. 2606. REPORT ON UNIFIED, SIMPLIFIED, GOVERNMENTWIDE
STANDARDS FOR POSITIONS OF TRUST AND SECURITY
CLEARANCES.
Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Security Executive Agent and the Suitability
and Credentialing Executive Agent, in coordination with the
other members of the Council, shall jointly submit to the
appropriate congressional committees and make available to
appropriate industry partners a report regarding the
advisability and the risks, benefits, and costs to the
Government and to industry of consolidating to not more than
3 tiers for positions of trust and security clearances.
SEC. 2607. REPORT ON CLEARANCE IN PERSON CONCEPT.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that to
reflect the greater mobility of the modern workforce,
alternative methodologies merit analysis to allow greater
flexibility for individuals moving in and out of positions
that require access to classified information, while still
preserving security.
[[Page H5880]]
(b) Report Required.--Not later than 90 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Security Executive Agent
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and
make available to appropriate industry partners a report that
describes the requirements, feasibility, and advisability of
implementing a clearance in person concept described in
subsection (c).
(c) Clearance in Person Concept.--The clearance in person
concept--
(1) permits an individual who once held a security
clearance to maintain his or her eligibility for access to
classified information, networks, and facilities for up to 3
years after the individual's eligibility for access to
classified information would otherwise lapse; and
(2) recognizes, unless otherwise directed by the Security
Executive Agent, an individual's security clearance and
background investigation as current, regardless of employment
status, contingent on enrollment in a continuous vetting
program.
(d) Contents.--The report required under subsection (b)
shall address--
(1) requirements for an individual to voluntarily remain in
a continuous evaluation program validated by the Security
Executive Agent even if the individual is not in a position
requiring access to classified information;
(2) appropriate safeguards for privacy;
(3) advantages to government and industry;
(4) the costs and savings associated with implementation;
(5) the risks of such implementation, including security
and counterintelligence risks;
(6) an appropriate funding model; and
(7) fairness to small companies and independent
contractors.
SEC. 2608. REPORTS ON RECIPROCITY FOR SECURITY CLEARANCES
INSIDE OF DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES.
(a) Reciprocally Recognized Defined.--In this section, the
term ``reciprocally recognized'' means reciprocal recognition
by Federal departments and agencies of eligibility for access
to classified information.
(b) Reports to Security Executive Agent.--The head of each
Federal department or agency shall submit an annual report to
the Security Executive Agent that--
(1) identifies the number of individuals whose security
clearances take more than 2 weeks to be reciprocally
recognized after such individuals move to another part of
such department or agency; and
(2) breaks out the information described in paragraph (1)
by type of clearance and the reasons for any delays.
(c) Annual Report.--Not less frequently than once each
year, the Security Executive Agent shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees and make available to
industry partners an annual report that summarizes the
information received pursuant to subsection (b) during the
period covered by such report.
SEC. 2609. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REPORTS ON SECURITY
CLEARANCES.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) despite sustained efforts by Congress and the executive
branch, an unacceptable backlog in processing and
adjudicating security clearances persists, both within
elements of the intelligence community and in other
departments of the Federal Government, with some processing
times exceeding a year or even more;
(2) the protracted clearance timetable threatens the
ability of elements of the intelligence community to hire and
retain highly qualified individuals, and thus to fulfill the
missions of such elements;
(3) the prospect of a lengthy clearance process deters some
such individuals from seeking employment with the
intelligence community in the first place, and, when faced
with a long wait time, those with conditional offers of
employment may opt to discontinue the security clearance
process and pursue different opportunities;
(4) now more than ever, therefore, the broken security
clearance process badly needs fundamental reform; and
(5) in the meantime, to ensure the ability of elements of
the intelligence community to hire and retain highly
qualified personnel, elements should consider, to the extent
possible and consistent with national security, permitting
new employees to enter on duty immediately or nearly so, and
to perform, on a temporary basis pending final adjudication
of their security clearances, work that either does not
require a security clearance or requires only a low-level
interim clearance.
(b) In General.--Section 506H of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3104) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)(1)--
(A) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by inserting ``and'' after the
semicolon;
(B) in subparagraph (B)(ii), by striking ``; and'' and
inserting a period; and
(C) by striking subparagraph (C);
(2) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c);
(3) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new
subsection (b):
``(b) Intelligence Community Reports.--(1) Not later than
March 1 of each year, the Director of National Intelligence
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees,
the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
of the Senate, and the Committee on Homeland Security of the
House of Representatives a report on the security clearances
processed by each element of the intelligence community
during the preceding fiscal year. Each such report shall
separately identify security clearances processed for Federal
employees and contractor employees sponsored by each such
element.
``(2) Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall
include each of the following for each element of the
intelligence community for the fiscal year covered by the
report:
``(A) The total number of initial security clearance
background investigations sponsored for new applicants.
``(B) The total number of security clearance periodic
reinvestigations sponsored for existing employees.
``(C) The total number of initial security clearance
background investigations for new applicants that were
adjudicated with notice of a determination provided to the
prospective applicant, including--
``(i) the total number that were adjudicated favorably and
granted access to classified information; and
``(ii) the total number that were adjudicated unfavorably
and resulted in a denial or revocation of a security
clearance.
``(D) The total number of security clearance periodic
background investigations that were adjudicated with notice
of a determination provided to the existing employee,
including--
``(i) the total number that were adjudicated favorably; and
``(ii) the total number that were adjudicated unfavorably
and resulted in a denial or revocation of a security
clearance.
``(E) The total number of pending security clearance
background investigations, including initial applicant
investigations and periodic reinvestigations, that were not
adjudicated as of the last day of such year and that remained
pending as follows:
``(i) For 180 days or less.
``(ii) For 180 days or longer, but less than 12 months.
``(iii) For 12 months or longer, but less than 18 months.
``(iv) For 18 months or longer, but less than 24 months.
``(v) For 24 months or longer.
``(F) In the case of security clearance determinations
completed or pending during the year preceding the year for
which the report is submitted that have taken longer than 12
months to complete--
``(i) an explanation of the causes for the delays incurred
during the period covered by the report; and
``(ii) the number of such delays involving a polygraph
requirement.
``(G) The percentage of security clearance investigations,
including initial and periodic reinvestigations, that
resulted in a denial or revocation of a security clearance.
``(H) The percentage of security clearance investigations
that resulted in incomplete information.
``(I) The percentage of security clearance investigations
that did not result in enough information to make a decision
on potentially adverse information.
``(3) The report required under this subsection shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.''; and
(4) in subsection (c), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by
striking ``subsection (a)(1)'' and inserting ``subsections
(a)(1) and (b)''.
SEC. 2610. PERIODIC REPORT ON POSITIONS IN THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY THAT CAN BE CONDUCTED WITHOUT ACCESS
TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION, NETWORKS, OR
FACILITIES.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act and not less frequently than once every 5 years
thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report
that reviews the intelligence community for which positions
can be conducted without access to classified information,
networks, or facilities, or may only require a security
clearance at the secret level.
SEC. 2611. INFORMATION SHARING PROGRAM FOR POSITIONS OF TRUST
AND SECURITY CLEARANCES.
(a) Program Required.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Security Executive Agent and
the Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent shall
establish and implement a program to share between and among
agencies of the Federal Government and industry partners of
the Federal Government relevant background information
regarding individuals applying for and currently occupying
national security positions and positions of trust, in order
to ensure the Federal Government maintains a trusted
workforce.
(2) Designation.--The program established under paragraph
(1) shall be known as the ``Trusted Information Provider
Program'' (in this section referred to as the ``Program'').
(b) Privacy Safeguards.--The Security Executive Agent and
the Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent shall
ensure that the Program includes such safeguards for privacy
as the Security Executive Agent and the Suitability and
Credentialing Executive Agent consider appropriate.
(c) Provision of Information to the Federal Government.--
The Program shall include requirements that enable
investigative service providers and agencies of the Federal
Government to leverage certain pre-employment information
gathered during the employment or military recruiting
process, and other relevant security or human resources
information obtained during employment with or for the
Federal Government, that satisfy Federal investigative
standards, while safeguarding personnel privacy.
(d) Information and Records.--The information and records
considered under the Program shall include the following:
(1) Date and place of birth.
(2) Citizenship or immigration and naturalization
information.
(3) Education records.
(4) Employment records.
(5) Employment or social references.
(6) Military service records.
[[Page H5881]]
(7) State and local law enforcement checks.
(8) Criminal history checks.
(9) Financial records or information.
(10) Foreign travel, relatives, or associations.
(11) Social media checks.
(12) Such other information or records as may be relevant
to obtaining or maintaining national security, suitability,
fitness, or credentialing eligibility.
(e) Implementation Plan.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Security Executive Agent and
the Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent shall
jointly submit to the appropriate congressional committees
and make available to appropriate industry partners a plan
for the implementation of the Program.
(2) Elements.--The plan required by paragraph (1) shall
include the following:
(A) Mechanisms that address privacy, national security,
suitability or fitness, credentialing, and human resources or
military recruitment processes.
(B) Such recommendations for legislative or administrative
action as the Security Executive Agent and the Suitability
and Credentialing Executive Agent consider appropriate to
carry out or improve the Program.
(f) Plan for Pilot Program on Two-way Information
Sharing.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Security Executive Agent and
the Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent shall
jointly submit to the appropriate congressional committees
and make available to appropriate industry partners a plan
for the implementation of a pilot program to assess the
feasibility and advisability of expanding the Program to
include the sharing of information held by the Federal
Government related to contract personnel with the security
office of the employers of those contractor personnel.
(2) Elements.--The plan required by paragraph (1) shall
include the following:
(A) Mechanisms that address privacy, national security,
suitability or fitness, credentialing, and human resources or
military recruitment processes.
(B) Such recommendations for legislative or administrative
action as the Security Executive Agent and the Suitability
and Credentialing Executive Agent consider appropriate to
carry out or improve the pilot program.
(g) Review.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Security Executive Agent and the
Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent shall jointly
submit to the appropriate congressional committees and make
available to appropriate industry partners a review of the
plans submitted under subsections (e)(1) and (f)(1) and
utility and effectiveness of the programs described in such
plans.
SEC. 2612. REPORT ON PROTECTIONS FOR CONFIDENTIALITY OF
WHISTLEBLOWER-RELATED COMMUNICATIONS.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Security Executive Agent shall, in coordination
with the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community,
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report
detailing the controls employed by the intelligence community
to ensure that continuous vetting programs, including those
involving user activity monitoring, protect the
confidentiality of whistleblower-related communications.
TITLE XXVII--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS
Subtitle A--Matters Relating to Russia and Other Foreign Powers
SEC. 2701. LIMITATION RELATING TO ESTABLISHMENT OR SUPPORT OF
CYBERSECURITY UNIT WITH THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.
(a) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the
Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives;
and
(3) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives.
(b) Limitation.--
(1) In general.--No amount may be expended by the Federal
Government, other than the Department of Defense, to enter
into or implement any bilateral agreement between the United
States and the Russian Federation regarding cybersecurity,
including the establishment or support of any cybersecurity
unit, unless, at least 30 days prior to the conclusion of any
such agreement, the Director of National Intelligence submits
to the appropriate congressional committees a report on such
agreement that includes the elements required by subsection
(c).
(2) Department of defense agreements.--Any agreement
between the Department of Defense and the Russian Federation
regarding cybersecurity shall be conducted in accordance with
section 1232 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114-328), as amended by section
1231 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2018 (Public Law 115-91).
(c) Elements.--If the Director submits a report under
subsection (b) with respect to an agreement, such report
shall include a description of each of the following:
(1) The purpose of the agreement.
(2) The nature of any intelligence to be shared pursuant to
the agreement.
(3) The expected value to national security resulting from
the implementation of the agreement.
(4) Such counterintelligence concerns associated with the
agreement as the Director may have and such measures as the
Director expects to be taken to mitigate such concerns.
(d) Rule of Construction.--This section shall not be
construed to affect any existing authority of the Director of
National Intelligence, the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, or another head of an element of the
intelligence community, to share or receive foreign
intelligence on a case-by-case basis.
SEC. 2702. REPORT ON RETURNING RUSSIAN COMPOUNDS.
(a) Covered Compounds Defined.--In this section, the term
``covered compounds'' means the real property in New York,
the real property in Maryland, and the real property in San
Francisco, California, that were under the control of the
Government of Russia in 2016 and were removed from such
control in response to various transgressions by the
Government of Russia, including the interference by the
Government of Russia in the 2016 election in the United
States.
(b) Requirement for Report.--Not later than 180 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of
National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees, and the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs
of the House of Representatives (only with respect to the
unclassified report), a report on the intelligence risks of
returning the covered compounds to Russian control.
(c) Form of Report.--The report required by this section
shall be submitted in classified and unclassified forms.
SEC. 2703. ASSESSMENT OF THREAT FINANCE RELATING TO RUSSIA.
(a) Threat Finance Defined.--In this section, the term
``threat finance'' means--
(1) the financing of cyber operations, global influence
campaigns, intelligence service activities, proliferation,
terrorism, or transnational crime and drug organizations;
(2) the methods and entities used to spend, store, move,
raise, conceal, or launder money or value, on behalf of
threat actors;
(3) sanctions evasion; and
(4) other forms of threat finance activity domestically or
internationally, as defined by the President.
(b) Report Required.--Not later than 60 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of
the Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis, shall submit to
the congressional intelligence committees a report containing
an assessment of Russian threat finance. The assessment shall
be based on intelligence from all sources, including from the
Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence of the
Department of the Treasury.
(c) Elements.--The report required by subsection (b) shall
include each of the following:
(1) A summary of leading examples from the 3-year period
preceding the date of the submittal of the report of threat
finance activities conducted by, for the benefit of, or at
the behest of--
(A) officials of the Government of Russia;
(B) persons subject to sanctions under any provision of law
imposing sanctions with respect to Russia;
(C) Russian nationals subject to sanctions under any other
provision of law; or
(D) Russian oligarchs or organized criminals.
(2) An assessment with respect to any trends or patterns in
threat finance activities relating to Russia, including
common methods of conducting such activities and global nodes
of money laundering used by Russian threat actors described
in paragraph (1) and associated entities.
(3) An assessment of any connections between Russian
individuals involved in money laundering and the Government
of Russia.
(4) A summary of engagement and coordination with
international partners on threat finance relating to Russia,
especially in Europe, including examples of such engagement
and coordination.
(5) An identification of any resource and collection gaps.
(6) An identification of--
(A) entry points of money laundering by Russian and
associated entities into the United States;
(B) any vulnerabilities within the United States legal and
financial system, including specific sectors, which have been
or could be exploited in connection with Russian threat
finance activities; and
(C) the counterintelligence threat posed by Russian money
laundering and other forms of threat finance, as well as the
threat to the United States financial system and United
States efforts to enforce sanctions and combat organized
crime.
(7) Any other matters the Director determines appropriate.
(d) Form of Report.--The report required under subsection
(b) may be submitted in classified form.
SEC. 2704. NOTIFICATION OF AN ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGN.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the
Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives;
and
(C) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives.
(2) Congressional leadership.--The term ``congressional
leadership'' includes the following:
(A) The majority leader of the Senate.
(B) The minority leader of the Senate.
(C) The Speaker of the House of Representatives.
(D) The minority leader of the House of Representatives.
[[Page H5882]]
(b) Requirement for Notification.--The Director of National
Intelligence, in cooperation with the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and the head of any other relevant
agency, shall notify the congressional leadership and the
Chairman and Vice Chairman or Ranking Member of each of the
appropriate congressional committees, and of other relevant
committees of jurisdiction, each time the Director of
National Intelligence determines there is credible
information that a foreign power has, is, or will attempt to
employ a covert influence or active measures campaign with
regard to the modernization, employment, doctrine, or force
posture of the nuclear deterrent or missile defense.
(c) Content of Notification.--Each notification required by
subsection (b) shall include information concerning actions
taken by the United States to expose or halt an attempt
referred to in subsection (b).
SEC. 2705. NOTIFICATION OF TRAVEL BY ACCREDITED DIPLOMATIC
AND CONSULAR PERSONNEL OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION IN THE UNITED STATES.
In carrying out the advance notification requirements set
out in section 502 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2017 (division N of Public Law 115-31; 131 Stat.
825; 22 U.S.C. 254a note), the Secretary of State shall--
(1) ensure that the Russian Federation provides
notification to the Secretary of State at least 2 business
days in advance of all travel that is subject to such
requirements by accredited diplomatic and consular personnel
of the Russian Federation in the United States, and take
necessary action to secure full compliance by Russian
personnel and address any noncompliance; and
(2) provide notice of travel described in paragraph (1) to
the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation within 1 hour of receiving
notice of such travel.
SEC. 2706. REPORT ON OUTREACH STRATEGY ADDRESSING THREATS
FROM UNITED STATES ADVERSARIES TO THE UNITED
STATES TECHNOLOGY SECTOR.
(a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and
(3) the Committee on Armed Services, Committee on Homeland
Security, and the Committee on Oversight and Reform of the
House of Representatives.
(b) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of
Congress a report detailing outreach by the intelligence
community and the Defense Intelligence Enterprise to United
States industrial, commercial, scientific, technical, and
academic communities on matters relating to the efforts of
adversaries of the United States to acquire critical United
States technology, intellectual property, and research and
development information.
(c) Contents.--The report required by subsection (b) shall
include the following:
(1) A review of the current outreach efforts of the
intelligence community and the Defense Intelligence
Enterprise described in subsection (b), including the type of
information conveyed in the outreach.
(2) A determination of the appropriate element of the
intelligence community to lead such outreach efforts.
(3) An assessment of potential methods for improving the
effectiveness of such outreach, including an assessment of
the following:
(A) Those critical technologies, infrastructure, or related
supply chains that are at risk from the efforts of
adversaries described in subsection (b).
(B) The necessity and advisability of granting security
clearances to company or community leadership, when necessary
and appropriate, to allow for tailored classified briefings
on specific targeted threats.
(C) The advisability of partnering with entities of the
Federal Government that are not elements of the intelligence
community and relevant regulatory and industry groups
described in subsection (b), to convey key messages across
sectors targeted by United States adversaries.
(D) Strategies to assist affected elements of the
communities described in subparagraph (C) in mitigating,
deterring, and protecting against the broad range of threats
from the efforts of adversaries described in subsection (b),
with focus on producing information that enables private
entities to justify business decisions related to national
security concerns.
(E) The advisability of the establishment of a United
States Government-wide task force to coordinate outreach and
activities to combat the threats from efforts of adversaries
described in subsection (b).
(F) Such other matters as the Director of National
Intelligence may consider necessary.
(d) Consultation Encouraged.--In preparing the report
required by subsection (b), the Director is encouraged to
consult with other government agencies, think tanks,
academia, representatives of the financial industry, or such
other entities as the Director considers appropriate.
(e) Form.--The report required by subsection (b) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex as necessary.
SEC. 2707. REPORT ON IRANIAN SUPPORT OF PROXY FORCES IN SYRIA
AND LEBANON.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence
of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(2) Arms or related material.--The term ``arms or related
material'' means--
(A) nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological weapons
or materials or components of such weapons;
(B) ballistic or cruise missile weapons or materials or
components of such weapons;
(C) destabilizing numbers and types of advanced
conventional weapons;
(D) defense articles or defense services, as those terms
are defined in paragraphs (3) and (4), respectively, of
section 47 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2794);
(E) defense information, as that term is defined in section
644 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2403);
or
(F) items designated by the President for purposes of the
United States Munitions List under section 38(a)(1) of the
Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)).
(b) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of
Congress a report on Iranian support of proxy forces in Syria
and Lebanon and the threat posed to Israel, other United
States regional allies, and other specified interests of the
United States as a result of such support.
(c) Matters for Inclusion.--The report required under
subsection (b) shall include information relating to the
following matters with respect to both the strategic and
tactical implications for the United States and its allies:
(1) A description of arms or related materiel transferred
by Iran to Hizballah since March 2011, including the number
of such arms or related materiel and whether such transfer
was by land, sea, or air, as well as financial and additional
technological capabilities transferred by Iran to Hizballah.
(2) A description of Iranian and Iranian-controlled
personnel, including Hizballah, Shiite militias, and Iran's
Revolutionary Guard Corps forces, operating within Syria,
including the number and geographic distribution of such
personnel operating within 30 kilometers of the Israeli
borders with Syria and Lebanon.
(3) An assessment of Hizballah's operational lessons
learned based on its recent experiences in Syria.
(4) A description of any rocket-producing facilities in
Lebanon for nonstate actors, including whether such
facilities were assessed to be built at the direction of
Hizballah leadership, Iranian leadership, or in consultation
between Iranian leadership and Hizballah leadership.
(5) An analysis of the foreign and domestic supply chains
that significantly facilitate, support, or otherwise aid
Hizballah's acquisition or development of missile production
facilities, including the geographic distribution of such
foreign and domestic supply chains.
(6) An assessment of the provision of goods, services, or
technology transferred by Iran or its affiliates to Hizballah
to indigenously manufacture or otherwise produce missiles.
(7) An identification of foreign persons that are based on
credible information, facilitating the transfer of
significant financial support or arms or related materiel to
Hizballah.
(8) A description of the threat posed to Israel and other
United States allies in the Middle East by the transfer of
arms or related material or other support offered to
Hizballah and other proxies from Iran.
(d) Form of Report.--The report required under subsection
(b) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include
a classified annex.
SEC. 2708. ANNUAL REPORT ON IRANIAN EXPENDITURES SUPPORTING
FOREIGN MILITARY AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.
(a) Annual Report Required.--Not later than 90 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act and not less frequently
than once each year thereafter, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report describing
Iranian expenditures in the previous calendar year on
military and terrorist activities outside the country,
including each of the following:
(1) The amount spent in such calendar year on activities by
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including activities
providing support for--
(A) Hizballah;
(B) Houthi rebels in Yemen;
(C) Hamas;
(D) proxy forces in Iraq and Syria; or
(E) any other entity or country the Director determines to
be relevant.
(2) The amount spent in such calendar year for ballistic
missile research and testing or other activities that the
Director determines are destabilizing to the Middle East
region.
(b) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
SEC. 2709. EXPANSION OF SCOPE OF COMMITTEE TO COUNTER ACTIVE
MEASURES AND REPORT ON ESTABLISHMENT OF FOREIGN
MALIGN INFLUENCE CENTER.
(a) Scope of Committee to Counter Active Measures.--
(1) In general.--Section 501 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 115-31; 50
U.S.C. 3001 note) is amended--
(A) in subsections (a) through (h)--
(i) by inserting ``, the People's Republic of China, the
Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea, or other nation state'' after ``Russian Federation''
each place it appears; and
[[Page H5883]]
(ii) by inserting ``, China, Iran, North Korea, or other
nation state'' after ``Russia'' each place it appears; and
(B) in the section heading, by inserting ``, the people's
republic of china, the islamic republic of iran, the
democratic people's republic of korea, or other nation
state'' after ``russian federation''.
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents in section
1(b) of such Act is amended by striking the item relating to
section 501 and inserting the following new item:
``Sec. 501. Committee to counter active measures by the Russian
Federation, the People's Republic of China, the Islamic
Republic of Iran, the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea, or other nation states to exert covert influence
over peoples and governments.''.
(b) Report Required.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence, in coordination with such elements of the
intelligence community as the Director considers relevant,
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
report on the feasibility and advisability of establishing a
center, to be known as the ``Foreign Malign Influence
Response Center'', that--
(A) is comprised of analysts from all appropriate elements
of the intelligence community, including elements with
related diplomatic and law enforcement functions;
(B) has access to all intelligence and other reporting
acquired by the United States Government on foreign efforts
to influence, through overt and covert malign activities,
United States political processes and elections;
(C) provides comprehensive assessment, and indications and
warning, of such activities; and
(D) provides for enhanced dissemination of such assessment
to United States policy makers.
(2) Contents.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall
include the following:
(A) A discussion of the desirability of the establishment
of such center and any barriers to such establishment.
(B) Such recommendations and other matters as the Director
considers appropriate.
Subtitle B--Reports
SEC. 2711. TECHNICAL CORRECTION TO INSPECTOR GENERAL STUDY.
Section 11001(d) of title 5, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) in the subsection heading, by striking ``Audit'' and
inserting ``Review'';
(2) in paragraph (1), by striking ``audit'' and inserting
``review''; and
(3) in paragraph (2), by striking ``audit'' and inserting
``review''.
SEC. 2712. REPORTS ON AUTHORITIES OF THE CHIEF INTELLIGENCE
OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs of the Senate; and
(C) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of
Representatives.
(2) Homeland security intelligence enterprise.--The term
``Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise'' has the meaning
given such term in Department of Homeland Security
Instruction Number 264-01-001, or successor authority.
(b) Report Required.--Not later than 120 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, in consultation with the Under Secretary of
Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis, shall submit
to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the
authorities of the Under Secretary.
(c) Elements.--The report required by subsection (b) shall
include each of the following:
(1) An analysis of whether the Under Secretary has the
legal and policy authority necessary to organize and lead the
Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise, with respect to
intelligence, and, if not, a description of--
(A) the obstacles to exercising the authorities of the
Chief Intelligence Officer of the Department and the Homeland
Security Intelligence Council, of which the Chief
Intelligence Officer is the chair; and
(B) the legal and policy changes necessary to effectively
coordinate, organize, and lead intelligence activities of the
Department of Homeland Security.
(2) A description of the actions that the Secretary has
taken to address the inability of the Under Secretary to
require components of the Department, other than the Office
of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department to--
(A) coordinate intelligence programs; and
(B) integrate and standardize intelligence products
produced by such other components.
SEC. 2713. REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WHISTLEBLOWER
MATTERS.
(a) Review of Whistleblower Matters.--The Inspector General
of the Intelligence Community, in consultation with the
inspectors general for the Central Intelligence Agency, the
National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the
National Reconnaissance Office, shall conduct a review of the
authorities, policies, investigatory standards, and other
practices and procedures relating to intelligence community
whistleblower matters, with respect to such inspectors
general.
(b) Objective of Review.--The objective of the review
required under subsection (a) is to identify any
discrepancies, inconsistencies, or other issues, which
frustrate the timely and effective reporting of intelligence
community whistleblower matters to appropriate inspectors
general and to the congressional intelligence committees, and
the fair and expeditious investigation and resolution of such
matters.
(c) Conduct of Review.--The Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community shall take such measures as the
Inspector General determines necessary in order to ensure
that the review required by subsection (a) is conducted in an
independent and objective fashion.
(d) Report.--Not later than 270 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a written report containing the
results of the review required under subsection (a), along
with recommendations to improve the timely and effective
reporting of intelligence community whistleblower matters to
inspectors general and to the congressional intelligence
committees and the fair and expeditious investigation and
resolution of such matters.
SEC. 2714. REPORT ON ROLE OF DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN FOREIGN
INVESTMENTS.
(a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence,
in consultation with the heads of the elements of the
intelligence community determined appropriate by the
Director, shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report on the role of the Director in preparing
analytic materials in connection with the evaluation by the
Federal Government of national security risks associated with
potential foreign investments into the United States.
(b) Elements.--The report under subsection (a) shall
include--
(1) a description of the current process for the provision
of the analytic materials described in subsection (a);
(2) an identification of the most significant benefits and
drawbacks of such process with respect to the role of the
Director, including the sufficiency of resources and
personnel to prepare such materials; and
(3) recommendations to improve such process.
SEC. 2715. REPORT ON SURVEILLANCE BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS
AGAINST UNITED STATES TELECOMMUNICATIONS
NETWORKS.
(a) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means the following:
(1) The congressional intelligence committees.
(2) The Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate.
(3) The Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on
Homeland Security of the House of Representatives.
(b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence
shall, in coordination with the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security
Agency, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
and the Secretary of Homeland Security, submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report describing--
(1) any attempts known to the intelligence community by
foreign governments to exploit cybersecurity vulnerabilities
in United States telecommunications networks (including
Signaling System No. 7) to target for surveillance United
States persons, including employees of the Federal
Government; and
(2) any actions, as of the date of the enactment of this
Act, taken by the intelligence community to protect agencies
and personnel of the United States Government from
surveillance conducted by foreign governments.
SEC. 2716. BIENNIAL REPORT ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT RISKS.
(a) Intelligence Community Interagency Working Group.--
(1) Requirement to establish.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall establish an intelligence community
interagency working group to prepare the biennial reports
required by subsection (b).
(2) Chairperson.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall serve as the chairperson of such interagency working
group.
(3) Membership.--Such interagency working group shall be
composed of representatives of each element of the
intelligence community that the Director of National
Intelligence determines appropriate.
(b) Biennial Report on Foreign Investment Risks.--
(1) Report required.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act and not less frequently
than once every 2 years thereafter, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees, the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate, and the Committee on
Homeland Security of the House of Representatives a report on
foreign investment risks prepared by the interagency working
group established under subsection (a).
(2) Elements.--Each report required by paragraph (1) shall
include identification, analysis, and explanation of the
following:
(A) Any current or projected major threats to the national
security of the United States with respect to foreign
investment.
(B) Any strategy used by a foreign country that such
interagency working group has identified to be a country of
special concern to use foreign investment to target the
acquisition of critical technologies, critical materials, or
critical infrastructure.
(C) Any economic espionage efforts directed at the United
States by a foreign country, particularly such a country of
special concern.
[[Page H5884]]
SEC. 2717. MODIFICATION OF CERTAIN REPORTING REQUIREMENT ON
TRAVEL OF FOREIGN DIPLOMATS.
Section 502(d)(2) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 115-31) is amended by striking
``the number'' and inserting ``a best estimate''.
SEC. 2718. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON INVESTIGATIONS OF
UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION.
(a) In General.--Title XI of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3231 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end
the following new section:
``SEC. 1105. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON INVESTIGATIONS OF
UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION.
``(a) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Covered official.--The term `covered official'
means--
``(A) the heads of each element of the intelligence
community; and
``(B) the inspectors general with oversight responsibility
for an element of the intelligence community.
``(2) Investigation.--The term `investigation' means any
inquiry, whether formal or informal, into the existence of an
unauthorized public disclosure of classified information.
``(3) Unauthorized disclosure of classified information.--
The term `unauthorized disclosure of classified information'
means any unauthorized disclosure of classified information
to any recipient.
``(4) Unauthorized public disclosure of classified
information.--The term `unauthorized public disclosure of
classified information' means the unauthorized disclosure of
classified information to a journalist or media organization.
``(b) Intelligence Community Reporting.--
``(1) In general.--Not less frequently than once every 6
months, each covered official shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on
investigations of unauthorized public disclosures of
classified information.
``(2) Elements.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1)
shall include, with respect to the preceding 6-month period,
the following:
``(A) The number of investigations opened by the covered
official regarding an unauthorized public disclosure of
classified information.
``(B) The number of investigations completed by the covered
official regarding an unauthorized public disclosure of
classified information.
``(C) Of the number of such completed investigations
identified under subparagraph (B), the number referred to the
Attorney General for criminal investigation.
``(c) Department of Justice Reporting.--
``(1) In general.--Not less frequently than once every 6
months, the Assistant Attorney General for National Security
of the Department of Justice, in consultation with the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall submit
to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee
on the Judiciary of the Senate, and the Committee on the
Judiciary of the House of Representatives a report on the
status of each referral made to the Department of Justice
from any element of the intelligence community regarding an
unauthorized disclosure of classified information made during
the most recent 365-day period or any referral that has not
yet been closed, regardless of the date the referral was
made.
``(2) Contents.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1)
shall include, for each referral covered by the report, at a
minimum, the following:
``(A) The date the referral was received.
``(B) A statement indicating whether the alleged
unauthorized disclosure described in the referral was
substantiated by the Department of Justice.
``(C) A statement indicating the highest level of
classification of the information that was revealed in the
unauthorized disclosure.
``(D) A statement indicating whether an open criminal
investigation related to the referral is active.
``(E) A statement indicating whether any criminal charges
have been filed related to the referral.
``(F) A statement indicating whether the Department of
Justice has been able to attribute the unauthorized
disclosure to a particular entity or individual.
``(d) Form of Reports.--Each report submitted under this
section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may have
a classified annex.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first
section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by
inserting after the item relating to section 1104 the
following new item:
``Sec. 1105. Semiannual reports on investigations of unauthorized
disclosures of classified information.''.
SEC. 2719. CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION OF DESIGNATION OF
COVERED INTELLIGENCE OFFICER AS PERSONA NON
GRATA.
(a) Covered Intelligence Officer Defined.--In this section,
the term ``covered intelligence officer'' means--
(1) a United States intelligence officer serving in a post
in a foreign country; or
(2) a known or suspected foreign intelligence officer
serving in a United States post.
(b) Requirement for Reports.--Not later than 72 hours after
a covered intelligence officer is designated as a persona non
grata, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation
with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the Committee on Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives a notification of
that designation. Each such notification shall include--
(1) the date of the designation;
(2) the basis for the designation; and
(3) a justification for the expulsion.
SEC. 2720. REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN
VULNERABILITIES EQUITIES PROCESS OF FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Vulnerabilities equities policy and process document.--
The term ``Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process
document'' means the executive branch document entitled
``Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process'' dated
November 15, 2017.
(2) Vulnerabilities equities process.--The term
``Vulnerabilities Equities Process'' means the interagency
review of vulnerabilities, pursuant to the Vulnerabilities
Equities Policy and Process document or any successor
document.
(3) Vulnerability.--The term ``vulnerability'' means a
weakness in an information system or its components (for
example, system security procedures, hardware design, and
internal controls) that could be exploited or could affect
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information.
(b) Reports on Process and Criteria Under Vulnerabilities
Equities Policy and Process.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a written report describing--
(A) with respect to each element of the intelligence
community--
(i) the title of the official or officials responsible for
determining whether, pursuant to criteria contained in the
Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process document or any
successor document, a vulnerability must be submitted for
review under the Vulnerabilities Equities Process; and
(ii) the process used by such element to make such
determination; and
(B) the roles or responsibilities of that element during a
review of a vulnerability submitted to the Vulnerabilities
Equities Process.
(2) Changes to process or criteria.--Not later than 30 days
after any significant change is made to the process and
criteria used by any element of the intelligence community
for determining whether to submit a vulnerability for review
under the Vulnerabilities Equities Process, such element
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
report describing such change.
(3) Form of reports.--Each report submitted under this
subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may
include a classified annex.
(c) Annual Reports.--
(1) In general.--Not less frequently than once each
calendar year, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
classified report containing, with respect to the previous
year--
(A) the number of vulnerabilities submitted for review
under the Vulnerabilities Equities Process;
(B) the number of vulnerabilities described in subparagraph
(A) disclosed to each vendor responsible for correcting the
vulnerability, or to the public, pursuant to the
Vulnerabilities Equities Process; and
(C) the aggregate number, by category, of the
vulnerabilities excluded from review under the
Vulnerabilities Equities Process, as described in paragraph
5.4 of the Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process
document.
(2) Unclassified information.--Each report submitted under
paragraph (1) shall include an unclassified appendix that
contains--
(A) the aggregate number of vulnerabilities disclosed to
vendors or the public pursuant to the Vulnerabilities
Equities Process; and
(B) the aggregate number of vulnerabilities disclosed to
vendors or the public pursuant to the Vulnerabilities
Equities Process known to have been patched.
(3) Non-duplication.--The Director of National Intelligence
may forgo submission of an annual report required under this
subsection for a calendar year, if the Director notifies the
intelligence committees in writing that, with respect to the
same calendar year, an annual report required by paragraph
4.3 of the Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process
document already has been submitted to Congress, and such
annual report contains the information that would otherwise
be required to be included in an annual report under this
subsection.
SEC. 2721. INSPECTORS GENERAL REPORTS ON CLASSIFICATION.
(a) Reports Required.--Not later than October 1, 2019, each
Inspector General listed in subsection (b) shall submit to
the congressional intelligence committees a report that
includes, with respect to the department or agency of the
Inspector General, analyses of the following:
(1) The accuracy of the application of classification and
handling markers on a representative sample of finished
reports, including such reports that are compartmented.
(2) Compliance with declassification procedures.
(3) The effectiveness of processes for identifying topics
of public or historical importance that merit prioritization
for a declassification review.
(b) Inspectors General Listed.--The Inspectors General
listed in this subsection are as follows:
(1) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
(2) The Inspector General of the Central Intelligence
Agency.
(3) The Inspector General of the National Security Agency.
(4) The Inspector General of the Defense Intelligence
Agency.
(5) The Inspector General of the National Reconnaissance
Office.
[[Page H5885]]
(6) The Inspector General of the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency.
SEC. 2722. REPORTS ON GLOBAL WATER INSECURITY AND NATIONAL
SECURITY IMPLICATIONS AND BRIEFING ON EMERGING
INFECTIOUS DISEASE AND PANDEMICS.
(a) Reports on Global Water Insecurity and National
Security Implications.--
(1) Reports required.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act and not less frequently
than once every 5 years thereafter, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report on the implications of water insecurity
on the national security interest of the United States,
including consideration of social, economic, agricultural,
and environmental factors.
(2) Assessment scope and focus.--Each report submitted
under paragraph (1) shall include an assessment of water
insecurity described in such subsection with a global scope,
but focus on areas of the world--
(A) of strategic, economic, or humanitarian interest to the
United States--
(i) that are, as of the date of the report, at the greatest
risk of instability, conflict, human insecurity, or mass
displacement; or
(ii) where challenges relating to water insecurity are
likely to emerge and become significant during the 5-year or
the 20-year period beginning on the date of the report; and
(B) where challenges relating to water insecurity are
likely to imperil the national security interests of the
United States or allies of the United States.
(3) Consultation.--In researching a report required by
paragraph (1), the Director shall consult with--
(A) such stakeholders within the intelligence community,
the Department of Defense, and the Department of State as the
Director considers appropriate; and
(B) such additional Federal agencies and persons in the
private sector as the Director considers appropriate.
(4) Form.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
(b) Briefing on Emerging Infectious Disease and
Pandemics.--
(1) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--In this
subsection, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
House of Representatives; and
(C) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate.
(2) Briefing.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall provide to the appropriate congressional
committees a briefing on the anticipated geopolitical effects
of emerging infectious disease (including deliberate,
accidental, and naturally occurring infectious disease
threats) and pandemics, and their implications on the
national security of the United States.
(3) Content.--The briefing under paragraph (2) shall
include an assessment of--
(A) the economic, social, political, and security risks,
costs, and impacts of emerging infectious diseases on the
United States and the international political and economic
system;
(B) the economic, social, political, and security risks,
costs, and impacts of a major transnational pandemic on the
United States and the international political and economic
system; and
(C) contributing trends and factors to the matters assessed
under subparagraphs (A) and (B).
(4) Examination of response capacity.--In examining the
risks, costs, and impacts of emerging infectious disease and
a possible transnational pandemic under paragraph (3), the
Director of National Intelligence shall also examine in the
briefing under paragraph (2) the response capacity within
affected countries and the international system. In
considering response capacity, the Director shall include--
(A) the ability of affected nations to effectively detect
and manage emerging infectious diseases and a possible
transnational pandemic;
(B) the role and capacity of international organizations
and nongovernmental organizations to respond to emerging
infectious disease and a possible pandemic, and their ability
to coordinate with affected and donor nations; and
(C) the effectiveness of current international frameworks,
agreements, and health systems to respond to emerging
infectious diseases and a possible transnational pandemic.
(5) Form.--The briefing under paragraph (2) may be
classified.
SEC. 2723. ANNUAL REPORT ON MEMORANDA OF UNDERSTANDING
BETWEEN ELEMENTS OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND
OTHER ENTITIES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
REGARDING SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES OR
POLICY.
Section 311 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2017 (50 U.S.C. 3313) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c); and
(2) by striking subsection (a) and inserting the following:
``(a) In General.--Each year, concurrent with the annual
budget request submitted by the President to Congress under
section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, each head of an
element of the intelligence community shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report that lists
each memorandum of understanding or other agreement regarding
significant operational activities or policy entered into
during the most recently completed fiscal year between or
among such element and any other entity of the United States
Government.
``(b) Provision of Documents.--Each head of an element of
an intelligence community who receives a request from the
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate or the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives for a copy of a memorandum of understanding
or other document listed in a report submitted by the head
under subsection (a) shall submit to such committee the
requested copy as soon as practicable after receiving such
request.''.
SEC. 2724. STUDY ON THE FEASIBILITY OF ENCRYPTING
UNCLASSIFIED WIRELINE AND WIRELESS TELEPHONE
CALLS.
(a) Study Required.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall complete a study on the feasibility of
encrypting unclassified wireline and wireless telephone calls
between personnel in the intelligence community.
(b) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date on which
the Director completes the study required by subsection (a),
the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report on the Director's findings with respect
to such study.
SEC. 2725. MODIFICATION OF REQUIREMENT FOR ANNUAL REPORT ON
HIRING AND RETENTION OF MINORITY EMPLOYEES.
(a) Expansion of Period of Report.--Subsection (a) of
section 114 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3050) is amended by inserting ``and the preceding 5 fiscal
years'' after ``fiscal year''.
(b) Clarification on Disaggregation of Data.--Subsection
(b) of such section is amended, in the matter before
paragraph (1), by striking ``disaggregated data by category
of covered person from each element of the intelligence
community'' and inserting ``data, disaggregated by category
of covered person and by element of the intelligence
community,''.
SEC. 2726. REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY LOAN REPAYMENT
AND RELATED PROGRAMS.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) there should be established, through the issuing of an
Intelligence Community Directive or otherwise, an
intelligence community-wide program for student loan
repayment, student loan forgiveness, financial counseling,
and related matters, for employees of the intelligence
community;
(2) creating such a program would enhance the ability of
the elements of the intelligence community to recruit, hire,
and retain highly qualified personnel, including with respect
to mission-critical and hard-to-fill positions;
(3) such a program, including with respect to eligibility
requirements, should be designed so as to maximize the
ability of the elements of the intelligence community to
recruit, hire, and retain highly qualified personnel,
including with respect to mission-critical and hard-to-fill
positions; and
(4) to the extent possible, such a program should be
uniform throughout the intelligence community and publicly
promoted by each element of the intelligence community to
both current employees of the element as well as to
prospective employees of the element.
(b) Report on Potential Intelligence Community-wide
Program.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence, in cooperation with the heads of the elements
of the intelligence community and the heads of any other
appropriate department or agency of the Federal Government,
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
report on potentially establishing and carrying out an
intelligence community-wide program for student loan
repayment, student loan forgiveness, financial counseling,
and related matters, as described in subsection (a).
(2) Matters included.--The report under paragraph (1) shall
include, at a minimum, the following:
(A) A description of the financial resources that the
elements of the intelligence community would require to
establish and initially carry out the program specified in
paragraph (1).
(B) A description of the practical steps to establish and
carry out such a program.
(C) The identification of any legislative action the
Director determines necessary to establish and carry out such
a program.
(c) Annual Reports on Established Programs.--
(1) Covered programs defined.--In this subsection, the term
``covered programs'' means any loan repayment program, loan
forgiveness program, financial counseling program, or similar
program, established pursuant to title X of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3191 et seq.) or any other
provision of law that may be administered or used by an
element of the intelligence community.
(2) Annual reports required.--Not less frequently than once
each year, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit
to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the
covered programs. Each such report shall include, with
respect to the period covered by the report, the following:
(A) The number of personnel from each element of the
intelligence community who used each covered program.
(B) The total amount of funds each element expended for
each such program.
(C) A description of the efforts made by each element to
promote each covered program pursuant to both the personnel
of the element of the intelligence community and to
prospective personnel.
[[Page H5886]]
SEC. 2727. REPEAL OF CERTAIN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.
(a) Correcting Long-standing Material Weaknesses.--Section
368 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2010 (Public Law 110-259; 50 U.S.C. 3051 note) is hereby
repealed.
(b) Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group.--
Section 210D of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C.
124k) is amended--
(1) by striking subsection (c); and
(2) by redesignating subsections (d) through (i) as
subsections (c) through (h), respectively; and
(3) in subsection (c), as so redesignated--
(A) in paragraph (8), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a
period; and
(B) by striking paragraph (9).
(c) Inspector General Report.--Section 8H of the Inspector
General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended--
(1) by striking subsection (g); and
(2) by redesignating subsections (h) and (i) as subsections
(g) and (h), respectively.
SEC. 2728. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
REPORT ON SENIOR EXECUTIVES OF THE OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
(a) Senior Executive Service Position Defined.--In this
section, the term ``Senior Executive Service position'' has
the meaning given that term in section 3132(a)(2) of title 5,
United States Code, and includes any position above the GS-
15, step 10, level of the General Schedule under section 5332
of such title.
(b) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report on the number of Senior
Executive Service positions in the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence.
(c) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (b)
shall include the following:
(1) The number of required Senior Executive Service
positions for the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.
(2) Whether such requirements are reasonably based on the
mission of the Office.
(3) A discussion of how the number of the Senior Executive
Service positions in the Office compare to the number of
senior positions at comparable organizations.
(d) Cooperation.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall provide to the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community any information requested by the Inspector General
of the Intelligence Community that is necessary to carry out
this section by not later than 14 calendar days after the
date on which the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community makes such request.
SEC. 2729. BRIEFING ON FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
OFFERING PERMANENT RESIDENCE TO SOURCES AND
COOPERATORS.
Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees a
briefing on the ability of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation to offer, as an inducement to assisting the
Bureau, permanent residence within the United States to
foreign individuals who are sources or cooperators in
counterintelligence or other national security-related
investigations. The briefing shall address the following:
(1) The extent to which the Bureau may make such offers,
whether independently or in conjunction with other agencies
and departments of the United States Government, including a
discussion of the authorities provided by section
101(a)(15)(S) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(S)), section 7 of the Central Intelligence
Agency Act (50 U.S.C. 3508), and any other provision of law
under which the Bureau may make such offers.
(2) An overview of the policies and operational practices
of the Bureau with respect to making such offers.
(3) The sufficiency of such policies and practices with
respect to inducing individuals to cooperate with, serve as
sources for such investigations, or both.
(4) Whether the Director recommends any legislative actions
to improve such policies and practices, particularly with
respect to the counterintelligence efforts of the Bureau.
SEC. 2730. INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT OF NORTH KOREA REVENUE
SOURCES.
(a) Assessment Required.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of
State for Intelligence and Research and the Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis,
shall produce an intelligence assessment of the revenue
sources of the North Korean regime. Such assessment shall
include revenue from the following sources:
(1) Trade in coal, iron, and iron ore.
(2) The provision of fishing rights to North Korean
territorial waters.
(3) Trade in gold, titanium ore, vanadium ore, copper,
silver, nickel, zinc, or rare earth minerals, and other
stores of value.
(4) Trade in textiles.
(5) Sales of conventional defense articles and services.
(6) Sales of controlled goods, ballistic missiles, and
other associated items.
(7) Other types of manufacturing for export, as the
Director of National Intelligence considers appropriate.
(8) The exportation of workers from North Korea in a manner
intended to generate significant revenue, directly or
indirectly, for use by the government of North Korea.
(9) The provision of nonhumanitarian goods (such as food,
medicine, and medical devices) and services by other
countries.
(10) The provision of services, including banking and other
support, including by entities located in the Russian
Federation, China, and Iran.
(11) Online commercial activities of the Government of
North Korea, including online gambling.
(12) Criminal activities, including cyber-enabled crime and
counterfeit goods.
(b) Elements.--The assessment required under subsection (a)
shall include an identification of each of the following:
(1) The sources of North Korea's funding.
(2) Financial and non-financial networks, including supply
chain management, transportation, and facilitation, through
which North Korea accesses the United States and
international financial systems and repatriates and exports
capital, goods, and services; and
(3) the global financial institutions, money services
business, and payment systems that assist North Korea with
financial transactions.
(c) Submittal to Congress.--Upon completion of the
assessment required under subsection (a), the Director of
National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a copy of such assessment.
SEC. 2731. REPORT ON POSSIBLE EXPLOITATION OF VIRTUAL
CURRENCIES BY TERRORIST ACTORS.
(a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Stop
Terrorist Use of Virtual Currencies Act''.
(b) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence,
in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall
submit to Congress a report on the possible exploitation of
virtual currencies by terrorist actors. Such report shall
include the following elements:
(1) An assessment of the means and methods by which
international terrorist organizations and State sponsors of
terrorism use virtual currencies.
(2) An assessment of the use by terrorist organizations and
State sponsors of terrorism of virtual currencies compared to
the use by such organizations and States of other forms of
financing to support operations, including an assessment of
the collection posture of the intelligence community on the
use of virtual currencies by such organizations and States.
(3) A description of any existing legal impediments that
inhibit or prevent the intelligence community from collecting
information on or helping prevent the use of virtual
currencies by international terrorist organizations and State
sponsors of terrorism and an identification of any gaps in
existing law that could be exploited for illicit funding by
such organizations and States.
(c) Form of Report.--The report required by subsection (b)
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
Subtitle C--Other Matters
SEC. 2741. PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD.
Section 710(b) of the Public Interest Declassification Act
of 2000 (Public Law 106-567; 50 U.S.C. 3161 note) is amended
by striking ``December 31, 2018'' and inserting ``December
31, 2028''.
SEC. 2742. TECHNICAL AND CLERICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL
SECURITY ACT OF 1947.
(a) Table of Contents.--The table of contents at the
beginning of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3001 et seq.) is amended--
(1) by inserting after the item relating to section 2 the
following new item:
``Sec. 3. Definitions.'';
(2) by striking the item relating to section 107;
(3) by striking the item relating to section 113B and
inserting the following new item:
``Sec. 113B. Special pay authority for science, technology,
engineering, or mathematics positions.'';
(4) by striking the items relating to sections 202, 203,
204, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, and 214; and
(5) by inserting after the item relating to section 311 the
following new item:
``Sec. 312. Repealing and saving provisions.''.
(b) Other Technical Corrections.--Such Act is further
amended--
(1) in section 102A--
(A) in subparagraph (G) of paragraph (1) of subsection (g),
by moving the margins of such subparagraph 2 ems to the left;
and
(B) in paragraph (3) of subsection (v), by moving the
margins of such paragraph 2 ems to the left;
(2) in section 106--
(A) by inserting ``sec. 106.'' before ``(a)''; and
(B) in subparagraph (I) of paragraph (2) of subsection (b),
by moving the margins of such subparagraph 2 ems to the left;
(3) by striking section 107;
(4) in section 108(c), by striking ``in both a classified
and an unclassified form'' and inserting ``to Congress in
classified form, but may include an unclassified summary'';
(5) in section 112(c)(1), by striking ``section 103(c)(7)''
and inserting ``section 102A(i)'';
(6) by amending section 201 to read as follows:
``SEC. 201. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.
``Except to the extent inconsistent with the provisions of
this Act or other provisions of law, the provisions of title
5, United States Code, shall be applicable to the Department
of Defense.'';
(7) in section 205, by redesignating subsections (b) and
(c) as subsections (a) and (b), respectively;
(8) in section 206, by striking ``(a)'';
(9) in section 207, by striking ``(c)'';
(10) in section 308(a), by striking ``this Act'' and
inserting ``sections 2, 101, 102, 103, and 303 of this Act'';
(11) by redesignating section 411 as section 312;
[[Page H5887]]
(12) in section 503--
(A) in paragraph (5) of subsection (c)--
(i) by moving the margins of such paragraph 2 ems to the
left; and
(ii) by moving the margins of subparagraph (B) of such
paragraph 2 ems to the left; and
(B) in paragraph (2) of subsection (d), by moving the
margins of such paragraph 2 ems to the left; and
(13) in subparagraph (B) of paragraph (3) of subsection (a)
of section 504, by moving the margins of such subparagraph 2
ems to the right.
SEC. 2743. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY.
(a) National Nuclear Security Administration Act.--
(1) Clarification of functions of the administrator for
nuclear security.--Subsection (b) of section 3212 of the
National Nuclear Security Administration Act (50 U.S.C.
2402(b)) is amended--
(A) by striking paragraphs (11) and (12); and
(B) by redesignating paragraphs (13) through (19) as
paragraphs (11) through (17), respectively.
(2) Counterintelligence programs.--Section 3233(b) of the
National Nuclear Security Administration Act (50 U.S.C.
2423(b)) is amended--
(A) by striking ``Administration'' and inserting
``Department''; and
(B) by inserting ``Intelligence and'' after ``the Office
of''.
(b) Atomic Energy Defense Act.--Section 4524(b)(2) of the
Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2674(b)(2)) is amended
by inserting ``Intelligence and'' after ``The Director of''.
(c) National Security Act of 1947.--Paragraph (2) of
section 106(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3041(b)(2)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (E), by inserting ``and
Counterintelligence'' after ``Office of Intelligence'';
(2) by striking subparagraph (F); and
(3) by redesignating subparagraphs (G), (H), and (I) as
subparagraphs (F), (G), and (H), respectively.
SEC. 2744. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NOTIFICATION OF CERTAIN
DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Adversary foreign government.--The term ``adversary
foreign government'' means the government of any of the
following foreign countries:
(A) North Korea.
(B) Iran.
(C) China.
(D) Russia.
(E) Cuba.
(2) Covered classified information.--The term ``covered
classified information'' means classified information that
was--
(A) collected by an element of the intelligence community;
or
(B) provided by the intelligence service or military of a
foreign country to an element of the intelligence community.
(3) Established intelligence channels.--The term
``established intelligence channels'' means methods to
exchange intelligence to coordinate foreign intelligence
relationships, as established pursuant to law by the Director
of National Intelligence, the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security
Agency, or other head of an element of the intelligence
community.
(4) Individual in the executive branch.--The term
``individual in the executive branch'' means any officer or
employee of the executive branch, including individuals--
(A) occupying a position specified in article II of the
Constitution;
(B) appointed to a position by an individual described in
subparagraph (A); or
(C) serving in the civil service or the Senior Executive
Service (or similar service for senior executives of
particular departments or agencies).
(b) Findings.--Congress finds that section 502 of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3092) requires
elements of the intelligence community to keep the
congressional intelligence committees ``fully and currently
informed'' about all ``intelligence activities'' of the
United States, and to ``furnish to the congressional
intelligence committees any information or material
concerning intelligence activities * * * which is requested
by either of the congressional intelligence committees in
order to carry out its authorized responsibilities.''.
(c) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) section 502 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3092), together with other intelligence community
authorities, obligates an element of the intelligence
community to submit to the congressional intelligence
committees written notification, by not later than 7 days
after becoming aware, that an individual in the executive
branch has disclosed covered classified information to an
official of an adversary foreign government using methods
other than established intelligence channels; and
(2) each such notification should include--
(A) the date and place of the disclosure of classified
information covered by the notification;
(B) a description of such classified information;
(C) identification of the individual who made such
disclosure and the individual to whom such disclosure was
made; and
(D) a summary of the circumstances of such disclosure.
SEC. 2745. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON CONSIDERATION OF ESPIONAGE
ACTIVITIES WHEN CONSIDERING WHETHER OR NOT TO
PROVIDE VISAS TO FOREIGN INDIVIDUALS TO BE
ACCREDITED TO A UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN THE
UNITED STATES.
It is the sense of the Congress that the Secretary of
State, in considering whether or not to provide a visa to a
foreign individual to be accredited to a United Nations
mission in the United States, should consider--
(1) known and suspected intelligence activities, espionage
activities, including activities constituting precursors to
espionage, carried out by the individual against the United
States, foreign allies of the United States, or foreign
partners of the United States; and
(2) the status of an individual as a known or suspected
intelligence officer for a foreign adversary.
The CHAIR. No further amendment to the bill, as amended, shall be in
order except those printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
Each further amendment printed in part B of the report may be offered
only in the order printed in the report, by a Member designated in the
report, shall be considered as read, shall be debatable for the time
specified in the report equally divided and controlled by the proponent
and an opponent, shall not be subject to amendment, and shall not be
subject to a demand for division of the question.
Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Stewart
The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 printed in
part B of House Report 116-154.
Mr. STEWART. Mr. Chairman, as the designee of the gentleman from
Texas (Mr. Burgess), I have an amendment at the desk.
The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Page 224, line 15, insert ``the Committee on Energy and
Commerce,'' after ``Armed Services,''.
Page 224, line 19, insert ``the Committee on Health,
Education, Labor, and Pensions,'' after ``Armed Services,''.
The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman from Utah
(Mr. Stewart) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Utah.
Mr. STEWART. Mr. Chairman, my amendment is very simple. It adds the
House Energy and Commerce Committee and the Senate Health, Education,
Labor, and Pensions Committee to the list of committees that will
receive a briefing from the Director of National Intelligence on
emerging infectious disease and pandemics.
The Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Health has jurisdiction over
all public health and quarantine, as well as the Centers for Disease
Control.
Given the Energy and Commerce Committee's and the Senate Health,
Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee's jurisdiction over the
Assistant Secretary of Preparedness and Response, which plays an
integral role in our Nation's public health and security, it is
imperative that these committees be included in this briefing.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
{time} 1930
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chair, I rise in opposition to the amendment,
although I am not opposed.
The Acting CHAIR (Mr. Thompson of Mississippi). Without objection,
the gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chair, the gentleman from Texas' proposal would allow
the congressional committees with jurisdiction over public health
matters the opportunity to receive a briefing about the effects of
emerging and infectious diseases and pandemics on national security and
the international political and economic system, along with the
Intelligence Committee and Armed Services Committee.
It is critical that Congress be well-informed on the posture of the
United States and, indeed, the rest of the world to address a public
health crisis that might arise in the face of a particularly rapidly
spreading, devastating disease. It is crucial that committees that
oversee public health responses understand how prepared we may be to
address such a crisis.
I support this amendment, and I believe it will be helpful to our
colleagues on the House Energy and Commerce Committee and the Senate
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee to receive this
briefing and information from the DNI, along with the Intelligence,
Armed Services, Foreign Affairs, and Appropriations Committees that are
already included in the bill text.
[[Page H5888]]
For that reason, I support the amendment, and I yield back the
balance of my time.
Mr. STEWART. Mr. Chair, I thank the chairman for supporting the
amendment. I urge adoption of the amendment, and I yield back the
balance of my time
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Utah (Mr. Stewart).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 2 Offered by Mr. Stewart
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 2
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
Mr. STEWART. Mr. Chair, again I rise as the designee of Mr. Burgess,
and I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
At the end of title VII, add the following new section:
SEC. 7___. REMOVAL AND NEUTRALIZATION OF IMSI CATCHERS.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, in
collaboration with the Director of National Intelligence, the
Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, and the
heads of such other Federal agencies as the Secretary
determines appropriate, and following consultation with
appropriate private entities, shall--
(1) undertake an effort to remove or neutralize
unauthorized IMSI catchers installed by foreign entities or
that have an unknown attribution, with prioritization given
to IMSI catchers identified in the National Capital Region;
and
(2) conduct further assessments, not less than once every
90 days, to identify new IMSI catchers for removal or
neutralization.
(b) IMSI Catcher Defined.--The term ``IMSI catcher'' means
an international mobile subscriber identity-catcher or other
device used for intercepting mobile phone identifying
information and location data.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman
from Utah (Mr. Stewart) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Utah.
Mr. STEWART. Mr. Chair, once again, my amendment is simple. It
directs the Secretary of Homeland Security, in collaboration with the
Director of National Intelligence, Chairman of the Federal
Communications Commission, and appropriate private entities, to
undertake an effort to remove or neutralize unauthorized international
mobile subscriber identity catchers, or cell-site simulators, installed
by foreign entities or that have an unknown attribution.
International mobile subscriber identities, IMSI, catchers, or cell-
site simulators, are devices used for intercepting mobile traffic and
location data. They appear to be legitimate cell phone towers that
nearby phones may connect to. Once connected, phone locations can be
tracked.
Some advanced IMSI catchers can even read content, such as messages
and cell phone data. Much remains unknown about the proliferation of
these devices, particularly in the national capital region. However, we
do know that foreign actors have access to and have used these devices.
It is imperative that our intelligence community, with the relevant
agencies and private industry partners, undertake an effort to
neutralize unauthorized IMSI catchers.
Mr. Chair, I urge support of this amendment, and I yield back the
balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Utah (Mr. Stewart).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 3 Offered by Mr. Carson of Indiana
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 3
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
Mr. CARSON of Indiana. Mr. Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
At the end of title VII, add the following new section:
SEC. 7__. PLAN FOR STRENGTHENING THE SUPPLY CHAIN
INTELLIGENCE FUNCTION.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center, in coordination with
the Director of the Defense Counterintelligence and Security
Agency and other interagency partners, shall submit to
Congress a plan for strengthening the supply chain
intelligence function.
(b) Elements.--The plan submitted under subsection (a)
shall address the following:
(1) The appropriate workforce model, including size, mix,
and seniority, from the elements of the intelligence
community and other interagency partners.
(2) The budgetary resources necessary to implement the
plan.
(3) The appropriate governance structure within the
intelligence community and with interagency partners.
(4) The authorities necessary to implement the plan.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman
from Indiana (Mr. Carson) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana.
Mr. CARSON of Indiana. Mr. Chair, first, I thank Chairman Schiff and
Ranking Member Nunes for their work on the Intelligence Authorization
Act this year. It is always a pleasure to serve under Chairman Schiff's
leadership. Without it, the Intelligence Committee would not have been
able to pass such a strong bill out of committee.
I rise today, Mr. Chair, in support of an amendment that I have
offered to the underlying bill text. This amendment will help the
United States protect the integrity of its economic supply chain
infrastructure. I am pleased that my good friend Representative Elise
Stefanik has joined me in cosponsoring this amendment.
Today, businesses and organizations in the United States face an
array of distinct and stealthy threats. The American supply chain is
under repeated attack from foreign intelligence services, cyber
hackers, and sophisticated criminal enterprises.
Unfortunately, experienced adversaries often exploit vulnerabilities
in American companies' technological infrastructure or weak links in
their organizational supply chain so that they can steal their
intellectual property, co-opt equipment from suppliers, damage
software, or conduct surveillance. Moving forward, we must be more
vigilant to stop them.
The Carson-Stefanik amendment, Mr. Chair, will guard against these
grave concerns, and it will lead to stronger safeguards for the supply
chain by mandating the National Counterintelligence and Security Center
to produce a plan within 6 months to strengthen the supply chain
intelligence function within the intelligence community.
The plan, Mr. Chair, will identify personnel with the right expertise
from the intelligence community workforce, outline budgetary and
resource needs, and describe the necessary authorities and governance
structure for future implementation of this plan.
It will inform both the executive branch and Congress' efforts to
enhance our defenses against exploitation of the supply chain.
The United States remains one of the most technologically advanced
economies in the world. Throughout the past century, America has
enjoyed unprecedented economic growth because of the ingenuity of our
people and the technological innovation that undergirds that
entrepreneurial spirit.
While that economic growth has not always been evenly distributed,
and we are still wrestling with debates about economic inequality,
surrendering our technological edge and innovative advantages to
strategic rivals would pose a huge risk to America's future prosperity
and security.
I believe, Mr. Chair, it is very important to offer this amendment,
recognizing the evolving and emerging threats to our Nation's supply
chain infrastructure. In a very rapidly developing global economy, the
intelligence community must work to safeguard the core of what America
and her competitive strength is: economic, intellectual, and
technological ingenuity.
My amendment proactively works toward that goal, ensuring that we
stay on top of those varying threats to our supply chain infrastructure
that emanate from strategic rivals.
In addition to this amendment, Mr. Chair, I would like to highlight
another important part of the base bill. This year's Intelligence
Authorization Act includes an entire section on domestic terrorism. It
is important that we acknowledge domestic terrorism as a very serious
threat, and we must do more than just talk about it as a societal
problem. We must act.
[[Page H5889]]
Domestic terrorism incidents in the U.S. are on the rise, fueled by
hatred, stoked by fear, and inspired by dangerous rhetoric. At a time
when this President is ignoring the truth about domestic terrorism, and
his administration is concealing and hiding the proliferation of white
supremacist-inspired incidents, Congress and the public urgently need
more information to better understand and prevent domestic terrorism.
Specifically, Mr. Chair, this bill would require the FBI, Department
of Homeland Security, and NCTC to produce an annual report on domestic
terrorism. With the reporting that is mandated in the underlying
intelligence authorization bill, we can better determine how to change
the law and make the necessary adjustments to procedures and to
adequately shift current practices in order to fully address the threat
of domestic terrorism and its root causes.
Much of the report, Mr. Chair, would be made available to the public,
increasing transparency, while the full report would be provided to
oversight committees in greater detail. It would be valuable
information and would require an annual strategic assessment on trends
and patterns. Ultimately, it will dramatically expand the information
on domestic terrorism available to Congress and the public.
I urge my colleagues to support the Carson-Stefanik amendment and the
underlying bill, and I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Carson).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Hurd of Texas
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 4
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
Mr. HURD of Texas. Mr. Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
At the end of title V, add the following:
SEC. 5__. ASSESSMENTS REGARDING THE NORTHERN TRIANGLE AND
MEXICO.
(a) Assessments of Activities by Drug Trafficking
Organizations in the Northern Triangle and Mexico.--
(1) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence,
in coordination with the Chief of Intelligence of the Drug
Enforcement Administration and the Assistant Secretary of
State for Intelligence and Research, shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report containing an
analytical assessment of the activities of drug trafficking
organizations in the Northern Triangle and Mexico. Such
assessment shall include, at a minimum--
(A) an assessment of the effect of drug trafficking
organizations on the security and economic situation in the
Northern Triangle;
(B) an assessment of the effect of the activities of drug
trafficking organizations on the migration of persons from
the Northern Triangle to the United States-Mexico border;
(C) a summary of any relevant activities by elements of the
intelligence community in relation to drug trafficking
organizations in the Northern Triangle and Mexico;
(D) a summary of key methods and routes used by drug
trafficking organizations in the Northern Triangle and Mexico
to the United States;
(E) an assessment of the intersection between the
activities of drug trafficking organizations, human
traffickers and human smugglers, and other organized criminal
groups in the Northern Triangle and Mexico; and
(F) an assessment of the illicit funds and financial
transactions that support the activities of drug trafficking
organizations and connected criminal enterprises in the
Northern Triangle and Mexico.
(2) Form.--The report required by paragraph (2) may be
submitted in classified form, but if so submitted, shall
contain an unclassified summary.
(3) Availability.--The report under paragraph (1), or the
unclassified summary of the report described in paragraph
(2), shall be made publicly available.
(b) Assessment of Human Trafficking and Smuggling From the
Northern Triangle to the United States-Mexico Border.--
(1) Report required.--Not later than 90 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence, in coordination with the Under Secretary of
Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis and the
Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research,
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
report containing an analytical assessment of human
trafficking and human smuggling by individuals and
organizations in the Northern Triangle and Mexico. Such
assessment shall include, at a minimum--
(A) an assessment of the effect of human trafficking and
human smuggling on the security and economic situation in the
Northern Triangle;
(B) a summary of any relevant activities by elements of the
intelligence community in relation to human trafficking and
human smuggling in the Northern Triangle and Mexico;
(C) an assessment of the methods and routes used by human
traffickers and human smuggler organizations to move persons
from the Northern Triangle to the United States-Mexico
border;
(D) an assessment of the intersection between the
activities of human traffickers and human smugglers, drug
trafficking organizations, and other organized criminal
groups in the Northern Triangle and Mexico; and
(E) an assessment of the illicit funds and financial
transactions that support the activities of human traffickers
and human smugglers and connected criminal enterprises in the
Northern Triangle and Mexico.
(2) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1) may be
submitted in classified form, but if so submitted, shall
contain an unclassified summary.
(3) Availability.--The report under paragraph (1), or the
unclassified summary of the report described in paragraph
(2), shall be made publicly available.
(c) Prioritization of Intelligence Resources for the
Northern Triangle and Mexico.--
(1) Review of intelligence community efforts in northern
triangle and mexico.--The Director of National Intelligence,
in coordination with the Under Secretary of Homeland Security
for Intelligence and Analysis, the Assistant Secretary of
State for Intelligence and Research, the Chief of
Intelligence of the Drug Enforcement Administration, and
other appropriate officials in the intelligence community,
shall carry out a comprehensive review of the current
intelligence collection priorities of the intelligence
community for the Northern Triangle and Mexico in order to
identify whether such priorities are appropriate and
sufficient in light of the threat posed by the activities of
drug trafficking organizations and human traffickers and
human smugglers to the security of the United States and the
Western Hemisphere.
(2) Report and briefings.--
(A) Report on initial review.--Not later than 120 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of
National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a comprehensive description of the
results of the review required by paragraph (1), including
whether the priorities described in that paragraph are
appropriate and sufficient in light of the threat posed by
the activities of drug trafficking organizations and human
traffickers and human smugglers to the security of the United
States and the Western Hemisphere. If the report concludes
that such priorities are not so appropriate and sufficient,
the report shall also include a description of the actions to
be taken to modify such priorities in order to assure that
such priorities are so appropriate and sufficient.
(B) Quarterly briefings.--Not later than 90 days after the
date on which the report under subparagraph (A) is submitted,
and every 90 days thereafter for a 5-year period, the
Director of National Intelligence shall provide to the
congressional intelligence committees a briefing on the
intelligence community's collection priorities and activities
in the Northern Triangle and Mexico with a focus on the
threat posed by the activities of drug trafficking
organizations and human traffickers and human smugglers to
the security of the United States and the Western Hemisphere.
The first briefing under this subparagraph shall also include
a description of the amount of funds expended by the
intelligence community to the efforts described in paragraph
(1) during each of fiscal years 2018 and 2019.
(3) Form.--The report and briefings required by paragraph
(2) may be submitted or provided in classified form, but if
so submitted or provided, shall include an unclassified
summary.
(d) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Homeland Security, and the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
(2) Human trafficking.--The term ``human trafficking'' has
the meaning given the term ``severe forms of trafficking in
persons'' by section 103 of the Victims of Trafficking and
Violence Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7102).
(3) Northern triangle.--The term ``Northern Triangle''
means El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman
from Texas (Mr. Hurd) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. HURD of Texas. Mr. Chair, I am proud to join my good friend and
fellow
[[Page H5890]]
former CIA officer, the gentlewoman from the Commonwealth of Virginia,
to offer this bipartisan amendment that would direct the intelligence
community to prioritize resources to address the humanitarian crisis at
the border, in the Northern Triangle, and also in Mexico.
I represent more of the southern border than any other Member of
Congress. The root causes of this current crisis are violence, extreme
poverty, and lack of economic opportunity in the Northern Triangle--El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.
Drug cartels, human traffickers, and human smugglers are making this
crisis worse and putting innocent lives at risk. They profit while
people in Central America suffer and entire nations are destabilized.
Our intelligence community is not maximizing the use of our
intelligence to deny and disrupt these operations.
In June, we all know that 104,000 people were detained at our border.
Almost every one of them had a phone number of a smuggler, a license
plate of a bus that brought them here, or a pickup location in their
home country.
Understanding and disabling these smuggling and trafficking networks
should be a national intelligence priority. This amendment would
require the Director of National Intelligence to conduct a review of
intelligence collection priorities in the Northern Triangle and Mexico
and then provide quarterly briefings to Congress regarding the
intelligence community activities in this region.
These individuals and organizations threaten the security of the
United States and the Western Hemisphere, and we should be using
intelligence to stop them.
I urge my colleagues to support this amendment, and I reserve the
balance of my time.
Ms. SPANBERGER. Mr. Chair, I rise in opposition to the amendment,
although I am not opposed.
The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentlewoman from Virginia is
recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Ms. SPANBERGER. Mr. Chair, I am proud to introduce this amendment
alongside my colleague, Congressman Hurd from Texas, who is also a
former CIA case officer.
Our bipartisan amendment, the Trafficking and Smuggling Intelligence
Act, comes at a time of great hardship, violence, and heartbreak across
Mexico and the Northern Triangle countries and at a time of crisis at
our southern border.
The volatility in our backyard should be cause for serious concern.
Here in the United States, we have experienced the devastating effects
of the drug trade on the health of our citizens. On our southwest
border, we have witnessed how ongoing violence and instability in
Central America is a driving factor for increased migration toward the
United States.
Our bipartisan amendment would require intelligence assessments of
drug trafficking organizations, human trafficking organizations, and
human smugglers across Mexico and the Northern Triangle.
{time} 1945
These would include reports that could be released publicly to the
American people.
Our amendment would direct our public servants to use their expertise
to better understand the root causes of violence, instability, and
migration. With these improved assessments from DNI, we would be able
to strengthen our national security in the face of threats from
traffickers, smugglers, and other criminal organizations.
Like so many of our colleagues, Congressman Hurd and I recognize that
if we are to keep Americans safe while also responsibly addressing the
situation at the border, we must address the conditions at the core of
the instability we are seeing in Central America.
Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to join
us in supporting this amendment, and I yield back the balance of my
time.
Mr. HURD of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I am looking forward to working on
more pieces of legislation with my friend from the Commonwealth of
Virginia, and I want to thank both of the gentlemen from California and
their teams for helping us perfect this to get this important piece of
legislation onto the floor.
Again, Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this amendment,
and I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Hurd).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 5 offered by Mr. Thompson of Mississippi
The Acting CHAIR (Ms. Spanberger). It is now in order to consider
amendment No. 5 printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the
desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Page 62, after line 4 insert the following:
(6) Applicable Federal requirements and compliance by the
Federal Government with privacy, civil rights, and civil
liberties policies and protections with respect to the
production of the report, including protections against the
public release of names or other personally identifiable
information of individuals involved in incidents,
investigations, indictments, prosecutions, or convictions for
which data is reported under this section.
Page 62, after line 16 insert the following (and
redesignate the succeeding clauses):
(ii) the date and location of such incident;
Page 65, line 18, strike ``and'' at the end.
Page 66, line 9, strike the period at the end and insert
``; and''.
Page 66, after line 9 insert the following:
(ix) with respect to the Office of Intelligence and
Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security, the number
of staff (expressed in terms of full-time equivalents and
positions) working on matters relating to domestic terrorism
described in clauses (i) through (vi).
Page 69, after line 7 insert the following:
(h) Information Quality.--Each report submitted under
subsection (a), to the extent applicable, shall comply with
the guidelines issued by the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget pursuant to section 515 of title V of
the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001 (Public Law 106-
554; 114 Stat. 2763A-154).
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman
from Mississippi (Mr. Thompson) and a Member opposed each will control
5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Mississippi.
Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as
I may consume.
Madam Chair, I rise to offer an amendment to title VI of H.R. 3494
titled Federal Efforts Against Domestic Terrorism. I am pleased to see
that this title was significantly informed by my bill, H.R. 3106, the
Domestic Terrorism DATA Act which the Homeland Security Committee will
be considering tomorrow.
I am glad to have the opportunity to work with Chairman Schiff and
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on this text.
My legislation, which requires the government to produce an annual
domestic terrorism report, was the product of more than 5 months of
engagement with outside stakeholders and experts. As a result of that
consultation process, I included protections for civil rights, civil
liberties, privacy, and data quality in my bill. These provisions made
my bill stronger. My amendment to H.R. 3494 would require that these
very protections are included.
Madam Chair, my amendment also requires additional information be
included in the government's domestic terrorism report. Requiring the
date and location of each incident of terrorism or investigation of
terrorism will help Congress and the public better understand the
landscape of domestic terrorism.
Madam Chair, I urge my colleagues to support my amendment, and I
yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, I was going to request the chairman yield me
1 minute of time.
Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Madam Chair, I yield 1 minute to the
gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff).
The Acting CHAIR (Mrs. Dingell). Does the gentleman seek unanimous
consent to reclaim his time?
Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Yes.
The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Mississippi
is recognized for the balance of his time.
There was no objection.
Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Madam Chair, I yield such time as he may
consume to the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff).
[[Page H5891]]
Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, this amendment clarifies section 602 of the
bill dealing with domestic terrorism. This section would require the
FBI, DHS, and the National Counterterrorism Center to produce an annual
report and joint strategic intelligence assessment on domestic
terrorism.
Chairman Thompson's amendment would add safeguards to protect the
civil liberties and privacy of individuals whose information would be
contained in the report and mandate compliance with the Data Quality
Act.
It also would require DHS to disclose information on the allocation
of personnel working domestic terrorism matters, enhancing oversight in
this area.
I would like to recognize Chairman Thompson for his work that the
House Homeland Security Committee has done on the issue of domestic
terrorism. Together we will continue our lines of effort to address
this significant threat.
Once again, Madam Chair, I thank my colleague for his work, and I
urge support for the amendment.
Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of
my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. Thompson).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 6 Offered by Mr. Ruppersberger
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 6
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
At the end of title VII, add the following new section:
SEC. 7___. SECURING ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of
the Senate; and
(C) the Committee on Homeland Security and the Committee on
Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives.
(2) Covered entity.--The term ``covered entity'' means an
entity identified pursuant to section 9(a) of Executive Order
13636 of February 12, 2013 (78 Fed. Reg. 11742), relating to
identification of critical infrastructure where a
cybersecurity incident could reasonably result in
catastrophic regional or national effects on public health or
safety, economic security, or national security.
(3) Exploit.--The term ``exploit'' means a software tool
designed to take advantage of a security vulnerability.
(4) Industrial control system.--The term ``industrial
control system'' means an operational technology used to
measure, control, or manage industrial functions, and
includes supervisory control and data acquisition systems,
distributed control systems, and programmable logic or
embedded controllers.
(5) National laboratory.--The term ``National Laboratory''
has the meaning given the term in section 2 of the Energy
Policy Act of 2005 (42 U.S.C. 15801).
(6) Program.--The term ``Program'' means the pilot program
established under subsection (b).
(7) Secretary.--Except as otherwise specifically provided,
the term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of Energy.
(8) Security vulnerability.--The term ``security
vulnerability'' means any attribute of hardware, software,
process, or procedure that could enable or facilitate the
defeat of a security control.
(b) Pilot Program for Securing Energy Infrastructure.--Not
later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Secretary shall establish a 2-year control systems
implementation pilot program within the National Laboratories
for the purposes of--
(1) partnering with covered entities in the energy sector
(including critical component manufacturers in the supply
chain) that voluntarily participate in the Program to
identify new classes of security vulnerabilities of the
covered entities; and
(2) evaluating technology and standards, in partnership
with covered entities, to isolate and defend industrial
control systems of covered entities from security
vulnerabilities and exploits in the most critical systems of
the covered entities, including--
(A) analog and nondigital control systems;
(B) purpose-built control systems; and
(C) physical controls.
(c) Working Group to Evaluate Program Standards and Develop
Strategy.--
(1) Establishment.--The Secretary shall establish a working
group--
(A) to evaluate the technology and standards used in the
Program under subsection (b)(2); and
(B) to develop a national cyber-informed engineering
strategy to isolate and defend covered entities from security
vulnerabilities and exploits in the most critical systems of
the covered entities.
(2) Membership.--The working group established under
paragraph (1) shall be composed of not fewer than 10 members,
to be appointed by the Secretary, at least 1 member of which
shall represent each of the following:
(A) The Department of Energy.
(B) The energy industry, including electric utilities and
manufacturers recommended by the Energy Sector coordinating
councils.
(C)(i) The Department of Homeland Security; or
(ii) the Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency
Response Team.
(D) The North American Electric Reliability Corporation.
(E) The Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
(F)(i) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence;
or
(ii) the intelligence community (as defined in section 3 of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)).
(G)(i) The Department of Defense; or
(ii) the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Security and America's Security Affairs.
(H) A State or regional energy agency.
(I) A national research body or academic institution.
(J) The National Laboratories.
(d) Reports on the Program.--
(1) Interim report.--Not later than 180 days after the date
on which funds are first disbursed under the Program, the
Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees an interim report that--
(A) describes the results of the Program;
(B) includes an analysis of the feasibility of each method
studied under the Program; and
(C) describes the results of the evaluations conducted by
the working group established under subsection (c)(1).
(2) Final report.--Not later than 2 years after the date on
which funds are first disbursed under the Program, the
Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a final report that--
(A) describes the results of the Program;
(B) includes an analysis of the feasibility of each method
studied under the Program; and
(C) describes the results of the evaluations conducted by
the working group established under subsection (c)(1).
(e) Exemption From Disclosure.--Information shared by or
with the Federal Government or a State, Tribal, or local
government under this section--
(1) shall be deemed to be voluntarily shared information;
(2) shall be exempt from disclosure under section 552 of
title 5, United States Code, or any provision of any State,
Tribal, or local freedom of information law, open government
law, open meetings law, open records law, sunshine law, or
similar law requiring the disclosure of information or
records; and
(3) shall be withheld from the public, without discretion,
under section 552(b)(3) of title 5, United States Code, and
any provision of any State, Tribal, or local law requiring
the disclosure of information or records.
(f) Protection From Liability.--
(1) In general.--A cause of action against a covered entity
for engaging in the voluntary activities authorized under
subsection (b)--
(A) shall not lie or be maintained in any court; and
(B) shall be promptly dismissed by the applicable court.
(2) Voluntary activities.--Nothing in this section subjects
any covered entity to liability for not engaging in the
voluntary activities authorized under subsection (b).
(g) No New Regulatory Authority for Federal Agencies.--
Nothing in this section authorizes the Secretary or the head
of any other department or agency of the Federal Government
to issue new regulations.
(h) Authorization of Appropriations.--
(1) Pilot program.--There is authorized to be appropriated
$10,000,000 to carry out subsection (b).
(2) Working group and report.--There is authorized to be
appropriated $1,500,000 to carry out subsections (c) and (d).
(3) Availability.--Amounts made available under paragraphs
(1) and (2) shall remain available until expended.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman
from Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger) and a Member opposed each will
control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Maryland.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Madam Chair, I rise today in strong support of my amendment to
protect the energy grid from cybersecurity threats.
In the 4 years since the Ukraine power grid attack, our enemies have
doubled down on their effort to target cybersecurity vulnerabilities in
our
[[Page H5892]]
Nation's energy infrastructure, especially within industrial control
systems. The 2015 Ukraine grid intrusion orchestrated by the Russians
was a turning point in industrial cybersecurity. For the first time,
hackers penetrated industrial controls of a power plant with the goal
of causing widespread disruption.
Both the security and economic consequences of a destructive attack
on our energy grid cannot be overstated. We can no longer wait to
address these threats. My amendment will ensure we continue to develop
the ability to both discover vulnerabilities and keep an eye on
emerging threats that could disrupt electricity generation or even cost
lives.
I want to thank our government partners, including the Cybersecurity
and Infrastructure Security Agency, CISA, the intelligence community,
the Department of Energy, and national labs. I look forward to working
with all these stakeholders to ensure that we are implementing grid
security measures in a responsible way consistent with existing law and
authorities. As a member of the Homeland Security Subcommittee on
Appropriations, I fully intend to help leverage the authorization in
this amendment to supplement the already great effort underway at CISA
and other government agencies.
Also I want to thank the many talented computer scientists,
cybersecurity experts, and engineers from the private sector,
especially the team at Dragos, a cybersecurity firm focused on
industrial controls, located in my district in Hanover, Maryland, for
all the hard work they do in this space to not only defend against
threats but to educate others.
Our amendment is simple and mirrors language already passed by the
overwhelming bipartisan majority in the Senate's Intelligence
Authorization Act. Senator King from Maine has been a stalwart force on
this issue, and none of this would have happened without his
determination and vision on this issue.
The amendment sets up a 2-year pilot program to identify the classes
of security vulnerabilities in the grid. It establishes a working group
to evaluate the technology solutions proposed by the pilot program. The
working group would include government agencies, the energy industry,
and other experts.
Lastly, it requires the Department of Energy to submit a report to
the relevant congressional committees describing the results of the
program.
Finally, I want to thank Judge Carter from Texas who has led the
charge on this issue with me in the House since last Congress. Judge
Carter is a good friend, and I appreciate his help on this important
issue.
Madam Chair, this amendment will help the intelligence community and
the government at large better understand the vulnerabilities to
certain aspects of our energy grid.
Madam Chair, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman
from California (Mr. Schiff), who is the distinguished chairman of the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
I rise in strong support of the amendment offered by my colleagues
from Maryland and Texas which mirrors language passed in the Senate's
intelligence authorization bill last month. This provision would bring
together government entities and the energy sector in a pilot program
for purposes of evaluating and strengthening industrial control systems
and related critical infrastructure elements against security
vulnerabilities and exploits.
The cyber threats faced by our critical infrastructure remain a
persistent national security concern, as the former ranking member of
our committee, the distinguished Mr. Ruppersberger, knows all too well.
DNI Coats likewise warned in the most recent unclassified Worldwide
Threat Assessment about the capabilities of our adversaries to hold
U.S. critical infrastructure at risk.
This measure is another line of effort toward securing that
infrastructure against outside cyberattacks and disruptions, and I am
very proud to support the work of my colleague and friend.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chair, I yield such time as he may consume
to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Carter).
Mr. CARTER of Texas. Madam Chair, I thank my friend for yielding.
Madam Chair, today I rise in strong support of the Ruppersberger-
Carter amendment to help secure the energy infrastructure. Now is the
time to address electrical grid security. Grid attacks are a powerful
weapon in the cyber toolkit of really bad actors.
As the two previous speakers said, a cyberattack in Ukraine wiped out
their power grid, and over 225,000 people were without power. The
Office of the Director of National Intelligence in their 2019 Worldwide
Threat Assessment makes numerous mentions of our adversaries' mapping
out grid systems, identifying our weaknesses, and developing the very
real and deadly capacity to attack our grid system. A targeted attack
on our Nation could be devastating.
Securing our energy infrastructure is especially critical in Texas
which maintains an independent electric grid.
The Acting CHAIR. The time of the gentleman from Maryland has
expired.
Mr. CARTER of Texas. Madam Chair, I claim the time in opposition to
the amendment, although I do not oppose the amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Texas is
recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. CARTER of Texas. Madam Chair, the Electric Reliability Council of
Texas is located in Taylor, Texas, which is about 19 miles from my
house, and it manages 90 percent of my home State's electrical load.
Understanding where our system's weak spots are will enhance ERCOT's
work to ensure that we have the most stable and secure energy network
in the world.
Our amendment addresses the serious topic of electrical grid security
by leveraging the unique aspects of national laboratories to establish
solutions to defend the United States energy grid from attacks and to
ensure the resiliency of operation during and after an event.
It establishes a 2-year pilot program to study and identify new
classes of security vulnerabilities, and research and test technologies
that could be used to isolate the most critical systems from
cyberattacks.
It creates working groups to develop a national cyber-informed
strategy to protect our energy grids.
This amendment is a commonsense approach to solving grid security. I
am proud to work across the aisle with my good friend and colleague,
Dutch Ruppersberger, on this important issue.
Madam Chair, I urge support of this amendment, and I yield back the
balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger).
The amendment was agreed to.
{time} 2000
Amendment No. 7 Offered by Mr. Chabot
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 7
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
Mr. CHABOT. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Page 35, strike line 4 through page 42, line 5.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman
from Ohio (Mr. Chabot) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio.
Mr. CHABOT. Madam Chair, I rise this evening to offer a commonsense
amendment to H.R. 3494.
My amendment simply strikes Section 401, which creates the Climate
Security Advisory Council. And I thank the gentleman from South
Carolina (Mr. Duncan) for his leadership, and also cosponsoring this
particular amendment.
This council is not the most responsible use of the valuable manpower
and funding of the intelligence community, especially since the
Director of National Intelligence did not even request that we create
such an organization. The Federal Government already has vast resources
devoted to the climate issue.
Any climate security intelligence work should be in the context of
larger intelligence matters affecting major regions around the world
and the U.S. national security infrastructure.
[[Page H5893]]
Additionally, many of the existing intelligence organizations already
do much of this work on their own, including the CIA. Section 401 would
just create unneeded redundancy across the intelligence community.
If the goal is to ensure that we allocate our resources efficiently,
we should instead require a report to Congress from the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence outlining the necessity for the
Climate Security Council before Congress establishes the organization
or appropriates any funding.
Madam Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. For what purpose does the gentleman--
Mr. DUNCAN. Madam Chair, I rise in favor of the Chabot amendment.
Our country faces serious threats around the globe. We have cyber
threats coming from China, Russia, and Iran, and others. Iran is also
pursuing nuclear weapons that threaten our friends and our ally,
Israel, and indeed the rest of the world.
While ISIS is defeated and on the run, radical islamic terrorism
remains one of our Nation's greatest threats, thanks in part to Iran's
actions as a leading state sponsor of terrorism.
It is, therefore, extremely irresponsible to take our attention and
resources off of these known and proven threats to American national
security and divert those funds and attention to climate change.
The intelligence community, which is tasked with protecting Americans
from fiscal and cyberattacks, should not bear the burden of silly,
politically correct, left-wing social policy. But just as Democrats
politicized military policy with the NDAA, here they go again with the
intelligence policy.
That is a mistake, it is irresponsible, and that is why I support
this amendment to strip out this silly idea and refocus the
intelligence community on the actual threats to our national security.
Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. CHABOT. Madam Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Ohio has the only time
remaining.
Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, I rise in opposition to the amendment and
claim time in opposition, therefore.
The Acting CHAIR. The time in opposition has already been claimed.
Would the gentleman from Ohio yield to your colleague from--
Mr. CHABOT. Madam Chair, may I inquire as to how much time I have
remaining?
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Ohio has 2\1/2\ minutes
remaining.
Mr. CHABOT. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Madam Chair, I want to quote a great American President, Ronald
Reagan.
Parliamentary Inquiry
Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, may I make a parliamentary inquiry?
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from California will state his
parliamentary inquiry.
Mr. SCHIFF. Did the Chair offer time in opposition to the amendment?
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from South Carolina claimed the time.
The Chair looked to see who was seeking recognition, and went to the
gentleman who was standing.
Mr. HECK. Madam Chair, I was standing when he was recognized. The
gentleman from Ohio did not yield to him. And when he asked to claim
time in opposition, he did not say ``although I am not opposed.'' And
you did not, therefore, ask if there was no objection.
He was not legitimately recognized.
Mr. CHABOT. Madam Chair, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman
be granted 5 minutes in opposition, but I have a little time left.
Madam Chair, I have no objection to the gentleman offering his
opposition to this.
The Acting CHAIR. That unanimous consent request cannot be
entertained in the Committee of the Whole.
Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, I am sorry. I couldn't hear the ruling of
the Chair.
The gentleman asked for unanimous consent.
The Acting CHAIR. The Parliamentarian advised that the request cannot
be entertained in the Committee of the Whole.
Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, well, if my colleagues in the minority--I
don't know how much time they have both on the amendment and on the
time in opposition to the amendment--but if they can yield to my
colleague to make sure that he has time for his remarks out of both of
their time, I think we can resolve this.
Mr. CHABOT. There is 2\1/2\ minutes left. Is that correct?
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Ohio has 2\1/2\ minutes
remaining.
Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, the gentleman offering the amendment has how
much time? Because they claimed both the time on the amendment--
The Acting CHAIR. The proponent of the amendment has 2\1/2\ minutes
remaining.
Mr. SCHIFF. So no one claimed the time in opposition?
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from South Carolina claimed the time
and yielded back.
Mr. SCHIFF. Okay. So there should be 5 minutes.
Mr. HECK. He asked for time in opposition but did not state that he
was not opposed.
You did not ask if, therefore, there was no objection. He was not
legitimately recognized.
The offerer of the amendment did not yield to him. The gentleman from
South Carolina claimed time in opposition but did not say ``although I
am not opposed.'' He supported the amendment. And you did not ask if
there was no objection.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman will suspend.
The gentleman claimed the time, and then he yielded back his time.
Mr. HECK. Madam Chair, you didn't ask if there was no objection,
which is the customary practice.
The Acting CHAIR. All time claimed by the gentleman from South
Carolina has been yielded back.
Mr. CHABOT. Madam Chair, I still have 2\1/2\ minutes, is that
correct, because I reserved my time?
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Ohio has the only time
remaining.
Mr. CHABOT. Madam Chair, I would like to make a unanimous consent
request that there be an opposition that gets 5 minutes and that I can
close with my 2\1/2\ minutes.
We are trying to be fair here, and we are happy to give our
colleagues on the other side of the aisle 5 minutes to offer their
opposition.
The Acting CHAIR. The Parliamentarian advises that the request cannot
be entertained in the Committee of the Whole.
Mr. CHABOT. Madam Chair, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from
Washington (Mr. Heck). I will just take 1 minute to wrap up.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman is recognized.
Mr. CHABOT. Madam Chair, I have 2\1/2\ minutes. Is that right?
The Acting CHAIR. Yes. The gentleman is recognized.
Mr. CHABOT. Madam Chair, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from
Washington (Mr. Heck).
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman yields 1\1/2\ minutes to the
gentleman from Washington?
Mr. CHABOT. Madam Chair, 2 minutes in opposition.
Mr. SCHIFF. If I could, Madam Chair, through the Chair to my
colleague, I appreciate that. We will take you up on that. And on the
next amendment that we have time, I will yield to my colleague, and
your colleague may yield to you, if you have further comments you want
to make on this issue.
Mr. CHABOT. Madam Chair, I have 2\1/2\ minutes. I yield 1\1/2\
minutes to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Heck). So I have 1 minute
left.
Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, I thank the gentleman through the Chair.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Washington is recognized for
1\1/2\ minutes.
Mr. HECK. Madam Chair, I thank very much the graciousness of the
gentleman from Ohio, although I think his amendment is wrongheaded.
Here is what is real:
Climate change is real, number one.
Number two, it has significant national security implications.
Number three, the only smart thing to do is to borrow the old motto
from the Boy Scouts, ``Be prepared.'' Passage of this amendment, which
would remove the Climate Security Advisory Council, renders us less
prepared.
[[Page H5894]]
We all know that the intelligence community and the DOD have, time
and again, assessed the measurable effects of climate change--rising
sea levels, higher temperatures, more frequent extreme weather events,
new stressors on natural resources and agriculture--have tangible
impacts that exacerbate economic distress, human insecurity, political
instability, and other humanitarian conditions detrimental to our
national security.
The smart thing to do is to be prepared, to have the advisory council
that can work across the intelligence community, that can collect the
information, coordinate the information, so that we know what is
coming, we know what we are being presented with, and we can confront
it in a smart way.
Madam Chair, I urge my colleagues to please defeat this amendment and
pass the underlying bill.
Mr. CHABOT. Madam Chair, I think I have 1 minute left.
I thought perhaps the gentleman wanted to support my amendment, but
he called it wrongheaded. I am just shocked.
Madam Chair, in closing, this council is a redundant, unnecessary use
of manpower funding. We need our intelligence community focused on the
most critical threats facing our Nation, specifically,
counterterrorism, Iran, China, Russia, North Korea.
If this council is something that the Director of National
Intelligence believes is critical to our country, he should come to
Congress and make such a request, and to my knowledge, that has not
occurred. Madam Chair, until he does, I urge my colleagues to support
this amendment and remove this provision from the bill.
I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. All time for debate has expired.
The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio
(Mr. Chabot).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
Mr. CHABOT. Madam Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio will be
postponed.
Amendment No. 8 Offered by Mr. Schiff
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 8
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, I rise to offer this amendment as the
designee of Representative Green of Texas and Representative Connolly.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
At the end of title VII, add the following new section:
SEC. 7__. COLLECTION, ANALYSIS, AND DISSEMINATION OF
WORKFORCE DATA.
(a) Initial Reporting.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and subject to paragraph (3), the
Director of National Intelligence shall make available to the
public, the appropriate congressional committees, and the
workforce of the intelligence community a report which
includes aggregate demographic data and other information
regarding the diversity and inclusion efforts of the
workforce of the intelligence community.
(2) Contents.--A report made available under paragraph
(1)--
(A) shall include unclassified reports and barrier analyses
relating to diversity and inclusion efforts;
(B) shall include aggregate demographic data--
(i) by segment of the workforce of the intelligence
community and grade or rank;
(ii) relating to attrition and promotion rates;
(iii) that addresses the compliance of the intelligence
community with validated inclusion metrics, such as the New
Inclusion Quotient index score; and
(iv) that provides demographic comparisons to the relevant
nongovernmental labor force and the relevant civilian labor
force;
(C) shall include an analysis of applicant flow data,
including the percentage and level of positions for which
data are collected, and a discussion of any resulting policy
changes or recommendations;
(D) shall include demographic data relating to participants
in professional development programs of the intelligence
community and the rate of placement into senior positions for
participants in such programs;
(E) shall include any voluntarily collected demographic
data relating to the membership of any external advisory
committee or board to which individuals in senior positions
in the intelligence community appoint members; and
(F) may include data in proportions or percentages to
account for concerns relating to the protection of classified
information.
(b) Updates.--After making available a report under
subsection (a), the Director of National Intelligence shall
annually provide a report (which may be provided as part of
an annual report required under another provision of law) to
the workforce of the intelligence community (including senior
leadership), the public, and the appropriate congressional
committees that includes--
(1) demographic data and information on the status of
diversity and inclusion efforts of the intelligence
community;
(2) an analysis of applicant flow data, including the
percentage and level of positions for which data are
collected, and a discussion of any resulting policy changes
or recommendations; and
(3) demographic data relating to participants in
professional development programs of the intelligence
community and the rate of placement into senior positions for
participants in such programs.
(c) Expand the Collection and Analysis of Voluntary
Applicant Flow Data.--
(1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall develop a system to collect and analyze applicant flow
data for as many positions within the intelligence community
as practicable, in order to identify areas for improvement in
attracting diverse talent, with particular attention to
senior and management positions.
(2) Phased implementation.--The collection of applicant
flow data may be implemented by the Director of National
Intelligence in a phased approach commensurate with the
resources available to the intelligence community.
(d) Identify Additional Categories for Voluntary Data
Collection of Current Employees.--
(1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence may
submit to the Office of Management and Budget and to the
appropriate congressional committees a recommendation
regarding whether the intelligence community should
voluntarily collect more detailed data on demographic
categories in addition to the race and ethnicity categories
specified in the statistical policy directive issued by the
Office of Management and Budget entitled ``Standards for
Maintaining, Collecting, and Presenting Federal Data on Race
and Ethnicity''.
(2) Process.--In making a recommendation under paragraph
(1), the Director of National Intelligence shall--
(A) engage in close consultation with internal
stakeholders, such as employee resource or affinity groups;
(B) ensure that there is clear communication with the
workforce of the intelligence community--
(i) to explain the purpose of the potential collection of
such data; and
(ii) regarding legal protections relating to any
anticipated use of such data; and
(C) ensure adherence to relevant standards and guidance
issued by the Federal Government.
(e) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Applicant flow data.--The term ``applicant flow data''
means data that tracks the rate of applications for job
positions among demographic categories.
(2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Armed Services, the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, the Select Committee on Intelligence,
and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Armed Services, the Committee on Homeland Security, the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee
on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(3) Diversity.--The term ``diversity'' means diversity of
persons based on gender, race, ethnicity, disability status,
veteran status, sexual orientation, gender identity, national
origin, and other demographic categories.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman
from California (Mr. Schiff) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.
Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, I am happy to support the amendment offered
by Representative Green and Representative Connolly, which would
require the Director of National Intelligence to make publicly
available its annual report that aggregates demographic data and other
information regarding the diversity and inclusion efforts within the
intelligence community.
The amendment would expand the elements that the DNI must report on
to include grade-level attrition and promotion rates, as well as
validated metrics, such as New Inclusion Quotient Index scores.
The IQ initiative is designed to help employees and managers foster
diversity and inclusion in the workplace.
[[Page H5895]]
This amendment is important as we strive to significantly improve
hiring and retention in the IC such that the workforce mirrors the
American population. It is imperative that we have better visibility
into the demographics of our current workforce to legislate well-
informed change.
Again, I thank my colleagues for their work, and I am happy to
support the amendment and urge my colleagues to do the same.
Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 9 Offered by Mr. Case
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 9
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
Mr. CASE. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows
At the end of title VII, add the following new section:
SEC. 708. REPORT ON BEST PRACTICES TO PROTECT PRIVACY AND
CIVIL LIBERTIES OF CHINESE AMERICANS.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the People's Republic of China appears to be
specifically targeting the Chinese-American community for
intelligence purposes;
(2) such targeting carries a substantial risk that the
loyalty of such Americans may be generally questioned and
lead to unacceptable stereotyping, targeting and racial
profiling;
(3) the United States Government has a duty to warn and
protect all Americans including those of Chinese descent from
these intelligence efforts by the People's Republic of China;
(4) the broad stereotyping, targeting and racial profiling
of Americans of Chinese descent is contrary to the values of
the United States and reinforces the flawed narrative
perpetuated by the People's Republic of China that ethnically
Chinese individuals worldwide have a duty to support the
People's Republic of China; and
(5) the United States efforts to combat the People's
Republic of China's intelligence activities should actively
safeguard and promote the constitutional rights of all
Chinese Americans.
(b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence,
acting through the Office of Civil Liberties, Privacy, and
Transparency, in coordination with the civil liberties and
privacy officers of the elements of the intelligence
community, shall submit a report to the congressional
intelligence committees containing--
(1) a review of how the policies, procedures, and practices
of the intelligence community that govern the intelligence
activities and operations targeting the People's Republic of
China affect policies, procedures, and practices relating to
the privacy and civil liberties of Americans of Chinese
descent who may be targets of espionage and influence
operations by China; and
(2) recommendations to ensure that the privacy and civil
liberties of Americans of Chinese descent are sufficiently
protected.
(c) Form.--The report under subsection (b) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman
from Hawaii (Mr. Case) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Hawaii.
Mr. CASE. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Madam Chair, not far from here, on the slopes of Capitol Hill, is a
small, serene, and unassuming memorial. On its walls are names not now
known to too many Americans but indelibly etched in a dark chapter of
our national story.
Tule Lake, Poston, Manzanar--these are the internment camps where
120,000 ethnic Japanese, most of them American citizens, were locked up
in the hysteria of the Second World War just because they were
Japanese.
This amendment, proudly sponsored by many of my colleagues in our
Congressional Asian Pacific American Caucus, including our chair, the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Judy Chu), asked us a question that
must be asked: Are we repeating history or in danger of doing so?
{time} 2015
In these recent years of justifiably heightened scrutiny on the
intelligence activities of the People's Republic of China, a
disproportionate number of Americans of Chinese descent have been
investigated and prosecuted for espionage.
Those convicted have received disproportionately high sentences, and
the too many exonerated have had their careers ruined nonetheless.
No doubt, China seeks to recruit Chinese Americans to its goals, and
no doubt, our government should and must review specific cases of
potential espionage by China on specific facts. But have we fallen into
the same trap all over again of justifying investigations and other
actions toward the ends of national security by means of general
profiling and targeting based solely on ethnic identity?
The Committee of 100, a group of prominent Chinese Americans in
diverse fields, reviewed the empirical evidence and concluded that
``Asian Americans, whether immigrant or native-born, may be facing
unfair and increasing racial prejudice in this era of geopolitical
competition.''
It stated, and I believe correctly: ``A definite line can be drawn
between appropriate prosecution that is based on actual evidence and
free of bias and overreaching persecution that is triggered by
unfounded suspicions and tainted by racial prejudice. All Americans,
regardless of ethnicity, depend on that line.''
This resolution is a flashing red light to our intelligence
community: Stop, look, and listen. Take some time to think it through
to be sure you are staying on the right side of that line, and then
report back to us here in Congress that you have done so and have the
procedures and mindset in place to ensure that we won't repeat history
with Chinese Americans or any other broad ethnic or interest group.
Madam Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr.
Schiff), the committee chair.
Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
I strongly support the amendment. This amendment expresses the sense
of Congress that racial profiling of Americans of Chinese descent is
contrary to the values of the United States and reinforces flawed
narratives perpetuated by the People's Republic of China that
ethnically Chinese individuals worldwide have a duty to support the
People's Republic of China.
Moreover, the amendment reaffirms that the United States Government
has a duty to warn and protect all Americans, including those of
Chinese descent, from intelligence operations executed by the People's
Republic of China.
Finally, the amendment requires the ODNI Office of Civil Liberties,
Privacy, and Transparency, in coordination with civil liberties and
privacy officers throughout the intelligence community, to submit a
report to the congressional intelligence committees. This report would
review how the intelligence community policies that govern
counterintelligence operations against China impact the civil liberties
of Americans of Chinese descent who are the targets of Chinese
espionage and provide recommendations to preserve these liberties and
privacy interests.
Mr. Case's important amendment reaffirms that Americans of all
backgrounds deserve equal protection under the law and reminds our
intelligence community of its duty to protect the privacy and civil
liberties of all persons.
Madam Chair, again, I thank my colleague for his work, and I strongly
support the amendment.
Mr. CASE. Madam Chair, I strongly urge adoption of this amendment. It
is the right amendment. We certainly want our intelligence community to
do its job, but we also want them to be very conscious of the decisions
that they are making and are in line with our basic civil liberties.
Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Hawaii (Mr. Case).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 10 Offered by Ms. Frankel
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 10
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
Ms. FRANKEL. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows
At the end of title VII, add the follow new section:
[[Page H5896]]
SEC. 708. INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
WOMEN AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the
Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the head of
any element of the intelligence community the Director
determines appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees an intelligence assessment on the
relationship between women and violent extremism and
terrorism throughout the world, including an assessment of--
(1) the historical trends and current state of women's
varied roles worldwide in all aspects of violent extremism
and terrorism, including as recruiters, sympathizers,
perpetrators, and combatants, as well as peace-builders and
preventers;
(2) how women's roles in all aspects of violent extremism
and terrorism are likely to change in the near- and medium-
term;
(3) the extent to which the unequal status of women affects
the ability of armed combatants and terrorist groups to
enlist or conscript women as combatants and perpetrators of
violence;
(4) how terrorist groups violate the rights of women and
girls, including child, early, and forced marriage,
abduction, sexual violence, and human trafficking, and the
extent to which such violations contribute to the spread of
conflict and terrorist activities; and
(5) opportunities to address the security risk posed by
female extremists and leverage the roles of women in
counterterrorism efforts.
(b) Form.--The assessment required under subsection (a)
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
(c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(1) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on
Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Armed Services, of
the Senate; and
(2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Armed
Services, of the House of Representatives.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentlewoman
from Florida (Ms. Frankel) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Florida.
Ms. FRANKEL. Madam Chair, this amendment takes an important step
toward fighting terrorism. It would require the Director of National
Intelligence to submit an intelligence assessment on the relationship
between women and violent extremism and terrorism.
Madam Chair, to prevent ISIS 2.0 and to improve U.S. counterterrorism
and peace-building efforts, we need to pay more attention to the roles
that women play in violent extremism, including as victims, as
perpetrators, and as preventers.
First, as victims, women are often the first targets of terrorism. We
have seen it with the abduction and rape of thousands of women and
girls by ISIS, the kidnapping of hundreds of girls by Boko Haram in
Nigeria, and the attack of girls just trying to go to school by the
Taliban.
Secondly, Madam Chair, women are not only the victims of terrorism.
Some are perpetrators. Recent research shows that women are turning to
terror organizations because of false promises of protection, escape
from abuse at home, and even, believe it or not, for leadership
opportunities. As a result, women-led attacks are rising. In fact, now,
20 to 30 percent of foreign terrorist fighters are women. In sub-
Saharan Africa alone, three out of four child suicide bombers are
girls.
Madam Chair, women are not only victims and perpetrators of
terrorism. They are also preventers, as mothers, wives, and daughters.
They influence their spouses and children. They are on the front line
of detecting early signs of radicalization in their families and
communities.
Madam Chair, because of gender inequality, their warnings are often
ignored.
Let me give you an example. Afghan women saw young men being
recruited at a wedding, and they shared their concerns with law
enforcement. They were dismissed. Later, those same recruits went on to
kill 32 people in a bus attack.
I conclude, Madam Chair, by saying that understanding women's unique
roles in terrorism is important to creating more peaceful communities
around the world, which results in more security for the United States
of America.
Madam Chair, I urge all of my colleagues to support this very
important amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Frankel).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 11 Offered by Mr. Kennedy
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 11
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
Mr. KENNEDY. Madam Chair, I wish to speak on behalf of the amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
At the end of title IV add the following new section:
SEC. 403. FOREIGN THREAT RESPONSE CENTER.
(a) Establishment.--The National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section
119B the following new section:
``SEC. 119C. FOREIGN THREAT RESPONSE CENTER.
``(a) Establishment.--There is within the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence a Foreign Threat Response
Center (in this section referred to as the `Center').
``(b) Mission.--The primary missions of the Center shall be
as follows:
``(1) To serve as the primary organization in the United
States Government for analyzing and integrating all
intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States
Government pertaining to foreign threats.
``(2) To synchronize the efforts of the intelligence
community with respect to countering foreign efforts to
undermine the national security, political sovereignty, and
economic activity of the United States and the allies of the
United States, including by--
``(A) ensuring that each such element is aware of and
coordinating on such efforts; and
``(B) overseeing the development and implementation of
comprehensive and integrated policy responses to such
efforts.
``(3) In coordination with the relevant elements of the
Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the intelligence community, and
other departments and agencies of the United States--
``(A) to develop policy recommendations for the President
to detect, deter, and respond to foreign threats, including
with respect to covert activities pursuant to section 503;
and
``(B) to monitor and assess foreign efforts to carry out
such threats.
``(4) In coordination with the head of the Global
Engagement Center established by section 1287 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law
114-328), to examine current and emerging foreign efforts to
use propaganda and information operations relating to the
threats described in paragraph (1).
``(5) To identify and close gaps across the departments and
agencies of the Federal Government with respect to expertise,
readiness, and planning to address foreign threats.
``(c) Director.--
``(1) Appointment.--There is a Director of the Center, who
shall be the head of the Center, and who shall be appointed
by the Director of National Intelligence, with the
concurrence of the Secretary of State. The Director may not
simultaneously serve in any other capacity in the executive
branch.
``(2) Reporting.--The Director of the Center shall directly
report to the Director of National Intelligence.
``(3) Responsibilities.--The Director of the Center shall--
``(A) ensure that the relevant departments and agencies of
the Federal Government participate in the mission of the
Center, including by recruiting detailees from such
departments and agencies in accordance with subsection
(e)(1); and
``(B) have primary responsibility within the United States
Government, in coordination with the Director of National
Intelligence, for establishing requirements for the
collection of intelligence related to, or regarding, foreign
threats, in accordance with applicable provisions of law and
Executive orders.
``(d) Annual Reports.--
``(1) In general.--At the direction of the Director of
National Intelligence, but not less than once each year, the
Director of the Center shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report on foreign threats.
``(2) Matters included.--Each report under paragraph (1)
shall include, with respect to the period covered by the
report, a discussion of the following:
``(A) The nature of the foreign threats.
``(B) The ability of the United States Government to
address such threats.
``(C) The progress of the Center in achieving its missions.
``(D) Recommendations the Director determines necessary for
legislative actions to improve the ability of the Center to
achieve its missions.
``(3) Form.--Each report under paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
``(e) Employees.--
[[Page H5897]]
``(1) Detailees.--Any Federal Government employee may be
detailed to the Center on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable
basis, and such detail shall be without interruption or loss
of civil service status or privilege for a period of not more
than 8 years.
``(2) Personal service contractors.--The Director of
National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of
State, may hire United States citizens or aliens as personal
services contractors for purposes of personnel resources of
the Center, if--
``(A) the Director of National Intelligence determines that
existing personnel resources are insufficient;
``(B) the period in which services are provided by a
personal services contractor, including options, does not
exceed 3 years, unless the Director of National Intelligence
determines that exceptional circumstances justify an
extension of up to 1 additional year;
``(C) not more than 10 United States citizens or aliens are
employed as personal services contractors under the authority
of this paragraph at any time; and
``(D) the authority of this paragraph is only used to
obtain specialized skills or experience or to respond to
urgent needs.
``(3) Security clearances.--Each employee detailed to the
Center and contractor of the Center shall have the security
clearance appropriate for the assigned duties of the employee
or contractor.
``(f) Board.--
``(1) Establishment.--There is established a Board of the
Foreign Threat Response Center (in this section referred to
as the `Board').
``(2) Functions.--The Board shall conduct oversight of the
Center to ensure the Center is achieving the missions of the
Center. In conducting such oversight, upon a majority vote of
the members of the Board, the Board may recommend to the
Director of National Intelligence that the Director of the
Center should be removed for failing to achieve such
missions.
``(3) Membership.--
``(A) Appointment.--The Board shall consist of 7 members.
The head of each department or agency of the Federal
Government specified in subparagraph (B) shall appoint a
senior official from that department or agency, who shall be
a member of the Senior Executive Service, as a member.
``(B) Departments and agencies represented.--The department
or agency of the Federal Government specified in this
subparagraph are the following:
``(i) The Department of State.
``(ii) The Department of Defense.
``(iii) The Department of Justice.
``(iv) The Department of the Treasury.
``(v) The Department of Homeland Security.
``(vi) The Central Intelligence Agency.
``(vii) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
``(4) Meetings.--The Board shall meet not less than
biannually and shall be convened by the member appointed by
the Secretary of State.
``(g) International Engagement.--The Director of the Center
may convene biannual conferences to coordinate international
efforts against foreign threats.
``(h) Termination.--The Center shall terminate on the date
that is 8 years after the date of the enactment of this
section.
``(i) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--the term
`appropriate congressional committees' means--
``(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
``(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and
``(C) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee
on Armed Services of the Senate.
``(2) Foreign threats.--The term `foreign threats' means
efforts to influence, through overt or covert malign
activities, the national security, political sovereignty, or
economic activity of the United States or the allies of the
United States, made by the government of any of the following
foreign countries:
``(A) Russia.
``(B) Iran.
``(C) North Korea.
``(D) China.
``(E) Any other foreign country that the Director
determines appropriate for purposes of this section.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents at the
beginning of such Act is amended by inserting after the item
relating to section 119B the following new item:
``Sec. 119C. Foreign Threat Response Center.''.
(c) Conforming Amendment.--Section 507(a) of such Act (50
U.S.C. 3106) is amended by adding at the end the following
new paragraph:
``(6) An annual report submitted under section
119C(d)(1).''.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman
from Massachusetts (Mr. Kennedy) and a Member opposed each will control
5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts.
Mr. KENNEDY. Madam Chair, I begin by thanking the chairman of the
committee and his staff for their dedication to getting this amendment
here today and for their long and strong defense of our electoral
system from foreign interference.
Madam Chair, a few weeks ago, Special Counsel Robert Mueller stood
before the American people and issued a stern warning and an ominous
challenge. In what he referred to as the central allegation of his 2-
year-long investigation, he told us that there were ``multiple,
systemic efforts to interfere in our election. That allegation deserves
the attention of every American.''
Our democracy was attacked, our government undermined, and our
election system weakened. We were manipulated.
A foreign adversary exposed many of our worst impulses as they
hacked, prodded, forged, stole, lied, and exploited in a coordinated
and sustained effort to change the trajectory of this country.
We cannot change what happened in 2016, but we can learn from it
because our adversaries certainly did. They watched as politicians were
all too eager to use hacked material. They took notes as social media
networks were used to inflame racial, geographic, and demographic
divisions.
According to the ``Worldwide Threat Assessment'' by the Director of
National Intelligence, Dan Coats, Russia, China, and Iran already have
their eyes trained on 2020.
That is why we must proactively create a foreign threat response
center tasked with identifying and rejecting any attempts by any
adversary to influence our political process because we cannot hold
ourselves up as a beacon of democracy if we are not willing to defend
the institutions upon which our democratic system rests.
By removing politics from this response and coordinating it under one
roof within the intelligence community, we can rebuild that faith in
our system.
In this body, we have no greater responsibility than to protect the
sanctity of our elections, to protect the trust of our citizens, and to
protect our faith in government. That is what this amendment codifies.
Madam Chair, I encourage all of my colleagues to support this
amendment, and I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. CONAWAY. Madam Chair, I claim the time in opposition to the
amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Texas is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. CONAWAY. Madam Chair, before I get to my objections to the
amendment, I want to congratulate the chairman, the majority members of
the committee, as well as the majority staff for the great work they
did in helping us bring a fully bipartisan bill to the floor, which I
fully intend to support.
They also helped us navigate the intricacies of the Rules Committee
so that what we are debating tonight, with the amendments that were put
forward, we will be able to support this bill on the floor tomorrow or
whenever they decide to bring it up. I thank the chairman for the good
work that they put into it.
Madam Chair, I do, though, rise in opposition to this amendment. For
the past several years, the House Intelligence Committee has spent a
significant amount of time overseeing the intelligence community's
ongoing efforts to counter foreign malign influence targeting the
United States. Although Russia gains significant and necessary
attention given the events of 2016, the committee is also concerned
about Chinese, Iranian, and other foreign powers that have designs on
sowing discord in the United States or covertly influencing the
American populace.
The amendment today would establish a foreign threat response center
within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. While I
believe my colleague from Massachusetts offers this amendment with the
best of intentions, it is clearly redundant to existing efforts and
creates an additional and potentially unnecessary bureaucracy within an
organization that may not be best suited to take the lead on these
actions.
This issue is not new. Last Congress, we worked with the gentleman
from Massachusetts in adding a report to the fiscal 2018 and 2019 IAAs
that would examine the necessity of a foreign malign influence response
center. This report remains in the bill, given that it is a 3-year
bill.
[[Page H5898]]
I am not convinced of the necessity of such a center, given the
ongoing efforts by our intelligence community to address this problem.
However, even assuming its necessity, I am concerned that the ODNI may
not be the best place for such a center. Based on our ongoing oversight
efforts, we know that the interagency is taking the threat of foreign
malign influences very seriously. Given the significant
counterintelligence impact to the homeland, it may make more sense to
house such an entity within the FBI.
I don't believe in putting the cart before the horse. It is important
for us to collect all the necessary information in order for Congress
to make an informed decision after significant debate on the merits of
such a center and whether the ODNI is the right home for it. This
debate should happen within the Intelligence Committee. To date, that
debate has not occurred.
This amendment would also set up a board to oversee the work of the
Foreign Intelligence Center, which would then be overseen by the House
and Senate Intelligence Committees. Again, a redundancy that is, in my
estimation, not necessary.
Madam Chair, based on these foregoing reasons, I will oppose the
gentleman's amendment and urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle
to vote against it, and I reserve the balance of my time.
{time} 2030
Mr. KENNEDY. Madam Chair, may I inquire how much time I have
remaining?
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Massachusetts has 2\1/2\ minutes
remaining.
Mr. KENNEDY. Madam Chair, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished
gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff).
Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
This amendment directs the intelligence community to expand upon its
work in identifying and reporting foreign malign influence activity by
establishing a center responsible for integrating all intelligence
pertaining to foreign efforts to undermine our democratic institutions.
The committee and the intelligence community has seen all too clearly
over the last 3 years that the malign influence threats to U.S.
sovereignty and security are emerging as a new normal, all the while
becoming more sophisticated and diverse.
Identifying and defending against these threats, particularly those
committed by strategic adversaries of the U.S., requires a dedicated
whole-of-intelligence-community effort in order to fully understand the
nature of the threat and identify outstanding intelligence gaps that
need to be filled.
In establishing an interagency Foreign Threat Response Center, this
amendment lays out a framework for accomplishing this challenging task.
I thank my colleague for his work. I appreciate Mr. Kennedy's
commitment to this area very much, and I support the amendment.
Mr. CONAWAY. Madam Chair, I yield myself the balance of my time.
In closing, I would like to reiterate that the establishment of such
a center should be debated properly within the House Intelligence
Committee. It should also be informed by the report that the gentleman
was successful in adding to the fiscal 2018 and 2019 Intelligence
Authorization Acts, and such debate should focus on the merits of the
center, given existing efforts, as well as whether or not the ODNI
should house the center.
Until that report is finished, and then the debate happens, I would
urge a ``no'' vote on the amendment.
Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. KENNEDY. Madam Chair, I yield myself the balance of my time.
I would just say, in closing, that I appreciate the gentleman's words
and the work that they did with us to get the report language into the
version last year. I would point out that much of the intent behind
this legislation and this amendment is directly related to what the
gentleman indicated around an ongoing threat assessment from Russia,
China, and Iran.
The issue isn't so much, has that threat been identified? It is, what
has the Intelligence Committee done to ensure the sanctity and the
purity of those elections?
I think this amendment speaks for itself. I urge my colleagues to
adopt it.
I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Kennedy).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the ayes
appeared to have it.
Mr. CONAWAY. Madam Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from
Massachusetts will be postponed.
Amendment No. 12 Offered by Miss Rice of New York
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 12
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
Miss RICE of New York. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Page 238, line 15, insert ``and the Under Secretary of
Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis'' before ``,
shall''.
Page 239, after line 14, insert the following new
subsection:
(d) Dissemination to State and Local Partners.--
Consistent with the protection of classified and confidential
unclassified information, the Under Secretary shall share the
report required by subsection (b) with State, local, and
regional officials who operate within State, local, and
regional fusion centers through the Department of Homeland
Security State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative
established in section 210A of the Homeland Security Act of
2002 (6 U.S.C 124h).
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentlewoman
from New York (Miss Rice) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from New York.
Miss RICE of New York. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
I was pleased to see that my bill, the Stop Terrorist Use of Virtual
Currencies Act, was included in the base text of the Intelligence
Authorization Act. This bill requires the Director of National
Intelligence and the Secretary of the Treasury to develop and submit a
threat assessment report on the use of virtual currencies by terrorist
organizations.
My amendment would simply include the DHS Under Secretary for
Intelligence and Analysis into this report and require that this report
be disseminated to State and local law enforcement officials.
In the 18 years since the deadliest terrorist attack in American
history, the United States has led the global campaign to combat
terrorism, thwarting plots and preventing attacks on American soil,
identifying and disrupting terrorist networks around the world, hunting
down terrorists wherever they hide, and proving that they can and will
be brought to justice.
But we also know that the threat of terrorism is not the same as it
was 18 years ago; it is a threat that constantly evolves, and we need
to evolve with it. We need to evolve ahead of it. That is why I have
offered this amendment.
In recent years, we have seen instances in which members of terrorist
groups have turned to virtual currencies to finance and support their
operations.
For example, in December of 2017, a woman in New York was arrested
and pled guilty after she obtained $62,000 in bitcoin and other virtual
currencies to send to ISIS.
Using those virtual funds, she was able to send the money via shell
entities in Pakistan, China, and Turkey that were fronts for ISIS.
In early 2017, Indonesian authorities reported that a Syria-based
Indonesian with ties to ISIS used bitcoin and other virtual currencies
to fund attacks in Indonesia.
The same things that make virtual currencies appealing to everyday
consumers, speed and convenience, make these currencies appealing to
those who want to finance illegal activities.
And many forms of virtual currencies also offer their users
anonymity, making them particularly attractive to those seeking to
circumvent American law enforcement and financial institutions.
[[Page H5899]]
In order to effectively confront this threat, we need to fully
understand it. We need a comprehensive assessment of how virtual
currencies might be abused for illegal and nefarious ends. That is why
it is critical that we act now to assess and understand this emerging
threat.
There is no denying it. Virtual currencies have exposed deep
vulnerabilities in our counterterrorism efforts. And unfortunately,
right now, our government lacks a comprehensive response and strategy
to address this threat.
Passing this amendment will give counterterrorism and law enforcement
officials at all levels the information and strategies they desperately
need to confront this threat head-on with 21st-century solutions.
This is a commonsense, bipartisan priority, and I urge all my
colleagues to support this amendment.
Madam Chair, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr.
Schiff).
Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.
This straightforward amendment adds the Under Secretary of Homeland
Security for Intelligence and Analysis to the DNI's consultation
requirement for its report on possible exploitation of virtual
currencies by terrorist actors.
It also requires the report's dissemination to State and local law
enforcement, consistent with the protection of classified information.
Ensuring that relevant counterterrorism information is distributed,
as appropriate, to State and local law enforcement is a key priority
and a major function of the Department of Homeland Security. Adding
these entities as recipients of this report through the DHS fusion
center mechanism improves the bill.
I want to encourage all my colleagues to support the amendment, as
well as the underlying bill. I thank my colleague for her work.
Miss RICE of New York. Madam Chair, I want to thank Chairman Schiff
and Ranking Member Nunes for supporting the amendment.
I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentlewoman from New York (Miss Rice).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 13 Offered by Ms. Jayapal
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 13
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
Ms. JAYAPAL. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
At the end of title VII, add the following new section:
SEC. 3__. REPORT ON USE BY INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY OF FACIAL
RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the use of facial recognition technology for the
purpose of suppressing or burdening criticism or dissent, or
for disadvantaging persons based on their ethnicity, race,
gender, sexual orientation, or religion, is contrary to the
values of the United States;
(2) the United States Government should not engage in the
sale or transfer of facial recognition technology to any
country that is using such technology for the suppression of
human rights; and
(3) it is incumbent upon the intelligence community to
develop clear policies and procedures that prevent the abuse
of facial recognition technology.
(b) Report Required.--Not later than 1 year after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report on the use of facial recognition
technology by the intelligence community. Such report shall
include each of the following:
(1) An analysis of the current use of facial recognition
technology by the intelligence community.
(2) An analysis of the accuracy of facial recognition
technology, including a discussion of the appropriate
threshold for use, and data disaggregated by race, gender,
ethnicity, and age.
(3) Whether the Government has adequate procedures in place
to audit or test technology they purchase to assess its
accuracy, including on the basis of race, gender, ethnicity,
and age.
(4) The extent to which the intelligence community has
codified policies governing the use of facial recognition
technology that adequately prevent adverse impacts on
privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties.
(5) An analysis of the ability of the intelligence
community to use facial recognition technology to identify
individuals in a way that respects constitutional rights,
civil rights, civil liberties, and privacy of such
individuals.
(6) Identification of risks and safeguards to uphold the
constitutional rights, civil rights, civil liberties, and
privacy of individuals, including for communities of color
and religious minorities.
(7) Whether such technology is deployed in public areas or
on photos of public areas in a manner that could raise First
Amendment concerns.
(8) An identification of existing policies, procedures, or
practices that permit the sharing of facial recognition data
and technology with foreign governments or other non-United
States Government entities.
(9) An identification of measures in place to protect data
security.
(10) An identification of any redress procedures to address
complaints in cases where the use of facial recognition
resulted in harm to an individual.
(11) An analysis of existing transparency, oversight, and
audits of the use of facial recognition to measure the
efficacy of the technology on an ongoing basis, as measured
against the cost and impact on individual rights.
(c) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
(d) Facial Recognition Data Defined.--In this section, the
term ``facial recognition data'' means any unique attribute
or feature of the face of an end user that is used by facial
recognition technology to assign a unique, persistent
identifier, or for the unique personal identification of a
specific individual.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentlewoman
from Washington (Ms. Jayapal) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Washington.
Ms. JAYAPAL. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I want to start by recognizing the work of our chairman, Mr. Schiff,
on this bill.
Madam Chair, my amendment would require Congress to provide much-
needed oversight to the intelligence community's use of face
recognition technology. The amendment does three things.
First, it requires the Director of National Intelligence to submit a
report to the Intelligence Committees in both the House and the Senate
on the use of this new technology. This is a critical step in ensuring
that there is a deeper understanding of the technology here in Congress
and also, appropriate transparency.
Second, the amendment expresses the sense of Congress that using this
technology to suppress dissent, or to target people based on ethnicity,
race, gender, sexual orientation, or religion is contrary to our
Nation's values.
And finally, it makes clear that Congress believes that the
government should not sell or transfer face recognition technology to
any country that is using this technology to suppress human rights.
I offered this amendment to the Intelligence Authorization Act
because I am concerned that face recognition poses grave privacy
concerns. As a Nation committed to democratic norms, including
constitutionally-enshrined rights to freedom of speech and privacy, it
is critical that we ensure that our national security activities do not
come at the expense of our individual liberties and our right to
privacy. And thus, it is critical that this body know exactly how this
technology is being used.
In addition to the civil liberties concerns of those in our country,
the technology does disproportionately impact people of color. The
technology, unfortunately, misidentifies people of color and women at
higher rates than Whites and men, which undermines its usefulness to
the intelligence community, and makes it potentially problematic for
large-scale use.
Finally, my amendment makes clear that the United States should not
be providing this technology to countries who are using it to
perpetuate human rights abuses. We should not be selling or
transferring the technologies to countries like China, who are actively
using this technology to suppress dissent and target minorities, like
the Uighurs, a Muslim minority group.
Although this sense of Congress lays down an important marker, we do
need to continue to work to ensure that there are proper controls on
the sale and the transfer of this technology, and I look forward to
doing that with my colleagues.
[[Page H5900]]
Madam Chair, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished gentleman from
California (Mr. Schiff), the chairman of the committee.
Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.
This amendment expresses a sense of Congress that conveys our firm
opposition to any use of facial recognition technology to suppress
criticism or dissent, as well as our opposition to the U.S. Government
sale or transfer of facial recognition technology to countries using
this technology to suppress human rights.
Critically, the amendment also acknowledges the IC's unique
responsibility to develop robust policies and procedures that prevent
the abuse of this technology.
To ensure that the intelligence community is held accountable, the
amendment requires the submission of a comprehensive report analyzing
any use of facial recognition technology by the IC, and the associated
implications for privacy and civil liberties, especially among
marginalized communities.
Ms. Jayapal's amendment requires the intelligence community to
establish clear policies and procedures, enhance transparency, and
increase oversight concerning the applications of these new
capabilities.
Her amendment lays the groundwork for a thoughtful U.S. response to
the emergence of divisive and disruptive technologies and how they
would fit into existing civil liberties frameworks.
Again, I want to thank my colleague for her work. I am pleased to
support Ms. Jayapal's amendment.
Ms. JAYAPAL. Madam Chair, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Illinois (Mr. Garcia).
Mr. GARCIA of Illinois. Madam Chair, I rise in support of the
amendment we have filed to study and limit the use of facial
recognition technology.
The intelligence community collects large amounts of data with
limited oversight about how and from whom data is collected. Facial
recognition technology has shown to be less accurate on nonwhite faces,
and its use disproportionately hurts communities of color because of
algorithmic bias.
This amendment studies the potential for bias and expresses the sense
that people should not be targeted for their ethnicity, race, or sexual
orientation, or to suppress dissent. Given the U.S. Government's
history of tracking protesters and activists, especially in minority
communities, this is important.
Congress can and should exercise Federal oversight of emerging
surveillance technologies. For facial recognition technology, this
means our work is only just beginning. I urge support for this
amendment.
{time} 2045
Ms. JAYAPAL. Madam Chair, I urge my colleagues to support this
amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR (Ms. Omar). The question is on the amendment offered
by the gentlewoman from Washington (Ms. Jayapal).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 14 Offered by Mrs. Murphy
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 14
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
Mrs. MURPHY. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
At the end of title VII, add the following:
SEC. 708. REPORT ON DEEPFAKE TECHNOLOGY, FOREIGN
WEAPONIZATION OF DEEPFAKES, AND RELATED
NOTIFICATIONS.
(a) Report on Foreign Weaponization of Deepfakes and
Deepfake Technology.--
(1) Report required.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of the elements
of the intelligence community determined appropriate by the
Director, shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report on--
(A) the potential national security impacts of machine-
manipulated media (commonly known as ``deepfakes''); and
(B) the actual or potential use of machine-manipulated
media by foreign governments to spread disinformation or
engage in other malign activities.
(2) Matters to be included.--The report under subsection
(a) shall include the following:
(A) An assessment of the technical capabilities of foreign
governments, including foreign intelligence services, foreign
government-affiliated entities, and foreign individuals, with
respect to machine-manipulated media, machine-generated text,
generative adversarial networks, and related machine-learning
technologies, including--
(i) an assessment of the technical capabilities of the
People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation with
respect to the production and detection of machine-
manipulated media; and
(ii) an annex describing those governmental elements within
China and Russia known to have supported or facilitated
machine-manipulated media research, development, or
dissemination, as well as any civil-military fusion, private-
sector, academic, or non-governmental entities which have
meaningfully participated in such activities.
(B) An updated assessment of how foreign governments,
including foreign intelligence services, foreign government-
affiliated entities, and foreign individuals, could use or
are using machine-manipulated media and machine-generated
text to harm the national security interests of the United
States, including an assessment of the historic, current, or
potential future efforts of China and Russia to use machine-
manipulated media, including with respect to--
(i) the overseas or domestic dissemination of
misinformation;
(ii) the attempted discrediting of political opponents or
disfavored populations; and
(iii) intelligence or influence operations directed against
the United States, allies or partners of the United States,
or other jurisdictions believed to be subject to Chinese or
Russian interference.
(C) An updated identification of the counter-technologies
that have been or could be developed and deployed by the
United States Government, or by the private sector with
Government support, to deter, detect, and attribute the use
of machine-manipulated media and machine-generated text by
foreign governments, foreign-government affiliates, or
foreign individuals, along with an analysis of the benefits,
limitations and drawbacks of such identified counter-
technologies, including any emerging concerns related to
privacy.
(D) An identification of the offices within the elements of
the intelligence community that have, or should have, lead
responsibility for monitoring the development of, use of, and
response to machine-manipulated media and machine-generated
text, including--
(i) a description of the coordination of such efforts
across the intelligence community;
(ii) a detailed description of the existing capabilities,
tools, and relevant expertise of such elements to determine
whether a piece of media has been machine manipulated or
machine generated, including the speed at which such
determination can be made, the confidence level of the
element in the ability to make such a determination
accurately, and how increasing volume and improved quality of
machine-manipulated media or machine-generated text may
negatively impact such capabilities; and
(iii) a detailed description of planned or ongoing research
and development efforts intended to improve the ability of
the intelligence community to detect machine-manipulated
media and machine-generated text.
(E) A description of any research and development
activities carried out or under consideration to be carried
out by the intelligence community, including the Intelligence
Advanced Research Projects Activity, relevant to machine-
manipulated media and machine-generated text detection
technologies.
(F) Updated recommendations regarding whether the
intelligence community requires additional legal authorities,
financial resources, or specialized personnel to address the
national security threat posed by machine-manipulated media
and machine generated text.
(G) Other additional information the Director determines
appropriate.
(b) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
(c) Requirement for Notification.--The Director of National
Intelligence, in cooperation with the heads of any other
relevant departments or agencies of the Federal Government,
shall notify the congressional intelligence committees each
time the Director of National Intelligence determines--
(1) there is credible information or intelligence that a
foreign entity has attempted, is attempting, or will attempt
to deploy machine-manipulated media or machine-generated text
aimed at the elections or domestic political processes of the
United States; and
(2) that such intrusion or campaign can be attributed to a
foreign government, a foreign government-affiliated entity,
or a foreign individual.
(d) Annual Update.--Upon submission of the report in
subsection (a), on an annual basis, the Director of National
Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of the elements
of the intelligence community determined appropriate by the
Director, shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees any significant updates with respect to the
matters described in subsection (a).
(e) Definitions.--
(1) Machine-generated text.--The term ``machine-generated
text'' means text generated using machine-learning techniques
in
[[Page H5901]]
order to resemble writing in natural language.
(2) Machine-manipulated media.--The term ``machine-
manipulated media'' has the meaning given that term in
section 707.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentlewoman
from Florida (Mrs. Murphy) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Florida.
Mrs. MURPHY. Madam Chair, my amendment, which I am coleading with
Congresswoman Yvette Clarke of New York, involves a looming threat to
American security and American democracy from the use of deepfake
technology by our Nation's adversaries.
As policymakers, we must understand this challenge and put in place a
whole-of-government strategy to address it in a way that protects our
interests and is consistent with our values. The U.S. intelligence
community has an important role to play in this effort.
The House Intelligence Committee, led by Chairman Schiff, recently
held an illuminating and alarming hearing on deepfakes. As the
witnesses at that hearing testified, technology now enables anyone with
a computer, internet access, and technical skills to create fabricated
and relatively convincing video and audio recordings that depict
individuals doing or saying things that they did not do or say.
The technology behind deepfakes is rapidly evolving. Soon individuals
will be able to create highly realistic and difficult to debunk video
and audio content. At a time when Americans are already being
inundated, especially online, by a flood of false or misleading
information, deepfake technology has the potential to make it even
harder for the American public to trust what it sees and hears.
It is easy to imagine the different ways in which deepfake technology
could be exploited by America's foes. Imagine a Russian intelligence
service creating a video purporting to show an American Presidential
candidate accepting a bribe or an audio recording purporting to reveal
an American Secretary of State saying something inflammatory about an
ally. Or imagine a Chinese-produced video that falsely depicts the
commander of a U.S. military unit committing a war crime. Such efforts,
if not quickly exposed as false by the United States, could create
havoc.
In today's world, perhaps the biggest national security threat we
face is not the risk of direct military conflict between the United
States and Russia, China, Iran, or another adversary. Instead, the
threat lurks in the gray space short of kinetic action. It is
illustrated by Russian efforts to intervene in the 2016 Presidential
election, most notably in my home State of Florida. It is the threat
from authoritarian governments using new technologies to spread
disinformation, sow discord, create divisions, and cause the American
people to lose faith in our democratic form of government.
To address this threat, our amendment requires the DNI to prepare a
report for Congress on how foreign countries are using or could use
deepfake technology to harm the United States and to explain how the
intelligence community is working to develop appropriate
countermeasures. This report will help us to understand the problem and
to combat it more effectively.
We must get this right because the stakes couldn't be higher. I urge
my colleagues to support this amendment.
Madam Chair, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California
(Chairman Schiff).
Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding, and I
rise in strong support of this amendment offered by my colleagues from
Florida and New York, who have both been leaders in this body focused
on national security challenges posed by deepfake technologies.
We in the Intelligence Committee held a hearing on this very topic
last month, and the rate at which these capabilities are evolving is
almost as breathtaking as what they can produce, high-quality video and
other types of media that convincingly portray individuals saying or
doing things that never happened.
The potential for a foreign adversary to undermine an election,
foment chaos, or create a national security crisis with a sophisticated
digital forgery means that we need to ensure the intelligence community
is fully considering the wide-ranging implications of deepfakes,
including the capacity of foreign entities and adversaries to weaponize
machine-generated media.
This report will also give us a detailed picture about how the
intelligence community is coordinating efforts, activities, and
research surrounding this emerging technology and if there are
lingering gaps in resources or assignments of responsibility, since we
need to be clear-eyed about how disruptive and devastating a well-timed
deep fake could be during an election or a tense diplomatic standoff.
I want to thank my colleague for her work on this amendment, and I am
very proud to support it.
Mrs. MURPHY. Madam Chair, I urge support for this amendment, and I
yield back the balance of my time
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Murphy).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 15 Offered by Mrs. Murphy
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 15
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
Mrs. MURPHY. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
At the end of title V, add the following new section:
SEC. 5__. SENSE OF CONGRESS AND REPORT ON IRANIAN EFFORTS IN
SYRIA.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that,
regardless of the ultimate number of United States military
personnel deployed to Syria, it is a vital interest of the
United States to prevent the Islamic Republic of Iran,
Hizbollah, and other Iranian-backed forces from establishing
a strong and enduring presence in Syria that can be used to
project power in the region and threaten the United States
and its allies, including Israel.
(b) Report.--
(1) Report required.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of State and
the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report that assesses--
(A) efforts by Iran to establish long-term influence in
Syria through military, political, economic, social, and
cultural means; and
(B) the threat posed by such efforts to United States
interests and allies.
(2) Elements.--The report under paragraph (1) shall include
each of the following:
(A) An assessment of--
(i) how Iran and Iranian-backed forces, including the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Hizbollah, have
provided or are currently providing manpower, training,
weapons, equipment, and funding to the Syrian government led
by President Bashar al-Assad;
(ii) the support provided by Iran and Hizbollah to Shia
militias operating in Syria that are composed of domestic
fighters from Syria and foreign fighters from countries like
Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Pakistan;
(iii) the threat posed by Iran and Iranian-backed forces to
the al-Tanf garrison and to areas of northeast Syria that are
currently controlled by local partner forces of the United
States;
(iv) the degree to which efforts of the United States to
sustain and strengthen Kurdish forces in Syria may undermine
the influence of Iran and Iranian-backed forces in Syria;
(v) how Iran and Iranian-backed forces seek to enhance the
long-term influence of such entities in Syria through non-
military means such as purchasing strategic real estate in
Syria, constructing Shia religious centers and schools,
securing loyalty from Sunni tribes in exchange for material
assistance, and inducing the Assad government to open Farsi-
language departments at Syrian universities; and
(vi) whether the prominent role of Iran in Syria, including
the influence of Iran over government institutions, may
increase the likelihood of the reconstitution of the Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria in Syria.
(B) An analysis of--
(i) how Iran is working with the Russian Federation,
Turkey, and other countries to increase the influence of Iran
in Syria; and
(ii) the goals of Iran in Syria, including, but not limited
to, protecting the Assad government, increasing the regional
influence of Iran, threatening Israel from a more proximate
location, building weapon-production facilities and other
military infrastructure, and securing a land bridge to
connect Iran through Iraq and Syria to the stronghold of
Hizbollah in southern Lebanon.
(C) A description of--
(i) how the efforts of Iran to transfer advanced weapons to
Hizbollah and to establish a military presence in Syria has
led to direct and repeated confrontations with Israel; and
(ii) the intelligence and military support that the United
States provides to Israel to
[[Page H5902]]
help Israel identify and appropriately address specific
threats to Israel from Iran and Iranian-backed forces in
Syria.
(3) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
(4) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence
of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentlewoman
from Florida (Mrs. Murphy) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Florida.
Mrs. MURPHY. Madam Chair, our amendment would require the Director of
National Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretaries of State
and Defense, to prepare a report for Congress on efforts by Iran to
establish long-term influence in Syria using both hard and soft power
and the threat that this proposes to U.S. interests and allies,
including Israel.
Syria's civil war, which began in 2011, has brought an influx of
Iranian-backed forces into Syria. Iran and Syria are both designated by
the United States as state sponsors of terrorism. Their military
partnership dates back decades, and Iran regards Syria as one of its
most important allies.
Iran and Iranian-backed forces, including the Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps and Hezbollah, have provided manpower, training, weapons,
and funding to the Syrian Government, led by President Bashar al-Assad.
This assistance, coupled with support from Russia, has enabled the
Assad government to retain or regain territory in Syria, and the Assad
government currently maintains control over roughly two-thirds of the
country.
Iran's goals in Syria include protecting the Assad government,
increasing Iran's regional influence, threatening Israel from a closer
location, building weapon production facilities and other military
infrastructure, and securing a land bridge that would connect Iran to
Hezbollah's stronghold in southern Lebanon via Iraq and Syria.
It is clear that Iran is seeking long-term influence in Syria and is
pursuing this objective through military, political, and social means.
Iran's effort to establish a military presence in Syria has led to
repeated confrontations with Israel. In February of 2018, Israel shot
down an Iranian drone flying over Israeli territory and then targeted
the base in Syria from which the drone was launched. In May 2018,
Israel launched strikes against Iranian military installations in
Syria. Iran responded by firing missiles at Israeli positions in the
Golan Heights, and Israel then targeted nearly all of Iran's military
infrastructure in Syria.
Iranian and Iranian-backed forces also seek to enhance their
influence in Syria through nonmilitary means, such as purchasing
strategic real estate, constructing Shia religious centers and schools,
securing loyalty from Sunni tribes, and inducing the Assad government
to open Farsi language departments at Syrian universities.
In a startling move, President Trump has proposed to withdraw all or
most U.S. forces from Syria, a proposal I view as a profound mistake.
But regardless of the number of U.S. troops deployed to Syria, I
believe it is a vital U.S. interest to prevent Iran, Hezbollah, and
other Iranian-backed forces from establishing an enduring presence in
Syria.
Our amendment would require the DNI to assess how Iran is using hard
and soft power to gain long-term influence in Syria. Among other
things, the IC would examine how U.S. efforts to strengthen Kurdish
forces in Syria could undermine Iran, how the U.S. helps Israel
identify threats from Iran and Syria, and how Iran's influence over
Syrian institutions could increase the likelihood that the Islamic
State will reconstitute itself inside Syria.
I urge my colleagues to support this amendment, and I reserve the
balance of my time.
Mr. SCHNEIDER. Madam Chair, I claim the time in opposition to the
amendment, though I am not opposed to it.
The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Illinois is
recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. SCHNEIDER. Madam Chair, I rise in support of the Murphy-Schneider
amendment that makes abundantly clear it is of the utmost importance to
prevent Iran from establishing any enduring presence in Syria.
The amendment also requires the Director of National Intelligence to
report on Iran's efforts to establish a foothold in Syria on the threat
this poses to the United States and our allies, in particular Israel.
Madam Chair, I stood before Congress in the last Congress urging
support for my amendment to require a report on Iran's support for
proxy forces in Syria and Lebanon, and I am pleased that this report
remains in this bill. Today we are building on this important effort
with the Murphy-Schneider amendment.
I thank my good friend from Florida, Stephanie Murphy, for her
leadership on this issue.
Iran is a bad actor that has spread its maligned influence and
continued to engage in destabilizing activities throughout the Middle
East region, as well as beyond. The Iranian regime has and continues to
establish deep ties within Syria through military, political, economic,
social, and cultural means. This is a dangerous behavior that must be
checked. Iran must not be allowed to maintain a permanent foothold in
Syria that threatens our allies and stability in the region.
To stand up to Iran, we must first understand the full extent of
Iran's activities in Syria, and that is what this amendment does. I
look forward to seeing this report and engaging on how we can prevent
Iran from maintaining a permanent presence in Syria.
I hope my colleagues will join me in supporting this important
amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mrs. MURPHY. Madam Chair, I urge support for the amendment, and I
yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Murphy).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 16 Offered by Mr. Brindisi
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 16
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
Mr. BRINDISI. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
At the end of title VII, add the following new section:
SEC. 708. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN CRIMES
RELATING TO TERRORISM.
Nothing in this Act, or the amendments made by this Act,
shall be construed to contradict chapter 113B of title 18,
United States Code, including with respect to--
(1) section 2332b (relating to acts of terrorism
transcending national boundaries);
(2) section 2339 (relating to harboring or concealing
terrorists); and
(3) section 2339A (relating to providing material support
to terrorists).
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman
from New York (Mr. Brindisi) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York.
Mr. BRINDISI. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Madam Chair, I rise today urging adoption of my amendment, which
makes clear that nothing in the underlying bill contradicts existing
Federal law regarding acts of international terrorism, providing
support to terrorists, or aiding terrorists.
The underlying bill helps keep our country safe by ensuring the
intelligence community has the resources and authorities it needs to do
its job. It also makes sure the intelligence community can improve and
adapt to today's rapidly changing threats and technologies by improving
the collection and analytic capabilities against our adversaries like
China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.
My amendment makes it crystal clear that our country will remain
tough on international terrorism.
Terrorism continues to be a serious threat to our national security.
This provision strengthens the underlying
[[Page H5903]]
bill by ensuring current law regarding terrorism is not changed, so
terrorists and those who support them can be brought to justice.
Madam Chair, again, I urge my colleagues to support this amendment. I
urge adoption of the amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time
{time} 2100
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from New York (Mr. Brindisi).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 17 Offered by Mr. Kinzinger
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 17
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
Mr. KINZINGER. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
At the end of title VII, add the following new section:
SEC. 7___ REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL MOBILE SUBSCRIBER IDENTITY-
CATCHERS AND UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY.
(a) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland
Security, the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and the heads of other agencies the Director
of National Intelligence determines appropriate, shall submit
to the congressional intelligence committees a report
describing--
(1) the threats that international mobile subscriber
identity-catchers pose to national security and,
specifically, the safety and security of Government
personnel;
(2) the prevalence of international mobile subscriber
identity-catchers used by both foreign actors and domestic
law enforcement within the United States;
(3) actions taken by Federal agencies, as of the date of
the report, to remove or neutralize international mobile
subscriber identity-catchers installed by foreign entities,
with a primary focus on the National Capital Region (as
defined in section 2674(f) of title 10, United States Code);
(4) policy recommendations for Congress to consider that
would empower law enforcement and the intelligence community
to counter such foreign intelligence operations while
minimizing interference with legitimate domestic law
enforcement operations;
(5) the extent to which private entities, as well as
Federal entities not primarily responsible for national
security or homeland security, are able to remove,
neutralize, or otherwise render ineffective international
mobile subscriber identity-catchers; and
(6) recommendations for new software programs, or the
hardening of existing software programs, to reduce mobile
phone susceptibility to international mobile subscriber
identity-catchers.
(b) Form.--To the extent practicable, the report shall be
submitted in an unclassified, law enforcement sensitive form
for the purposes of distribution to other congressional
committees, but may also include a classified annex.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman
from Illinois (Mr. Kinzinger) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois.
Mr. KINZINGER. Madam Chair, my amendment is very simple. It would
require that the Director of National Intelligence and other relevant
agencies report to Congress on the threat that international mobile
subscriber identity catchers, also referred to as ``cell-site
simulators'' or under the brand name ``StingRay,'' pose to U.S.
Government personnel and national security.
In addition to providing this report, the DNI would need to provide
recommendations to Congress regarding possible policy changes to
counter these devices.
IMSI catchers send signals to mobile phones that appear to be coming
from legitimate mobile networks. Once connected, the phones are used to
track the locations of the users, which can be seen by whoever is
controlling the IMSI catcher. The more advanced versions of these cell
devices allow their owners even to access messages and phone call data.
Many of us were shocked when a report came out last year that the
Department of Homeland Security had found these devices around the
national capital region. Even more concerning was that many of these
were located around sensitive government buildings.
My amendment would help Congress understand the proliferation of
these devices around our Nation, with a focus on their prevalence in
the national capital region. We need to know which actors, foreign or
domestic, are deploying them and what Congress can do to ensure the
safekeeping of our national security apparatus.
Madam Chair, I urge support for this amendment, and I yield back the
balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Kinzinger).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 18 Offered by Ms. Hill of California
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 18
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
Ms. HILL of California. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
At the end of title VII, add the following new section:
SEC. 7__. WHISTLEBLOWER DISCLOSURES TO CONGRESS AND
COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.
Section 2302 of title 5, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in subsection (b)(8)(B), by inserting ``Congress
(including any committee of Congress),'' before ``the Special
Counsel''; and
(2) in subsection (c)(2)(C)(iii)(III), by inserting after
``Congress'' the following: ``(including any committee of
Congress)''.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentlewoman
from California (Ms. Hill) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California.
Ms. HILL of California. Madam Chair, I yield myself as much time as I
may consume. I rise in support of an amendment to H.R. 3494.
I believe strongly in the principle of government transparency. It is
something I ran on and talk about. I have spent my time in Congress
working to deliver on accountability and transparency as the vice chair
of the Oversight and Reform Committee and through other legislation.
Today, I am introducing this amendment to clarify what Congress
already believes to be the law, that Federal whistleblowers have the
ability to make protected disclosures to the appropriate congressional
committee of jurisdiction, not just members of the Intelligence
Committee.
At a time like this, we cannot afford ambiguity. This technical
change will allow congressional committees to conduct their business in
a more timely and effective manner.
This amendment is not my first effort to protect whistleblowers, nor
will it be my last. Those with the courage to stand up and say
something is not right should have every single protection that we, as
Congress, can offer to them.
Madam Chair, I urge all of my colleagues to support this amendment,
and I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Hill).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 19 Offered by Mr. Levin of Michigan
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 19
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
Mr. LEVIN of Michigan. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Page 68, strike line 24 through page 69, line 3, and insert
the following:
(2) with respect to the unclassified portion of the report,
made available on the public internet websites of the
National Counterterrorism Center, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and Department of Homeland Security--
(A) not later than 30 days after submission to the
appropriate congressional committees; and
(B) in an electronic format that is fully indexed and
searchable; and
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman
from Michigan (Mr. Levin) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN of Michigan. Madam Chair, according to the Anti-Defamation
League, domestic extremists killed at least 50 people in the United
States in 2018, a sharp increase from
[[Page H5904]]
the 37 extremist-related murders documented in 2017. Indeed, that is a
26 percent jump in 1 year.
Given the disturbing rise of plots and incidents of domestic
terrorism nationwide, I am pleased with the provision in this bill
requiring that a joint report on domestic terrorism be submitted to
Congress each year by the DNI, the FBI Director, and the Under
Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis.
My amendment requires that this comprehensive report on domestic
terrorism be made available on the public websites not just of the
National Counterterrorism Center but also of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the Department of Homeland Security.
The amendment also specifies that the report should be made publicly
available no later than 30 days after submission to the appropriate
congressional committees. We can't let something this important be
delayed over and over again.
We need to ensure that this report is accessible not just to promote
transparency but also to help policymakers nationwide recognize the
scope of the threat that domestic terrorism poses and to encourage
academic research necessary to understand the scourge of domestic
terrorism better so that we might bring it to an end once and for all.
I am talking about policymakers on the local and the State level as
well as the Federal level.
Madam Chair, I thank, in particular, Chairman Schiff and his staff
for their leadership on this bill and for working with me on this and
other provisions.
Madam Chair, I urge my colleagues to support this amendment, and I
yield back the balance of my time
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Levin).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 20 Offered by Mr. Schiff
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 20
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, as the designee of the gentleman from New
Jersey (Mr. Malinowski), I rise to offer an amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Page 49, after line 13, insert the following new paragraph:
(7) An assessment and identification of the technological
and financial support provided by United States-based
companies, including technological support for the
development of facial recognition capabilities or
technologies for digital surveillance, social control, or
censorship, and financial support, including from financial
institutions, investment vehicles, and pension funds, to
China-based companies or Chinese government entities
providing material support to the digital surveillance or
repression of Uyghur and other ethnic minorities in Xinjiang
by the Xinjiang authorities.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman
from California (Mr. Schiff) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.
Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, I rise to support this amendment, which adds
an additional requirement to section 502, a report on the repression of
ethnic Muslim minorities in the Xinjiang region of the People's
Republic of China.
The human rights crisis underway in Xinjiang is staggering in scale.
Open-source analysis based on extensive reviews of satellite imagery
and Chinese Government documents has concluded that as many as 1.5
million Muslims could be held in internment camps by the Chinese
Government.
Despite this body of evidence, the executive branch has rebuffed
attempts to clearly describe the scope and scale of this crisis.
H.R. 3494 calls for a comprehensive U.S. Government assessment that
addresses the number of persons detained, a description of forced labor
practices in the camps, and an assessment of the surveillance,
detection, and control methods associated with China's new high-tech
policing model.
Mr. Malinowski's amendment adds an additional requirement for the
intelligence community to assess and identify the technological and
financial support provided by U.S.-based companies to the Chinese
Government's repressive operations in Xinjiang.
In light of the alarming public reports detailing cooperation between
prominent U.S. companies and foreign companies aiding and abetting the
Chinese Communist Party's surveillance state, this amendment could not
be timelier.
Madam Chair, I thank my colleagues, particularly Mr. Malinowski for
his tireless work to support human rights.
Madam Chair, I am happy to support the amendment. I urge support for
the amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 21 Offered by Mr. Schiff
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 21
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, as the designee of the gentlewoman from
Massachusetts (Ms. Pressley), I rise to offer an amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Page 62, after line 4 insert the following:
(6) Information regarding any training or resources
provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Department of Homeland Security, or the National
Counterterrorism Center, to assist Federal, State, local, and
Tribal law enforcement agencies in understanding, detecting,
deterring, and investigating acts of domestic terrorism,
including the date, type, subject, and recipient agencies of
such training or resources.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman
from California (Mr. Schiff) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.
Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, this amendment clarifies section 602 of the
bill dealing with domestic terrorism.
Section 602 would require the FBI, DHS, and the National
Counterterrorism Center to produce an annual report and strategic
intelligence assessment on domestic terrorism. Ms. Pressley's amendment
would require more information regarding any training or resources on
domestic terrorism provided by the FBI, DHS, and National
Counterterrorism Center to assist Federal, State, local, and Tribal law
enforcement agencies.
This would enhance oversight and transparency in this area and give
us a better sense of how domestic terrorism training has been provided
to law enforcement throughout the United States.
Madam Chair, I thank my colleague for her work, and I urge our
colleagues to support the amendment and the underlying bill.
I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 22 Offered by Mr. Rose of New York
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 22
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
Mr. ROSE of New York. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
At the end of title VII, add the following new section:
SEC. 7___. REPORT CONTAINING THREAT ASSESSMENT ON TERRORIST
USE OF CONVENTIONAL AND ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL
WEAPONS.
(a) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter
for a period of 4 years, the Under Secretary of Homeland
Security for Intelligence and Analysis, in coordination with
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall
develop and submit to the entities in accordance with
subsection (b) a report containing a threat assessment
regarding the availability of conventional weapons, including
conventional weapons lacking serial numbers, and advanced
conventional weapons, for use in furthering acts of
terrorism, including the provision of material support or
resources to a foreign terrorist organization and to
individuals or groups supporting or engaging in domestic
terrorism.
(b) Dissemination of Report.--Consistent with the
protection of classified and confidential unclassified
information, the Under Secretary shall--
(1) submit the initial report required under subsection (a)
to Federal, State, local, and Tribal law enforcement
officials, including officials who operate within State,
local, and
[[Page H5905]]
regional fusion centers under the Department of Homeland
Security State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative
established by section 210A of the Homeland Security Act of
2002 (6 U.S.C. 124h); and
(2) submit each report required under subsection (a) to the
appropriate congressional committees.
(c) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the
Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee on the
Judiciary of the House of Representatives; and
(B) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee
on the Judiciary of the Senate.
(2) Domestic terrorism.--The term ``domestic terrorism''
has the meaning given that term in section 2331 of title 18,
United States Code.
(3) Foreign terrorist organization.--The term ``foreign
terrorist organization'' means an organization designated as
a foreign terrorist organization under section 219 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189).
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman
from New York (Mr. Rose) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York.
{time} 2115
Mr. ROSE of New York. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Madam Chair, I rise in support of my amendment to H.R. 3494.
Our law enforcement officers stand on the front lines of defending
the American people from domestic and international terrorist threats.
It is our job as Congress to make sure that they have the most up-to-
date information about the evolving threats posed by terrorism,
including the use of advanced conventional weapons.
One such evolving threat is the danger posed by terrorist use of
conventional and advanced conventional weapons, including unregistered
weapons that lack serial numbers.
To address this issue, my amendment to the Intelligence Authorization
Act will require the Department of Homeland Security to conduct an
annual assessment of the domestic and international terrorist threats
posed by conventional weapons as well as advanced conventional weapons.
This is a simple, straightforward amendment that seeks to put
important information about terrorist threats in the hands of our law
enforcement officers.
Madam Chair, law enforcement needs to have the information they need
to understand these threats. The assessment of the terrorist threat
posed by conventional weapons and advanced conventional weapons that I
call for in this amendment will do just that.
Additionally, this assessment will then be shared with Congress and
with law enforcement so that our frontline officers have the
information they need to understand these evolving threats.
Madam Chair, I urge all of my colleagues to support my amendment, and
I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from New York (Mr. Rose).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 23 Offered by Mr. Rose of New York
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 23
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
Mr. ROSE of New York. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Page 79, line 19, insert ``, the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, and the
Committee on Homeland Security of the House of
Representatives'' after ``congressional intelligence
committees''.
At the end of title VII, add the following new section:
SEC. 7___. ASSESSMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY VULNERABILITIES
ASSOCIATED WITH CERTAIN RETIRED AND FORMER
PERSONNEL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) Assessment Required.--Not later than the date that is
120 days after submission of the report required under
section 704 of this Act, and annually thereafter, the
Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the
Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and
Analysis, the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency, and the Director of the Defense Counterintelligence
and Security Agency, shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees an assessment of the homeland
security vulnerabilities associated with retired and former
personnel of intelligence community providing covered
intelligence assistance.
(b) Form.--The assessment under subsection (a) may be
submitted in classified form.
(c) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs of the Senate; and
(C) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of
Representatives.
(2) Covered intelligence assistance.--The term ``covered
intelligence assistance'' has the meaning given that term in
section 704 of this Act.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman
from New York (Mr. Rose) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York.
Mr. ROSE of New York. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Madam Chair, I rise to offer an amendment to title VII of H.R. 3494,
entitled, ``Reports and Other Matters.''
As a combat veteran, I can tell you firsthand that intelligence
drives operations, and it is imperative to the security of our homeland
that the U.S. maintains its superiority when it comes to intelligence.
However, a growing concern I have is when our former or retired
intelligence professionals choose to later work for a foreign
government.
We saw it with former NSA employees working as hackers for the United
Arab Emirates' Project Raven. Interviews and documents showed that the
NSA's surveillance techniques were central to the country's monitoring
efforts.
Reporting showed that American ex-intelligence personnel would target
the UAE Government's opponents online. This information, provided to
them by the country's NSA equivalent, didn't just target terrorists,
but also human rights activists and journalists, those whom the UAE
deemed unfavorable.
It is concerning when our best and brightest go off to conduct or
advise on intelligence operations for foreign governments that, in some
cases, are against the very people our American ideals protect. We need
to understand the nature and impact of this expertise in the hands of a
foreign government. What are the homeland security implications of
this?
My amendment will do just that. It requires the Director of National
Intelligence, in coordination with other intelligence community
partners, to conduct an annual assessment of the homeland security
vulnerabilities associated with former intelligence community employees
providing intelligence assistance to a foreign government.
Madam Chair, the invaluable training, tradecraft, and expertise
developed by former or retired intelligence professionals to keep our
country safe, to keep Americans safe, now in the hands of a foreign
government for their benefit is absolutely chilling.
My amendment will tackle these concerns head-on with an annual
assessment of any homeland security vulnerabilities that may be
associated with this capability, cultivated from years of service to
our country, now being provided to foreign governments.
Madam Chair, I urge all of my colleagues to support my amendment, and
I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from New York (Mr. Rose).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 24 Offered by Mr. Pence
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 24
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
Mr. PENCE. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
At the end of title VII, add the following new section:
[[Page H5906]]
SEC. 7___. EXPANSION OF AVAILABILITY OF FINANCIAL ASSETS OF
IRAN TO VICTIMS OF TERRORISM.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) On October 23, 1983, terrorists sponsored by the
Government of Iran bombed the United States Marine barracks
in Beirut, Lebanon. The terrorists killed 241 servicemen and
injured scores more.
(2) Those servicemen were killed or injured while on a
peacekeeping mission.
(3) Terrorism sponsored by the Government of Iran threatens
the national security of the United States.
(4) The United States has a vital interest in ensuring that
members of the Armed Forces killed or injured by such
terrorism, and the family members of such members, are able
to seek justice.
(b) Amendments.--Section 502 of the Iran Threat Reduction
and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8772) is
amended--
(1) in subsection (a)(1)--
(A) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``in the United
States'' the first place it appears and inserting ``by or'';
(B) in subparagraph (B), by inserting ``, or an asset that
would be blocked if the asset were located in the United
States,'' after ``unblocked)''; and
(C) in the flush text at the end--
(i) by inserting after ``in aid of execution'' the
following: ``, or to an order directing that the asset be
brought to the State in which the court is located and
subsequently to execution or attachment in aid of
execution,''; and
(ii) by inserting ``, without regard to concerns relating
to international comity'' after ``resources for such an
act''; and
(2) in subsection (b)--
(A) by striking ``that are identified'' and inserting the
following: ``that are--
``(1) identified'';
(B) by striking the period at the end and inserting ``;
and''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following:
``(2) identified in and the subject of proceedings in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York in Peterson et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran et al.,
Case No. 13 Civ. 9195 (LAP).''.
(c) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on threats
against the United States military and defense interests,
personnel, and their families, posed by organizations that
are designated by the Secretary of State as a foreign
terrorist organization pursuant to section 219 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189) with
connections to the Government of Iran, as determined by the
Director.
(2) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified
annex.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman
from Indiana (Mr. Pence) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana.
Mr. PENCE. Madam Chair, I rise in support of my amendment, which is
deeply personal.
Madam Chair, I was assigned to the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines. In
1983, my battalion was ordered to Beirut, Lebanon.
On October 23 of that same year, an Iranian national affiliated with
Hezbollah, a terror group founded, trained, and financially supported
by the Iranian regime, drove a truck bomb into the U.S. barracks in
Beirut, killing 241 servicemen, 220 of which were my fellow marines.
It is by the grace of God that I am standing here today. My battalion
shipped out 10 days before the bombing. I was lucky. I was able to come
home to my wife, who was expecting our first child, and my family in
Columbus, Indiana.
As proud U.S. marines, Congressman Gallego and I authored this
bipartisan, bicameral legislation to provide a sliver of justice for
the 241 heroes who were not as lucky that day.
Madam Chair, our amendment is simple. The OORAH Act would allow the
families of the bombing victims to execute on the $1.6 billion in
Iranian funds currently held by a European-based firm. These funds were
laundered through New York before making their way to Europe, where
they sit just outside the hand of justice.
Regardless of the party you conference with or the district you
represent, we can all agree that terrorists and those who support them
financially must be held accountable for their actions.
When I joined the Marines in 1979, I made a promise of Semper
Fidelis. Semper Fi is a lifelong commitment held by every marine for
the corps and America, a promise reciprocated by the corps to all
marines.
Madam Chair, we must uphold this promise. Marines are the first to
fight, and this time we are fighting for the Gold Star families who
lost their loved ones.
Madam Chair, I urge my colleagues to support this amendment and stand
with Congressman Gallego and me and our colleagues in the Senate to
honor the faith and loyalty of the 241 American servicemen who made the
ultimate sacrifice.
Madam Chair, OORAH stands for Our Obligation to Recognize American
Heroes, or as the Marines say, OORAH.
Madam Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GALLEGO. Madam Chair, I claim the time in opposition, although I
am not opposed to the amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Arizona is
recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. GALLEGO. Madam Chair, I rise in proud support of the amendment
sponsored by fellow marine and public servant, Mr. Pence.
October 23, 1983, remains seared in the memory of all marines. On
that day, over 300 innocent people were killed in a surprise terrorist
attack sponsored by the Government of Iran. Most of the people killed
36 years ago were my brothers. They were U.S. marines. They were
serving our country and doing their best to preserve the peace in war-
torn Lebanon.
We know that the wheels of justice turn slowly, Madam Chair. It took
over 35 years for victims to get traction in U.S. courts. But now that
they are getting that traction and winning judgments, marines in
Congress are here to help to ensure that Iranian funds cannot be hidden
from them in secret foreign bank accounts.
This amendment helps the families of those killed and wounded by
making sure that Iran is held liable for this attack. It makes it
harder for Iran to hide money in overseas bank accounts when it should
be paying for the pain and suffering of its victims. It shows that,
even 36 years after the attack, we have not forgotten, and it once
again proves that U.S. marines remain ``no better friend, no worse
enemy.''
Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. PENCE. Madam Chair, I thank the chairman and ranking member for
their leadership and my colleague and fellow marine from Arizona (Mr.
Gallego) for his faithful service and unwavering support on this
legislation.
Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Pence).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 25 Offered by Mr. Schiff
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 25
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, as the designee of the gentlewoman from
Michigan (Ms. Slotkin), I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Page 203, line 1, strike ``Report Required'' and insert
``report on foreign malign influence response''.
Page 204, after line 10, insert the following new
subsection:
(c) Report on Ability to Identify Foreign Influence
Efforts.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report concerning the ability of the
intelligence community to--
(A) identify foreign influence efforts aimed at sowing
discord or interfering, or both, in the political processes
of the United States; and
(B) report such efforts to appropriate authorities.
(2) Contents.--The report under paragraph (1) shall include
the following:
(A) A description of the current level of ongoing
communication and coordination across the intelligence
community and law enforcement, including the Department of
Justice, the Department of State, the Department of Homeland
Security, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with
respect to combating foreign influence efforts described in
subparagraph (A) of such paragraph.
(B) Identification of the offices or components of the
departments and agencies of the Federal Government that are
tasked with any responsibility with respect to combating such
foreign influence efforts.
(C) Identification of the number of personnel within each
element of the intelligence community and other elements of
[[Page H5907]]
the Federal Government that are focused on combating such
foreign influence efforts, whether on a temporary or
permanent basis.
(D) Identification of the legal authorities that are most
relevant to combating such foreign influence efforts,
including--
(i) which such legal authorities pose challenges or
barriers to effectively combat such foreign influence efforts
and a description of the reasons for such challenges or
barriers; and
(ii) which such legal authorities pose challenges or
barriers with respect to elements of the intelligence
community and other elements of the Federal Government
working together to combat such foreign influence efforts and
a description of the reasons for such challenges or barriers.
(E) A description of the current level of communication or
engagement between the intelligence community and private
internet-platforms or social media companies with respect to
combating such foreign influence efforts.
(F) A description of the additional resources the Director
determines is necessary to effectively identify such foreign
influence efforts, and the roles and responsibilities across
the intelligence community that would best support the shared
objective of identifying such foreign influence efforts.
(G) Any other matters the Director determines appropriate.
(3) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) may be submitted
in classified form.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman
from California (Mr. Schiff) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.
Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, the Intelligence Committee has invested
considerable time and focus the last 3 years to study the painful
lessons of foreign interference in our democratic system.
Ms. Slotkin's amendment will enhance the work of the committee by
compelling the Director of National Intelligence to identify barriers
that prevent the intelligence community from fully understanding the
scope and impact of these threats.
Our adversaries are committed to employing a whole-of-government
approach to execute their plan to disrupt our democratic system. In
order to defeat these efforts, we must understand the scope of the
threat. We must enlist our intelligence community to identify the scope
of and the means by which our adversaries are attempting to achieve
their goal.
This amendment sets forth a framework by which the DNI will report to
Congress on these threats and identify whether there are gaps in the
IC's authorities that hinder its ability to find, assess, and enable
action on foreign influence campaigns.
Madam Chair, I believe this is an important amendment. I encourage my
colleagues to support it, as well as the underlying bill, and I yield
back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff).
The amendment was agreed to.
{time} 2130
Amendment No. 26 Offered by Mr. Schiff
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 26
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chairwoman, I rise as the designee of Ms. Slotkin
to offer her second amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
At the end of title V, add the following new section:
SEC. 507. ANNUAL REPORTS ON INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND
CAMPAIGNS IN THE UNITED STATES BY THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION.
(a) Reports.--Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 3231 et seq.), as amended by section 501, is
further amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
``SEC. 1107. ANNUAL REPORTS ON INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND
CAMPAIGNS IN THE UNITED STATES BY THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION.
``(a) Requirement.--On an annual basis, the Director of the
National Counterintelligence and Security Center shall submit
to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the
influence operations and campaigns in the United States
conducted by the Russian Federation.
``(b) Contents.--Each report under subsection (a) shall
include the following:
``(1) A description and listing of the Russian
organizations and persons involved in influence operations
and campaigns operating in the United States as of the date
of the report.
``(2) An assessment of organizations that are associated
with or receive funding from organizations and persons
identified in paragraph (1), particularly such entities
operating in the United States.
``(3) A description of the efforts by the organizations and
persons identified in paragraph (1) to target, coerce, and
influence populations within the United States.
``(4) An assessment of the activities of the organizations
and persons identified in paragraph (1) designed to influence
the opinions of elected leaders of the United States or
candidates for election in the United States.
``(5) With respect to reports submitted after the first
report, an assessment of the change in goals, tactics,
techniques, and procedures of the influence operations and
campaigns conducted by the organizations and persons
identified in paragraph (1).
``(c) Coordination.--In carrying out subsection (a), the
Director shall coordinate with the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security
Agency, and any other relevant head of an element of the
intelligence community.
``(d) Form.--Each report submitted under subsection (a)
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first
section of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by
section 501, is further amended by inserting after the item
relating to section 1106 the following new item:
``Sec. 1107. Annual reports on influence operations and campaigns in
the United States by the Russian Federation.' '''.
(c) Initial Report.--The Director of the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees the first report under
section 1107 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added
by subsection (a), by not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman
from California (Mr. Schiff) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.
Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chairwoman, we are all too familiar with the
influence operations perpetrated by the Russian Government during the
2016 U.S. election.
As the IC articulated in its January 2017 intelligence community
assessment, those operations were merely the most recent in a long
history of efforts to undermine the liberal democratic order. We must
remain vigilant and fully informed about the operations executed by the
Government of Russia to influence and undermine our democratic system.
To that end, this amendment requires an annual report from the
Director of National Intelligence containing information about the
influence operations and campaigns in the U.S. by the Russian
Federation. I support the amendment and urge my colleagues to do the
same.
I urge support for the amendment, and I yield back the balance of my
time
The Acting CHAIR (Mrs. Murphy). The question is on the amendment
offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 27 Offered by Mr. Yoho
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 27
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
Mr. YOHO. Madam Chairwoman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Page 81, line 12, strike ``and'' at the end.
Page 81, after line 12 insert the following (and
redesignate the succeeding paragraph):
(2) the threat to the national security of the United
States posed by telecommunications companies that are subject
to the jurisdiction of a foreign adversary; and
Page 81, line 22, strike ``and'' at the end.
Page 81, after line 22 insert the following (and
redesignate the succeeding paragraph):
(3) the threat to the national security of the United
States from acquisition, importation, transfer, installation,
or use of any communications technology by any person subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States that involves
communications technology designed, developed, manufactured
or supplied by, controlled by, or subject to, the
jurisdiction of a foreign adversary; and
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman
from Florida (Mr. Yoho) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida.
Mr. YOHO. Madam Chairwoman, I stand in support of an amendment I
[[Page H5908]]
have offered to the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard
Intelligence Authorization Act.
I would like to thank Representative Nunes and Representative Schiff
for their work on this important legislation.
My proposed amendment includes within the report on 5G technology,
the threat to the national security of the United States posed by
telecommunication companies that are subject to the jurisdiction of a
foreign adversary; namely, China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and Syria.
This will cover threats from acquisitions, importations, transfers,
or use of communications technology by any person subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States that involved technology designed,
developed or controlled by a foreign adversary.
As globalization continues to shape the world we live in, it is
increasingly important that the United States prioritizes the security
of our cyber networks and infrastructure. Today, China controls over 60
percent of the 5G networks in the world.
In 2012, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence deemed
telecommunication companies, Huawei and ZTE national security threats.
Seven years later, these companies continue to harm and undermine U.S.
cybersecurity interests. Should the U.S. continue to let these
companies and others like them continue to proliferate our networks, we
are putting the security of our citizens at risk and our national
security.
We must continue our maximum pressure campaign on these malicious
companies until we can ensure that these actors do not pose threats to
our national security.
I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman
from Florida (Mr. Yoho).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 28 Offered by Mr. Yoho
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 28
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
Mr. YOHO. Madam Chairwoman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
At the end of title VI, add the following new section:
SEC. 6__. REPORT CHARACTERIZING DOMESTIC TERRORISM ACTIVITY
WITHIN THE UNITED STATES.
(a) Report.--Not later than 150 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, in coordination with the Under Secretary of
Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis, shall submit
to the congressional intelligence committees a report on
domestic terrorism activity within the United States.
(b) Contents.--The report under subsection (a) shall
include the following:
(1) Activities conducted by domestic terrorist groups to
restrict free speech using violence or intimidation.
(2) Activities conducted by domestic terrorist groups that
are dangerous to human life and are a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States or of any State.
(3) The prevalence of any domestic terrorist group's
activities within the United States and abroad.
(c) Coordination.--The Director shall carry out subsection
(a) in coordination with the head of any other agency of the
Federal Government that the Director determines appropriate.
(d) Form.--The report submitted under subsection (a) shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman
from Florida (Mr. Yoho) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida.
Mr. YOHO. Madam Chairwoman, I rise today to offer an amendment to
H.R. 3494. My amendment No. 28 would require the FBI Director, in
coordination with the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for
Intelligence and Analysis to submit a report on domestic terrorist
activity in the United States to the congressional intelligence
committees.
The report will detail:
Activities conducted by domestic terrorist groups that restrict free
speech using violence or intimidation;
Activities conducted by domestic terrorist groups that are a danger
to human life and are a violation of the criminal laws of the United
States or any State; and
The prevalence of any domestic terrorist group within the United
States and abroad or any group that claimed to be domestic yet have
ties to foreign groups like al-Qaida or other terrorist organizations.
There are abhorrent groups of people within the United States today
whose reasons for existence is violence. They do not respect the rule
of law or the values of America. Yes, we have the First Amendment that
allows for freedom of speech, religion, and assembly, but with those
freedoms, one must exercise responsibility.
They seek to inflict harm on Americans or specific groups of
Americans because of their race, religion, personal beliefs, or other
reasons.
We have seen this evil in recent years with the deadly attacks on the
Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh, the attack on the Mother Emanuel
AME Church in Charleston, and, sadly, too many more.
Moreover, we have seen violence used by groups that restrict free
speech, most recently with the attack on Andy Ngo in Portland by the
group Antifa.
We are the most extraordinary Nation because of our belief in and the
adherence to the idea ``that all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights, that among
these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,'' with the rule
of law included.
Groups that threaten these notions threaten our country and our very
form of government. It is imperative that Congress be informed of
domestic terrorist activities and understand the prevalence of these
activities.
By keeping Congress informed of these activities, we, as legislators,
may continue to ensure laws are appropriately crafted to protect all
Americans and safeguard the liberties we hold dear.
I encourage my colleagues to support this amendment, and I yield back
the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Yoho).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 29 Offered by Ms. Omar
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 29
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
Ms. OMAR. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
At the end of title VII, add the following new section:
SEC. 7__. REPORT ON TERRORIST SCREENING DATABASE.
(a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence
and the Secretary of State shall jointly submit to the
congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on the
terrorist screening database of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
(b) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (a)
shall identify the following:
(1) Which foreign countries receive access to the terrorist
screening database.
(2) Which foreign countries have successfully petitioned to
add individuals to the terrorist screening database.
(3) What standards exist for determining which countries
get access to the terrorist screening database.
(4) The extent to which the human rights record of the
government of a foreign country is considered in the
determination to give the country access to the terrorist
screening database.
(5) What procedures, if any, exist to remove access to the
terrorist screening database from a foreign country.
(6) What procedures, if any, exist to inform an individual,
or the legal counsel of an individual, of the placement of
the individual on the terrorist screening database.
(c) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentlewoman
from Minnesota (Ms. Omar) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Minnesota.
Ms. OMAR. Madam Chairwoman, my amendment mandates reporting on the
foreign governments with whom we share access to the Terrorist
Screening Database. The database is shared with more than 60 foreign
governments, including countries with appalling human rights records,
such as Saudi Arabia and China.
[[Page H5909]]
An FBI official has acknowledged in sworn testimony that it has never
stopped sharing watch-list information with a foreign government
because of that government's human rights abuses. Many of the people
who are included in the database have never been charged with a crime,
and, yet, we share sensitive information about them with the same
government that murdered Jamal Khashoggi.
I have also received credible reports that there have been Uighurs
added to the database at the request of the Chinese Government. I ask
the Chair to think about that.
There is universal outrage in Washington about the treatment of the
Uighur population in China. What are we talking about?
Let's be clear. These are the precursors to genocide. And while it is
happening, while Members of both sides of the aisle and the Secretary
of State are condemning what is happening, we are allowing the Chinese
Government to add Uighurs to the Terrorist Screening Database. We are
allowing them to track Uighurs in the United States.
This is probably the most appalling aspect of our sharing this
information with governments that violate human rights, but it is not
the only appalling aspect. One thing we know for sure in almost two
decades that we have been fighting the war on terror, is that dictators
have been more than happy to call whoever opposes them a terrorist.
The Saudis, whose family has direct, proven, and clear financial
links to al-Qaida, are given access to this database. The Saudis, who
have rounded up human rights activists, tortured them, mass executed
them, and claiming they are terrorists, get to add people on this list.
It is entirely possible that they get to add American citizens to this
list.
This isn't compatible with a free society. It isn't compatible with
our essential concepts of civil liberties. It is important to note that
the evidentiary standard for being placed in the database is very low.
The government only needs reasonable suspicion that someone is involved
in terrorism, which is not even enough to charge someone with a crime.
It is also significant that individuals added to this database are
not informed of their placements and have suffered preventable harms as
a result.
So my amendment asks some basic questions, questions that we as
Members of Congress have not only a right to, but a responsibility to
ask.
I ask my colleagues to support this amendment. If they are concerned
about civil liberties, they should be concerned about this. If they are
concerned about human rights abroad, they should be concerned about
this. And no matter how they feel about the database itself, this
amendment asks that we need answers in order to make informed decisions
about our national security policy.
Madam Chair, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr.
Schiff), the chairman.
Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding to me.
This amendment requires a report on a number of civil liberties
questions regarding the Terrorist Screening Database. We need to
structure our counterterrorism programs by thinking about not only what
we can do and what is constitutional to do, but what we should be doing
so that we get the maximum security benefit along with the maximum
privacy.
Our aim is a healthy equilibrium between security and privacy. With
that in mind, I support my colleague's amendment which will assist the
Intelligence Committee with its oversight and inform the public about
how the privacy security balance is being struck.
I want to thank Ms. Omar for her work, and I encourage my colleagues
to support her amendment.
Ms. OMAR. Madam Chair, I am thankful to the chairman and ranking
member for their support, and with that, I yield back the balance of my
time
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentlewoman from Minnesota (Ms. Omar).
The amendment was agreed to.
The Acting CHAIR. The Chair understands that amendment No. 30 will
not be offered.
Amendment No. 31 Offered by Mr. Crow
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 31
printed in part B of House Report 116-154.
Mr. CROW. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
At the end of title VII, add the following new section:
SEC. 708. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON AMERICANS AND FOREIGN
INDIVIDUALS WHO CONTRIBUTE TO THE NATIONAL
SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES WHO ARE HELD
CAPTIVE.
It is the sense of Congress that the United States
Government should--
(1) prioritize the safety and protection for all Americans,
including citizens of the United States who are wrongfully
detained by foreign governments;
(2) make every effort to bring these Americans back home;
and
(3) provide assistance to and, as appropriate, advocate on
behalf of foreign individuals detained abroad who contributed
directly to the national security of the United States.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman
from Colorado (Mr. Crow) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Colorado.
Mr. CROW. Madam Chairwoman, I rise today to offer an amendment to
highlight the importance of honoring our commitments, to keep Americans
and those who serve our country around the world safe.
Unfortunately, by virtue of being Americans and representing the
values of our country, our citizens are sometimes targeted by
adversarial countries and wrongfully detained. In those situations, we
must leverage all available tools and resources at our disposal to
secure their safe return. We must employ a whole-of-government approach
to return Americans wrongfully detained in foreign countries back to
their families.
{time} 2145
We are a nation founded on the principle of due process. We must hold
other countries to the same expectations of equal treatment under the
law.
We must also support the foreign nationals who put their lives and
the lives of their families at risk to contribute to our national
security. We owe these extraordinary individuals our gratitude for
their assistance, particularly in light of the dangers that they often
face. Despite precautions, in some cases, their contributions have led
to their detainment or imprisonment.
One of our greatest strengths is the network of individuals and
nations that want to help us because they can rely on us to keep our
promises. That is why we must continue to stand by our commitments to
our partners, particularly when they are persecuted for their
contributions to the U.S.
Simply stated, we must honor our commitments to those who have stood
by us.
This amendment asserts the importance of this position, not just
because it is in the best interests of the United States, but because
it is the right thing to do, and that moral responsibility is an
essential virtue of being an American.
Madam Chair, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from California (Mr.
Schiff).
Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Securing the safe release of Americans held abroad is a top and
urgent priority. Congress can play a role in keeping this issue at the
forefront of public consciousness.
With that in mind, I salute my colleague for all of his efforts. I
thank Mr. Crow for drafting this sense of Congress that keeps the
spotlight on this important issue.
Madam Chair, I urge my colleagues to support the amendment and the
underlying bill.
Mr. CROW. Madam Chair, in closing, I urge my colleagues to support my
amendment and uphold our obligations to our fellow Americans and
partners around the world. We are a country that keeps its promises,
and we must do so well into the future.
Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Colorado (Mr. Crow).
The amendment was agreed to.
[[Page H5910]]
Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, I move that the Committee do now rise.
The motion was agreed to.
Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Ms.
Omar) having assumed the chair, Mrs. Murphy, Acting Chair of the
Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that
that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 3494) to
authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2020 for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the
Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, had come to
no resolution thereon.
____________________
[Congressional Record Volume 165, Number 120 (Wednesday, July 17, 2019)]
[House]
[Pages H5978-H5980]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
DAMON PAUL NELSON AND MATTHEW YOUNG POLLARD INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION
ACT FOR FISCAL YEARS 2018, 2019, AND 2020
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 491 and rule
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House
on the state of the Union for the further consideration of the bill,
H.R. 3494.
Will the gentleman from New York (Mr. Espaillat) kindly take the
chair.
{time} 1825
In the Committee of the Whole
Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the
Whole House on the state of the Union for the further consideration of
the bill (H.R. 3494) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2020
for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United
States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other
purposes, with Mr. Espaillat (Acting Chair) in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The Acting CHAIR. When the Committee of the Whole rose on Tuesday,
July 16, 2019, amendment No. 31 printed in part B of House Report 116-
154 offered by the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. Crow) had been disposed
of.
Announcement by the Acting Chair
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, proceedings
will now resume on those amendments printed in part B of House Report
116-154 on which further proceedings were postponed, in the following
order:
Amendment No. 7 by Mr. Chabot of Ohio.
Amendment No. 11 by Mr. Kennedy of Massachusetts.
The Chair will reduce to 2 minutes the minimum time for any
electronic vote in this series.
Amendment No. 7 Offered by Mr. Chabot
The Acting CHAIR. The unfinished business is the demand for a
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio (Mr.
Chabot) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which the
noes prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.
Recorded Vote
The Acting CHAIR. A recorded vote has been demanded.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The Acting CHAIR. This will be a 2-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 178,
noes 255, not voting 5, as follows:
[Roll No. 490]
AYES--178
Aderholt
Allen
Amash
Amodei
Armstrong
Arrington
Babin
Bacon
Baird
Balderson
Banks
Barr
Bergman
Biggs
Bilirakis
Bishop (UT)
Bost
Brady
Brooks (AL)
Brooks (IN)
Buck
Bucshon
Budd
Burchett
Burgess
Byrne
Calvert
Carter (GA)
Carter (TX)
Chabot
Cheney
Cline
Cloud
Cole
Collins (GA)
Collins (NY)
Comer
Conaway
Cook
Crawford
Crenshaw
Curtis
Davidson (OH)
Davis, Rodney
DesJarlais
Diaz-Balart
Duffy
Duncan
Dunn
Emmer
Estes
Ferguson
Fleischmann
Flores
Foxx (NC)
Fulcher
Gianforte
Gibbs
Gohmert
Gonzalez (OH)
Gonzalez-Colon (PR)
Gooden
Gosar
Granger
Graves (GA)
Graves (MO)
Green (TN)
Griffith
Grothman
Guest
Guthrie
Hagedorn
Harris
Hartzler
Hern, Kevin
Hice (GA)
Higgins (LA)
Hill (AR)
Holding
Huizenga
Hunter
Johnson (LA)
Johnson (OH)
Johnson (SD)
Jordan
Joyce (OH)
Joyce (PA)
Keller
Kelly (MS)
Kelly (PA)
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kinzinger
Kustoff (TN)
LaHood
LaMalfa
Lamborn
Latta
Lesko
Long
Loudermilk
Lucas
Luetkemeyer
Marchant
Marshall
Massie
McCarthy
McClintock
McKinley
Meadows
Meuser
Miller
Mitchell
Moolenaar
Mooney (WV)
Mullin
Newhouse
Norman
Nunes
Olson
Palazzo
Palmer
Pence
Perry
Posey
Radewagen
Ratcliffe
Reschenthaler
Rice (SC)
Riggleman
Roby
Rodgers (WA)
Roe, David P.
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rose, John W.
Rouzer
Roy
Rutherford
Scalise
Schweikert
Scott, Austin
Sensenbrenner
Shimkus
Simpson
Smith (MO)
Smith (NE)
Smucker
Spano
Stauber
Steil
Steube
Stewart
Stivers
Taylor
Thornberry
Timmons
Tipton
Turner
Wagner
Walberg
Walden
Walorski
Waltz
Watkins
Weber (TX)
Webster (FL)
Wenstrup
Westerman
Williams
Wilson (SC)
Wittman
Womack
Woodall
Wright
Yoho
Young
Zeldin
NOES--255
Adams
Aguilar
Allred
Axne
Barragan
Bass
Beatty
Bera
Beyer
Bishop (GA)
Blumenauer
Blunt Rochester
Bonamici
Boyle, Brendan F.
Brindisi
Brown (MD)
Brownley (CA)
Buchanan
Bustos
Butterfield
Carbajal
Cardenas
Carson (IN)
Cartwright
Case
Casten (IL)
Castor (FL)
Castro (TX)
Chu, Judy
Cicilline
Cisneros
Clark (MA)
Clarke (NY)
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Cohen
Connolly
Cooper
Correa
Costa
Courtney
Cox (CA)
Craig
Crist
Crow
Cuellar
Cummings
Cunningham
Davids (KS)
Davis (CA)
Davis, Danny K.
Dean
DeFazio
DeGette
DeLauro
DelBene
Delgado
Demings
DeSaulnier
Deutch
Dingell
Doggett
Doyle, Michael F.
Engel
Escobar
Eshoo
Espaillat
Evans
Finkenauer
Fitzpatrick
Fletcher
Fortenberry
Foster
Frankel
Fudge
Gaetz
Gallagher
Gallego
Garamendi
Garcia (IL)
Garcia (TX)
Golden
Gomez
Gonzalez (TX)
Gottheimer
Graves (LA)
Green, Al (TX)
Grijalva
Haaland
Harder (CA)
Hastings
Hayes
Heck
Herrera Beutler
Higgins (NY)
Hill (CA)
Himes
Hollingsworth
Horn, Kendra S.
Horsford
Houlahan
Hoyer
Huffman
Hurd (TX)
Jackson Lee
Jayapal
Jeffries
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (TX)
Kaptur
Katko
Keating
Kelly (IL)
Kennedy
Khanna
Kildee
Kilmer
Kim
Kind
Kirkpatrick
Krishnamoorthi
Kuster (NH)
Lamb
Langevin
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Lawrence
Lawson (FL)
Lee (CA)
Lee (NV)
Levin (CA)
Levin (MI)
Lewis
Lieu, Ted
Lipinski
Loebsack
Lofgren
Lowenthal
Lowey
Lujan
Luria
Lynch
Malinowski
Maloney, Carolyn B.
Maloney, Sean
Mast
Matsui
McAdams
McBath
McCaul
McCollum
McEachin
McGovern
McHenry
McNerney
Meeks
Meng
Moore
Morelle
Moulton
Mucarsel-Powell
Murphy
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal
Neguse
Norcross
Norton
O'Halleran
Ocasio-Cortez
Omar
Pallone
Panetta
Pappas
Pascrell
Payne
Perlmutter
Peters
Peterson
Phillips
Pingree
Plaskett
Pocan
Porter
Pressley
Price (NC)
Quigley
Raskin
Reed
Rice (NY)
Richmond
Rooney (FL)
Rose (NY)
Rouda
Roybal-Allard
Ruiz
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan
Sablan
Sanchez
Sarbanes
Scanlon
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schneider
Schrader
Schrier
Scott (VA)
Scott, David
Serrano
Sewell (AL)
Shalala
Sherman
Sherrill
Sires
Slotkin
Smith (NJ)
Smith (WA)
Soto
Spanberger
Speier
Stanton
Stefanik
Stevens
Suozzi
Swalwell (CA)
Takano
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thompson (PA)
Titus
Tlaib
Tonko
Torres (CA)
Torres Small (NM)
Trahan
Trone
Underwood
Upton
Van Drew
Vargas
Veasey
Vela
Velazquez
Visclosky
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watson Coleman
Welch
Wexton
Wild
Wilson (FL)
Yarmuth
NOT VOTING--5
Abraham
Gabbard
Hudson
San Nicolas
Walker
Announcement by the Acting Chair
The Acting CHAIR (during the vote). There is 1 minute remaining.
[[Page H5979]]
{time} 1828
Mr. GRAVES of Louisiana and Ms. HAALAND changed their vote from
``aye'' to ``no.''
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Amendment No. 11 Offered by Mr. Kennedy
The Acting CHAIR. The unfinished business is the demand for a
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from
Massachusetts (Mr. Kennedy) on which further proceedings were postponed
and on which the ayes prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.
Recorded Vote
The Acting CHAIR. A recorded vote has been demanded.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The Acting CHAIR. This is a 2-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 237,
noes 196, not voting 5, as follows:
[Roll No. 491]
AYES--237
Adams
Aguilar
Allred
Axne
Barragan
Bass
Beatty
Bera
Beyer
Bishop (GA)
Blumenauer
Blunt Rochester
Bonamici
Boyle, Brendan F.
Brindisi
Brown (MD)
Brownley (CA)
Bustos
Butterfield
Carbajal
Cardenas
Carson (IN)
Cartwright
Case
Casten (IL)
Castor (FL)
Castro (TX)
Chu, Judy
Cicilline
Cisneros
Clark (MA)
Clarke (NY)
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Cohen
Connolly
Cooper
Correa
Costa
Courtney
Cox (CA)
Craig
Crist
Crow
Cuellar
Cummings
Cunningham
Davids (KS)
Davis (CA)
Davis, Danny K.
Dean
DeFazio
DeGette
DeLauro
DelBene
Delgado
Demings
DeSaulnier
Deutch
Dingell
Doggett
Doyle, Michael F.
Engel
Escobar
Eshoo
Espaillat
Evans
Finkenauer
Fletcher
Foster
Frankel
Fudge
Gallego
Garamendi
Garcia (IL)
Garcia (TX)
Golden
Gomez
Gonzalez (TX)
Gottheimer
Green, Al (TX)
Grijalva
Haaland
Harder (CA)
Hastings
Hayes
Heck
Higgins (NY)
Hill (CA)
Himes
Horn, Kendra S.
Horsford
Houlahan
Hoyer
Huffman
Jackson Lee
Jayapal
Jeffries
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (TX)
Kaptur
Keating
Kelly (IL)
Kennedy
Khanna
Kildee
Kilmer
Kim
Kind
Kirkpatrick
Krishnamoorthi
Kuster (NH)
Lamb
Langevin
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Lawrence
Lawson (FL)
Lee (CA)
Lee (NV)
Levin (CA)
Levin (MI)
Lewis
Lieu, Ted
Lipinski
Loebsack
Lofgren
Lowenthal
Lowey
Lujan
Luria
Lynch
Malinowski
Maloney, Carolyn B.
Maloney, Sean
Matsui
McAdams
McBath
McCollum
McEachin
McGovern
McNerney
Meeks
Meng
Moore
Morelle
Moulton
Mucarsel-Powell
Murphy
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal
Neguse
Norcross
Norton
O'Halleran
Ocasio-Cortez
Omar
Pallone
Panetta
Pappas
Pascrell
Payne
Perlmutter
Peters
Peterson
Phillips
Pingree
Plaskett
Pocan
Porter
Pressley
Price (NC)
Quigley
Raskin
Rice (NY)
Richmond
Rooney (FL)
Rose (NY)
Rouda
Roybal-Allard
Ruiz
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan
Sablan
Sanchez
Sarbanes
Scanlon
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schneider
Schrader
Schrier
Scott (VA)
Scott, David
Serrano
Sewell (AL)
Shalala
Sherman
Sherrill
Sires
Slotkin
Smith (WA)
Soto
Spanberger
Speier
Stanton
Stevens
Suozzi
Swalwell (CA)
Takano
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Titus
Tlaib
Tonko
Torres (CA)
Torres Small (NM)
Trahan
Trone
Underwood
Van Drew
Vargas
Veasey
Vela
Velazquez
Visclosky
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watson Coleman
Welch
Wexton
Wild
Wilson (FL)
Yarmuth
NOES--196
Aderholt
Allen
Amash
Amodei
Armstrong
Arrington
Babin
Bacon
Baird
Balderson
Banks
Barr
Bergman
Biggs
Bilirakis
Bishop (UT)
Bost
Brady
Brooks (AL)
Brooks (IN)
Buchanan
Buck
Bucshon
Budd
Burchett
Burgess
Byrne
Calvert
Carter (GA)
Carter (TX)
Chabot
Cheney
Cline
Cloud
Cole
Collins (GA)
Collins (NY)
Comer
Conaway
Cook
Crawford
Crenshaw
Curtis
Davidson (OH)
Davis, Rodney
DesJarlais
Diaz-Balart
Duffy
Duncan
Dunn
Emmer
Estes
Ferguson
Fitzpatrick
Fleischmann
Flores
Fortenberry
Foxx (NC)
Fulcher
Gaetz
Gallagher
Gianforte
Gibbs
Gohmert
Gonzalez (OH)
Gonzalez-Colon (PR)
Gooden
Gosar
Granger
Graves (GA)
Graves (LA)
Graves (MO)
Green (TN)
Griffith
Grothman
Guest
Guthrie
Hagedorn
Harris
Hartzler
Hern, Kevin
Herrera Beutler
Hice (GA)
Higgins (LA)
Hill (AR)
Holding
Hollingsworth
Huizenga
Hunter
Hurd (TX)
Johnson (LA)
Johnson (OH)
Johnson (SD)
Jordan
Joyce (OH)
Joyce (PA)
Katko
Keller
Kelly (MS)
Kelly (PA)
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kinzinger
Kustoff (TN)
LaHood
LaMalfa
Lamborn
Latta
Lesko
Long
Loudermilk
Lucas
Luetkemeyer
Marchant
Marshall
Massie
Mast
McCarthy
McCaul
McClintock
McHenry
McKinley
Meadows
Meuser
Miller
Mitchell
Moolenaar
Mooney (WV)
Mullin
Newhouse
Norman
Nunes
Olson
Palazzo
Palmer
Pence
Perry
Posey
Radewagen
Ratcliffe
Reed
Reschenthaler
Rice (SC)
Riggleman
Roby
Rodgers (WA)
Roe, David P.
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rose, John W.
Rouzer
Roy
Rutherford
Scalise
Schweikert
Scott, Austin
Sensenbrenner
Shimkus
Simpson
Smith (MO)
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smucker
Spano
Stauber
Stefanik
Steil
Steube
Stewart
Stivers
Taylor
Thompson (PA)
Thornberry
Timmons
Tipton
Turner
Upton
Wagner
Walberg
Walden
Walorski
Waltz
Watkins
Weber (TX)
Webster (FL)
Wenstrup
Westerman
Williams
Wilson (SC)
Wittman
Womack
Woodall
Wright
Yoho
Young
Zeldin
NOT VOTING--5
Abraham
Gabbard
Hudson
San Nicolas
Walker
Announcement by the Acting Chair
The Acting CHAIR (during the vote). There is 1 minute remaining.
{time} 1833
So the amendment was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
The Acting CHAIR. There being no further amendments, under the rule,
the Committee rises.
Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr.
Sean Patrick Maloney of New York) having assumed the chair, Mr.
Espaillat, Acting Chair of the Committee of the Whole House on the
state of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under
consideration the bill (H.R. 3494) to authorize appropriations for
fiscal year 2020 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities
of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and
the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and
for other purposes, and, pursuant to House Resolution 491, he reported
the bill, as amended by that resolution, back to the House with sundry
further amendments adopted in the Committee of the Whole.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is
ordered.
Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment reported from the
Committee of the Whole? If not, the Chair will put them en gros.
The amendments were agreed to.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third
reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was
read the third time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XX, this 5-
minute vote on passage of the bill will be followed by a 5-minute vote
on the motion to suspend the rules and pass H.R. 748.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 397,
nays 31, not voting 4, as follows:
[Roll No. 492]
YEAS--397
Adams
Aderholt
Aguilar
Allen
Allred
Amodei
Armstrong
Arrington
Axne
Babin
Bacon
Baird
Balderson
Banks
Barr
Barragan
Bass
Beatty
Bera
Bergman
Beyer
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (UT)
Blunt Rochester
Bonamici
Bost
Boyle, Brendan F.
Brady
Brindisi
Brooks (IN)
Brown (MD)
Brownley (CA)
Buchanan
Buck
Bucshon
Bustos
Butterfield
Byrne
Calvert
Carbajal
Cardenas
Carson (IN)
Carter (GA)
Carter (TX)
Cartwright
Case
Casten (IL)
Castor (FL)
Castro (TX)
Chabot
Cheney
Chu, Judy
Cicilline
Cisneros
Clark (MA)
Clarke (NY)
Clay
Cleaver
[[Page H5980]]
Cloud
Clyburn
Cohen
Cole
Collins (GA)
Collins (NY)
Conaway
Connolly
Cook
Cooper
Correa
Costa
Courtney
Cox (CA)
Craig
Crawford
Crenshaw
Crist
Crow
Cuellar
Cummings
Cunningham
Curtis
Davids (KS)
Davidson (OH)
Davis (CA)
Davis, Danny K.
Davis, Rodney
Dean
DeGette
DeLauro
Delgado
Demings
DeSaulnier
DesJarlais
Deutch
Diaz-Balart
Dingell
Doggett
Doyle, Michael F.
Duffy
Dunn
Emmer
Engel
Escobar
Eshoo
Espaillat
Estes
Evans
Ferguson
Finkenauer
Fitzpatrick
Fleischmann
Fletcher
Flores
Fortenberry
Foster
Foxx (NC)
Frankel
Fudge
Fulcher
Gallagher
Gallego
Garamendi
Garcia (IL)
Garcia (TX)
Gianforte
Gibbs
Golden
Gomez
Gonzalez (OH)
Gonzalez (TX)
Gooden
Gottheimer
Granger
Graves (GA)
Graves (LA)
Graves (MO)
Green (TN)
Green, Al (TX)
Griffith
Grijalva
Guest
Guthrie
Haaland
Hagedorn
Harder (CA)
Hartzler
Hastings
Hayes
Heck
Hern, Kevin
Herrera Beutler
Hice (GA)
Higgins (LA)
Higgins (NY)
Hill (AR)
Hill (CA)
Himes
Holding
Hollingsworth
Horn, Kendra S.
Horsford
Houlahan
Hoyer
Huizenga
Hunter
Hurd (TX)
Jackson Lee
Jayapal
Jeffries
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (LA)
Johnson (OH)
Johnson (SD)
Johnson (TX)
Joyce (OH)
Joyce (PA)
Kaptur
Katko
Keating
Keller
Kelly (IL)
Kelly (MS)
Kelly (PA)
Kennedy
Khanna
Kildee
Kilmer
Kim
Kind
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kinzinger
Kirkpatrick
Krishnamoorthi
Kuster (NH)
Kustoff (TN)
LaHood
LaMalfa
Lamb
Lamborn
Langevin
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Latta
Lawrence
Lawson (FL)
Lee (NV)
Lesko
Levin (CA)
Levin (MI)
Lewis
Lieu, Ted
Lipinski
Loebsack
Long
Loudermilk
Lowenthal
Lowey
Lucas
Luetkemeyer
Lujan
Luria
Lynch
Malinowski
Maloney, Carolyn B.
Maloney, Sean
Marchant
Marshall
Mast
Matsui
McAdams
McBath
McCarthy
McCaul
McCollum
McEachin
McGovern
McHenry
McKinley
McNerney
Meeks
Meng
Meuser
Miller
Mitchell
Moolenaar
Moore
Morelle
Moulton
Mucarsel-Powell
Mullin
Murphy
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal
Neguse
Newhouse
Norcross
Nunes
O'Halleran
Ocasio-Cortez
Olson
Omar
Palazzo
Pallone
Palmer
Panetta
Pappas
Pascrell
Payne
Pence
Perlmutter
Peters
Peterson
Phillips
Pingree
Pocan
Porter
Pressley
Price (NC)
Quigley
Raskin
Ratcliffe
Reed
Reschenthaler
Rice (NY)
Rice (SC)
Richmond
Riggleman
Roby
Rodgers (WA)
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rooney (FL)
Rose (NY)
Rose, John W.
Rouda
Rouzer
Roybal-Allard
Ruiz
Ruppersberger
Rush
Rutherford
Ryan
Sanchez
Sarbanes
Scalise
Scanlon
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schneider
Schrader
Schrier
Schweikert
Scott (VA)
Scott, Austin
Scott, David
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Sewell (AL)
Shalala
Sherman
Sherrill
Shimkus
Simpson
Sires
Slotkin
Smith (MO)
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (WA)
Smucker
Soto
Spanberger
Spano
Speier
Stanton
Stauber
Stefanik
Steil
Steube
Stevens
Stewart
Stivers
Suozzi
Swalwell (CA)
Takano
Taylor
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thompson (PA)
Thornberry
Timmons
Tipton
Titus
Tonko
Torres (CA)
Torres Small (NM)
Trahan
Trone
Turner
Underwood
Upton
Van Drew
Vargas
Veasey
Vela
Velazquez
Visclosky
Wagner
Walberg
Walden
Walorski
Waltz
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watkins
Watson Coleman
Weber (TX)
Webster (FL)
Welch
Wenstrup
Westerman
Wexton
Wild
Williams
Wilson (FL)
Wilson (SC)
Wittman
Womack
Woodall
Wright
Yarmuth
Yoho
Young
Zeldin
NAYS--31
Amash
Biggs
Blumenauer
Brooks (AL)
Budd
Burchett
Burgess
Cline
Comer
DeFazio
DelBene
Duncan
Gaetz
Gohmert
Gosar
Grothman
Harris
Huffman
Jordan
Lee (CA)
Lofgren
Massie
McClintock
Meadows
Mooney (WV)
Norman
Perry
Posey
Roe, David P.
Roy
Tlaib
NOT VOTING--4
Abraham
Gabbard
Hudson
Walker
{time} 1842
So the bill was passed.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
The title of the bill was amended so as to read: ``A bill to
authorize appropriations for fiscal years 2018, 2019, and 2020 for
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other
purposes.''.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
____________________
