HEARING

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2019

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING

ON

THE FISCAL YEAR 2019 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

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THE FISCAL YEAR 2019 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Thursday, April 12, 2018.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m. in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. "Mac" Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. "MAC" THORN-BERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COM-MITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. The committee is pleased to welcome back the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to discuss the administration's fiscal year 2019 budget request for the Department of Defense. We are also pleased to have the Comptroller available to answer any questions.

We meet under rather different circumstances than last year. Congress and the administration have worked together to provide to the military the resources they need to begin to reverse the erosion of our military strength. There is agreement on the funding levels for defense for fiscal year 2019. We know how much we have to work with.

The challenge, as we work through the details, is that some of the consequences of years of cuts and neglect are becoming more apparent. A study published this weekend by Military Times found that aviation mishaps have risen about 40 percent since the Budget Control Act took effect. The alarming number of aviation accidents in just the past three and a half weeks reveals how deep the damage goes, and the magnitude of the task of repairing and rebuilding our capabilities.

Meanwhile, as events in Syria remind us, the world does not slow down and wait on us to rebuild.

This committee has had a number of hearings and briefings this year to examine more closely the challenges we face, from readiness to space and cyber. We have studied what adversaries are doing. We have heard from combatant commanders, service chiefs, and outside experts.

The issue today is how well the administration's budget request meets our national security needs under the parameters set in the Bipartisan Budget Act. We also want to examine how this budget request implements the new National Defense Strategy, about which the Secretary testified in February.

I am committed to working with the Department to achieve reforms that enable our military to be more agile and more efficient in facing the threats which confront us. The challenges are great, but if Congress and the Department work together, we can ensure that the military has what it needs to meet those challenges.

I would yield to the ranking member for any comments he would

like to make.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Thornberry can be found in the Appendix on page 83.]

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED **SERVICES**

Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Secretary Mattis, General Dunford, Comptroller Norquist. We appreciate you being here, and we appreciate your leadership in the Pentagon. And the chairman, I think, is quite correct in that it is better this year that we have a budget for 2018. We have the framework of an agreement for 2019, going forward. And certainly, some degree of predictability is going to be enormously helpful.

And without question, we have a readiness crisis within the military. The chairman has cited a number of the examples of that. We are better now than we were a year or two ago, but still a long way to go to make up for 15 years of war and, frankly, for spending

money in other places and not on readiness.

So, as we look at the 2018–2019 budget, one of my top priorities is to make sure that that money goes to make sure that our force is ready, that we address that problem, because there will be other needs, there will be other pressures. I hope we don't give in to those, I hope we remember that the troops should come first. Having them ready for the fights that they are saying they need to be

ready for is our number one priority, going forward.

I will also point out that, while 2018 to 2019 are great, I hope you are also planning for a lean future, because we are looking at an over \$1 trillion deficit this year. We just cut taxes by almost \$2 trillion, increased spending by somewhere in the neighborhood of

\$500 billion in the face of a now nearly \$22 trillion debt.

So, going forward in the next decade, certainly for the country as a whole, but for your purposes, for the military, understanding our fiscal restraints and dealing with them is going to be a critically important part of making sure that our military is ready to do what it can do. So we do need to get the budget under control.

On a couple other matters, just quickly, in North Korea I just want to emphasize that we should find a peaceful solution. It is a very, very difficult situation. But going to war on the Korean Peninsula would have catastrophic consequences. So I hope that we figure out a way to contain and control the very real threat of

North Korea, but at the same time prevent going to war.

The last two things I will say is, one, on Syria, it is a very, very difficult situation. You know, two Presidents have struggled with how to deal with it. I am not going to pretend I have an easy answer. But until we have a more long-term strategy, until we have some idea of where we are going in Syria and the Middle East, it seems unwise to me to start launching missiles. We need to know where that is going, what the purpose of it is, before we take that

I think it is also worth pointing out it is hard to find a legal justification for that military strike in Syria, absent congressional approval. So, whatever you decide to do, I would hope that you would

include the legislative branch.

And then, lastly, we have heard a lot-and I agree with thisthat we have shifted our focus in the last few years. We are now back into an era of great power struggles because of what Russia and China are doing, and how aggressive they are in pushing their agendas and their ideas across the world. And I agree with that.

I just hope that we don't see a great power struggle as simply an excuse for another arms race, and that we understand that a great power struggle involves all the elements of our government: diplomacy; I think, most critically, allies, finding partners in the world to advance our agenda and thwart those aspects of the Russia and Chinese agenda that are against the interests, not just of the United States, but I think of the world. So we work with partners, and we use diplomacy, and we use development, that we don't simply use the excuse of the rise of Russia and China to build more and more weapons.

There has to be a much more comprehensive approach, if we are going to be successful in creating a peaceful and prosperous world, which certainly is in our best interests, but it is in the best interests of the entire world, as a whole.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Ap-

pendix on page 84.]

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary and Chairman, welcome. Without objection, any written statements you would like to make will be made part of our record.

And Mr. Secretary, you are recognized for any comments you

would like to make.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES N. MATTIS, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Secretary Mattis. Well, thank you, Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished members of the committee. I do appreciate the opportunity to testify in support of the President's budget request for fiscal year 2019. I am joined by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Dunford, who will discuss military factors, and the Department's Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer, Mr. David Norquist, who is superintending the first full financial audit in most of our lifetimes, since it is the first of the Department of Defense history.

I am now in my second year as Secretary of Defense. And with your help we have made steady progress during the past 14 months. In January, the Department published a 2018 National Defense Strategy to which I testified previously. It is the first in

a decade.

Framed within President Trump's National Security Strategy, our National Defense Strategy provides clear direction for America's military to restore its competitive edge in an era of re-emerging, long-term, great power competition.

The Department next released the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, which calls for America's military to provide a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent, one that is modern, robust, flexible, resilient, ready, and appropriately tailored to deter 21st century threats, and to reassure our allies.

In South Asia and Afghanistan, uncertainty in the region has been replaced by the certainty of President Trump's South Asia strategy. Concurrently, in the Middle East, we have dramatically reduced ISIS's [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria's] physical caliphate, using a coordinated, whole-of-government approach that works by, with, and through our allies and partners to crush ISIS's claim of invincibility, and deny them a geographic haven from which to

Last month, thanks to the bipartisan support and political courage of Congress, President Trump signed an omnibus spending bill that funds the government for the remainder of the fiscal year. This law, along with the 2-year budget agreement passed as part of February's Bipartisan Budget Act, finally freed us from the inefficient and damaging continuing resolution funding process, and is now providing the predictable and sufficient funding needed to con-

tinue implementing the 2018 National Defense Strategy.

Our fiscal year 2019 budget requests the resources necessary to fulfill the Department's enduring mission to provide the combatcredible forces needed to deter war and, if deterrence fail, to win in the event of conflict. These forces reinforce America's traditional tools of diplomacy, ensuring that the President and our diplomats negotiate from a position of strength.

To restore our Nation's competitive military edge, the fiscal year 2019 budget funds our National Defense Strategy's three overarching lines of effort: first, to build a more lethal force; second, to strengthen traditional alliances while building new partnerships; and third, to reform the Department's business practices for better

performance and affordability.

Our first line of effort is to build a more lethal force. All our Department's policies, expenditures, and training must contribute to the lethality of our military. We cannot expect success fighting tomorrow's conflicts with yesterday's thinking, yesterday's weapons, or yesterday's equipment. As President Washington said during his first State of the Union Address, "To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace." And today, ladies and gentlemen, our lethal military arm will enhance our diplomats' persuasiveness.

The paradox of war is that an adversary will always move against any perceived weakness. So we cannot adopt a single preclusive form of warfare. We must be able to fight across the entire spectrum of combat. The Nation must field sufficient, capable forces to deter conflict. And if deterrence fails, we must win.

Following this logic, we must maintain a credible nuclear deterrent so these weapons are never used, and a decisive conventional force that can also wage irregular warfare. Preserving the full range of our Nation's deterrent options requires the recapitalization of our Cold War legacy nuclear deterrent forces, as initiated during the previous administration. Modernizing the Nation's nuclear deterrent delivery systems, including our nuclear command and control, is the Department's top priority, and these programs

are fully funded in the fiscal year 2019 budget.

The fiscal year 2019 budget also funds enhancements to the U.S. missile defense capabilities to defend the homeland, our deployed forces, allies, and partners against an increasingly complex ballistic missile threat. In accordance with the soon-to-be-released 2018 Missile Defense Review, this budget request continued robust support for missile defense capability and capacity to keep pace with the advancing threats.

The proposed budget will modestly increase end strength of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps to restore readiness, adding 25,900 to the Active and Reserve Force. The budget will also continue to invest in the military's most important assets, its

warfighters, with a 2.6 percent military pay increase.

The 2019 budget continues increased procurement of preferred and advanced munitions, a necessity due to ongoing operations in

the Middle East, and the need for war reserves.

Ten combat ships and eight support ships are funded, arresting the downward trajectory of our Navy's size and lethality. We will continue production of 77 F-35 and 24 F-18 aircraft, evaluating the performance of both to determine the most appropriate mix, moving forward.

This budget request funds systems to enhance communications and resiliency in space, addressing overhead persistent infrared capabilities; positioning, navigation, and timing; plus space launch

systems.

Our 2018 National Defense Strategy also prioritizes investing in technological innovation to increase lethality. Cyber advanced computing, big-data analytics, artificial intelligence, autonomy, robotics, miniaturization, additive manufacturing, directed energy, and hypersonics are the very technologies that we need to fight and win wars of the future.

Every investment in the strategy-driven fiscal year 2019 budget is designed to contribute to the lethality of our military and ensuring that subsequent Secretaries of Defense inherit a military force that is fit for its time. Those seeking to threaten America's experiment in democracy should know if you challenge us, it will be your longest and worst day.

Our 2018 National Defense Strategy's second line of effort is to strengthen traditional alliances, while building new partnerships. In the past, I had the privilege of fighting many times in defense of the United States, but I never fought in a solely American for-

mation. It was always alongside foreign troops.

Easier said than done. Winston Churchill noted that the only thing harder than fighting with allies is fighting without them. History proves that we are stronger when we stand united with others. And accordingly, our military will be designed, trained, and

ready to fight alongside allies.

Working by, with, and through allies and partners who carry their fair share remains a source of strength of the United States. Since the costly victory in World War II, Americans have carried a disproportionate share of the global defense burden, while others recovered. Today the growing economic strength of allies and partners has enabled them to step up, as demonstrated by the 74 nations and international organizations participating in the Defeat ISIS campaign, and again in the 41 nations standing shoulder-to-shoulder in NATO's [North Atlantic Treaty Organization's] Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan.

To date, 15 NATO allies are also increasing their defense budget as a share of the gross domestic product, giving credence to the value of democracies standing together. Further, our Pacific part-

ners are strengthening their defenses.

Our third line of effort is the urgent reform of the Department's business practices to provide both solvency and security. We will continue to establish a culture of performance where results and accountability matter on every expenditure to gain full benefit from

every single taxpayer dollar spent on defense.

We are committed to exercising the utmost degree of financial stewardship and budget discipline within the Department. In this regard, this year we will deliver our Department's first full financial audit in history. We will find the problems and take swift action to correct our deficiencies, thereby earning the trust of Con-

gress and the American people.

I am confident we have the right leaders in place to make meaningful reform a reality: Pat Shanahan, as Deputy Secretary of Defense; Jay Gibson, as Chief Management Officer; Ellen Lord, as our Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment; Michael Griffin, as Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering; Bob Daigle, as Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation; and David Norquist, as the Department's Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer. Each brings the intellect and the energy and the experience required to implement and sustain meaningful reform, ensuring the Department provides performance and affordability for the American taxpayer.

The Department is transitioning to a culture of performance and affordability that operates at the speed of relevance. We will prioritize speed of delivery, continuous adaptation, and frequent modular upgrades. With your continued critical support, we will shed outdated management and acquisition processes, while adopting American industry's best practices. Our management structure and processes are not engraved in stone, they are a means to an end. If current structures inhibit our pursuit of lethality, I have directed service secretaries and agency heads to consolidate, elimi-

nate, or restructure to achieve their mission.

The 2018 National Defense Strategy three primary lines of effort—building a more lethal force, strengthening our traditional alliances and building new partnerships, and reforming the Department's business practices for performance and affordability—will restore our competitive military advantage, ensuring we are prepared to fight across the full spectrum of combat, now and into the future.

I want to thank this committee for your strong spirit of bipartisan collaboration. While our trajectory is going in the right direction, our work has just begun. This is a year of opportunity and a chance to continue to work together, building on a strong start as we turn the 2018 National Defense Strategy into action.

The points I need to emphasize in today's hearing is that this budget, which is designed to execute the National Defense Strat-

egy, is building a more lethal force by restoring current and future readiness, modernizing our nuclear deterrent forces and their command and control systems, building for the future by improving our military's technological competitive edge, and reforming the Department's business processes to establish a culture of performance and affordability to ensure security and solvency. This strategy is the guidepost for all our actions, including this year's strategy-driven budget request, driving meaningful reform to establish an enduring culture of performance, affordability, and agility.

I cannot appear before you without expressing my gratitude to the men and women of the Department of Defense. They are the ones that must ultimately turn the National Defense Strategy into action. Every day more than 2 million service members and nearly 1 million civilians do their duty, honoring previous generations of veterans and civil servants who have sacrificed for their country. It is my privilege to serve alongside them, and I thank them for their tireless efforts and unyielding standards in defense of our Na-

tion.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Mattis can be found in the Appendix on page 86.]

Secretary MATTIS. General Dunford is prepared to discuss the military dimensions of our budget request.

The CHAIRMAN. General Dunford.

STATEMENT OF GEN JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., USMC, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

General DUNFORD. Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to join Secretary Mattis and Under Secretary Norquist here today. It is an honor to represent your men and women in uniform. And while we all recognize the challenges that the chairman outlined and the ranking member outlined in their opening remarks, I want to begin by assuring you that the U.S. military has a competitive advantage over any potential adversary today. I am confident we can defend the homeland, meet our alliance commitments, and prevail in any conflict.

But as I testified last summer, after years of sustained operational commitments, budgetary instability, and advances by our adversaries, our competitive advantage has eroded, and our readiness has been degraded. Driven by the National Defense Strategy that the Secretary outlined, and building on the fiscal year 2017 and 2018 appropriations, the fiscal year 2019 budget submission supports rebuilding the lethal and ready joint force that the Nation needs.

Our defense strategy recognizes the central challenge to U.S. prosperity and security is the re-emergence of long-term strategic competition by revisionist powers. With Russia and China as the priority, we also have to meet the challenges of North Korea, Iran, and violent extremist organizations.

China and Russia continue to invest across the full range of nuclear, cyber, space, and conventional capabilities. Both states are focused on limiting our ability to project power and undermine the credibility of our alliances. They are also increasingly adept at ad-

vancing their interests through coercive, competitive activity below the threshold of armed conflict.

North Korea has been on a relentless pursuit to develop their nuclear and missile capability. They have been clear that these capabilities are intended to threaten the United States and our allies in the region.

Iran continues to spread malign influence and create instability across the Middle East. And while we have made a great deal of progress over the past year, we are still grappling with the challenges of violent extremism, including ISIS, al-Qaida, and associated movements.

Defending our homeland, our allies, and advancing our interests in the context of these and many other challenges requires us to maintain a balanced inventory of ready, lethal, and flexible forces that are relevant across the range of military operations. Fortunately, with your support, we have begun to arrest the erosion of our competitive advantage, and we are on the path to developing the force we need to meet our current and future challenges.

This year's budget builds on the readiness recovery that we started in 2017, and reinforces our effort to develop the capabilities we need, both today and tomorrow.

In requesting your support for this year's budget submission, I, and all the senior leaders in the Department, are making a commitment to you that we will make every dollar count. We will fully support the auditing initiative led by Secretary Norquist, and we will maintain an ongoing dialogue with you on our progress toward addressing our current readiness challenges in building the capabilities we will need tomorrow.

To restore our competitive advantage and assure our men and women never find themselves in a fair fight, the U.S. military requires sustained, sufficient, and predictable funding. The funding in this budget is sufficient. I look forward to working with Congress to make it sustained and predictable.

Thank you again for your support and the opportunity to appear before you today.

[The prepared statement of General Dunford can be found in the Appendix on page 110.]

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Norquist, my understanding is you did not have an oral statement. Is that correct?

Mr. NORQUIST. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary, a lot of members want to ask questions. Let me just pose one question for you. I made reference to the study that came out this weekend that showed a 40 percent increase in aviation mishaps since the Budget Control Act took effect. And yet, over the past 3 weeks there have been some criticism about the amount in the omnibus funding bill, which Congress passed and the President signed.

I think it is important for this committee and for the country to hear from you about the significance of the funding bill that was passed and the 2-year agreement that most of us voted for in February to raise the Budget Control Act. How does that affect the men and women who serve our Nation, and our national security?

Secretary Mattis. Chairman, thank you. I believe that this committee is probably keenly aware of the readiness challenges we have faced. And for—ever since I got into this job, you have been part of the solution. All of you have been part of the solution.

Right now we cannot repair our way out of the situation we are in. We are actually going to have to buy, in some cases, the capabilities that we have simply worn out and had to set aside that can't even be repaired, whether it be aircraft or squadrons do not have enough; or it be ships that cannot go back to sea on time because when we open them up, long overdue for their maintenance period, we find things wrong inside that lengthen their time in the shipyard.

When you put all this together, this is why you can have young officers getting promoted to major, for example, that have not had the same flight hours that you have expected during your tenure on this committee, that a lieutenant or captain would have had. They have not had the opportunity because we have not funded for it, the aircraft are not available, the spare parts and the maintain-

ers have not been there.

This is not pointing a finger at anyone in particular; it is where we are at, and we deal with it. I will let the historians deal with how did we get here. But with your help, we are now going to be able to come out from underneath this and put our readiness back to where you expect it to be when you put out billions of taxpayer dollars for various parts of the military, yet when we put it all together, due to the continuing resolutions, it did not have the kind of budget support it needed for a balanced force.

The bottom line is we can spend every dollar. The audit is going to find problems, Chairman, and we will correct those problems. But we will be working with you, and we are keenly aware that we have got to deliver a more ready force, objectively, quantitatively, a more ready force that we can lay out to you. It is absolutely necessary, what you have given us. Now it is up to us to

spend every dollar where you expect it to be spent.

The CHAIRMAN. General Dunford, do you want to add anything

to the effects of this budget agreement?

General DUNFORD. The only thing I would say, Chairman Thornberry, is it is an agreement that allows us to balance both the needs of today and tomorrow.

And to emphasize the Secretary's point, I think we used to look at operations and maintenance money as associated with readiness, and then modernization money as associated with the future. And to the Secretary's point, I really do believe today there is a distinction without a difference when you talk about readiness and modernization. We actually have to modernize the force in order for us to be ready against the challenges that are outlined in the National Defense Strategy.

And I think, as a result of the 15 years of erosion, I don't think we can collectively think about these as discreet tasks. In other words, today is tomorrow, and the investments that we make in maintaining a competitive advantage in the context of the National Defense Strategy are the same ones we need to make sure our squadrons, our battalions, our brigades are up and running today.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ranking Member.

Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I—on the budget, just out of curiosity, I wonder what your response is. For fiscal year 2019, the agreement that we reached that the chairman just alluded to, I believe had a—if you count the DOE [Department of Energy] portion of what we do in this committee—\$647 billion. That is not counting OCO [overseas contingency operations] in there, and its \$716 billion.

The budget cap number for 2020 is, I believe, \$567 billion. So it would be, gosh, about an \$80 billion cut in what we did in fiscal year 2019. Are you planning on having to absorb that cut, or are you hoping that there will be some way to avoid the Budget Con-

trol Act come 2020 and 2021?

Secretary MATTIS. Sir, we will lay out the requirement for 2020 and 2021. However, our internal reforms, we are looking to accrue savings there.

At the same time, we are going to have to have a budget fit for its time, and I can't tell you what the threat specifically will be. I can tell you we are trying to put ourselves in a position to have a shock absorber, where we can take those threats on board, maintain budget predicts hilling that includes requests from us

tain budget predictability that includes requests from us.

But for right now, I would just suggest that, in light of the percent of the GDP [gross domestic product] we are putting out for military security, for defense, America can afford survival, and our job is to make certain what we bring to you is only what is required. And that is—I don't want to lock myself into the future, since I don't have—

Mr. SMITH. I am sorry, but if I may interpret that, basically what you are saying is you believe that if we go back to the budget caps in 2020 and 2021, we will be putting the country at risk, and you do not accept that number, and you are not planning on that number

Secretary Mattis. Sir, I owe you my best advice—

Mr. SMITH. Yes. No, I just want your honest opinion, so-

Secretary MATTIS. Right. I mean I would love to see the budget go down. In the world that we are looking at out there, I don't think that is going to be the case.

Mr. SMITH. Right. Well, you don't think that that would put us in a position to provide for the national security, if the budget went

back to the cap numbers in fiscal year 2020 and 2021.

Secretary MATTIS. I do not, sir.

Mr. SMITH. Okay, that—and the problem with that, of course, is the debt and deficit that I talked about. And I would just say, from my colleagues, that, you know, whatever disagreements we may have on exactly what the number for the defense budget should be, we are headed towards an enormous problem, unless we can continue to borrow north of \$1 trillion every year, basically forever.

So there are some big-picture budget things that we need to deal with, even if we disagree on the exact number for the defense budget, going forward. It is going to create—we are going to be right back in the uncertainty about a year from now if we don't come up with some comprehensive approach to our budget challenge.

Last thing I will say is, you know, I think, given the budget that we face, we have to try to find ways to save money as much as possible. And we have had this discussion before. I just want to put it on the record. I don't think we need to spend \$1.2 trillion on modernizing our nuclear weapons. We certainly need to modernize them.

But again, I will emphasize—I have said this before in hearings—China has 275 nuclear weapons, that is it. We have 15, 20 times as many. They have set up a deterrence, a very, very credible deterrence, because a lot of people don't know, but nuclear weapons these days are, I think, roughly 1,000 times more powerful than the one that dropped on Hiroshima.

We ought to be able to come up with a nuclear deterrence strategy that costs us a lot less money. And also, if there are fewer nuclear weapons out there, not just on our side, granted, but on all

sides, there is less risk of stumbling into a nuclear war.

So I am deeply concerned about the nuclear modification plan, both in terms of what it really does for our national security, the risks it places for a nuclear conflict, and also just for the budget, because I am—I will say this. I am 100 percent with the chairman on the readiness crisis and the way you described it. We are not providing the equipment or the training for our troops that we should right now to make sure that they are ready. I want to find money wherever I can to make sure that we are. And that is one big area that I am going to be looking at.

If it is okay, I will just—you know, you can send me your comments for the record. I want to let other people get in, but I just

wanted to put that on the record.

I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. As all members were notified, we are going to pick up the questioning today where we left off when the Secretary was with us in February. And so, Mr. Lamborn is recognized.

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank

you both for your service to our country.

So for either or both of you, everyone knows that Russia is in violation of the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty. Do you expect the Russians to return any time soon to full and verifiable compliance with that treaty?

Secretary MATTIS. Right now, Congressman, we have very modest expectations that they would return to compliance as a result. In the Nuclear Posture Review we are looking for a way, at the lowest possible cost, to checkmate them and make it in their best interest to return to compliance.

Mr. LAMBORN. General Dunford, do you have anything to add to that?

General DUNFORD. All I would say, Congressman, is that one of the things we are doing in this budget that we have submitted is there is research and development for non-compliant weapons that is allowed by the treaty, and that is in the budget for fiscal year 2019. So we are not only looking for operational concepts and ways to deal with the Russian violation, but we are also at least posturing ourselves to develop weapons, should they be required.

Mr. LAMBORN. And I think we should stress the point that, even as we stay in the treaty—although I am skeptical that they are

going to come back into compliance, and we are kind of unilaterally tying our hands behind our back—we are legitimately allowed to do research for non-compliant systems. Is that not correct?

Secretary MATTIS. That is correct, and we are doing that. It is in the budget, Congressman. We—as we modernize this nuclear deterrent, our effort will also be matched at State Department by movement on arms control and non-proliferation. There are two thrusts to our nuclear strategy.

And so, as a result, we have got to do something that would make it in Russia's best interest to return to compliance, and that is why these funds have been requested.

is why those funds have been requested.

Mr. LAMBORN. Well, I am glad they are being requested. And how important is it to have additional options in our nuclear stockpile to address possible threats in the future?

Secretary MATTIS. In order to keep a deterrent fit for its time, it has got to be one that adjusts to any changes that we see an adversary or potential adversary making. And in this case you will notice that there are several adaptations. One of them is to return possibly the nuclear cruise missiles to the Navy ships. We had them there before. A second one is to put a small number of low-yield weapons onboard Navy submarines, ballistic missile submarines. This is because we have uncovered—and Russia has been rather out front with the idea that they could escalate to de-escalate.

What that means is you use a low-yield nuclear weapon in a conventional war to compel surrender, basically. And our point is to say you can't do that, we are going to have a low-yield weapon, we are not confronted only by using a high yield, which they believe we would not do. In order to make certain that the deterrent works, they must know that we don't have a choice only between surrender or suicide. So that is why we are doing these kind of adaptations to stay fit for our time.

Mr. LAMBORN. I am really glad to hear that because, as we go into the budget, some folks may argue that having additional options is destabilizing. We all want as much stability as possible when it comes to these powerful weapons.

So it is your belief that it is stabilizing to have more options. Is that not correct?

Secretary MATTIS. The entire point of that nuclear modernization is to maintain a nuclear deterrent that stabilizes and deters any use of the weapon. Then that is why we have looked at the research and development as authorized under the treaty, for one. It is why we are looking at the low-yield weapon, as well. It actually raises the deterrent effect of what we have, and actually reduces the chance of nuclear war.

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you so much. I appreciate what you do for our country.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. And I appreciate the gentleman keeping all questions and answers within 5 minutes. Let me encourage everybody to do that, so—because—so we can get to as many people as possible.

Mr. Courtney is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to both witnesses.

I appreciate the remarks regarding passage of the omnibus on March 21st. Again, Secretary Mattis, you noted the fact that it was a bipartisan effort. I think it is important to note that, not only was it bipartisan, but neither caucus by itself was able to deliver the votes to actually pass it by itself. So it truly took a coalition of people who, again, I think have heeded your repeated testimony over the last 2 or 3 years about the harm that the sequestration caps were causing, in terms of readiness and other issues.

So again, you were a big part of the external effort to get us to that point and, obviously, to create a 2-year horizon with the bipar-

tisan budget agreement.

Secretary Mattis, on page 3 of your testimony it states that the 2018 National Defense Strategy provides clear strategic direction for America's military to reclaim an era of strategic purpose, which is, I think, a very, you know—has a, you know, high aspirational goal for our country, to get sort of a clear picture that budgets are

tied to a stable strategy.

Unfortunately, you know, just the events of the last 2 weeks, you know, we have comments coming out of the White House that—regarding Syria, which I think really are sort of disconnected to that goal. On March 28 the President was giving a speech on infrastructure where he-again, without any prompting-talked about wanting to leave Syria "very soon." Again, when the Pentagon was asked about that, they referred the media to the White House to get an explanation.

On April 3rd, at a joint appearance with the presidents of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, again he doubled down, saying that they want to get out, that the U.S. wants to get out. On the 4th, said it would be within a few months, and then on April 7th we had, obviously, the chemical attack, which, again, resulted in a gyration of comments coming out of the White House, talking about

missile attacks.

And then, yesterday morning, Russia vows to shoot down any and all missiles fired at Syria. "Get ready, Russia, because they

will be coming nice and new and smart."

Again, in terms of, you know, trying to align those messages with a clear, strategic direction for our country, I am not asking you to answer any questions about operational decisions that you are considering right now, but what is the policy of the Department of Defense regarding—and strategy regarding the Assad regime, its future, and the Syrian civil war? Or is there a strategy?

Secretary MATTIS. Yes, sir. Well—and thank you for your comments about my role in the bipartisan omnibus, sir. But I would tell you that without this committee's bipartisanship that you have right in this room, I think my comments would have been whistling in the dark. I think it was the example you set. On Syria, sir—both the last administration and this one made very clear that our role in Syria is the defeat of ISIS. We are not going to engage in the civil war, itself.

Now, you can look back to a year ago, when we did fire missiles into Syria, unrelated to ISIS. And that was, of course, the use of chemical weapons. And some things are simply inexcusable, beyond the pale, and in the worst interest of not just the Chemical Weapons Convention, but of civilization itself.

And so the recognition of that means at times you are going to see contrary impulses. You saw President Obama try to deal with those chemical weapons when he was in, and enlisting the Russians, who now it shows were complicit in Syria retaining those weapons, Assad retaining them. And the only reason Assad is still in power is because of the Russians' regrettable vetoes in the U.N. [United Nations], and the Russian and Iranian military.

So how do we deal with this very complex situation? First of all, we are committed to ending that war through the Geneva process and a U.N.-orchestrated effort. It has been unfulfilled because, again, Russia has continually blocked the efforts. But that doesn't mean we give up. We work with the international community, the United Nations, to get the Geneva process underway, and make certain that we don't allow this war to go on.

I have seen refugees from Asia to Europe, Kosovo to Africa. I have never seen refugees as traumatized as coming out of Syria. It has got to end, and our strategy remains the same as a year ago. It is to drive this to a U.N.-brokered peace, but at the same time keep our foot on the neck of ISIS until we suffocate it.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Wittman.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Secretary Mattis, General Dunford, Mr. Norquist. Thanks so much for joining us, and thanks for your service.

Secretary Mattis, I want to begin by going to your words in your statement when you talked about the downward trajectory of our Navy inventory and of Navy lethality. In response to that last year, this committee authorized \$26.2 billion and 13 warships. I think many of us were bitterly disappointed when the appropriators cut that number to \$23.7 billion and 10 warships.

And I know that our effort now this year is to be to continue the path of rebuilding the readiness and capability within our Navy. And obviously, the Navy-Marine Corps team needs that on the mission, going forward.

In your testimony you state, "The fleet will continue to grow to meet capabilities needed in the future and maintain an industrial base healthy enough to adapt and evolve in a dynamic environment."

I am still concerned, though. As you saw last year, we authorized \$26 billion, essentially; appropriated \$24 billion, essentially. This year the fiscal year 2019 request was for \$21 billion for shipbuilding. And I expected more because we had lifted the caps last year. So I thought there may be, as you talked about, a response to that downward trajectory.

Mr. Secretary, let me ask this. If, given the resources, does our military have the need for additional submarines? Do we have a more efficient and effective way to purchase aircraft carriers? And could we build amphibious ships for our Marines on a more cost-effective timeline?

Secretary MATTIS. We—sir, we always need more submarines, we always need more ships. And in a perfect world, I would have—I

would tell you right now that I would have a 350-ship Navy. But I have to deal with where the ball lies, not where I want it to be.

I think that, as you looked at the tradeoffs and the balance as we tried to go forward with current capability, with the future capability, with the growing challenges in space and cyberspace that have got to be accommodated, we probably did very well on shipbuilding.

Now, can we get more affordable aircraft carriers? We not only can, we will. You will not see another one that goes through what you all experienced as you went down to Norfolk and saw that beautiful ship. But it is too late, it is over budget, and there are

ways to prevent that in the future.

So we are going to make better use of the dollars, and make a more affordable Navy. There are some strategic decisions to be made about how we do that to include what we do in cyberspace and space so each ship is more capable. But also, I would just tell you that this is part of an integrated force, and nobody can integrate their forces in the world better than we can right now.

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I want to

talk a little bit about the Ready Reserve Force.

It is projected that our Ready Reserve Force would carry over 90 percent of readiness lift, if called upon. And our Ready Reserve Force today, 46 ships averages 43 years old. In fact, we maintain some of the only steam plants left in the world onboard ships. They are essentially floating Smithsonian Institute displays.

Some have speculated that, in a conflict, the limiting factors are going to be sealift. General Dunford, I know you had talked a little bit about that, about where we are with that. What steps is the Department pursuing to address this—what I believe is a strategic deficiency?

Secretary MATTIS. I want to take that for the record, sir. I have

met with the commander of Military Sealift Command.

It—there is a way to make some of the ships more capable right now: simply modernize them at relatively cheap price. And we are also going to have to buy certain types of ships in the future. I believe that, right now, we have got a pretty good plan for it, the prioritization of it.

And what does the Army really need to bring? You know, the Army is trying to adapt, as well, and that has significant impact on what is the requirement. And I want to make certain I get the requirement right, so I don't come in and tell you that I built something I didn't need, and 5 years from now I need to beach it.

I will get back to you with something on that, sir.

[The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thanks, Secretary Mattis.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Tsongas.

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome to you both, I appreciate your being here before us.

I too would like to focus on Syria. The chemical weapons attack against innocent civilians in Syria over the weekend is but the latest tragic atrocity in that country.

Secretary Mattis, you referenced a refugee crisis. Human Rights Watch has reported at least 86 verified chemical weapons attacks there. So we know what a terrible situation exists there.

But in response to the most recent attack, the President has signaled that the administration is reviewing possible military action. There are compelling uncertainties surrounding renewed strikes in Syria. Just to name a few: how these actions fit into a broader Syria strategy, which you have tried to address in some form; the nature of the support from the international partners who share our condemnation of Assad's atrocities; and how any renewed action in Syria, particularly should it escalate into a broader conflict, would impact our ability to engage in other areas of concern around the world, not the least of which also—what it might require of us in that part of the world, as well, in Syria.

So these concerns are not de minimis or passing. And I hope that you would agree that it is clearly time for Congress to review existing authorizations for use of military force, and to engage in the considered debate these times require. But as we speak, the administration is reviewing possible military courses of action. So I appreciate the timing of your appearance here today.

So, as you are considering possible steps forward, military actions you might take, what do you hope to achieve by any military action that the administration might eventually decide to take?

Secretary Mattis. Congresswoman, I don't want to get—as you will understand—into the details of a potential decision by the Commander in Chief, due to this latest attack, which is absolutely inexcusable. There have been a number of these attacks. In many cases, you know, we don't have troops, we are not engaged on—in the ground—on the ground there, so I cannot tell you that we had evidence, even though we certainly had a lot of media and social media indicators that either chlorine or sarin were used.

As far as our current situation, if, like last time, we decide we have to take military action in regard to this chemical weapons attack, then like last time we will be reporting to Congress, just as we did when we fired a little over a year ago, slightly over a year ago.

As far as the counter-violent extremist, counter-ISIS—

Ms. TSONGAS. So let me go back to this. So before taking any action, you would report to Congress as to the nature of what that action might be?

Secretary MATTIS. I will speak only to the fact that we will report to Congress, we will keep open lines of communication. There will be notification to leadership, of course, prior to the attack. But we will give a full report to the Congress itself, probably as rapidly as possible.

On the counter-violent——

Ms. TSONGAS. And so I—let's just stick with this.

Secretary Mattis. Okay.

Ms. TSONGAS. I would also then like to know, would you take action absent support from our allies? I know that the administration is engaged in talks with France and the U.K. [United Kingdom]. Would you seek to have them involved in any action we might take?

Secretary MATTIS. As you know, ma'am, or Congresswoman, our—

Ms. TSONGAS. Would that be a pre-condition, I should say.

Secretary MATTIS. Our strategy is to engage by, with, and through allies in all things we do. I do not want to discuss the current situation, because I owe confidentiality to our allies, due to the sensitive nature of military operations and the need to keep those secret. But I think you will find nothing inconsistent with your view in what we are doing, without going into any details.

On the——

Ms. TSONGAS. And what worries you most about any military action we might take, given the highly complex landscape in Syria,

the many, many actors that are engaged there?

Secretary MATTIS. There is a tactical concern, ma'am, that innocent people—we don't add any civilian deaths, and do everything humanly possible to avoid that. We are trying to stop the murder of innocent people.

But on a strategic level, it is how do we keep this from escalating

out of control, if you get my drift on that.

Ms. Tsongas. I get your drift. Thank you.

I yield back.

Secretary Mattis. Okay.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Coffman.

Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Mattis, General Dunford, thank you so much for your years of dedicated service to the United States.

Secretary Mattis, you mentioned that—in previous testimony today that we don't have confirmation yet whether or not there was a chemical attack. Don't we reasonably have enough evidence to—certainly to believe that there was an attack, and the fact that they didn't—the Russians and the Syrian Assad government did not grant immediate access, I believe, that was requested? Could you speak to that?

Secretary Mattis. I can, Congressman. I believe there was a chemical attack, and we are looking for the actual evidence. The OPCW—that is the organization for the Chemical Weapons Convention—we are trying to get those inspectors in, probably within the week.

You know the challenges we face, where Russia has six times in the U.N. rejected and made certain that we could not get investigators in. We will not know from this investigating team that goes in, if we get them in, if the regime will let them in, we will not know who did it. They can only say that they found evidence or did not. And as each day goes by, as you know, it is a non-persistent gas, so it becomes more and more difficult to confirm it.

So that is where we are at right now, sir.

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay, thank you. Just a question on the light attack aircraft.

Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, the Air Force is currently testing light attack—a light attack aircraft that may be acquired by the Department for use as a cost-effective way to provide close air support of counterinsurgency, armed reconnaissance, and other combat operations in a more—when in a more permissive threat environment.

The—I think an F-22 was recently used to attack a Taliban drug lab. I think that is \$70,000 an hour, in terms of the operational cost. And a light attack aircraft, I think, is approximately about

\$1,000, in terms of its operational cost an hour.

I wonder if you could speak to having them in our inventory, as we are, again, in a low-threat environment, where we don't have air-to-air threat, where we have a limited ground-to-air threat. And the—and also be able to sell those, in terms of foreign military sales, to our allies that can't afford an F-35 aircraft, and that—to foster a better military-to-military relationship with many of our allies. Could you speak to that, please?

allies. Could you speak to that, please?

Secretary MATTIS. Yes, sir, Congressman. You hit on all the right points, sir. We are looking for affordability. And where we don't need an aircraft that costs 17-, 20-, \$70,000 per flight hour, we need to look at it as a way to deliver readiness and combat capa-

bility on an affordable basis. And we are looking at it.

As you know, the Chief of Staff Air Force personally flew in one to check it out. And I think you hit on all the right points there about why we are looking at this, sir.

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. General Dunford.

General DUNFORD. Congressman, the role I play is to identify the capability that the force needs. What you have described is the capability that we need, and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force I know is committed to delivering that low-end capability at the most cost-effective way possible, and that is really why these trials are ongoing,

So we support his attempt to get that capability at the best cost

we can, meeting the criteria you outlined.

Mr. COFFMAN. Right. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Speier.

Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for your service.

Mr. Secretary, approximately how many transgender troops are currently deployed?

Secretary Mattis. I do not know, Congresswoman.

Ms. Speier. Could you provide that to us, subsequently?

Secretary MATTIS. I think I can. I will give you the best data I can come up with on it, yes.

[The information referred to was not available at the time of

printing.]

Ms. Speier. Do you believe that the currently serving transgender troops are weakening readiness or reducing lethality?

Secretary MATTIS. Congresswoman, on this one I submitted my recommendation and put it out publicly, my recommendation to the President. It is a highly charged issue from some people's perspective, and it is under litigation right now. So out of respect for the courts, I will just tell you the current policy stays in effect, the last administration's policy, as directed by the courts. And I have submitted to the President what I think is the best military advice.

Ms. Speier. So, Mr. Secretary, I want to introduce you to Staff Sergeant Logan Ireland. He was a noncommissioned Officer of the Quarter when he was deployed to Afghanistan. He is also transgender. Do you believe that currently serving transgender troops like Staff Sergeant Ireland are a burden to our military?

Secretary Mattis. Congresswoman, I think that, as we look at the enlistment standards, I gave a recommendation that troops, patriotic Americans who do not have gender dysphoria, should be allowed to serve. I do not—did not recommend that we change the clear standards that apply to all in that regard, or make a special group. And I would prefer to leave the courts to their action at this point, and then see where they stand at the end of it, and then look at what I have recommended to the President when I can answer you more fully.

Ms. Speier. Well, Mr. Secretary, you rolled out this new policy, and now you are basically saying, "I am not prepared to defend it."

Secretary Mattis. Oh, I am prepared to defend it, ma'am. But out of respect for the courts, I do not intrude into something that—it would be inappropriate for me to say something that would somehow impact in a court case that is going on. I think this is a rather standard situation, once the courts engage.

Ms. Speier. Were there any nongovernmental individuals or organizations involved in the formulation of the recommendations by

the DOD [Department of Defense] to the President?

Secretary MATTIS. It was the best military advice I could draw up from civilian overseers and military personnel, both officer and senior enlisted.

Ms. Speier. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask unanimous consent to enter into the record letters from medical groups refuting the conclusions of the DOD report on military service by transgender individuals in which they say no medically valid reasons exist to exclude.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, whatever letters the gentlelady would like to enter into the record may be included.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 125.]

Ms. Speier. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary, a Military Times article this week revealed that the Defense Manpower Data Center failed to report the number of combat troops deployed in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan last quarter. That website was also stripped of deployment data from previous quarters.

I am very concerned about that. I think that there is no combat advantage to obfuscating the number of U.S. service members that were in these countries 3 months ago. And furthermore, the American public has a right to know.

Do you intend to restore that information to the website?

Secretary MATTIS. I will look at it, Congresswoman. As you know, we keep the Congress fully informed, right down to every week we can update you on exactly the numbers in each case. And we do maintain some degree of confidentiality over the number of troops engaged against enemies in the field. So I will have to look at it. But we will not, of course, ever keep that—those numbers away from Members of Congress for your oversight.

Ms. Speier. Well, I know, but this has been an ongoing website that has provided this information to the public, and all of a sudden the last quarter it is not posted and they have sweeped away

all the data for previous quarters.

So it would suggest to, I think, the public and to Members of this Congress, that you are no longer going to make that information

available. And I think the public has a right to know.

Secretary MATTIS. I see. When I come in, ma'am, I don't come in intending to hide things. But I would just ask what would you do if you thought the enemy could take advantage of that kind of data, seeing trends at certain times of the year, and what they can expect in the future.

But I will certainly look at it. I share your conviction that the American people should know everything that doesn't give the

enemy an advantage——
Ms. Speier. Thank you. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Hartzler.

Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I want to certainly commend you and your leadership, all of you, to make sure that our force is ready, capable, and able, and deployable. And so I appreciate the policies that—and the positions that you are advancing.

I would like to ask—bring up the topic of base security, as it relates to rogue and careless drones. What many people don't realize is that, under title 18, to interdict a drone, it is very—it is illegal to do that, because they are used as an aircraft or a protected com-

puter.

And in the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] of 2017 and 2018, as you know, we did give DOD some new authorities to go after them, which I certainly applaud. But they are limited to certain areas like nuclear deterrence, missile defense, air defense, assistance in protecting the President and the Vice President.

So I am wondering and I am concerned about other DOD facilities and, you know, specifically a couple of things in Missouri makes me think of Mobility Command, it makes me think of also training bases and the potential danger or threat with a rogue drone on those missions. So I was wondering how is the Department of Defense interpreting the authorities provided by the fiscal year 2018 NDAA, and should this authority be expanded to all DOD mission sets, or perhaps to other specific missions like mobility and training that aren't currently included?

General DUNFORD. Congresswoman, I will start, and maybe the

Secretary will add something.

The Secretary, when the legislation was passed, brought together all the service chiefs and leadership to look at this issue, both from a material solution perspective, as well as from an authorities perspective. And he made it pretty clear that if we have a threat to our forces, to our bases, that we had the authorization—so we have interpreted it as we have the authorization to protect our people.

There are still some gaps in our material solutions to be able to do that. I am satisfied that, particularly for our sensitive sites, we have addressed that. But we perhaps haven't produced the equipment in the volume that we would want to see to be able to protect all of our facilities, and so forth.

But I have been in a room a couple of times with the Secretary, and I feel like our leadership has interpreted the law to mean that we can protect our bases and protect our people.

Mrs. HARTZLER. So you said there are some gaps, though? Would you like to see those addressed in the next NDAA?

General DUNFORD. We are addressing now the material solution gaps. In other words, making sure we have the right amount of equipment out there in the hands of our people across all of our bases and stations.

Mrs. Hartzler. That is great.

Secretary MATTIS. We also have authority gaps, though. Congresswoman, you are exactly right about the threat. We see what they are doing overseas, we know what is coming to a place near us, back here. We do need more authorities, and we will outline what those should look like, because you indicate that we can protect our nuclear sites. That is accurate. But we have a lot of other sensitive situations that are basically left outside the authority.

So we owe to you what we think that authority should look like, and make our case.

Mrs. Hartzler. Great. Thank you for that.

And the National Defense Strategy—rightfully so—highlighted the long-term strategic competition with China as one of the central challenges to national security. As you know, China is very focused, they have multiple lanes of effort, from espionage to the military effort to counterintelligence to propaganda arm, et cetera. And there are multiple lines of efforts in OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] policy, the Joint Staff, across services and the combatant commands that look at these issues.

Who is the focal point for such coordination across policy, across

the services, across the commands?

Secretary Mattis. Inside DOD, it would be the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. However, there is a broader issue here, a defend the Nation, a holistic, and that falls under Secretary Nielsen of Homeland Defense. And in that case, we have confronted a number of vulnerabilities that have not been fully addressed, and we are putting together the interagency effort to outline the holistic approach to that defense.

Mrs. Hartzler. Very good. I know we only have 28 seconds, but China, as you know, is beyond just the Indo-Pacific in their influence and their goals. Their activities are present in Africa, Europe, Latin America, et cetera. What efforts are you aware of being taken by each of the combatant commands in the different AORs [areas

of responsibility] to counter the China challenge?

General DUNFORD. Congresswoman we have—in the time remaining—we have a global campaign plan for China. Each one of the combatant commanders addresses China in the context of that

global command—global campaign plan.

Admiral Harris, as the Pacific Command, is the coordinating authority for that global campaign plan. But each one of the combatant commanders has supporting plans in their respective areas of responsibility that address specifically Chinese activity and capability in their areas.

Mrs. Hartzler. Could I have a copy of that, or maybe be briefed on that?

General DUNFORD. I—we will make sure you get briefed on that, Congresswoman.

Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Veasey.

Mr. Veasey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know that everyone on the panel today is very concerned about what happened in Niger with the four soldiers that were killed there. And what I want to ask you today are about the risks that we are accepting by responding to crises or incidents on the continent of Africa, and wondered if you could comment on those risks. And can we respond to multiple threats around the world, particularly when you look at Africa and how large that footprint is, under our current defense budget restraints that we have?

Secretary MATTIS. Representative, you hit on a key point for why our second line of effort—three lines of effort, the second one is building allies and partnerships. What we want to do is address those kinds of issues, whether it be in the Pacific or in Africa Com-

mand, in Europe, by, with, and through our allies.

So when we go in—let's just take Africa for an example. I actually looked at how many troops we are going to invest against how many—in this case, African—troops are we going to then be training or bringing in to the fight. And it looks like an investment chart right out of corporate America: one American equals how many trained and ready troops who can defend their own country.

So our goal is to turn this to the right people, that is the people who—whose country it is. And that is the way we go about it. We don't try to take on the full mission, we do a needs assessment of that specific country. In the case of the Sahel area—and you know Boko Haram and the threat that is there—in that case the French are leading the effort in—as the leading nation. And African nations are gathered around France, and we support France and the African nations.

So you can see how we are doing this by, with, and through our allies, so we don't carry the burden.

Mr. Veasey. When you—if we were to cut the State Department budget—and, of course, they work on things like governance that are, you know, very key, in my opinion, and in the opinion of many others, on making sure that these countries know how to govern themselves accordingly, so we don't have to spend as much militarily—if we cut back on those particular efforts, how much more money would we need to be able to invest, and how much more risk would we need to take on the continent of Africa under those sort of restraints?

I would imagine you would need more U.S. military power to be able to address—again, just because of the expanse of the continent.

General DUNFORD. Congressman, just to follow up on what the Secretary is saying—and I think this is where you were going with your question—you know, we have approximately 1,000 forces in West Africa. The French have over 4,000, and we are working with some 20- to 30,000 partners on the ground. So the requirement is for somewhere north of 30,000 forces to actually do the job, and our investment is only 1,000.

So if your question is what would it take if we were doing it by ourselves, you know, it would take on a large order of magnitude greater than what we are investing right now. That is what by, with, and through really means, is a small U.S. footprint leverag-

ing local capability to actually do the work that needs to be done

to address terrorism, extremism in the region.

Secretary Mattis. Congressman, I worked very, very closely with my counterpart at State. It was Secretary Tillerson, as you know. I am now working with Secretary Sullivan, the Deputy Secretary,

as nominee Pompeo goes through his hearing today.

But I can assure you that, for example, when we have a small amount of development money given us through this committee, we meet with State, we align State and Defense development monies so there is an integrated effort. So everything we do is done to enable our diplomats to speak with more authority and to reinforce the foreign policy of the administration largely put together by State Department.

So they have the lead, we reinforce, and it has been a good team,

sir, all the way through.

Mr. Veasey. For the continent, though, is the best strategy governance or military right now? Like, what would help those coun-

tries in Africa? Is it more of a governance issue?

Secretary MATTIS. Most of the challenges they face, Congressman, are not militarily solvable. It needs better governance. It needs diplomacy. It needs development. And we are working with State Department in support of those efforts.

But it is—you are—I know what you are driving at, and I agree

with you, that it is a diplomatically led effort.

Mr. VEASEY. All right, thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, good after-

noon—good morning here.

First question, General Mattis, Secretary Mattis, you have a joint program office with the Coast Guard and the Navy right now for icebreakers. There is no joint strategy on icebreakers. Coast Guard has their own Arctic strategy and the Navy has their own Arctic strategy, and I was wondering if it had entered your mind to combine those into a joint Arctic strategy.

Secretary MATTIS. We work, as you know, very closely. I don't hold a meeting with the chairman and the four-stars without the Commandant of the Coast Guard in the room. So we intend to stay collaborative. We have different authorities, different missions, but

they need to be integrated in the Arctic.

Certainly we have not prioritized the Arctic right now, due to the other situations from Korea and Syria, the situation vis-a-vis Russia, South China Sea. But—

Mr. Hunter. Would Russia be a reason——

Secretary Mattis [continuing]. I take no issue with—

Mr. HUNTER [continuing]. To increase—wouldn't Russia be——

Secretary MATTIS. Pardon?

Mr. HUNTER [continuing]. A reason to increase our presence in the Arctic?

Secretary MATTIS. I think what we increase there is what we

would look at, what type of forces.

Clearly, search and rescue in the Arctic is a high priority. Environmental protection is. Some of these things are not fit—are not best done by the U.S. military. But I would have no problem sup-

porting Department of Homeland Security Coast Guard efforts in the Arctic. We work closely together on every other part, from the Caribbean to the Persian Gulf. So it is—I am sure it is an area we

will work together.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you. Last question. The funding request from everything for the MSP, the Ready Reserve Fleet, basically the logistics train that you would use to go to war, you didn't request full funding for the MSP ships. That is the Maritime Security Program they—you requested the old funding, which is over \$3.5 million, versus \$5 million a ship.

General McDew is now working on, for the first time, ever, looking at if we take casualties with our ships, as they load our gear—and I remember when I deployed in 2004 we loaded a RORO [roll-on/roll-off] in San Diego with all of our gear, and then flew over to Kuwait, and fell in on our stuff. If you don't have the gear, you can't go to war. You might have the people there, and you might

have the first stage, but you won't be able to continue that.

Our Ready Reserve Fleet is falling apart, it is done. It is a steam-engine-powered fleet, which is ridiculous. The MSP is going to be underfunded now. You might see people dropping out of that. So what are your thoughts and your—the grand strategy of aligning the effectiveness and the killing end of the military with the guys that are going to make it work, which is being able to get the gear there to sustain a battle?

Secretary MATTIS. Right. Projecting power, Congressman, you are quite right, that is a key area of concern, and we are trying to prioritize inside many demands on the budget. But I have met with the Military Sealift Command commander, and we are going to come up with a way to get out of the situation we have inher-

ited. It is going to have to be prioritized.

I think that the mobility requirements study that comes in later this year—I would say probably by October, maybe November—is going to actually have a part of it that focuses right on what is the problem, not in general terms. What is the specific problem? What needs to be moved? What capability do we need? And how do we go forward?

The problem has not been sufficiently defined yet. We see all the symptoms of the problem. We need to really get it right before we start spending, you know, hundreds of millions of dollars on this.

Mr. HUNTER. I can't even tell when my voice is good enough for both.

North Korea boost phase shoot-down. The same system would work in Kuwait, shooting down boost phase out of Iran to Western Europe or to Southeast Europe. You would have the same system, roughly the same geography and trajectories. So just—can you give us an update on how, instead of waiting until the missile is coming down out of space at us, we are shooting at it, how we are doing on shooting it as it is low and slow and going up into the air?

Secretary MATTIS. Congressman, we are looking at left of launch, prior to launch, and we are looking at boost phase. I would prefer to do that in private with you, give you that brief, because of the

current nature of the threat.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, gentlemen.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Garamendi.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you so much for your service, and particularly

in this very difficult period of time.

In response to Ms. Tsongas's questions, you dealt with a lot of the issues of Syria. And I want to pick up one additional one: the horrific use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime has prompted the President to threaten military action.

My question, Secretary Mattis, is very specific: What is the legal authority, the precise legal authority, of the United States Government to engage in military action in response to the chemical weapons use by the Assad regime?

Secretary MATTIS. I believe that authority is under article 2. We have forces in the field, as you know, in Syria. And the use of chemical weapons in Syria is not something that we should assume that, well, because he didn't use them on us this time, he wouldn't use them on us next time.

So for right now, I will have the lawyers get back to you with the broader issue. I am aware of where your question goes, sir, but I would just tell you that, you know, that we have got to look at the use of chemical weapons, whether it be in Salisbury, England, or in Syria, as something that is inexcusable and that has got to be addressed.

And as Russia-

Mr. GARAMENDI. So, if I might-

Secretary Mattis [continuing]. Prevents the United Nations from dealing with it, we can sit acquiescent, or we can do something

Mr. GARAMENDI. So you do not believe you need further congressional authority to respond to the chemical weapons attack with

military kinetic action?

Secretary MATTIS. Under article 2, sir, the President has the right to employ the military. There are war powers resolutions or other actions that could—or legislative actions that cause us to come to you, as you know, with reports. But at the same time, I think we have the authority to deal with this.

Mr. Garamendi. Are you prepared to deliver to this committee the precise legal authority in writing that you are referring to?

Secretary Mattis. Well, sir, again, protection of our forces, I don't think we have to wait until they are under chemical attack, when the weapons are used in the same theater we are operating

Mr. GARAMENDI. I understand that. But I am awaiting a legal document from the Department of Defense specifying the exact authority and circumstances that cause you to use that protection of

Secretary Mattis. Yes, sir. I will provide it.

The information referred to was not available at the time of

Mr. ĞARAMENDI. Thank you very much, I appreciate that. And I think it is necessary. Obviously, there would be a debate about

The—in your testimony you indicated that there is some \$12 billion for missile defense, that that is an imminent threat to the United States. There is also, a week ago—actually, 2 weeks ago, from the Department of Homeland Security, an imminent threat from Russia hacking into critical infrastructure systems in the United States.

What is the Department of Defense doing to defend against those kinds of attacks that could easily lead to a shutdown of the grid, or some other critical infrastructure, thereby bringing physical, as well as social and economic harm to the United States?

Secretary MATTIS. Sir, as you know, we have a fair amount of money that is given to our Cyber Command for cyberspace operations. And we have a number of mission teams. But these are primarily, Congressman, focused on our own defense of the Department of Defense and offense against an adversary.

For the defend the Nation mission that comes under the Secretary of Homeland Security, Secretary Nielsen, we are in close contact with her. We have the only capability to try and defend, whether it be an electrical grid, a financial system, something like that.

And I think that right now we need to get a lot stronger in the defense of our critical infrastructure, all aspects of it. And I realize that some of that could come under the Department of Defense, which is going to take congressional initiative and action in order to balance the constitutional safeguards for our citizens with the reality that we have got to be able to protect them.

And this is an area that needs a lot of work, I will be the first to admit it.

Mr. GARAMENDI. If I might just—in a hearing that Ms. Stefanik had yesterday it became very, very clear that the coordination between the Department of Homeland Security and Department of Defense is lacking. I appreciate your attention to it.

Secretary MATTIS. Yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Scott.

Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I want to follow up on that a little bit. And I know, Secretary Mattis, in the National Defense Strategy you discussed the need to be strategically predictable, but operationally unpredictable. We are spending an increasing amount of time on gray zone conflicts.

Obviously, if we have evidence that somebody used a chemical weapon, that is a line that we can see. We know we want a predictable response to that, so that that doesn't happen again. But with gray zone conflicts, that line sometimes doesn't seem to exist.

And so, Chairman Dunford, as we talk about these gray zones, can you discuss the implications of the potential for future—proxy war might not be the right term, but certainly could work there. And is this going to be the way in the future that our adversaries challenge our resolve, as a country, both to operate on behalf of ourselves and our allies?

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I think the answer to the end of the question is yes, it is what we see, particularly with nations that we have a competitive advantage in the conventional space. They realize they can't take us on conventionally, so they find another way.

To put a finer point on gray zone, I would describe that as political influence, economic coercion, use of cyber, use of information operations, and then military posture. So there is a military dimension to it, but it is clearly a broader problem than just a military dimension.

As we think about it in the military strategy, we think the competition that is taking place in that gray zone is really the competition for our allies and partners. So we believe that the critical thing that they are trying to do in the gray zone, in the military space, is undermine the credibility of our alliances and partnerships, which, as the Secretary outlined, is an important line of effort in the National Defense Strategy.

So what is critical for us to do is overcome in information space, overcome in cyber capabilities, and then our military posture, the erosion of that relationship that we have with our allies. The broader government piece is, in fact what we are going to see, and that is going to require the State Department, the Treasury Department, the Defense Department all to come together to be competitive in what you described as the gray zone.

And as I mentioned, it really does have a political and economic

and military and an informational aspect.

Mr. Scott. And so, if I could follow up, it is going to take an all-of-government approach on the homeland defense side of the gray zone conflicts. What authorities do you have to take offensive action in the gray zone?

General DUNFORD. I think, Congressman, what you get at is a really important point, and that is that we have traditionally—and we do today—distinguished between peace and war. And so the activities and the authorities that we have in place on a day-to-day

basis reflect the fact that we are at peace.

And our adversaries don't actually have the same restraints. So what they are doing on a day-to-day basis looks more like moving towards war than being in peace. And so, from a cyber perspective and information operations perspective, we are reviewing, and we do review—we are reviewing that issue, and we do believe that we are limited in the activities that we can perform on a day-to-day basis, and the authorities that we have to allow us to be competitive.

Mr. Scott. This is something that I know, as a Member of Congress, we are going to need help from people that understand these definitions and operations significantly better than I do, and I look forward to your help with the authorities and other things that you need to not only defend the homeland, but to take action against those who are taking these actions against us.

General Mattis, as—I mentioned the strategic predictability and operational unpredictability, as outlined in the National Defense Strategy. Can you briefly describe what this means for troop rota-

tions and overseas assignments and training?

Secretary MATTIS. I can, Congressman. What we will do is make certain our allies know that we are reliable and we can break through to them, we can get to them, and stand with them at the time of need. We will do it by making certain that keeping the maintenance of the equipment, the training of the troops, and the family—wear and tear on the families is all kept in balance.

The way you do this is we ensure that preparation for great power competition drives us, not simply a rotation schedule that allows me to tell you 3 years from now which aircraft carrier will be where in the world. That is a great way to run a shipping line. It is no way to run a navy.

So during the time when they would be authorized to deploy, directed to deploy, they may not deploy out of home waters. They may stay there, operating an aircraft carrier down off San Diego, operating with the Army at Fort Irwin, overhead cover, this sort

of thing, as we keep our joint force ready.

And then, when we send them out, it may be for a shorter deployment. It will be three carriers in the South China Sea today, and then 2 weeks from now there is only one there, and two of them are in the Indian Ocean. They will be home at the end of a 90-day deployment. They will not have spent 8 months at sea, and we are going to have a force more ready to surge and deal with the high-end warfare, as a result, without breaking the families, the maintenance cycles, or reducing—we will actually enhance the training time.

Does that give you a-

Mr. Scott. Yes, sir.

Secretary Mattis [continuing]. Appreciation for it?

Mr. Scott. Gentlemen, thank you for your service.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Gabbard.

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. Thank you, gentlemen, for your service.

You know, the President has indicated recently his intention to launch U.S. military attacks against Syria. Article 1 of the Constitution gives Congress the sole power to declare war. Congress has not done so against the Syrian Government.

Section 3 of the War Powers Resolution requires the President to consult with Congress before introducing U.S. Armed Forces into

situations of hostilities.

Section 2 of the War Powers Resolution clarifies the constitutional powers of the President as Commander in Chief, and article 2, which you referenced, Secretary Mattis, to introduce forces into hostilities only pursuant to, one, a declaration of war; two, specific statutory authorization; or three, a national emergency created by an attack upon the U.S., its territories, possessions, or Armed Forces.

Syria has not declared war against the U.S. or threatened the U.S. The launch of 59 missiles against Syria by Trump last year was illegal, and did not meet any of those criteria in the War Powers Resolution.

The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018, which was signed into law by President Trump, states that none of the funds made available by this Act may be used with respect to Syria, in contravention of the War Powers Resolution, including for the introduction of U.S. armed military forces into hostilities in Syria.

My question is, will the President uphold the Constitution, the War Powers Resolution, and comply with the law that he signed by obtaining authorization from Congress before launching U.S. mili-

tary attacks against Syria?

Secretary MATTIS. Congresswoman, we have not yet made any decision to launch military attacks into Syria. I think that when you look back at President Obama sending the U.S. troops into Syria at the time he did, he also had to deal with this type of situation, because we are going after a named terrorist group that was not actually named in the AUMF [authorization for use of military force] that put them in.

This is a complex area, I will be the first to admit.

Ms. Gabbard. It is simple, however, what the Constitution requires. So while you are correct in saying the President has not yet made a decision, my question is will he abide by the Constitution and comply with the law?

Secretary Mattis. Yes, I believe that the President will carry out

his duties under the Constitution to protect the country.

Ms. GABBARD. What would the objective of an attack on Syria be, and how does that serve the interests of the American people?

Secretary MATTIS. I don't want to talk about a specific attack that is not yet in the offing, knowing that these are decisions—this would be pre-decisional. Again, the President has not made that decision.

However, looking at the chemical warfare convention, I think it is in the—by far, in the best interest of civilization—certainly in the best interest of America—that that convention be obeyed by the nations that have signed it. And what has happened in Salisbury, England, and now has happened in Syria again shows that this is not an idle concern.

Ms. GABBARD. So if the decision is made, as you have stated publicly, you are laying—are all the options on the table for the President? If the decision is made to launch a military attack against Syria, Russia has already responded, saying that they would respond to our U.S. strike. As this action is considered, can you justify for the American people how going to war with Russia over Syria serves the interests of the American people?

Secretary Mattis. No, Congresswoman, I can't answer that ques-

tion. I am not ready to speculate that that would happen.

Ms. GABBARD. Would you not say that it is a highly likely occurrence, given what Russia has stated directly, that they will respond?

Secretary MATTIS. No, Congresswoman, I would not. And there is a lot of ways to respond to the violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention diplomatically, economically, militarily—

Ms. Gabbard. Sure.

Secretary MATTIS [continuing]. That, taken in total, would represent, I think, what we have to do in this world if we are going to turn it over in accordance with international norms and international law.

Ms. Gabbard. One last question. The 2001 AUMF is the authorization with which our U.S. forces are in Syria. Today, while ISIS—there has been much progress made in the counter-ISIS campaign, and they are close to being defeated in Syria, al-Qaida has grown stronger.

Brett McGurk stated just over a year ago that al-Nusra is now al-Qaida's largest formal affiliate in history. So al-Qaida has grown

stronger in Syria.

Secretary Mattis. Mm-hmm.

Ms. GABBARD. Why is this, and why have our U.S. policies not

gone after al-Qaida in Syria?

Secretary MATTIS. Well, our policy is in Syria, which is a very complex battlespace, Congresswoman, that where they are located right now we do not want to go up and do another part of Syria. We are doing this by, with, and through our partner forces. They do not have the capability to move into that region.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentlelady is expired.

Mr. Brooks.

Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Now, Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, by way of background, I was one of some of our House Armed Services Committee members who, in 2011, voted against the Budget Control Act and its sequestration provisions that disproportionately cut national defense spending and so badly damaged America's national security.

Now to the current date. Per the Congressional Budget Office, we face an \$804 billion deficit this year, \$12.5 trillion in total deficits over the next decade, and a total \$33.8 trillion gross Federal debt by 2028. Proverbs 22:7 warns us that, "The borrower is the slave of the lender."

Similarly, I would submit America's debt slowly but surely gives our creditors power over America. For emphasis, China, a geopolitical rival and perhaps a foe, is America's largest foreign creditor, at \$1.2 trillion.

Here is our problem: If America's creditors simply stop loaning America more money, something they have every right to do, our Federal Government is immediately, the next day, insolvent, and faces an immediate \$800 billion shortfall. If this \$800 billion shortfall is prorated equally across our \$1.3 trillion discretionary budget, that translates into a devastating \$400 billion cut to national defense, immediately.

In 2011, when America's gross Federal debt was much less, at approximately \$15 trillion, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen testified in this very same room that "The most

significant threat to our national security is our debt."

Similarly, in 2017, when America's gross Federal debt was roughly \$20 trillion, you, Secretary Mattis, confirmed at your Senate hearing that "The greatest threat to our national security is our own Federal debt."

In the time that remains, will you please help the American people understand why you believe America's out-of-control deficit and

exploding debt are threats to America's national security?

Secretary Mattis. Well, Congressman, I think any nation that can't keep its fiscal house in order eventually cannot maintain its military power. Hence the connection to the Department of Defense that concerns me so much. It is also why we put solvency and security as watchwords at the Pentagon, because we need solvency first.

So we are aligned with you. The situation I face is a worsening security situation in the world. So then, even with that thesis I just mentioned, I come in asking for an awful lot of money.

The point I would make is in 1985 we spent 5.7 percent of our GDP on national defense. It was in the 35, 36 percentile during

World War II. But 1985 was not a war year for us, and we were spending 5.7. What we are asking for in 2019 is 3.1 percent. So we believe America can afford survival, and I recognize the competing and very tough decisions on domestic spending, on health care, on defense, and I can only tell you that we will spend every dollar as wisely as we can.

I don't have stress, Congressman, I create it. If I find someone who is getting artful with the money you have given us, that person will have to leave our ranks as we try to buy the time, securitywise, for you to put the fiscal situation back under proper order.

Mr. Brooks. General Dunford, do you share that concern about our accumulated deficits and total debt at some point becoming or

currently being a national security threat?

General DUNFORD. I do, Congressman. That really gets to my opening statement, that—what I said was we needed sufficient resources at Department of Defense; we also needed that to be sustainable and predictable. And clearly, on the path we are on, the sustainability and the predictability is at risk.

Mr. Brooks. On an entirely different subject matter, Secretary Mattis, do you believe that people who are illegally in the United States should be allowed to take military service opportunities

from American citizens and lawful immigrants?

Secretary MATTIS. I am not quite sure—sir, very bluntly, we need every qualified patriot we can get our hands on, but we do not support illegal activity in our recruiting. So I know at times we have had an awful lot of immigrant—legal immigrants, children of those families join at a much higher rate than we do with native-born, believe it or not. So we would like to see the immigration system fixed, so that we have legal immigrants coming into the country, because we recruit very well from them. They are overrepresented, sir, in our ranks.

Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Secretary Mattis, General Dunford, and Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. O'Rourke.

Mr. O'ROURKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, earlier you said in response to a colleague's question, you said we have not made any decision to launch attacks in Syria. Yesterday at 6:57 a.m. the President tweeted, "Russia vows to shoot down any and all missiles fired at Syria. Get ready, Russia, because they will be coming. Nice and new"—and he put in quotes—"smart!"

Can you resolve the disconnect between the answer that you gave and the commitment that the President made yesterday?

Secretary Mattis. Today our President—

Mr. O'ROURKE. I don't know if your microphone is on.

Secretary Mattis. Today our President did say that he has not made a decision. And I will tell you that we are meeting—when I leave here I go to a meeting where the National Security Council will be meeting on this. And we will take forward the various options to the President and the—

Mr. O'ROURKE. When the President of the United States says—

Secretary Mattis [continuing]. Intelligence assessment.

Mr. O'ROURKE [continuing]. "These missiles will be coming," the President of the United States of America says, "These missiles will be coming," that sounds to me and to the rest of the world like a decision.

In the answer to another question that was asked for the legal justification to fire missiles into Syria in response to these chemical weapons attacks, you said that we have troops in the field and we are not going to wait for them to be attacked before we take action. If we did not have U.S. service members in Syria, would you have the legal authorization to launch attacks in Syria in response to these chemical weapons attacks?

Secretary MATTIS. Yes, Congressman, I am going to have to have my lawyer start taking these questions. I look for the legitimate protection of the American people and their interests. I am the Secretary of Defense. And I did not pick up a law degree on my way to the job. So I need to get some people to give me, I think, the specific answers to your question.

Mr. O'ROURKE. Thank you. We have talked today about North Korea, about Syria, about ISIS, about Russia, about China, but we have not talked about the threat that the country of Mexico poses to us

The President also announced recently that—these are his words—"We are sending the United States military to secure our border with Mexico." Could you share with me what that will cost, what the mission is, how long it will last, since the President vowed to keep U.S. service members there until his wall is completed?

Secretary Mattis. Yes, I——

Mr. O'ROURKE. And then I have a follow-up question for that.

Secretary Mattis. I cannot tell you the cost yet, sir. I am in close contact, daily contact, with Secretary Nielsen. We are in support of Department of Homeland Security, Customs Border Enforcement personnel, and right now I have got about 800 deployed under the governors' authority. We are paying for them out of the title 32 funds that the Congress has allocated.

I believe I will get around—a request for around 700 more in the second tranche. Those will mostly be helicopters and observation type forces. These forces will not involve themselves with the migrants themselves, or have any law enforcement duties.

Mr. O'ROURKE. Related question. Can any part of your budget be used to construct a wall, a fence, fortifications along the U.S.-Mexico border?

Secretary MATTIS. Probably the part where, if I need to wall off or, excuse me, put a fence along a bombing range that is right next to the border, this is a safety consideration. I don't care who they are, they are human beings, I don't want them wandering into a bombing range that was active.

Mr. O'ROURKE. In 1997 then-President Clinton sent the United States military to the border. A United States Marine shot and killed an 18-year-old U.S. citizen named Esequiel Hernandez. The tragedy for the Hernandez family, the tragedy for that Marine who was put in a position for which he was not trained should be something from which we learn.

I think this is a grave mistake on the part of this country. And I would also, given everything else that we are talking about, all of our other challenges and threats and priorities around the world, I have to think that you also see, Mr. Secretary, the opportunity cost of sending the United States military to the U.S.-Mexico border at a time that it has never been more secure, more safe, where we have record low northbound apprehensions, the lowest numbers since 1971.

The community, El Paso, Texas, that I represent, conjoined with Ciudad Juarez forming the largest binational community in this hemisphere, is also one of the safest cities in the United States of America. I think this is a gross waste of taxpayer resources. I think this is a wasted opportunity, in terms of what those service members could be doing. And I think it sets the stage for another tragedy if we do not carefully manage this. And I would urge you to advise the President to withdraw this commitment. We do not need another ill-defined, ill-planned mission for the United States military.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cook.

Mr. Cook. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our panel today for their service and everything else. It has been a tough budget year. I was one of the ones that voted for the omnibus, I am one of the ones that—I cannot stand the Budget Control Act, and one of the big supporters behind the audit. I think that is extremely important, so that we don't waste money, and get the most cost efficiency.

I want to switch gears a little bit. And Mr. Secretary, you talked about allies. And I want to talk about F-35s. Ever since I have been in Congress it has been about the cost, the problems with the F-35s. And I think we have come a long ways correcting a lot of the problems that we had with them. I am all onboard and everything else, but it is not cheap.

And now we are talking—well, Canada dropped out of the buy for that, and there is some of us on this committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee that are concerned about Turkey and its behavior as an ally, and whether we should sell or continue to have Turkey as one of the recipients of the F-35.

If for some reason they drop out of that program, or we prevent them from buying that, is that going to significantly increase the costs of something which is extremely important to our future, and obviously the conversation today, the budget that we are trying to

do something about?

Secretary MATTIS. Congressman, we right now look at the F-35 as a program that we have got to drive down the costs on, and that is both the purchase cost but it is also the flight-hour cost, the sustainment cost, the cost of spare parts. So we have a full-court press on this, working with the contractor in order to drive it down.

We do have other allies around the world that are considering increasing the number of F-35s they buy, and right now I can't tell you that it is going to be equal, you know, if some drop and others go in to pick it up. But I will tell you that our focus on driving down costs and getting rid of excess costs is ongoing. We have had some success already since we got in. And between Ellen Lord and

my deputy, Pat Shanahan, I have got two very capable people of going after this with the contractor and getting the best value on this aircraft.

It is revolutionary. I realize how great it is, but it has got to be affordable.

Mr. Cook. General Dunford, were you going to comment on that at all, or-

General DUNFORD. No. The only thing I can tell you, Congressman, we would have to get back to you, the specific implications. Obviously, foreign military sales help hold down the cost, but I don't have the data on what the implications would be for Turkey. So we owe you an answer on that.

[The information referred to was not available at the time of

printing.]

Mr. COOK. Okay. The last thing I just wanted to address said NATO, number of us are on the NATO parliament, and we are concerned about our allies. We have some very good allies, in terms of meeting their commitment, and there are some that were about half in and half out. Do you have any suggestions on how we can gently pressure our allies to meet their commitments on this?

Secretary MATTIS. And you used the right word, Congressman, "commitments." Article 3 of the Washington Treaty, the NATO Treaty, said every nation will provide enough for their own defense

and the defense of fellow alliance members.

Article 5, of course, where we stand together in the face—a threat against one is a threat against all, and the message that President Trump directed me to take to NATO a year ago when I first returned to that headquarters, having been-served there as a NATO Supreme Commander, was you cannot expect me to go in front of the Congress and say we need American parents to care more about the freedom of their children than they care about the freedom of their children.

We have 15 nations that are on the right track to meet their Wales commitment, a pledge they made. And we want national plans. And thanks to Secretary General Stoltenberg, Secretary General of NATO, former prime minister of Norway, he is pushing very hard that each nation come to the summit this year with a national plan showing how they are going to get at 2 percent of gross domestic product committed to defense.

We do not have them all there, and the pressure continues. And the President, in his usual blunt style, has made it very clear that this is where we are going.

Mr. COOK. Thank you. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gallego.

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Secretary Mattis, one of our concerns here, obviously, is Russia. And I am following up on my fellow Marine's comments on NATO. One of the focuses that we have had is on the EDI, the European Defense Initiative.

Last year's NDAA we asked for a report about what would be actually, we put a report in the NDAA asking specifically what kind of resources, tooling, locations—in general, to give us more information so we can actually come up with a good EDI this coming

NDAA. That has not arrived yet, and we are about to go back into the NDAA again.

So I am just wondering, when is that report going to come out? You know, we want to be helpful, we want to make sure that we are giving you guys everything you need. But we need that type of information to actually properly size the budget for EDI.

Secretary.

Secretary MATTIS. I regret that you don't have it yet. I need to go back and look at it, sir. There is over 1,700 reports I am due every year to you all, and I confess that we at times have been late on a few.

Chairman, do you have anything on EDI?

General DUNFORD. Congressman, you know, I am not sure about that specific report, although, you know, I have looked at the details of the \$6.5 billion that are in this year's submission. And broadly speaking, it addresses the infrastructure, and we can share with you the specific locations. It addresses the increased exercise program as a result of rotational forces that increased. And it is increasing the pre-position equipment was the third piece.

So those are the three pieces that make up the \$6.5 billion, and I think we have a very clear sight picture exactly how that is allo-

cated.

We will take back the requirement to report, which, like the Secretary, I am not following a specific report, but I can assure you I am following the specific way we plan to spend the European Defense Initiative, and we do have a detailed plan to lay out.

Mr. GALLEGO. Well, thank you, General. You know, for us it would be great that we could compare the two to make sure that

we are rightsizing everything that is going on.

And just to continue on that kind of vein of thought, are we—and we could have two separate questions on this, but are you in favor of increasing our forces and adding more pre-position equipment or, more specifically, putting new basing locations in NATO with U.S. forces?

General, you can start.

General DUNFORD. Yes. Did you say, Congressman, specifically in NATO?

Mr. Gallego. In NATO territory, yes.

General DUNFORD. We do not have plans at this time to increase. We have, with your help over the last 3 years, increased to the level that we believe is sustainable—

Mr. Gallego. General——

General DUNFORD [continuing]. And appropriate.

Mr. GALLEGO [continuing]. I understand that. Would you be in favor of that? Should we give you the right budget? Would you be in favor of, you know, putting more positioned U.S. military personnel in NATO territory?

General DUNFORD. You know, I will be honest with you, Congressman. Right now, you know, the Secretary has laid out the National Defense Strategy, we pretty much know what the forces that will be available over the next several years are, and we believe, to meet the—our requirements for assurance and deterrence, we have the right U.S. composition in place right now, and realizing

that that is going to be in the context of the other 28 members of NATO.

Mr. GALLEGO. Okay. From some of the RAND studies that I have read and been involved with, what I have seen is that there is a clear picture that I have been told that we have a math problem in the Eastern European theater, specifically when dealing with Russia and Russian armaments. Do we—you know, do you agree with some of these studies, in terms of our math problem and how we could fix that?

Secretary MATTIS. The math problem is accurate, sir. However, there is more to the power of NATO alliance than simply the number of American tanks, as you understand.

Mr. Gallego. But—

Secretary MATTIS. So what we are trying to do is make certain the American military is there in an—support of the NATO alliance.

But at the same time, everyone has got to step up for this thing. And right now I think we could always rotate more forces in during a period of heightened tensions. But overall, I think we have got it about right right now, and we are working with the NATO partners to get their forces up on the step, as well.

Mr. GALLEGO. I yield back. The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Wenstrup.

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you all for being here today. I appreciate it.

We have witnessed Russia tampering in our elections and that of our allies. And in open testimony, the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] have talked about Russia undermining our defenses and our foreign policies.

It has been reported that Russia is trying to undermine our energy investments in Europe. Our science committee has detailed how Russia has done this. In a declassified report from CIA in 1983 that detailed Russia's active measures concerning nuclear modernization, missile defense, and the report stated—and I quote—one report stated, "Their campaign covers a whole spectrum of activities, from overt efforts to create a fear of nuclear war to covert measures including forgeries and disinformation."

And so my question is, do you believe that Russia is carrying out these types of active measures today? What are we doing to counter them? And are the agencies involved able to coordinate well in those efforts?

Secretary Mattis. I think that, as you look at the National Defense Strategy, Congressman—and this is something that President Trump personally approved, I talked with him about it before I signed it—and you see Russia now registers as a strategic competitor.

We didn't want that, we were all trying to make a partnership of sorts with Russia after the fall of the Berlin Wall in the late 1990s, early 2000s. I can remember Russian marines training at Camp Lejeune with U.S. Marines for U.N. peacekeeping operations. That is in the dim past now, sir, as we watch what they have done, from Georgia to Crimea, from the Ukraine to Syria.

And so, when you look at the gray zone issues that were brought up by a Member earlier, this is where Russia is putting a lot of effort. The deniable—they think deniable—efforts that they believe they can undermine our belief in democratic processes, elections, as you mentioned, undermine us financially.

As you know, they have a declining economy, a worsening demographic. And until they wake up to the fact that they have a lot more to gain by working with Europe, by working with NATO, by being a responsible nation in the U.N., we are going to have to deal with them in all areas as a strategic competitor.

Dr. WENSTRUP. So are you comfortable with how we may be countering their efforts?

Secretary MATTIS. We are doing better. I will never be comfortable with our security. I will always be looking for ways to improve.

Dr. WENSTRUP. Do you feel like the agencies have the ability to coordinate the efforts to counter what is taking place?

I mean I think you have highlighted very well what is taking

place. But how are we countering that?

Secretary MATTIS. Right. We have—I believe we do have the ability, I think we have the focus. There is a lot going on right now, but I don't think I would—I wouldn't tell you we are where we need to be, but I know we are going in the right direction.

Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you.

General Dunford, do you have anything to add to that, or—

General DUNFORD. No, Congressman. You know, we spoke earlier, as the Secretary said, about the gray zone. And that is the threat we face.

The one thing that comes to mind as you were asking about are we postured where we need to be, you know, we are in an environment, particularly in cyber, where offensive operations are going to outpace defensive operations. And so that is one of the areas that I think is really being looked at by the experts right now at CYBERCOM [U.S. Cyber Command] and Department of Homeland Security and so forth is what is the right organizational construct, and what is the right level of activity every day, so we can have the momentum and the offense.

Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you, I appreciate that response.

Just a quick question for Mr. Norquist—I think you have been eagerly awaiting a question.

[Laughter.]

Dr. Wenstrup. As we go through the audit, do you anticipate that this will lead to DOD to be able to redirect funds into other areas, as we discover where we are spending money and how we are spending money?

Mr. Norquist. So I appreciate the question. The—there are three benefits we are going to see from the audit. The first and foremost is better data, which will feed better decision making. The second is the transparency and accountability that goes with it. And the third—and I think it is the third where you are going to see that the savings is—how it helps drive reform.

And so, as the Secretary mentioned in his opening statement, that crosses a number of offices in the Department, but their abil-

ity to drive reform benefits from the accuracy of the underlying business data.

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you very much, and I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Moulton.

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Norquist, thank you very

much for being here.

Secretary Mattis, last October before the Senate Armed Services Committee you stated that, "It is in our national security interest to remain in the JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action]," or Iran nuclear deal. Do you still believe that remaining in the JCPOA is within U.S. national security interests?

Secretary MATTIS. I think it needs to be fixed, Congressman.

Mr. MOULTON. I am asking if it remains in our interest to stay within the deal, in our national security interest.

Secretary Mattis. If it is fixed, yes, sir.

Mr. MOULTON. But not without it being fixed? What do you intend to recommend to President Trump, approaching the May 12th sanctions deadline?

Secretary Mattis. Right. We are working on what needs to be fixed in it. We are also working with our allies, in very close consultation with our European allies on this. There are three areas—I owe—this is not an area, because it is pre-decisional, but I want to go into detail here. But if those three areas are addressed, then it perhaps can be saved.

Mr. MOULTON. And otherwise, you think we should pull out?

Secretary MATTIS. I am not willing to say that until I see how much of it can be saved.

I mean this is not a—I think it is not an easily binary situation——

Mr. MOULTON. And yet the decision—

Secretary MATTIS [continuing]. Depending on our success—

Mr. MOULTON. Right, but Mr. Secretary, the decision is—

Secretary MATTIS [continuing]. With the European allies. If we can fix most of it, will that make it sufficient? I don't know right now

Mr. MOULTON. The problem, Mr. Secretary, is the decision to stay in or pull out is ultimately a binary decision.

Secretary Mattis. Right.

Mr. Moulton. Mr. Chairman, your deputy, General Paul Selva, testified last July that, based on the evidence that has been presented to the intelligence community, it appears that Iran is in compliance with the rules that were laid out in the JCPOA. And since that time, the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] has continued to affirm Iran's compliance.

In your assessment, and in the assessment of the intelligence community, is Iran still in compliance with the terms of the deal?

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I will caveat my statement by saying I haven't seen a recent report. I am not aware of any violations.

Mr. MOULTON. What does the Joint Staff plan to recommend to the President about staying in the Iran nuclear deal?

General DUNFORD. Yes, Congressman, I can't share that with you right now. I mean I think, from my perspective, we want to make

sure that all of Iran's malign activity is addressed: nuclear activity, cyber activity, missile activity, maritime threats.

And so we have a framework right now that addresses the nuclear piece. It has been deemed to be unsatisfactory. What we need to come out of is a diplomatic and a legal framework within which to manage the nuclear threat that Iran poses.

Mr. MOULTON. Mr. Chairman, how do you expect North Korea to believe that we will adhere to a deal if we are so willing to pull out of a deal that the United States of America signed with Iran

on the same subject?

General Dunford. Well, I understand your question, Congressman, but it certainly won't be up to me to decide whether we pull out of the deal or not. That is ultimately going to be a political decision.

Mr. MOULTON. I understand, Mr. Chairman. What I am asking you is how do we expect North Korea to believe in a deal, if we are so willing to pull out of our previous—our immediate past nuclear deal?

General DUNFORD. No, I understand it, and I am not trying to be argumentative. But you are speculating that we will pull out, and then you are asking me to determine what the action would be of North Korea.

Mr. MOULTON. Yes, sir.

General DUNFORD. I can't do that.

Mr. Moulton. All right, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, we discussed before the advent of artificial intelligence [AI] and its implications for our military, and you brought it up in your opening testimony. China has made a clear commitment to meet U.S. capability in artificial intelligence by 2020, and then exceed it by 2030.

Who owns U.S. research and development in artificial intel-

ligence, bureaucratically?

Secretary Mattis. Right now it is our new Under Secretary of Research and Engineering, Michael Griffin. And I would tell you that we are looking at a joint office where we would concentrate all of the DOD's efforts, since we have a number of AI efforts underway right now. We are looking at pulling them all together.

Mr. Moulton. So, Mr. Secretary, is it just within the DOD? Is there any government-wide effort on artificial intelligence, or is it

just—is the owner essentially the Department of Defense?

Secretary MATTIS. I can only speak to my portfolio, and I will get back to you with the broader—answering the broader question. But in terms of the defense of America, obviously I am primary. I know that also the CIA works on this issue.

The information referred to was not available at the time of

Mr. MOULTON. Mr. Secretary, a quick question on Syria. When I served under you in Iraq, you made it very clear what our mission was. In fact, you made it clear what we had to accomplish before we came home.

What do the troops in Syria, the over 2,000 Americans risking their lives every day, have to accomplish in Syria before they can come home?

Secretary MATTIS. I think both administrations, the last one and the current one, said we are going to take ISIS down so they do not have a physical caliphate and they are shattered, in terms of an aura of invincibility that attracts funding and recruiting.

So that remains the same at this time, Congressman.

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Byrne.

Mr. BYRNE. Mr. Secretary, General, Mr. Norquist, it is good to see all of you again, and thank you for your service to our country.

We talked about a lot of different parts of the world today, but I would like to shift a little bit, if I could, to our own neighborhood, the Western Hemisphere. It is very important to all of us, I know it is to you. We will have a congressional delegation—I will be a part of it—going to Peru this weekend for the Summit of [the] Americas.

And Mr. Secretary, I know you believe very strongly in soft power. But as you well know, soft power alone can't get the job done.

It is no secret that SOUTHCOM [U.S. Southern Command] is significantly underresourced to meet the combatant commander's requirements. And in his list of requirements, Admiral Tidd has expressed a necessity of a littoral combat ship [LCS] in his theater because he believes that small surface combatants are ideal for several missions, including combating drug trafficking, partnership-building, and providing support for special forces. Currently the Coast Guard is the only service providing maritime security in that region.

I also believe, in order to meet our requirements and provide the necessary support to effectively perform our missions, it is impera-

tive the Navy play an active role in SOUTHCOM.

Understanding that we need to invest in our capabilities across the globe, what would be your solution to get the most capability for low cost in the SOUTHCOM region? And specifically within that, how can we provide additional necessary resources to SOUTHCOM like the LCS that are ideally situated for the mission requirements in that region?

Secretary MATTIS. Right. It has been a prioritization issue. You are laying it out quite accurately, as has the commander, Admiral

Tidd.

We are looking at the mix of Coast Guard cutters and LCS right now. As you know, we also have Coast Guard cutters elsewhere in the world. Would those missions be best carried out by the Coast Guard or by Navy LCS, shifting more, for example, cutters into the Caribbean, into the Latin America area? Or do we want to put some of the LCSs into that region? We are looking at this issue as we speak. The chairman owes me some feedback here in the next couple of weeks as we try to sort out the right mix, based on the mission.

Is it primarily law enforcement? Do they need to have people with badges, which would mean Coast Guard cutters? We are going to have to shift and go to the Department of Homeland Security. Or is it LCSs because of the nature of an evolving threat? We don't

have the answer yet, sir, but we are working it. We will have it sorted out very soon.

Mr. BYRNE. Well, thank you. General, did you want to respond to that?

General DUNFORD. The one I can tell you, Congressman, in the National Defense Strategy the Secretary has directed me to do something called dynamic force employment. And what that really means is, in those areas where we don't have sufficient forces to be forward-posture engaged on a day-to-day basis, to find ways to use the force in a different way to support the combatant commanders.

And so that is exactly how we anticipate filling some of the gaps down in the U.S. Southern Command.

Mr. Byrne. My conversations with leaders from some of those countries, they actually are seeking that presence, sometimes only for the symbolic nature of it. But symbols are important; you know that better than I do.

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I—there is—I don't think either the Secretary or I would disagree with the desire to increase our presence down in the United States Southern Command.

I think, as you understand, one of the challenges we have right now is our Navy ships—I mean one example I use, I went to visit the USS *Barry* about 18 months ago, and those sailors had been underway 70 percent of the time the previous 12 months. So we really do have a requirements resources mismatch here that, again, we will be growing a force over time.

And Congressman Wittman has left, but he spoke about the size of the Navy, and if we—we are about 55 ships or more short of the

study that Congressman Wittman identified.

Mr. Byrne. Well, I am a strong supporter—a member of that subcommittee—of rebuilding the fleet. I was a strong supporter before, but now that my daughter is engaged to a young Navy officer who deployed yesterday, I am in the Navy now, and I want to make sure that we do everything we possibly can to resource you in the appropriate ways so that you can carry out this important mission, and at the same time protect those men and women that are wearing our uniform.

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Hanabusa.

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, General, Mr. Norquist, thank you for being here. And of course, thank you for your service.

Mr. Secretary, in your statement you speak to the fact that the United States remains the world's preeminent maritime power, and I, of course, agree with you. You do say that the 2019 budget provides to fund 10 combat ships and 8 support ships. What is the combat ships that you envision being funded, the 10 combat ships?

Secretary MATTIS. Yes, there will be two submarines; those are *Virginia* class, Congresswoman; three Aegis destroyers—these are the DDG-51s that you see often in Pearl Harbor and out in the Pacific. There will be a littoral combat ship. There is going to be two of the *John Lewis*-class replenishment oilers. They are critical for keeping the fleet at sea, and not having to come into port. In the

event of hostilities, we don't want them coming into ports, we want

to keep them outside the ports.

We have also got an expeditionary sea-based ship that is funded that is a *Lewis* [B.] *Puller* class. And we have also got the advance procurement for another *Ford*-class aircraft carrier, and advance procurement for the *Columbia* class. These are the replacement nuclear missile submarines.

Ms. Hanabusa. The reason I ask is for the period of time that I have sat on this committee I have always felt that somehow we have had a disconnect in the sense that, instead of purchasing based on some kind of future needs, we almost set our policy by acquisition.

In other words, what we buy then sort of sets what we are going to do.

For the time I have been here, DDG-51s were supposed to sort of be discontinued. The *Zumwalt*, the DDG-1000, was the ultimate ship. Then, of course, the LCSs were preferred. Then they kind of fell from the grace and now they are back again. This is a—I am not quite sure how we make these kinds of decisions.

Of course I don't want you to touch the *Virginia* class, for obvious reasons, and that is, of course, Pearl Harbor. So you keep on the

Virginia class. I think those are great.

But it is something that bothers me in how we acquire, especially with your statement today about the fact that we want a more affordable Navy.

So I understand that we have to be affordable. That is why we have Mr. Norquist here. But I want to be sure that we are not sort of short-changing and defining what our future is going to look like, because these ships are going to be around for a very long time, and they are going to define how we fight, General.

So please, can you explain to me how we come up with these decisions, in what is the preferred and not preferred and back to

being preferred again?

Secretary MATTIS. Congresswoman, you bring up very valid points. We need to rationalize what we are doing, and yet we are doing that at a time of dramatic change in information technology, in certain data handling, in hypersonic weapons, things that are going to fundamentally change the character of the war that we might fight, or deter, if we are successful in deterrence.

So innovation has now become something that we have got to unleash in a much more focused way, and we have got to have outputs from our innovative efforts that keep us from building a ship that, 5 years later, you say, well, that class doesn't look so good,

after all.

So it is challenging. I don't think anyone set out to put us on the track that you just explained, I think, very accurately. But that is the situation that you and I confront in our responsibilities, and I am going to have to come back and convince you that we have now figured out what is the requirement, based on the threat, and what can we afford to do about it in a sustainable way.

And that is where we are going right now. I have got the right people onboard, as of about January 5th, and we will get this figured out. I can guarantee you that. But it is a very dynamic world, and navies are at the cutting edge of this. And so they take a lot of hits.

Ms. Hanabusa. Yes, Mr. Secretary, that is my point. I do not want to hear again that we are battling today's war with last—the last war's equipment. And then our men and women in uniform are the ones that are in jeopardy. And I know I don't need to tell either you or the general that, but I think we need a great understanding of what we are doing before we engage in all of this.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. McSally. Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks, gentlemen, for

your testimony and your service.

As you have all mentioned today, we just partnered with you and the President in order to provide a desperately needed funding boost for our troops to deal with the readiness crisis and the erosion of our competitive edge.

But with less and less of our society serving in the military and being veterans, there is a bit of a sometimes civil-military disconnect, and we go back to our constituents in translating this, and

having them understand how critical this is.

This testimony you have today is so important, and I really hope that it breaks through the news cycle and the noise that is often seen on TV when people are at the dinner table every night.

I am going to take a little bit of a different approach, as normal. Secretary Mattis, you have a way with words. So could you, in just the next little bit of time, not answer to me, but in layman's terms to my constituents, the American people, about what has happened with readiness and the erosion of our capabilities, and why it is so important that we all are partnering in order to give our troops everything they need?

And also, for those who have a patriotic urge, why it would be

important for them to join those ranks.

Secretary MATTIS. Congresswoman, what happened over these years was we were engaged in a form of warfare, irregular warfare, that consumed much of our focus and—as it should have—but perhaps distracted us from other things going on in the world.

The result has been that we have got troops who are very, very good at what they do, but they are not trained for higher-end warfare to the degree that we want them trained for that. We have got ships that have not received the maintenance they needed, we have gone through a period when understandable hopes for a lower level

of expenditure for defense issues guided us.

And the end result of the war and of the rapid change in the world and the changes especially among several countries that have decided not to play by the international rules now puts us in a position that almost every generation of Americans have had to face, that if we are going to keep this experiment alive that we call America, we are going to have to once again fund our military at

The—what we owe you is the reality of how we see it, and we should be able to defend it. For example, readiness today does not necessarily equate to readiness 5 years from now in a time of rapid change. So we need to define the problems to a very keen level of detail, and then bring to you the solutions. And we will open it up;

if someone has got a better idea, I am wide open to it. But we can afford survival, we are not paying an inordinate percent of our GDP right now, and I don't want to pay one cent more than nec-

But we must pay what is necessary. And if we do not, if we do not do this, if we decide we are going to save money and underfund the military and costs there, the cost of a war basically is magnified many times beyond what the cost of peace is, even as expen-

sive as the bill I have brought you here today.

Ms. McSally. Thank you, Secretary Mattis. Also, the American people are not the only people listening. Our enemies, the mullahs, the thugs, the dictators are all listening today, listening to you to hear if they can identify some weaknesses or vulnerabilities. So I also want to give you the opportunity to speak to them, that if they were to choose to take us on, it would be an awful mistake that would come at a high, high price.

Secretary Mattis. Well, if that were to happen, if they were to make that mistake, Congresswoman, they would regret it. We would hit it with overwhelming force. And we would triumph. That is not our intent. Our intent is that our diplomats be engaged and

we solve things the way rational nations should.

But we have readiness issues. They would not in any way stop us from dominating. I think the chairman would probably be good to make a few comments on this, ma'am.

General DUNFORD. The thing I would say to our adversaries, Congresswoman McSally, is that they shouldn't confuse our willingness in a democracy to speak about readiness challenges as a sign of weakness.

Ms. McSally. Amen.

General DUNFORD. And as I mentioned in my opening comments—and I speak with a high degree of confidence about this you know, we can protect the homeland and our way of life today. We can meet our alliance commitments. And we have a competitive advantage over any potential adversary out there today.

The reason why we have this discussion and debate, and the reason why it is so important is we are not only focused on today, we are focused on tomorrow, as well. And because of the last 15 or 16 years, both of wars in Iraq and Syria, Afghanistan, as well as fiscal instability, the competitive advantage that we have historically had has eroded. It is not gone.

Ms. McSally. Right.

General DUNFORD. It has eroded. And the thing, speaking to both constituencies, both the folks back home, as well as our adversaries, we never want to send our men and women in a fair fight.

Ms. McSally. Right.

General DUNFORD. And the whole dialogue that we are having today, it is all about making sure when we send our men and women in harm's way, we do so and we make sure they are not in a fair fight.

Ms. McSALLY. Thank you, gentlemen.

I yield back.

The Chairman. Ms. Rosen.

Ms. Rosen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for being here, and for your thoughtful testimony today.

I just want to bring up that last week we lost one of our own at Nellis Air Force Base, a Thunderbird pilot, Major Stephen Del Bagno. It was a great loss to us, and I really appreciate that you are going to look into these accidents with our aircraft that have been going on. We know what it is related to, and I don't want to belabor that, but I want to honor his service and thank you for looking into that.

What I really want to talk about is a little bit Nevada-specific—actually, the whole world specific. We have a lot of challenges ahead of us: people that are our adversaries, with the President's tweets about sending bombs, with Russia and North Korea having

nuclear weapons.

Can you tell me—you put out a Nuclear Posture Review, so can you tell me—you said geopolitical challenges may dictate how we are going to respond or have a possible return to nuclear testing? We have a Nevada test site. Can you tell me, is there any circumstance at all that we would return to above-ground nuclear testing within the United States of America?

Secretary Mattis. I cannot imagine one, Congresswoman.

Ms. ROSEN. Thank you. People in my State have been worried about that.

I want to talk a little bit about below-ground testing. We do continue to do that. So can you tell me what kind of nuclear explosive testing that we may consider doing in the future? And how do we make sure these detonations are safe?

Secretary MATTIS. Congresswoman, there I would like to come back to you in private.

Ms. ROSEN. Okay.

Secretary MATTIS. I will tell you that we—our primary effort right now is to use very advanced computer modeling that removes the need to do much of what you—if you read the history books—

Ms. Rosen. Right.

Secretary MATTIS [continuing]. We did back in the 1950s and 1960s. But in terms of any below-ground, let me come back to you in a classified form—

Ms. Rosen. Thank you.

Secretary MATTIS [continuing]. For you. That should not be misinterpreted by anyone that that means that this is in the offing. That is not what I am indicating.

Ms. Rosen. No, thank you, I appreciate it. It is a great concern

to many Nevadans.

And so I also want to turn, then, to our influence operations and cyber activities. We talked a little bit about DOD over artificial intelligence. But really, as these traditional methods of warfare—especially cyberattacks—they don't fall under traditional means. So really, who is going to be the lead in this area, and how do we respond to attacks in every area? Everyone seems like they are going out, they are doing their thing, but where do we have that confluence?

Secretary Mattis. Inside the Department of Defense, Congresswoman, we have U.S. Cyber Command, and they are responsible for defending our networks and attacking the adversary's. We also have NSA and Cyber Command, National Security [Agency] and Cyber Command, connected.

We are going to—per the congressional guidance, we are going to separate those two, but keep them in a synergistic role together. And we need to figure this out. And once we have it figured out, we will come back to the Congress. But there will be most of America's offense and defensive capability.

Ms. ROSEN. And then, speaking again to security challenges, when you do do this and we move to the cloud, what are the cloud's implications—if we do public and private partnerships, if we move to the cloud, who is going to own some of that proprietary information? What if some of those private businesses go out of business?

Who holds the keys to the kingdom on the private side, and as it relates to our military readiness in the future, as things do move forward and we may drop certain technologies in favor of others?

Secretary MATTIS. The movement to the cloud, Congresswoman, is to enhance the availability of the information among us. Right now we have to also quickly advance our security.

We have over 400 different basic data centers that we have to protect. And we have watched very closely what CIA got, in terms of security and service from their movement to the cloud. It is a fair and open competition for anyone who wants to—it is only 2 years. If you have read something about 10 years in the press, that is not the case at all. So it will be a full and open competition, not sole source, by the way, to make certain we don't fall into just one.

And I am very confident that we can get a 2-year horizon on the—on anyone bidding on it to know with certainty they will not be folding. And we will just make certain that their performance tells us where we go in the future.

We just know what we are doing right now has to change, ma'am.

Ms. ROSEN. Perfect. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Knight.

Mr. KNIGHT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I join with Congresswoman Rosen in saying that our country mourns Major Del Bagno. He came from my district, and we appreciate his service.

There are certain things that have been said, Mr. Secretary. The speed of relevance, I think, is one of the things that you used, and I appreciate it very much. It is how quickly can we get a platform to our military is the most important issue of defending a nation.

So I believe the audit is very important. But taking that information and taking it to the next level might mean saving money, but it also might be identifying how we are getting that platform to the military faster.

Do you believe that the audit is going to prove out not only that maybe we are—we can have some savings, but we can also have some new issues that we can get those platforms moving faster?

Secretary Mattis. Congressman, I have no doubt that the data we get from the audit is going to be acted on, whether it be by the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Staff of the Army, CAPE [Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation], the ones who really look and give me an independent view of the progress or lack of progress of certain high-cost weapons systems, this sort of thing. The data itself is going to open opportunities. It is data that has never been displayed before.

And you will also be able to review it, so it is good in the sense of oversight by the Congress. You will have either more confidence

or more questions for me when I come up here next, sir.

Mr. KNIGHT. And in the NDAA 2017 we did a reorg [reorganization] of acquisition, technology, and logistics. And in that we have developmental test and evaluation. We want to make sure that developmental test and evaluation is at the forefront of what we are doing today, especially when it comes to aerospace and things that we are trying to move to the next technology step.

I would like to take this in the realm of hypersonics. Hypersonics, we have been doing in America for 65 years, but we have been taking great leaps in advancements over the last decade or so. And I think other countries have, too. Having an open society, it

is easy to steal information and data from us.

But that being said, hypersonics and developmental test and evaluation is extremely important. If we can reach out and touch the enemy before they can touch us, it is an advantage that everyone wants to have.

So I would like to have your commitment, Mr. Secretary, that developmental test and evaluation is going to stay at the top of our kind of priority list when we are talking about advancements of

technology.

Secretary MATTIS. Congressman, you are reading our mind in DOD. Under Secretary for Research and Engineering Mike Griffin, formerly NASA [National Aeronautics and Space Administration], formerly Lincoln Lab. This is his number one priority. What we have to do is get something that DT&E [Developmental Test and Evaluation] can test and evaluate, and our goal is to put something in the air, not have another study or something like this.

So it is focused, it is going forward, it is our number one priority of those innovative technologies, not to the exclusion of artificial intelligence, certainly, which will probably contribute, or machine learning, this sort of thing, but it is number one on Mike Griffin's list of things to do, and we have got the right man there by experi-

ence and force of personality to take it forward.

Mr. KNIGHT. Thank you, sir.

And General Dunford, the budget we have passed, I think the number one concern is always our troops, from any standpoint. But it is the perishable skills, also. It is the time in the cockpit, it is the time of sailing, it is the time of doing ground exercises with our Marines and our soldiers.

That, to me, is the part that this budget is now pushing back on, and we are saying that we are going to advance those perishable skills. Or maybe not advance, but increase the amount of time that

we have training. Is that a good assessment?

General DUNFORD. It is, Congressman. And what this will do, it will give us the resources necessary to train. It will backfill the holes in equipment that would allow us to improve the capabilities of individuals. But combined with the budget is the Secretary's direction also to redo how we are allocating forces to have more time at home station to make sure that those high-end skills you discussed are actually developed.

Mr. KNIGHT. Thank you very much, and I yield back, Mr. Chair-

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McEachin.

Mr. McEachin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Mattis, as you know, discriminatory barriers have historically prevented many patriotic Americans from serving in our military. Whenever we have allowed new groups to serve or serve

in new ways, voices have been raised in protest.

In the years before President Truman integrated the military, many argued that the armed services shouldn't be used for "social experiments," and raised fears about the effects of such a change would have on readiness and cohesion. And we have heard similar arguments more recently, arguments for banning gay and lesbian Americans from serving openly, or for keeping women out of combat roles.

In retrospect, I think history has shown that those arguments are wrong. Time and time again, those who have fought against discriminatory barriers have been vindicated, and the military has benefitted from access to an even broader pool of talented potential service members. Yet today we are hearing the same kind of rhetoric regarding transgender people.

Mr. Secretary, I have read your memo to the President, and I know it lays out a sincere professional judgment. I recognize that you do not recommend a blanket policy, but the arguments I hear in favor of the current ban are the same as the arguments that were made in favor of clearly discriminatory policies in the past.

In light of the historical evidence from racial integration to repeal of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," to the participation of women in combat roles, can you please explain why this time is different? Why are transgender people different?

Why are transgender people different?

Secretary Mattis. Congressman, as you know, these cases are under litigation, so there is a limit to how much I can say. That is why I hung on the web what the policy recommendation was to

the Commander in Chief.

I would just tell you that that report was endorsed by the President as my best military advice for how we keep the military focused on its lethality. We welcome those who meet the high standards of the military. I think that without gender dysphoria it means we are not making a special category of people who medically perhaps would not have been allowed in with any of the other—any other condition.

And I think right now the current policy remains in effect, because it is under court order to.

So I will see where the—basically, where the courts come out. But I don't want to say more than I have already put out publicly to make very clear what data we used, so that they knew there was some—that it was not what I would call standard rhetoric in there. That was looked at very carefully.

Mr. McEachin. Well, Mr. Secretary, I have to note it is just ironic to me that I note that your decision not to comment on matters of the part of the judicial process stand in complete contrast to your boss's habit of always commenting, seemingly, on matters of—

subject to the judicial process.

But let me ask you this, Mr. Secretary. If the President had not suggested that there be a ban on transgender troops, would you have ever initiated that memo in the first instance?

Secretary MATTIS. Sir, when I came in I went in front of the Senate, and they asked me where I stood on a number of issues, and I said, "Let me make it clear. I am here to solve problems in the defense of the country. I don't come in with a pre-formed agenda."

In this case it was not the President who brought the problem to my attention, it was service chiefs who asked me questions, how do we deal, and they laid out a number of issues. And I said, "Well, what is the policy?" And they did not have a policy. So I said, "Let's study it"

study it."

And then that is what triggered what you eventually read from me, sir. It became a recommendation to the President because he asked for it, but it already—we were engaged on studying this to figure out how to employ the policy I inherited. And you can see where I ended up on that. I was unable to answer those questions.

Mr. McEachin. Mr. Secretary, in the little bit of time that we

have remaining I am going to shift gears on you.

Last year's NDAA made it our national policy to achieve a 355-ship battle force as soon as practicable. I understand that the annual long-range plan for construction of Navy vessels has us reaching that goal some time in 2048. Yet I have read statements of both news articles and HASC [House Armed Services Committee] testimony that a 355-ship battle force is achievable potentially as soon as the 2030s.

Can you please explain to me how the fiscal year 2019 budget request meets the "as soon as practicable" standard when it comes

to Navy ships?

Secretary MATTIS. I can, Congressman. This is the balancing act, the prioritization that you expect from us. I have got a number of competing demands. I am absolutely supportive of where we need

the Navy to go.

But when you read 2048, Congressman, I think you and I have to keep a certain sanguine view of the people that brought that up and say, "Okay, I understand what you are saying. That is on the current trajectory." The Congress is the one that raises armies and sustains navies. Part of this is the choice of Congress and what level of funding do they wish to push forward on this. Part of it is me bringing forward the absolute requirement at any one point in time.

So it is not on automatic pilot, and both of us in our responsibilities have an impact on where we go and how fast we get there.

Mr. McEachin. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Des Jarlais.

Dr. DESJARLAIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, you touched on this briefly a moment ago, but I

think it is worth revisiting, due to its importance.

When we spoke at this hearing last year on the topic of hypersonic weapon development, you indicated that you were not happy that—where we were or where we needed to be. And thanks in large part to your efforts during your time as Secretary of Defense, we have seen a major shift in focus and support towards hypersonics

My State of Tennessee has a vested interest in this issue, with all the work that is done at Arnold Air Force Base in Tullahoma.

What concerns me, though, is the aging infrastructure and significant investments required across the range and test center enterprise.

And as you are aware, both class of hypersonic weapons systems have significant and strenuous test capability requirements, but because we minimally addressed the long-term needs of hypersonic development in the past, places like Arnold, Holloman, Edwards Air Force Base face enormous challenges to maintaining and improving existing systems.

If we aren't prioritizing our test and evaluation facilities, then in a sense we are really putting the cart before the horse. And I think you agree and share these concerns and sense of urgency. But what would you suggest? How do we work together to address this problem and prioritize the challenges faced by our testing centers?

Secretary Mattis. Yes, Congressman, you are hitting on what I found was what we call the limiting factor, frankly. It wasn't just our organization, it was that we were not set up to embrace the required—have the facilities that would embrace the whole challenge of hypersonics.

So in the budget we have addressed this, to a degree. But we are going to have to have a complete program, support program, for

this. This is going to be a major effort.

Comptroller, do you have anything additional on it?

Mr. NORQUIST. Not at this time.

Secretary Mattis. All right, yes. So just rest assured, sir, that we know where we want to go, and this is one of the key building blocks to getting us there.

Dr. DESJARLAIS. Okay. One final question for both you and the

chairman. Earlier this year Mr. Putin announced that Russia had developed a series of new types of strategic offensive arms. Do you agree that Russia should honor the terms of the treaty, and agree to limit those new arms under New START [Strategic Arms Reduction

Secretary Mattis. Sir, I believe they should. However, I will tell you that what he brought up in that video, if that is the one you are referring to, Congressman, I studied it closely and talked to people on my staff who know these issues very, very well. Nothing that President Putin said that day in his, I think, election hearing changed my strategic calculus one bit. I wish him a good arms race

with himself. Dr. DESJARLAIS. Yes. General, did you have anything to add?

General Dunford. I see it the same way, Congressman. Dr. Desjarlais. I just want to thank you all for your service. We so appreciate you. And thanks for being here today.

And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Carbajal.
Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, this has already been touched on, but I want to—I think it is so important that I need to do the same.

When this country was started, debating the possibility of African Americans, women, and lesbians and gays serving in the military, the same doubts, the same reports and questions were posed: How would it impact unit cohesion and effectiveness? Would it negatively impact the morale of the military? The military would lose its effectiveness. It would put our readiness at risk, especially when this Nation started talking about allowing women into the military and, most recently, opening combat positions to service women. Discussions evolved around the impacts of pregnancy and the rise in the number of sexual assault and harassments due to so-called more women serving.

This Nation's military is as powerful and effective today because of the sacrifice and the service of all its members, who proactively volunteer, something this President does not know and even went to great lengths to not serve. It is frustrating to me that we have not learned our lessons from the past, and we are here again, discussing the same unwarranted concerns and implementing dis-

criminatory policies in the military.

And as someone who has served in the Marine Corps, a brother who has served in the Marine Corps, many nephews—half of my nephews have served in the military—many of who have gone to Afghanistan and Iraq, I find this extremely troubling and upsetting.

Transgender individuals are already serving in the military. And not once during any hearing did I hear military leaders citing transgender service members as a threat to our military readiness.

So Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, I hope our military will focus on getting the most capable and qualified individuals to defend our Nation, regardless of the race, gender, and sexual orientation.

Now I will move on to my question.

Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, there are many officials who believe diplomacy and negotiations are pointless, and force is the only way forward. Looking back at the past two decades and what the men and women of this Nation have had to endure as a result of multiple bloody wars, what would be your words of caution to those who are more willing to rush and engage in regime change?

Secretary MATTIS. I will just tell you, Congressman, that in over 14 months in the most sensitive meetings in the White House, at Foggy Bottom, State Department, Langley, and around the world with our commanders and allies, I have never found this thesis

proposed, that negotiations and diplomacy are pointless.

As you can see with what we have going on right now with North Korea, where we have a summit meeting coming up, the whole point all along was to drive this to a negotiated resolution that I am—obviously, we can't see the future, but we are all cautiously optimistic we may be on the right path for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula

In Syria we are driving toward the Geneva process, and that again is the diplomatic outcome.

So we have not seen this sort of approach, and I would reject it if I saw it.

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you.

General Dunford.

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I guess just to reinforce the point you are making, there is no challenge that I can think of that

we are dealing with right now that isn't—that doesn't have the lead of the State Department, and it is not primarily a diplomatic or an economic issue.

There is a military dimension to our challenge in Afghanistan, there is a military dimension to our challenge in Syria, Iraq, Libya. You can name the crises that we are dealing with right now. But in no case, in no case was the Department of Defense actually in the lead in a final—in achieving a final political solution, which is the end state of all of those endeavors.

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you very much. I think some of the tweets that come out of this administration sometimes speak to a different tone and are contradictory to what you just stated today. But really, really appreciate you. I think many of us in this country are so grateful that both of you are—or two of you of this administration are there. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chair, I yield back. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kelly.

Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, Secretary Mattis, thank you, and General Dunford

and Mr. Norquist, thank you all for being here.

Second, I noticed in your chart on the back the percent of defense to GDP, and I couldn't help but notice there is 3.1 percent now. You go back to World War II and it was 35.5 percent. The Korean War, which—I am assuming the 1950 period—was 11.3 percent, I think. But I think that underscores your point about the cost of war is much more expensive than the cost of a military that is capable being able to prevent war. And I don't want to go back there. So I thank you for that chart, Secretary Mattis. I think that is very important for people to understand.

I want to also commend you and the President on the team that you have assembled for our national defense. I think that is so important. We start with you, we have got our Joint Chiefs of Staff, all the members are—your secretaries of your services, all three are very, very impressive, very well knowledged, and very capable people. Our Deputy Secretary of Defense, Shanahan, what a phe-

nomenal guy who brings so much to the table.

And so I just want to thank you and the President for bringing a team of that level of talent that is solving our Nation's problems.

Now I want to get into—this is for both you and Chairman Dunford. We do not—and the American people certainly do not—want to see U.S. troops deployed indefinitely in an open-ended conflict in Syria. However, as the previous administration learned with Iraq, a hasty withdrawal of U.S. military personnel and security assistance can have very negative consequences, especially if they are on a timeline that is timeline-only driven.

I—unfortunately or fortunately, whatever the case may be—was there in 2009 during the drawdown, and got to see firsthand the effects as a battalion commander on the ground of going from [Camp] Taji being 17,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines, and civilians, to going to probably 1,500 when I left, and even lower

So under what conditions would it be prudent for the U.S. to withdraw or remove our forces from Syria? What are we using as

a catalyst to say we have achieved this objective, and this is when it will happen?

Secretary MATTIS. Basically, Congressman, we want to make certain that ISIS has been driven to its knees, you know, that they are no longer a concentrated threat with a geographic ground that they can use as a safe haven. I think we are well on the way there.

As you can see right now, we have, due to the Turkey incursion, had a distracted partner force, and that has thrown us off in the last couple of weeks. But we are on the right track right now.

The second point would be what was brought up earlier, and that is the diplomatic outcome, that we get Geneva underway. That—the U.N. special envoy, Staffan de Mistura, has got that responsibility. And so you have got the military security piece on the ground, which we are achieving, and then we are going to have to see the diplomats, the U.N. step up to address the political outcome. But that is where I see us going, sir.

Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. And that is good to hear, because it needs to be objective-driven, not time-driven. And I really appreciate that. And I know you guys—like I said, I commented on the team, because I know we will make the right decision.

Doesn't the State Department fund its stabilization activity—also alleviate strain on Syria's neighbors, like Israel and Jordan, that must deal immediately with the instability on the borders?

Secretary Mattis. Absolutely, sir.

Mr. KELLY. And then the final question I kind of just want to talk to both of you about is kind of a question, but kind of a comment.

Our State Partnership Programs with the National Guards, the 50 National Guards, 54 States and territories that we have, those things are extremely effective, if we use. And I just encourage both General Dunford and you, Secretary Mattis, to do all we can to make sure we help our State Department with using those things. Sometimes they can do things that U.S. DOD or we, as a nation, can't do. But those at State and individual territories sometimes have a little more leverage to work with State to get us to some objectives. And if you have a comment on that—if you don't, I will yield back.

Secretary MATTIS. I think just that we are aligned with you. I think that, again, by, with, and through allies, plus there is the person-to-person connection between, you know, the guys from Tennessee and the guys from a country, or the guys from Montana and the guys from, you know, wherever they are serving. And when you start connecting like that, you get a more enduring, deeper relationship. And that has a lot to do with stability in the world and building trust, sir.

Mr. Kelly. Well, thank you, Mr. Secretary. And you take care of my Mississippi Rifles, which are deploying to CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] next year.

Thank you, and I yield back. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Suozzi.

Mr. Suozzi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you for your good and effective service.

Secretary Mattis, I admire you for so many reasons, one of which is your candor. And I just want to bring up two issues that are

incongruous with your leadership, one of which was brought up by Congresswoman Tsongas earlier today about the Defense Manpower Data Center scrubbing data regarding troop levels in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria. And you addressed that earlier. I just want to bring up that. You know, it just doesn't make any sense that we would not share that information.

And I had written a letter to you back in January about the special inspector general's report on Afghan reconstruction, which is a report that has been issued for some time now. And it always had information regarding population and district control. And that information was originally listed as classified. In response to my letter, I was told that the decision to classify the data was an oversight by NATO Resolute Support.

So I just want to point these two things out that—you know, we are watching these things, and it doesn't make sense in the context

of your leadership.

I have been digging in on the issue of Pakistan and Afghanistan. I read the book by Husain Haqqani about Magnificent Delusions. I read Steven Coll's book recently. I have been talking to Pakistani officials, certainly American officials as well, as to what is going on. And Pakistan claims that they have reduced the violence in their own country dramatically over the past several years, that they are starting to repopulate the ungoverned areas, and that they are starting to build a border fence along their border with Afghanistan, and that by 2022 they are going to have some substantial piece of it done.

They are claiming that they need to see the same thing happen from the other side, from the Afghani side, to try and prevent this porous border from—people escaping from Afghanistan, going into Pakistan, finding a safe harbor, and then coming back into Afghan-

istan when they want to.

Is there any discussion about border security from the Afghani side regarding this porous border? It is—I understand from reading and talking to people and having visited Afghanistan how difficult that is to do, and how expensive it would be to do. But it seems like it is a legitimate concern that if they are going to be doing it on the Pakistani side, we need to figure out how the Afghanis can be doing it on the Afghani side, as well.

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I think I can answer that question. A few years ago we had a—what we call the trilateral border standard operating procedure between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

And we, of course, served as the honest broker.

For the last couple years what we have been trying to do is develop an effective bilateral border standard operating procedure between Afghanistan and Pakistan. And you have been a student of Pakistan, so you followed the fits and starts in their relationship, even over the last 2 or 3 years.

So the short answer is both nations are looking at this issue, but not yet effectively have they looked at it in a bilateral way that allows them to make the compromises necessary to actually put in place effective border control. And I think you understand that the historical disagreement just about where Pakistan begins and ends and where Afghanistan begins and ends is at the root of the prob-

lem of establishing its bilateral SOP [standard operating procedure].

There is a process that—the encouraging thing is there is a process between senior leaders in Pakistan and Afghanistan, both political leaders and military leaders, to work through this issue. That didn't exist 18 or 24 months ago. So there has been some progress in that regard and I can tell you—I think you visited as well—this is one of the things that General Nicholson certainly works very closely with both the Afghans and the Pakistanis to move forward.

But again, the short answer is are there detailed plans that will be reconciled between Afghanistan and Pakistan? No. Is there a process in place right now to address the concerns of both Pakistan and Afghanistan, and develop a way ahead? Yes.

Mr. Suozzi. So what can we do to facilitate that in the context of the tensions that are existing between our country and Pakistan

right now?

General DUNFORD. Well, that is a great question, because, you know, as you know, we have talked a lot about the military dimension of problems here today, and at the end of the day what is going to be necessary to have peace and stability in Afghanistan is going to be to have a good relationship with their neighbor, Pakistan.

And I think this issue is going to be—have to be addressed in the context of reconciliation, and in the context of developing an effective relationship between the two countries.

What can we do? That is what our State Department partners have to do, and it certainly—that is something General Nicholson is doing at the mil-to-mil relationship, as well. As you know, the Pakistani Army plays an outsized role in Pakistan.

Mr. Suozzi. Yes.

General DUNFORD. And so our military-to-military engagement is very important to be a foundational element of our diplomatic efforts.

Mr. Suozzi. So again, I want to thank you very much. I want to continue to try and encourage the whole-of-government approach that we hear about all the time. I see the military has a very clear strategy in Afghanistan. I am concerned that the rest of the whole-of-government is more like a list of things that we do, as opposed to an overall strategy.

But I yield back my time. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gallagher.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Norquist, I don't have a question for you. But since the Marines are getting all the attention I just want to say we appreciate you being here.

[Laughter.]

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Secretary and General Dunford, the President, as you know, has endorsed the need to revise the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States [CFIUS] in general, and particularly the FIRRMA [Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act] legislation in particular. Can you offer any concrete examples of why this legislation and this broader effort is important to the Department?

And, in other words, what are the long-term consequences if China is allowed to continue to acquire our advanced technologies through investment and joint ventures?

Secretary MATTIS. Congressman, there are technologies we do not want to-for defense, for security reasons-to see in Chinese

hands, American technologies, American businesses.

We have got to bring CFIUS up to date. I think you saw on the 5G effort here some weeks ago that we moved swiftly, even in advance of what the process requires, in order to make certain that we did not naively watch a business linkup that was not in our best interest. But that was a one-shot effort. We need to look at the entire penetration of our society and what we need to protect, and CFIUS is a key part of this.

Every democratic nation right now, by the way, that we deal with, from Germany to Australia, from Canada to the United Kingdom, they are all working this issue. And so this is not unique to

us, but it is certainly one of our responsibilities.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you. And Australia in particular has been at the leading edge, in terms of trying to figure out how to deal with this level of influence.

And I don't know, Mr. Chairman, if you had anything to add to that.

General Dunford. The only thing I would say, Congressman, I mean, you zero in on-I would just say if someone asked me what are our competitive advantages, first and foremost, of course, is the quality of our people. But second is the technological edge that we have historically enjoyed over the past 20 or 30 years.

And this is nothing more and nothing less than putting at risk our ability to remain a technological edge over our potential adversaries. And the lifting of intellectual property in the manner in which China is doing that is actually undermining our ability to maintain a technological competitive advantage.

Secretary MATTIS. We are going to have to improve on the investment risk review process. That would be the specific area where the Congress could take some steps, and we would be happy to work with you alongside Commerce Department and Treasury Department in order to come up with the specific things we need to do to protect what we absolutely must hold on to.

Mr. Gallagher. I appreciate that. In a related question, Mr. Secretary, should DOD permit equipment manufactured and maintained by companies linked to the Chinese military and intelligence

services, like Huawei or ZTE, to be part of its supply chain?

Secretary Mattis. I do not think that is wise.

Mr. GALLAGHER. And in particular, should it be servicing key military installations in the United States or abroad, companies like that?

Secretary Mattis. No.

Mr. GALLAGHER. And are you comfortable with the—that the Department has the tools it needs to deal with the so-called white labeling problem, whereby a company like Huawei sells its equipment to a third party who simply rebrands it?

Secretary MATTIS. I think this is an area of needed attention to include saying we will not deal with white labels. We need to have—we need to know who we are buying from, Congressman.

Mr. Gallagher. Thank you.

And Mr. Chairman, I don't know if you have any similar concerns related to companies like Huawei or ZTE being part of a military supply chain.

General Dunford. I have the same concerns, both here and

abroad.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you. And quickly, with what remains of my time, we have seen multiple instances in the past year where the services have sought to be more guarded in their transparency and accessibility to the media, even at the unclassified level, particularly in guidance issued by the Navy and Air Force leadership.

Now, as someone who is new to politics and often spends a lot of time dealing with the media, part of that is understandable. But I think transparency is needed now, more than ever. And I just was wondering, Mr. Secretary, is this media engagement posture downstream of guidance that was given to DOD at large issued by

you or your staff?

Secretary MATTIS. That was issued by me. However, I said I want more engagement with the media. I want you to give your name. I don't want to read that somebody speaking on the condition of anonymity because they weren't authorized to speak. I have yet to tell anyone they are not authorized to speak. So if they are not willing to say they know about the issue and give their name, that would concern me. If they are giving background, they should just be a defense official giving background information authorized to give it.

What I don't want is pre-decisional information or classified information or any information about upcoming military movements or operations, which is the normal "loose lips sink ships" kind of restriction. Pre-decisional, we do not close the President's decision-making maneuver space by saying things before the President has made a decision. But otherwise, I want more engagement with the

military.

And I don't want to see a—an increase opaqueness about what we are doing. We are already remote enough from the American people by our size and by our continued focus overseas. We need to be more engaged here at home.

Mr. Gallagher. Thank you. My time has expired.

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And to Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, thank you for your extraordinary service. I wanted to just associate myself very briefly with my colleagues who have made supportive comments regarding our transgender troops. I think the way we handle this issue certainly reflects our values, and it is an important one.

I also wanted to just ask you for a moment about the authorization for the use of military force, or AUMF. As you know, the Armed Services Committee, unlike what most people think, doesn't take up this matter. It really aligns with Foreign Affairs. But to the extent that it would be helpful or hurtful for that dialogue, that

debate to take place, could you respond in some ways?

Perhaps you are agnostic to it, but on the other hand I am wondering where you would err on the side of trying to move forward with that.

I think the concern is really around what kind of a comprehensive response we would have. It is not just that we would strike at this horrible time of attacks on the people, but where are we going with that, and what kind of language in an AUMF might be helpful to making certain that we are moving in a direction that perhaps doesn't repeat some of our mistakes of the past.

Secretary MATTIS. Congresswoman, I believe that what we have

right now in terms of AUMF is sufficient legal authority.

Now, why do I say that? Because I can show you where al-Qaida that becomes al-Qaida in Iraq that becomes ISIS-I can show a continued thread all the way through. So, when you are up against an adversary, like we see with al-Nusra-al-Qaida in Syria that has changed its name yet again—we are up against groups that change their names very, very rapidly.

So as we look at our legal structures, they have got to adapt to the reality of that enemy, in terms of associated movements. Now I have no reservations about reporting to you. We just found another one that we have got to go after, you know, the folks found they are ready to attack us, an ally, our embassy, whatever. So we would have to make certain that timelines were not addressed, other than in reporting requirements, and whatever you say on that we would be right back in here on time saying number of troops, operations, scope, and concept.

I think geography, you would have to be very careful, because this adversary, as you know, uses every border because they think we respect the border and so they can get over the border and continue what they are doing. We cannot have an AUMF that would not take that into account, something which I—is one of the reasons we look at AUMF 2001 and 2003 as being sufficient.

We also don't want to go for a new one and then find all of our detainee authority has now dissipated, we have got to start over in courts of law to try and protect ourselves from people that we have

in our custody today.

And so, if you keep the association, if you watch the timelines and say we are not going to put—you know, you have the power of the purse every year, so you really have the timeline authority now. And if we keep the geography, the borderlines, from inhibiting our operations and yet you oversee us so you are comfortable with

what we are doing, then I think that is what we are looking for. But the spirit of Congress saying you are with us, would be very helpful. We think we have that right now with AUMFs. I understand and respect those who think that they are not sufficient.

Mrs. Davis. General Dunford.

General DUNFORD. You know, Congresswoman, I think I could only reinforce what the Secretary said. As I sit here thinking about the threat, and we are dealing with threats that are transregional threats, they don't—as the Secretary identified, they don't respect borders. And the time that some of these conflicts take is not pre-

And so what I would, I guess, ask for, regardless of the specific form, is I think there is three things that is—from a military perspective, you want to have. One is the full-throated support of the American people, you know, through the Congress. You would want to have a framework that was flexible enough to address the geographical and time issues that the Secretary spoke about and that would allow you to actually be effective, from a military perspective. Those are—that is the criteria. And whatever form that takes politically I would support. But you would have to deliver those four things to us.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. I think I may have been hearing something slightly different coming from you, but I think I heard that on a positive way there is—could be something possibly that at least is broad enough and yet specific enough, I guess, those two things that are important.

And helpful? Not helpful? Helpful if it is done right? And not so politicized. Is that—would sum up—okay, thank you.

Secretary Mattis. Yes.

Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gaetz.

Mr. GAETZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all for your service.

While I fear it came at too high a price, I am very glad that we are giving you the resources and the tools to go and fight and win when necessary, and to ensure that you are supporting our diplomatic efforts appropriately.

Chairman Dunford, you had made mention in your testimony that you saw Iran's malign influence extending through the Middle East, and I wanted to make sure that that wasn't an exclusive reference, and that we weren't merely viewing Iran as a regional hegemon, but as a potential global threat, as well.

General DUNFORD. No, Congressman. I think it is fair to say that they are a potential global threat, and there is certainly some evidence of Hezbollah, as an example, in South America. But today we view that largely as a threat in the Middle East.

I mean where we see Iran's malign influence manifest most is in places like Syria and places like Yemen and places like Lebanon and Iraq.

Mr. GAETZ. Yes, and I am very interested in that nexus, wherein the Hezbollah activities in Latin America could be served to financing the operations that we are having to combat in the CENTCOM AOR [area of responsibility].

Can you speak to this budget request's treatment of the Iranian-backed Hezbollah threat in Latin America? Because in prior briefings with other DOD officials there has been an appropriate focus on the CENTCOM AOR and on what we see going on on the Korean Peninsula, but I want to make sure that that threat you have just identified is well resourced in our strategy—

General DUNFORD. Sure. And Congressman, to the theme, one of the themes that we have had today is that not all the problems can be solved in a military dimension. And when I look at transregional groups like Hezbollah, there is really three things they need to survive. You know, they need the people, the fighters; they need the resources; and then they have got a narrative, the message. That is what allows extremists to survive.

And so, we can deal with the physical manifestation of Hezbollah in places like Syria or Yemen. We are not currently dealing with them right now, except in the diplomatic, economic space. But it is

going to take a whole-of-government approach to deal with an organization like Hezbollah, particularly that operates transregionally.

Mr. GAETZ. How does this budget request that we are evaluating at this hearing service that threat from the DOD standpoint?

General DUNFORD. Yes, I don't—I can't—I will get back to you, Congressman, and see if there is a specific way to do that, other than the fact that we are increasing our overall capabilities in the U.S. military to deal with whatever threat we have to deal with.

Mr. GAETZ. Yes, and I am most interested in determining whether or not we are engaged in an adequate train-and-equip mission, whether we are engaging in the right, you know, human activities from a DOD standpoint, because it is a difficult environment.

So, Secretary Mattis—

General DUNFORD. Okay, I better understand your question. I would say right now that supporting the independence and sovereignty of Iraq is one way to deal with malign influence in—Iranian malign influence in the region. Our support for the Lebanese Armed Forces is another way we deal with Iranian malign influence in the region—

Mr. GAETZ. I speak specifically to the SOUTHCOM AOR, dealing

with the threat there.

General Dunford. Yes-

Mr. GAETZ. So that is something we certainly can work on. And I am eager to see how the enhanced resources will be able to be directed to that threat that we face here, in our backyard.

Secretary Mattis, I fear that when we look 50 years out we will not win wars with our near-peer adversaries based on our airframes alone, that we will require the most technically capable munitions and missiles and bombs in the world to be able to win. Can you speak to this budget request's treatment of our research and development assets and our goals to ensure that we are getting a good bang for the buck, but that we also have a diverse research and development mission underway?

Secretary Mattis. Right. Up at Picatinny Arsenal and various other locations we are looking at advanced munitions, everything

from rifle bullets to bombs to precision missiles.

We have a newly energized, innovative effort, as you know, because we have received more money for innovation. I forget the specific addition, but it is significant, I will tell you. And in there is the necessity for identifying those kind of weapons, and not just hypersonics now, but the kind that allow us to go to the next level.

Where will you find them? One of the primary efforts right now is in missile defense, for example. How do we take out missiles from the air, and do it a lot more cheaply than very expensive interceptor kill vehicles? We have got to find a cheaper way to do this against a growing threat. We don't want to break the budget all on missile defense, for example. So that would be one.

We also have a number of naval weapons, from directed energy and others that we are putting money into, so that those are at the cutting edge and we are in the lead on those weapons systems if we have to employ them.

So we can give you a more detailed lay-down of the various ordnance that we are looking at. Some of them are novel enough, they are not high explosive, they are that different. But we can give you a more wholesome readout, if you are interested in that.

Mr. Gaetz. Yes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Langevin.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank our witnesses for your testimony today, and especially Secretary Mattis and General Dunford. Thank you for your service to the Nation.

So we have this morning discussed the atrocities in Syria, we have touched on the controversy surrounding our southern border and the threats posed by North Korea at some point during these hearings. But one recurring issue that really is not defined by geo-

graphic location is malicious actors in cyberspace.

Mr. Secretary or General Dunford, how should the Department of Defense be imposing higher costs on our adversaries who violate norms of state behavior using cyber means, particularly when those actions don't rise to the level of armed conflict? How does your budget request address the tradeoffs between building capacity and capability to counter these threats, and what metrics will we use to know if we get the balance right, going forward?

Secretary Mattis. Congressman, this is a growing area. If we look at it 10 years ago, we wouldn't even be having this conversa-

tion. This is a dynamic threat that has grown.

We do have a 7 percent increase in the budget for our cyber efforts, and you are aware that the Congress has directed us to look at separating Cyber Command and NSA without losing the synergy of those two organizations, as we expand not only the defense of our DOD networks and the offense capability, but also what we call DTN, defend the Nation, which is led by Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen at DHS [Department of Homeland Security]. But we at DOD have the bulk of the capability for this.

So what we are doing about it is we are creating offensive plans. I won't go into detail about them, but you can imagine what they

look like. We also are increasing our defenses internally.

The challenge is when we go to the defend the Nation effort, we are going to have to have agreements and authorities on what DOD does inside our own country, because while we may have a lot of the capability, generally speaking we have concentrated, you know, obviously, outside the Nation. That has been our responsibility.

So we have got to gather right now a cyber strategy in support of DHS that is in Secretary Nielsen's hand, and she has that available. That is only the first step, I might add. We are going to have to refine it for this when she gets done defining the problems we didn't address in what we submitted to her. And we will keep working it forward on the DTN effort.

Internally, we will be going to the cloud. We have a fair and open competition going on, and we have examined what CIA achieved in terms of availability of data and using data, but also security of

their systems. And it is very impressive.

So those are just a couple of things we are doing right now, sir. Mr. Langevin. Thank you. Well, I am going to be following this very closely. I think it is important that we do impose costs on

those nations that are using cyber tools and, again, doing things that don't rise to the level of armed conflict, but we need to have a strong offense here to deter them, I believe.

Secretary, the fiscal year 2019 budget request includes more than—more RDT&E [research, development, test, and evaluation] funding, particularly for prototyping. So I know we touched on

some of these this morning, but I will again raise this.

So what advances can we expect to see from this increase in prototyping, in terms of bringing technologies into the field that leverage prior investments or recent commercial technical advancements?

And how does the RDT&E portion of the fiscal year 2019 budget request reflect investments in technical advancements to both enhance current military capabilities and also invest in emerging ideas like quantum computing, robotics, and hypersonics to build a foundation for future warfighting capabilities?

Secretary Mattis. Right. Congressman, Secretary Carter, my predecessor, set up DIUx [Defense Innovation Unit-Experimental] out in Silicon Valley for a reason, and we have embraced it and ac-

tually strengthened it.

We are looking to prioritize these various efforts due to the Congress that broke our acquisition, technology, and logistics undersecretariat into two parts. One is acquisition and sustainment, the other is research and engineering. We have brought in varsity-level players there, and defense test and evaluation, and we are going to move things into production, prototyping. We are not going to have more papers, we are going to move on hypersonics, move on AI.

What do I mean by move? Joint program officers, not a bunch of

different organizations all feeling their way forward.

And you just listed in the list you gave me—just in the question, you just listed exactly where we are going. And we can give you a brief on this, sir, but I have got a varsity-level player in—as the Under Secretary of Research and Engineering with NASA background, DOD background, Lincoln Labs. He has really got what he needs, in terms of experience, to drive this forward, not for theory, not for experiments, but putting something out for test and moving it into a capability.

Mr. Langevin. Well, we sure look forward to seeing the results

of that work. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Secretary MATTIS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Cheney.

Ms. Cheney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, all three of you, for being here today. I am proud that, as we meet today, we have taken the first steps in providing the resources necessary to begin the rebuild. I think that there are many of us who were very frustrated and opposed a lot of the domestic spending in the omnibus, but made the decision that our own dysfunction here as an entity, as a Congress, shouldn't be-the cost of that shouldn't be borne by our men and women in uniform and their families. And so we will continue certainly to help fight to make sure we get those resources necessary in the out-years, as well.

Mr. Secretary, I have a Syria question for you. We lost significant credibility and deterrence capability when we failed to enforce the red line with respect to Assad's use of chemical weapons in

2013. Could you talk about how we get that back?

Secretary MATTIS. Congresswoman Cheney, I think the first point about red lines is you don't draw them unless you intend to live up to them. And we don't always even have to draw them, and we can speak with our actions. And you saw us do that just slightly over a year ago, when the Syrian Government, with either Russian complicity or incompetence, carried out a sarin gas attack, and we took out 17 percent of their air force as a caution to them that that was unwise.

I am not sure they have learned their lesson, but I think in this case actions speak louder than words. There are times to draw a red line, and there is times to leave some ambiguity and speak with your actions. And I think that is what we are doing right now to address the question you brought up.

Ms. Cheney. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. And I think, obviously, the concern is that we won't be able to be an effective deterrence against the future use of chemical weapons, for example, if we fail

to take action once again.

With respect to North Korea, we have seen historically, time and time again, as we have discussed, the North Koreans follow the same game plan, where they create a crisis, come to the table, offer concessions, pocket benefits that we give them, and then continue down the path of developing their weapons.

I saw on both Chairman Dunford and Secretary Mattis's testimony, I think, the phrase "cautious optimism" about where we are.

I wonder, Secretary Mattis, first, if you could talk about how we are going to guard against a situation where the North Koreans do exactly that against

exactly that again.

Secretary MATTIS. Right. As you know, Congresswoman, right now or today nominee Pompeo is going through his hearing for confirmation over on the Senate side. And I will tell you that in talking with him, he has studied all those past occasions of negotiation failed, of documents signed and then not carried through. And I think we have someone who will, with the consent of the Senate, be in position to guide us in a very mature way to not walk into the same trap again.

Ms. CHENEY. And then, Chairman Dunford, could you address the issue of the notion that there is significant risk involved, as we have also discussed, as you have testified before, with the potential for having to take military action on the Korean Peninsula?

I am concerned that we have not seen the same level of focus and attention and reporting, frankly, about the risk involved in a nuclear-armed North Korea, and the risk involved with—you know, even if we creep into a policy of deterrence here, instead of complete and verifiable elimination of their nuclear capability, would you please address the risks of a nuclear-armed North Korea?

General DUNFORD. Sure, Congresswoman Cheney. I think, first and foremost, I just want to add a point to the earlier question, which is nothing has changed in the military dimension of the diplomatic and economic pressure campaign. So one of the lessons in the past, I think, we have made adjustments on our military pos-

ture where we have changed things that we were doing. We have

made no changes in that regard.

And with regard to a nuclear North Korea, I think there is two issues. There is a capability piece and then there is a capacity piece. And at some point the capabilities that can be developed can overcome our defenses, or the numbers of missiles that North Korea can overcome our defenses.

So today I think I can say with confidence that we can defend against the capability that North Korea has today, the specific capabilities, and the numbers of missiles that they can field that can reach the United States. We could never deal with—we could never create a defense against a growing serial production missile capability by the North Koreans. So the North Koreans would be able

to hold us at risk, were they to go into serial production with the numbers of missiles that would exceed our ability to defend.

And again, the equation can never be you can never afford to defend your way out of something that—if people are serious about building offensive capability.

Ms. Cheney. Thank you. I have additional questions, but will have to—I have to yield back. Thank you.

The Chairman. Mr. Brown.

Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, you have answered questions that have taken us around the world. I would like to come back home regarding the National Guard deployment to

our southern border at the direction of the President.

In 2012 there was a GAO [U.S. Government Accountability Office] report, and this report was conducted at the direction of Congress. And I think it was motivated by-in large part, by the number of National Guard deployments by various administrations, but more recently at that time by President Bush's administration's decision to deploy, I think, 4,000 to 6,000 guardsmen for almost 2 years at the cost of close to \$2 billion.

And the GAO report found that—and they were concerned with a lack of a comprehensive, long-term strategy for the southern border. In fact—and I will read—in the report it said, "DOD officials expressed concerns about the absence of a comprehensive strategy for southwest border security, and the resulting challenges to identify and plan a DOD role. DHS officials expressed concerns that DOD's border assistance is ad hoc, and that DOD has other operational requirements.

And in light of the President's public comment, where he suggested that the National Guard would be deployed until such time that a wall is built, I have concerns, and could you please address what comprehensive, long-term strategy is either present or in development to frame the National Guard's involvement on the south-

ern border?

Secretary Mattis. Congressman, I read that 2012 report a little over a year ago, when I was getting ready for the job here, and took it on board as I thought my way through what has come up more recently.

I think the priority that President Trump has placed on the southern border and Secretary Nielsen's—what she has put together for a comprehensive plan is sound. Now, I have not read all of it, I have read enough of it to know what I needed to do to put these 4,000—up to 4,000 down there until the first of October in a non-law-enforcement, no contact with the migrants, position to support DHS. They are under the Governor's command and control.

Mr. Brown. If I could just jump in, though, Mr. Secretary, I mean, I am assuming that what you just said was probably what was in place when President Obama and President Bush asked the Guard—directed the Guard to go to the border. The GAO found that there was not a comprehensive strategy.

So I guess my question is, is there a comprehensive strategy that clearly defines the role of the DOD, the National Guard in these operations, an operation that may be a very long time in this sce-

nario?

Secretary MATTIS. What we have going on right now, sir, is to back up the Department of Homeland Security, the Customs and Border Patrol troops who are down—or Guards who are down are not troops. The Guards who are down there, this is the time of year when you will see generally an uptick. This is an anticipatory backing up so that the Customs and Border Patrol can put more troops in the field.

As far as the larger issue on the strategy, that is rightly under Department of Homeland Security, and you would have to—

Mr. Brown. Well, I am going to—let me just jump back in here, Mr. Secretary, because the GAO report looked at both the DHS and DOD.

Secretary Mattis. Right.

Mr. Brown. DHS said it is ad hoc. DOD said, we are concerned because there needs to be a comprehensive, long-term strategy that outlines the role. This is a potential—a deployment that may potentially last for years, given the statement of the Commander in Chief that their presence may be there until such time that a wall is built.

So again, I mean, you may not have time to fully answer the question today, and I will follow up with a correspondence to your office, but I would like to have a little bit more detail about a comprehensive, long-term strategy for a DOD role to support DHS. Because I assume that you do that in partnership with the DHS, but

they are not going to do it in a vacuum.

Secretary Mattis. Right. But right now, Congressman, this is not a long-term deployment— the President says if the wall gets built, that is one thing. Does Secretary Nielsen—does she need this reinforcement? That is a second point. It is to buy time. It is under the defense support to civil authority's authority, and we have limited it, both in numbers, and we have limited it in location. She has given us priority areas, sectors they are called, where they are working.

So this is a short-term—this is not a long-term strategy. This is

a buying-time effort. Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Chairman Mac Thornberry, for your diligence covering the fiscal year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, and thank you for your extraordinary success in rebuilding the American military.

The spectrum of our current world threats are becoming increasingly challenging, from terrorism in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and Africa to the radicalism of Iran and North Korea and the competition with Russia and China, our military has more broader focus than ever before.

As the Readiness Subcommittee chair, I am particularly grateful as a military dad who has had four sons serve in Iraq under your leadership—and Egypt and Afghanistan—I appreciate the challenges our Department of Defense faces, and I would like to thank you both for your service and commitment to our country as you manage all the key issues I have identified.

Additionally, as a veteran myself and a military parent, I would like to thank all of you for your support of the budget agreement that finally puts our military on the path to addressing readiness

shortfalls.

And for each of you, a—I am really very supportive of President Trump's initiatives to provide funding for the European Deterrence Initiative. I believe that this funding goes a long way in deterring Putin's increasingly aggressive activities in the region.

One concern I have is—with the EDI, is our ability to transport troops and supporting resources across Europe. Are there ongoing efforts within European Command to improve mobility throughout

the region?

As to infrastructure, and additionally as to border crossings, do you share the concern that I have, if something happens in Europe, that we may not be able to effectively respond in time?

And is this a readiness concern? For each of you.

Secretary MATTIS. It is a readiness concern for the U.S. military, but for all of NATO's military. Right now you can drive hazardous cargo from southern Italy all the way to Finland faster than we can move some of our troops across some of those borders, due to different bridge capacities, authorities, legal restrictions, this sort of thing.

In one area that we have found we can work with the European Union on security in Europe, they are working on what is called military mobility across their borders. And that is underway right now. It is called PESCO [Permanent Structured Cooperation]. It is—the acronym for it. And NATO is working closely with the European Union to remove the very obstacles that are inhibiting our movement of forces.

Mr. WILSON. And General, did you have a—about the infrastructure? What is the status of improving infrastructure?

General DUNFORD. Congressman, that is one of the three elements of the EDI for this year, is infrastructure. It is infrastructure, pre-position equipment, and exercises.

Mr. Wilson. Well, I want to thank both of you. And Mr. Secretary, as the co-chairman of the European Union Caucus, I am certainly going to relay your information immediately, and thank them for their efforts to provide particularly expedited border crossing.

And additionally for General Dunford, we have heard that the force is strained, as services continue to do more with less. What is your assessment of the current state of force? What is the great-

est strain on the joint force? And how is it being mitigated? What is your assessment of the military risk?

General Dunford. Sure, Congressman. First, I will start with the people. I think we are recruiting and retaining high-quality

And then I will go to the operational tempo, which is causing us to be away more than we would like. And we talked about rebuild-

ing some of our capabilities, so we need to do that.

And then the third element that it—I would point out is material readiness, which this budget really is designed to address and build on the efforts of 2017 and 2018 to get after some of those material

shortfalls, readiness challenges that we spoke about.

Mr. WILSON. And as—I am really grateful—recruiting extraordinary people. I want to show you, as I previously represented Parris Island. And to see the young people serving there, it was just heartwarming. And now I continue to represent Fort Jackson, where I-Secretary Mattis, you would be so grateful to see these new recruits coming in, and how much that means to our country.

And General, a final question, and that is could you provide an unclassified characterization of the annual Chairman's Risk Assessment to Congress, discuss the strategic risk and military risk,

and what is your assessment of each?

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I would like to do what I did last year, is to come in in a closed session with all the Members

and outline the risk assessment.

We asked for your permission to delay it this year, and I appreciate the opportunity to do that. And the reason is that I finished it in January, but the Secretary wrote a new National Defense Strategy, and so the risk assessment that I will come back to you with in the fall is going to be specifically benchmarked against the National Defense Strategy the Secretary has published, as well as the revised National Military Strategy.

Mr. WILSON. Well, thank you. And your service to our country is reassuring. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Panetta.

Mr. PANETTA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, all three of you, thank you very much for your time, for waiting out until you get to the last few questioners. So thank

you very much.

Secretary Mattis, I just wanted to direct your attention to one of your quotes in last year's NDAA fiscal year 2018: "It is appropriate for the combatant commands to incorporate drivers of instability that impact the security environment and their areas into their planning." You also say, "I agree that the effects of a changing climate, such as increased maritime access to the Arctic, rising sea levels, desertification, among others impact our security situation."

Next, Chairman Dunford, you then give a quote saying, "It is a question, once again, of being forward deployed, forward engaged, and be in a position to respond to the kinds of natural disasters that I think we see as a second or third-order effect of climate

change."

Then subsequent to that there are a number of other quotes the one from Defense Secretary Gates, ODNI [Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and so forth. And all that leads up to the sense of Congress quote, which says that it is a sense of Congress that "climate change is a direct threat to the national security of the United States and is impacting stability in areas of the world, both where the United States Armed Forces are operating today, and where strategic implications for future conflict exist."

Presidents Bush and Obama, in their National Defense Strategies, recognized climate change as a threat to our national security. But unfortunately, this National Defense Strategy under President

Trump did not.

A couple questions to you. One, do you agree that—with that sense of Congress in last year's NDAA? Would you like to see the same sense in this year's NDAA? And if so, why wasn't it addressed in our National Defense Strategy?

Secretary MATTIS. Well, I can take that one, Congressman. I think that when you see us dealing by, with, and through allies, you recognize the local nature of much of what happens in the

world that eventually impacts America.

So what we do is we go in and we sometimes call it "take three cups of tea." We start by listening when we go in. We don't go in and start solving their problems. We want to go and listen to what they have got going on. We look at security issues to include the—what I would call the physical environment. I mean that is part of it, and why are people going hungry and turning to violent extremists as the only solution, this sort of thing. And we have seen this—that very thing happen.

So we do not sense that we are somehow, by going—by talking about the root causes, that we are unable to deal with the local

conditions as we engage with each of these countries.

I wanted to trim it down and get everyone focused on three things I think 5 to 7 years from now that are still going to be focused on, and that is a lethal force so our adversaries take note; by, with, and through allies, build more partnerships, don't just take the traditional ones, build more; and then, of course, the business practices.

That second one is all about dealing with the real world as it exists, and standing with our allies. So I—if I would put in all the root causes, I would have made it a pretty long document, sir.

Mr. PANETTA. General Dunford.

General DUNFORD. Congressman, my position, as I articulated earlier, hasn't changed. And actually, the military role is dealing with the effects, the outcome of natural disasters. That is still something we have the capability to do, and we use that, we use our support and humanitarian disaster relief to foster those relationships that the Secretary just spoke about.

Mr. PANETTA. Great. And gentlemen, would you agree that we should be addressing that in the upcoming NDAA, this issue, with the same intent, same sense about climate change and how it af-

fects our national security?

Secretary MATTIS. Sir, when we look at what the outcome is, what we have to deal with, the origins of it, I think, are largely

issues that are dealt with through diplomacy.

We need to have foreign policy guided by diplomats and buttressed, backed up, supported by militaries. And militaries need to stay focused in their lane. That doesn't mean we can't address these situations, the outcomes. But I think that the—it is best addressed by the USAID, Agency for International Development people, the State Department, the ones who actually set our foreign policy there, so we are working for a purpose, and that purpose is established by the President or the State Department.

Mr. PANETTA. Okay, thank you. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Chairman Bishop. Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much.

Gentlemen, we are proud of what you do. I was here for your opening statements, and in the meantime I have gone to two hearings, fixed three amendments, and did a fundraiser, and you are still sitting here.

[Laughter.]

Mr. BISHOP. So obviously, your training in the military has given you patience and stamina matched only by Chairman Thornberry, as well. So thank you for that.

Look, I have a quick question. If this has already been asked and

answered, you can stop me at any time.

But in light of the National Defense Strategy, what is DOD doing differently to counter the destabilizing activities of Iran in that region?

Secretary Mattis. Congressman, we are looking at Iran very holistically right now, and we are looking at the nuclear weapons program. As you know, the JCPOA is being reviewed. We are looking at their counter-maritime effort, where our 5th Fleet, U.S. fleet, actually draws together nations from—between 25 and 35 nations to do counter-mine exercises. So we send a—it is not just a naval message, it is also a diplomatic message that don't try this, nations from all around the world are going to show up and sweep the mines if you try to do it.

We are working with our partners in the area to counter their terrorist activities, and those go from Yemen and Syria, their militia there in Lebanon, to Bahrain and the mischief they are up to

there.

We are also addressing their cyber efforts, working with other partners in the region to make them more resistant. And we are dealing with the missile program through foreign military sales and integration of our allies in the region and their ballistic missile defense capability.

Mr. BISHOP. Close to that, I mean, one of the problems Iran is doing is their illicit sales of advanced conventional weapons to their partners. What are we doing specifically to try and counter those

illegal transfers?

Secretary Mattis. Right. You are absolutely right, Congressman. And out here at Bolling Air Force Base—I invite you all to come out and see it—is a display that is laying out the debris and the evidence of the advanced weapons that Iran is shipping out to other countries. They are a threat, obviously, to Europe. They are a threat to Saudi Arabia, being fired out of Yemen right now. They are a threat to Israel, they are a threat to our forces in the area, and our partners.

So we are exposing this out here at Bolling. We have had over 70 nations, ambassadors either to the United Nations or to Washington, their defense attachés come out and look at it, and we are

going to continue to display everything that we can show the world, as far as what kind of murderous intent they are up to in that re-

Mr. BISHOP. I appreciate those are great answers. One of the things that you did very well is coming up with a coalition to fight ISIS in both Syria and Iraq. Do we have that same commitment, or do we—or why do we not have that same commitment in trying to confront the Iranian destabilizing efforts in the region?

Secretary MATTIS. Congressman, I think over the years there have been efforts to try to guide Iran back to a more responsible stance. Those have been probably unavailing, if we were to sum it

up in one word.

But, as a result, with ISIS we were all focused on destroying it. I think there was a lot of effort over the years to see if Iran would want to cease being, at least in terms of its leadership, a revolutionary cause and join the responsible nations. From all indications, they have declined that option.

And so we are probably going to have to deal with them in terms of diplomatic and economic and security issues that are going to have to be addressed.

Mr. BISHOP. Gentlemen, thank you. Thank you for your service and for your answers. I appreciate it.

I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Murphy.

Mrs. Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It looks like I am the last woman standing on this side. But thank you all for being here

today, and for your patience.

You know, as you know, the National Defense Strategy concludes that the inter-state strategic competition is—not terrorism—is the main, primary concern in the U.S.—in U.S. national security. And while I agree the Department must focus more on countering the growing threats from Russia and China, I represent a district in Central Florida that was significantly impacted by terrorism.

In June 2016, a gunman who swore allegiance to ISIS walked into a Pulse nightclub in Orlando, and killed and wounded over 100 people. It was the deadliest terrorist attack in the United States since September 11th. Unfortunately, the Pulse nightclub shooting serves as a tragic reminder that the violence—that violence motivated by ideological extremism is an enduring threat to our security at home and abroad.

How do you think the Department should posture itself to continue to be able to protect the homeland against imminent threats from terrorism, while also addressing this transition to an inter-

state, strategic competition in the long term?

Secretary MATTIS. You are hitting at the very heart of what we had to balance as we changed to a dynamic threat envelope, as we

saw it expanding in the great power competition.

What we decided was we had to have a problem statement. The problem statement is, Congresswoman, that we are going to have to maintain an effective and safe nuclear deterrent so those weapons are never used, a decisive conventional force that has irregular warfare capability. And therein lies the capability that goes to the heart of your concern. Because if we don't go after this adversary overseas, if we give them safe havens, allow them to recruit, allow

them to raise funds, then we are going to see it in your district and more here at home. We do this by, with, and through allies.

For example, every week the chairman reports to me how many American troops do we have in the Sahel, where the French have 4,000. We are supporting them as they help the African nations fight Boko Haram and this sort of thing, which is an al-Qaida affiliate.

We are going to continue with that sort of by, with, and through our allies, whether it be in the Philippines or in Afghanistan, around the world, as we keep this adversary off balance. We recognize that violent extremists haven't suddenly decided to become responsible actors and cease their murder.

Mrs. Murphy. Thank you. And, you know, to that end, when you talk about by, with, and through, there is a huge component of that that requires diplomacy and the role of diplomats. And you just said, just a few questions back, that you believe diplomats should

handle diplomacy buttressed by military capabilities.

You are often quoted having said that if you don't fund the State Department more fully, then you will need to buy more ammunition, ultimately. And the more that we put into the State Department's diplomacy, hopefully the less we will have to put into our military budget. And yet we have seen a significant increase in defense funding at the same time as a dramatic attrition in the State Department.

What policies do you think Congress should pursue to prevent the dissipation of American soft power, as well as sort of the erosion of this concept that diplomats can lead with a military that

supports when they are so sorely underfunded?

Secretary MATTIS. Ma'am, I am probably the wrong person to talk with about that, because I just don't have any visibility or—I don't deal with that issue. I have got a pretty full portfolio, as

you understand.

However, I will tell you that my first stop in every foreign country I go into is our ambassador, often—right now it has been a chargé d'affaires. And these foreign service officers that I see out there, the ambassadors and the foreign service officers of 10, 15, 20 years experience filling these leadership positions, they are clearly at the top of their game, they are varsity players. And I think right now we are very well represented.

Now, that is not to address the details of your question. I just

don't feel confident to do so in an authoritative way.

Mrs. Murphy. Well, I agree with you, that the career civil servants that are on the front lines in our embassies are very qualified.

I think my concern a bit, too, is that some of the leadership changes over at the State Department, as well as resources. As you know—

Secretary Mattis. Yes.

Mrs. Murphy [continuing]. Resources enable organizations to move forward. And so it—while you don't have purview over that, certainly, as you have stated, it has a significant impact on your mission and how you carry out your mission.

Let me just move to one other thing before I run out of time. You know, earlier this year my colleagues and I were really shocked to learn that Dr. Victor Cha was removed from consideration as am-

bassador to South Korea after he shared his objection to the bloody nose strategy against North Korea with administration officials. I felt Dr. Cha was [an] extremely qualified candidate for this position, and it is unimaginable that the Trump administration removed Dr. Cha from consideration because of his opposition to such a strike.

Secretary Mattis, earlier this year you identified North Korea as an international threat and said, you know, "Our response to this threat remains diplomacy-led, backed up with military options available to ensure that our diplomats are understood to be speaking from a position of strength.

As you know, the administration still hasn't appointed a U.S. ambassador to South Korea, and we are over 16 months into this Presidency. How does the lack of an ambassador to South Korea complicate our bilateral security relationship with the Republic of Korea [ROK], particularly at a time when war with North Korea

remains a dangerous possibility?

Secretary Mattis. I have not seen that yet, Congresswoman. I have been to Korea, as you know, and our chargé there seems to have it—you know, he is connected to everyone, he has full access—as you know, the ROK is a uniquely willing and capable ally, too. So it is probably a lot to do with their willingness to deal with him.

But I would tell you, too, that you see the summit that is coming up now, based on the pressure campaign. As President Moon of the Republic of Korea put it, he believes the pressure campaign is what has brought North Korea to the table. And so we are now seeing a degree of willingness to engage—again, only cautious optimism, but the diplomacy is clearly in the lead.

Mrs. Murphy. Great. Thank you, Secretary Mattis and Mr.

Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Turner.

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Secretary, in your opening comments you stated about the importance of our allies. And I want to thank you for your work to both assure our allies and to work closely with our allies.

I chaired the Air and Land Subcommittee, and I also have the-I am the head of the U.S. delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. And I can tell you that your leadership, as I am certain you are aware, makes a big difference with respect to our allies, both your professionalism, your history, your prior work.

I have two questions for you about the F-35, and with respect to our allies. Last night I had dinner with the Minister of Defense from the Netherlands at the—with the ambassador. And they spoke, again, very highly of the time that they had spent with you. Thank you for the attention that you—with all the things that you have, the attention that you do give our allies, because you do give them those assurances.

We spoke about the F-35 and our allied partners, our NATO

partners, more specifically, who are participating in that.

We shared the concern about—as we go to the next phase of the F-35 on dual-capable aircraft, that we need our allies to participate in the F-35 program fully, so that our NATO mission, maintaining NATO as a nuclear mission, is realized.

We are all concerned about the Belgians' upcoming decision, and I wanted you to speak for a moment about the importance of our allied partners, especially on the dual-capable aircraft side, because we don't want that mission to diminish at all.

And then, also, if you could speak about the issue with Turkey and the Russian air missile defense system—of course being another F-35 partner—I think we are all concerned about what we should be doing, perhaps more, to try to diminish the military cooperation between Turkey and Russia, and ensure that the United States has a strong partnership with Turkey on a military basis.

Secretary Mattis. Congressman, on the dual-capable aircraft in Europe, NATO is a nuclear-armed military alliance, and that means that NATO nations have got to be—they have to have in their inventory dual-capable aircraft that are capable of carrying the nuclear weapons, because the deterrent only works if it can be employed. And hopefully never to be employed, but the need is for dual-capable aircraft. The F–35 will be dual-capable, hence why we support allowing our allies to buy that superb aircraft.

So it is necessary. And I think, by and large, it is fully embraced, this mission is fully embraced. The Nuclear Posture Review, when I brought it forward at a Brussels ministerial, Congressman, was fully accepted. I didn't run into any pushback, I think partly because we took them onboard early and allowed them to have reviews of it and give input for it, knowing the leadership role the

Americans have, but it is an alliance of democratic partners.

On Turkey and Russia——

Mr. Turner. Mr. Secretary, before you get to Turkey,

I just—I do hope that you underscore with our allies the importance of their participation in the F-35 to maintain that dual-capable mission, because I think there may be some misunderstanding as to the—their options of participating in that mission, separate from the F-35. And I think we are—we have it fairly clear that it both affects ours and their participation.

Secretary MATTIS. Well, thank you. And I am on my way to Brussels in a month. I will make certain I do that in person. I appreciate that.

On Turkey purchasing the Russian missile defense system, Turkey is a NATO ally. Once we bring a system like that in, we know right away it is incompatible with the rest of the NATO defenses, by its very nature.

Furthermore, there are two NATO nations that provide missile defense to Turkey now using NATO-approved systems, two other nations.

So now what you are talking about doing is putting into the same area incompatible missile defense systems, and this is hardly something that is in NATO's best interest. So we do not recommend it. We have been engaging with Turkey on this to include providing them foreign military sales options that would permit them to have NATO-compatible systems.

Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rogers.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for your service and for your attendance today.

General Mattis, I look forward to receiving the two reports that

we called for last year in the NDAA on space reform.

But as you know, we-from our previous conversation, you are acutely aware that we find ourselves now in a situation where our two primary strategic competitors, Russia and China, have become our peers in space, and our—and in fact, challenging our superiority in that warfighting domain.

As you also know, this committee and this House called for the establishment of a space corps to more aggressively pursue that problem. And last month the President announced his support for

a space force.

Now my question. While we are still waiting on those reports, do you have a viable alternative to the space force the President has

called for, and that this committee has called for?

Secretary MATTIS. So we have to define this problem, not just the space focus of a force, but also from acquisition to employment, from coordination to innovation for future, all those things that go with it.

If a space force is the right thing to do, I have no reservations about it. But I don't want to stand up in DOD, which is an enormous bureaucracy and has many sub-bureaucracies, another bu-

reaucracy, as if that will be the solution.

If it is the solution, then we will go there. But I believe right now what we are looking at is a warfighting domain. And when I look at the Pacific domain, or I look at the cyber domain, I look for combatant commanders of those. I don't set up a Pacific army in the sense—a new military force. It draws from all the joint force.

So I am open on this. I will tell you I did not recognize the degree of the problem when I went through confirmation. And what you and your colleague have done have brought it to our attention. It is a primary focus of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Pat Shanahan, my deputy, and we are going to solve this to your satisfaction.

I don't know right now what all that solution looks like, but we are not waiting, either. As we break out the pieces, we are solving each one of them, and we will sort this out. It is not an ideological opposition here, but when we have got an Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps now, putting them together in the joint force is challenging and makes us the best in the world, and we are good at

Do we want to set up another force—and we have to make certain it solves the problem before we put out the money for an entirely new military, from recruiting to training, and everything else. Might be the right thing to do, though.

Mr. ROGERS. Right. And I have—I share your confidence in Deputy Secretary Shanahan. We think he is the right guy to pursue

General Dunford, in your professional military judgment, can you tell us—explain to us why you believe that we need a lower-yield submarine launch ballistic missile when we already have a loweryield gravity bomb?

General DUNFORD. I can do that, Congressman. Deterrence really is all about making sure the adversary knows that you have a credible response that is going to impose a cost that is greater than whatever they do. And while we might like to reduce our nuclear capabilities, the fact is that Russia specifically has grown those over time.

They have thousands of what we would call nonstrategic nuclear weapons. They have a mind that, maybe if they used those non-strategic nuclear weapons, we are at the point where we would have to either risk the homeland or we would concede that they have escalated to the point where they achieved their political objectives.

In my judgment, the Nuclear Posture Review and the recommendation to have a low-yield—the option increases our deterrence vis-a-vis Russia, because it convinces them that we do have credible, capable responses. No matter what they do, they are going to be met with a credible, capable response, and there is no circumstances under which they will do something where the cost that they will pay won't be greater than whatever they hope to gain.

Mr. ROGERS. Great. Well, General, we also continue to hear calls to de-alert our ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] and give up our responsiveness of the nuclear forces. Do you believe that would be a wise path for us to pursue?

General DUNFORD. I don't, Congressman. And that particular issue—as you know, you follow it well—it has been looked at in several posture reviews. In fact, the determination has been made that it is actually more stabilizing to leave them on alert so that that is where they are, so that if you—because in a crisis, if you then alerted them, you would by definition perhaps create unstable

conditions.

Mr. ROGERS. Great. Thank you both. Thank you all for your serv-

I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Banks.

Mr. BANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, gentlemen, for being here today.

On August 21st of 2017 many of us championed and welcomed this administration's change in strategy and focus to win in Af-

ghanistan and create a safe and secure Afghanistan.

General Dunford, last summer in your fiscal year 2018 posture testimony you stated, "In Afghanistan fiscal year 2018 investments will reinforce improvements in the Afghan national defense and security forces." Today you stated, "We are working toward a sustainable approach to stabilizing the Afghan Government and denying terrorists sanctuary."

General Votel recently testified before this committee in February, and he assessed, "The ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces] does not have the ability to prevent the insurgency from maintaining a rural presence, and occasionally threatening a population center or critical ground lines of communication." Supporting this, the latest SIGAR [Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction] report stated in the most recent assessment that the Afghan Government's control of districts is lowest, while the insurgency's control is the highest, since December of 2015.

General Dunford, we would expect to see the Afghan Government's control increase, while the insurgencies' control decrease.

When do you see the ANSF turning the corner against the insurgents and other terrorists?

General DUNFORD. Congressman, thanks for that question. I was just in Afghanistan, I spent 5 days there about 3 weeks ago. We visited all of our positions and spent time with General Nicholson to talk about, in detail, how he was implementing a South Asia strategy, and specifically the military dimension of the South Asia strategy that Secretary Mattis directed.

A couple of challenges we have had. Number one, we have suffered significant Afghan casualties. Number two, the cooperation across the Afghan police, Afghan Army, intelligence organizations hasn't been quite what it has—what it needed to be. And number three, they were short capabilities: aviation capability, intelligence

capability, surface fires capability.

What we have done, I believe, is taken a look exactly at what the Afghans need to gain momentum and retain momentum against the adversary. Our advisors are the right advisors. They are carefully hand-selected, with previous combat experience. So they are the right people to be providing advice. They are at the right level.

You remember before they were up at the corps level, a general officer level, and they now have the capability to go down to the tactical level. That is significant for two reasons. One is it enhances the leadership development of the Afghan forces, but more importantly it helps deliver our fires at the right time and the right place, and helps them to learn how to deliver their fires at the right time and the right place.

And the other thing I was encouraged about by my visit was that the cross—what we call cross-pillar coordination—that is the police, the army, and the security forces—many demonstrations of that in January and February and March this year. I just would tell you that we just now are about 6, 7 weeks into this new organizational construct, and I would expect to see different results this summer.

And I will close, knowing that we are short of time, by just saying this: We are not doing—you know, the people would say we are just doing more of the same. I would argue that, until 2013, we did the fighting. From 2013, when at a peak, we had about 140,000 forces. We focused for the next 3 years on decreasing our forces to the point we only had 8,000 forces in 2017.

This is going to be the first season where we have had a fully resourced plan to support the Afghans in conducting counterinsurgency operations inside of Afghanistan. By no means is the military dimension of the problem sufficient to achieve strategic success, but I do believe right now that the military dimension—the problem

has been adequately addressed.

I am confident that we have the right organizational construct, we have the right people, and we have the right capabilities in place to address the specific issues that we identified in doing a failure analysis over the last few years. We drew from those lessons learned the specific issues that had to be addressed when we deployed the force for 2018.

Mr. Banks. Okay, thank you. With the less than a minute that I have left, again, Secretary Mattis, many of us support this administration's new approach. We have, since August 21st of 2017. But we have heard far too little from the Pentagon about the success

of that strategy. The American people deserve to know that we are

turning the corner, we are making progress.

What can we do—what can you do to better inform the American people that we are making progress in the months to come to show them that we are doing everything that we can to win in Afghanistan?

Secretary Mattis. Congressman, I register your point loud and clear. We owe that kind of explanation to the American people. I think what we need to do is deliver results, as well. And as the results come with this new organization, now that we have a strategy, not just to leave, but to actually win, and we are at a position now to actually give the kind of progress reports that you are look-

But it is a good point. I have not looked at it. Let me look at it.

Okav? And-

Mr. Banks. My-

Secretary MATTIS. Thank you.

Mr. Banks [continuing]. Time has expired.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hice. Mr. Hice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, each of

you, for being here this afternoon, and for your service.

Secretary Mattis, in your written statement you said that modernizing the Nation's nuclear deterrent delivery systems, including our nuclear command and control, is the Department's top priority.

And General Dunford, you similarly said that the nuclear modernization is the highest priority mission of the joint force, and there is no margin remaining in the modernization schedule, and we must deliver these critical nuclear modernization programs on the established timelines.

So just to elaborate a little bit, both of you, why do you think

the nuclear programs are the top priority?

Secretary Mattis. Congressman, these weapons, if they are used, bring a tragedy beyond anyone's ability to explain it. There is—we have got to maintain the prohibition on these weapons. It is costly, it is a lot less costly than if there was a slip into a nuclear war,

Mr. HICE. Okay. General Dunford.

General Dunford. Congressman, as the Secretary has made clear to us that deterring a nuclear war is job one inside the Department of Defense, and to deter nuclear war we have to have credible capabilities. The adversary has to know—again, back to the-that we would respond in a way that would impose a cost much greater than whatever they would do. If they struck us, they would be met with overwhelming force.

We have had a successful deterrent framework in place to deter nuclear war for decades. Unfortunately, we stopped making investments in our nuclear enterprise back in the 1990s. We should have

started modernizing back then, in the late 1990s.

As we have seen, as much as we might like to emphasize nuclear weapons, our adversaries have, in fact, modernized nuclear weapons, and they have created a capable, modern nuclear enterprise.

And with regard to the Russians, they have certainly opened that up, and have a lot—large number of nonstrategic nuclear weapons, as well as nuclear weapons.

So I think, at the end of the day, it does reflect a relatively small percentage of the Department of Defense. When you look at job one, deter nuclear weapons, the force that we have and the command and control systems we have to have in place have to be credible enough to make sure the adversary knows that we do have the ability to respond and set the same deterrent framework that has been in place for decades.

Mr. HICE. So I am assuming from that answer that you would agree with General Hyten from STRATCOM [U.S. Strategic Command], his statement that we need to go faster on our nuclear mod-

ernization programs.

General DUNFORD. Absolutely. And I think that the good thing is now we have the Nuclear Posture Review roadmap laid out. In fact, just on one element of it, nuclear command and control, I am responsible to come back to the Secretary very soon on nuclear command and control to make recommendations how we implement the modernization element of that.

And of course, as you know, in this year's budget, in 2019, we have made investments across the entire triad as a result—and it

is all analytically based in that Nuclear Posture Review.

Mr. HICE. General Mattis, you would agree with that, as well? Secretary MATTIS. I do, sir, and I appreciate the 25 percent budget increase that Congress provided for—this would all just be words, if you hadn't provided the resources. Thank you.

Mr. HICE. Well taken. Let me ask my final question. Do—and really, Secretary Mattis, this is for you. Do you think that de-alert-

ing our nuclear forces is a good idea?

Secretary MATTIS. I cannot find any positive aspect of it, sir. As you know, the weapons, the ICBMs are targeted into the open waters. We have reduced any sense that they are on hair-trigger alert, as well, because we don't have to use them or lose them. It is not that sort of an issue.

What we want is a deterrent. In other words, someone who wants to attack us would have to take them all out. That cannot be done with 1 or 10 or even 100 nuclear weapons. And that sobers anyone who thinks they are going to take us on.

So the ICBM force, the submarines, the bombers, it is the right

way to keep the deterrence intact.

Mr. HICE. So to ask a similar question a little different way, are you worried that having parts of our nuclear forces on alert is dangerous?

Secretary Mattis. No, sir.

Mr. HICE. Thank you very much, and I appreciate you all being here, and I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, we have been joined by some good citizens from the Amarillo, Texas, Chamber of Commerce, whom I stood up about 45 minutes ago.

[Laughter.]


The CHAIRMAN. At least a couple of them are involved in helping provide our nuclear deterrence. On behalf of them and all of us, I want to thank you both for being here for 4 hours and answering our questions, and for your service to the country.

The hearing stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 2:03 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

APRIL 12, 2018



Opening Statement of Hon. William M. "Mac" Thornberry Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services HEARING ON

The Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense Authorization Budget Request from the Department of Defense

April 12, 2018

The committee is pleased to welcome back the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to discuss the Administration's fiscal year 2019 budget request for the Department of Defense.

We meet under rather different circumstances than last year. Congress and the Administration have worked together to provide to the military the resources they need to begin to reverse the erosion of our military strength. There is agreement on the funding levels for defense for FY '19. We know how much we have to work with.

The challenge as we work through the details is that some of the consequences of the years of cuts and neglect are becoming more apparent. A study published this weekend by Military Times found that aviation mishaps have risen about 40 percent since the Budget Control Act took effect.

The alarming number of aviation accidents just in the past 3 ½ weeks reveals how deep the damage goes and magnitude of the task of repairing and rebuilding our capabilities. Meanwhile, as events in Syria remind us, the world does not slow down and wait for us to rebuild.

This committee has held a number of hearings and briefings this year to examine more closely the challenges we face, from readiness to space and cyber. We have studied what are adversaries are doing. We have heard from combatant commanders, service chiefs, and outside experts. The issue today is how well the Administration's budget meets our national security needs under the parameters set in the Bipartisan Budget Act. We also want to examine how this budget request implements the new National Defense Strategy about which the Secretary testified in February.

I am committed to working with the Department to achieve reforms that enable our military to be more agile and more efficient in facing the threats which confront us. The challenges are great, but if Congress and the Department work together, we can ensure that the military has what it needs to meet them.

House Armed Services Committee Ranking Member Adam Smith Opening Statement

Full Committee Hearing on the Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense Authorization Budget Request from the Department of Defense

April 12, 2018

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, and I thank them for testifying today. Their views are fundamental to our evaluation of the President's budget request and its correlation with the National Defense Strategy (the NDS).

The President's budget request for fiscal year 2019 matches the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (the BBA) in providing \$716 billion for national defense. Approximately \$686.1 billion of that request is designated for the Department of Defense to sustain operations, restore readiness, and invest in future capabilities. That is a significant amount, and we have a duty to manage our country's resources responsibly in fielding an effective military force. As I have said many times, we must invest wisely in national security, and we must be realistic when it comes to resourcing strategic objectives. Given the current security environment, an increase in defense spending is justifiable, but we clearly need to find new ways to realize savings within the defense budget.

In doing so, we will need to make tough budgetary choices. When you combine the defense budget with all of the other government programs that the public wants funded, there simply isn't enough money to go around. We need to raise revenues, and we need to scrutinize tradeoffs within the defense budget for potential savings. I am particularly interested to know the opportunity costs associated with the \$1.2 trillion plan for the nuclear weapons enterprise.

We also need to be mindful of how we aim to achieve strategic priorities. The NDS establishes numerous defense objectives to address challenges to the international rules-based order posed by Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and violent extremist organizations, such as ISIS and al Qaeda. Thus, it provides the foundation for this year's defense budget request. In introducing the NDS, however, Secretary Mattis acknowledged that "national security is much more than just defense." We must embrace whole-of-government approaches to securing objectives and to meeting future challenges, as those challenges will surely continue to require us to attend holistically to the political, economic, and social conditions that nurture them.

Secretary Mattis also indicated that fiscal certainty will be necessary for implementing the NDS and for building and maintaining a capable force. Long-term planning requires a comprehensive and reliably funded long-term

budget. Congress should begin by eliminating sequestration and by lifting the spending caps imposed by the Budget Control Act of 2011 to provide relief to both the defense and nondefense discretionary accounts, because empowering defense priorities alone is insufficient. The nondefense discretionary accounts should be funded to the extent the BBA allows, because important federal spending priorities, including homeland security, law enforcement, emergency preparedness and response capacities, veterans' services, and foreign assistance programs require sufficient budgetary support. We also need to reinvest in sound infrastructure, research and innovation, education, health care, public safety, housing, the workforce, small businesses and many other facets of enduring national strength.

Despite the Secretary's recognition that national security is a broadly defined concept, I am concerned that we may be tilting toward overreliance on defense funding and military capability as means for effecting national policy. It seems that the Department of Defense is being tasked with either performing or supplementing the performance of more and more key diplomatic, development, and law enforcement roles that traditionally are performed by civilian government agencies. The commitment of military resources to reinforce the southern border serves as a case in point. When you combine this trend with the Administration's willingness to deprive the nondefense elements of the federal government of necessary funding to perform important national security functions, I worry that the broader definition of national security isn't widely accepted. I am interested in Secretary Mattis' thoughts on how we might maintain balance within the broader National Security Strategy and allow the Department of Defense to focus on its core responsibilities.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to receiving our witnesses' testimony.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JIM MATTIS HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE WRITTEN STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD THURSDAY, APRIL 12, 2018

Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished members of the committee; I appreciate the opportunity to testify in support of the President's budget request for Fiscal Year 2019. I am joined by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Dunford, and the Department's Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer, Mr. David Norquist.

I am now in my second year as Secretary of Defense. With your help, we have made steady progress during the past 14 months.

In January, the Department published the 2018 National Defense Strategy – the first national defense strategy in a decade. Framed within President Trump's National Security Strategy, the 2018 National Defense Strategy provides clear direction for America's military to restore its competitive edge in an era of reemerging long-term strategic competition. The Department next released the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review which calls for America's military to provide a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent that is "modern, robust, flexible, resilient, ready, and appropriately tailored to deter 21st century threats and reassure allies."

In South Asia and Afghanistan, uncertainty in the region has been replaced by the certainty of the Administration's South Asia Strategy. Concurrently in the Middle East, we have dramatically reduced ISIS' physical caliphate, using a coordinated, whole-of-government approach that works "by, with, and through" our allies and partners to crush ISIS' claim of invincibility and deny them a geographic haven from which to plot murder.

Last month, thanks to the bipartisan support and political courage of Congress, President Trump signed an omnibus spending bill that funds the government for the remainder of the fiscal year. This law – along with the two-year budget agreement passed as part of February's Bipartisan Budget Act – finally freed us from the inefficient and damaging continuing resolution in 2018, providing the funding needed to start implementing the 2018 National Defense Strategy.

We in the Department of Defense (DoD) are grateful to the American people for their sacrifices on behalf of military readiness and for the priority given the military at a time when numerous competing demands must be met by our government. We recognize and embrace our responsibility to gain full value from every taxpayer dollar spent on defense. As such, every decision we make will focus on lethality and affordability as we rebuild readiness and provide the combat capabilities required for our Nation's security.

I want to thank this committee for your strong spirit of bipartisan collaboration. We continue to implement the range of reform initiatives directed by the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act. For example, your establishment of Under Secretaries for Research and Engineering and for Acquisition and Sustainment is already paying dividends in current and future readiness. This change—and others called for by Congress in its oversight role—sets the right course and we are aggressively implementing them.

While our trajectory is going in the right direction, our work has just begun. This is a year of opportunity and a chance to build on a strong start as we turn the 2018 National Defense Strategy into action. Continuing our close collaboration will address our security challenges, thereby enhancing the protection of our way of life. Initiatives such as codifying reform efforts to further streamline the defense acquisition process and employing feedback loops to reduce the number of Congressionally-mandated annual reports are areas that need our combined attention.

STRATEGY-DRIVEN BUDGET

The DoD's Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 budget is the second complete budget request from President Trump's administration. This budget will provide the resources necessary to fulfill DoD's requirements to meet the National Security Strategy's four vital national interests:

- Protect the American people, the Homeland, and the American way of life,
- · Promote American prosperity,
- Preserve peace through strength, and
- · Advance American influence.

The DoD FY 2019 base budget requests the resources necessary to fulfill the Department's enduring mission to provide the combat-credible military forces needed to deter war and, if deterrence fails, win in the event of conflict. Our armed forces reinforce America's traditional tools of diplomacy, ensuring that the President and our diplomats negotiate from a position of strength.

The 2018 National Defense Strategy provides clear strategic direction for America's military to reclaim an era of strategic purpose. Although the Department continues to prosecute the campaign against terrorists, long-term strategic competition – not terrorism – is now the primary focus of U.S. national security.

Nations as different as China and Russia have chosen to be strategic competitors as they seek to create a world consistent with their authoritarian models and pursue veto power over other nations' economic, diplomatic, and security decisions. Rogue regimes like North Korea and Iran persist in taking outlaw actions that undermine and threaten regional and global stability. Additionally and despite our successes against ISIS's physical caliphate, violent extremist organizations continue to sow hatred, incite violence, and murder innocents.

Due to our open, multi-cultural, democratic society and strengthening economy—more than any other nation—America can expand the competitive space, challenging our competitors where we possess advantages and they lack depth. In order to restore our competitive military edge, the FY19 budget funds our defense strategy's three overarching lines of effort to:

- · build a more lethal force,
- strengthen traditional alliances while building new partnerships, and
- · reform the Department's business practices for performance and affordability.

Build a More Lethal Force

The Department's policies, expenditures, and training <u>must contribute to the lethality of our military</u>. We cannot expect success fighting tomorrow's conflicts with yesterday's thinking, weapons, or equipment. As General Washington said during his first State of

the Union address, "to be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace," and a lethal military arm will enhance our diplomat's persuasiveness.

The paradox of war is that an adversary will move against any perceived weakness, so we cannot adopt a single, preclusive form of warfare. Rather, we must be able to fight across the entire spectrum of combat. This means the size and composition of our force matters, and the Nation must field sufficient, capable forces to deter conflict. If deterrence fails, we must win. In today's environment we are determined to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent so these weapons are never used, and a decisive conventional force that includes irregular warfare capability.

Our military remains capable, but our competitive edge has eroded in every domain of warfare – air, land, sea, space, and cyber. The combination of rapidly changing technology, the negative impact on military readiness resulting from the longest continuous period of combat in our Nation's history, and a prolonged period of unpredictable and insufficient funding, created an overstretched and under-resourced military. The FY 2017 Request for Additional Appropriations and FY 2018 Omnibus Appropriation provided the funding needed to address immediate readiness shortfalls and accelerate modernization programs in a sustained effort to solidify our competitive advantage. As indicated below in Figure 1, America can afford survival. The FY 2019 strategy-based budget is affordable and will continue to enhance U.S. military capabilities, but the budget can only be fully effective if passed on time, not later than October 1st.




Figure 1. Defense outlays as a percentage of gross domestic product (FY 1940 - FY 2023)

The National Defense Strategy prioritizes major power competition and, in particular, reversing the erosion of U.S. military advantage in relation to China and Russia. The FY 2019 budget request invests in key capabilities to implement the National Defense Strategy through:

- modernization of nuclear deterrence forces and nuclear command, control and communications (NC3) capabilities;
- · additional missile defense capabilities;
- modest increases in end strength for Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps;
- · a 2.6% military pay raise;
- continuing increased procurement of certain preferred and advanced munitions;
- acquisition of 10 combat ships and 8 support ships;
- continued production of F-35 and F/A-18 aircraft;
- · increasing funds to enhance communications and resiliency in space, and;
- investment in technological innovation to increase lethality, including research into advanced autonomous systems, artificial intelligence, and hypersonics.

As noted earlier, one of the key elements of the 2018 National Defense Strategy is to ensure America's military provides a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent that is fit for our time.

The global situation is sobering. Russia is modernizing its full range of nuclear systems while espousing a theory of nuclear escalation in military conflict. China, too, is modernizing and expanding its already considerable nuclear forces, pursuing entirely new capabilities. China is also modernizing its conventional military forces to a degree that will challenge U.S. military superiority. While recent events have given rise to a sense of positive movement, North Korea's nuclear provocations threaten regional and global peace and have garnered universal condemnation by the United Nations. Iran's nuclear ambitions also remain an unresolved concern. Globally, nuclear terrorism remains a tangible threat.

The recently completed 2018 Nuclear Posture Review reaffirms the findings of previous reviews that the nuclear triad—comprised of silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, bomber aircraft, and nuclear-armed submarines—is the most strategically sound means

of nuclear deterrence. Given the range of potential adversaries, their capabilities and strategic objectives, the review calls for a nuclear deterrent fit for its time—a tailored and diverse set of nuclear deterrent capabilities that provides a flexible, tailored approach to deterring one or more potential adversaries.

Deterrence exists in the mind of an adversary. Given today's complex security environment and the dynamics of deterrence, our Nuclear Posture Review introduces two supplemental nuclear capabilities to strengthen our deterrent stance. Both capabilities deny any adversary the confidence that limited nuclear use can provide an advantage.

First is the near-term modification of a small number of existing submarine-launched ballistic missile warheads to reduce their yield. From submarines this provides a survivable capability to credibly hold at risk heavily-defended targets, which an adversary might believe could be successfully defended against current air-delivered nuclear weapons. This is consistent with the New START Treaty and does not increase the number of deployed U.S. strategic nuclear weapons. It counters any misconception on the part of Russia that they could escalate a conventional war through the use of a low yield weapon and we could only respond with a high yield weapon, which they calculate we would not do. In terms of deterrence, this submarine-launched low yield weapon gives us an option other than surrender or suicide, thus strengthening our deterrence to adversary use of nuclear weapons.

Second is the pursuit of a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile. This is not a new or novel capability. The U.S. had these weapons for decades before dismantling them after the Cold War. If we subsequently choose to go into full production, this INF Treaty-compliant capability will close a capability gap. Currently this effort is meant to incentivize Russia to return to compliance with its obligations under the INF Treaty.

These capabilities do not lower the nuclear threshold. Rather, by convincing adversaries that even limited use of nuclear weapons will be more costly than they can tolerate, it raises that threshold.

Preserving this range of options requires the recapitalization of our Cold War legacy nuclear deterrent forces as initiated during the previous Administration. **Modernizing the Nation's nuclear deterrent delivery systems**, including our nuclear command and control, is the Department's top priority, and these programs are fully funded in the FY 2019 budget. Most of the Nation's nuclear deterrence delivery systems, built in the 1980's or earlier, reach the end of their service life between 2025 and 2035, with all currently-fielded systems extended well beyond their original service lives. Replacement programs are underway to ensure there are no gaps in capability when the legacy systems age out.

Investments include the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent system; COLUMBIA-class ballistic missile submarine; Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missile service life extension program; B-21 Raider strategic bomber; replacing the air-launched cruise missile with the Long-Range Standoff weapon; and B61 Mod 12 life extension program to consolidate four legacy B61 variants into a single variant for carriage on heavy bombers and dual-capable aircraft.

Our modernization estimates align with a recent Congressional Budget Office report that estimated \$1.2 trillion to (1) modernize and (2) operate our nuclear deterrent forces over 30 years when combined with the costs incurred by the Department of Energy to develop and sustain the warheads. However, the cost of our nuclear modernization program is significantly less than the cost of failing to deter war by underinvesting in these capabilities.

Nuclear deterrent forces, along with our conventional forces and other instruments of national power, help deter aggression and preserve peace. Our goal is to convince adversaries they have nothing to gain and everything to lose from the use of nuclear weapons. I note again that our deterrent stance does not lower the nuclear threshold, and it remains U.S. policy to consider employing nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States, its allies, and partners.

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review reaffirms the mutually reinforcing role of nuclear deterrence in a complex and dynamic security environment and continued U.S.

commitment to non-proliferation, counter-nuclear terrorism, and arms control. The United States remains committed to its global leadership role to reduce the number of nuclear weapons, and to fulfill existing treaty and arms control obligations, including the New START Treaty. While Russia and U.S. both met their agreed New START strategic weapons reduction requirement on time, Moscow has violated the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty over the past several years. While our intent is to bring Russia back into compliance, the duration of Russia's INF violation illustrates the challenging environment for progress in arms control efforts and undermines U.S. confidence in Russia as a reliable treaty partner.

The FY 2019 budget funds enhancements to U.S. missile defense capabilities to defend the homeland, deployed forces, allies, and partners against an increasingly complex ballistic missile threat. In accordance with the soon-to-be-released 2018 Missile Defense Review, this budget requests continued robust support for missile defense capacity and capability to keep pace with advancing threats. The budget includes \$12.9 billion for missile defense, including \$9.9 billion for the Missile Defense Agency. The Department will develop an additional missile field in Alaska and increase the number of operational deployed Ground-Based Interceptors to 64 missiles as early as FY 2023. While our efforts remain focused on increasing interceptor capacity in Alaska, the Department has completed environmental impact studies for four possible ballistic missile defense sites on the East Coast should the Iranian ICBM threat materialize.

The FY 2019 request will continue development of the Redesigned Kill Vehicle to address the evolving threat along with development of a 2nd / 3rd-stage booster selectable capability to expand battlespace for ground-based interceptor engagements for homeland defense. The budget also uses available technology to improve existing sensors, battle management, fire control, and kill vehicle capabilities to include a Long-Range Discrimination Radar in Alaska, a Homeland Defense Radar in Hawaii, and an additional Medium Range Discrimination Radar in the Pacific.

For regional missile defense capabilities, the FY 2019 budget request supports improved missile defense capability on the Korean peninsula; provides funding for development of advanced missile defense technologies to counter future threats; supports the Aegis

Ashore site in Romania and deployment of a second site in Poland as part of NATO's Ballistic Missile Defense architecture; increases BMD capability and capacity of the Aegis fleet; integrates SM-3 Block IIA into the Aegis weapon system; provides funding for Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) development efforts and software upgrades; and continues support for Israeli Cooperative BMD Programs, including the Iron Dome system to defeat short-range missiles and rockets, and co-development/co-production of the David's Sling Weapon System and Arrow-3 System.

Modest increases in end strength for the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps are critical to restoring readiness. DoD's FY 2019 budget funds a total end strength increase of 25,900 as depicted in figures 2 (Active Force) and 3 (Reserve Force) below.

Service	FY 2018*	FY 2019	Delta (FY18 – FY19
Army	476.0	487.5	+11.5
Navy	327.9	335.4	+7.5
Air Force	325.1	329.1	+4.0
Marine Corps	185.0	186.1	+1.1
TOTAL	1,314.0	1,338.1	+24.1

Figure 2. Active Component End Strength (in thousands) *FY 2018 reflects the PB request

Service	FY 2018*	FY 2019	Delta (FY18 – FY19
Army Reserve	199.0	199.5	+0.5
Navy Reserve	59.0	59.1	+0.1
Air Force Reserve	69.8	70.0	+0.2
Marine Corps Reserve	38.5	38.5	
Army National Guard	343.0	343.5	+0.5
Air National Guard	106.6	107.1	+0.5
TOTAL	815.9	817.7	+1.8

Figure 3. Reserve Component End Strength (in thousands) *FY 2018 reflects the PB request

Our joint culture remains one of our military's greatest strengths, and a force multiplier on the battlefield. Each service's manpower needs remain unique to their specific missions. For example, the Army will continue to rebuild manpower readiness with a new "Sustainable Readiness" force generation model, making greater use of Reserve forces, updating the force structure model, and providing greater home station training against a

broad range of threats. The Navy will ensure Sailors with the right skills are assigned to the most appropriate jobs, using the increase in end strength to reduce identified gaps in critical manning areas. The Marine Corps will implement a 1:2 deploy-to-dwell ratio for active duty forces, providing more recovery time between deployments and for home station training. The Air Force is closing gaps in aircrew and skilled maintenance personnel, targeting their increased personnel to get more planes in the air.

Increasing lethality requires us to change our approach to talent management. We must reinvigorate our military education and training, and hone our civilian workforce's expertise. The creativity and talent of the Department is our deepest wellspring of strength and warrants greater investment. The FY 2019 budget will continue to invest in the military's most important asset—its warfighters—with a 2.6% military pay increase. This pay raise and the increase in manpower will improve readiness and lethality by reducing personnel tempo and retaining skillsets like cyber, electronic warfare, and special operations. With changes to our forces' posture, we will prioritize for warfighting readiness in major combat, making us more strategically predictable and reliable for our allies but operationally unpredictable to any adversary.

The U.S. Military's predominant mission is to be prepared to fight and win our Nation's wars. No human endeavor is more demanding physically, mentally, and emotionally than the life and death struggle of battle. High standards for military service are designed to ensure our military remains the most professional and lethal force in the world. While not everyone in the military sees combat, every Soldier, Sailor, Airman and Marine must be physically and mentally qualified and prepared to endure the hardship of war, for the U.S. military to carry out its demanding missions.

Acknowledging that infantry units take over 80% of combat casualties, the Department's Close Combat Lethality Task Force is integrating human factors and technology to ensure our forces retain their hard won superiority in battle. We will expose troops to as many simulated tactical and ethical challenges possible before they see combat, ensuring that their first time in combat doesn't feel like their first time in combat. The Task Force will also provide recommendations regarding the fundamentals of performance, including physical fitness and nutrition standards. The end result is to

ensure that U.S. close quarters battle is conducted in a way that ferociously destroys the enemy's spirit and brings back as many as possible in top physical and mental shape.

To ensure the most lethal and effective fighting force in the world, the Department maintains high mental, physical, and behavioral standards. These necessarily high standards mean that 71% of young Americans (ages 17-24) are ineligible to join the military without a waiver. The Department's detailed 44-page report thoroughly explains why and under what circumstances transgender persons without gender dysphoria can serve, and why transgender persons with gender dysphoria cannot, except in limited circumstances. I'm confident that my recommendation to the President is in the best interests of the military and is consistent with the Constitution. The report also explains why transgender persons who entered under the prior administration's policy will be retained. The Department will continue to comply with the court orders that require the accession and retention of transgender persons until this issue is fully resolved, and I must remain careful with my comments on this matter while it is in active litigation.

Continued increased procurement of preferred and advanced munitions is

necessary due to ongoing operations in the Middle East and the need for war reserves. Specifically, the DoD has expended a significant number of munitions, primarily to defeat Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Many preferred munitions are precision-guided, low-collateral damage munitions, used by all Services and by U.S. allies. Addressing the Department's need to maintain critical munition inventories, the FY 2017 and FY 2018 funds you provided have strengthened the Department's lethal posture, enabling our industrial base to increase production capacities. The FY 2019 budget provides \$4.4 billion to continue to procure munitions at maximum production capacity, lowering the price for each unit and ensuring greater buying power for those munitions as we rebuild our war reserve.

The United States remains the world's preeminent maritime power. During peacetime and in times of conflict, Sailors and Marines are deployed at sea, enabling forces to arrive sooner and remain longer, while bringing everything they need with them. These forces reassure allies and temper adversaries' designs. The U.S. Constitution vests Congress with the authority to "provide and maintain a Navy," and the FY 2019 budget

provides \$23.7 billion to **fund 10 combat ships and 8 support ships**. These funds arrest the downward trajectory of the Navy's size and lethality. Consistent with the National Defense Strategy, the Fleet will continue to grow to meet capabilities needed in the future and to maintain an industrial base healthy enough to adapt and evolve in a dynamic environment. The FY 2019 budget provides for a deployable battle force of 280 ships growing to 355, supporting the requirements to respond to persistent and emerging threats. We are also increasing near-term capacity by investing in service life extension programs for six guided missile cruisers (adding five years of service life) and one Los Angeles-class submarine (extending service life by 11 years). We are committed to expanding the Navy while making it fit for operations in the face of future threats.

Along with shipbuilding, the FY 2019 budget prioritizes capabilities to enhance air and sea power through the **continued production of F-35 and F/A-18 aircraft.** The F-35 program is developing, producing, and fielding three variants of the F-35 to support the needs of the U.S. Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy. The budget requests 77 F-35s and 24 additional F/A-18 Super Hornets in FY 2019, increasing the readiness of the Navy's fighter fleet and relieving pressure on its aging, legacy F/A-18A-D aircraft. It remains imperative that our air fleet deliver performance, affordability, and capability. The F-35 aircraft is performing well, but the contractor is not delivering the affordability that keeps solvency and security as our guideposts. We are working with the contractor to reduce the costs associated with purchasing and sustaining the F-35. We will evaluate the performance of both F-35s and F/A-18s to determine the most appropriate mix of aircraft as we move forward.

The FY 2019 budget request provides \$9.3 billion for space and space-based **systems to enhance communications and resiliency in space**, addressing needs for overhead persistent infrared capabilities; positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT); and space launch systems. The Department will sustain existing systems, while developing follow-on capabilities to support operations in a contested space environment.

The Air Force will continue the production of space-based infrared systems (SBIRS) and advanced extremely high frequency space vehicles currently in production to meet military satellite communication needs. Facing rising threats to our space capabilities,

however, the FY 2019 budget request transitioned the SBIRS space vehicles 7 and 8 procurements to the Next Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared effort in order to field rapidly a more survivable system by the mid-2020s. The Air Force will incorporate a technology refresh of the sensor to assure missile warning capabilities equal to or greater than today's SBIRS, taking advantage of sensor technology improvements.

The FY 2019 budget request supports resiliency improvements in the PNT mission, incorporating military protection capability into the next generation global positioning system (GPS) III constellation. This enhancement assures PNT capabilities in contested environments and funds improvements to the GPS ground segment to improve antijamming and secure access of military GPS signals.

Successful implementation of the 2018 National Defense Strategy includes **investing in technological innovation to increase lethality.** Rapid technological change includes developments in advanced computing, big data analytics, artificial intelligence, autonomy, robotics, miniaturization, additive manufacturing, directed energy, and hypersonics—the very technologies that ensure we will be able to fight and win wars of the future. Ultimately, these technologies will change the character of war, a reality embraced by DoD.

The Department's FY 2019 Science and Technology (S&T) program invests in and develops capabilities that advance the technological superiority of the U.S. military to counter new and emerging threats. The Congressionally-directed split of my office's Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) into two portfolios (Acquisitions and Sustainment, and Research and Engineering) has enabled a stronger focus on urgently needed innovation, aligned with our defense strategy.

The FY 2019 budget request for science and technology is \$13.7 billion, focusing on innovation to advance DoD's military dominance for the 21st century. Highlights include: a robust basic research program of \$2.3 billion; funding the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency budget of \$3.4 billion to develop technologies for revolutionary, high-payoff military capabilities; and continuing to leverage commercial research and

development to provide leading edge capabilities to the Department while encouraging emerging non-traditional technology companies to focus on DoD-specific problems.

The 2018 National Defense Strategy recognizes cyberspace as an increasingly contested warfighting domain, where malevolent cyber incidents and attacks present significant risks to national security. Long-term strategic competitors like Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran are using increasingly aggressive methods and levels of sophistication to conduct malicious activities. The challenge facing the Department is equally applicable to public and private networks across the United States, networks that are already held at risk.

In terms of cyber as a contested domain, the Department of Defense has two broad portfolios: First is DoD's requirement to defend its networks, weapons, infrastructure, and information while providing integrated offensive cyber capabilities as options if needed. Second is our responsibility to Defend the Nation, which we perform by defending forward against significant cyber threats, and by supporting the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) which has the lead responsibility for integrating various governmental roles, missions, and responsibilities. Because DoD has offensive and defensive cyber capabilities in U.S. Cyber Command (Title 10) and the National Security Agency (Title 50) on a scale and scope not available through other agencies and departments, we have a responsibility to the President and the Secretary of DHS for effectively aligning our capabilities to support cyber deterrence and responses to malicious cyber actions as part of a whole of government approach. Further, protection of our Nation's economy is fundamental to protecting our open society's way of life and ultimately to maintaining our military power. There are critical sectors (e.g., energy/electricity, finance, communications) vulnerable to disruption which must be reflected in our Nation's strategy and DoD's role.

The FY 2019 budget provides \$8.6 billion to build and maintain offensive and defensive capabilities for cyberspace operations. This funding also provides the resources needed to organize, train, and equip the 133 Cyber Mission Force teams whose purpose it is to perform DoD's cyber missions. This budget further provides the resources to elevate

U.S. Cyber Command to a 4-star level command as required by the 2017 NDAA, to ensure DoD's organization accounts for the new threats facing our Nation.

Across manpower, research, procurement, operations and maintenance, and construction—every investment in the FY 2019 budget is designed to contribute to the lethality of our military as we adapt the size and composition of our force to address the current international situation while adjusting our stance to account for an evolving future. The enduring departmental theme is derived from our National Defense Strategy and Congressional intent: that we field forces sufficient and capable of deterring conflict or dominating the battlefield if we must fight and win. This year's budget reinforces a message to those seeking to threaten America's experiment in democracy: if you challenge us, it will be your longest and worst day.

Strengthen Traditional Alliances while Building New Partnerships

The 2018 National Defense Strategy's second line of effort is to strengthen traditional alliances while building new partnerships.

In the past, I had the privilege of fighting many times in defense of the United States, but I never fought in a solely American formation; it was always alongside foreign troops. Easier said than done. Winston Churchill noted that the only thing harder than fighting with allies is fighting without them. History proves that we are stronger when we stand united with others. Accordingly, our military will be designed, trained, and ready to fight alongside allies.

Acknowledging the lessons of World War II, the Greatest Generation invested in this approach to security, and our Nation's resulting prosperity helped much of the world develop. Working by, with, and through allies who carry their fair share remains a source of strength for the U.S. Since the costly victory in World War II, Americans have carried a disproportionate share of the global defense burden while others recovered.

Today, the growing economic strength of allies and partners has enabled them to step up, as demonstrated by the 74 nations and international organizations participating in the

Defeat-ISIS campaign, and again in the 41 nations standing shoulder-to-shoulder in NATO's Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan. 15 NATO allies are also increasing their defense budgets as a share of gross domestic product, giving credence to the value of democracies standing together. Our Pacific partners are also doing so.

To strengthen and work jointly with more allies, our organizations, processes, and procedures will be ally friendly. The Department will do more than just listen to other nations' ideas—we will be willing to be persuaded by our partners, recognizing that not all good ideas come from the country with the most aircraft carriers. This line of effort will bolster an extended network of like-minded nations capable of promptly and prudently meeting the challenges of our time.

The FY 2019 budget prioritizes investment where it is needed today and tomorrow. In the Middle East, we will work with responsive governments to ensure a more stable and secure region that denies safe haven to terrorists; is not dominated by any power hostile to the United States; and that contributes to stable global energy markets and secure trade routes. The \$69 billion requested for the Overseas Contingency Operations account maintains our regional presence to protect the homeland, allies, and partners from terrorist threats. The budget request supports U.S. forces in Afghanistan as part of the Administration's South Asia Strategy; continues operations to prevent the resurgence of ISIS; and continues our security partnership with Iraqi Security Forces to support Iraq's long-term stability and independence.

NATO remains our key security alliance. The Overseas Contingency Operations request also provides \$6.5 billion for the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI). Established in 2015, the EDI supports a strong and free Europe, reaffirms America's commitment to the security and territorial commitment of NATO member states, and enhances activities in Eastern Europe to deter Russian aggression such as we have observed in Georgia and Crimea/Ukraine. This initiative also increases bilateral and multilateral exercises and training with allies and partners to ensure our deterrent stance is built on a strong, joint military capability.

A free and open Indo-Pacific region provides prosperity and security for all. We will continue to strengthen our alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific to a networked security architecture capable of deterring aggression, maintaining stability, and ensuring free access to common domains. With key countries in the region, we will bring together bilateral and multilateral security relationships to preserve the free and open international system.

In our own hemisphere, the Canadian-American North American Air Defense Command is a long-standing, allied effort to protect both our nations. We maintain mature relations with both Canadian and Mexican militaries with a high degree of quiet collaboration. Further South we work jointly with Latin American nations on counter-narcotics and other operations and training efforts.

Our efforts in Africa are largely focused on assisting nations facing violent terrorists to develop their own capability to provide internal security and mutual support against insurgents and terror groups. Ethical use of force is inherent in all training we provide.

Reform the Department's Business Practices for Performance and Affordability

As we take proactive steps to ensure our military is ready to fight today and in the future, we must urgently reform the business practices of the Department to provide both solvency and security. We will continue to establish a culture of performance where results and accountability matter on every expenditure, thereby gaining full benefit from every single taxpayer dollar spent on defense. We also have a commitment to exercise the utmost degree of financial stewardship and budget discipline within the Department, and we will deliver our Department's full financial audit this year. We also have the right leaders in place to make meaningful reform a reality: Pat Shanahan as Deputy Secretary of Defense; Jay Gibson as Chief Management Officer; Ellen Lord as Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisitions and Sustainment; Michael Griffin as Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering; Bob Daigle as Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation; and David Norquist as the Department's Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer. Each brings the intellect and energy required to

implement and sustain meaningful reform, ensuring the Department provides performance and affordability for the American taxpayer.

The Department began a consolidated financial statement audit in FY 2018. For the first time, the Department will complete an independent and full audit across its business processes and systems, as required by law. A financial statement audit is comprehensive, occurs annually, and covers more than just financial management. During a financial statement audit, an independent public accounting firm or the DoD Office of Inspector General examines the Department's books and records. Financial statement audits give management independent validation and feedback on the effectiveness of each reporting entity's business systems and internal processes and controls. The financial statement audit helps drive enterprise-wide improvements to standardize our business processes and improve the quality of our data. Audits also ensure Department leaders have visibility over the counts, locations, and conditions of DoD property to inform current readiness and inform future programming, budgeting, and investment decisions. While we fully expect to find deficiencies, we will take swift action to correct them, thereby earning the trust of Congress and the American people.

Remediating audit findings is at the center of our financial improvement strategy. The Department owes accountability to the American people. The taxpayers deserve a level of confidence that the Department's financial statements present a true and accurate picture of its financial condition and operations. Transparency, accountability, and business process reform are some of the benefits the Department will receive from the financial statement audit even before achieving a positive opinion.

The Department is transitioning to a culture of performance and affordability that operates at the speed of relevance. We will prioritize speed of delivery, continuous adaptation, and frequent modular upgrades. With your continued, critical support, we will shed outdated management and acquisition processes while adopting American industries' best practices. Our management structure and processes are not engraved in stone. They are a means to an end—empowering the warfighter with the knowledge, equipment, and support needed to fight and win. If current structures inhibit our pursuit

of lethality, I have directed Service Secretaries and Agency Heads to consolidate, eliminate, or restructure to achieve the mission.

Deputy Secretary of Defense Shanahan has established the Reform Management Group (RMG), which relies on cross-functional teams to drive efficiency by using shared, centralized services throughout the Department with the goal of making each area maximally effective and improving our performance. The RMG's central goal is to leverage best practices, centers of excellence, and private sector sources to benchmark and best align business operations. Improved performance in the Department's business operations leads to a more effective force, and savings will be reinvested to increase lethality.

Initial Reform Teams are focused on evaluating operations in the following areas:

- · Information Technology,
- Healthcare.
- Real Property,
- Human Resources,
- · Financial Management,
- · Contracted Services and Goods,
- · Logistics and Supply Chain,
- · Community Services, and
- Testing and Evaluation.

Goals and performance metrics are crucial to measuring the benefit-to-cost and value generated as business processes are optimized. Key to this reform effort is generating relevant, accurate, and timely data. Displaying this data will ensure that all decision makers have access to the best information on a real-time basis. As reform efforts are underway, the longer-term objective is to institutionalize the behavior of continuous improvement throughout the culture of the Department.

As the Department implements reform initiatives that reduce the operating costs of institutional activities, those resources will be reallocated to readiness, modernization, and recapitalization. The Department is ensuring that the savings associated with better

business practices from previous Presidents' Budgets are implemented fully, including streamlining major headquarters activities and eliminating redundancy. This effort includes a systemic review of past Inspector Generals' findings to ensure remedial action has been fully implemented.

There are several efforts currently underway to improve the Department's ability to acquire and field products and services that provide for significant increases in mission capability and operational support in the most cost effective and schedule efficient manner possible.

A Defense Acquisition System that facilitates speed and agility in support of mission accomplishment is key. The Department is engaging with the independent advisory panel on streamlining and codifying acquisition regulations established by section 809 of the FY 2016 NDAA and amended by section 863 of the FY 2017 NDAA. This effort also includes potential recommendations for new statutes as well as amendments or repeal of existing statutes.

The Department looks forward to working with the Congress to provide the right capabilities to the warfighters when needed and at an affordable cost. A Defense Acquisition System that facilitates speed and agility in support of the aforementioned objective is key in this regard.

Current Issues Update

Aviation Mishaps / Deaths: Recent aviation mishaps across each of the Services are tragic and troubling, with 133 service members killed over a five year period. In the last three weeks alone, 16 service members have been killed. I am concerned that these recent mishaps represent lagging indicators, a tragic manifestation of readiness that has degraded during 17 years of war and made worse by budget cuts and fiscal instability. The two-year Bipartisan Budget Act and 2018 Omnibus appropriation will begin restoring the flight hours, equipment, and manpower needed to regain readiness, but it took us years to get to this point and measurable improvements will take time.

Border Security Support: In support of the Department of Homeland Security, and as directed by the President, I have authorized use of up to 4,000 National Guardsmen in Title 32 duty status. They will be assigned supporting roles requested by DHS along our southern border region under the command of their respective governors. Current requested support is for aviation, surveillance, intelligence analysis, and planning support in priority sectors. I anticipate additional requests for construction and logistical support. National Guard personnel will not perform law enforcement duties or interact with migrants. Previously employed Title 10 forces (approximately 195) conducting ongoing counter-narcotics support missions remain under U.S. Northern Command's control.

Cancellation of Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS)

Recapitalization and Space-Based Infrared Systems: The Air Force has proposed replacing JSTARS – the aircraft that performs battle management, command and control, and ground moving target sensing – with a network of sensors, fusing information from space, air, ground, and sea sensors. In a contested environment with integrated air defenses, the currently planned JSTARS replacement would be unable to get close enough to the fight to accomplish its mission, leaving our forces potentially blind to enemy activity. These functions must be adapted if they are to survive in the changed threat environment. We will move swiftly to Advanced Battle Management and Surveillance, and the Next Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared procurements, rapidly fielding capabilities with more survivability.

Niger Incident and Loss of Four Soldiers: This incident and contributing factors have been extensively investigated by U.S. Africa Command. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs has added his review, and I expect my review and endorsement to be completed shortly. We will then brief the families and Congressional leadership followed by a public release.

Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA): President Trump signed CAATSA into law on August 2, 2017, imposing new sanctions to counter aggressive actions from Iran, Russia, and North Korea. I look forward to working with Congress to address the national security implications created by this act. It is important

for us to have a flexible waiver authority, otherwise we prevent ourselves from acting in our own best interest and place an undue burden on our allies or partners.

<u>Transition to the Cloud</u>: DoD must remain on the cutting edge of advanced computing capabilities to support warfighting and lethality. Our cloud initiative simplifies the ability to provide enterprise-wide access to information and improves security to safeguard critical information. Despite what you have heard in the media, the contract is not a sole source contract. The initial 2-year contract will follow a fair and open competition with the ultimate decision made based on performance and affordability. We are pursuing this path to ensure cloud providers are competitive and responsive to DoD needs.

CONCLUSION

Again, thank you for your bipartisan support and strong spirit of collaboration between this committee and our Department.

The 2018 National Defense Strategy's three primary lines of effort—building a more lethal force, strengthening traditional alliances while building new partnerships, and reforming the Department's business practices for performance and affordability—will restore our competitive military advantage, ensuring we are prepared to fight across the full spectrum of combat now and into the future.

Department of Defense readiness degraded over the course of many years. It will take continued budgetary stability to rebuild the readiness and increase the lethality required to expand the American military's competitive space. Now that we have a strategy-driven budget, the FY 2019 budget request needs a timely appropriation enacted before October 1st to be fully effective.

This budget request requires each and every one of us in the Department to be good stewards of every taxpayer dollar spent on defense. This budget also holds me accountable to the men and women of the Department of Defense, for they are the ones that must ultimately turn the 2018 National Defense Strategy into action. Every day, more than two million Service members and nearly one million civilians do their duty,

honoring previous generations of veterans and civil servants who have sacrificed for their country. I am reminded every day of the privilege I have to serve alongside them, and I thank them for their tireless efforts and unyielding standards in defense of our Nation.

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James N. Mattis Secretary of Defense

James N. Mattis became the 26th Secretary of Defense on January 20, 2017.

A native of Richland, Washington, Secretary Mattis enlisted in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve at the age of 18. After graduating from Central Washington University in 1971, he was commissioned a second lieutenant in the U.S. Marine Corps.

During his more than four decades in uniform, Secretary Mattis commanded Marines at all levels, from an infantry rifle platoon to a Marine Expeditionary Force. He led an infantry battalion in Iraq in 1991, an expeditionary brigade in Afghanistan after the 9/11 terror attack in 2001, a Marine Division in the initial attack and subsequent stability operations in Iraq in 2003, and led all U.S. Marine Forces in the Middle East as Commander, I Marine Expeditionary Force and U.S. Marine Forces Central Command.

During his non-combat assignments, Secretary Mattis served as Senior Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense; as Director, Marine Corps Manpower Plans & Policy; as Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command; and as Executive Secretary to the Secretary of Defense.

As a joint force commander, Secretary Mattis commanded U.S. Joint Forces Command, NATO's Supreme Allied Command for Transformation, and U.S. Central Command. At U.S. Central Command, he directed military operations of more than 200,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, Coast Guardsmen, Marines and allied forces across the Middle East.

Following his retirement from the U.S. Marine Corps in 2013, Secretary Mattis served as the Davies Family Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, specializing in the study of leadership, national security, strategy, innovation, and the effective use of military force. In 2016, he co-edited the book, Warriors & Citizens: American Views of Our Military.

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF

GENERAL JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., USMC

19TH CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET HEARING

APRIL 12, 2018

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished members of this committee, thank you for the opportunity to join Secretary Mattis in appearing before you today. It is an honor to represent the men and women of the Joint Force.

Today, the United States Armed Forces have a competitive advantage over any potential adversary. We are capable of meeting all the requirements associated with defending the homeland and our way of life. And we can meet every one of our alliance commitments. I am confident we can prevail in any armed conflict. That said, one of my greatest concerns as Chairman is the erosion of our competitive advantage over time.

Last summer, I testified that after years of sustained operational commitments, budgetary instability, and advances by our adversaries, our competitive advantage was eroding. I assessed that, without sustained, sufficient, and predictable funding, within five years the U.S. military would lose its advantage in projecting power—the basis for how we defend the homeland, advance U.S. interests, and meet our alliance commitments.

I estimated that arresting the erosion of our competitive advantage required real budget growth of at least three percent above inflation across the FYDP, and restoring it would cost more. This figure represented the minimum investment necessary to rebuild readiness and modernize key warfighting systems while continuing to meet operational requirements.

Driven by the National Defense Strategy, the FY19 Budget Request builds on the FY17 and FY18 budgets and supports rebuilding the U.S. military into the lethal and ready Joint Force the nation needs. However, we cannot reverse a decade-plus of erosion in one fiscal year. The Joint Force must continue to receive sufficient, sustained, and predictable funding for the foreseeable future to restore our competitive advantage and ensure we never send our sons and daughters into a fair fight.

Strategic Environment

The 2018 National Defense Strategy recognizes that "The central challenge to U.S. prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition by... revisionist powers." The Joint Force must face this long-term threat while still managing the immediate challenges posed by rogue regimes and terrorists. With China and Russia as the priority, we continue to use North Korea, Iran, and violent extremist organizations to inform our planning, force design, force development, and risk assessments.

Our adversaries, particularly China and Russia, continue to modernize and invest in concepts and capabilities specifically designed to counter our advantages, and they are intent on outpacing us. As noted in the National Defense Strategy, we are in a fierce competition to maximize the benefits of emerging technologies including hypersonics, artificial intelligence, directed energy, and biotechnology—as these developments fundamentally change the character of war. China and Russia are also increasingly active and adept at what we call 'competition short of armed conflict'—integrating economic coercion, political influence, criminal activity, military posturing, unconventional warfare, and information and cyber operations. Through these activities, they seek to coerce opponents, advance their interests, and create strategic advantages without triggering a conventional armed response.

China intends to become a global military power and is currently building the capability to do so. Militarily, China seeks to limit our access and undermine our important alliances in the Indo-Pacific. While modernizing their nuclear enterprise, China is also developing a full range of air, maritime, space, and cyber capabilities. Their continued militarization of the South and East China Seas accompanies expanding sovereignty claims that have no basis in international law. They leverage diplomatic and economic influence through the Belt and Road Initiative, and China's military interests have followed these initiatives into the Indian Ocean, South Asia and beyond. And while we

continue to seek Chinese cooperation on a number of fronts, especially with respect to North Korea, their projection of a state-controlled, 'strong-rule-the-weak' global order is incompatible with U.S. interests and a rules-based international order.

Russia also continues to modernize and invest across the full range of military capability, including new aircraft, submarines, armor, counter-space, and air defense systems, while also modernizing conventional and nuclear strike capabilities. These investments and activities are specifically designed to limit our power projection capability and undermine the credibility of U.S. alliances, especially NATO.

While modernizing and preparing for long-term strategic competition and potential armed conflict with these revisionist powers, the Joint Force must also manage the ongoing challenges of rogue regimes.

Although I remain cautiously optimistic about the potential for talks in the near future, North Korea's reckless pursuit of nuclear and missile capability is perhaps the most immediate threat to the security of the United States and our Allies. In 2017, North Korea conducted an unprecedented 17 ballistic missile test events, two of which overflew our treaty Ally, Japan. Last year also saw North Korea's first successful tests of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) capable of ranging the continental United States—and they tested a nuclear device that they claim can be delivered by ICBM. I have testified to Congress several times in recent months about Pyongyang's accelerated capability development and the threats this poses to US interests, to Allies in the Pacific, and to the homeland.

Iran also continues to project malign influence and threaten freedom of navigation in the Middle East. They are also modernizing their space, cyber, missile, and conventional maritime capabilities which pose a direct threat to our Allies and our interests in the region.

We continue to grapple with the challenge of violent extremism, including ISIS, a resurgent al Qaida, and associated movements. Our strategy remains focused on cutting the flow of finances, foreign fighters, and their disruptive narrative, while working by, with, and through local partners to sustain pressure on their networks, disrupt attacks, and dismantle their capabilities.

Defending our homeland, our Allies, and our interests in the near-term while restoring our competitive advantage and building lethality, will require a focused and sustained effort over many years.

Where We Are Today

Fortunately, with your support, we have begun to arrest the erosion of our competitive advantage. The additional appropriation in FY17 supported immediate investments in readiness—including increases to end strength, funding for critical training, initial restoration of ammunition stocks, and continued modernization of critical systems.

PB18 builds on the readiness recovery started in FY17 and begins to balance the program. It allows the Department to meet operational requirements, begin rebuilding mid- and long-term readiness, and restoring warfighting capability and capacity.

While we are grateful for the FY18 appropriation, we spent the first six months of FY18 with FY17 funding levels. The flexibility provided in recent legislation enables the Department to execute these resources responsibly., This includes easing the 80/20 rule that requires the Department to obligate no more than 20% of a one-year appropriation in the last two months of the fiscal year, and raising the Below Threshold Reprogramming amounts. Though these measures help the Department effectively utilize FY18 funds, I remain resolute that sustained, sufficient, and predictable funding is required in FY19 and beyond to restore our competitive military advantage.

The Department's FY19 budget funds ongoing operations, builds on FY18 readiness improvements, and supports the National Defense Strategy by investing in modernization for high-end competition against near-peer adversaries. These investments are a necessary step in building the lethal, resilient, agile, and ready Joint Force directed by the NDS.

<u>Operations</u>. Our first budget priority is to provide our deployed servicemembers the resources they need to effectively accomplish their missions--whether in active contingencies, deterring adversaries, assuring Allies, or building partner capacity.

PB19 supports deterrence and assurance operations around the world. In the Pacific theater, this budget accelerates substantial construction projects to improve infrastructure and bolster our ability to project power in the region. It allows prepositioning of critical munitions, increased intelligence activity, and increased rotational troop presence. PB19 also improves missile defense by funding 20 additional Ground Based Interceptors, with redesigned kill vehicles, to be deployed at Fort Greely, Alaska across the FYDP. To deter Russian aggression, this budget fully funds the European Deterrence Initiative increasing the number and quality of exercises with our NATO Allies, deploying key U.S.-based enablers, and modernizing prepositioned stocks. It also recapitalizes the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System, enhancing our ability to detect Russian submarines.

This budget provides \$69 billion for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), the bulk of which funds operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. In Afghanistan, we are working toward a sustainable approach to stabilizing the Afghan government and denying terrorist sanctuary. In Iraq and Syria, we remain committed to eliminating the remnants of ISIS and setting the conditions for the stabilization effort.

The FY19 funding for ongoing operations not only ensures our deployed servicemembers have what they need to execute missions in Iraq, Syria, and

Afghanistan, but also makes conflict less likely by assuring Allies and deterring aggression in key strategic theaters.

<u>Readiness</u>. PB19 builds on the readiness gains in PB18 by adding end strength and increasing capacity and training to extend our readiness focus to the midand long-term.

PB19 adds end strength to each of the services, allowing them to fill gaps in existing combat formations, address critical shortfalls in aviation maintenance, and increase manning in cyber and information warfare. The Air Force will address pilot shortages by adding two new training squadrons, enabling the production of 125 additional new pilots per year starting in FY19. PB19 focuses funding on readiness for ground combat and flight hour programs, funding most programs to near-maximum executable levels.

PB19 also increases available capacity and training for all of the Services by funding key readiness accounts at maximum executable levels. The Navy funds service life extensions for six cruisers as well as infrastructure, spares, and ship depot maintenance. The Navy and Marine Corps improve aircraft readiness by funding aviation spare and repair parts and depot-level maintenance. The Air Force upgrades training ranges and funds weapons system sustainment. The Army will create a sixteenth Armored Brigade Combat Team while accelerating fielding of four Security Force Assistance Brigades. This budget also adds necessary capacity in air defense, mobile rocket artillery, and operational command and control in Europe. Finally, PB19 funds munitions inventory levels sufficient to meet multiple demands across theaters.

What We Must Do Going Forward

For decades, the United States held a competitive advantage through the unparalleled, unchallenged development of capabilities our Services brought to bear. Today, however, our adversaries' rapid fielding of advanced capabilities combined with funding constraints imposed by the Budget Control Act, which have forced the Services to defer critical modernization, have resulted in the erosion of our competitive advantage. The restoration of our competitive advantage will require a joint approach to concept and capability development, coupled with sustained and predictable budgets beyond FY19.

PB19 begins to address this erosion through targeted investments that develop the <u>lethal</u>, <u>agile</u>, and <u>innovative</u> Joint Force demanded by the threats of 2025 and beyond.

The Joint Force must maintain the comprehensive readiness to address any potential threat across the spectrum of conflict, now and in the future. To enhance the lethality of the current force, we are modernizing key units and platforms, while implementing more flexible and dynamic ways to employ the force—ensuring our ability to project power. Our emphasis in doing so is on enhancing the survivability and maneuverability of existing platforms while rapidly leveraging emerging technologies. While the Service Chiefs have briefed you on specific actions to increase the lethality of their individual Services, let me offer a few important examples where PB19 will enhance the lethality of the joint aspects of our Armed Forces.

Nuclear. A safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent is essential to defending the homeland. In accordance with the recently published Nuclear Posture Review, we will invest \$24 billion in FY19 to sustain and recapitalize the nuclear enterprise. This is a significant step in a 23-year modernization program to recapitalize the entire enterprise--including all three legs of our strategic triad, our non-strategic nuclear forces, and command and control. Initial delivery of modernized bombers and dual capable aircraft (F-35) is slated for the mid-2020s, initial operating capability of modernized ground-based missiles will be achieved in 2029, and the first modernized ballistic missile submarine will be operational in 2031. This is the highest priority mission of the Joint Force and there is no margin remaining in the modernization

schedule. We must deliver these critical nuclear modernization programs on the established timelines.

Space. Space is now a contested domain. This budget builds on FY18 investments to address increasing threats to critical space systems with a focus on space resiliency and mission assurance. It accelerates procurement of the next generation of space-based infrared systems to field a modernized, resilient space-based missile warning capability. Other investments focus on resilient systems for navigation, communications, and situational awareness. Given rapid advances in our adversaries' capabilities, the space domain will require continuous investment in future years.

Cyberspace. FY19 investments in cyber capabilities continue to prioritize defense of DoD information networks, while improving offensive and defensive operations, building Cyber Mission Forces, and maturing command and control.

Electronic Warfare (EW). Competition in the electromagnetic spectrum has increased substantially. In order to maintain the ability of the Joint Force to project power, we are investing in offensive and defensive systems, while exploring new concepts to maximize the effectiveness of our multi-domain EW capabilities.

Missile Defense. To keep pace with the rapidly fielding of new capabilities and increased quantities of ballistic and cruise missiles we are modernizing our missile defense capabilities in 2019. In addition to increasing the number of Ground Based Interceptors at Fort Greely, this budget will invest in the procurement of additional Terminal High Altitude Area Defense and SM-3 interceptors.

In addition to investing in capabilities to increase the lethality of the force, the Department is developing concepts to maximize the effectiveness and agility of the force we have today. For example, the National Defense Strategy directs the Joint Force to "introduce unpredictability to adversary decision-makers"

through Dynamic Force Employment. Dynamic Force Employment allows us to develop a wide range of proactive, scalable options and quickly deploy forces for emerging requirements while maintaining readiness to respond to contingencies.

PB19 continues investment in cutting edge capabilities that extend the advantages of our current capabilities. For example, we continue to refine stealth and strike technologies such as the B-21 next generation bomber. However, the rapidly changing technological environment demands that we innovate by fielding and incorporating new concepts and capabilities with increased speed. PB19 will see increased investments in technologies such as hypersonics, artificial intelligence, directed energy, and biotechnology.

Across the Joint Force, PB19 starts, accelerates, or continues funding for critical modernization efforts. As our adversaries continue to advance, our future concept and capability development is critical to maintaining our competitive advantage in all domains. These programs will require years of sustained funding to deliver material results, but they are all vital to ensuring the future force is capable of defending the homeland and advancing U.S. interests in the competitive security environment to come.

Conclusion

To achieve the National Defense Strategy, the Joint Force requires sustained, sufficient, and predictable funding. The funding levels in the recent Bipartisan Budget Agreement are sufficient, providing the first years of real growth required to begin reversing the degradation of our competitive advantage over the last decade. I look forward to working with Congress to make this funding sustained and predictable over the coming years so we can fully restore our competitive military advantage.

PB19 represents a significant investment in the lethal Joint Force that the United States will need to prevail in future conflicts. We are committed to the responsible, disciplined, and transparent use of that investment. With your continued help and commitment, we will ensure we never send America's sons and daughters into a fair fight.

General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr. is the 19th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the nation's highest-ranking military officer, and the principal military advisor to the President, Secretary of Defense, and National Security Council.


Prior to becoming Chairman on October 1, 2015, General Dunford served as the 36th Commandant of the Marine Corps. He previously served as the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps from 2010 to 2012 and was Commander, International Security Assistance Force and United States Forces-Afghanistan from February 2013 to August 2014

A native of Boston, Massachusetts, General Dunford graduated from Saint Michael's College and was commissioned in 1977. He has served as an infantry officer at all levels, to include command of 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines, and command of the 5th Marine Regiment during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

General Dunford also served as the Assistant Division Commander of the 1st Marine Division, Marine Corps Director of Operations, and Marine Corps Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies and Operations. He commanded I Marine Expeditionary Force and served as the Commander, Marine Forces U.S. Central Command.

His Joint assignments include duty as the Executive Assistant to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chief of the Global and Multilateral Affairs Division (J-5), and Vice Director for Operations on the Joint Staff (J-3).

A graduate of the U.S. Army Ranger School, Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School, and the U.S. Army War College, General Dunford also earned master's degrees in Government from Georgetown University and in International Relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.





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Honorable James N. Mattis Secretary Department of Defense 1000 Defense Pentagon Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Mattis:

On behalf of the World Professional Association of Transgender Health (WPATH), we are writing to express alarm concerning the new policy President Trump has initiated based on your recommendations. This policy is at odds with all scientific and clinical evidence regarding gender dysphoria.

WPATH is a multi-disciplinary international professional educational organization that maintains the Standards of Care for the treatment of transgender individuals and is widely recognized as the "gold standard" for transgender care throughout the world. Gender dysphoria is a treatable condition that in no way limits the ability of individuals to serve in the military or undermines morale and/or readiness. Nor does it entail "tremendous medical costs."

Absent any medical basis for a transgender military ban, and mischaracterizing the extensive body of research, this exclusionary ban is blatantly discriminatory and demeans the brave individuals who serve in our military. We stand with the American Medical Association, the American Psychological Association, the American Psychological Association and the Surgeons General in opposing this ban and the stigma it casts over all transgender individuals.

Sincerely,

Gail Knudson, MD, FRCPC President, WPATH



JAMES L. MADARA, MD EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, CEO

ama-assn.org t (312) 464-5000

April 3, 2018

The Honorable James N. Mattis Secretary Department of Defense 1000 Defense Pentagon Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Mattis:

On behalf of the physician and medical student members of the American Medical Association (AMA), I am writing to express our concern about the new policy recently approved by President Trump imposing limits on transgender individuals serving in the military. This new policy, based on recommendations you made in February to President Trump, states that "transgender persons with a history or diagnosis of gender dysphoria—individuals who the policies state may require substantial medical treatment, including medications and surgery—are disqualified from military service except under certain limited circumstances" (Presidential Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security Regarding Military Service by Transgender Individuals, March 23, 2018).


We believe there is no medically valid reason—including a diagnosis of gender dysphoria—to exclude transgender individuals from military service. Transgender individuals have served, and continue to serve, our country with honor, and we believe they should be allowed to continue doing so. We share the concerns recently expressed by former Surgeons General M. Joycelyn Elders and David Satcher that the Defense Department's February 22, 2018, Memorandum for the President mischaracterized and rejected the wide body of peer-reviewed research on the effectiveness of transgender medical care. This research, demonstrating that medical care for gender dysphoria is effective, was the rationale for the AMA's adoption of policy by our House of Delegates in 2015, that there is no medically valid reason to exclude transgender individuals from military service.

The AMA also supports public and private health insurance coverage for treatment of gender dysphoria as recommended by the patient's physician. We support the finding of the RAND study conducted for the Department of Defense on the impact of transgender individuals in the military that the financial cost is negligible and a rounding error in the defense budget. It should not be used as a reason to deny patriotic Americans an opportunity to serve their country. We should be honoring their service.

Sincerely,

James L. Madara, MD

2 Modern



QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER

Mr. TURNER. You mentioned that you now recognize that when considering space as a warfighting domain, we should also be looking at it in the full spectrum of "acquisition to employment, from coordination to innovation for the future, and all the things that go with it". Given our immediate issues with great power competition against Russia and China, do we have the luxury of waiting for the DSD's final report in August or are there steps that Congress should be taking prior to the report?

Secretary MATTIS. I appreciate Congress's continued focus and attention on the Department's approach to the space domain. I do not believe that Congress needs to take any additional actions at this time. The Deputy Secretary of Defense is fully engaged in his review of the organizational and management structure of the national security space components of the Department of Defense, as required by Section 1601(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, and will provide recommendations back to Congress by August 1, 2018. While the Deputy's review is still underway, the Department is not sitting still. The Department is acting on the guidance laid out in the President's recent National Strategy for Space and the 2018 National Defense Strategy to convert strategy into immediate, near-term, and long-term action. The Department specifically is harmonizing its space activities to ensure U.S. leadership, preeminence, and freedom of action in space for decades to come. The Air Force is reorganizing its Space and Missile Content in the state of the content is the space and Missile Content in the state of the stat decades to come. The Air Force is reorganizing its Space and Missile Center in response to the Deputy's focus on accelerating the speed of space acquisition. The Fiscal Year 2019 President's Budget request, which included approximately \$13 billion for Defense space programs, constitutes over a 9 percent increase above last year's request. The President's Budget request also included more than \$65 billion across the Future Years Defense Plan, reflecting a 14 percent growth above the previous five-year planning period. Our words and actions, backed by the increased funding requests, will amplify the mission assurance of the Department's space-based capabilities against the growing threats from our competitors and adversaries. It will also leverage commercial innovation and our international partnerships to accelerate development and deployment of new capabilities, strengthen lethality and readiness of the total force, and enhance the nation's overall deterrence and warfighting power.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER

Ms. Speier. Media reports indicate that U.S. and North Korean officials have discussed "denuclearization" in the buildup to a summit between President Trump and Kim Jong Un. While this news is encouraging, it's also unclear, because we hope "denuclearization" means that the North Koreans will give up their nuclear weapons in exchange for the lifting of sanctions, while the North Koreans seem to think "denuclearization" means they'd give up their weapons if we abandoned our defense relationship with South Korea. I understand that these details pertain to ongoing negotiations, but I think it's important for this to be public: What does the President mean and envision when he says denuclearization? Does he understand that his definition and expectations likely diverge greatly from the North Koreans'?

Secretary MATTIS. Denuclearization means the complete, verifiable, and irreversible abandonment by North Korea of its nuclear weapons programs and existing nu-

clear and delivery programs.

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General Dunford. I defer to the administration to characterize the President's remarks.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. HARTZLER

Mrs. Hartzler. The FY18 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) Senate report included language directing the Department "to ensure that appropriate training on religious liberty is conducted at all levels of command on the requirements of the law..." The specific committee recommendation was "to develop curriculum and implement training concerning religious liberty in accordance with the law." Has DOD, in conjunction with each of the services, developed "a comprehensive training program" for commanders, chaplains, and judge advocates? How has DOD implemented this recommendation? Please provide an update on DOD's, and each of the branches, "intentional strategy for developing and implementing a comprehensive training program on religious liberty issues for military leadership and commanders."

Senator Ernst Religious Liberty Report Language FY18 S. 1519, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 Bill: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-115s1519pcs/pdf/BILLS-115s1519pcs.pdf Report: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-115srpt125/pdf/CRPT-115srpt125.pdf

Secretary MATTIS. The training will assist the military services in ensuring that the right to the free exercise of religion of all service members, as well as the right to exercise no religion at all, is protected. Each chaplain corps integrates religious freedom training into its training for chaplains on the broader topics of facilitation of religious ministry and religious accommodation for all faith groups. This training occurs at the basic and advanced course at each of the service chaplain schools. Judge advocates from each of the services receive religious accommodation and expression training at their basic courses, mid-career courses, and senior leader courses. Additionally, commanders receive advice from their judge advocates and chaplains throughout the course of their commands. Religious liberty training in each of the services is continually refined to address the free exercise in the context of military service.

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