[Congressional Record Volume 163, Number 128 (Friday, July 28, 2017)]
[House]
[Pages H6528-H6531]
PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 3180, INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION
ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018; WAIVING A REQUIREMENT OF CLAUSE 6(a) OF RULE
XIII WITH RESPECT TO CONSIDERATION OF CERTAIN RESOLUTIONS REPORTED FROM
THE COMMITTEE ON RULES; AND PROVIDING FOR PROCEEDINGS DURING THE PERIOD
FROM JULY 31, 2017, THROUGH SEPTEMBER 4, 2017
Ms. CHENEY. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I
call up House Resolution 481 and ask for its immediate consideration.
The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:
H. Res. 481
Resolved, That upon adoption of this resolution it shall be
in order to consider in the House the bill (H.R. 3180) to
authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2018 for
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the
United States Government, the Community Management Account,
and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability
System, and for other purposes. All points of order against
consideration of the bill are waived. The amendment in the
nature of a substitute recommended by the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence now printed in the bill shall be
considered as adopted. The bill, as amended, shall be
considered as read. All points of order against provisions in
the bill, as amended, are waived. The previous question shall
be considered as ordered on the bill, as amended, and on any
further amendment thereto, to final passage without
intervening motion except: (1) one hour of debate equally
divided and controlled by the chair and ranking minority
member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; and
(2) one motion to recommit with or without instructions.
Sec. 2. The requirement of clause 6(a) of rule XIII for a
two-thirds vote to consider a report from the Committee on
Rules on the same day it is presented to the House is waived
with respect to any resolution reported through the
legislative day of August 1, 2017.
Sec. 3. On any legislative day during the period from July
31, 2017, through September 4, 2017--
(a) the Journal of the proceedings of the previous day
shall be considered as approved; and
(b) the Chair may at any time declare the House adjourned
to meet at a date and time, within the limits of clause 4,
section 5, article I of the Constitution, to be announced by
the Chair in declaring the adjournment.
Sec. 4. The Speaker may appoint Members to perform the
duties of the Chair for the duration of the period addressed
by section 3 of this resolution as though under clause 8(a)
of rule I.
Sec. 5. Each day during the period addressed by section 3
of this resolution shall not constitute a calendar day for
purposes of section 7 of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C.
1546).
Sec. 6. Each day during the period addressed by section 3
of this resolution shall not constitute a legislative day for
purposes of clause 7 of rule XIII.
Sec. 7. Each day during the period addressed by section 3
of this resolution shall not constitute a calendar or
legislative day for purposes of clause 7(c)(1) of rule XXII.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentlewoman from Wyoming is recognized
for 1 hour.
Ms. CHENEY. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I yield the
customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings),
pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume. During
consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for the purpose
of debate only.
General Leave
Ms. CHENEY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members
have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentlewoman from Wyoming?
There was no objection.
Ms. CHENEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of House Resolution
481, which provides a closed rule for consideration of H.R. 3180, the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018.
Mr. Speaker, there is nothing we do in this body that is more
important than actions we take for the defense of our Nation. We now
face a more complex array of threats than we have at any time since the
end of World War II.
North Korea continues to test ballistic missiles, has successfully
tested an ICBM, and is continuing to move rapidly towards achieving the
capability to strike U.S. soil.
A resurgent Russia is imposing its will across Europe, occupies
Crimea, and is now using its military to support the Assad regime in
Syria.
China is increasingly belligerent, continues to expand the size of
its military and create bases on artificial islands in the South China
Sea.
And Iran, Mr. Speaker, continues to work on its ballistic missile
program and expand its influence as it supports terror across the
Mediterranean and the larger Middle East.
Terrorist groups like al-Qaida and ISIS continue to carry out attacks
across the West and threaten the United States.
We have seen a dramatic increase in tensions on the Temple Mount, Mr.
Speaker, in just the last few weeks, and we have men and women in
uniform deployed around the globe fighting to defend our Nation.
Our intelligence community plays a crucial role in ensuring our
decision-makers and our warfighters have the information they need to
keep our Nation secure.
H.R. 3180 provides the intelligence community with the authorization
it needs to continue working to protect and defend the United States,
supports critical national security programs, such as those protecting
Americans against terrorism, cyber attacks, and hostile foreign
nations. The bill maintains critical congressional oversight of the
activities of the intelligence community, and the bill makes no changes
to any surveillance authorities, including those set to expire, which
we will take up later this year in legislation separate from this bill.
Mr. Speaker, as you know, earlier this week, H.R. 3180 was considered
under suspension of the rules, which is not at all uncommon for bills,
like this one, that receive unanimous bipartisan support in committee.
While the bill received well over 50 percent of the votes of the
House, it did not achieve the required two-thirds majority to pass
under suspension, which is why we are here today debating this rule.
A large portion of this bill, Mr. Speaker, is understandably, as it
should be, classified, which requires Members of this body to review
the bill in the SCIF.
I want to personally thank members of the Intelligence Committee and
their staff for facilitating that process and making it so easy for
Members of this House to undertake. A bipartisan notice was sent out,
provided to Members, informing us of the availability of the text for
review. And the text, Mr. Speaker, was available for 10 days, twice as
long as last year's bill.
My staff simply had to call and inform the committee that I would
like to review the bill, and the committee asked when I would be
available, and they made sure that a member of the committee staff was
also there to answer any questions I had.
The process itself was seamless, was very easy, and was facilitated
by the members of the Intelligence Committee staff.
Mr. Speaker, this is a good and important bill. It supports the men
and women in our intelligence community and the work they do to keep us
safe. This is not an issue we should politicize or subject to partisan
debate.
The intelligence community plays a critical role in the defense of
our Nation, and we need to support them, Mr. Speaker, by supporting
this bill. Therefore, I urge support for the rule to allow
consideration of H.R. 3180.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman from Wyoming (Ms. Cheney) for
yielding me the customary 30 minutes for debate, and I rise to debate
the rule for H.R. 3180, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2018.
I was somewhat dismayed earlier this week when my friends across the
aisle attempted to jam today's bill through this body by jettisoning
regular order and bringing the bill up under suspension.
Luckily, we can add this shortsighted attempt at governing to their
long list of legislative failures. And although I may be pleased that
their suspension shenanigans failed, my frustration was born anew when
we were informed that the bill would come to the floor under yet
another closed rule.
This is all bad enough, and I will come back to it in a moment, but
first we need to discuss the blanket martial law provision that my
friends on the other side put into this rule.
This move, especially when considered in the context of those
mentioned
[[Page H6529]]
above, truly elevated poor governing to an art form.
{time} 0945
I want the American people, Republican and Democrat and Independents
alike, to be crystal clear on what is happening here today. By putting
a blanket martial law provision into this rule, my friends across the
aisle were trying to make it as easy as possible for them to pass a
healthcare bill that they had never seen. The bill would have surely
ripped healthcare away from millions of Americans and unceremoniously
upended one-sixth of our economy.
Thankfully, Senators Collins, Murkowski, and McCain, and tens of
thousands of regular Americans-turned-activists ensured that this
effort failed.
Since day one, the approach of my colleagues on the other side of the
aisle on healthcare or, for that matter, any number of other important
issues has been horrendous. It has been rushed; it has been secretive;
it has been chaotic; and it has been inspired by the desire for a cheap
win rather than the desire to make our healthcare system stronger and
more widely available to all Americans.
Truly, whether it is healthcare, veterans, or the authorization of
funding for something as important as our intelligence community, the
approach leaves some of us bewildered, dismayed, and gravely concerned
for the well-being of our country.
Indeed, when discussing something as important as the authorization
for funding for the intelligence community, we ought to proceed in a
manner that allows all Members of this body the opportunity to weigh in
with their concerns. This closed process does a disservice not only to
those of us who do not sit on the committee of jurisdiction, but also
the intelligence community and the American people.
As an example, when I did sit on this committee, I was vice chair of
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and I worked
diligently to ensure that minorities were given equal opportunity to
break into the upper ranks of the intelligence community.
Since leaving that committee, I have continued this important work
and introduced an amendment to a previous iteration of the underlying
bill that called for the Director of National Intelligence to put forth
a plan that would encourage diversity hires throughout the intelligence
community. Frustratingly, I am stripped of such an opportunity today
because of the Republican leadership's unyielding devotion to
perpetuating a closed process.
Additionally, the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee), my
friend, has also offered amendments to the underlying bill in the past
that call for an increase in the recruitment and training of minorities
as officers and employees of the Central Intelligence Agency. She, like
the majority of our colleagues, will not be afforded a similar
opportunity this time around.
This is troublesome because diversity is a mission imperative for the
intelligence community. Not only do we need to see minorities have more
opportunities to climb the ranks, but we also need to recruit Americans
who will be able to blend in, speak foreign languages, and understand
the cultures in countries that are now central to our foreign policy
interests.
At the end of the day, such diversity is achieved through the hiring
process, and, therefore, we need to ensure that we are hiring Arab
Americans, Iranian Americans, Pakistani Americans, Chinese Americans,
Korean Americans, women, gays, and many other Americans from diverse
backgrounds as we confront a myriad of threats and work harder to
better understand our adversaries, wherever they may lurk. We do not
seek this diversity in the name of political correctness but, rather,
in the name of national security. As I have said before, if the
intelligence community is to succeed in its global mission, it must
have a global face.
I have no doubt that scores of Members would like to have offered
amendments addressing the issues I have just mentioned as well as many
other issues that are of particular concern to them and their
constituents. Unfortunately, under this rule, they will not be afforded
such an opportunity today.
Those who work in the intelligence community serve our country
faithfully and bravely, knowing that they will never receive the public
recognition they so richly deserve. In fact, they have served and
continue to serve knowing that not only will they not receive well-
earned accolades, but that they will, upon occasion, have to endure
unfounded and offensive statements from this administration. These
statements began before the current administration even moved in down
Pennsylvania Avenue.
I quote the following from the administration's, President's, Twitter
account: ``Intelligence agencies should never have allowed this fake
news to `leak' into the public. One last shot at me. Are we living in
Nazi Germany?''
I find that shameful and absolutely unfounded in making such a
statement. Comparing these brave and patriotic Americans to Nazis? You
really have to be kidding me.
As a former member of HPSCI, I will not sit idly by while anyone
maligns the honorable work these proud Americans do day in and day out
to protect our country. But it seems that, with this closed process and
their continued support of President Donald John Trump, even as he
slowly erodes the foundation of our democracy one tweet at a time, is
exactly what my friends and the Republican Congress are doing.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. CHENEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
My colleague from Florida, with whom I have had the privilege of
spending many hours in the Rules Committee debating this and a range of
other issues, raised a number of points I think that are important to
clarify.
First of all on the issue of minority recruitment, last night, in the
Rules Committee, in open session, Chairman Nunes was asked about this,
and he testified very clearly and directly that diversity is very
important, that it is mission-critical for the reasons that my
colleague from Florida stated.
I can report that there are several provisions in the classified
annex--I won't go into the details about them--with which my colleague
may or may not be familiar that support the whole notion of Centers of
Academic Excellence, which are particularly focused on recruiting young
people, recruiting minorities and young people across the board for
service in the intelligence community.
We tend, in these rule discussions, Mr. Speaker, to have a lot of
arguments and criticism of procedure. The Democrats this morning seem
to be particularly concerned about our same-day authority. But I would
just note, Mr. Speaker, I am certainly confident that my constituents
who are watching this--and, I would say, probably most Americans
watching--would understand the importance of the House of
Representatives getting its work done in a timely manner. And
certainly, when it comes to healthcare, the arguments and the criticism
from the other side of the aisle lose a little bit of their credibility
when they simultaneously attack the Republicans for moving too slowly
and then also for moving too quickly.
What I can tell you is we are debating hugely important issues and
hugely important topics. We are absolutely committed to repealing and
replacing ObamaCare. It is a system that is collapsing. It is a system
that has devastated the lives of people across this country. It is a
system that has driven premiums and deductibles through the roof. It
has absolutely limited people's choice in terms of insurance plans, in
terms of healthcare providers. It is a system that is failing.
We have seen the Democrats' fundamental approach was a government
mandate and their attempt to force people across this Nation to buy
health insurance. They thought that, through a government mandate, they
would be able to force young people into these insurance pools and,
therefore, drive the cost down. That is not what happened. It didn't
work.
We know we have got to put in place a system that will be able to
provide people the kind of care that they need, access, as well as
lowering the cost and increasing availability. So there are a whole
range of very important substantive efforts going on.
I think that it is clear that the folks on the other side of the
aisle don't support the direction we are going in, may
[[Page H6530]]
not support the policy, but the people across this Nation--certainly,
in my home State of Wyoming--spoke very clearly last November that they
wanted a change, that they wanted to see the government reduce its role
in their lives, and that they wanted to see us begin the process of
building our military, rebuilding what has been lost over the course of
the last 8 years, as well as rebuilding the facilities and the
capabilities of our intelligence community, and that is exactly what
this bill does. That is exactly what we are here doing this morning.
Mr. Speaker, I think that is why it is so important that my
colleagues support this rule, that we provide the authority that the
intelligence community needs through this bill to continue to do its
important work to keep us safe.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
The brazen and reckless manner in which this bill was first brought
to the floor is evidence that my friends across the aisle have still
not figured out how to govern. The learning curve may be steep, but it
is not that steep.
Quite simply, my friends, it is time for you to start governing
responsibly, not with closed rules and martial law, without hearings,
and without CBO scores, but through regular order, with an opportunity
for all Members and, through them, their constituents to take part in
legislating. The White House may be in chaos, but that is no reason for
the House to legislate in a similar manner.
For the good of the country, we must return to regular order. We must
work to ensure that those serving in the intelligence community are
able to do their best work, to do it as safely as possible, and to do
it knowing that they will receive the respect they deserve from all
branches of their government. I worry that they, increasingly, do not
receive this respect, and that this disrespect, should it continue,
will make it more difficult for us to retain and recruit the talent we
so desperately need to protect our national security.
Of course, the intelligence community is only one part of our
national security apparatus. The men and women in our military are an
equally important part of maintaining our national security. And,
unfortunately, we learned just yesterday that these brave
servicemembers are not immune from baseless attacks from the
administration.
It was announced, on the 69th anniversary of President Truman's
issuing an executive order that desegregated the Armed Forces, that
transgender servicemembers would no longer be able to serve in the
military. Were these individuals, numbering between 10,000 and 15,000,
banned because they are not brave, because they are not patriotic,
because they are incapable of meeting the rigorous requirements of
being in the military? No, they have been banned because bigotry
defeated decency yesterday, and they have been banned because of who
they are.
As I mentioned the other evening, I had three uncles who were in the
Army. They served proudly. They served bravely. They served in a
segregated Army. Two of them received purple hearts.
{time} 1000
It was a great offense that they had to serve in a segregated Army in
which they were made to feel that somehow their bravery, their
patriotism, and their devotion to their brothers in arms was somehow
less because of the color of their skin.
President Truman knew this was wrong, and he ended it. Simply put,
President Truman knew then what our current President is incapable of
understanding today: the strength of our military is not found in the
race or the religion or the creed or the sex or the gender identity of
its servicemembers, but rather in the bravery and honor exhibited by
these individuals on a daily basis. They, like all of us here today,
are proud citizens of this country. They, like all of us here today,
are God's children. I thank them for their service to our Nation.
Mr. Speaker, I urge a ``no'' vote on the rule, and I yield back the
balance of my time.
Ms. CHENEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 481 and the underlying bill, H.R. 3180,
ensure the men and women of our intelligence community have the tools
and the resources they need to continue the vital role they play in
helping us address the threats facing our Nation.
I do want to point out, Mr. Speaker, my colleague is accusing the
Republicans of being brazen and reckless because of our same-day
rulemaking authority. I would only note that in the 111th Congress,
when they were in the majority, they enacted this process 26 times; in
the 110th Congress, 17 times.
It is an important ability for us to have when we know we might need
to move quickly on something. As a member of the Rules Committee, I am
committed to ensuring we do everything possible to make sure that we
are able to bring bills to this floor that carry out the kind of
changes and improvements that the people of this Nation sent us all
here to undertake.
I was really disappointed, Mr. Speaker, earlier this week when this
bill was defeated under suspension of the rules. There are many things
that are partisan issues in this body, and it is too bad when the
minority uses the Intelligence Authorization bill as part of a
political stunt to make what should be a bipartisan process and a
bipartisan committee appear partisan.
The bill, H.R. 3108, received unanimous support in committee, and I
certainly hope today, Mr. Speaker, that the minority members of that
committee, and frankly all on the minority side who understand the
importance of the intelligence community in keeping our Nation safe,
will put aside the partisanship, will put aside the games that the
American people are so tired of, and will join me in supporting a good,
effective, and important bill, that, frankly, the minority members in
the Intelligence Committee worked very hard to help craft.
Mr. Speaker, I urge adoption of both the rule and H.R. 3180.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I move the
previous question on the resolution.
The previous question was ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the resolution.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 224,
nays 186, not voting 23, as follows:
[Roll No. 436]
YEAS--224
Abraham
Aderholt
Allen
Amodei
Arrington
Babin
Bacon
Banks (IN)
Barletta
Barr
Barton
Bergman
Biggs
Bilirakis
Bishop (MI)
Bishop (UT)
Black
Blackburn
Blum
Bost
Brady (TX)
Brat
Bridenstine
Brooks (AL)
Brooks (IN)
Buchanan
Buck
Bucshon
Budd
Burgess
Byrne
Calvert
Carter (GA)
Carter (TX)
Chabot
Cheney
Coffman
Cole
Collins (GA)
Comer
Comstock
Conaway
Cook
Costa
Cramer
Crawford
Culberson
Curbelo (FL)
Davidson
Davis, Rodney
Denham
Dent
DeSantis
DesJarlais
Diaz-Balart
Duffy
Duncan (SC)
Duncan (TN)
Dunn
Emmer
Estes (KS)
Farenthold
Faso
Ferguson
Fitzpatrick
Fleischmann
Flores
Fortenberry
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gaetz
Gallagher
Garrett
Gianforte
Gibbs
Gohmert
Goodlatte
Gosar
Gowdy
Granger
Graves (GA)
Graves (LA)
Griffith
Grothman
Guthrie
Handel
Harper
Harris
Hartzler
Hensarling
Herrera Beutler
Hice, Jody B.
Higgins (LA)
Hill
Holding
Hudson
Huizenga
Hultgren
Hurd
Issa
Jenkins (KS)
Jenkins (WV)
Johnson (LA)
Johnson (OH)
Johnson, Sam
Jordan
Joyce (OH)
Katko
Kelly (MS)
Kelly (PA)
King (IA)
Kinzinger
Knight
Kustoff (TN)
Labrador
LaHood
LaMalfa
Lamborn
Lance
Latta
Lewis (MN)
LoBiondo
Long
Loudermilk
Love
Lucas
Luetkemeyer
MacArthur
Marchant
Marino
Marshall
Mast
McCarthy
McCaul
McClintock
McHenry
McKinley
McMorris Rodgers
McSally
Meadows
Meehan
Messer
Mitchell
Moolenaar
Mooney (WV)
Mullin
Murphy (PA)
Newhouse
Noem
Norman
Nunes
Olson
Palazzo
Palmer
Paulsen
Pearce
Perry
Pittenger
Poe (TX)
Poliquin
Posey
Ratcliffe
Reed
Reichert
Renacci
Rice (SC)
Roby
Roe (TN)
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rohrabacher
Rokita
Rooney, Francis
Ros-Lehtinen
Ross
Rothfus
Rouzer
Royce (CA)
[[Page H6531]]
Russell
Rutherford
Sanford
Schweikert
Scott, Austin
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shimkus
Shuster
Simpson
Smith (MO)
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smucker
Stefanik
Stewart
Stivers
Taylor
Tenney
Thompson (PA)
Thornberry
Tiberi
Tipton
Trott
Turner
Upton
Valadao
Wagner
Walberg
Walden
Walker
Walorski
Walters, Mimi
Weber (TX)
Wenstrup
Westerman
Williams
Wilson (SC)
Wittman
Womack
Woodall
Yoder
Yoho
Young (IA)
NAYS--186
Adams
Aguilar
Amash
Barragan
Beatty
Bera
Beyer
Bishop (GA)
Blumenauer
Blunt Rochester
Bonamici
Boyle, Brendan F.
Brady (PA)
Brown (MD)
Brownley (CA)
Bustos
Butterfield
Capuano
Carbajal
Cardenas
Carson (IN)
Cartwright
Castor (FL)
Castro (TX)
Chu, Judy
Cicilline
Clark (MA)
Clarke (NY)
Cleaver
Clyburn
Cohen
Connolly
Cooper
Correa
Courtney
Crist
Crowley
Cuellar
Davis (CA)
Davis, Danny
DeFazio
DeGette
Delaney
DeLauro
DelBene
Demings
DeSaulnier
Deutch
Dingell
Doggett
Doyle, Michael F.
Ellison
Eshoo
Espaillat
Esty (CT)
Evans
Foster
Frankel (FL)
Fudge
Gabbard
Gallego
Garamendi
Gomez
Gonzalez (TX)
Gottheimer
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Grijalva
Hanabusa
Hastings
Heck
Higgins (NY)
Himes
Hoyer
Huffman
Jackson Lee
Jayapal
Jeffries
Johnson (GA)
Johnson, E. B.
Jones
Kaptur
Keating
Kelly (IL)
Kennedy
Khanna
Kihuen
Kildee
Kilmer
Kind
Krishnamoorthi
Kuster (NH)
Langevin
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Lawrence
Lawson (FL)
Lee
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lieu, Ted
Lipinski
Loebsack
Lofgren
Lowenthal
Lowey
Lujan, Ben Ray
Lynch
Maloney, Carolyn B.
Maloney, Sean
Massie
Matsui
McCollum
McEachin
McGovern
McNerney
Meeks
Meng
Moore
Moulton
Murphy (FL)
Nadler
Neal
Nolan
Norcross
O'Halleran
O'Rourke
Pallone
Panetta
Pascrell
Payne
Pelosi
Perlmutter
Peters
Peterson
Pingree
Pocan
Polis
Price (NC)
Quigley
Raskin
Rice (NY)
Rosen
Roybal-Allard
Ruiz
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Sanchez
Sarbanes
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schneider
Schrader
Scott (VA)
Scott, David
Serrano
Sewell (AL)
Shea-Porter
Sherman
Sinema
Sires
Slaughter
Smith (WA)
Soto
Speier
Suozzi
Swalwell (CA)
Takano
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Titus
Tonko
Torres
Tsongas
Vargas
Veasey
Vela
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walz
Wasserman Schultz
Watson Coleman
Welch
Wilson (FL)
Yarmuth
NOT VOTING--23
Bass
Clay
Collins (NY)
Conyers
Costello (PA)
Cummings
Donovan
Engel
Graves (MO)
Gutierrez
Hollingsworth
Hunter
King (NY)
Lujan Grisham, M.
Napolitano
Richmond
Rooney, Thomas J.
Roskam
Scalise
Waters, Maxine
Webster (FL)
Young (AK)
Zeldin
{time} 1027
Messrs. SUOZZI and HOYER changed their vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
Mr. FERGUSON changed his vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
So the resolution was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
____________________
[Congressional Record Volume 163, Number 128 (Friday, July 28, 2017)]
[House]
[Pages H6547-H6557]
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 481, I call up
the bill (H.R. 3180) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2018
for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United
States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other
purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 481, the
amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, printed in the bill, shall be
considered as adopted, and the bill, as amended, shall be considered
read.
The text of the bill, as amended, is as follows:
H.R. 3180
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the
``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 202. Computation of annuities for employees of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Sec. 301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
Sec. 303. Congressional oversight of intelligence community
contractors.
Sec. 304. Enhanced personnel security programs.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Sec. 401. Authority for protection of current and former employees of
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 402. Designation of the program manager-information sharing
environment.
Sec. 403. Technical correction to the executive schedule.
Subtitle B--Other Elements
Sec. 411. Requirements relating to appointment of General Counsel of
National Security Agency.
Sec. 412. Transfer or elimination of certain components and functions
of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 413. Technical amendments related to the Department of Energy.
TITLE V--MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES
Sec. 501. Assessment of significant Russian influence campaigns
directed at foreign elections and referenda.
Sec. 502. Foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to
Federal election campaigns.
Sec. 503. Assessment of threat finance relating to the Russian
Federation.
TITLE VI--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS
Sec. 601. Period of overseas assignments for certain foreign service
officers.
Sec. 602. Semiannual reports on investigations of unauthorized public
disclosures of classified information.
Sec. 603. Intelligence community reports on security clearances.
Sec. 604. Report on expansion of Security Protective Services
jurisdiction.
Sec. 605. Report on role of Director of National Intelligence with
respect to certain foreign investments.
Sec. 606. Report on Cyber Exchange Program.
Sec. 607. Review of intelligence community participation in
vulnerabilities equities process.
Sec. 608. Review of Intelligence Community whistleblower matters.
Sec. 609. Sense of Congress on notifications of certain disclosures of
classified information.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term
``congressional intelligence committees'' means--
(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives.
(2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence
community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4)
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal
year 2018 for the conduct of the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the following elements of
the United States Government:
(1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(3) The Department of Defense.
(4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(5) The National Security Agency.
(6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force.
(7) The Coast Guard.
(8) The Department of State.
(9) The Department of the Treasury.
(10) The Department of Energy.
(11) The Department of Justice.
(12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
(14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(16) The Department of Homeland Security.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts.--The amounts authorized to
be appropriated under section 101 and, subject to section
103, the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30,
2018, for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the
elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of section
101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations prepared to accompany this Act.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of
Authorizations.--
(1) Availability.--The classified Schedule of
Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made
available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate,
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives, and to the President.
(2) Distribution by the president.--Subject to paragraph
(3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of
the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in
subsection (a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule,
within the executive branch.
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(3) Limits on disclosure.--The President shall not publicly
disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any
portion of such Schedule except--
(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C.
3306(a));
(B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or
(C) as otherwise required by law.
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
(a) Authority for Increases.--The Director of National
Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel
in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2018 by
the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in
section 102(a) if the Director of National Intelligence
determines that such action is necessary to the performance
of important intelligence functions, except that the number
of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized
under such section may not, for any element of the
intelligence community, exceed 3 percent of the number of
civilian personnel authorized under such schedule for such
element.
(b) Treatment of Certain Personnel.--The Director of
National Intelligence shall establish guidelines that govern,
for each element of the intelligence community, the treatment
under the personnel levels authorized under section 102(a),
including any exemption from such personnel levels, of
employment or assignment in--
(1) a student program, trainee program, or similar program;
(2) a reserve corps or as a reemployed annuitant; or
(3) details, joint duty, or long-term, full-time training.
(c) Notice to Congressional Intelligence Committees.--The
Director of National Intelligence shall notify the
congressional intelligence committees in writing at least 15
days prior to each exercise of an authority described in
subsection (a).
SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management
Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal
year 2018 the sum of $526,900,000. Within such amount, funds
identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and
development shall remain available until September 30, 2019.
(b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the
Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of
National Intelligence are authorized 804 positions as of
September 30, 2018. Personnel serving in such elements may be
permanent employees of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence or personnel detailed from other elements of the
United States Government.
(c) Classified Authorizations.--
(1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to
amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence
Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are
authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community
Management Account for fiscal year 2018 such additional
amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional
amounts made available for advanced research and development
shall remain available until September 30, 2019.
(2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the
personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the
Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30,
2018, there are authorized such additional personnel for the
Community Management Account as of that date as are specified
in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in
section 102(a).
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal
year 2018 the sum of $514,000,000.
SEC. 202. COMPUTATION OF ANNUITIES FOR EMPLOYEES OF THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
(a) Computation of Annuities.--
(1) In general.--Section 221 of the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2031) is amended--
(A) in subsection (a)(3)(B), by striking the period at the
end and inserting ``, as determined by using the annual rate
of basic pay that would be payable for full-time service in
that position.'';
(B) in subsection (b)(1)(C)(i), by striking ``12-month''
and inserting ``2-year'';
(C) in subsection (f)(2), by striking ``one year'' and
inserting ``two years'';
(D) in subsection (g)(2), by striking ``one year'' each
place such term appears and inserting ``two years'';
(E) by redesignating subsections (h), (i), (j), (k), and
(l) as subsections (i), (j), (k), (l), and (m), respectively;
and
(F) by inserting after subsection (g) the following:
``(h) Conditional Election of Insurable Interest Survivor
Annuity by Participants Married at the Time of Retirement.--
``(1) Authority to make designation.--Subject to the
rights of former spouses under subsection (b) and section
222, at the time of retirement a married participant found by
the Director to be in good health may elect to receive an
annuity reduced in accordance with subsection (f)(1)(B) and
designate in writing an individual having an insurable
interest in the participant to receive an annuity under the
system after the participant's death, except that any such
election to provide an insurable interest survivor annuity to
the participant's spouse shall only be effective if the
participant's spouse waives the spousal right to a survivor
annuity under this Act. The amount of the annuity shall be
equal to 55 percent of the participant's reduced annuity.
``(2) Reduction in participant's annuity.--The annuity
payable to the participant making such election shall be
reduced by 10 percent of an annuity computed under subsection
(a) and by an additional 5 percent for each full 5 years the
designated individual is younger than the participant. The
total reduction under this subparagraph may not exceed 40
percent.
``(3) Commencement of survivor annuity.--The annuity
payable to the designated individual shall begin on the day
after the retired participant dies and terminate on the last
day of the month before the designated individual dies.
``(4) Recomputation of participant's annuity on death of
designated individual.--An annuity which is reduced under
this subsection shall, effective the first day of the month
following the death of the designated individual, be
recomputed and paid as if the annuity had not been so
reduced.''.
(2) Conforming amendments.--
(A) Central intelligence agency retirement act.--The
Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2001 et
seq.) is amended--
(i) in section 232(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 2052(b)(1)), by
striking ``221(h),'' and inserting ``221(i),''; and
(ii) in section 252(h)(4) (50 U.S.C. 2082(h)(4)), by
striking ``221(k)'' and inserting ``221(l)''.
(B) Central intelligence agency act of 1949.--Subsection
(a) of section 14 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 (50 U.S.C. 3514(a)) is amended by striking ``221(h)(2),
221(i), 221(l),'' and inserting ``221(i)(2), 221(j),
221(m),''.
(b) Annuities for Former Spouses.--Subparagraph (B) of
section 222(b)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2032(b)(5)(B)) is amended by
striking ``one year'' and inserting ``two years''.
(c) Prior Service Credit.--Subparagraph (A) of section
252(b)(3) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act
(50 U.S.C. 2082(b)(3)(A)) is amended by striking ``October 1,
1990'' both places that term appears and inserting ``March
31, 1991''.
(d) Reemployment Compensation.--Section 273 of the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2113) is
amended--
(1) by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections
(c) and (d), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following:
``(b) Part-time Reemployed Annuitants.--The Director shall
have the authority to reemploy an annuitant in a part-time
basis in accordance with section 8344(l) of title 5, United
States Code.''.
(e) Effective Date and Application.--The amendments made by
subsection (a)(1)(A) and subsection (c) shall take effect as
if enacted on October 28, 2009, and shall apply to
computations or participants, respectively, as of such date.
TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
SEC. 301. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not
be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any
intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by
the Constitution or the laws of the United States.
SEC. 302. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay,
retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be
increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may
be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits
authorized by law.
SEC. 303. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
CONTRACTORS.
(a) Oversight by Congress.--
(1) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by inserting after
section 506J the following new section:
``SEC. 506K. OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONTRACTORS.
``Notwithstanding the terms of any contract awarded by the
head of an element of the intelligence community, the head
may not--
``(1) prohibit a contractor of such element from contacting
or meeting with either of the congressional intelligence
committees (including a member or an employee thereof) to
discuss matters relating to a contract;
``(2) take any adverse action against a contractor of such
element, including by suspending or debarring the contractor
or terminating a contract, based on the contractor contacting
or meeting with either of the congressional intelligence
committees (including a member or an employee thereof) to
discuss matters relating to a contract; or
``(3) require the approval of the head before a contractor
of such element contacts or meets with either of the
congressional intelligence committees (including a member or
an employee thereof) to discuss matters relating to a
contract.''.
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents in the first
section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by
inserting after the item relating to section 506J the
following new item:
``Sec. 506K. Oversight of intelligence community contractors.''.
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(b) Application.--The amendment made by subsection (a)(1)
shall apply with respect to a contract awarded by the head of
an element of the intelligence community on or after the date
of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 304. ENHANCED PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAMS.
Section 11001(d) of title 5, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) in the subsection heading, by striking ``Audit'' and
inserting ``Review'';
(2) in paragraph (1), by striking ``audit'' and inserting
``review''; and
(3) in paragraph (2), by striking ``audit'' and inserting
``review''.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
SEC. 401. AUTHORITY FOR PROTECTION OF CURRENT AND FORMER
EMPLOYEES OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
Section 5(a)(4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 (50 U.S.C. 3506(a)(4)) is amended by striking ``such
personnel of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence as the Director of National Intelligence may
designate;'' and inserting ``current and former personnel of
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and their
immediate families as the Director of National Intelligence
may designate;''.
SEC. 402. DESIGNATION OF THE PROGRAM MANAGER-INFORMATION
SHARING ENVIRONMENT.
(a) Information Sharing Environment.--Section 1016(b) of
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
(6 U.S.C. 485(b)) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``President'' and
inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``President'' both places
that term appears and inserting ``Director of National
Intelligence''.
(b) Program Manager.--Section 1016(f) of the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485(f))
is amended by striking ``The individual designated as the
program manager shall serve as program manager until removed
from service or replaced by the President (at the President's
sole discretion).'' and inserting ``Beginning on the date of
the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2018, each individual designated as the program
manager shall be appointed by the Director of National
Intelligence.''.
SEC. 403. TECHNICAL CORRECTION TO THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE.
Section 5313 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the end the following:
``Director of the National Counterintelligence and
Security.''.
Subtitle B--Other Elements
SEC. 411. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO APPOINTMENT OF GENERAL
COUNSEL OF NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY.
(a) In General.--Section 2 of the National Security Agency
Act of 1959 (Public Law 86-36; 50 U.S.C. 3602) is amended by
adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(c)(1) There is a General Counsel of the National
Security Agency.
``(2) The General Counsel of the National Security Agency
shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate.''.
(b) Effective Date.--Subsection (c) of section 2 of the
National Security Agency Act of 1959 (Public Law 86-36; 50
U.S.C. 3602) shall apply with respect to any person who is
appointed to serve as General Counsel of the National
Security Agency on or after January 21, 2021.
SEC. 412. TRANSFER OR ELIMINATION OF CERTAIN COMPONENTS AND
FUNCTIONS OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
(a) Information Review Task Force.--
(1) Transfer required.--Effective on the date that is 180
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, there is
transferred from the Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff all
functions performed by the Information Review Task Force and
all assigned responsibilities performed by the Information
Review Task Force. Upon such transfer, such Task Force shall
be designated as a chairman's controlled activity.
(2) Transition plan.--
(A) Congressional briefing.--Not later than 60 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff shall jointly brief the congressional
intelligence committees and the congressional defense
committees on the plan to carry out the transfer required
under paragraph (1).
(B) Submittal of formal plan.--Not later than 90 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff shall jointly submit to the congressional
intelligence committees and the congressional defense
committees a formal plan for the transfer required under
paragraph (1).
(3) Limitation on use of funds.--The Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency may not obligate or expend any
funds authorized to be appropriated for the Information
Review Task Force for fiscal year 2018 after the date that is
180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. Any
such funds that are unobligated or unexpended as of such date
shall be transferred to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
(b) Identity Intelligence Project Office.--
(1) Elimination.--Effective on the date that is 180 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of
the Defense Intelligence Agency shall eliminate the Identity
Intelligence Project Office, including all functions and
assigned responsibilities performed by the Identity
Intelligence Project Office. All personnel and assets
pertaining to such Office shall be transferred to other
elements of the Defense Intelligence Agency, as determined by
the Director.
(2) Transition plan.--
(A) Congressional briefing.--Not later than 60 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency shall brief the congressional
intelligence committees and the congressional defense
committees on the plan to carry out the elimination required
under paragraph (1).
(B) Submittal of formal plan.--Not later than 90 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees and the congressional defense
committees a formal plan for the elimination required under
paragraph (1).
(3) Limitation on use of funds.--The Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency may not obligate or expend any
funds authorized to be appropriated for the Identity
Intelligence Project Office for fiscal year 2018 after the
date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act. Any such funds that are unobligated or unexpended as of
such date shall be transferred to other elements of the
Defense Intelligence Agency, as determined by the Director.
(c) Watchlisting Branch.--
(1) Transfer required.--Effective on the date that is 180
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, there is
transferred from the Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency to the Director for Intelligence of the Joint Staff
all functions and all assigned responsibilities performed by
the Watchlisting Branch.
(2) Transition plan.--
(A) Congressional briefing.--Not later than 60 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency and the Director for Intelligence
of the Joint Staff shall jointly brief the congressional
intelligence committees and the congressional defense
committees on the plan to carry out the transfer required
under paragraph (1).
(B) Submittal of formal plan.--Not later than 90 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency and the Director for Intelligence
of the Joint Staff shall jointly submit to the congressional
intelligence committees and the congressional defense
committees a formal plan for the transfer required under
paragraph (1).
(3) Limitation on use of funds.--The Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency may not obligate or expend any
funds authorized to be appropriated for the Watchlisting
Branch for fiscal year 2018 after the date that is 180 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act. Any such funds
that are unobligated or unexpended as of such date shall be
transferred to the Director for Intelligence of the Joint
Staff.
(d) Counter-Threat Finance.--
(1) Elimination.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency shall eliminate the Counter-Threat
Finance analysis function of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
All personnel and assets pertaining to such function shall be
transferred to other elements of the Defense Intelligence
Agency, as determined by the Director.
(2) Transition plan.--
(A) Congressional briefing.--Not later than 60 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency shall brief the congressional
intelligence committees and the congressional defense
committees on the plan to eliminate the Counter-Threat
Finance analysis function under paragraph (1).
(B) Submittal of formal plan.--Not later than 90 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees and the congressional defense
committees a formal plan to eliminate such function under
paragraph (1).
(3) Limitation on use of funds.--The Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency may not obligate or expend any
funds authorized to be appropriated for the Counter-Threat
Finance analysis function for fiscal year 2018 after the date
that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
Any such funds that are unobligated or unexpended as of such
date shall be transferred to other elements of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, as determined by the Director.
(e) National Intelligence University.--
(1) Transfer required.--Effective on October 1, 2020, there
is transferred from the Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency to the Director of National Intelligence all functions
and all assigned responsibilities performed by the National
Intelligence University.
(2) Transition plan.--
(A) Congressional briefing.--Not later than October 1,
2018, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the
Director of National Intelligence shall jointly brief the
congressional intelligence committees and the congressional
defense committees on the plan to carry out the transfer
required under paragraph (1).
(B) Submittal of formal plan.--Not later than April 1,
2019, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the
Director of National Intelligence shall jointly submit to the
congressional intelligence committees and the congressional
defense committees a formal plan for the transfer required
under paragraph (1).
(3) Limitation on use of funds.--The Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency may not obligate or expend any
funds authorized to be appropriated for the National
Intelligence University after October 1, 2020. Any such funds
that are unobligated or unexpended as of such
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date shall be transferred to the Director of National
Intelligence.
(f) Congressional Notice for Reprogramming.--Not later than
30 days before transferring any funds relating to
transferring or eliminating any function under this section,
the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall submit
to the congressional intelligence committees and the
congressional defense committees notice in writing of such
transfer.
(g) Treatment of Certain Functions and Responsibilities.--
(1) In general.--In the case of any function or executive
agent responsibility that is transferred to the Director of
National Intelligence pursuant to this section, the Director
of National Intelligence may not delegate such function or
responsibility to another element of the intelligence
community.
(2) Executive agent responsibility.--In this subsection,
the term ``executive agent responsibility'' means the
specific responsibilities, functions, and authorities
assigned by the Director of National Intelligence to the head
of an intelligence community element to provide defined
levels of support for intelligence operations, or
administrative or other designated activities.
(h) Deadline for Policy Updates.--Not later than October 1,
2020, the Director of National Intelligence, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall ensure that all relevant
policies of the intelligence community and Department of
Defense are updated to reflect the transfers required to be
made pursuant to this section.
(i) Treatment of Transferred Functions.--No transferred
functions or assigned responsibility referred to in
subsection (a), (c), or (e) shall be considered a new start
by the receiving element, including in the case of any lapse
of appropriation for such transferred function or assigned
responsibility.
(j) Reports on Other Elements of Defense Intelligence
Agency.--
(1) National center for credibility assessment.--
(A) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(i) the assignment of executive agency for the National
Center for Credibility Assessment to the Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency may be limiting the ability of
the Center to effectively serve the Federal customer base of
the Center;
(ii) the failure of the Director of National Intelligence,
in the role of the Director as security executive for the
Federal Government, to define in policy the term ``Executive
Agent'' may be further limiting the ability of the Center to
receive sufficient resources to carry out the critical
Federal mission of the Center; and
(iii) the evolution of the Center from an organization of
the Army to an organization serving 27 departments and
agencies and responsible for all Federal credibility
assessment training, oversight, and research and development,
has resulted in a convoluted oversight structure based on
legacy reporting requirements.
(B) Report.--Not later than October 1, 2018, the Director
of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Director of National
Intelligence, and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly
submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the
congressional defense committees a report on--
(i) the current and projected missions and functions of the
National Center for Credibility Assessment;
(ii) the effectiveness of the current organizational
assignment of the Center to the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency;
(iii) the effectiveness of the current oversight structure
between the Center, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Director
of National Intelligence; and
(iv) the resources and authorities necessary to most
effectively execute the missions and functions of the Center.
(2) Underground facilities analysis center.--
(A) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(i) the assignment of executive agency for the Underground
Facilities Analysis Center to the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency may be limiting the ability of the Center
to effectively serve the broader intelligence community
customer base of the Center;
(ii) the failure of the Director of National Intelligence
to define in policy the term ``Executive Agent'' may be
further limiting the ability of the Center to receive
sufficient resources to carry out the critical mission of the
Center; and
(iii) the requirements of the intelligence community and
Department of Defense with respect to underground facilities
are not adequately being met given the scale and complexity
of the problem set and the relatively small amount of funding
currently received by the Center.
(B) Report.--Not later than October 1, 2018, the Director
of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Director of National
Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
shall jointly submit to the congressional intelligence
committees and the congressional defense committees a report
on--
(i) the missions and functions of the Underground
Facilities Analysis Center;
(ii) the state of the requirements of the intelligence
community and Department of Defense with respect to
underground facilities and the ability of the Center to meet
such requirements;
(iii) the effectiveness of the current organizational
assignment of the Center to the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency;
(iv) the effectiveness of the current oversight structure
between the Center, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the
Secretary of Defense, and the Director of National
Intelligence; and
(v) the resources and authorities necessary to most
effectively execute the missions and functions of the Center.
(k) Congressional Defense Committees Defined.--In this
section, the term ``congressional defense committees''
means--
(1) the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and
House of Representatives; and
(2) the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and
House of Representatives.
SEC. 413. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY.
(a) Atomic Energy Defense Act.--Section 4524(b)(2) of the
Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2674(b)(2)) is amended
by inserting ``Intelligence and'' after ``The Director of''.
(b) National Security Act of 1947.--Paragraph (2) of
section 106(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3041(b)(2)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (E), by inserting ``and
Counterintelligence'' after ``Office of Intelligence'';
(2) by striking subparagraph (F);
(3) by redesignating subparagraphs (G), (H), and (I) as
subparagraphs (F), (G), and (H), respectively; and
(4) in subparagraph (H), as redesignated by paragraph (3),
by realigning the margin of such subparagraph two ems to the
left.
TITLE V--MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES
SEC. 501. ASSESSMENT OF SIGNIFICANT RUSSIAN INFLUENCE
CAMPAIGNS DIRECTED AT FOREIGN ELECTIONS AND
REFERENDA.
(a) Assessment Required.--Not later than 60 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report containing an analytical assessment of
the most significant Russian influence campaigns, if any,
conducted during the 3-year period preceding the date of the
enactment of this Act, as well as the most significant
current or planned such Russian influence campaigns, if any.
Such assessment shall include--
(1) a summary of such significant Russian influence
campaigns, including, at a minimum, the specific means by
which such campaigns were conducted, are being conducted, or
likely will be conducted, as appropriate, and the specific
goal of each such campaign;
(2) a summary of any defenses against or responses to such
Russian influence campaigns by the foreign state holding the
elections or referenda;
(3) a summary of any relevant activities by elements of the
intelligence community undertaken for the purpose of
assisting the government of such foreign state in defending
against or responding to such Russian influence campaigns;
and
(4) an assessment of the effectiveness of such defenses and
responses described in paragraphs (2) and (3).
(b) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) may be
submitted in classified form, but if so submitted, shall
contain an unclassified summary.
(c) Russian Influence Campaign Defined.--In this section,
the term ``Russian influence campaign'' means any effort,
covert or overt, and by any means, attributable to the
Russian Federation directed at an election, referendum, or
similar process in a country other than the Russian
Federation or the United States.
SEC. 502. FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND CYBERSECURITY
THREATS TO FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS.
(a) Reports Required.--
(1) In general.--As provided in paragraph (2), for each
Federal election, the Director of National Intelligence, in
coordination with the Under Secretary of Homeland Security
for Intelligence and Analysis and the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, shall make publicly available on an
internet website an advisory report on foreign
counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to election
campaigns for Federal offices. Each such report shall
include, consistent with the protection of sources and
methods, each of the following:
(A) A description of foreign counterintelligence and
cybersecurity threats to election campaigns for Federal
offices.
(B) A summary of best practices that election campaigns for
Federal offices can employ in seeking to counter such
threats.
(C) An identification of any publicly available resources,
including United States Government resources, for countering
such threats.
(2) Schedule for submittal.--A report under this subsection
shall be made available as follows:
(A) In the case of a report regarding an election held for
the office of Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives during 2018, not later than the date that is
60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(B) In the case of a report regarding an election for a
Federal office during any subsequent year, not later than the
date that is one year before the date of the election.
(3) Information to be included.--A report under this
subsection shall reflect the most current information
available to the Director of National Intelligence regarding
foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats.
(b) Treatment of Campaigns Subject to Heightened Threats.--
If the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and
Analysis jointly determine that an election campaign for
Federal office is subject to a heightened foreign
counterintelligence or cybersecurity threat, the Director and
the Under Secretary, consistent with the protection of
sources and methods, may make available additional
information to the appropriate representatives of such
campaign.
SEC. 503. ASSESSMENT OF THREAT FINANCE RELATING TO THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION.
(a) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director
[[Page H6551]]
of National Intelligence, acting through the National
Intelligence Manager for Threat Finance, shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report containing an
assessment of the financing of threat activity by the Russian
Federation.
(b) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (a)
shall include, at a minimum, the following:
(1) A summary of leading examples from the 3-year period
prior to the date of the report of any threat finance
activities conducted by, for the benefit of, or at the behest
of officials of the Government of Russia, persons subject to
sanctions under any provision of law imposing sanctions with
respect to Russia, or Russian nationals subject to sanctions
under any other provision of law.
(2) An assessment with respect to any trends or patterns in
threat finance activities relating to Russia, including
common methods of conducting such activities.
(3) A summary of engagement and coordination with
international partners on threat finance relating to Russia,
especially in Europe, including examples of such engagement
and coordination.
(4) An identification of any resource and collection gaps.
(c) Form.--The report submitted under subsection (a) may be
submitted in classified form.
(d) Threat Finance Defined.--In this section, the term
``threat finance'' means--
(1) the financing of cyber operations, global influence
campaigns, intelligence service activities, proliferation,
terrorism, or transnational crime and drug organizations;
(2) the methods and entities used to spend, store, move,
raise, or conceal money or value on behalf of threat actors;
(3) sanctions evasion; or
(4) other forms of threat financing domestically or
internationally, as defined by the President.
TITLE VI--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS
SEC. 601. PERIOD OF OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENTS FOR CERTAIN FOREIGN
SERVICE OFFICERS.
(a) Length of Period of Assignment.--Subsection (a) of
section 502 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C.
3982) is amended by adding at the end the following new
paragraph:
``(3) In making assignments under paragraph (1), and in
accordance with section 903, and, if applicable, section 503,
the Secretary shall assure that a member of the Service may
serve at a post for a period of not more than six consecutive
years.''.
(b) Foreign Language Deployment Requirements.--Section 702
of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 4022) is
amended by--
(1) redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new
subsection:
``(c) Foreign Language Deployment Requirements.--
``(1) In general.--The Secretary of State, with the
assistance of other relevant officials, shall require all
members of the Service who receive foreign language training
in Arabic, Farsi, Chinese (Mandarin or Cantonese), Turkish,
Korean, and Japanese by the institution or otherwise in
accordance with subsection (b) to serve three successive
tours in positions in which the acquired language is both
relevant and determined to be a benefit to the Department.
``(2) Overseas deployments.--In carrying out paragraph (1),
at least one of the three successive tours referred to in
such paragraph shall be an overseas deployment.
``(3) Waiver.--The Secretary of State may waive the
application of paragraph (1) for medical or family hardship
or in the interest of national security.
``(4) Congressional notification.--The Secretary of State
shall notify the Committees on Appropriations and Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives and Committees on
Appropriations and Foreign Relations of the Senate at the end
of each fiscal year of any instances during the prior twelve
months in which the waiver authority described in paragraph
(3) was invoked.''.
SEC. 602. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON INVESTIGATIONS OF
UNAUTHORIZED PUBLIC DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION.
(a) In General.--Title XI of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end
the following new section:
``SEC. 1105. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON INVESTIGATIONS OF
UNAUTHORIZED PUBLIC DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION.
``(a) In General.--On a semiannual basis, each covered
official shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report that includes, with respect to the
preceding 6-month period--
``(1) the number of investigations opened by the covered
official regarding an unauthorized public disclosure of
classified information;
``(2) the number of investigations completed by the covered
official regarding an unauthorized public disclosure of
classified information; and
``(3) of the number of such completed investigations
identified under paragraph (2), the number referred to the
Attorney General for criminal investigation.
``(b) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) The term `covered official' means--
``(A) the heads of each element of the intelligence
community; and
``(B) the inspectors general with oversight responsibility
for an element of the intelligence community.
``(2) The term `investigation' means any inquiry, whether
formal or informal, into the existence of an unauthorized
public disclosure of classified information.
``(3) The term `unauthorized public disclosure of
classified information' means the unauthorized disclosure of
classified information to a journalist or media
organization.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first
section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by
inserting after the item relating to section 1104 the
following new item:
``Sec. 1105. Semiannual reports on investigations of unauthorized
public disclosures of classified information.''.
SEC. 603. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REPORTS ON SECURITY
CLEARANCES.
Section 506H of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3104) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)(1)--
(A) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by inserting ``and'' after the
semicolon;
(B) in subparagraph (B)(ii), by striking ``; and'' and
inserting a period; and
(C) by striking subparagraph (C);
(2) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c);
(3) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new
subsection (b):
``(b) Intelligence Community Reports.--(1) Not later than
March 1 of each year, the Director of National Intelligence
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
report on the security clearances processed by each element
of the intelligence community during the preceding calendar
year. Each such report shall separately identify security
clearances processed by each such element and shall cover
Federal employees and contractor employees.
``(2) Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall
include each of the following for each element of the
intelligence community for the year covered by the report:
``(A) The total number of initial security clearance
background investigations opened for new applicants.
``(B) The total number of security clearance periodic re-
investigations opened for existing employees.
``(C) The total number of initial security clearance
background investigations for new applicants that were
finalized and adjudicated with notice of a determination
provided to the prospective applicant, including--
``(i) the total number that were adjudicated favorably and
granted access to classified information; and
``(ii) the total number that were adjudicated unfavorably
and resulted in a denial or revocation of a security
clearance.
``(D) The total number of security clearance periodic
background investigations that were finalized and adjudicated
with notice of a determination provided to the existing
employee, including--
``(i) the total number that were adjudicated favorably; and
``(ii) the total number that were adjudicated unfavorably
and resulted in a denial or revocation of a security
clearance.
``(E) The total number of pending security clearance
background investigations, including initial applicant
investigations and periodic re-investigations, that were not
finalized and adjudicated as of the last day of such year and
that remained pending as follows:
``(i) For 180 days or less.
``(ii) For 180 days or longer, but less than 12 months.
``(iii) For 12 months or longer, but less than 18 months.
``(iv) For 18 months or longer, but less than 24 months.
``(v) For 24 months or longer.
``(F) In the case of security clearance determinations
completed or pending during the year preceding the year for
which the report is submitted that have taken longer than 12
months to complete--
``(i) the cause of the delay for such determinations; and
``(ii) the number of such determinations for which
polygraph examinations were required.
``(G) The percentage of security clearance investigations,
including initial and periodic re-investigations, that
resulted in a denial or revocation of a security clearance.
``(H) The percentage of security clearance investigations
that resulted in incomplete information.
``(I) The percentage of security clearance investigations
that did not result in enough information to make a decision
on potentially adverse information.
``(3) The report required under this subsection shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.''; and
(4) in subsection (c), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by
inserting ``and (b)'' after ``subsection (a)(1)''.
SEC. 604. REPORT ON EXPANSION OF SECURITY PROTECTIVE SERVICES
JURISDICTION.
(a) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report on the feasibility,
justification, costs, and benefits of expanding the
jurisdiction of the protective services of the Central
Intelligence Agency under section 15(a)(1) of the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3515(a)). The
report shall include--
(1) an explanation of the need for expanding such
jurisdiction beyond the 500-feet limit specified in such
section 15(a)(1); and
(2) an identification of any comparable departments or
agencies of the Federal Government in the Washington
metropolitan region (as defined in section 8301 of title 40,
United States Code) whose protective services jurisdictions
exceed 500 feet.
(b) Form.--The report under subsection (a) may be submitted
in classified form.
[[Page H6552]]
SEC. 605. REPORT ON ROLE OF DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN FOREIGN INVESTMENTS.
(a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence,
in consultation with the heads of the elements of the
intelligence community determined appropriate by the
Director, shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report on the role of the Director in preparing
analytic materials in connection with the evaluation by the
Federal Government of national security risks associated with
potential foreign investments into the United States.
(b) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (a)
shall--
(1) describe the current process for the provision of the
analytic materials described in subsection (a);
(2) identify the most significant benefits and drawbacks of
such process with respect to the role of the Director,
including any benefits or drawbacks relating to the time
allotted to the Director to prepare such materials; and
(3) include recommendations to improve such process.
SEC. 606. REPORT ON CYBER EXCHANGE PROGRAM.
(a) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
report on the potential establishment of a fully voluntary
exchange program between elements of the intelligence
community and private technology companies under which--
(1) an employee of an element of the intelligence community
with demonstrated expertise and work experience in
cybersecurity or related disciplines may elect to be
temporarily detailed to a private technology company that has
elected to receive the detailee; and
(2) an employee of a private technology company with
demonstrated expertise and work experience in cybersecurity
or related disciplines may elect to be temporarily detailed
to an element of the intelligence community that has elected
to receive the detailee.
(b) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (a)
shall include the following:
(1) The feasibility of establishing the exchange program
described in such subsection.
(2) Identification of any challenges in establishing the
exchange program.
(3) An evaluation of the benefits to the intelligence
community that would result from the exchange program.
SEC. 607. REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN
VULNERABILITIES EQUITIES PROCESS.
(a) Review.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community shall review, with respect to the 3-
year period preceding the date of the review, the roles and
responsibilities of the elements of the intelligence
community in the process of the Federal Government for
determining whether, when, how, and to whom information about
a vulnerability that is not publicly known will be shared
with or released to a non-Federal entity or the public.
(b) Report.--
(1) Submission.--Not later than 240 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General shall submit
to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the
results of the review under subsection (a).
(2) Elements.--The report under paragraph (1) shall include
the following:
(A) A description of the roles and responsibilities of the
elements of the intelligence community in the process of
determining whether, when, how, and to whom information about
a vulnerability that is not publicly known will be shared or
released to a non-Federal entity or the public.
(B) The criteria used by the Federal Government, including
elements of the intelligence community, in making such
determination.
(C) With respect to the period covered by the review--
(i) a summary of vulnerabilities known to elements of the
intelligence community that were reviewed by the Federal
Government pursuant to such process, including--
(I) the number of vulnerabilities known to the intelligence
community that were reviewed; and
(II) of such number of reviewed vulnerabilities, the number
for which information was shared with or released to a non-
Federal entity or the public;
(ii) an assessment of whether there were any
vulnerabilities known to elements of the intelligence
community that were not reviewed pursuant to such process,
and if so, the basis and rationale for not conducting such a
review; and
(iii) a summary of the most significant incidents in which
a vulnerability known to the intelligence community, but not
shared with or released to a non-Federal entity or the
public, was exploited by an individual, an entity, or a
foreign country in the course of carrying out a cyber
intrusion.
(D) A description of any current mechanisms for overseeing
such process.
(E) Recommendations to improve the efficiency,
effectiveness, accountability, and, consistent with national
security, transparency of such process.
(F) Any other matters the Inspector General determines
appropriate.
(3) Form.--The report may be submitted in classified form.
(c) Vulnerability Defined.--In this section, the term
``vulnerability'' means, with respect to information
technology, a design, configuration, or implementation
weakness in a technology, product, system, service, or
application that can be exploited or triggered to cause
unexpected or unintended behavior.
SEC. 608. REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WHISTLEBLOWER
MATTERS.
(a) Review of Whistleblower Matters.--The Inspector General
of the Intelligence Community, in consultation with the
inspectors general for the Central Intelligence Agency, the
National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the
National Reconnaissance Office, shall conduct a review of the
authorities, policies, investigatory standards, and other
practices and procedures relating to intelligence community
whistleblower matters, with respect to such inspectors
general.
(b) Objective of Review.--The objective of the review
required under subsection (a) is to identify any
discrepancies, inconsistencies, or other issues, which
frustrate the timely and effective reporting of intelligence
community whistleblower matters to appropriate inspectors
general and to the congressional intelligence committees, and
the fair and expeditious investigation and resolution of such
matters.
(c) Conduct of Review.--The Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community shall take such measures as the
Inspector General determines necessary in order to ensure
that the review required by subsection (a) is conducted in an
independent and objective fashion.
(d) Report.--Not later than 270 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a written report containing the
results of the review required under subsection (a), along
with recommendations to improve the timely and effective
reporting of Intelligence Community whistleblower matters to
inspectors general and to the congressional intelligence
committees and the fair and expeditious investigation and
resolution of such matters.
SEC. 609. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NOTIFICATIONS OF CERTAIN
DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds that section 502 of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3092) requires
elements of the intelligence community to keep the
congressional intelligence committees ``fully and currently
informed'' about all ``intelligence activities'' of the
United States, and to ``furnish to the congressional
intelligence committees any information or material
concerning intelligence activities. . .which is requested by
either of the congressional intelligence committees in order
to carry out its authorized responsibilities.''.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the authorities described in subsection (a), together
with other intelligence community authorities, obligate an
element of the intelligence community to submit to the
congressional intelligence committees written notification,
by not later than 7 days after becoming aware, that an
individual in the executive branch has disclosed covered
classified information to an official of an adversary foreign
government using methods other than established intelligence
channels; and
(2) each such notification should include--
(A) the date and place of the disclosure of classified
information covered by the notification;
(B) a description of such classified information;
(C) identification of the individual who made such
disclosure and the individual to whom such disclosure was
made; and
(D) a summary of the circumstances of such disclosure.
(c) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) The term ``adversary foreign government'' means the
government of any of the following foreign countries:
(A) North Korea.
(B) Iran.
(C) China.
(D) Russia.
(E) Cuba.
(2) The term ``covered classified information'' means
classified information that was--
(A) collected by an element of the intelligence community;
or
(B) provided by the intelligence service or military of a
foreign country to an element of the intelligence community.
(3) The term ``established intelligence channels'' means
methods to exchange intelligence to coordinate foreign
intelligence relationships, as established pursuant to law by
the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National
Security Agency, or other head of an element of the
intelligence community.
(4) The term ``individual in the executive branch'' means
any officer or employee of the executive branch, including
individuals--
(A) occupying a position specified in article II of the
Constitution;
(B) appointed to a position by an individual described in
subparagraph (A); or
(C) serving in the civil service or the senior executive
service (or similar service for senior executives of
particular departments or agencies).
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California (Mr. Nunes)
and the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff) each will control 30
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. Nunes).
General Leave
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may
have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and insert
extraneous material in the Record on the bill, H.R. 3180.
[[Page H6553]]
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from California?
There was no objection.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, this is a good, bipartisan bill that we have worked all
year putting together in a bipartisan manner. I thank all of my
colleagues not only on the Intelligence Committee, but also those
colleagues who came down to review the bill. Hopefully they got all the
information from our staff to provide all the answers that they may
need so that they understand the classified nature of the bill and the
importance of this bill to our Nation's intelligence community and our
warfighters.
I want to highlight just a few things in the bill, because we did
debate this bill on Monday, so I will go through this quickly.
The legislation provides the intelligence community authorization
needed to protect and defend the United States. It supports critical
national security programs, such as those protecting Americans against
terrorism, cyber attacks, and hostile foreign nations.
The total funding authorized in the bill is slightly below the
President's budget request, and is consistent with the House Budget
Committee-passed fiscal year 2018 budget resolution.
H.R. 3180 enables the intelligence community to carry out its vital
work protecting Americans in the most complex threat environment since
9/11.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 is a solid,
bipartisan bill, one that garnered unanimous approval in the committee
by voice vote.
I thank my committee colleagues and the entire HPSCI staff for their
collaborative efforts in crafting the measure that we consider here
today.
In the 114th Congress, this committee worked in a similar bipartisan
fashion to pass into law four key pieces of national security
legislation. I am proud of our past legislative accomplishments, which
testify to the virtues of substantive deliberation and reasoned
compromise without needing to compromise the security of the American
people or of our brave servicemembers.
Reflecting on the past year, on Russia's assault on Western
democracies, and on other challenges as well, from everything to
include North Korea's unrelenting pursuit of a strategic nuclear
capability, we owe the American people a deliberate process.
I wish the bill had come to the floor with a rule that allowed
Members to offer amendments. That opportunity is commensurate with the
importance of the intelligence bill and the need for vigorous oversight
of the IC by the whole Congress.
Nonetheless, the manifest shortcomings in the process cannot take
precedence over the imperative of discharging our duty and authorizing
the operations of the intelligence community. On its merits, I urge all
Members to vote ``yes'' on H.R. 3180 today.
The Intelligence Committee oversees some of the most sensitive and
highly classified aspects of U.S. intelligence operations and programs.
The annual Intelligence Authorization Act is the primary means by which
we can guarantee an appropriate balance between our Nation's national
security imperatives and the civil liberties and privacy rights
enshrined in the Constitution.
H.R. 3180 does just that by funding, equipping, and giving policy
direction to the intelligence community and military intelligence
elements of the Defense Department. It sustains support for key
national security priorities and programs, and represents a slight
decrease from the President's budget request from 2018.
This bill features a number of provisions championed by my Democratic
colleagues, some of which redouble the IC's focus on the scope and
nature of the threat, both overt and covert, that Russia poses to our
interests and American political institutions.
H.R. 3180 also mandates public reporting about counterintelligence
and cyber threats against future U.S. elections; bolsters oversight of
our policy guiding counterterrorism actions outside of declared areas
of hostilities; and seeks more information about the executive branch's
process for determining when and to whom to reveal information about
vulnerabilities in computers and networks.
At the same time, and unlike IAAs of years past, this bill omits
problematic language regarding Guantanamo detentions and the role of
the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board.
I am less supportive of some elements in this legislation, but the
bill's merits outweigh any misgivings I may have, and I was proud to
cosponsor the bill along with the chairman. Through it, our committee
and the Congress as a whole serves as a guardrail against any excesses,
transgressions or abuses. That has always been a solemn obligation, but
at this uncertain and unprecedented moment in our national life, it
carries even more responsibility for all of us.
So, again, I urge my colleagues today to vote with me to advance the
Intelligence Authorization Act and see that it is enacted into law.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I have no further speakers, and I reserve the
balance of my time.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from
Connecticut (Mr. Himes), one of our subcommittee ranking members.
Mr. HIMES. Mr. Speaker, I thank both the chairman and ranking member
for the strong bill that has been offered up today and for the
bipartisan manner in which it was developed and enacted and, hopefully,
will be passed.
I rise in strong support of this bill, but would note for my
colleagues that this authorization bill is an odd one. To fully
understand it, you need to go deep into the basement of this Capitol
and review it behind heavy metal doors.
{time} 1200
The bill is full of acronyms and code words and classified
information. As such, it can be hard to understand, and things that are
hard to understand sometimes cause anxiety and fear. Let me take a
moment to describe what this bill does.
This bill has the strong bipartisan support of my fellow committee
members, liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans alike, because
it provides the lifeblood to a truly remarkable group of people who
work behind the scenes and in the dark to keep us safe and to keep us
free.
The unheralded and unacknowledged warriors of the intelligence
community never stop in the work that they do around the world. As we
speak, North Korea is feverishly working to develop the ability to
deliver a nuclear bomb to American shores. Our intelligence community
is watching, evaluating, and planning against this mortal threat.
As we speak, for the first time in a generation, Iran is not
feverishly working to develop the ability to deliver a nuclear bomb to
our shores. Our intelligence community is making sure that that stays
true.
As we speak, Mr. Speaker, for the umpteenth time, terrorists in
places like Afghanistan and Libya and Syria are spending their time
desperately trying to stay alive instead of spending their time
planning to attack our airlines, our cities, and our people.
As we speak, Mr. Speaker, Russia lurks, seeking advantage, promoting
instability, and working to erode international norms and instability.
We should make no mistake about Russia as an adversary, because there
is a lot of noise about this. Russia is a country that invades
neighboring sovereign countries, it murders political opponents, it
bombs Syrian hospitals, and, yes, it conducted an unprecedented attack
on the very core of our Democratic system: our free and fair elections.
This bill funds the warriors who are watching that, who are standing
up against that, in order to keep our system what we all like it to be.
Mr. Speaker, because these activities are carried out secretly in the
dark of night and usually unacknowledged, there is always the
possibility for abuse. These activities, by their nature, run up
against the lines of those values that make us Americans. This is
surveillance. It is other things that are worthy of debate. The members
of this committee spend their days in good argument about what the
limits of those
[[Page H6554]]
activities should be, and we will have additional arguments around
things like the reauthorization of the section 702 surveillance
programs. These are terrific arguments that we have in a constructive
way. These are not arguments that are present in this bill. Just as we
did on section 215, we will have a robust discussion of the section 702
international authorities. These are authorities that raise questions
and that should be subject to the debate of this Chamber.
But this bill, this bill today, is about the lifeblood of a
remarkable group of people who don't always get it right any more than
we do, but who are patriots, who respect the Constitution, and who need
our support in the work that they do to keep us safe and keep us free.
I would like to, again, thank the majority, the chairman, the ranking
member, and especially the staff who worked diligently to make this a
bill that we would unanimously support and suggest to my colleagues in
this Chamber that we don't see a lot of bills like this one, but this
one is worthy of their support.
Mr. NUNES. Madam Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman, Mr. Himes,
for his kind comments, and I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to
the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi.)
Ms. PELOSI. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me
time, and I join our colleague in saluting the committee for bringing
this bipartisan legislation to the floor--so many issues that the
committee has to deal with. I know that full well as a previous ranking
member.
I know that we all agree that every chance we get we want to salute
the patriotic men and women of the intelligence community for their
ceaseless heroism and unblinking vigilance to keep the American people
safe. I thank them for all they do for force protection and conflict
prevention. The quiet professionals of the U.S. intelligence community
work every day, again, to keep this country safe and our leaders
informed. Respect for their work is essential.
I thank Ranking Member Schiff and members of the committee--Mr.
Schiff, for his leadership, and commend all the members of the
committee for their dedication to those same goals.
I am sorry that this bill is coming up under a closed rule so that
Members cannot offer amendments. One such amendment might be about an
independent commission. It is the judgment of the intelligence
community, as expressed in the January 2017 Intelligence Community
Assessment, that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered a
multifaceted active-measures campaign to sow discord in our political
process and help one Presidential candidate and hurt the other.
For this reason, we continue to ask for an outside, independent
commission to look forward on how to prevent Russia and others from
meddling in our election system again. The Swalwell-Cummings
legislation to establish that commission has 200 bipartisan cosponsors.
I also want to salute our Homeland Security Committee ranking member,
Bennie Thompson, for his leadership to strengthen the preparedness of
the election infrastructure of the United States to identify and
withstand a foreign attack.
Our election systems are part of the critical infrastructure of our
country, some of the most critical infrastructure of our democracy
itself. We must protect it.
The United States must reject foreign interference in our elections,
no matter which party it helps or which party it hurts. Our oath of
office is to protect and defend the Constitution against all enemies,
foreign and domestic. Working with the intelligence community to better
ensure the integrity of our elections is vital to that goal.
Madam Speaker, I urge a ``yes'' vote on this bipartisan legislation
and salute the members of the committee. I especially want to
acknowledge the tremendous leadership of our ranking member, Mr. Schiff
from California.
Mr. NUNES. Madam Speaker, I continue to reserve the balance of my
time.
Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Speaker, I want to express my agreement with Leader
Pelosi's comments on the continuing need for the appointment of an
independent commission. An independent commission would have the
dedicated focus, the distance from any potential political
interference, and the resources to prepare a report of the caliber that
we saw of the 9/11 Commission. I think that would be a very sound and
important complement to what we are doing in Congress and what Special
Counsel Mueller is doing.
Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Washington
(Mr. Heck), my wonderful colleague on the Intelligence Committee.
Mr. HECK. Madam Speaker, I rise to support the 2018 Intelligence
Authorization Act, but first I would like to tender a point of personal
privilege.
Happy birthday, Madam Speaker.
This Intelligence Authorization Act has very strong bipartisan
language. I just want to highlight two areas where the IAA furthers
what I believe to be high priorities for our national security.
First, section 605, which I had the honor to author, sets in motion
how to change the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States,
we also call it CFIUS, to better protect our keystone technologies.
This IAA provision dovetails with some broader work that we are doing
in the Financial Services Committee, in fact, across the aisle with
Congressman Pittenger and myself and others. It would modernize the
process to better protect and prevent strategic foreign adversaries
like China or Russia from taking advantage of our open markets in a way
that undermines our national security.
America's technological edge is, in fact, a cornerstone of our
national security, but our strategic adversaries know that, too. They
are increasingly seeking to obtain these critical technologies and
resources through commercial transactions, i.e., they are buying them.
CFIUS is a place to safeguard us against this risk, but it needs
modernization, more resources, and authority and support from the
intelligence community.
Russian meddling in the 2017 election showed us what happens when an
adversary tries to exploit our political openness. Now they are trying
to exploit our economic openness. Our intelligence community is vital
in protecting against both of those threats.
Let me also underscore this point: The fiscal year 2018 IAA takes
steps to safeguard our Nation's edge, our advantage in space, which is,
I am sorry to say, increasingly threatened by adversary nations. To
mitigate that risk, the bill supports some truly cutting-edge space
technologies and invests in and oversees programs to ensure the
resiliency of overhead architecture. At the same time, it keeps up with
the Intelligence Committee's long-running efforts to stimulate
innovation.
In particular, the committee report accompanying today's legislation
asks the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency to examine new
approaches to public and private sector collaboration, with the goal of
fostering the faster, smarter development of automation, artificial
intelligence, and similar technologies.
Madam Speaker, I am proud to support this legislation. I hope all my
colleagues will join me in both wishing the Speaker a happy birthday
and in voting ``yes'' on this bill.
Mr. NUNES. Madam Speaker, I wasn't aware it is your birthday, but
happy birthday, and I continue to reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Speaker, happy birthday.
Madam Speaker, I am pleased to yield to the gentleman from Texas (Mr.
Castro), who will now sing Happy Birthday for you.
Mr. CASTRO of Texas. Madam Speaker, I will spare you that.
Madam Speaker, I voice my support for H.R. 3180, the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018.
The men and women of America's intelligence community, the best in
the world, protect our country every day. They serve beyond the front
lines of conflict to collect and analyze intelligence on our
adversaries.
In addition to being highly effective, America's intelligence
community adapts as the threats our country faces shift on a daily
basis. Their effectiveness is amplified when they are in close
[[Page H6555]]
cooperation and coordination with policymakers.
I want to thank my fellow members on the committee, especially
Ranking Member Schiff and Chairman Nunes, for working with me to add
language into this bill requiring the intelligence community to brief
Congress on our intelligence capabilities in the South China Sea.
Over $5 trillion in ship-borne commerce flows through the region each
year, including the vast majority of sea-borne energy imports by close
U.S. partners such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.
The security of the United States and those of these partners is
closely linked to the ability of the United States to guarantee the
freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.
Our ongoing territorial disputes in the South China Sea threaten the
principles of a rules-based order and the security of the United States
and our allies.
The language in the IAA allows Congress to more effectively
understand the needs of the intelligence community. It allows for a
two-way conversation so that Congress can act to provide the
intelligence community the tools and authorities it needs to inform
policymakers.
Mr. NUNES. Madam Speaker, I continue to reserve the balance of my
time.
Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from
Florida (Mrs. Murphy).
Mrs. MURPHY of Florida. Madam Speaker, I rise in support of the
Intelligence Authorization Act.
Good intelligence safeguards our Nation from adversaries. It is used
to support our Armed Forces, our diplomats, and our homeland security
professionals.
The men and women of the U.S. intelligence community make enormous
sacrifices on behalf of our country. While others seek the limelight,
they shun publicity and self-promotion. They are silent warriors and
quiet heroes.
I want to highlight section 609 of this legislation. It is a version
of a bill that I authored called the Prevention and Oversight of
Intelligence Sharing with Enemies Act, or the POISE Act.
I introduced the POISE Act in May after the President disclosed
highly sensitive information to senior Russian officials during a White
House meeting. This information had been entrusted to the U.S. by key
allies.
Under Federal law, the executive branch is required to inform the
congressional intelligence committees of U.S. intelligence activities.
The POISE Act would specify that the executive branch must notify the
committees when a member of the executive branch, including the
President, intentionally or inadvertently discloses top-secret
information to adversary foreign government.
{time} 1215
It is dangerous for a U.S. official to share classified information
with an adversary, especially outside of established intelligence
channels. The adversary could use the information to harm the United
States or its allies. Moreover, our partners might decide to stop
sharing critical intelligence with us if they lose confidence in our
capacity to keep it confidential.
The congressional notification requirement in the POISE Act would
help deter inappropriate disclosures of classified information to
adversaries. Once formally notified of the disclosure, Congress would
be in a position to take any appropriate oversight action.
I am so pleased that the core of the POISE Act is contained in
section 609. I want to thank Chairman Nunes and Ranking Member Schiff
for including the provision in the bill, and I urge the bill's swift
passage.
Mr. NUNES. Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Swalwell).
Mr. SWALWELL of California. Madam Speaker, happy birthday to you.
Madam Speaker, I would like to thank the ranking member and our
chair.
I think this IAA represents the best of what we do together in the
committee, and I am really just thrilled on behalf of the men and women
who serve this country in our military and in our intelligence services
that they have an authorization, act, that respects what they do, that
enables what they do and understands that we have trying days ahead.
Press reports right now are showing that North Korea may have just
launched another ballistic missile, and so people who we represent at
home are counting on us to do everything we can to protect this great
country. It has been a privilege to work with Mr. Schiff and the
chairman on this bill.
Of particular interest for me is that this bill also has our
intelligence agencies report back to Congress just what efforts the
Russians are taking not just in America, but across the globe to
interfere and meddle in other countries' elections. We have seen an
escalating pattern of this over the past few decades, certainly
culminating in our recent 2016 election.
It is very important that the Congress knows and that the American
people and our allies know what continued efforts will look like. So I
appreciate the majority's willingness to work with us.
We have seen, I think, in just the past few days, a bicameral effort
to come together and say that we are not going to tolerate Russia's
aggression in the world. The sanctions that were recently passed in
this House and across the way in the Senate, I think, showed the world
that we are serious, that this is our democracy, and it is still a
democracy that is worth protecting. I think part of the IAA reflects
that spirit as well.
So, again, I thank the chairman for his work. I thank the staff on
the majority side and the Members on the majority side, as well as our
ranking member and our own staff, for working so hard to put this
forward to protect and defend this great country.
Mr. NUNES. Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
This year's Intelligence Authorization Act was a bipartisan effort,
and I am pleased to vote for it today. With this legislation, we
reaffirm that all of our government's activities, including ones that
are, by necessity, classified, must be maximally effective and bound by
law. I urge my colleagues to vote ``yes'' on this year's IAA.
I do want to take this opportunity, also, to commend our committee's
outgoing fellow from the Los Alamos National Lab, Phil Tubesing. For 2
years, Phil has worked alongside the entire HPSCI staff, imparting his
scientific expertise about nuclear weapons and the other significant
national security work that our national labs undertake.
Phil, we thank you for your service to the committee and wish you
every success in the future.
Finally, I want to extend a closing word to all of the men and women
of the intelligence community. The work that you do keeps us safe. Your
mission is to speak truth to power, to give policymakers objective,
rigorously vetted and diligently produced intelligence, and you do that
in magnificent fashion. Thank you for your commitment and resolve in
the face of a challenging global threat landscape. With this
legislation, we believe that we provide you with the adequate tools,
authorities, and funding, while making sure that our congressional
oversight remains robust.
Madam Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. NUNES. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Madam Speaker, I want to thank both the majority and minority members
of our committee for working in a bipartisan manner this year to
complete this bill, which I believe is a really good product and will
support the men and women doing very difficult work to protect the
American people.
I do want to thank the staff not only from the minority side, but
also from the majority side, specifically: Shannon Stuart, Nick
Ciarlante, Scott Glabe, Bill Flanigan, Allen Souza, Lisa Major,
Jacqueline Tame, Mark Stewart, Chelsey Campbell, Andrew House, Marissa
Skaggs, Angel Smith, Kash Patel, Doug Presley, Steve Keith, George
Pappas, and Jack Langer for helping craft this bill with the minority;
as well as the committee-shared staff of Brandon Smith, Kim Kerr, and
Kristin Jepson.
I would also like to take another moment, as Mr. Schiff just did, our
ranking member, and thank our fellow who
[[Page H6556]]
will be leaving us this year, who has been here a couple of years, Mr.
Phil Tubesing, who will be going back and ending his congressional
fellowship. We thank him for all of his work.
Madam Speaker, I urge all of my colleagues to pass this bill and send
an overwhelming message to the men and women who protect this country
that this Congress stands ready to support them.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Madam Speaker, as a senior member of the Homeland
Security Committee and vigilant defender of our national security, I
rise in support of H.R. 3180, the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2018,'' which will provide the Intelligence Community (IC)
with the necessary resources and authorities to ensure they remain
capable of protecting and defending the United States.
Our intelligence community is facing unprecedented threats from our
adversaries around the world as this Administration struggles with the
basics of leading this great nation.
The Obama Administration left the nation with a stable and growing
economy; several important international coalition wins that include
the Iranian Nuclear Arms Deal; the Russia Sanctions; and the Paris
Climate Agreement.
The work of our intelligence community is a key asset in our efforts
to thwart our adversaries when they seek to do Americans or our
interests harm.
Following the Election, President-elect Trump was critical of the
intelligence community.
In December 2016, he attacked the CIA over its assessment that
Russian hacks on Democratic political targets were intended to help him
win the White House.
In January of this year just prior to his inauguration, he compared
our intelligence community to Nazi Germany, while making an unfounded
accusation that the intelligence community leaked an unconfirmed
dossier of sensitive information regarding him compiled by a private
investigator.
President Trump's disclosure of highly sensitive intelligence to
Russian officials during a visit they had in the oval office raises
grave concerns among our allies regarding sharing information with our
intelligence community and the disclosure threatened to fracture his
already-delicate relationship with the intelligence community.
The revelation that President Trump met a second time in secret with
Russian President Putin was not disclosed to the public, but came to
light due to investigative journalism.
The New York Times reported that lawyers and aides to President Trump
are investigating the investigators hired by special counsel Robert
Mueller, by scouring their records for potential conflicts of interest
in an attempt to discredit their work.
There is a pressing need for not only funding the work of the
intelligence community, but to also provide additional protections to
guard this national asset from undue interference from an
Administration with too many entanglements with the Russian government
that are under investigation.
This bill authorizes appropriations for Fiscal Year 2018 for vital
intelligence activities of the U.S. Government, the Community
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.
H.R. 3180 comes at a critical time in the status of our national
security and the IC's ability to protect it.
As we continue to face a diverse and growing array of threats from
terrorist groups, hostile nation states, and questionable or
incompetent figures in the Trump administration, it is crucial that the
IC receive all the resources it needs to do its job while Congress has
the necessary tools to carry out rigorous oversight of its work.
This bill seeks to meet these challenges by supporting critical
national security programs, particularly those focused on countering
terrorism and cyberattacks.
Under H.R. 3180, the Director of National Intelligence will be
required to electronically publish an unclassified advisory report on
foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to federal
elections.
It also bolsters intelligence oversight by ensuring that IC
contractors can meet freely with Congress.
Lastly, this bill improves IC accountability to Congress by requiring
the IC to provide reports on:
Investigations of leaks of classified information;
Security clearance processing timelines;
The process for reviewing information about computer vulnerabilities
for retention or potential release;
And Russian influence campaigns directed at foreign elections and
threat finance activities.
Madam Speaker, H.R. 3180 is a necessary response to the overwhelming
evidence pointing to a carefully planned and executed infiltration of
our 2016 Presidential Election by the Russian government and its
operatives.
The issue of cybersecurity, particularly with regards to our federal
election computer system infrastructure, has been of great concern to
me and the American public as more and more reports of Russian hacking
efforts have come to light.
In addition, the provision requiring reports on security clearance
processing timelines should shed light on the highly dubious and
inscrutable security clearances of Ivanka Trump and Jared Kushner.
Donald Trump's blatant and irresponsible nepotism towards his
daughter and son-in-law have made us all vulnerable to Russian and
other foreign influence at the highest levels of our federal
government.
H.R. 3180 will give the American people what they crave and deserve:
clarity and transparency to pierce through the haze of cover-ups and
distractions surrounding the Trump Administration.
This bill also takes significant, much-needed steps to improve
benefits for members of the IC, such as increasing employee
compensation and authorizing $514 million in appropriations for the
CIA's Retirement and Disability System.
Congress must do its part to adequately recompense the patriotic
Americans who serve our nation through their work in the IC, especially
employees with disabilities, who make up 9 percent of the intelligence
workforce.
At the same time, we must continue to ensure that Congress can
exercise oversight over and maintain transparency for the 17 agencies
that comprise the IC.
I am heartened that my Republican colleagues in the Intelligence
Committee are starting to see the light in recognizing the sinister
threat of Russian infiltration and White House collusion, both of which
endanger our nation's ability to practice and protect its core
democratic values.
I look forward to working with all Members of Congress to strengthen
our IC, and I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this
important legislation.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Ms. Cheney). All time for debate has
expired.
Pursuant to House Resolution 481, the previous question is ordered on
the bill, as amended.
The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was
read the third time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. NUNES. Madam Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, this 15-
minute vote on passage of H.R. 3180 will be followed by a 5-minute vote
on passage of S. 114.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 380,
nays 35, not voting 18, as follows:
[Roll No. 437]
YEAS--380
Abraham
Adams
Aderholt
Aguilar
Allen
Amodei
Arrington
Babin
Bacon
Banks (IN)
Barletta
Barr
Barragan
Barton
Beatty
Bera
Bergman
Beyer
Biggs
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (MI)
Bishop (UT)
Black
Blackburn
Blum
Blunt Rochester
Bonamici
Bost
Boyle, Brendan F.
Brady (PA)
Brady (TX)
Brat
Bridenstine
Brooks (AL)
Brooks (IN)
Brown (MD)
Brownley (CA)
Buchanan
Buck
Bucshon
Budd
Burgess
Bustos
Butterfield
Byrne
Calvert
Carbajal
Cardenas
Carson (IN)
Carter (GA)
Carter (TX)
Cartwright
Castor (FL)
Castro (TX)
Chabot
Cheney
Cicilline
Cleaver
Clyburn
Coffman
Cohen
Cole
Collins (GA)
Comer
Comstock
Conaway
Connolly
Cook
Cooper
Correa
Courtney
Cramer
Crawford
Crist
Crowley
Cuellar
Culberson
Curbelo (FL)
Davidson
Davis (CA)
Davis, Danny
Davis, Rodney
DeFazio
DeGette
Delaney
DeLauro
Demings
Denham
Dent
DeSantis
DeSaulnier
DesJarlais
Deutch
Diaz-Balart
Dingell
Doggett
Doyle, Michael F.
Duffy
Duncan (SC)
Dunn
Emmer
Engel
Eshoo
Espaillat
Estes (KS)
Esty (CT)
Evans
Farenthold
Faso
Ferguson
Fitzpatrick
Fleischmann
Flores
Fortenberry
Foster
Foxx
Frankel (FL)
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Fudge
Gaetz
Gallagher
Gallego
Garamendi
Garrett
Gianforte
Gibbs
Gohmert
Gonzalez (TX)
Goodlatte
Gosar
Gottheimer
Gowdy
Granger
Graves (GA)
Graves (LA)
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Griffith
Grothman
Guthrie
[[Page H6557]]
Hanabusa
Handel
Harper
Harris
Hartzler
Hastings
Heck
Hensarling
Herrera Beutler
Hice, Jody B.
Higgins (LA)
Higgins (NY)
Hill
Himes
Holding
Hoyer
Hudson
Huizenga
Hultgren
Hunter
Hurd
Issa
Jackson Lee
Jeffries
Jenkins (KS)
Jenkins (WV)
Johnson (LA)
Johnson (OH)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnson, Sam
Jordan
Joyce (OH)
Kaptur
Katko
Keating
Kelly (IL)
Kelly (MS)
Kelly (PA)
Kennedy
Kihuen
Kildee
Kilmer
Kind
King (IA)
Kinzinger
Knight
Krishnamoorthi
Kuster (NH)
Kustoff (TN)
LaHood
LaMalfa
Lamborn
Lance
Langevin
Larsen (WA)
Latta
Lawrence
Lawson (FL)
Levin
Lewis (MN)
Lieu, Ted
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Loebsack
Long
Loudermilk
Love
Lowenthal
Lowey
Lucas
Luetkemeyer
Lujan, Ben Ray
Lynch
MacArthur
Maloney, Carolyn B.
Maloney, Sean
Marchant
Marino
Marshall
Mast
Matsui
McCarthy
McCaul
McClintock
McCollum
McEachin
McHenry
McKinley
McMorris Rodgers
McNerney
McSally
Meadows
Meehan
Meeks
Meng
Messer
Mitchell
Moolenaar
Mooney (WV)
Moore
Moulton
Mullin
Murphy (FL)
Murphy (PA)
Nadler
Neal
Newhouse
Noem
Nolan
Norcross
Norman
Nunes
O'Halleran
Olson
Palazzo
Pallone
Palmer
Panetta
Pascrell
Paulsen
Payne
Pearce
Pelosi
Perlmutter
Perry
Peters
Peterson
Pingree
Pittenger
Poe (TX)
Poliquin
Posey
Price (NC)
Quigley
Raskin
Ratcliffe
Reed
Reichert
Renacci
Rice (NY)
Rice (SC)
Richmond
Roby
Roe (TN)
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rohrabacher
Rokita
Rooney, Francis
Rooney, Thomas J.
Ros-Lehtinen
Rosen
Ross
Rothfus
Rouzer
Roybal-Allard
Royce (CA)
Ruiz
Ruppersberger
Rush
Russell
Rutherford
Ryan (OH)
Sanchez
Sarbanes
Schiff
Schneider
Schrader
Schweikert
Scott (VA)
Scott, Austin
Scott, David
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Sessions
Sewell (AL)
Shea-Porter
Sherman
Shimkus
Shuster
Simpson
Sinema
Sires
Slaughter
Smith (MO)
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smucker
Soto
Stefanik
Stewart
Stivers
Suozzi
Swalwell (CA)
Taylor
Tenney
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thompson (PA)
Thornberry
Tiberi
Tipton
Titus
Tonko
Torres
Trott
Tsongas
Turner
Upton
Valadao
Vargas
Veasey
Vela
Visclosky
Wagner
Walberg
Walden
Walker
Walorski
Walters, Mimi
Walz
Wasserman Schultz
Watson Coleman
Weber (TX)
Wenstrup
Westerman
Williams
Wilson (FL)
Wilson (SC)
Wittman
Womack
Woodall
Yarmuth
Yoder
Yoho
Young (AK)
Young (IA)
NAYS--35
Amash
Bass
Blumenauer
Capuano
Chu, Judy
Clark (MA)
Clarke (NY)
Conyers
DelBene
Duncan (TN)
Ellison
Gabbard
Gomez
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Huffman
Jayapal
Johnson (GA)
Jones
Khanna
Labrador
Lee
Lewis (GA)
Lofgren
Massie
McGovern
O'Rourke
Pocan
Polis
Sanford
Schakowsky
Smith (WA)
Takano
Velazquez
Welch
NOT VOTING--18
Clay
Collins (NY)
Costa
Costello (PA)
Cummings
Donovan
Graves (MO)
Hollingsworth
King (NY)
Larson (CT)
Lujan Grisham, M.
Napolitano
Roskam
Scalise
Speier
Waters, Maxine
Webster (FL)
Zeldin
{time} 1245
Mmes. SCHAKOWSKY, VELAZQUEZ, and CLARKE of New York changed their
vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
Ms. ADAMS, Messrs. CROWLEY and KIND changed their vote from ``nay''
to ``yea.''
So the bill was passed.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
____________________
