[Congressional Record Volume 163, Number 124 (Monday, July 24, 2017)]
[House]
[Pages H6187-H6195]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill
(H.R. 3180) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2018 for
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other
purposes, as amended.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The text of the bill is as follows:
H.R. 3180
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the
``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 202. Computation of annuities for employees of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Sec. 301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
Sec. 303. Congressional oversight of intelligence community
contractors.
Sec. 304. Enhanced personnel security programs.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Sec. 401. Authority for protection of current and former employees of
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 402. Designation of the program manager-information sharing
environment.
Sec. 403. Technical correction to the executive schedule.
Subtitle B--Other Elements
Sec. 411. Requirements relating to appointment of General Counsel of
National Security Agency.
Sec. 412. Transfer or elimination of certain components and functions
of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 413. Technical amendments related to the Department of Energy.
TITLE V--MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES
Sec. 501. Assessment of significant Russian influence campaigns
directed at foreign elections and referenda.
Sec. 502. Foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to
Federal election campaigns.
Sec. 503. Assessment of threat finance relating to the Russian
Federation.
TITLE VI--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS
Sec. 601. Period of overseas assignments for certain foreign service
officers.
Sec. 602. Semiannual reports on investigations of unauthorized public
disclosures of classified information.
Sec. 603. Intelligence community reports on security clearances.
Sec. 604. Report on expansion of Security Protective Services
jurisdiction.
Sec. 605. Report on role of Director of National Intelligence with
respect to certain foreign investments.
Sec. 606. Report on Cyber Exchange Program.
Sec. 607. Review of intelligence community participation in
vulnerabilities equities process.
Sec. 608. Review of Intelligence Community whistleblower matters.
Sec. 609. Sense of Congress on notifications of certain disclosures of
classified information.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term
``congressional intelligence committees'' means--
(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives.
(2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence
community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4)
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal
year 2018 for the conduct of the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the following elements of
the United States Government:
(1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(3) The Department of Defense.
(4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(5) The National Security Agency.
(6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force.
(7) The Coast Guard.
(8) The Department of State.
(9) The Department of the Treasury.
(10) The Department of Energy.
(11) The Department of Justice.
(12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
(14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(16) The Department of Homeland Security.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts.--The amounts authorized to
be appropriated under section 101 and, subject to section
103, the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30,
2018, for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the
elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of section
101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations prepared to accompany this Act.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of
Authorizations.--
(1) Availability.--The classified Schedule of
Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made
available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate,
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives, and to the President.
(2) Distribution by the president.--Subject to paragraph
(3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of
the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in
subsection (a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule,
within the executive branch.
(3) Limits on disclosure.--The President shall not publicly
disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any
portion of such Schedule except--
(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C.
3306(a));
(B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or
(C) as otherwise required by law.
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
(a) Authority for Increases.--The Director of National
Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel
in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2018 by
the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in
section 102(a) if the Director of National Intelligence
determines that such action is necessary to the performance
of important intelligence functions, except that the number
of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized
under such section may not, for any element of the
intelligence community, exceed 3 percent of the number
[[Page H6188]]
of civilian personnel authorized under such schedule for such
element.
(b) Treatment of Certain Personnel.--The Director of
National Intelligence shall establish guidelines that govern,
for each element of the intelligence community, the treatment
under the personnel levels authorized under section 102(a),
including any exemption from such personnel levels, of
employment or assignment in--
(1) a student program, trainee program, or similar program;
(2) a reserve corps or as a reemployed annuitant; or
(3) details, joint duty, or long-term, full-time training.
(c) Notice to Congressional Intelligence Committees.--The
Director of National Intelligence shall notify the
congressional intelligence committees in writing at least 15
days prior to each exercise of an authority described in
subsection (a).
SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management
Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal
year 2018 the sum of $526,900,000. Within such amount, funds
identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and
development shall remain available until September 30, 2019.
(b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the
Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of
National Intelligence are authorized 804 positions as of
September 30, 2018. Personnel serving in such elements may be
permanent employees of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence or personnel detailed from other elements of the
United States Government.
(c) Classified Authorizations.--
(1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to
amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence
Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are
authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community
Management Account for fiscal year 2018 such additional
amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional
amounts made available for advanced research and development
shall remain available until September 30, 2019.
(2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the
personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the
Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30,
2018, there are authorized such additional personnel for the
Community Management Account as of that date as are specified
in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in
section 102(a).
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal
year 2018 the sum of $514,000,000.
SEC. 202. COMPUTATION OF ANNUITIES FOR EMPLOYEES OF THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
(a) Computation of Annuities.--
(1) In general.--Section 221 of the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2031) is amended--
(A) in subsection (a)(3)(B), by striking the period at the
end and inserting ``, as determined by using the annual rate
of basic pay that would be payable for full-time service in
that position.'';
(B) in subsection (b)(1)(C)(i), by striking ``12-month''
and inserting ``2-year'';
(C) in subsection (f)(2), by striking ``one year'' and
inserting ``two years'';
(D) in subsection (g)(2), by striking ``one year'' both
places it appears and inserting ``two years'';
(E) by redesignating subsections (h), (i), (j), (k), and
(l) as subsections (i), (j), (k), (l), and (m), respectively;
and
(F) by inserting after subsection (g) the following:
``(h) Conditional Election of Insurable Interest Survivor
Annuity by Participants Married at the Time of Retirement.--
``(1) Authority to make designation.--Subject to the
rights of former spouses under subsection (b) and section
222, at the time of retirement a married participant found by
the Director to be in good health may elect to receive an
annuity reduced in accordance with subsection (f)(1)(B) and
designate in writing an individual having an insurable
interest in the participant to receive an annuity under the
system after the participant's death, except that any such
election to provide an insurable interest survivor annuity to
the participant's spouse shall only be effective if the
participant's spouse waives the spousal right to a survivor
annuity under this Act. The amount of the annuity shall be
equal to 55 percent of the participant's reduced annuity.
``(2) Reduction in participant's annuity.--The annuity
payable to the participant making such election shall be
reduced by 10 percent of an annuity computed under subsection
(a) and by an additional 5 percent for each full 5 years the
designated individual is younger than the participant. The
total reduction under this subparagraph may not exceed 40
percent.
``(3) Commencement of survivor annuity.--The annuity
payable to the designated individual shall begin on the day
after the retired participant dies and terminate on the last
day of the month before the designated individual dies.
``(4) Recomputation of participant's annuity on death of
designated individual.--An annuity which is reduced under
this subsection shall, effective the first day of the month
following the death of the designated individual, be
recomputed and paid as if the annuity had not been so
reduced.''.
(2) Conforming amendments.--
(A) Central intelligence agency retirement act.--The
Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2001 et
seq.) is amended--
(i) in section 232(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 2052(b)(1)), by
striking ``221(h),'' and inserting ``221(i),''; and
(ii) in section 252(h)(4) (50 U.S.C. 2082(h)(4)), by
striking ``221(k)'' and inserting ``221(l)''.
(B) Central intelligence agency act of 1949.--Subsection
(a) of section 14 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 (50 U.S.C. 3514(a)) is amended by striking ``221(h)(2),
221(i), 221(l),'' and inserting ``221(i)(2), 221(j),
221(m),''.
(b) Annuities for Former Spouses.--Subparagraph (B) of
section 222(b)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2032(b)(5)(B)) is amended by
striking ``one year'' and inserting ``two years''.
(c) Prior Service Credit.--Subparagraph (A) of section
252(b)(3) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act
(50 U.S.C. 2082(b)(3)(A)) is amended by striking ``October 1,
1990'' both places that term appears and inserting ``March
31, 1991''.
(d) Reemployment Compensation.--Section 273 of the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2113) is
amended--
(1) by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections
(c) and (d), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following:
``(b) Part-time Reemployed Annuitants.--The Director shall
have the authority to reemploy an annuitant in a part-time
basis in accordance with section 8344(l) of title 5, United
States Code.''.
(e) Effective Date and Application.--The amendments made by
subsection (a)(1)(A) and subsection (c) shall take effect as
if enacted on October 28, 2009, and shall apply to
computations or participants, respectively, as of such date.
TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
SEC. 301. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not
be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any
intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by
the Constitution or the laws of the United States.
SEC. 302. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay,
retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be
increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may
be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits
authorized by law.
SEC. 303. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
CONTRACTORS.
(a) Oversight by Congress.--
(1) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by inserting after
section 506J the following new section:
``SEC. 506K. OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONTRACTORS.
``Notwithstanding the terms of any contract awarded by the
head of an element of the intelligence community, the head
may not--
``(1) prohibit a contractor of such element from contacting
or meeting with either of the congressional intelligence
committees (including a member or an employee thereof) to
discuss matters relating to a contract;
``(2) take any adverse action against a contractor of such
element, including by suspending or debarring the contractor
or terminating a contract, based on the contractor contacting
or meeting with either of the congressional intelligence
committees (including a member or an employee thereof) to
discuss matters relating to a contract; or
``(3) require the approval of the head before a contractor
of such element contacts or meets with either of the
congressional intelligence committees (including a member or
an employee thereof) to discuss matters relating to a
contract.''.
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents in the first
section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by
inserting after the item relating to section 506J the
following new item:
``Sec. 506K. Oversight of intelligence community contractors.''.
(b) Application.--The amendment made by subsection (a)(1)
shall apply with respect to a contract awarded by the head of
an element of the intelligence community on or after the date
of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 304. ENHANCED PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAMS.
Section 11001(d) of title 5, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) in the subsection heading, by striking ``Audit'' and
inserting ``Review'';
(2) in paragraph (1), by striking ``audit'' and inserting
``review''; and
(3) in paragraph (2), by striking ``audit'' and inserting
``review''.
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TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
SEC. 401. AUTHORITY FOR PROTECTION OF CURRENT AND FORMER
EMPLOYEES OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
Section 5(a)(4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 (50 U.S.C. 3506(a)(4)) is amended by striking ``such
personnel of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence as the Director of National Intelligence may
designate;'' and inserting ``current and former personnel of
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and their
immediate families as the Director of National Intelligence
may designate;''.
SEC. 402. DESIGNATION OF THE PROGRAM MANAGER-INFORMATION
SHARING ENVIRONMENT.
(a) Information Sharing Environment.--Section 1016(b) of
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
(6 U.S.C. 485(b)) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``President'' and
inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``President'' both places
that term appears and inserting ``Director of National
Intelligence''.
(b) Program Manager.--Section 1016(f) of the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485(f))
is amended by striking ``The individual designated as the
program manager shall serve as program manager until removed
from service or replaced by the President (at the President's
sole discretion).'' and inserting ``Beginning on the date of
the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2018, each individual designated as the program
manager shall be appointed by the Director of National
Intelligence.''.
SEC. 403. TECHNICAL CORRECTION TO THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE.
Section 5313 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the end the following:
``Director of the National Counterintelligence and
Security.''.
Subtitle B--Other Elements
SEC. 411. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO APPOINTMENT OF GENERAL
COUNSEL OF NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY.
(a) In General.--Section 2 of the National Security Agency
Act of 1959 (Public Law 86-36; 50 U.S.C. 3602) is amended by
adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(c)(1) There is a General Counsel of the National
Security Agency.
``(2) The General Counsel of the National Security Agency
shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate.''.
(b) Effective Date.--Subsection (c) of section 2 of the
National Security Agency Act of 1959 (Public Law 86-36; 50
U.S.C. 3602) shall apply with respect to any person who is
appointed to serve as General Counsel of the National
Security Agency on or after January 21, 2021.
SEC. 412. TRANSFER OR ELIMINATION OF CERTAIN COMPONENTS AND
FUNCTIONS OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
(a) Information Review Task Force.--
(1) Transfer required.--Effective on the date that is 180
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, there is
transferred from the Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff all
functions performed by the Information Review Task Force and
all assigned responsibilities performed by the Information
Review Task Force. Upon such transfer, such Task Force shall
be designated as a chairman's controlled activity.
(2) Transition plan.--
(A) Congressional briefing.--Not later than 60 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff shall jointly brief the congressional
intelligence committees and the congressional defense
committees on the plan to carry out the transfer required
under paragraph (1).
(B) Submittal of formal plan.--Not later than 90 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff shall jointly submit to the congressional
intelligence committees and the congressional defense
committees a formal plan for the transfer required under
paragraph (1).
(3) Limitation on use of funds.--The Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency may not obligate or expend any
funds authorized to be appropriated for the Information
Review Task Force for fiscal year 2018 after the date that is
180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. Any
such funds that are unobligated or unexpended as of such date
shall be transferred to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
(b) Identity Intelligence Project Office.--
(1) Elimination.--Effective on the date that is 180 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of
the Defense Intelligence Agency shall eliminate the Identity
Intelligence Project Office, including all functions and
assigned responsibilities performed by the Identity
Intelligence Project Office. All personnel and assets
pertaining to such Office shall be transferred to other
elements of the Defense Intelligence Agency, as determined by
the Director.
(2) Transition plan.--
(A) Congressional briefing.--Not later than 60 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency shall brief the congressional
intelligence committees and the congressional defense
committees on the plan to carry out the elimination required
under paragraph (1).
(B) Submittal of formal plan.--Not later than 90 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees and the congressional defense
committees a formal plan for the elimination required under
paragraph (1).
(3) Limitation on use of funds.--The Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency may not obligate or expend any
funds authorized to be appropriated for the Identity
Intelligence Project Office for fiscal year 2018 after the
date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act. Any such funds that are unobligated or unexpended as of
such date shall be transferred to other elements of the
Defense Intelligence Agency, as determined by the Director.
(c) Watchlisting Branch.--
(1) Transfer required.--Effective on the date that is 180
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, there is
transferred from the Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency to the Director for Intelligence of the Joint Staff
all functions and all assigned responsibilities performed by
the Watchlisting Branch.
(2) Transition plan.--
(A) Congressional briefing.--Not later than 60 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency and the Director for Intelligence
of the Joint Staff shall jointly brief the congressional
intelligence committees and the congressional defense
committees on the plan to carry out the transfer required
under paragraph (1).
(B) Submittal of formal plan.--Not later than 90 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency and the Director for Intelligence
of the Joint Staff shall jointly submit to the congressional
intelligence committees and the congressional defense
committees a formal plan for the transfer required under
paragraph (1).
(3) Limitation on use of funds.--The Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency may not obligate or expend any
funds authorized to be appropriated for the Watchlisting
Branch for fiscal year 2018 after the date that is 180 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act. Any such funds
that are unobligated or unexpended as of such date shall be
transferred to the Director for Intelligence of the Joint
Staff.
(d) Counter-Threat Finance.--
(1) Elimination.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency shall eliminate the Counter-Threat
Finance analysis function of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
All personnel and assets pertaining to such function shall be
transferred to other elements of the Defense Intelligence
Agency, as determined by the Director.
(2) Transition plan.--
(A) Congressional briefing.--Not later than 60 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency shall brief the congressional
intelligence committees and the congressional defense
committees on the plan to eliminate the Counter-Threat
Finance analysis function under paragraph (1).
(B) Submittal of formal plan.--Not later than 90 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees and the congressional defense
committees a formal plan to eliminate such function under
paragraph (1).
(3) Limitation on use of funds.--The Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency may not obligate or expend any
funds authorized to be appropriated for the Counter-Threat
Finance analysis function for fiscal year 2018 after the date
that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
Any such funds that are unobligated or unexpended as of such
date shall be transferred to other elements of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, as determined by the Director.
(e) National Intelligence University.--
(1) Transfer required.--Effective on October 1, 2020, there
is transferred from the Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency to the Director of National Intelligence all functions
and all assigned responsibilities performed by the National
Intelligence University.
(2) Transition plan.--
(A) Congressional briefing.--Not later than October 1,
2018, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the
Director of National Intelligence shall jointly brief the
congressional intelligence committees and the congressional
defense committees on the plan to carry out the transfer
required under paragraph (1).
(B) Submittal of formal plan.--Not later than April 1,
2019, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the
Director of National Intelligence shall jointly submit to the
congressional intelligence committees and the congressional
defense committees a formal plan for the transfer required
under paragraph (1).
(3) Limitation on use of funds.--The Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency
[[Page H6190]]
may not obligate or expend any funds authorized to be
appropriated for the National Intelligence University after
October 1, 2020. Any such funds that are unobligated or
unexpended as of such date shall be transferred to the
Director of National Intelligence.
(f) Congressional Notice for Reprogramming.--Not later than
30 days before transferring any funds relating to
transferring or eliminating any function under this section,
the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall submit
to the congressional intelligence committees and the
congressional defense committees notice in writing of such
transfer.
(g) Treatment of Certain Functions and Responsibilities.--
(1) In general.--In the case of any function or executive
agent responsibility that is transferred to the Director of
National Intelligence pursuant to this section, the Director
of National Intelligence may not delegate such function or
responsibility to another element of the intelligence
community.
(2) Executive agent responsibility.--In this subsection,
the term ``executive agent responsibility'' means the
specific responsibilities, functions, and authorities
assigned by the Director of National Intelligence to the head
of an intelligence community element to provide defined
levels of support for intelligence operations, or
administrative or other designated activities.
(h) Deadline for Policy Updates.--Not later than October 1,
2020, the Director of National Intelligence, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall ensure that all relevant
policies of the intelligence community and Department of
Defense are updated to reflect the transfers required to be
made pursuant to this section.
(i) Treatment of Transferred Functions.--No transferred
functions or assigned responsibility referred to in
subsection (a), (c), or (e) shall be considered a new start
by the receiving element, including in the case of any lapse
of appropriation for such transferred function or assigned
responsibility.
(j) Reports on Other Elements of Defense Intelligence
Agency.--
(1) National center for credibility assessment.--
(A) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(i) the assignment of executive agency for the National
Center for Credibility Assessment to the Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency may be limiting the ability of
the Center to effectively serve the Federal customer base of
the Center;
(ii) the failure of the Director of National Intelligence,
in the role of the Director as security executive for the
Federal Government, to define in policy the term ``Executive
Agent'' may be further limiting the ability of the Center to
receive sufficient resources to carry out the critical
Federal mission of the Center; and
(iii) the evolution of the Center from an organization of
the Army to an organization serving 27 departments and
agencies and responsible for all Federal credibility
assessment training, oversight, and research and development,
has resulted in a convoluted oversight structure based on
legacy reporting requirements.
(B) Report.--Not later than October 1, 2018, the Director
of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Director of National
Intelligence, and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly
submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the
congressional defense committees a report on--
(i) the current and projected missions and functions of the
National Center for Credibility Assessment;
(ii) the effectiveness of the current organizational
assignment of the Center to the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency;
(iii) the effectiveness of the current oversight structure
between the Center, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Director
of National Intelligence; and
(iv) the resources and authorities necessary to most
effectively execute the missions and functions of the Center.
(2) Underground facilities analysis center.--
(A) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(i) the assignment of executive agency for the Underground
Facilities Analysis Center to the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency may be limiting the ability of the Center
to effectively serve the broader intelligence community
customer base of the Center;
(ii) the failure of the Director of National Intelligence
to define in policy the term ``Executive Agent'' may be
further limiting the ability of the Center to receive
sufficient resources to carry out the critical mission of the
Center; and
(iii) the requirements of the intelligence community and
Department of Defense with respect to underground facilities
are not adequately being met given the scale and complexity
of the problem set and the relatively small amount of funding
currently received by the Center.
(B) Report.--Not later than October 1, 2018, the Director
of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Director of National
Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
shall jointly submit to the congressional intelligence
committees and the congressional defense committees a report
on--
(i) the missions and functions of the Underground
Facilities Analysis Center;
(ii) the state of the requirements of the intelligence
community and Department of Defense with respect to
underground facilities and the ability of the Center to meet
such requirements;
(iii) the effectiveness of the current organizational
assignment of the Center to the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency;
(iv) the effectiveness of the current oversight structure
between the Center, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the
Secretary of Defense, and the Director of National
Intelligence; and
(v) the resources and authorities necessary to most
effectively execute the missions and functions of the Center.
(k) Congressional Defense Committees Defined.--In this
section, the term ``congressional defense committees''
means--
(1) the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and
House of Representatives; and
(2) the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and
House of Representatives.
SEC. 413. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY.
(a) Atomic Energy Defense Act.--Section 4524(b)(2) of the
Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2674(b)(2)) is amended
by inserting ``Intelligence and'' after ``The Director of''.
(b) National Security Act of 1947.--Paragraph (2) of
section 106(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3041(b)(2)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (E), by inserting ``and
Counterintelligence'' after ``Office of Intelligence'';
(2) by striking subparagraph (F);
(3) by redesignating subparagraphs (G), (H), and (I) as
subparagraphs (F), (G), and (H), respectively; and
(4) in subparagraph (H), as redesignated by paragraph (3),
by realigning the margin of such subparagraph two ems to the
left.
TITLE V--MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES
SEC. 501. ASSESSMENT OF SIGNIFICANT RUSSIAN INFLUENCE
CAMPAIGNS DIRECTED AT FOREIGN ELECTIONS AND
REFERENDA.
(a) Assessment Required.--Not later than 60 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report containing an analytical assessment of
the most significant Russian influence campaigns, if any,
conducted during the 3-year period preceding the date of the
enactment of this Act, as well as the most significant
current or planned such Russian influence campaigns, if any.
Such assessment shall include--
(1) a summary of such significant Russian influence
campaigns, including, at a minimum, the specific means by
which such campaigns were conducted, are being conducted, or
likely will be conducted, as appropriate, and the specific
goal of each such campaign;
(2) a summary of any defenses against or responses to such
Russian influence campaigns by the foreign state holding the
elections or referenda;
(3) a summary of any relevant activities by elements of the
intelligence community undertaken for the purpose of
assisting the government of such foreign state in defending
against or responding to such Russian influence campaigns;
and
(4) an assessment of the effectiveness of such defenses and
responses described in paragraphs (2) and (3).
(b) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) may be
submitted in classified form, but if so submitted, shall
contain an unclassified summary.
(c) Russian Influence Campaign Defined.--In this section,
the term ``Russian influence campaign'' means any effort,
covert or overt, and by any means, attributable to the
Russian Federation directed at an election, referendum, or
similar process in a country other than the Russian
Federation or the United States.
SEC. 502. FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND CYBERSECURITY
THREATS TO FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS.
(a) Reports Required.--
(1) In general.--As provided in paragraph (2), for each
Federal election, the Director of National Intelligence, in
coordination with the Under Secretary of Homeland Security
for Intelligence and Analysis and the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, shall make publicly available on an
internet website an advisory report on foreign
counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to election
campaigns for Federal offices. Each such report shall
include, consistent with the protection of sources and
methods, each of the following:
(A) A description of foreign counterintelligence and
cybersecurity threats to election campaigns for Federal
offices.
(B) A summary of best practices that election campaigns for
Federal offices can employ in seeking to counter such
threats.
(C) An identification of any publicly available resources,
including United States Government resources, for countering
such threats.
(2) Schedule for submittal.--A report under this subsection
shall be made available as follows:
(A) In the case of a report regarding an election held for
the office of Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives during 2018, not later than the date that is
60
[[Page H6191]]
days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(B) In the case of a report regarding an election for a
Federal office during any subsequent year, not later than the
date that is one year before the date of the election.
(3) Information to be included.--A report under this
subsection shall reflect the most current information
available to the Director of National Intelligence regarding
foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats.
(b) Treatment of Campaigns Subject to Heightened Threats.--
If the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and
Analysis jointly determine that an election campaign for
Federal office is subject to a heightened foreign
counterintelligence or cybersecurity threat, the Director and
the Under Secretary, consistent with the protection of
sources and methods, may make available additional
information to the appropriate representatives of such
campaign.
SEC. 503. ASSESSMENT OF THREAT FINANCE RELATING TO THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION.
(a) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence,
acting through the National Intelligence Manager for Threat
Finance, shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report containing an assessment of the financing
of threat activity by the Russian Federation.
(b) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (a)
shall include, at a minimum, the following:
(1) A summary of leading examples from the 3-year period
prior to the date of the report of any threat finance
activities conducted by, for the benefit of, or at the behest
of officials of the Government of Russia, persons subject to
sanctions under any provision of law imposing sanctions with
respect to Russia, or Russian nationals subject to sanctions
under any other provision of law.
(2) An assessment with respect to any trends or patterns in
threat finance activities relating to Russia, including
common methods of conducting such activities.
(3) A summary of engagement and coordination with
international partners on threat finance relating to Russia,
especially in Europe, including examples of such engagement
and coordination.
(4) An identification of any resource and collection gaps.
(c) Form.--The report submitted under subsection (a) may be
submitted in classified form.
(d) Threat Finance Defined.--In this section, the term
``threat finance'' means--
(1) the financing of cyber operations, global influence
campaigns, intelligence service activities, proliferation,
terrorism, or transnational crime and drug organizations;
(2) the methods and entities used to spend, store, move,
raise, or conceal money or value on behalf of threat actors;
(3) sanctions evasion; or
(4) other forms of threat financing domestically or
internationally, as defined by the President.
TITLE VI--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS
SEC. 601. PERIOD OF OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENTS FOR CERTAIN FOREIGN
SERVICE OFFICERS.
(a) Length of Period of Assignment.--Subsection (a) of
section 502 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C.
3982) is amended by adding at the end the following new
paragraph:
``(3) In making assignments under paragraph (1), and in
accordance with section 903, and, if applicable, section 503,
the Secretary shall assure that a member of the Service may
serve at a post for a period of not more than six consecutive
years.''.
(b) Foreign Language Deployment Requirements.--Section 702
of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 4022) is
amended by--
(1) redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new
subsection:
``(c) Foreign Language Deployment Requirements.--
``(1) In general.--The Secretary of State, with the
assistance of other relevant officials, shall require all
members of the Service who receive foreign language training
in Arabic, Farsi, Chinese (Mandarin or Cantonese), Turkish,
Korean, and Japanese by the institution or otherwise in
accordance with subsection (b) to serve three successive
tours in positions in which the acquired language is both
relevant and determined to be a benefit to the Department.
``(2) Overseas deployments.--In carrying out paragraph (1),
at least one of the three successive tours referred to in
such paragraph shall be an overseas deployment.
``(3) Waiver.--The Secretary of State may waive the
application of paragraph (1) for medical or family hardship
or in the interest of national security.
``(4) Congressional notification.--The Secretary of State
shall notify the Committees on Appropriations and Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives and Committees on
Appropriations and Foreign Relations of the Senate at the end
of each fiscal year of any instances during the prior twelve
months in which the waiver authority described in paragraph
(3) was invoked.''.
SEC. 602. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON INVESTIGATIONS OF
UNAUTHORIZED PUBLIC DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION.
(a) In General.--Title XI of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end
the following new section:
``SEC. 1105. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON INVESTIGATIONS OF
UNAUTHORIZED PUBLIC DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION.
``(a) In General.--On a semiannual basis, each covered
official shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report that includes, with respect to the
preceding 6-month period--
``(1) the number of investigations opened by the covered
official regarding an unauthorized public disclosure of
classified information;
``(2) the number of investigations completed by the covered
official regarding an unauthorized public disclosure of
classified information; and
``(3) of the number of such completed investigations
identified under paragraph (2), the number referred to the
Attorney General for criminal investigation.
``(b) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) The term `covered official' means--
``(A) the heads of each element of the intelligence
community; and
``(B) the inspectors general with oversight responsibility
for an element of the intelligence community.
``(2) The term `investigation' means any inquiry, whether
formal or informal, into the existence of an unauthorized
public disclosure of classified information.
``(3) The term `unauthorized public disclosure of
classified information' means the unauthorized disclosure of
classified information to a journalist or media
organization.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first
section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by
inserting after the item relating to section 1104 the
following new item:
``Sec. 1105. Semiannual reports on investigations of unauthorized
public disclosures of classified information.''.
SEC. 603. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REPORTS ON SECURITY
CLEARANCES.
Section 506H of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3104) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)(1)--
(A) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by inserting ``and'' after the
semicolon;
(B) in subparagraph (B)(ii), by striking ``; and'' and
inserting a period; and
(C) by striking subparagraph (C);
(2) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c);
(3) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new
subsection (b):
``(b) Intelligence Community Reports.--(1) Not later than
March 1 of each year, the Director of National Intelligence
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
report on the security clearances processed by each element
of the intelligence community during the preceding calendar
year. Each such report shall separately identify security
clearances processed by each such element and shall cover
Federal employees and contractor employees.
``(2) Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall
include each of the following for each element of the
intelligence community for the year covered by the report:
``(A) The total number of initial security clearance
background investigations opened for new applicants.
``(B) The total number of security clearance periodic re-
investigations opened for existing employees.
``(C) The total number of initial security clearance
background investigations for new applicants that were
finalized and adjudicated with notice of a determination
provided to the prospective applicant, including--
``(i) the total number that were adjudicated favorably and
granted access to classified information; and
``(ii) the total number that were adjudicated unfavorably
and resulted in a denial or revocation of a security
clearance.
``(D) The total number of security clearance periodic
background investigations that were finalized and adjudicated
with notice of a determination provided to the existing
employee, including--
``(i) the total number that were adjudicated favorably; and
``(ii) the total number that were adjudicated unfavorably
and resulted in a denial or revocation of a security
clearance.
``(E) The total number of pending security clearance
background investigations, including initial applicant
investigations and periodic re-investigations, that were not
finalized and adjudicated as of the last day of such year and
that remained pending as follows:
``(i) For 180 days or less.
``(ii) For 180 days or longer, but less than 12 months.
``(iii) For 12 months or longer, but less than 18 months.
``(iv) For 18 months or longer, but less than 24 months.
``(v) For 24 months or longer.
``(F) In the case of security clearance determinations
completed or pending during the year preceding the year for
which the report is submitted that have taken longer than 12
months to complete--
``(i) the cause of the delay for such determinations; and
[[Page H6192]]
``(ii) the number of such determinations for which
polygraph examinations were required.
``(G) The percentage of security clearance investigations,
including initial and periodic re-investigations, that
resulted in a denial or revocation of a security clearance.
``(H) The percentage of security clearance investigations
that resulted in incomplete information.
``(I) The percentage of security clearance investigations
that did not result in enough information to make a decision
on potentially adverse information.
``(3) The report required under this subsection shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.''; and
(4) in subsection (c), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by
inserting ``and (b)'' after ``subsection (a)(1)''.
SEC. 604. REPORT ON EXPANSION OF SECURITY PROTECTIVE SERVICES
JURISDICTION.
(a) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report on the feasibility,
justification, costs, and benefits of expanding the
jurisdiction of the protective services of the Central
Intelligence Agency under section 15(a)(1) of the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3515(a)). The
report shall include--
(1) an explanation of the need for expanding such
jurisdiction beyond the 500-feet limit specified in such
section 15(a)(1); and
(2) an identification of any comparable departments or
agencies of the Federal Government in the Washington
metropolitan region (as defined in section 8301 of title 40,
United States Code) whose protective services jurisdictions
exceed 500 feet.
(b) Form.--The report under subsection (a) may be submitted
in classified form.
SEC. 605. REPORT ON ROLE OF DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN FOREIGN INVESTMENTS.
(a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence,
in consultation with the heads of the elements of the
intelligence community determined appropriate by the
Director, shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report on the role of the Director in preparing
analytic materials in connection with the evaluation by the
Federal Government of national security risks associated with
potential foreign investments into the United States.
(b) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (a)
shall--
(1) describe the current process for the provision of the
analytic materials described in subsection (a);
(2) identify the most significant benefits and drawbacks of
such process with respect to the role of the Director,
including any benefits or drawbacks relating to the time
allotted to the Director to prepare such materials; and
(3) include recommendations to improve such process.
SEC. 606. REPORT ON CYBER EXCHANGE PROGRAM.
(a) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
report on the potential establishment of a fully voluntary
exchange program between elements of the intelligence
community and private technology companies under which--
(1) an employee of an element of the intelligence community
with demonstrated expertise and work experience in
cybersecurity or related disciplines may elect to be
temporarily detailed to a private technology company that has
elected to receive the detailee; and
(2) an employee of a private technology company with
demonstrated expertise and work experience in cybersecurity
or related disciplines may elect to be temporarily detailed
to an element of the intelligence community that has elected
to receive the detailee.
(b) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (a)
shall include the following:
(1) The feasibility of establishing the exchange program
described in such subsection.
(2) Identification of any challenges in establishing the
exchange program.
(3) An evaluation of the benefits to the intelligence
community that would result from the exchange program.
SEC. 607. REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN
VULNERABILITIES EQUITIES PROCESS.
(a) Review.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community shall review, with respect to the 3-
year period preceding the date of the review, the roles and
responsibilities of the elements of the intelligence
community in the process of the Federal Government for
determining whether, when, how, and to whom information about
a vulnerability that is not publicly known will be shared
with or released to a non-Federal entity or the public.
(b) Report.--
(1) Submission.--Not later than 240 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General shall submit
to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the
results of the review under subsection (a).
(2) Elements.--The report under paragraph (1) shall include
the following:
(A) A description of the roles and responsibilities of the
elements of the intelligence community in the process of
determining whether, when, how, and to whom information about
a vulnerability that is not publicly known will be shared or
released to a non-Federal entity or the public.
(B) The criteria used by the Federal Government, including
elements of the intelligence community, in making such
determination.
(C) With respect to the period covered by the review--
(i) a summary of vulnerabilities known to elements of the
intelligence community that were reviewed by the Federal
Government pursuant to such process, including--
(I) the number of vulnerabilities known to the intelligence
community that were reviewed; and
(II) of such number of reviewed vulnerabilities, the number
for which information was shared with or released to a non-
Federal entity or the public;
(ii) an assessment of whether there were any
vulnerabilities known to elements of the intelligence
community that were not reviewed pursuant to such process,
and if so, the basis and rationale for not conducting such a
review; and
(iii) a summary of the most significant incidents in which
a vulnerability known to the intelligence community, but not
shared with or released to a non-Federal entity or the
public, was exploited by an individual, an entity, or a
foreign country in the course of carrying out a cyber
intrusion.
(D) A description of any current mechanisms for overseeing
such process.
(E) Recommendations to improve the efficiency,
effectiveness, accountability, and, consistent with national
security, transparency of such process.
(F) Any other matters the Inspector General determines
appropriate.
(3) Form.--The report may be submitted in classified form.
(c) Vulnerability Defined.--In this section, the term
``vulnerability'' means, with respect to information
technology, a design, configuration, or implementation
weakness in a technology, product, system, service, or
application that can be exploited or triggered to cause
unexpected or unintended behavior.
SEC. 608. REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WHISTLEBLOWER
MATTERS.
(a) Review of Whistleblower Matters.--The Inspector General
of the Intelligence Community, in consultation with the
inspectors general for the Central Intelligence Agency, the
National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the
National Reconnaissance Office, shall conduct a review of the
authorities, policies, investigatory standards, and other
practices and procedures relating to intelligence community
whistleblower matters, with respect to such inspectors
general.
(b) Objective of Review.--The objective of the review
required under subsection (a) is to identify any
discrepancies, inconsistencies, or other issues, which
frustrate the timely and effective reporting of intelligence
community whistleblower matters to appropriate inspectors
general and to the congressional intelligence committees, and
the fair and expeditious investigation and resolution of such
matters.
(c) Conduct of Review.--The Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community shall take such measures as the
Inspector General determines necessary in order to ensure
that the review required by subsection (a) is conducted in an
independent and objective fashion.
(d) Report.--Not later than 270 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a written report containing the
results of the review required under subsection (a), along
with recommendations to improve the timely and effective
reporting of Intelligence Community whistleblower matters to
inspectors general and to the congressional intelligence
committees and the fair and expeditious investigation and
resolution of such matters.
SEC. 609. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NOTIFICATIONS OF CERTAIN
DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds that section 502 of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3092) requires
elements of the intelligence community to keep the
congressional intelligence committees ``fully and currently
informed'' about all ``intelligence activities'' of the
United States, and to ``furnish to the congressional
intelligence committees any information or material
concerning intelligence activities. . .which is requested by
either of the congressional intelligence committees in order
to carry out its authorized responsibilities.''.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the authorities described in subsection (a), together
with other intelligence community authorities, obligate an
element of the intelligence community to submit to the
congressional intelligence committees written notification,
by not later than 7 days after becoming aware, that an
individual in the executive branch has disclosed covered
classified information to an official of an adversary foreign
government using methods other than established intelligence
channels; and
[[Page H6193]]
(2) each such notification should include--
(A) the date and place of the disclosure of classified
information covered by the notification;
(B) a description of such classified information;
(C) identification of the individual who made such
disclosure and the individual to whom such disclosure was
made; and
(D) a summary of the circumstances of such disclosure.
(c) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) The term ``adversary foreign government'' means the
government of any of the following foreign countries:
(A) North Korea.
(B) Iran.
(C) China.
(D) Russia.
(E) Cuba.
(2) The term ``covered classified information'' means
classified information that was--
(A) collected by an element of the intelligence community;
or
(B) provided by the intelligence service or military of a
foreign country to an element of the intelligence community.
(3) The term ``established intelligence channels'' means
methods to exchange intelligence to coordinate foreign
intelligence relationships, as established pursuant to law by
the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National
Security Agency, or other head of an element of the
intelligence community.
(4) The term ``individual in the executive branch'' means
any officer or employee of the executive branch, including
individuals--
(A) occupying a position specified in article II of the
Constitution;
(B) appointed to a position by an individual described in
subparagraph (A); or
(C) serving in the civil service or the senior executive
service (or similar service for senior executives of
particular departments or agencies).
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from
California (Mr. Nunes) and the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff)
each will control 20 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. Nunes).
General Leave
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have
5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and include
extraneous material on the bill, H.R. 3180.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from California?
There was no objection.
{time} 1730
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, passing an annual intelligence authorization bill is the
most important tool Congress has to conduct effective oversight of the
intelligence activities of the U.S. Government. The Intelligence
Committee has brought a bill to the floor every year since fiscal year
2010. Once again, the bill is a bipartisan product that reflects
contributions from all committee members. It was reported out of
committee by a unanimous voice vote.
Because most of the intelligence budget involves highly classified
programs, the bulk of the Committee's schedule of authorizations and
direction are found in the classified annex to the bill. This
classified annex has been made available to Members since markup in the
House Intelligence Committee spaces.
At the unclassified level, I can report that the overall funding
authorized by this bill is slightly below the President's budget
request. Furthermore, the bill funds the Military Intelligence Program
in line with the levels of the House-passed National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018.
The bill implements the first stage of a committee initiative to
streamline and optimize defense intelligence beginning with the Defense
Intelligence Agency; provides guidelines to guarantee that intelligence
community contractors can meet with Congress unhindered; and enhances
oversight of intelligence activities by mandating intelligence
community reports on threats to Federal elections, leaks of classified
information, security clearance processing, and other vital activities.
Mr. Speaker, America faces an international threat matrix more
complicated than anything we have endured in the past. The recent,
impressive progress made by the U.S. military and its allies against
ISIS in Iraq and Syria has not ended the ISIS terror threat. In fact,
based on the group's ability to inspire terror attacks through social
media and other means, ISIS could remain a significant threat to the
West even after it loses all the territory it controls. Additionally,
al-Qaida remains active in Afghanistan and has retained its close links
to the resurgent Taliban. Meanwhile, other threats from belligerent
regimes like Iran and North Korea continue to intensify, while
instability in failed states like Libya presents pressing security
challenges to the U.S. and our European allies, including through the
facilitation of waves of mass migration that provide cover for the
movement of jihadists to the West.
This bill will ensure that the dedicated men and women of our
intelligence community have the funding, authorities, and support they
need to carry out their mission and to keep us safe, while providing
Congress with the tools it needs to provide robust oversight over their
actions.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC, July 24, 2017.
Hon. Devin Nunes,
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Nunes: I am writing to you concerning the
jurisdictional interest of the Committee on Homeland Security
in H.R. 3180, the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2018.'' The bill includes provisions that fall within
the jurisdiction of the Committee on Homeland Security.
I recognize and appreciate the desire to bring this
legislation before the House of Representatives in an
expeditious manner, and accordingly, the Committee on
Homeland Security will forego seeking a sequential referral
on this bill. However, this is conditional based on our
mutual understanding that foregoing action on H.R. 3180 at
this time does not prejudice this Committee with respect to
any future jurisdictional claim over the subject matter
contained in this bill or similar legislation.
This waiver is also given with the understanding that the
Committee on Homeland Security expressly reserves its
authority to seek conferees on any provision within its
jurisdiction during any House-Senate conference that may be
convened on this or any similar legislation, and requests
your support for such a request.
I would appreciate your response to this letter confirming
this understanding with respect to H.R. 3180, and ask that a
copy of this letter and your response be included in the
Congressional Record during consideration of this bill on the
House floor.
Sincerely,
Michael T. McCaul,
Chairman.
____
House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence,
Washington, DC, July 24, 2017.
Hon. Michael McCaul,
Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman McCaul: I received your letter regarding H.R.
3180, the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2018.'' You have asserted that Section 502 of the Act falls
within your jurisdiction because it requests that the
Director of National Intelligence coordinate with the
National Intelligence Program (NIP) funded Department of
Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS
I&A) to produce a publicly available advisory report on
foreign counterintelligence and cyber threats.
Consistent with our January 11, 2017 exchange of letters,
HPSCI has exclusive jurisdiction over NIP funded DHS I&A
intelligence activities. However, I acknowledge that your
letter in no way diminishes or alters the jurisdiction of the
Committee on Homeland Security with respect to any future
jurisdictional claim over the subject matter contained in the
bill or any similar legislation.
I will include a copy of your letter and this response in
the Congressional Record during consideration of the
legislation on the House Floor. Thank you for your assistance
with this matter.
Sincerely,
Devin Nunes,
Chairman.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to taking up the Intelligence
Authorization Act on suspension at a time when issues concerning the
intelligence community have taken on an even greater significance and
urgency, and taking up the bill this way will deprive Members of the
opportunity to offer important amendments.
The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 is a good and
bipartisan bill, but even a good bill can be made better. And although
we have taken up the IAA on suspension on occasion in the past, it has
only been on the basis of mutual agreement, which is not the case this
year.
On its merits, I believe the IAA should and will become law, and I
look
[[Page H6194]]
forward to its ultimate approval by both the House and Senate, and
enactment.
Nevertheless, I share Leader Pelosi and Whip Hoyer's view that
tonight's suspension vote should be opposed. This IAA should go through
regular order so that Members may offer amendments. I will vote ``no''
today because I disagree with the expedited procedure used to bring
this to the floor.
The Intelligence Committee has a unique role in this House and a
special obligation to the American people.
It is our job to oversee the activities of the 17 agencies that
comprise the intelligence community, ensuring that we strike an
appropriate balance between protecting our country's national security
and the civil liberties of everyone who calls America home.
On behalf of the House--by and through our oversight tools, including
the IAA--our committee helps ensure that the activities of the U.S.
intelligence community do the following: that they adhere to the
Constitution and to the law; that they advance the national security
interests of the United States; that they wisely expend taxpayer
dollars; and that they steadfastly protect Americans' civil liberties
and privacy rights.
The legislation before us today, like its predecessors, continues to
fund, equip, and give policy direction to the intelligence community
and military intelligence elements of the Department of Defense. It
provides funding levels slightly below the President's 2018 budget
request and sustains intelligence priorities provided for in previous
authorizations.
In addition to the unclassified legislative text and accompanying
House report, the IAA includes a classified annex, which directs the
resources and spending for the IC's activities and programs. This
includes a correlating schedule of authorizations that lays out funding
for the IC and the DOD.
This year's IAA, once again, incorporates a number of Democratic
Member oversight priorities: it improves our efforts to stamp out
waste, fraud, and abuse by requiring an Inspector General-level review
of existing whistleblower procedures and by permitting IC contractors
to come directly to Congress without requiring permission from the IC
elements that employ them.
A provision accompanying the report mandates that the ODNI notify and
provide justification to Congress if the executive branch alters the
existing Presidential Policy Guidance, or PPG, relating to U.S.
counterterrorism actions located outside of designated areas of active
hostilities. The PPG, first promulgated under the previous
administration, is an important element of U.S. policymaking that seeks
to ensure direct action against lawful terrorist targets is undertaken
only when necessary and consistent with U.S. national security and
foreign policy interests. This is the result of rigorous legal and
policy deliberation and coordination within the U.S. Government.
Reporting to Congress on any changes to it ensures proper oversight.
The bill also furthers our committee's belief that the future of the
IC workforce depends on diversity; as such, this year's IAA enhances
the ODNI's Centers of Academic Excellence program.
Finally, this bill reflects a clear-eyed assessment of the threat we
face from a resurgent Russia determined to undermine our democratic
institutions and our faith in the American political process.
As the intelligence community has determined, Moscow initiated as
early as mid-2015 an active measures campaign to assault our 2016
election. The Kremlin's influence campaign consisted of cyber
espionage, hacking and weaponizing stolen documents, and a propaganda
machine that was used to great effect to amplify every element of their
appalling campaign, and perhaps more.
This year's IAA acts on that unanimous IC judgment by directing
assessments on Moscow's influence campaigns against foreign elections
and the threat posed by Russian finance activities globally. It also
requires ODNI to publish a report on the foreign cybersecurity and
counterintelligence threats to future U.S. Federal election campaigns.
As with any product of a good-faith attempt at compromise, I do not
pretend this bill is perfect. There are provisions I wish were
modified, and some provisions that I would have liked to have seen
included. Many of my colleagues feel the same way, and they should have
been permitted to offer amendments, something I hope they will be
permitted to do by voting ``no'' on this bill under suspension.
For example, we wish this bill had done more to codify in law some of
the previous administration's counterterrorism reforms, including
giving the status of law to an executive order requiring the Director
of National Intelligence to continue the practice of releasing publicly
available data on the total number of combatants and noncombatants
killed or injured due to counterterrorism action.
I look forward to the fiscal year '18 Intelligence Authorization Act
being enacted into law--not through the vehicle of the suspension
calendar, but through consideration under regular order. For that
reason, I urge a ``no'' vote here so that all Members will have a
chance to be heard.
Mr. Speaker, I am proud to yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from
Alabama (Ms. Sewell), who is one of our superb members of the committee
and also one of our ranking members.
Ms. SEWELL of Alabama. Mr. Speaker, today I rise to speak on the
passage of the fiscal year 2018 Intelligence Authorization Act under
suspension of the rules.
Unfortunately, I strongly oppose its passage today, not because it is
a bad bill. On the contrary, I voted for it out of committee. But today
I disagree on how this bill is presented on the floor. The Intelligence
Authorization Act should be on regular order and rule and not on
suspension.
This critically important piece of legislation is the most
substantial oversight mechanism that Congress has over the intelligence
community, and it deserves full consideration and robust debate. The
American public and our intelligence community deserve nothing less.
Before authorizing tens of billions of dollars for the United States
intelligence community, our lawmakers should carefully consider and
debate the issues our intelligence community faces, many of which
directly impact our national security. Instead, today's consideration
of the IAA has been fast-tracked, and debate has been cut short.
Most of the work of the intelligence community and our committee
happens behind closed doors, which means that debate on the House floor
over the Intelligence Authorization Act is one of the few times the
public can engage with the issues facing our intelligence community. By
limiting debate on this bill, we cut public engagement off as well.
Mr. Speaker, I am proud of the bipartisan way in which our committee
worked to craft this year's Intelligence Authorization Act. I am
excited that this year's IAA includes a provision that I drafted that
provides our lawmakers, election officials, campaigns, and the public
with additional information and resources to defend our democracy
against emerging cyber threats. Additionally, we will continue to be
able to provide a summer internship program to students from the
existing Centers of Academic Excellence in intelligence. This year's
IAA will also hold the IC accountable for creating a more diverse and
inclusive working environment.
Nevertheless, I will oppose today's bill not because I don't support
the underlying bill, but because I believe that national security
issues raised by this legislation are too important to be fast-tracked.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to oppose today's vote under
suspension of the rules and to stand with us in demanding full debate
and consideration under regular order.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I have no further speakers, and I reserve the
balance of my time to close.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
The Intelligence Authorization Act is a critical oversight tool, one
component of the legal architecture that governs the authorities and
boundaries of our civilian and military intelligence professionals.
The bipartisan legislation before us today is sound, and I endorse
its substance on the merits. But I agree with our leadership that the
suspension process is not the appropriate venue for its adoption.
[[Page H6195]]
For this reason, I will vote ``no'' on the measure tonight, but I
remain optimistic about this legislation's ultimate passage into law
after we complete its consideration under regular order.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, first, I thank Mr. Phil Tubesing, who has been a
congressional fellow with our committee for the last 2 years. This will
be his last bill. He will be leaving us at the end of the month, so I
wanted to recognize him for all his fine work on the bill.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to vote ``yes'' on this bill. This
is typically how the bill has come to the floor from the Intelligence
Committee. As nearly all the Members know, for the last several years
that is how it has occurred. Unfortunately, we are beginning to
deteriorate into political theater at the Intelligence Committee. As
long as I am chairman, I am going to continue to try to stop that from
happening.
Mr. Speaker, I urge a ``yes'' vote, and I yield back the balance of
my time.
Mr. CARSON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, as a member of the House
Intelligence Committee, I am proud of the bipartisanship that allowed
us to put this bill together.
Our committee, which normally operates quietly, has gotten more
attention than normal this year as we conduct the critical business of
investigating Russian intervention in our elections.
But we still do our day job--overseeing intelligence programs and
providing support to the men and women of our intelligence community
who fight to keep our country safe.
This bill is the culmination of this cooperation.
Our country is facing a wide array of pervasive and complex threats.
Our near-peer adversaries, Russia and China, are rapidly growing
their military capabilities and regularly, unashamedly violating
international law.
A nuclear weapons stockpile and functioning ICBM program now sit in
the hands of an unpredictable North Korean dictator.
And the so-called caliphate started by ISIS is losing ground, only to
increase homegrown attacks against the United States and its allies.
My constituents, like all Americans, are rightly concerned.
But they can feel confident that we are working with the intelligence
community on ways to address them.
As the Ranking Member of the Emerging Threats Subcommittee, I am
particularly interested in supporting our intelligence professionals
who assess and prevent terrorist threats to our homeland--while
protecting the civil rights and liberties of innocent Americans.
I'm working to ensure they use their expertise, as well as that in
the private sector, to find and remove online propaganda used to
recruit would-be attackers.
I'm also proud to include language that will enable the IC and
private sector to temporarily exchange IT talent in order to better
tackle some of the toughest cybersecurity challenges.
Mr. Speaker, Chairman Nunes and Ranking Member Schiff have led this
process with bipartisan professionalism.
This bill is stronger because it reflects the input of all of our
members.
The full House should have this same opportunity--not be forced to
vote up or down under suspension.
Republican leadership owes it to our members to return to regular
order so our bill can benefit from the input of the full House.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, as a senior member of the Homeland
Security Committee and vigilant defender of our national security, I
rise in support of H.R. 3180, the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2018,'' which will provide the Intelligence Community (IC)
with the necessary resources and authorities to ensure they remain
capable of protecting and defending the United States.
This bill authorizes appropriations for Fiscal Year 2018 for vital
intelligence activities of the U.S. government, the Community
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.
H.R. 3180 comes at a critical time in the status of our national
security and the IC's ability to protect it.
As we continue to face a diverse and growing array of threats from
terrorist groups, hostile nation states, and questionable or
incompetent figures in the Trump administration, it is crucial that the
IC receive all the resources it needs to do its job while Congress has
the necessary tools to carry out rigorous oversight of its work.
This bill seeks to meet these challenges by supporting critical
national security programs, particularly those focused on countering
terrorism and cyberattacks.
Under H.R. 3180, the Director of National Intelligence will be
required to electronically publish an unclassified advisory report on
foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to federal
elections.
It also bolsters intelligence oversight by ensuring that IC
contractors can meet freely with Congress.
Lastly, this bill improves IC accountability to Congress by requiring
the IC to provide reports on:
Investigations of leaks of classified information;
Security clearance processing timelines;
The process for reviewing information about computer vulnerabilities
for retention or potential release;
And Russian influence campaigns directed at foreign elections and
threat finance activities.
Mr. Speaker, H.R. 3180 is a necessary response to the overwhelming
evidence pointing to a carefully planned and executed infiltration of
our 2016 Presidential Election by the Russian government and its
operatives.
The issue of cybersecurity, particularly with regards to our federal
election computer system infrastructure, has been of great concern to
me and the American public as more and more reports of Russian hacking
efforts have come to light.
In addition, the provision requiring reports on security clearance
processing timelines should shed light on the highly dubious and
inscrutable security clearances of Ivanka Trump and Jared Kushner.
Donald Trump's blatant and irresponsible nepotism towards his
daughter and son-in-law have made us all vulnerable to Russian and
other foreign influence at the highest levels of our federal
government.
H.R. 3180 will give the American people what they crave and deserve:
clarity and transparency to pierce through the haze of cover-ups and
distractions surrounding the Trump Administration.
This bill also takes significant, much-needed steps to improve
benefits for members of the IC, such as increasing employee
compensation and authorizing $514 million in appropriations for the
CIA's Retirement and Disability System.
Congress must do its part to adequately recompense the patriotic
Americans who serve our nation through their work in the IC, especially
employees with disabilities, who make up 9 percent of the intelligence
workforce.
At the same lime, we must continue to ensure that Congress can
exercise oversight over and maintain transparency for the 17 agencies
that comprise the IC.
I am heartened that my Republican colleagues in the Intelligence
Committee are starting to see the light in recognizing the sinister
threat of Russian infiltration and White House collusion, both of which
endanger our nation's ability to practice and protect its core
democratic values.
I look forward to working with all Members of Congress to strengthen
our IC, and I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this
important legislation.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the
gentleman from California (Mr. Nunes) that the House suspend the rules
and pass the bill, H.R. 3180, as amended.
The question was taken.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds
being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further
proceedings on this motion will be postponed.
____________________
[Congressional Record Volume 163, Number 124 (Monday, July 24, 2017)]
[House]
[Page H6196]
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The unfinished business is the vote on the
motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 3180) to authorize
appropriations for fiscal year 2018 for intelligence and intelligence-
related activities of the United States Government, the Community
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and
Disability System, and for other purposes, as amended, on which the
yeas and nays were ordered.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the
gentleman from California (Mr. Nunes) that the House suspend the rules
and pass the bill, as amended.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 241,
nays 163, not voting 29, as follows:
[Roll No. 407]
YEAS--241
Abraham
Aderholt
Aguilar
Allen
Amodei
Arrington
Babin
Bacon
Banks (IN)
Barletta
Barr
Barton
Bera
Bergman
Biggs
Bilirakis
Bishop (MI)
Bishop (UT)
Black
Blackburn
Blum
Bost
Brady (TX)
Bridenstine
Brooks (IN)
Brownley (CA)
Buchanan
Buck
Bucshon
Budd
Burgess
Bustos
Byrne
Calvert
Carbajal
Carter (GA)
Carter (TX)
Chabot
Cheney
Coffman
Cole
Collins (GA)
Collins (NY)
Comer
Comstock
Conaway
Cook
Correa
Costa
Cramer
Crist
Culberson
Curbelo (FL)
Davis, Rodney
Denham
Dent
DeSantis
DesJarlais
Diaz-Balart
Donovan
Duffy
Duncan (SC)
Dunn
Emmer
Estes (KS)
Farenthold
Faso
Ferguson
Fitzpatrick
Fleischmann
Flores
Fortenberry
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gaetz
Gallagher
Garamendi
Garrett
Gianforte
Gibbs
Goodlatte
Gosar
Gottheimer
Gowdy
Granger
Graves (GA)
Graves (LA)
Griffith
Grothman
Guthrie
Handel
Harper
Harris
Hartzler
Hensarling
Herrera Beutler
Hice, Jody B.
Higgins (LA)
Hill
Holding
Hollingsworth
Hudson
Huizenga
Hunter
Hurd
Issa
Jenkins (KS)
Johnson (LA)
Johnson (OH)
Johnson, Sam
Joyce (OH)
Katko
Keating
Kelly (MS)
Kelly (PA)
Kihuen
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kinzinger
Knight
Kuster (NH)
Kustoff (TN)
LaHood
LaMalfa
Lamborn
Lance
Latta
Lewis (MN)
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Loebsack
Long
Loudermilk
Love
Lucas
Luetkemeyer
Lujan Grisham, M.
MacArthur
Maloney, Sean
Marchant
Marino
Marshall
Mast
McCarthy
McClintock
McHenry
McMorris Rodgers
McNerney
McSally
Meadows
Meehan
Messer
Mitchell
Moolenaar
Mullin
Murphy (FL)
Murphy (PA)
Newhouse
Noem
Norcross
Norman
Nunes
O'Halleran
Olson
Palmer
Paulsen
Pearce
Perry
Peters
Peterson
Pittenger
Poliquin
Posey
Ratcliffe
Reed
Reichert
Rice (SC)
Roby
Roe (TN)
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rokita
Rooney, Francis
Ros-Lehtinen
Rosen
Roskam
Ross
Rothfus
Rouzer
Royce (CA)
Ruiz
Russell
Rutherford
Schneider
Schrader
Schweikert
Scott, Austin
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shea-Porter
Shimkus
Shuster
Simpson
Sinema
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smucker
Stefanik
Stivers
Suozzi
Taylor
Tenney
Thompson (PA)
Thornberry
Tiberi
Tipton
Trott
Turner
Upton
Valadao
Wagner
Walberg
Walden
Walker
Walorski
Walters, Mimi
Weber (TX)
Webster (FL)
Wenstrup
Westerman
Wilson (SC)
Wittman
Womack
Woodall
Yoder
Yoho
Young (AK)
Young (IA)
Zeldin
NAYS--163
Adams
Amash
Barragan
Beatty
Beyer
Bishop (GA)
Blumenauer
Blunt Rochester
Bonamici
Boyle, Brendan F.
Brady (PA)
Brat
Brown (MD)
Butterfield
Capuano
Cardenas
Carson (IN)
Cartwright
Castor (FL)
Castro (TX)
Chu, Judy
Cicilline
Clark (MA)
Clarke (NY)
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Cohen
Connolly
Conyers
Cooper
Courtney
Cuellar
Davidson
Davis (CA)
DeFazio
DeGette
Delaney
DeLauro
DelBene
Demings
DeSaulnier
Deutch
Dingell
Doggett
Doyle, Michael F.
Duncan (TN)
Ellison
Engel
Eshoo
Espaillat
Esty (CT)
Evans
Foster
Frankel (FL)
Fudge
Gabbard
Gallego
Gohmert
Gomez
Gonzalez (TX)
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Grijalva
Hanabusa
Hastings
Heck
Higgins (NY)
Himes
Hoyer
Huffman
Jackson Lee
Jayapal
Jeffries
Johnson, E. B.
Jones
Jordan
Kaptur
Kelly (IL)
Kennedy
Khanna
Kildee
Kilmer
Kind
Krishnamoorthi
Labrador
Langevin
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Lawson (FL)
Lee
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lieu, Ted
Lofgren
Lowenthal
Lowey
Lujan, Ben Ray
Lynch
Maloney, Carolyn B.
Massie
Matsui
McCollum
McEachin
McGovern
Meeks
Meng
Moore
Moulton
Nadler
Neal
Nolan
O'Rourke
Pallone
Panetta
Pascrell
Payne
Pelosi
Perlmutter
Pingree
Pocan
Polis
Price (NC)
Quigley
Raskin
Rice (NY)
Richmond
Roybal-Allard
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Sanchez
Sanford
Sarbanes
Schakowsky
Schiff
Scott (VA)
Scott, David
Serrano
Sewell (AL)
Sherman
Sires
Slaughter
Smith (WA)
Soto
Speier
Swalwell (CA)
Takano
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Titus
Tonko
Torres
Tsongas
Veasey
Vela
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walz
Wasserman Schultz
Watson Coleman
Wilson (FL)
Yarmuth
NOT VOTING--29
Bass
Brooks (AL)
Costello (PA)
Crawford
Crowley
Cummings
Davis, Danny
Graves (MO)
Gutierrez
Hultgren
Jenkins (WV)
Johnson (GA)
Lawrence
McCaul
McKinley
Mooney (WV)
Napolitano
Palazzo
Poe (TX)
Renacci
Rohrabacher
Rooney, Thomas J.
Scalise
Smith (MO)
Stewart
Vargas
Waters, Maxine
Welch
Williams
{time} 1854
Messrs. MESSER, MEADOWS, LOEBSACK, BIGGS, ARRINGTON, GOSAR, NORCROSS,
and GARAMENDI changed their vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
So (two-thirds not being in the affirmative) the motion was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
____________________
