[Congressional Record Volume 163, Number 16 (Tuesday, January 31, 2017)]
[House]
[Pages H775-H776]
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY INSIDER THREAT AND MITIGATION ACT OF
2017
Mr. KING of New York. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and
pass the bill (H.R. 666) to amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to
establish the Insider Threat Program, and for other purposes.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The text of the bill is as follows:
H.R. 666
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Department of Homeland
Security Insider Threat and Mitigation Act of 2017''.
SEC. 2. ESTABLISHMENT OF INSIDER THREAT PROGRAM.
(a) In General.--Title I of the Homeland Security Act of
2002 (6 U.S.C. 111 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end
the following new section:
``SEC. 104. INSIDER THREAT PROGRAM.
``(a) Establishment.--The Secretary shall establish an
Insider Threat Program within the Department. Such Program
shall--
``(1) provide training and education for Department
personnel to identify, prevent, mitigate, and respond to
insider threat risks to the Department's critical assets;
``(2) provide investigative support regarding potential
insider threats that may pose a risk to the Department's
critical assets; and
``(3) conduct risk mitigation activities for insider
threats.
``(b) Steering Committee.--
``(1) In general.--The Secretary shall establish a Steering
Committee within the Department. The Under Secretary for
Intelligence and Analysis shall serve as the Chair of the
Steering Committee. The Chief Security Officer shall serve as
the Vice Chair. The Steering Committee shall be comprised of
representatives of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis,
the Office of the Chief Information Officer, the Office of
the General Counsel, the Office for Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties, the Privacy Office, the Office of the Chief Human
Capital Officer, the Office of the Chief Financial Officer,
the Federal Protective Service, the Office of the Chief
Procurement Officer, the Science and Technology Directorate,
and other components or offices of the Department as
appropriate. Such representatives shall meet on a regular
basis to discuss cases and issues related to insider threats
to the Department's critical assets, in accordance with
subsection (a).
``(2) Responsibilities.--Not later than one year after the
date of the enactment of this section, the Under Secretary
for Intelligence and Analysis and the Chief Security Officer,
in coordination with the Steering Committee established
pursuant to paragraph (1), shall--
``(A) develop a holistic strategy for Department-wide
efforts to identify, prevent, mitigate, and respond to
insider threats to the Department's critical assets;
``(B) develop a plan to implement the insider threat
measures identified in the strategy developed under
subparagraph (A) across the components and offices of the
Department;
``(C) document insider threat policies and controls;
``(D) conduct a baseline risk assessment of insider threats
posed to the Department's critical assets;
``(E) examine existing programmatic and technology best
practices adopted by the Federal Government, industry, and
research institutions to implement solutions that are
validated and cost-effective;
``(F) develop a timeline for deploying workplace monitoring
technologies, employee awareness campaigns, and education and
training programs related to identifying, preventing,
mitigating, and responding to potential insider threats to
the Department's critical assets;
``(G) require the Chair and Vice Chair of the Steering
Committee to consult with the Under Secretary for Science and
Technology and other appropriate stakeholders to ensure the
Insider Threat Program is informed, on an ongoing basis, by
current information regarding threats, beset practices, and
available technology; and
``(H) develop, collect, and report metrics on the
effectiveness of the Department's insider threat mitigation
efforts.
``(c) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Critical assets.--The term `critical assets' means
the people, facilities, information, and technology required
for the Department to fulfill its mission.
``(2) Insider.--The term `insider' means--
``(A) any person who has access to classified national
security information and is employed by, detailed to, or
assigned to the Department, including members of the Armed
Forces, experts or consultants to the Department, industrial
or commercial contractors, licensees, certificate holders, or
grantees of the Department, including all subcontractors,
personal services contractors, or any other category of
person who acts for or on behalf of the Department, as
determined by the Secretary; or
``(B) State, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector
personnel who possess security clearances granted by the
Department.
``(3) Insider threat.--The term `insider threat' means the
threat that an insider will use his or her authorized access,
wittingly or unwittingly, to do harm to the security of the
United States, including damage to the United States through
espionage, terrorism, the unauthorized disclosure of
classified national security information, or through the loss
or degradation of departmental resources or capabilities.''.
(b) Reporting.--
(1) In general.--Not later than two years after the date of
the enactment of section 104 of the Homeland Security Act of
2002 (as added by subsection (a) of this section) and the
biennially thereafter for the next four years, the Secretary
of Homeland Security shall submit to the Committee on
Homeland Security and the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and
the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a report
on how the Department of Homeland Security and its components
and offices have implemented the strategy developed pursuant
to subsection (b)(2)(A) of such section 104, the status of
the Department's risk assessment of critical assets, the
types of insider threat training conducted, the number of
Department employees who have received such training, and
information on the effectiveness of the Insider Threat
Program (established pursuant to subsection (a) of such
section 104), based on metrics developed, collected, and
reported pursuant to subsection (b)(2)(H) of such section
104.
(2) Definitions.--In this subsection, the terms ``critical
assets'', ``insider'', and ``insider threat'' have the
meanings given such terms in section 104 of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (as added by subsection (a) of this
section).
(c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 is amended by inserting after
the item relating to section 103 the following new item:
``Sec. 104. Insider Threat Program.''.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from New
York (Mr. King) and the gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. Thompson) each
will control 20 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York.
General Leave
Mr. KING of New York. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all
Members have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their
remarks and include any extraneous material on the bill under
consideration.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from New York?
There was no objection.
Mr. KING of New York. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the legislation. Recent
high-profile cases of government employees leaking classified
information have caused drastic damage to U.S. national security and
diplomacy. The names Snowden and Manning are now synonymous with the
term ``insider threat.'' Unfortunately, Snowden, Manning, and others
were able to conduct their traitorous work undetected because the
government had at one time vetted and granted them access to secure
facilities and information systems.
In response to these cases, it is vital that Congress ensure Federal
agencies have the tools to detect and disrupt future insider threat
situations before damage is done. H.R. 666, in contrast to its unholy
numbering, has the important and respectable goal of authorizing and
expanding insider threat detection and mitigation efforts at the
Department of Homeland Security.
[[Page H776]]
DHS has over 115,000 employees with access to classified information
and many more with access to law enforcement sensitive data.
Unauthorized disclosures of classified information, whether deliberate
or unwitting, represent a significant threat to national security. The
very nature of modern communication systems, as well as DHS' important
information-sharing role with State and local partners, adds complexity
to the challenge and requires thoughtful programs to educate employees
and enhance DHS-wide detection capabilities.
The bill directs DHS to develop a strategy for the Department to
identify, prevent, mitigate, and respond to insider threats and
requires DHS to ensure that personnel understand what workplace
behavior may be indicative of a potential insider threat and how their
activity on DHS networks will be monitored. The bill codifies a
comprehensive insider threat program at DHS that can be implemented
through the Department and its component agencies and, most
importantly, reinforces the importance of preventing future insider
attacks.
I want to thank Homeland Security Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member
Thompson, and Congressmen Dan Donovan and Lou Barletta for working with
me to bring this bill to the floor.
The same bill passed the House floor in November 2015 by voice vote.
Unfortunately, last-minute scheduling issues with the Senate prevented
the bill from reaching the President's desk. I am pleased that the
House is willing to take up this measure so quickly in the new Congress
so we can move it through the process. I look forward to working with
the Senate to move this measure forward.
I urge my colleagues to support this bill so we can establish a
comprehensive, transparent, DHS-wide insider threat program. I urge
support for the bill.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as
I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 666, the Department of
Homeland Security Insider Threat and Mitigation Act of 2017. H.R. 666,
the Department of Homeland Security Insider Threat and Mitigation Act
of 2017, authorizes the Department of Homeland Security to address the
homeland and national security risk posed by trusted insiders.
Typically, trusted insiders are given unrestricted access to mission-
critical assets such as personnel, facilities, and computer networks.
While DHS, like other Federal agencies, conducts extensive vetting of
prospective employees, there is a risk that someone with insider status
exploits their position to damage the United States through espionage,
terrorism, or the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive national
security information.
As the ranking member of the Committee on Homeland Security, I am
supportive of the Department of Homeland Security's current Insider
Threat Program. It is targeted at preventing and detecting when a
vetted DHS employee or contractor with access to U.S. Government
resources, including personnel, facilities, information, equipment,
networks, and systems, exploits such access for nefarious, terroristic,
or criminal purposes.
{time} 1430
Though I support the DHS program, I do have some concerns about DHS
and other Federal agencies deploying continuous evaluation programs
without transparency and congressional oversight. I am concerned that
Federal agencies, with the understandable urge to protect their IT
systems and facilities, are racing to acquire the capability before
knowing whether such costly systems are even effective.
Therefore, I would like to reiterate to this Congress, as I did last
Congress, that prior to establishing any such program, under which
certain DHS employees would be subjected to ongoing automated credit,
criminal, and social media monitoring, the Department engage Congress
about not only the potential costs and benefits of such a program but
what protections would be in place for workers subject to such a
program.
Mr. Speaker, we live at a time when the threats to our Nation are
complex. When this bill was considered last Congress, the prospect that
a foreign intelligence agency would carry out an espionage campaign to
influence the outcome of our Presidential election was material for the
movies or for a good spy thriller. Today, in light of the Russian
Government's actions in the 2016 elections, we have a greater
appreciation for the importance of counterintelligence efforts. As
such, this bill is particularly timely. None of us wants to see someone
exploit their access to DHS networks to carry out cybercrimes or other
criminal activity.
Even as DHS works to detect and prevent such threats, it is important
that such activities be carried out in a transparent way so as not to
compound the chronic morale challenges that exist within its workforce.
Each time DHS considers making an adjustment to its insider threat
program, thoughtful consideration must be paid to whether the
operational drawbacks and costs for such an adjustment outweigh the
benefits of such a change.
That said, I commend General Taylor, the previous Under Secretary for
Intelligence and Analysis at DHS, for the attention he gave to the
insider threat challenge. I look forward to continuing to work with the
Department's successor to bolster security within the Department.
I would also like to give Mr. King particular credit for his interest
in this effort to make sure that problems don't come from the inside if
we can help it.
With that, Mr. Speaker, I urge passage of H.R. 666.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. KING of New York. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Speaker, at the outset, let me thank the ranking member for his
support and for his kind words, and let me fully agree with him on the
outstanding job General Taylor did during his time at DHS and
throughout his career in public service.
Mr. Speaker, on a daily basis, adversaries are targeting DHS and
other Federal agencies seeking to acquire sensitive information. U.S.
citizens with trusted access to government facilities and electronic
networks have been responsible for some of the most damaging attacks to
the U.S. Government.
This bill provides the framework for DHS to implement an insider
threat program that identifies and disrupts malicious insiders who seek
to do the Department and its employees harm. It also seeks to protect
the Department's workforce by conducting a transparent process to
reinforce cyber hygiene, data security, and an awareness of malicious
activity through a robust training program.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to vote for this bill, and I yield
back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the
gentleman from New York (Mr. King) that the House suspend the rules and
pass the bill, H.R. 666.
The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the
rules were suspended and the bill was passed.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
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