114th Congress } { Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session } { 114-573
======================================================================
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017
_______
May 18, 2016.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Nunes, from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
together with
MINORITY VIEWS
[To accompany H.R. 5077]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to whom was
referred the bill (H.R. 5077) to authorize appropriations for
fiscal year 2017 for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the United States Government, the Community
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes,
having considered the same, report favorably thereon without
amendment and recommend that the bill do pass.
Purpose
The purpose of H.R. 5077 is to authorize the intelligence
and intelligence-related activities of the United States
Government for Fiscal Year 2017. These activities enhance the
national security of the United States, support and assist the
armed forces of the United States, and support the President in
the execution of the foreign policy of the United States.
Classified Annexes and Committee Intent
The classified annexes to this report include the
classified schedules of authorizations and their associated
explanatory language. The Committee views the classified
annexes as integral parts of this legislation. The classified
annexes contain thorough discussions of the issues considered
by the Committee underlying the funding authorizations found in
the classified schedules of authorizations. The Committee
expects that all intelligence programs discussed in the
classified annexes to this report will follow the guidance and
limitations set forth as associated language therein. The
classified schedules of authorizations are incorporated
directly into this legislation by virtue of section 102 of the
bill. The classified annexes are available for review by all
Members of the House of Representatives, subject to the
requirements of clause 13 of rule XXIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives and rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure
for the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
Scope of Committee Review
The bill authorizes U.S. intelligence and intelligence-
related activities within the jurisdiction of the Committee,
including the National Intelligence Program (NIP) and the
Military Intelligence Program (MIP), the Homeland Security
Intelligence Program (HSIP), and the Information Systems
Security Program (ISSP). The bill also authorizes funding for
the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB). The
NIP consists of all activities of the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, as well as those intelligence,
intelligence-related, and counterintelligence activities
conducted by: the Central Intelligence Agency; the Department
of Defense; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National
Security Agency; the National Reconnaissance Office; the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; the Departments of the
Army, Navy, and Air Force; the Department of State; the
Department of the Treasury; the Department of Energy; the
Department of Justice; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the
U.S. Coast Guard; the Department of Homeland Security; and the
Drug Enforcement Administration. The Committee has exclusive
legislative, authorizing, and oversight jurisdiction of these
programs.
Committee Statement and Views
The Fiscal Year 2017 intelligence authorization bill funds
all U.S. intelligence activities, spanning 16 separate
agencies. It authorizes intelligence activities that enable
critical national security functions, including: combating the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), al-Qa'ida, and
other terrorist groups; checking increasing Russian aggression;
ensuring Iranian compliance with its obligations while
countering Iran's malign influence in the region; monitoring an
increasingly belligerent North Korea; countering Chinese
provocations; defending against cyber threats; preventing the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and stopping
overseas threats before they reach the Homeland.
This bill authorizes the resources necessary to face these
challenges and provides for needed future capabilities,
consistent with the funding constraints of the Bipartisan
Budget Act of 2015 (BBA). The Fiscal Year 2017 authorization is
very slightly above the President's budget request level and
includes authorization for a full-year of Overseas Contingency
Operations (OCO). Although the Committee believes that the
authorized level will allow the Intelligence Community (IC) to
meet the challenges to U.S. and global security in Fiscal Year
2017, the constraints imposed by the BBA have forced tradeoffs
that, while acceptable in the near term, are not sustainable
over the long term. The Committee remains concerned that the
funding levels set forth in current law for Fiscal Year 2018
and beyond could prevent the IC from fully carrying out its
missions at a time when the United States and its allies are
facing the most significant threat environment since September
11, 2001.
The legislative provisions of this bill consist of changes
to statute and direction to the IC to enable effective,
efficient, and constitutional intelligence activities. However,
as most of the intelligence budget involves highly classified
programs, the bulk of this Committee's recommendations each
year are found in the classified annexes to the bill. This
year's bill funds high-priority initiatives not included in the
President's budget request, trims requested increases that lack
clear justifications, and reflects the Committee's
determinations of which programs represent the best value for
intelligence dollars in a challenging and constrained budget
environment. Specific recommendations for the MIP are
consistent with H.R. 4909, the Committee on Armed Services
(HASC)-passed National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2017.
COMMITTEE PRIORITIES
Congressional notifications
Section 501(a)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. Sec. 3091(a)(1)) requires the President to keep the
Congressional intelligence committees fully and currently
informed of U.S. intelligence activities. Intelligence
Community Directive (ICD) 112, Congressional Notification,
states that IC elements--including within the Department of
Defense (DoD)--shall ``keep the Congressional intelligence
committees fully informed, in writing, of all significant
anticipated intelligence activities, significant intelligence
failures, significant intelligence activities, and illegal
activities.'' ICD 112 further directs that written notification
shall be provided to the committees no later than 14 days after
the final determination that the activity is significant.
However, the Committee has been frustrated by the varied
scope, quality, and timeliness of written Congressional
notifications from DoD and the military services, particularly
those regarding intelligence acquisition programs and sensitive
intelligence and intelligence-related activities. While the
Committee appreciates the recent efforts of the Under Secretary
of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) to formalize guidance to
the DoD intelligence components regarding intelligence
notifications, and notes that DoD Instruction O-5100.94 governs
reporting of sensitive activities, there is currently no
comprehensive DoD policy establishing guidelines for
notification of intelligence activities to Congress.
Therefore, the Committee directs that $20.0 million (O&M,
DW) of the Fiscal Year 2017 funds for Intelligence Management
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense may not be obligated
or expended until USD(I):
(1) Issues written guidance to the DoD and military service
intelligence components regarding notification to Congress of
intelligence activities; and
(2) Certifies to the congressional intelligence and defense
committees that the DoD is in compliance with intelligence
notification requirements as established by Section 501(a) of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. Sec. 3091) and has
implemented procedures consistent with ICD 112 and DoD
Instruction O-5100.94, Oversight, Coordination, Assessment, and
Reporting of DoD Intelligence and Intelligence Related
Sensitive Activities.
The certification in paragraph (2) shall also include an
explanation of the basis for the certification, including
criteria for determining when Congress is notified and a
description of current and planned mechanisms for improving
congressional notification.
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board priorities
In August 2004, Executive Order 13353 provided the
foundation for PCLOB by creating an entity within the
Department of Justice that would ``protect the legal rights of
all Americans, including freedoms, civil liberties, and
information privacy guaranteed by Federal law.'' Congress
subsequently enacted a statutory charter for PCLOB to function
as an independent agency. The Committee anticipates that
PCLOB's 2014 report regarding Section 702 of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) will serve as a valuable
resource during consideration of the reauthorization of Section
702 and its impact on Americans' privacy.
Therefore, in this light, and in light of concerns that
have been expressed about the impact of foreign intelligence
activities on U.S. persons, the Committee strongly encourages
PCLOB to prioritize the privacy rights and civil liberties of
U.S. persons in any findings, recommendations, or other reports
stemming from its in-depth examinations of counterterrorism
activities governed by Executive Order 12333. The Committee
further encourages PCLOB to refrain from publishing any such
materials in unclassified form until PCLOB has completed a
thorough fact-finding process, and the Committee expects the IC
will provide timely cooperation with that process.
Cost of living consideration
The Committee is concerned with the high cost of living for
military, civilian, and contractor personnel at overseas
Combatant Command intelligence centers. Although the Committee
recognizes the benefits of co-locating intelligence analysts
with the operational commander, the intelligence centers for
both U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) and U.S Africa Command
(USAFRICOM) are located over 600 miles from their Combatant
Command headquarters. Combatant Commanders based in the United
States regularly communicate with forward deployed units, and
the USEUCOM and USAFRICOM intelligence centers have developed
mechanisms to effectively employ various teleconferencing and
virtual communication tools to ensure collaboration across
large distances.
The Committee is concerned that despite the utility of
these virtual collaboration tools, DoD has not taken action to
reduce the number of intelligence personnel stationed in high
cost of living areas. These costs can exceed $65,000 per
person, per year in annual cost of living allowances compared
to the continental United States (CONUS) expenses. The
additional costs associated with stationing intelligence
personnel in high-cost overseas locations detract from other
critical intelligence priorities. The Committee is further
concerned that DoD does not adequately account for the long-run
expense of high costs of living when selecting locations for
intelligence facilities.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA) to evaluate alternate mechanisms for staffing
overseas Combatant Command intelligence centers, particularly
those that are not co-located with Combatant Command
headquarters, and to identify cost-savings opportunities by
shifting personnel to lower cost locations, including CONUS.
Defense Intelligence Agency education opportunities
DIA presently allows DIA employees to receive pay for a
single year only while attending certain graduate degree
programs on a full-time basis. Employees may pursue such
opportunities at the National Intelligence University and
similar institutions; and, in certain circumstances, also at
public and private civilian universities. However, the one-year
limit discourages DIA personnel from pursuing multi-year
graduate degree programs. Expanding DIA's program to allow
highly qualified DIA employees to pursue multi-year graduate
degree programs from accredited civilian universities would
further improve retention, recruitment, and foster diversity of
thought at DIA.
Therefore, the Committee directs the DIA, no later than 180
days after the enactment of this Act, to provide for and fund a
program that allows for DIA employees to attend civilian
graduate degree programs for up to two years each, based on the
standard length of the relevant program. Where DIA deems
appropriate, employees may pursue academic programs extending
beyond two years. Consistent with current practices, the
program should be made available to at least five employees
each year, with each employee receiving a full-time salary
while participating in the program.
Consistent with the direction above, each DIA participant
shall be subject to any program approvals, service obligations,
repayment obligations, and other requirements pertaining to
academic programs, as prescribed by applicable laws and
policies. No later than 180 days after the enactment of this
Act, DIA shall brief the Committee on the status of this
direction's implementation.
Mental health prevalence
The Committee is committed to supporting the men and women
of the IC, who bravely risk their lives serving their country
as civilians in conflict zones and other dangerous locations
around the world. These individuals often serve next to their
military counterparts in areas of active hostilities. As such,
they are often exposed to many of the emotional stresses
generally associated with a tour of duty abroad. The Committee
believes there are deficiencies and inconsistencies in the pre-
and post-deployment mental health and wellness services
available to civilian employees.
Therefore, the Committee directs the National Security
Agency (NSA), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
(NGA), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and DIA, no later
than 180 days after the enactment of this Act, to provide a
joint briefing to the congressional intelligence committees on
the mental health screenings and related services that these
agencies offer employees, both before and after they deploy to
combat zones. In addition, the briefing shall include a
description of:
(1) Existing services available and dedicated resources;
(2) Agency resourcing decisions for and analysis of these
services, including the frequency of use by employees compared
to the total number returning from deployment; and
(3) How agencies with deployed civilian employees are
sharing best practices and leveraging services or resources
outside their agencies.
Study of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
It has been more than ten years since the Director of
National Intelligence (DNI) was established by the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. The Committee
notes the steady expansion of the statutory functions and
responsibilities of the DNI.
Given its responsibilities, the DNI has traditionally been
staffed primarily by officers with some experience in the IC.
However, the Fiscal Year 2017 President's budget proposed a
``large,'' new effort to hire entry-level personnel into a
``DNI career service.'' The Committee recently learned that one
component of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI) has already extended a substantial number
of conditional offers of employment for entry-level positions,
and that additional components plan to identify jobs for, and
expand recruitment of, college graduates without experience
working in the IC.
The Committee believes that a change of this magnitude
should have triggered more fulsome notification to, and
engagement with, the congressional intelligence committees. The
Committee is also concerned that the continuing expansion of
ODNI's responsibilities, in combination with recent entry-level
hiring, may have diluted the role originally envisaged for the
DNI by Congress, and is skeptical that establishing a new
``career cadre'' represents the best way forward for ODNI.
Training, mentoring, and developing entry-level intelligence
officers is a mission better suited to other IC elements that
offer a broader range of junior career opportunities.
In Fiscal Year 2017, the Committee intends to closely
examine the roles and functions of the DNI, with particular
emphasis on DNI's ability to successfully fulfill its three
principal responsibilities as defined and described by 50
U.S.C. Sec. 3023. To assist the Committee in its efforts, the
Committee directs the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to
conduct a comprehensive review of the organization, management,
and operations of ODNI. This review should:
(1) Evaluate DNI's ability to fulfill its principal
responsibilities in light of ODNI's current scope and
structure, with particular emphasis given to the relative
proportion of personnel and funding dedicated to those
principal responsibilities;
(2) Assess how ODNI might be streamlined by divesting non-
essential roles and responsibilities that could be more
effectively and efficiently executed by other IC components or
government agencies outside the IC;
(3) Analyze the resource needs of the DNI with respect to
its principal responsibilities; and
(4) In light of the above, make recommendations regarding
high-volume entry-level hiring and the establishment of a
career cadre at ODNI.
The Committee directs OMB, in conjunction with the
President's budget request for Fiscal Year 2018, to provide the
results of its review to the congressional intelligence
committees.
Improving pre-publication review
The Committee is concerned that current and former IC
personnel have published written material without completing
mandatory pre-publication review procedures or have rejected
changes required by the review process, resulting in the
publication of classified information. The Committee is
particularly troubled by press reports suggesting that
officials are unaware of the existence or scope of pre-
publication review requirements.
The Committee is also aware of the perception that the pre-
publication review process can be unfair, untimely, and unduly
onerous and that these burdens may be at least partially
responsible for some individuals ``opting out'' of the
mandatory review process. The Committee further understands
that IC agencies' pre-publication review mechanisms vary, and
that there is no binding, IC-wide guidance on the subject.
The Committee believes that all IC personnel must be made
aware of pre-publication review requirements and that the
review process must yield timely, reasoned, and impartial
decisions that are subject to appeal. The Committee also
believes that efficiencies can be identified by limiting the
information subject to pre-publication review, to the fullest
extent possible, to only those materials that might reasonably
contain or be derived from classified information obtained
during the course of an individual's association with the IC.
In short, the pre-publication review process should be improved
to better incentivize compliance and to deter personnel from
violating their commitments.
Therefore, the Committee directs that, no later than 180
days after the enactment of this Act, the DNI shall issue an
IC-wide policy regarding pre-publication review. The DNI shall
transmit this policy to the congressional intelligence
committees concurrently with its issuance. The policy should
require each IC agency to develop and maintain a pre-
publication policy that contains, at a minimum, the following
elements:
(1) Identification of the individuals subject to pre-
publication review requirements (``covered individuals'');
(2) Guidance on the types of information that must be
submitted for pre-publication review, including regarding works
(a) unrelated to an individual's IC employment; or (b)
published in cooperation with a third party, e.g.--
(i) Authored jointly by covered individuals and third
parties;
(ii) Authored by covered individuals but published
under the name of a third party; or
(iii) Authored by a third party but with substantial
input from covered individuals;
(3) Guidance on a process by which covered individuals can
participate in pre-publication reviews, and communicate openly
and frequently with reviewers;
(4) Requirements for timely responses, as well as reasoned
edits and decisions by reviewers;
(5) Requirements for a prompt and transparent appeal
process;
(6) Guidelines for the assertion of interagency equities in
pre-publication review;
(7) A summary of the lawful measures each agency may take
to enforce its policy, to include civil and criminal referrals;
and
(8) A description of procedures for post-publication review
of documents that are alleged or determined to reveal
classified information but were not submitted for pre-
publication review.
Additionally the Committee directs the DNI, no later than
180 days after the enactment of this Act, to provide to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on the adequacy
of IC information technology efforts to improve and expedite
pre-publication review processes, and the resources needed to
ensure that IC elements can meet this direction.
The Committee further directs that, no later than 270 days
after the enactment of this Act, the DNI shall certify to the
congressional intelligence committees that IC elements' pre-
publication review policies, non-disclosure agreements, and any
other agreements imposing pre-publication review obligations
that reflect the policy described above.
Open Skies Treaty
The Committee is concerned that the Administration is not
leveraging commercial imagery in connection with the Open Skies
Treaty, resulting in cumbersome, obsolete, and expensive
information sharing practices that carry unnecessary national
security risks. The time, money, and effort the United States
spends to coordinate with state parties to the treaty provides
little to no valuable information to the United States, while
permitting Russian collection over U.S. and allies' critical
national security infrastructure.
State parties may appreciate the valuable information they
receive from the United States as a result of the Open Skies
Treaty, but the United States could potentially provide more
and better information from commercial imagery and other
sources without the inherent risks of independent Russian
collection.
Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI, no later than 90
days after the enactment of this Act, to provide a report to
the congressional intelligence and defense committees
evaluating the potential costs and benefits of providing to
covered state parties, excluding Russia and Belarus,
qualitatively and quantitatively similar information in lieu of
Open Skies Treaty information.
Student loan debt report
IC components need to be able to recruit talented young
professionals. However, the soaring cost of college and post-
graduate education in the United States is causing many young
people to forgo public service in favor of career opportunities
with more competitive pay or loan forgiveness benefits.
Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI, no later than 180
days after the enactment of this Act, to provide a report to
the congressional intelligence committees on programs that seek
to help IC personnel manage student loan debt. The report shall
include details about each IC element's program, including loan
forgiveness, loan repayment, and financial counseling programs;
efforts to inform prospective and current employees about such
programs; and the number of employees who use such programs.
The report shall also include an analysis of the benefits and
drawbacks of creating new programs and expanding existing
programs, and shall identify any barriers to the establishment
of IC-wide programs.
Workforce development partnership
The Committee has long promoted novel recruiting, hiring
and retention practices, especially with respect to highly
expert, highly sought-after Science, Technology, Engineering,
and Math (STEM) students and professionals. Despite these
efforts, the IC continues to struggle with meeting STEM
recruitment, hiring and retention goals inside the IC.
The Committee is therefore encouraged to learn that the IC
is considering new and creative practices in this regard. For
example, the Committee was intrigued by the Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory's (PNNL) budding Workforce Development
Partnership with the CIA. Partnerships like this may allow IC
agencies to leverage PNNL's robust employee recruiting network
and seek out STEM students who might not otherwise consider IC
employment.
Similarly, to address concerns that potential hires will
accept other job offers while awaiting clearances, NGA has a
program to allow interim hires to work on unclassified projects
until clearances are adjudicated. In addition, several IC
agencies have instituted a unique pay scale for their junior
STEM workforce. The Committee recognizes the benefits of these
initiatives, and believes that such efforts could have wider
applicability across the IC.
Therefore, the Committee directs, no later than 180 days
after the enactment of this Act, the DNI Chief Human Capital
Officer to provide to the congressional intelligence committees
an interagency briefing on new approaches, including outreach
and advertising, the IC is considering or conducting to attract
a diverse, robust STEM and IT workforce to meet the increasing
demands in the IC.
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE
Jurisdictional statement on defense intelligence
Pursuant to the Rules of the House of Representatives, the
Committee shares jurisdiction over the tactical intelligence
and intelligence-related activities of DoD with HASC. The
Committee enjoys a collaborative relationship with HASC and
appreciates DoD's efforts to facilitate shared oversight of the
MIP.
However, the Committee remains deeply concerned that many
DoD intelligence and intelligence-related activities are
improperly excluded from the MIP. The Committee is also
concerned that many intelligence and intelligence-related
activities continue to be characterized as ``battlespace
awareness,'' ``situational awareness,'' and--especially--
``operational preparation of the environment.'' As the
Committee observed in its report accompanying the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (H. Rpt. 111-186):
In categorizing its clandestine activities, DoD
frequently labels them as `Operational Preparation of
the Environment' (OPE) to distinguish particular
operations as traditional military activities and not
as intelligence functions. The Committee observes,
though, that overuse of this term has made the
distinction all but meaningless. The determination as
to whether an operation will be categorized as an
intelligence activity is made on a case-by-case basis;
there are no clear guidelines or principles for making
consistent determinations. The Director of National
Intelligence himself has acknowledged that there is no
bright line between traditional intelligence missions
carried out by the military and the operations of the
CIA.
Clandestine military intelligence-gathering operations,
even those legitimately recognized as OPE, carry the
same diplomatic and national security risks as
traditional intelligence-gathering activities. While
the purpose of many such operations is to gather
intelligence, DOD has shown a propensity to apply the
OPE label where the slightest nexus of a theoretical,
distant military operation might one day exist.
Consequently, these activities often escape the
scrutiny of the intelligence committees, and the
congressional defense committees cannot be expected to
exercise oversight outside of their jurisdiction.
The continued failure to subject OPE and other activities
to Committee scrutiny precludes the Committee from fully
executing its statutorily mandated oversight role on behalf of
the House and the American people, including by specifically
authorizing intelligence and intelligence-related activities as
required by Section 504(e) of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. Sec. 3094(e)).
Therefore, the Committee directs DoD to ensure that the
Committee receives proper insight and access to information
regarding all intelligence and intelligence-related activities
of DoD, including those presently funded outside the MIP. The
Committee further encourages DoD, in meeting this direction, to
err on the side of inclusivity and not to withhold information
based on arbitrary or overly technical distinctions such as
funding source, characterization of the activities in question,
or the fact that the activities in question may have a nexus to
ongoing or anticipated military operations.
Non-conventional assisted recovery
Section 1247 of H.R. 4909, the HASC-passed National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, extends and modifies
non-conventional assisted recovery capabilities originally
authorized by Section 943(h) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009.
The Committee directs that, to the extent DoD conducts
intelligence or intelligence-related activities pursuant to
Section 1247 of H.R. 4909, DoD shall keep the Committee fully
and currently informed of such activities.
Annual reports on foreign military capabilities
H.R. 4909, the HASC-passed National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2017, updates several annual country-
specific reports to include intelligence assessments of foreign
military capabilities. These assessments will be conducted by
NIP- and MIP-funded components of DoD.
Therefore, the Committee directs that, beginning in Fiscal
Year 2017, DoD shall ensure it provides to the congressional
intelligence committees:
(1) The annual report on military power of the People's
Republic of China directed by Section 1202 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, as amended;
(2) The annual report on military and security developments
involving the Russian Federation directed by Section 1245 of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, as
amended; and
(3) The annual report on military power of Iran directed by
Section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2010, as amended.
Distributed Common Ground/Surface System-Army
The Committee believes the Distributed Common Ground/
Surface System-Army (DCGS-A) provides operational and tactical
commanders with enhanced, state-of-the-art intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) tasking, processing,
exploitation, and dissemination capabilities and connectivity
to the defense intelligence information enterprise. DCGS-A is a
critical tool for enabling military intelligence warfighters to
process, fuse, and exploit data. In the past, the Army has
struggled to keep pace for pre-deployment and in-theater
training for DCGS-A. However, training for military
intelligence analysts must be prioritized in the pre-deployment
readiness cycle to ensure that those using this intelligence
tool can effectively utilize its capabilities.
The Army has fielded over 95 percent of DCGS-A Increment 1
systems, with mixed results and often negative feedback from
the users. The Army is in the process of fielding Increment 1,
Release 2, which will address many of the initial concerns and
deficiencies of Increment 1. The Committee remains concerned
that the Army has not sufficiently planned for user training in
support of the release of Increment 1, Release 2 to operational
users.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Army, no later than 90
days after the enactment of this Act, to submit a plan to the
congressional intelligence and defense committees on how the
Army will fully incorporate DCGS-A training into the readiness
cycle for Army personnel. The plan should specifically address
any lessons learned from the fielding of DCGS-A Increment 1 and
any ongoing corrective actions to improve the roll-out of
Increment 1, Release 2.
Distributed Common Ground/Surface System-Air Force
Consistent with the committee report accompanying H.R.
4909, the HASC-passed National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2017 (H. Rpt. 114-537), the Committee supports the
move toward an open architecture standard for the Distributed
Common Ground/Surface System-Air Force (DCGS-AF). However,
current program documentation on specific program milestones is
lacking, and it remains unclear how the Air Force will
effectively leverage an open architecture without additional
changes in contracting strategy for applications on the new
architecture.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Air Force, by January
9, 2017, to provide a briefing to the Committee and to HASC
outlining the strategic roadmap of how and when the Air Force
will achieve an open architecture, including key milestones and
decision points and timelines for addressing the
recommendations from the 2015 Operational Test and Evaluation
report on the DCGS-AF system. The roadmap should also include a
strategy for improving contracting mechanisms to better
leverage and utilize multiple vendors under the open
architecture construct.
Common controller for unmanned aircraft systems
The Committee supports the Army's efforts to develop a
common controller for the RQ-7A/B Shadow and the RQ-11B Raven
tactical unmanned aerial vehicles. However, the Committee is
concerned that the Army is not collaborating with the Marine
Corps on similar efforts to develop a ground controller for the
Marine Corps family of tactical unmanned aerial systems (UAS),
including the RQ-11B Raven, the RQ-12A Wasp, and the RQ-20A
Puma.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Army and the Marine
Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA), no later than 90 days after
the enactment of this Act, to jointly submit a report to the
congressional intelligence and defense committees on the
feasibility of developing a common controller for all Brigade
and Below UAS airframes, as well as U.S. Marine Corps small
unit UAS. The report should address the potential performance
and operational benefits of a common controller, anticipated
development costs, and anticipated life-cycle cost savings of a
common controller.
Conditions for repeal of report on unmanned aerial systems
The committee report accompanying H.R. 4909, the HASC-
passed National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017
(H. Rpt. 114-537), proposes to repeal the reporting requirement
on the challenges facing UAS, which was directed by the
committee report accompanying the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (H. Rpt. 110-652). The
Committee has found the report to be of value, but recognizes
that there are other avenues to convey the information it
contains in a more timely and relevant fashion.
Therefore, the Committee directs DoD to ensure the
Committee continues to receive pertinent updates regarding
DoD's efforts to address UAS acquisition and interoperability
challenges. The Committee further directs DoD, no later than 90
days after the enactment of this Act, to brief the Committee
regarding its proposed plan to keep the Committee fully and
currently informed regarding UAS issues.
MQ-9 Improvements
Consistent with the committee report accompanying H.R.
4909, the HASC-passed National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2017 (H. Rpt. 114-537), the Committee notes that
DoD is pursuing a variety of improvement initiatives for
additional capability for the MQ-9 UAS, including the
development and testing of innovative anti-icing technologies
that allow the MQ-9 to cruise in light icing and visible
moisture.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Secretary of Defense
(SECDEF), in coordination with the Commander, U.S. Air Force
Air Combat Command, and the Commander, U.S. Special Operations
Command (USSOCOM), to brief the Committee in addition to HASC
no later than October 1, 2016, on DoD's efforts to field an
anti-icing capability for the MQ-9.
Air Force Command, Control, Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance fleet
Consistent with the committee report accompanying H.R.
4909, the HASC-passed National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2017 (H. Rpt. 114-537), the Committee is aware that
the Air Force's critical manned Command, Control, Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C2ISR) aircraft are high-
demand assets facing low availability rates, end-of-life
issues, and growing sustainment costs. The committee is
supportive of the Air Force's plan to replace the Joint
Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) fleet with an
affordable commercially available platform under a full and
open competition. The Committee believes that, when
recapitalizing the remainder of the manned C2ISR fleet, the Air
Force should use a similar acquisition strategy as the one used
with JSTARS, and consider a full and open competition.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Secretary of the Air
Force to provide, no later than September 1, 2016, a briefing
to the Committee--in addition to HASC--on the Air Force's
current plans for recapitalization of its C2ISR aircraft.
Autonomous undersea vehicles
Consistent with the committee report accompanying H.R.
4909, the HASC-passed National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2017 (H. Rpt. 114-537), the Committee is aware that
the Department of the Navy is performing a gap analysis of
autonomous undersea vehicle requirements ``to determine the
inventory requirements of 2025 and beyond.'' In addition, the
Committee is aware that the Secretary of the Navy is developing
an unmanned systems roadmap strategy in 2016 to help inform
future inventory requirements and investment decisions. The
Committee remains interested in maintaining a significant peer
advantage in the undersea domain and believes autonomous
undersea vehicles represent an asymmetric opportunity to
leverage atypical intelligence capabilities.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Secretary of the Navy
to provide, no later than February 1, 2017, a report to the
congressional intelligence committees--in addition to the
congressional defense committees--that details the Unmanned
Systems roadmap strategy and the program objective memorandum
2018 investment strategy to obtain such a capability.
Unmanned Carrier Launched Surveillance and Strike and related programs
Consistent with the committee report accompanying H.R.
4909, the HASC-passed National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2017 (H. Rpt. 114-537), the Committee is encouraged
that DoD has completed its review of the Unmanned Carrier
Launched Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) program and has
decided to move forward with a slight variation that will
include airborne tanking as an additional requirement. The
Committee, however, is concerned that modifications such as
expanding requirements create inefficiencies and delays in the
DoD's major system acquisitions process.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Comptroller General of
the United States, no later than March 1, 2017, to provide a
report to the congressional intelligence committees in addition
to the congressional defense committees--on the Navy's carrier
based unmanned aircraft acquisition programs. The report shall
include the following:
(1) The Navy's requirements and acquisition strategy for
the programs, including whether the strategies are consistent
with acquisition management best practices identified by the
Comptroller General;
(2) The extent to which the programs have established and
are meeting cost, schedule, and performance goals, including
test plans and progress; and
(3) The extent to which critical technologies are mature;
system and subsystem designs are stable; and manufacturing
processes are understood and have demonstrated capability to
produce reliable, high-quality systems efficiently.
Translated foreign military and technical writings
Consistent with the committee report accompanying H.R.
4909, the HASC-passed National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2017 (H. Rpt. 114-537), the Committee notes that
DoD's strategy and programmatic decision-making are informed by
an understanding of foreign military and technical writings.
However, the Committee is concerned that these translated
writings are not widely disseminated or easily accessible
within either DoD or the broader community of analysts
supporting and informing U.S. defense strategy and policy.
Therefore, the committee directs SECDEF, no later than July
15, 2016, to provide a briefing to the Committee--in addition
to HASC--on the policies governing the access and dissemination
of translated foreign military and technical writings. The
briefing should also address the following elements:
(1) Policies and guidelines governing the access and
dissemination of translated writings;
(2) Policies and guidelines governing the releasability of
translated writings, including release authorities;
(3) Organizations and resources currently dedicated to the
translation and dissemination of such writings; and
(4) Options to make translated writings more accessible
within DoD and to the public, including identification of
policy changes and resources required for each option.
Comptroller General assessment of deployable identity management
Consistent with the committee report accompanying H.R.
4909, the HASC-passed National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2017 (H. Rpt. 114-537), the Committee notes that
DoD has used biometrics and forensics to successfully identify,
target, and disrupt terrorists and enemy combatants. The
Committee further notes that DoD has taken steps to establish
expeditionary biometrics and forensics as enduring capabilities
in the base budget. The Committee is concerned, however, that
these funding levels may not be adequate to sustain current and
future validated mission requirements.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Comptroller General of
the United States to assess DoD's process for determining and
validating its future expeditionary biometrics and forensics
requirements, as well as actions DoD has taken to ensure that
its expeditionary biometrics and forensics capabilities,
including materiel solutions, trained personnel, and funding,
are available to meet current and future requirements. The
Committee further directs the Comptroller General to provide,
no later than March 1, 2017, a briefing to the Committee--in
addition to HASC--on the Comptroller General's preliminary
findings.
Social media analytics supporting battlespace awareness
Consistent with the committee report accompanying H.R.
4909, the HASC-passed National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2017 (H. Rpt. 114-537), the Committee is concerned
with DoD's ability to effectively monitor and utilize social
media analytic tools.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Secretary of Defense,
no later than February 15, 2017, to conduct and provide a
briefing to the Committee--in addition to HASC--regarding an
assessment of the current policy directives on how defense
entities use such social media tools.
Language training
Consistent with the committee report accompanying H.R.
4909, the HASC-passed National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2017 (H. Rpt. 114-537), the Committee believes that
foreign language proficiency, including immersive regional and
cultural training, is a major force multiplier and a key
component of national intelligence and defense. The Committee
further believes that DoD should examine whether training for
U.S. service members in Russian language, regional expertise,
and culture are sufficient to ensure service members deploying
to Eastern Europe are prepared to effectively fulfill mission
requirements.
Therefore, the Committee urges the Director of the Defense
Language and National Security Education Office (DLNSEO) to
assess the need for additional courses in Russian language,
regional expertise, and culture training. Additionally, the
Committee directs the Director of the DLNSEO, no later than
September 30, 2016, to provide a briefing to the Committee--in
addition to HASC--on the feasibility and estimated costs of
these opportunities and provide a suggested list of developing
countries prioritized for engagement and instruction.
Domestic source of traveling wave tubes
Consistent with the committee report accompanying H.R.
4909, the HASC-passed National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2017 (H. Rpt. 114-537), the Committee is concerned
with the use of foreign-made components in the most sensitive
national security programs. Specifically, the Committee is
aware that traveling wave tubes (TWTs) of non-U.S. manufacture
are being used in critical satellite and guided missile
programs.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Secretary of Defense,
in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
no later than March 1, 2017, to provide a briefing to the
Committee--in addition to HASC--on the risks of non-U.S. TWTs
in national security programs.
Enduring high-resolution geospatial data
Consistent with the committee report accompanying H.R.
4909, the HASC-passed National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2017 (H. Rpt. 114-537), the Committee is aware that
the DoD has been utilizing sophisticated three-dimensional
high-resolution light detection and ranging (LIDAR) systems to
provide geospatial data for tactical users in theaters of
hostilities. The Committee believes that these tactical systems
are vital to supporting urgent, in-theater operational forces
in the successful execution of their missions. However, the
Committee is concerned that reliance on OCO funds prevented
USSOCOM and the Army from properly ensuring that such
capabilities are included in the base budget request.
Therefore the Committee directs the Commander, USSOCOM, in
coordination with the Secretary of the Army and the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, no later than November 1, 2016, to
conduct a review of these activities and the capabilities
supporting them, and to provide a briefing regarding this
review to the Committee--in addition to HASC.
Internet of Things
Consistent with the committee report accompanying H.R.
4909, the HASC-passed National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2017 (H. Rpt. 114-537), the Committee is concerned
that, despite mitigation efforts, DoD may remain vulnerable
based on its reliance on non-defense networks, such as those
from defense industrial base partners or allies. These
challenges will grow more pronounced with the increasing
prevalence of web-connected devices, commonly referred to as
the Internet of Things (IoT).
Therefore, the Committee directs the Comptroller General of
the United States to assess DoD's planning and management for
the security impact and challenges that the IoT will present to
DoD. The Committee further directs the Comptroller General to
provide a briefing to the congressional intelligence and
defense committees, no later than March 1, 2017, on the
preliminary results of this assessment.
Strategy for assured access to trusted microelectronics
Consistent with Section 231 of H.R. 4909, the HASC-passed
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017,
ensuring the integrity of the U.S. supply chain has been, and
continues to be, a matter of intense Committee interest.
Although the Committee's concerns extend to all links in the
supply chain, it is especially concerned with microelectronic
components employed within materials developed or purchased by
IC elements within DoD.
Therefore, the Committee directs that USD(I), no later than
one year after the enactment of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, submit to the
congressional intelligence--in addition to the congressional
defense committees--a strategy to ensure that the IC elements
within DoD have ensured access to trusted microelectronics by
no later than September 30, 2020. The strategy be submitted in
unclassified form but may include a classified annex. It shall
include the following elements:
(1) Definitions of the various levels of trust required by
classes of DoD systems;
(2) Means of classifying systems of DoD based on the level
of trust such systems are required to maintain with respect to
microelectronics;
(3) Means by which trust in microelectronics can be
assured;
(4) Means to increase the supplier base for assured
microelectronics to ensure multiple supply pathways;
(5) An assessment of the microelectronics needs of DoD in
future years, including the need for trusted, radiation-
hardened microelectronics;
(6) An assessment of the microelectronic needs of DoD that
may not be fulfilled by entities outside DoD; and
(7) The resources required to assure access to trusted
microelectronics, including infrastructure and investments in
science and technology.
Additionally, consistent with the committee report
accompanying H.R. 4909, the HASC-passed National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (H. Rpt. 114-537), the
Committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States,
no later than March 30, 2017, to provide to the Committee--in
addition to HASC--a report that evaluates how selected
commercial microelectronics businesses provide trusted
microelectronics to the U.S. government.
In its report, the Comptroller General should address the
following:
(1) How selected commercial companies incorporate trust
into their leading-edge microelectronics, including techniques
to protect intellectual property and prevent malicious content
in devices; and (2) The extent to which DoD could implement
these commercial practices, and any challenges associated with
implementing such practices for defense systems.
CYBERSECURITY
Review of dual-hatting relationship
Consistent with the committee report accompanying H.R.
4909, the HASC-passed National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2017 (H. Rpt. 114-537), the Committee supports
further evaluation of the dual-hatting of a single individual
as both Commander of U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) and
Director of the National Security Agency (DIRNSA) if USCYBERCOM
is established as a combatant command under the Unified Command
Plan.
Therefore, the Committee directs SECDEF, no later than
November 1, 2016, to provide a briefing to the Committee--in
addition to HASC--on a review and assessment of the dual-
hatting of DIRNSA and Commander, USCYBERCOM. This review should
address:
(1) Roles and responsibilities, including intelligence
authorities, of both USCYBERCOM and NSA;
(2) Assessment of the current impact of the dual-hatting
relationship, including both advantages and disadvantages;
(3) Recommendations on courses of action for separating the
dual-hatting of DIRNSA and Commander, USCYBERCOM, if
appropriate;
(4) Suggested timelines for carrying out such courses of
action, if appropriate; and
(5) Recommendations for legislative actions as necessary.
The Committee further believes that a decision to terminate
the dual-hatting of the DIRNSA and Commander, CYBERCOM, should
prompt a further review of NSA's organization. The Committee
seeks to promote the efficient and effective execution of NSA's
national intelligence mission. Specifically, the Committee
believes that the organization of NSA should be examined to
account for the evolution of its mission since its
establishment, the current structure of the IC, and the fact
that NSA is predominantly NIP-funded.
Therefore, the Committee directs DNI, no later than October
1, 2016, to conduct an assessment and provide a briefing to the
Committee on options to better align the structure, budgetary
procedures, and oversight of NSA with its national intelligence
mission. This assessment should include an evaluation of the
merits of transitioning NSA to civilian leadership appointed by
the DNI in lieu of military leadership appointed by SECDEF.
Comptroller General assessment of the management and measurement of
cyber activities
Consistent with the committee report accompanying H.R.
4909, the HASC-passed National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2017 (H. Rpt. 114-537), the Committee notes that a
single major cyber incident could have significant impact on
DoD, including loss of confidence in national security, loss of
national security or personal identifiable information, and the
inability to conduct military operations.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Comptroller General of
the United States to assess the Department of Defense's
management and measurement of progress in protecting its own
networks, systems, and information, and, no later than April
15, 2017, to provide to the congressional intelligence
committees--in addition to the HASC and the Senate Armed
Services Committee--a report on the findings of such
assessment.
Acquisition security improvement
The Committee remains concerned about supply chain and
cybersecurity vulnerabilities in the IC. The Committee believes
the IC should implement a more comprehensive approach to
address these vulnerabilities, particularly during the
acquisition process. However, ICD 801, the IC guideline
governing the acquisition process, is outdated and must be
revised to reflect current risks. In particular, despite
issuance of ICD 731, Supply Chain Risk Management, in 2013, ICD
801 has not been updated to reflect this policy nor does it
include consideration of cybersecurity vulnerabilities and
mitigation.
Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI, no later than 180
days after the enactment of this Act, to review and consider
amendments to ICD 801 to better reflect and anticipate supply
chain and cybersecurity risks and threats, as well as outline
policies to mitigate both risks and threats. In particular, the
review should examine whether to:
(1) Expand risk management criteria in the acquisition
process to include cyber and supply chain threats;
(2) Require counterintelligence and security assessments as
part of the acquisition and procurement process;
(3) Propose and adopt new education requirements for
acquisition professionals on cyber and supply chain threats;
and
(4) Factor in the cost of cyber and supply chain security.
Cyber information sharing and customer feedback
The Committee commends NSA's new policies and procedures to
facilitate greater information sharing of cyber threat
indicators and defensive measures with the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) at the unclassified level.
With the recent enactment of the Cybersecurity Act of 2015,
which encourages greater information sharing between private
sector stakeholders, as well as with government entities, the
Committee believes the next step is to ensure the entire IC is
working to disseminate timely, actionable information to
private sector stakeholders so they can better protect their
information technology networks. The vast majority of U.S.
networks reside in the private sector, and it is good
governance to ensure that those networks are safe and secure
for the general public.
The Committee appreciates that the IC has begun efforts to
increase unclassified cyber threat sharing. Because an increase
in the quantity of reporting does not necessarily indicate
effectiveness or usefulness, this Committee continues to
monitor the quality of the information distributed.
Therefore, the Committee directs that the DNI, no later
than 120 days after the enactment of this Act, to brief the
congressional intelligence committees on IC-wide efforts to
share more information with DHS for further dissemination to
the private sector. This briefing shall specifically address
types of information shared, metrics on output, tabulation of
low output producing agencies, recommendations on how low
output agencies can increase sharing, timeliness of information
shared, and average total time it takes for information to
transit the system.
The Committee also directs the DNI, in coordination with
the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), to conduct a
survey of government and private sector participants of the
National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center
(NCCIC). The survey shall be anonymous, provide an accurate
assessment of the usefulness and timeliness of the data
received, and determine if customers are satisfied with
intelligence briefings on threat actors impacting their
specific industry. The DNI shall provide to the congressional
intelligence and homeland security committees, no later than
one year after the enactment of this Act, an unclassified
report detailing the results of this survey.
Cybersecurity expertise at national labs
The Committee believes that the Department of Energy (DOE)
National Labs represent a unique and invaluable resource for
the government and the IC in particular.
Therefore, the Committee directs, no later than 180 days
after the enactment of this Act, DHS I&A, in coordination with
DOE Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (DOE-IN), to
provide to the congressional intelligence committees a report
on the current utilization of National Lab expertise by DHS
I&A. In addition, this report should address opportunities to
increase DHS I&A's utilization of cybersecurity expertise of
the National Labs as well as the budgetary implications of
taking advantage of these potential opportunities.
Cybersecurity courses for Centers of Academic Excellence
The Committee is concerned by a recent analysis from a
security firm, which determined that not one of the nation's
leading undergraduate computer science programs requires
students to take a cybersecurity course before graduating.
Cybersecurity depends on IC professionals having a strong
understanding of the cyber threat and how to mitigate it--which
in turn requires a strong academic background. NSA and DHS co-
sponsor the Centers of Academic Excellence (CAE) in Cyber
Defense program, which includes an emphasis on basic
cybersecurity. Nevertheless, even some CAE-designated
institutions lack cybersecurity course prerequisites in their
computer science curricula.
Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI, no later than 180
days after the enactment of this Act, to submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on improving
cybersecurity training within NIP-funded undergraduate and
graduate computer science programs. The report should
specifically address:
(1) The potential advantages and disadvantages of
conditioning an institution's receipt of such funds on its
computer science program's requiring cybersecurity as a
precondition to graduation;
(2) How CAE programs might bolster cybersecurity
educational requirements; and
(3) Recommendations to support the goal of ensuring that
federally-funded computer science programs properly equip
students to confront future cybersecurity challenges.
SPACE
Joint Interagency Combined Space Operations Center
Consistent with the committee report accompanying H.R.
4909, the HASC-passed National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2017 (H. Rpt. 114-537), the Committee supports
integrated interagency efforts, such as Joint Interagency
Combined Space Operations Center (JICSpOC), intended to protect
and defend critical national space capabilities in response to
increasing counterspace threats from potential foreign
adversaries. The Committee is also aware that it is unclear how
the JICSpOC or its capabilities will be used after Fiscal Year
2016.
Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI, in coordination
with DoD, to provide, no later than January 15, 2017, a
briefing to the congressional intelligence and defense
committees that addresses:
(1) The future objectives, strategy, and resources planned
for the JICSpOC;
(2) How these activities will be complementary to or
integrated with U.S. Strategic Command's Joint Space Operations
Center (JSpOC) and the National Reconnaissance Operations
Center; and
(3) A review of the costs and benefits of maintaining a
separate JSpOC and JICSpOC as well as the optimal location to
perform the related activities.
Space defense and protection
Consistent with the committee report accompanying H.R.
4909, the HASC-passed National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2017 (H. Rpt. 114-537), the Committee remains
concerned about the growing and serious risk that foreign
counterspace threats pose to the U.S. national security posture
and believes that the National Research Council (NRC) provided
useful guidance in addressing this challenge in its December
2015 study, as directed by Section 912 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014.
Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI, in coordination
with DoD, to provide a briefing to the congressional
intelligence and defense committees, no later than December 1,
2016, on the actions taken, if any, in response to the NRC's
findings and recommendations.
Plan for strengthening outer space cooperation with Japan
Consistent with the committee report accompanying H.R.
4909, the HASC-passed National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2017 (H. Rpt. 114-537), the Committee notes that
the Guidelines for Defense Cooperation between the United
States and the Government of Japan issued in April 2015
included important openness to cooperation in several areas,
including those utilizing outer space.
Therefore, the Committee directs SECDEF and the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the Secretary
of State and the DNI, no later than April 1, 2017, to jointly
submit to the congressional intelligence and defense
committees, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations a report outlining the
opportunities to improve U.S.-Japan cooperation in outer space.
Committee Consideration and Roll Call Votes
On April 29, 2016, the Committee met in open session and
ordered the bill H.R. 5077 favorably reported.
In open session, the Committee considered the text of the
bill H.R. 5077. Mr. Himes offered an amendment that would
permit the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board to
access covert action information related to protecting the
United States from terrorism. He subsequently withdrew the
amendment.
The Committee considered the classified Fiscal Year 2017
schedule of authorizations, which it adopted by a voice vote.
Chairman Nunes then moved to make the classified Fiscal
Year 2017 schedule of authorizations available for members of
the House to review. The motion was agreed to by a recorded
vote of 20 ayes to 0 noes:
Voting aye: Mr. Nunes (chairman), Mr. Miller, Mr.
Conaway, Mr. King, Mr. LoBiondo, Mr. Rooney, Mr. Heck,
Mr. Pompeo, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, Mr. Turner, Mr. Wenstrup,
Mr. Stewart, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Himes, Ms. Sewell, Mr.
Carson, Ms. Speier, Mr. Quigley, Mr. Swalwell, and Mr.
Murphy.
Voting no: None
The Committee then agreed to a motion by the Chairman to
favorably report the bill H.R. 5077 to the House, including by
reference the classified schedules of authorizations. The
motion was agreed to by a voice vote.
Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation of Amendment
Section 1--Short title; table of contents
Section 1 lists the title and the table of contents of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (the Act).
Section 2--Definitions
Section 2 defines the terms ``congressional intelligence
committees'' and the ``Intelligence Community'' (IC) that will
be used in the Act
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Section 101--Authorization of appropriations
Section 101 lists the U.S. Government departments,
agencies, and other elements for which the Act authorizes
appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities for Fiscal Year 2017.
Section 102--Classified schedule of authorizations
Section 102 provides that the amounts authorized to be
appropriated for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities and the personnel levels for Fiscal Year 2017 are
contained in the classified Schedule of Authorizations and that
the classified Schedule of Authorizations shall be made
available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and
House of Representatives and to the President.
Section 103--Personnel ceiling adjustments
Section 103 provides that the Director of National
Intelligence (DNI) may authorize employment of civilian
personnel in Fiscal Year 2017 in excess of the number of
authorized positions by an amount not exceeding three percent
of the total limit applicable to each IC element under Section
102. The DNI may do so only if necessary to the performance of
important intelligence functions.
Section 104--Intelligence Community Management Account
Section 104 authorizes appropriations for the Intelligence
Community Management Account (ICMA) of the DNI and sets the
authorized personnel levels for the elements within the ICMA
for Fiscal Year 2017.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Section 201--Authorization of appropriations
Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of
$514,000,000 for Fiscal Year 2017 for the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 301--Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized
by law
Section 301 provides that funds authorized to be
appropriated by the Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other
benefits for federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for
increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law.
Section 302--Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities
Section 302 provides that the authorization of
appropriations by the Act shall not be deemed to constitute
authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity that is
not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of the
United States.
Section 303--Authorization of appropriations for Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board
Section 303 requires funds available to the Privacy and
Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) to be obligated or
expended during a fiscal year only if such funds were
specifically authorized by Congress for that fiscal year, and
authorizes the full amount of the Administration's budget
request for PCLOB for Fiscal Year 2017.
Section 304--Modification of certain whistleblowing procedures
Section 304 amends current law, including the Intelligence
Community Whistleblower Protection Act (IC WPA), to provide for
the direct transmission to Congress by IC inspectors general
(IGs) of whistleblower complaints containing classified
information.
Section 305--Reports on major defense intelligence acquisition programs
Section 305 requires milestone decision authorities to
provide the congressional intelligence and defense committees
with reports on major defense intelligence acquisition programs
at each milestone approval through initial operating capability
or full operating capability, as applicable.
Section 306--Modifications to certain requirements for construction of
facilities
Section 306 amends and clarifies existing law regarding the
requirements for inclusion in the Administration's annual
budget request and notification to the congressional
intelligence committees of projects for the construction of
facilities for the primary use of IC personnel.
Section 307--Information on Activities of Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board
Section 307 requires PCLOB to keep Congress and relevant IC
elements fully and currently informed of its activities.
Section 308--Clarification of authorization of certain activities of
the Department of Energy
Section 308 authorizes funds appropriated for Fiscal Year
2016 for the intelligence and intelligence-related activities
of the Department of Energy.
Section 309--Technical correction to Executive Schedule
Section 309 contains a technical correction regarding the
annual rate of basic pay for the Director of the National
Counter Proliferation Center.
Section 310--Maximum amount charged for declassification reviews
Section 310 prohibits the head of an element of the IC from
charging reproduction fees for a mandatory declassification
review in excess of reproduction fees that the head would
charge for a request for information under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA). It also permits agency heads to waive
processing fees for declassification reviews in the same manner
as for FOIA.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
SUBTITLE A--OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Section 401--Analyses and impact statements by Director of National
Intelligence regarding actions by Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States
Section 401 directs the DNI to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees, after the completion of a review or an
investigation of a covered transaction, the threat analysis
previously provided to the Committee on Foreign Investment in
the United States (CFIUS) pertaining to such transaction. It
also directs the DNI to provide the committees with impact
statements when the DNI determines that a covered transaction
will have an operational impact on the IC.
Section 402--National Counterintelligence and Security Center
Section 402 renames the National Counterintelligence
Executive as the ``National Counterintelligence and Security
Center,'' with conforming amendments.
Section 403--Assistance for governmental entities and
private entities in recognizing online violent extremist
content
Section 403 requires the DNI to publish on a publicly
available Internet website a list of all logos, symbols,
insignia, and other markings commonly associated with, or
adopted by, State Department-designated foreign terrorist
organizations.
SUBTITLE B--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND OTHER ELEMENTS
Section 411--Enhanced death benefits for employees of the Central
Intelligence Agency
Section 411 authorizes the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) to pay death benefits substantially
similar to those authorized for members of the Foreign Service,
and requires the Director to submit implementing regulations to
the congressional intelligence committees.
Section 412--Pay and retirement authorities of the Inspector General of
the Central Intelligence Agency
Section 412 amends the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 to permit the CIA Inspector General (IG) to designate an
officer or employee as a law enforcement officer for purposes
of pay and retirement benefits, if such officer or employee is
appointed to a position with responsibility for investigating
suspected offenses against the criminal laws of the United
States. This section may not be construed to confer on the CIA
IG, or any other officer or employee of CIA, any police or law
enforcement or internal security functions or authorities.
Section 413--Clarification of authority, direction, and control over
the information assurance directorate of the National Security
Agency
Section 413 restores authority, direction, and control over
the Information Assurance Directorate of the National Security
Agency to the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
Section 414--Living quarters allowance for employees of the Defense
Intelligence Agency
Section 414 prohibits the receipt of a living quarters
allowance by any civilian employee of the Defense Intelligence
Agency who is assigned to a directorate of a geographic
combatant command that is headquartered outside of the United
States. It applies starting with the pay period beginning on or
after one year following enactment of the Act.
Section 415--Plan on assumption of certain weather missions by the
National Reconnaissance Office
Section 415 requires the Director of the National
Reconnaissance Office to develop a plan to carry out certain
space-based environmental monitoring missions currently
performed by the Air Force. It also authorizes certain pre-
acquisition activities and directs that an independent cost
estimate be submitted to the congressional intelligence and
defense committees.
Section 416--Modernization of security clearance information technology
architecture
Section 416 requires the DNI to assist the Secretary of
Defense in developing and implementing--and issuing guidance
relating to a modernization of DoD's security clearance
information technology architecture.
TITLE V--MATTERS RELATING TO UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO
BAY, CUBA
Section 501--Declassification of information on past terrorist
activities of detainees transferred from United States Naval
Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, after signing of Executive Order
13492
Section 501 requires the DNI to conduct a prompt
declassification review--and, once declassified, make available
to the public intelligence reports prepared by the National
Counterterrorism Center prior to Periodic Review Board sessions
or detainee transfers on the past terrorist activities of
individuals detained at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, who were transferred or released after the signing
of Executive Order 13492.
TITLE VI--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS
Section 601--Report on intelligence community employees detailed to
National Security Council
Section 601 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report listing, by year, the number
of employees of an element of the IC who have been detailed to
the National Security Council during each of the previous ten
years.
Section 602--Intelligence community reporting to Congress on foreign
fighter flows
Section 602 directs DNI to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report on foreign fighter flows to
and from terrorist safe havens abroad.
Section 603--Report on information relating to academic programs,
scholarships, fellowships, and internships sponsored,
administered, or used by the intelligence community
Section 603 directs DNI to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report regarding IC information
collection on certain academic programs, scholarships,
fellowships, and internships sponsored, administered, or used
by the intelligence community.
Section 604--Report on cybersecurity threats to seaports of the United
States and maritime shipping
Section 604 directs the Under Secretary of Homeland
Security for Intelligence and Analysis to submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on the
cybersecurity threats to seaports of the United States and
maritime shipping.
Section 605--Report on counter-messaging activities
Section 605 directs the Under Secretary of Homeland
Security for Intelligence and Analysis to submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on the counter-
messaging activities of the Department of Homeland Security
with respect to the Islamic State and other extremist groups.
Section 606--Report on reprisals against contractors of the
intelligence community
Section 606 directs the IC IG to submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on known or
suspected reprisals made against employees of contractors of
elements of the IC, and to make any appropriate
recommendations.
Oversight Findings and Recommendations
With respect to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, the Committee held multiple
hearings on the classified budgetary issues raised by H.R.
5077. The bill, as reported by the Committee, reflects
conclusions reached by the Committee in light of this oversight
activity.
General Performance Goals and Objectives
The goals and objectives of H.R. 5077 are to authorize the
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United
States Government for Fiscal Year 2017. These activities
enhance the national security of the United States, support and
assist the armed forces of the United States, and support the
President in the execution of the foreign policy of the United
States.
The classified annex that accompanies this report reflects
in great detail the Committee's specific performance goals and
objectives at the programmatic level with respect to classified
programs.
Unfunded Mandate Statement
Section 423 of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act (as amended by Section 101(a)(2) of the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act, P.L. 104-4) requires a statement of
whether the provisions of the reported bill include unfunded
mandates. In compliance with this requirement, the Committee
has received a letter from the Congressional Budget Office
included herein.
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, May 11, 2016.
Hon. Devin Nunes,
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 5077, the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is William Ma.
Sincerely,
Keith Hall.
Enclosure.
H.R. 5077--Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017
Summary: H.R. 5077 would authorize appropriations for
fiscal year 2017 for intelligence activities of the U.S.
government, the Intelligence Community Management Account
(ICMA), the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and
Disability System (CIARDS), and the Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board (PCLOB).
CBO does not provide estimates for classified programs;
therefore, this estimate addresses only the unclassified
aspects of the bill. On that limited basis, CBO estimates that
implementing the unclassified provisions of the bill would cost
$521 million over the 2017-2021 period, subject to
appropriation of the specified amounts.
In addition, enacting the bill also would affect direct
spending and revenues by allowing the Inspector General of the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to designate certain
employees as law enforcement officers; therefore, pay-as-you
procedures apply. However, CBO estimates that those effects
would not be significant over the 2017-2026 period.
CBO estimates that enacting H.R. 5077 would not increase
net direct spending or on-budget deficits in any of the four
consecutive 10-year periods beginning in 2027.
H.R. 5077 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector
mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA)
and would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal
governments.
Estimated Costs to the Federal Government: The estimated
budgetary effects of H.R. 5077 are shown in the following
table. The costs of this legislation fall within budget
function 050 (national defense).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
-----------------------------------------------------------
2017-
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2021
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
INCREASES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION
Intelligence Community Management Account:
Authorization Level............................. 519 0 0 0 0 519
Estimated Outlays............................... 337 145 18 8 3 511
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board:
Authorization Level............................. 10 0 0 0 0 10
Estimated Outlays............................... 7 3 0 0 0 10
Total Increases:
Estimated Authorization Level............... 529 0 0 0 0 529
Estimated Outlays........................... 344 148 18 8 3 521
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Basis of estimate: For this estimate, CBO assumes that H.R.
5077 will be enacted near the beginning of fiscal year 2017,
that the specified amounts will be appropriated, and that
outlays will follow historical spending patterns for existing
or similar programs.
Spending subject to appropriation
Intelligence Community Management Account. Section 104
would authorize the appropriation of nearly $519 million for
fiscal year 2017 for the ICMA. That amount is about 3 percent
higher (or $13 million more) than the amount appropriated for
that account for fiscal year 2016. The ICMA is the principal
source of funding for the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence and for managing the intelligence agencies. CBO
estimates that implementing section 104 would cost $511 million
over the 2017-2021 period.
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. Section 303
would authorize an appropriation of about $10 million for
fiscal year 2017 for the PCLOB to perform its statutory
functions. The PCLOB is an independent agency within the
executive branch responsible for ensuring that measures taken
by the federal government to combat terrorism are balanced
against the need to protect privacy and civil liberties. The
specified amount authorized for 2017 is less than the $21
million provided in 2016; however, that amount included two-
year funding to cover relocation costs the Board will
experience as it vacates its current facility in 2016, occupies
an interim space, and moves into new offices in 2017. CBO
estimates that implementing section 303 would cost $10 million
over the 2017-2021 period.
Living Quarters Allowance (LQA). Section 414 would prohibit
the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) from paying LQA to any of
its employees assigned to a directorate of a combatant command
that has its headquarters located outside of the United States.
Two combatant commands meet that condition--U.S. European
Command and U.S. Africa Command and both are headquartered in
Stuttgart, Germany.
LQA is used as an incentive to recruit eligible individuals
for assignments overseas. Annual rates are determined by the
Department of State and are based on location, employee grade,
and family size. For 2016, annual LQA rates published for
Stuttgart, Germany, range from $32,700 to $41,800 for employees
without families and from $39,200 to $42,300 for employees with
families. The with family rates may also be increased by
between 10 percent and 30 percent for employees with larger
families.
Eliminating LQA payments to those DIA employees would
decrease the amount the agency pays for LQA. However, on the
basis of information from DIA, CBO expects that, in the absence
of such payments, the affected employees would be more likely
to request and receive permission to cut short their tours of
duty by several years and return to the United States earlier
than they otherwise would. The resulting increase in relocation
costs the average cost to move an employee's household to or
from an overseas location is about $75,000--would, in CBO's
estimation, largely offset any savings that would result from
eliminating LQA payments. Thus, CBO estimates that implementing
this provision would have an insignificant net effect on
personnel costs.
Direct spending and revenues
Law Enforcement Officials. Section 412 would allow the CIA
Inspector General to designate individuals performing certain
investigative functions as law enforcement officers (LEOs) for
purposes of pay and retirement benefits. The average difference
between a LEO and a non-LEO retirement annuity is about $25,000
per year. LEOs are also required to contribute 0.5 percent more
of their salaries toward their future retirement annuities than
non-LEOs (such employee contributions are recorded in the
budget as revenues). Based on information from the CIA and the
Office of Management and Budget, CBO estimates that the
increase in revenues and direct spending under this provision
would not be significant over the 2017-2026 period.
Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability
System. Section 201 would authorize the appropriation of $514
million for CIARDS for fiscal year 2017 to maintain the proper
funding level for operating that retirement and disability
system. Appropriations to CIARDS are treated as direct spending
in the budget and are projected to continue in CBO's baseline.
Therefore, CBO does not ascribe any additional cost to this
provision.
Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: H.R. 5077
contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as
defined in UMRA and would impose no costs on state, local, or
tribal governments.
Increase in long-term direct spending and deficits: CBO
estimates that enacting H.R. 5077 would not increase net direct
spending or on-budget deficits in any of the four consecutive
10-year periods beginning in 2027.
Estimate prepared by: Federal costs: William Ma; impact on
state, local, and tribal governments; Jon Sperl; impact on the
private sector: Paige Piper-Bach.
Estimate approved by: H. Samuel Papenfuss, Deputy Assistant
Director for Budget Analysis.
Statement on Congressional Earmarks
Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the House
of Representatives, the Committee states that the bill as
reported contains no congressional earmarks, limited tax
benefits, or limited tariff benefits
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no
change is proposed is shown in roman):
INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004
* * * * * * *
TITLE I--REFORM OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
* * * * * * *
Subtitle F--Privacy and Civil Liberties
SEC. 1061. PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD.
(a) In General.--There is established as an independent
agency within the executive branch a Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board (referred to in this section as the
``Board'').
(b) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) In conducting the war on terrorism, the
Government may need additional powers and may need to
enhance the use of its existing powers.
(2) This shift of power and authority to the
Government calls for an enhanced system of checks and
balances to protect the precious liberties that are
vital to our way of life and to ensure that the
Government uses its powers for the purposes for which
the powers were given.
(3) The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
the United States correctly concluded that ``The choice
between security and liberty is a false choice, as
nothing is more likely to endanger America's liberties
than the success of a terrorist attack at home. Our
history has shown us that insecurity threatens liberty.
Yet, if our liberties are curtailed, we lose the values
that we are struggling to defend.''.
(c) Purpose.--The Board shall--
(1) analyze and review actions the executive branch
takes to protect the Nation from terrorism, ensuring
that the need for such actions is balanced with the
need to protect privacy and civil liberties; and
(2) ensure that liberty concerns are appropriately
considered in the development and implementation of
laws, regulations, and policies related to efforts to
protect the Nation against terrorism.
(d) Functions.--
(1) Advice and counsel on policy development and
implementation.--The Board shall--
(A) review proposed legislation, regulations,
and policies related to efforts to protect the
Nation from terrorism, including the
development and adoption of information sharing
guidelines under subsections (d) and (f) of
section 1016;
(B) review the implementation of new and
existing legislation, regulations, and policies
related to efforts to protect the Nation from
terrorism, including the implementation of
information sharing guidelines under
subsections (d) and (f) of section 1016;
(C) advise the President and the departments,
agencies, and elements of the executive branch
to ensure that privacy and civil liberties are
appropriately considered in the development and
implementation of such legislation,
regulations, policies, and guidelines; and
(D) in providing advice on proposals to
retain or enhance a particular governmental
power, consider whether the department, agency,
or element of the executive branch has
established--
(i) that the need for the power is
balanced with the need to protect
privacy and civil liberties;
(ii) that there is adequate
supervision of the use by the executive
branch of the power to ensure
protection of privacy and civil
liberties; and
(iii) that there are adequate
guidelines and oversight to properly
confine its use.
(2) Oversight.--The Board shall continually review--
(A) the regulations, policies, and
procedures, and the implementation of the
regulations, policies, and procedures, of the
departments, agencies, and elements of the
executive branch relating to efforts to protect
the Nation from terrorism to ensure that
privacy and civil liberties are protected;
(B) the information sharing practices of the
departments, agencies, and elements of the
executive branch relating to efforts to protect
the Nation from terrorism to determine whether
they appropriately protect privacy and civil
liberties and adhere to the information sharing
guidelines issued or developed under
subsections (d) and (f) of section 1016 and to
other governing laws, regulations, and policies
regarding privacy and civil liberties; and
(C) other actions by the executive branch
relating to efforts to protect the Nation from
terrorism to determine whether such actions--
(i) appropriately protect privacy and
civil liberties; and
(ii) are consistent with governing
laws, regulations, and policies
regarding privacy and civil liberties.
(3) Relationship with privacy and civil liberties
officers.--The Board shall--
(A) receive and review reports and other
information from privacy officers and civil
liberties officers under section 1062;
(B) when appropriate, make recommendations to
such privacy officers and civil liberties
officers regarding their activities; and
(C) when appropriate, coordinate the
activities of such privacy officers and civil
liberties officers on relevant interagency
matters.
(4) Testimony.--The members of the Board shall appear
and testify before Congress upon request.
(5) Information.--
(A) Activities.--In addition to the reports
submitted to Congress under subsection
(e)(1)(B), the Board shall ensure that each
official and congressional committee specified
in subparagraph (B) is kept fully and currently
informed of the activities of the Board,
including any significant anticipated
activities.
(B) Officials and congressional committees
specified.--The officials and congressional
committees specified in this subparagraph are
the following:
(i) The Director of National
Intelligence.
(ii) The head of any element of the
intelligence community (as defined in
section 3(4) of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)) the
activities of which are, or are
anticipated to be, the subject of the
review or advice of the Board.
(iii) The Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate.
(e) Reports.--
(1) In general.--The Board shall--
(A) receive and review reports from privacy
officers and civil liberties officers under
section 1062; and
(B) periodically submit, not less than
semiannually, reports--
(i)(I) to the appropriate committees
of Congress, including the Committee on
the Judiciary of the Senate, the
Committee on the Judiciary of the House
of Representatives, the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs of the Senate, the Committee on
Homeland Security of the House of
Representatives, the Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform of the
House of Representatives, the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate, and the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House
of Representatives; and
(II) to the President; and
(ii) which shall be in unclassified
form to the greatest extent possible,
with a classified annex where
necessary.
(2) Contents.--Not less than 2 reports submitted each
year under paragraph (1)(B) shall include--
(A) a description of the major activities of
the Board during the preceding period;
(B) information on the findings, conclusions,
and recommendations of the Board resulting from
its advice and oversight functions under
subsection (d);
(C) the minority views on any findings,
conclusions, and recommendations of the Board
resulting from its advice and oversight
functions under subsection (d);
(D) each proposal reviewed by the Board under
subsection (d)(1) that--
(i) the Board advised against
implementation; and
(ii) notwithstanding such advice,
actions were taken to implement; and
(E) for the preceding period, any requests
submitted under subsection (g)(1)(D) for the
issuance of subpoenas that were modified or
denied by the Attorney General.
(f) Informing the Public.--The Board shall--
(1) make its reports, including its reports to
Congress, available to the public to the greatest
extent that is consistent with the protection of
classified information and applicable law; and
(2) hold public hearings and otherwise inform the
public of its activities, as appropriate and in a
manner consistent with the protection of classified
information and applicable law.
(g) Access to Information.--
(1) Authorization.--If determined by the Board to be
necessary to carry out its responsibilities under this
section, the Board is authorized to--
(A) have access from any department, agency,
or element of the executive branch, or any
Federal officer or employee of any such
department, agency, or element, to all relevant
records, reports, audits, reviews, documents,
papers, recommendations, or other relevant
material, including classified information
consistent with applicable law;
(B) interview, take statements from, or take
public testimony from personnel of any
department, agency, or element of the executive
branch, or any Federal officer or employee of
any such department, agency, or element;
(C) request information or assistance from
any State, tribal, or local government; and
(D) at the direction of a majority of the
members of the Board, submit a written request
to the Attorney General of the United States
that the Attorney General require, by subpoena,
persons (other than departments, agencies, and
elements of the executive branch) to produce
any relevant information, documents, reports,
answers, records, accounts, papers, and other
documentary or testimonial evidence.
(2) Review of subpoena request.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 30 days after
the date of receipt of a request by the Board
under paragraph (1)(D), the Attorney General
shall--
(i) issue the subpoena as requested;
or
(ii) provide the Board, in writing,
with an explanation of the grounds on
which the subpoena request has been
modified or denied.
(B) Notification.--If a subpoena request is
modified or denied under subparagraph (A)(ii),
the Attorney General shall, not later than 30
days after the date of that modification or
denial, notify the Committee on the Judiciary
of the Senate and the Committee on the
Judiciary of the House of Representatives.
(3) Enforcement of subpoena.--In the case of
contumacy or failure to obey a subpoena issued pursuant
to paragraph (1)(D), the United States district court
for the judicial district in which the subpoenaed
person resides, is served, or may be found may issue an
order requiring such person to produce the evidence
required by such subpoena.
(4) Agency cooperation.--Whenever information or
assistance requested under subparagraph (A) or (B) of
paragraph (1) is, in the judgment of the Board,
unreasonably refused or not provided, the Board shall
report the circumstances to the head of the department,
agency, or element concerned without delay. The head of
the department, agency, or element concerned shall
ensure that the Board is given access to the
information, assistance, material, or personnel the
Board determines to be necessary to carry out its
functions.
(5) Access.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed to authorize the Board, or any agent thereof,
to gain access to information regarding an activity
covered by section 503(a) of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3093(a)).
(h) Membership.--
(1) Members.--The Board shall be composed of a full-
time chairman and 4 additional members, who shall be
appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate.
(2) Qualifications.--Members of the Board shall be
selected solely on the basis of their professional
qualifications, achievements, public stature, expertise
in civil liberties and privacy, and relevant
experience, and without regard to political
affiliation, but in no event shall more than 3 members
of the Board be members of the same political party.
The President shall, before appointing an individual
who is not a member of the same political party as the
President, consult with the leadership of that party,
if any, in the Senate and House of Representatives.
(3) Incompatible office.--An individual appointed to
the Board may not, while serving on the Board, be an
elected official, officer, or employee of the Federal
Government, other than in the capacity as a member of
the Board.
(4) Term.--Each member of the Board shall serve a
term of 6 years, except that--
(A) a member appointed to a term of office
after the commencement of such term may serve
under such appointment only for the remainder
of such term; and
(B) upon the expiration of the term of office
of a member, the member shall continue to serve
until the member's successor has been appointed
and qualified, except that no member may serve
under this subparagraph--
(i) for more than 60 days when
Congress is in session unless a
nomination to fill the vacancy shall
have been submitted to the Senate; or
(ii) after the adjournment sine die
of the session of the Senate in which
such nomination is submitted.
(5) Quorum and meetings.--The Board shall meet upon
the call of the chairman or a majority of its members.
Three members of the Board shall constitute a quorum.
(i) Compensation and Travel Expenses.--
(1) Compensation.--
(A) Chairman.--The chairman of the Board
shall be compensated at the rate of pay payable
for a position at level III of the Executive
Schedule under section 5314 of title 5, United
States Code.
(B) Members.--Each member of the Board shall
be compensated at a rate of pay payable for a
position at level IV of the Executive Schedule
under section 5315 of title 5, United States
Code, for each day during which that member is
engaged in the actual performance of the duties
of the Board.
(2) Travel expenses.--Members of the Board shall be
allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of
subsistence, at rates authorized for persons employed
intermittently by the Government under section 5703(b)
of title 5, United States Code, while away from their
homes or regular places of business in the performance
of services for the Board.
(j) Staff.--
(1) Appointment and compensation.--The chairman of
the Board, in accordance with rules agreed upon by the
Board, shall appoint and fix the compensation of a
full-time executive director and such other personnel
as may be necessary to enable the Board to carry out
its functions, without regard to the provisions of
title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in
the competitive service, and without regard to the
provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter
53 of such title relating to classification and General
Schedule pay rates, except that no rate of pay fixed
under this subsection may exceed the equivalent of that
payable for a position at level V of the Executive
Schedule under section 5316 of title 5, United States
Code.
(2) Detailees.--Any Federal employee may be detailed
to the Board without reimbursement from the Board, and
such detailee shall retain the rights, status, and
privileges of the detailee's regular employment without
interruption.
(3) Consultant services.--The Board may procure the
temporary or intermittent services of experts and
consultants in accordance with section 3109 of title 5,
United States Code, at rates that do not exceed the
daily rate paid a person occupying a position at level
IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of such
title.
(k) Security Clearances.--
(1) In general.--The appropriate departments,
agencies, and elements of the executive branch shall
cooperate with the Board to expeditiously provide the
Board members and staff with appropriate security
clearances to the extent possible under existing
procedures and requirements.
(2) Rules and procedures.--After consultation with
the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, and the
Director of National Intelligence, the Board shall
adopt rules and procedures of the Board for physical,
communications, computer, document, personnel, and
other security relating to carrying out the functions
of the Board.
(l) Treatment as Agency, Not as Advisory Committee.--The
Board--
(1) is an agency (as defined in section 551(1) of
title 5, United States Code); and
(2) is not an advisory committee (as defined in
section 3(2) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5
U.S.C. App.)).
[(m) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated to carry out this section amounts as
follows:
[(1) For fiscal year 2008, $5,000,000.
[(2) For fiscal year 2009, $6,650,000.
[(3) For fiscal year 2010, $8,300,000.
[(4) For fiscal year 2011, $10,000,000.
[(5) For fiscal year 2012 and each subsequent fiscal
year, such sums as may be necessary.]
(m) Funding.--
(1) Specific authorization required.--Appropriated
funds available to the Board may be obligated or
expended to carry out activities under this section
only if such funds were specifically authorized by
Congress for use for such activities for such fiscal
year.
(2) Definition.--In this subsection, the term
``specifically authorized by Congress'' has the meaning
given that term in section 504(e) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3094(e)).
* * * * * * *
TITLE III--SECURITY CLEARANCES
SEC. 3001. SECURITY CLEARANCES.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) The term ``agency'' means--
(A) an executive agency (as that term is
defined in section 105 of title 5, United
States Code);
(B) a military department (as that term is
defined in section 102 of title 5, United
States Code); and
(C) an element of the intelligence community.
(2) The term ``authorized investigative agency''
means an agency designated by the head of the agency
selected pursuant to subsection (b) to conduct a
counterintelligence investigation or investigation of
persons who are proposed for access to classified
information to ascertain whether such persons satisfy
the criteria for obtaining and retaining access to such
information.
(3) The term ``authorized adjudicative agency'' means
an agency authorized by law, regulation, or direction
of the Director of National Intelligence to determine
eligibility for access to classified information in
accordance with Executive Order 12968.
(4) The term ``highly sensitive program'' means--
(A) a government program designated as a
Special Access Program (as that term is defined
in section 4.1(h) of Executive Order 12958 or
any successor Executive order); or
(B) a government program that applies
restrictions required for--
(i) restricted data (as that term is
defined in section 11 y. of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014(y));
or
(ii) other information commonly
referred to as ``sensitive
compartmented information''.
(5) The term ``current investigation file'' means,
with respect to a security clearance, a file on an
investigation or adjudication that has been conducted
during--
(A) the 5-year period beginning on the date
the security clearance was granted, in the case
of a Top Secret Clearance, or the date access
was granted to a highly sensitive program;
(B) the 10-year period beginning on the date
the security clearance was granted in the case
of a Secret Clearance; and
(C) the 15-year period beginning on the date
the security clearance was granted in the case
of a Confidential Clearance.
(6) The term ``personnel security investigation''
means any investigation required for the purpose of
determining the eligibility of any military, civilian,
or government contractor personnel to access classified
information.
(7) The term ``periodic reinvestigations'' means
investigations conducted for the purpose of updating a
previously completed background investigation--
(A) every 5 years in the case of a top secret
clearance or access to a highly sensitive
program;
(B) every 10 years in the case of a secret
clearance; or
(C) every 15 years in the case of a
Confidential Clearance.
(8) The term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means--
(A) the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Committees on Armed
Services, Homeland Security, Government Reform,
and the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives; and
(B) the Select Committee on Intelligence and
the Committees on Armed Services, Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, and the
Judiciary of the Senate.
(9) Access determination.--The term ``access
determination'' means the determination regarding
whether an employee--
(A) is eligible for access to classified
information in accordance with Executive Order
12968 (60 Fed. Reg. 40245; relating to access
to classified information), or any successor
thereto, and Executive Order 10865 (25 Fed.
Reg. 1583; relating to safeguarding classified
information with industry), or any successor
thereto; and
(B) possesses a need to know under such an
Order.
(b) Selection of Entity.--Except as otherwise provided, not
later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the President shall select a single department, agency, or
element of the executive branch to be responsible for--
(1) directing day-to-day oversight of investigations
and adjudications for personnel security clearances,
including for highly sensitive programs, throughout the
United States Government;
(2) developing and implementing uniform and
consistent policies and procedures to ensure the
effective, efficient, and timely completion of security
clearances and determinations for access to highly
sensitive programs, including the standardization of
security questionnaires, financial disclosure
requirements for security clearance applicants, and
polygraph policies and procedures;
(3) serving as the final authority to designate an
authorized investigative agency or authorized
adjudicative agency;
(4) ensuring reciprocal recognition of access to
classified information among the agencies of the United
States Government, including acting as the final
authority to arbitrate and resolve disputes involving
the reciprocity of security clearances and access to
highly sensitive programs pursuant to subsection (d);
(5) ensuring, to the maximum extent practicable, that
sufficient resources are available in each agency to
achieve clearance and investigative program goals;
(6) reviewing and coordinating the development of
tools and techniques for enhancing the conduct of
investigations and granting of clearances; and
(7) not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2014, and consistent with subsection (j)--
(A) developing policies and procedures that
permit, to the extent practicable, individuals
alleging reprisal for having made a protected
disclosure (provided the individual does not
disclose classified information or other
information contrary to law) to appeal any
action affecting an employee's access to
classified information and to retain their
government employment status while such
challenge is pending; and
(B) developing and implementing uniform and
consistent policies and procedures to ensure
proper protections during the process for
denying, suspending, or revoking a security
clearance or access to classified information
following a protected disclosure, including the
ability to appeal such a denial, suspension, or
revocation, except that there shall be no
appeal of an agency's suspension of a security
clearance or access determination for purposes
of conducting an investigation, if that
suspension lasts no longer than 1 year or the
head of the agency or a designee of the head of
the agency certifies that a longer suspension
is needed before a final decision on denial or
revocation to prevent imminent harm to the
national security.
(c) Performance of Security Clearance Investigations.--(1)
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, not later than 180
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President
shall, in consultation with the head of the entity selected
pursuant to subsection (b), select a single agency of the
executive branch to conduct, to the maximum extent practicable,
security clearance investigations of employees and contractor
personnel of the United States Government who require access to
classified information and to provide and maintain all security
clearances of such employees and contractor personnel. The head
of the entity selected pursuant to subsection (b) may designate
other agencies to conduct such investigations if the head of
the entity selected pursuant to subsection (b) considers it
appropriate for national security and efficiency purposes.
(2) The agency selected under paragraph (1) shall--
(A) take all necessary actions to carry out the
requirements of this section, including entering into a
memorandum of understanding with any agency carrying
out responsibilities relating to security clearances or
security clearance investigations before the date of
the enactment of this Act;
(B) as soon as practicable, integrate reporting of
security clearance applications, security clearance
investigations, and determinations of eligibility for
security clearances, with the database required by
subsection (e); and
(C) ensure that security clearance investigations are
conducted in accordance with uniform standards and
requirements established under subsection (b),
including uniform security questionnaires and financial
disclosure requirements.
(d) Reciprocity of Security Clearance and Access
Determinations.--(1) All security clearance background
investigations and determinations completed by an authorized
investigative agency or authorized adjudicative agency shall be
accepted by all agencies.
(2) All security clearance background investigations
initiated by an authorized investigative agency shall be
transferable to any other authorized investigative agency.
(3)(A) An authorized investigative agency or authorized
adjudicative agency may not establish additional investigative
or adjudicative requirements (other than requirements for the
conduct of a polygraph examination) that exceed requirements
specified in Executive Orders establishing security
requirements for access to classified information without the
approval of the head of the entity selected pursuant to
subsection (b).
(B) Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), the head of the entity
selected pursuant to subsection (b) may establish such
additional requirements as the head of such entity considers
necessary for national security purposes.
(4) An authorized investigative agency or authorized
adjudicative agency may not conduct an investigation for
purposes of determining whether to grant a security clearance
to an individual where a current investigation or clearance of
equal level already exists or has been granted by another
authorized adjudicative agency.
(5) The head of the entity selected pursuant to subsection
(b) may disallow the reciprocal recognition of an individual
security clearance by an agency under this section on a case-
by-case basis if the head of the entity selected pursuant to
subsection (b) determines that such action is necessary for
national security purposes.
(6) The head of the entity selected pursuant to subsection
(b) shall establish a review procedure by which agencies can
seek review of actions required under this section.
(e) Database on Security Clearances.--(1) Not later than 12
months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Director of the Office of Personnel Management shall, in
cooperation with the heads of the entities selected pursuant to
subsections (b) and (c), establish and commence operating and
maintaining an integrated, secure, database into which
appropriate data relevant to the granting, denial, or
revocation of a security clearance or access pertaining to
military, civilian, or government contractor personnel shall be
entered from all authorized investigative and adjudicative
agencies.
(2) The database under this subsection shall function to
integrate information from existing Federal clearance tracking
systems from other authorized investigative and adjudicative
agencies into a single consolidated database.
(3) Each authorized investigative or adjudicative agency
shall check the database under this subsection to determine
whether an individual the agency has identified as requiring a
security clearance has already been granted or denied a
security clearance, or has had a security clearance revoked, by
any other authorized investigative or adjudicative agency.
(4) The head of the entity selected pursuant to subsection
(b) shall evaluate the extent to which an agency is submitting
information to, and requesting information from, the database
under this subsection as part of a determination of whether to
certify the agency as an authorized investigative agency or
authorized adjudicative agency.
(5) The head of the entity selected pursuant to subsection
(b) may authorize an agency to withhold information about
certain individuals from the database under this subsection if
the head of the entity considers it necessary for national
security purposes.
(f) Evaluation of Use of Available Technology in Clearance
Investigations and Adjudications.--(1) The head of the entity
selected pursuant to subsection (b) shall evaluate the use of
available information technology and databases to expedite
investigative and adjudicative processes for all and to verify
standard information submitted as part of an application for a
security clearance.
(2) The evaluation shall assess the application of the
technologies described in paragraph (1) for--
(A) granting interim clearances to applicants at the
secret, top secret, and special access program levels
before the completion of the appropriate full
investigation;
(B) expediting investigations and adjudications of
security clearances, including verification of
information submitted by the applicant;
(C) ongoing verification of suitability of personnel
with security clearances in effect for continued access
to classified information;
(D) use of such technologies to augment periodic
reinvestigations;
(E) assessing the impact of the use of such
technologies on the rights of applicants to verify,
correct, or challenge information obtained through such
technologies; and
(F) such other purposes as the head of the entity
selected pursuant to subsection (b) considers
appropriate.
(3) An individual subject to verification utilizing the
technology described in paragraph (1) shall be notified of such
verification, shall provide consent to such use, and shall have
access to data being verified in order to correct errors or
challenge information the individual believes is incorrect.
(4) Not later than one year after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the head of the entity selected pursuant to
subsection (b) shall submit to the President and the
appropriate committees of Congress a report on the results of
the evaluation, including recommendations on the use of
technologies described in paragraph (1).
(g) Reduction in Length of Personnel Security Clearance
Process.--(1) The head of the entity selected pursuant to
subsection (b) shall, within 90 days of selection under that
subsection, develop, in consultation with the appropriate
committees of Congress and each authorized adjudicative agency,
a plan to reduce the length of the personnel security clearance
process.
(2)(A) To the extent practical the plan under paragraph (1)
shall require that each authorized adjudicative agency make a
determination on at least 90 percent of all applications for a
personnel security clearance within an average of 60 days after
the date of receipt of the completed application for a security
clearance by an authorized investigative agency. Such 60-day
average period shall include--
(i) a period of not longer than 40 days to complete
the investigative phase of the clearance review; and
(ii) a period of not longer than 20 days to complete
the adjudicative phase of the clearance review.
(B) Determinations on clearances not made within 60 days
shall be made without delay.
(3)(A) The plan under paragraph (1) shall take effect 5 years
after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(B) During the period beginning on a date not later than 2
years after the date after the enactment of this Act and ending
on the date on which the plan under paragraph (1) takes effect,
each authorized adjudicative agency shall make a determination
on at least 80 percent of all applications for a personnel
security clearance pursuant to this section within an average
of 120 days after the date of receipt of the application for a
security clearance by an authorized investigative agency. Such
120-day average period shall include--
(i) a period of not longer than 90 days to complete
the investigative phase of the clearance review; and
(ii) a period of not longer than 30 days to complete
the adjudicative phase of the clearance review.
(h) Reports.--(1) Not later than February 15, 2006, and
annually thereafter through 2011, the head of the entity
selected pursuant to subsection (b) shall submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress a report on the progress
made during the preceding year toward meeting the requirements
of this section.
(2) Each report shall include, for the period covered by such
report--
(A) the periods of time required by the authorized
investigative agencies and authorized adjudicative
agencies for conducting investigations, adjudicating
cases, and granting clearances, from date of submission
to ultimate disposition and notification to the subject
and the subject's employer;
(B) a discussion of any impediments to the smooth and
timely functioning of the requirements of this section;
and
(C) such other information or recommendations as the
head of the entity selected pursuant to subsection (b)
considers appropriate.
(i) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to
be appropriated such sums as may be necessary for fiscal year
2005 and each fiscal year thereafter for the implementation,
maintenance, and operation of the database required by
subsection (e).
(j) Retaliatory Revocation of Security Clearances and Access
Determinations.--
(1) In general.--Agency personnel with authority over
personnel security clearance or access determinations
shall not take or fail to take, or threaten to take or
fail to take, any action with respect to any employee's
security clearance or access determination in
retaliation for--
(A) any lawful disclosure of information to
the Director of National Intelligence (or an
employee designated by the Director of National
Intelligence for such purpose) or the head of
the employing agency (or employee designated by
the head of that agency for such purpose) by an
employee that the employee reasonably believes
evidences--
(i) a violation of any Federal law,
rule, or regulation; or
(ii) gross mismanagement, a gross
waste of funds, an abuse of authority,
or a substantial and specific danger to
public health or safety;
(B) any lawful disclosure to the Inspector
General of an agency or another employee
designated by the head of the agency to receive
such disclosures, of information which the
employee reasonably believes evidences--
(i) a violation of any Federal law,
rule, or regulation; or
(ii) gross mismanagement, a gross
waste of funds, an abuse of authority,
or a substantial and specific danger to
public health or safety;
(C) any lawful disclosure that complies
with--
(i) subsections (a)(1), (d), and (h)
of section 8H of the Inspector General
Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.);
(ii) [subparagraphs (A), (D), and
(H)] subparagraphs (A), (C), and (G) of
section 17(d)(5) of the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C. 3517(d)(5)); or
(iii) subparagraphs (A), (D), and (I)
of section 103H(k)(5) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3033(k)(5)); and
(D) if the actions do not result in the
employee or applicant unlawfully disclosing
information specifically required by Executive
order to be kept classified in the interest of
national defense or the conduct of foreign
affairs, any lawful disclosure in conjunction
with--
(i) the exercise of any appeal,
complaint, or grievance right granted
by any law, rule, or regulation;
(ii) testimony for or otherwise
lawfully assisting any individual in
the exercise of any right referred to
in clause (i); or
(iii) cooperation with or disclosing
information to the Inspector General of
an agency, in accordance with
applicable provisions of law in
connection with an audit, inspection,
or investigation conducted by the
Inspector General.
(2) Rule of construction.--Consistent with the
protection of sources and methods, nothing in paragraph
(1) shall be construed to authorize the withholding of
information from Congress or the taking of any
personnel action against an employee who lawfully
discloses information to Congress.
(3) Disclosures.--
(A) In general.--A disclosure shall not be
excluded from paragraph (1) because--
(i) the disclosure was made to a
person, including a supervisor, who
participated in an activity that the
employee reasonably believed to be
covered by paragraph (1)(A)(ii);
(ii) the disclosure revealed
information that had been previously
disclosed;
(iii) the disclosure was not made in
writing;
(iv) the disclosure was made while
the employee was off duty; or
(v) of the amount of time which has
passed since the occurrence of the
events described in the disclosure.
(B) Reprisals.--If a disclosure is made
during the normal course of duties of an
employee, the disclosure shall not be excluded
from paragraph (1) if any employee who has
authority to take, direct others to take,
recommend, or approve any personnel action with
respect to the employee making the disclosure,
took, failed to take, or threatened to take or
fail to take a personnel action with respect to
that employee in reprisal for the disclosure.
(4) Agency adjudication.--
(A) Remedial procedure.--An employee or
former employee who believes that he or she has
been subjected to a reprisal prohibited by
paragraph (1) may, within 90 days after the
issuance of notice of such decision, appeal
that decision within the agency of that
employee or former employee through proceedings
authorized by subsection (b)(7), except that
there shall be no appeal of an agency's
suspension of a security clearance or access
determination for purposes of conducting an
investigation, if that suspension lasts not
longer than 1 year (or a longer period in
accordance with a certification made under
subsection (b)(7)).
(B) Corrective action.--If, in the course of
proceedings authorized under subparagraph (A),
it is determined that the adverse security
clearance or access determination violated
paragraph (1), the agency shall take specific
corrective action to return the employee or
former employee, as nearly as practicable and
reasonable, to the position such employee or
former employee would have held had the
violation not occurred. Such corrective action
may include back pay and related benefits,
travel expenses, and compensatory damages not
to exceed $300,000.
(C) Contributing factor.--In determining
whether the adverse security clearance or
access determination violated paragraph (1),
the agency shall find that paragraph (1) was
violated if a disclosure described in paragraph
(1) was a contributing factor in the adverse
security clearance or access determination
taken against the individual, unless the agency
demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence
that it would have taken the same action in the
absence of such disclosure, giving the utmost
deference to the agency's assessment of the
particular threat to the national security
interests of the United States in the instant
matter.
(5) Appellate review of security clearance access
determinations by director of national intelligence.--
(A) Appeal.--Within 60 days after receiving
notice of an adverse final agency determination
under a proceeding under paragraph (4), an
employee or former employee may appeal that
determination in accordance with the procedures
established under subparagraph (B).
(B) Policies and procedures.--The Director of
National Intelligence, in consultation with the
Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense,
shall develop and implement policies and
procedures for adjudicating the appeals
authorized by subparagraph (A).
(C) Congressional notification.--Consistent
with the protection of sources and methods, at
the time the Director of National Intelligence
issues an order regarding an appeal pursuant to
the policies and procedures established by this
paragraph, the Director of National
Intelligence shall notify the congressional
intelligence committees.
(6) Judicial review.--Nothing in this section shall
be construed to permit or require judicial review of
any--
(A) agency action under this section; or
(B) action of the appellate review procedures
established under paragraph (5).
(7) Private cause of action.--Nothing in this section
shall be construed to permit, authorize, or require a
private cause of action to challenge the merits of a
security clearance determination.
* * * * * * *
----------
INSPECTOR GENERAL ACT OF 1978
* * * * * * *
Sec. 8H. (a)(1)(A) An employee of the Defense Intelligence
Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the
National Reconnaissance Office, or the National Security
Agency, including any such employee who is assigned or detailed
to a combatant command or other element of the Federal
Government, or of a contractor of any of those Agencies, who
intends to report to Congress a complaint or information with
respect to an urgent concern may report the complaint or
information to the Inspector General of the Department of
Defense (or designee).
(B) An employee of an element of the intelligence community,
an employee assigned or detailed to an element of the
intelligence community, or an employee of a contractor to the
intelligence community, who intends to report to Congress a
complaint or information with respect to an urgent concern may
report such complaint or information to the Inspector General
of the Intelligence Community.
(C) An employee of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or of
a contractor of the Bureau, who intends to report to Congress a
complaint or information with respect to an urgent concern may
report the complaint or information to the Inspector General of
the Department of Justice (or designee).
(D) Any other employee of, or contractor to, an executive
agency, or element or unit thereof, determined by the President
under section 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii) of title 5, United States Code,
to have as its principal function the conduct of foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence activities, who intends to
report to Congress a complaint or information with respect to
an urgent concern may report the complaint or information to
the appropriate Inspector General (or designee) under this Act,
section 17 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, or
section 103H(k) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3033(k)).
(2) If a designee of an Inspector General under this section
receives a complaint or information of an employee with respect
to an urgent concern, that designee shall report the complaint
or information to the Inspector General within 7 calendar days
of receipt.
(3) The Inspectors General of the Defense Intelligence
Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the
National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Security
Agency shall be designees of the Inspector General of the
Department of Defense for purposes of this section.
(b)[(1) Not] Not later than the end of the 14-calendar day
period beginning on the date of receipt of an employee
complaint or information under subsection (a), the Inspector
General shall determine whether the complaint or information
appears credible. Upon making such a determination, the
Inspector General shall transmit [to the head of the
establishment] to the intelligence committees notice of that
determination, together with the complaint or information.
[(2) If the head of an establishment determines that a
complaint or information transmitted under paragraph (1) would
create a conflict of interest for the head of the
establishment, the head of the establishment shall return the
complaint or information to the Inspector General with that
determination and the Inspector General shall make the
transmission to the Director of National Intelligence and, if
the establishment is within the Department of Defense, to the
Secretary of Defense. In such a case, the requirements of this
section for the head of the establishment apply to each
recipient of the Inspector General's transmission.]
[(c) Upon receipt of a transmittal from the Inspector General
under subsection (b), the head of the establishment shall,
within 7 calendar days of such receipt, forward such
transmittal to the intelligence committees, together with any
comments the head of the establishment considers appropriate.]
[(d)] (c)(1) If the Inspector General does not find credible
under subsection (b) a complaint or information submitted to
the Inspector General under subsection (a), or does not
transmit the complaint or information to [the head of the
establishment] the intelligence committees in accurate form
under subsection (b), the employee (subject to paragraph (2))
may submit the complaint or information to Congress by
contacting either or both of the intelligence committees
directly.
(2) The employee may contact the intelligence committees
directly as described in paragraph (1) only if the employee--
(A) before making such a contact, furnishes to [the
head of the establishment, through the Inspector
General,] the Inspector General a statement of the
employee's complaint or information and notice of the
employee's intent to contact the intelligence
committees directly; and
(B) obtains and follows from [the head of the
establishment, through the Inspector General,] the
Inspector General, in consultation with the head of the
establishment, direction on how to contact the
intelligence committees in accordance with appropriate
security practices.
(3) A member or employee of one of the intelligence
committees who receives a complaint or information under
paragraph (1) does so in that member or employee's official
capacity as a member or employee of that committee.
[(e)] (d) The Inspector General shall notify an employee who
reports a complaint or information under this section of each
action taken under this section with respect to the complaint
or information. Such notice shall be provided not later than 3
days after any such action is taken.
[(f)] (e) An action taken by the head of an establishment or
an Inspector General under [subsections (a) through (e)]
subsections (a) through (d) shall not be subject to judicial
review.
[(g)] (f)(1) The Inspector General of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National
Security Agency shall each submit to the congressional
intelligence committees each year a report that sets forth the
following:
(A) The personnel and funds requested by such
Inspector General for the fiscal year beginning in such
year for the activities of the office of such Inspector
General in such fiscal year.
(B) The plan of such Inspector General for such
activities, including the programs and activities
scheduled for review by the office of such Inspector
General during such fiscal year.
(C) An assessment of the current ability of such
Inspector General to hire and retain qualified
personnel for the office of such Inspector General.
(D) Any matters that such Inspector General considers
appropriate regarding the independence and
effectiveness of the office of such Inspector General.
(2) The submittal date for a report under paragraph (1) each
year shall be the date provided in section 507 of the National
Security Act of 1947.
(3) In this subsection, the term ``congressional intelligence
committees'' shall have the meaning given that term in section
3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a).
[(h)] (g) An individual who has submitted a complaint or
information to an Inspector General under this section may
notify any member of the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives or the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, or a staff member of
either such Committee, of the fact that such individual has
made a submission to that particular Inspector General, and of
the date on which such submission was made.
[(i)] (h) In this section:
(1) The term ``urgent concern'' means any of the
following:
(A) A serious or flagrant problem, abuse,
violation of law or Executive order, or
deficiency relating to the funding,
administration, or operations of an
intelligence activity involving classified
information, but does not include differences
of opinions concerning public policy matters.
(B) A false statement to Congress, or a
willful withholding from Congress, on an issue
of material fact relating to the funding,
administration, or operation of an intelligence
activity.
(C) An action, including a personnel action
described in section 2302(a)(2)(A) of title 5,
United States Code, constituting reprisal or
threat of reprisal prohibited under section
7(c) in response to an employee's reporting an
urgent concern in accordance with this section.
(2) The term ``intelligence committees'' means the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House
of Representatives and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate.
* * * * * * *
----------
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949
* * * * * * *
[authority to pay death gratuities
[Sec. 11. (a)(1) The Director may pay a gratuity to the
surviving dependents of any officer or employee of the Agency
who dies as a result of injuries (other than from disease)
sustained outside the United States and whose death--
[(A) resulted from hostile or terrorist activities;
or
[(B) occurred in connection with an intelligence
activity having a substantial element of risk.
[(2) The provisions of this subsection shall apply with
respect to deaths occurring after June 30, 1974.
[(b) Any payment under subsection (a)--
[(1) shall be in an amount equal to the amount of the
annual salary of the officer or employee concerned at
the time of death;
[(2) shall be considered a gift and shall be in lieu
of payment of any lesser death gratuity authorized by
any other Federal law; and
[(3) shall be made under the same conditions as apply
to payments authorized by section 14 of the Act of
August 1, 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2679a).]
BENEFITS AVAILABLE IN EVENT OF THE DEATH OF AN EMPLOYEE
Sec. 11. (a) Authority.--The Director may pay death benefits
substantially similar to those authorized for members of the
Foreign Service pursuant to the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22
U.S.C. 3901 et seq.) or any other provision of law. The
Director may adjust the eligibility for death benefits as
necessary to meet the unique requirements of the mission of the
Agency.
(b) Regulations.--Regulations issued pursuant to this section
shall be submitted to the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate before such regulations
take effect.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 17. INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE AGENCY.
(a) Purpose; Establishment.--In order to--
(1) create an objective and effective office,
appropriately accountable to Congress, to initiate and
conduct independently inspections, investigations, and
audits relating to programs and operations of the
Agency;
(2) provide leadership and recommend policies
designed to promote economy, efficiency, and
effectiveness in the administration of such programs
and operations, and detect fraud and abuse in such
programs and operations;
(3) provide a means for keeping the Director fully
and currently informed about problems and deficiencies
relating to the administration of such programs and
operations, and the necessity for and the progress of
corrective actions; and
(4) in the manner prescribed by this section, ensure
that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
(hereafter in this section referred to collectively as
the ``intelligence committees'') are kept similarly
informed of significant problems and deficiencies as
well as the necessity for and the progress of
corrective actions,
there is hereby established in the Agency an Office of
Inspector General (hereafter in this section referred to as the
``Office'').
(b) Appointment; Supervision; Removal.--(1) There shall be at
the head of the Office an Inspector General who shall be
appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate. This appointment shall be made without regard to
political affiliation and shall be on the basis of integrity
and demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial
analysis, law, management analysis, public administration, or
investigation. Such appointment shall also be made on the basis
of compliance with the security standards of the Agency and
prior experience in the field of foreign intelligence.
(2) The Inspector General shall report directly to and be
under the general supervision of the Director.
(3) The Director may prohibit the Inspector General from
initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit, inspection,
or investigation if the Director determines that such
prohibition is necessary to protect vital national security
interests of the United States.
(4) If the Director exercises any power under paragraph (3),
he shall submit an appropriately classified statement of the
reasons for the exercise of such power within seven days to the
intelligence committees. The Director shall advise the
Inspector General at the time such report is submitted, and, to
the extent consistent with the protection of intelligence
sources and methods, provide the Inspector General with a copy
of any such report. In such cases, the Inspector General may
submit such comments to the intelligence committees that he
considers appropriate.
(5) In accordance with section 535 of title 28, United States
Code, the Inspector General shall report to the Attorney
General any information, allegation, or complaint received by
the Inspector General relating to violations of Federal
criminal law that involve a program or operation of the Agency,
consistent with such guidelines as may be issued by the
Attorney General pursuant to subsection (b)(2) of such section.
A copy of all such reports shall be furnished to the Director.
(6) The Inspector General may be removed from office only by
the President. The President shall communicate in writing to
the intelligence committees the reasons for any such removal
not later than 30 days prior to the effective date of such
removal. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to
prohibit a personnel action otherwise authorized by law, other
than transfer or removal.
(c) Duties and Responsibilities.--It shall be the duty and
responsibility of the Inspector General appointed under this
section--
(1) to provide policy direction for, and to plan,
conduct, supervise, and coordinate independently, the
inspections, investigations, and audits relating to the
programs and operations of the Agency to ensure they
are conducted efficiently and in accordance with
applicable law and regulations;
(2) to keep the Director fully and currently informed
concerning violations of law and regulations, fraud and
other serious problems, abuses and deficiencies that
may occur in such programs and operations, and to
report the progress made in implementing corrective
action;
(3) to take due regard for the protection of
intelligence sources and methods in the preparation of
all reports issued by the Office, and, to the extent
consistent with the purpose and objective of such
reports, take such measures as may be appropriate to
minimize the disclosure of intelligence sources and
methods described in such reports; and
(4) in the execution of his responsibilities, to
comply with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
(d) Semiannual Reports; Immediate Reports of Serious or
Flagrant Problems; Reports of Functional Problems; Reports to
Congress on Urgent Concerns.--(1) The Inspector General shall,
not later than October 31 and April 30 of each year, prepare
and submit to the Director a classified semiannual report
summarizing the activities of the Office during the immediately
preceding six-month periods ending September 30 and March 31,
respectively. Not later than 30 days after the date of the
receipt of such reports, the Director shall transmit such
reports to the intelligence committees with any comments he may
deem appropriate. Such reports shall, at a minimum, include a
list of the title or subject of each inspection, investigation,
review, or audit conducted during the reporting period and--
(A) a description of significant problems, abuses,
and deficiencies relating to the administration of
programs and operations of the Agency identified by the
Office during the reporting period;
(B) a description of the recommendations for
corrective action made by the Office during the
reporting period with respect to significant problems,
abuses, or deficiencies identified in subparagraph (A);
(C) a statement of whether corrective action has been
completed on each significant recommendation described
in previous semiannual reports, and, in a case where
corrective action has been completed, a description of
such corrective action;
(D) a certification that the Inspector General has
had full and direct access to all information relevant
to the performance of his functions;
(E) a description of the exercise of the subpoena
authority under subsection (e)(5) by the Inspector
General during the reporting period; and
(F) such recommendations as the Inspector General may
wish to make concerning legislation to promote economy
and efficiency in the administration of programs and
operations undertaken by the Agency, and to detect and
eliminate fraud and abuse in such programs and
operations.
(2) The Inspector General shall report immediately to the
Director whenever he becomes aware of particularly serious or
flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies relating to the
administration of programs or operations. The Director shall
transmit such report to the intelligence committees within
seven calendar days, together with any comments he considers
appropriate.
(3) In the event that--
(A) the Inspector General is unable to resolve any
differences with the Director affecting the execution
of the Inspector General's duties or responsibilities;
(B) an investigation, inspection, or audit carried
out by the Inspector General should focus on any
current or former Agency official who--
(i) holds or held a position in the Agency
that is subject to appointment by the
President, by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate, including such a position held
on an acting basis; or
(ii) holds or held the position in the
Agency, including such a position held on an
acting basis, of--
(I) Deputy Director;
(II) Associate Deputy Director;
(III) Director of the National
Clandestine Service;
(IV) Director of Intelligence;
(V) Director of Support; or
(VI) Director of Science and
Technology.
(C) a matter requires a report by the Inspector
General to the Department of Justice on possible
criminal conduct by a current or former Agency official
described or referred to in subparagraph (B);
(D) the Inspector General receives notice from the
Department of Justice declining or approving
prosecution of possible criminal conduct of any of the
officials described in subparagraph (B); or
(E) the Inspector General, after exhausting all
possible alternatives, is unable to obtain significant
documentary information in the course of an
investigation, inspection, or audit,
the Inspector General shall immediately notify and submit a
report on such matter to the intelligence committees.
(4) Pursuant to Title V of the National Security Act of 1947,
the Director shall submit to the intelligence committees any
report or findings and recommendations of an inspection,
investigation, or audit conducted by the office which has been
requested by the Chairman or Ranking Minority Member of either
committee.
(5)(A) An employee of the Agency, or of a contractor to the
Agency, who intends to report to Congress a complaint or
information with respect to an urgent concern may report such
complaint or information to the Inspector General.
(B)[(i) Not] Not later than the end of the 14-calendar day
period beginning on the date of receipt from an employee of a
complaint or information under subparagraph (A), the Inspector
General shall determine whether the complaint or information
appears credible. Upon making such a determination, the
Inspector General shall transmit [to the Director] to the
intelligence committees notice of that determination, together
with the complaint or information.
[(ii) If the Director determines that a complaint or
information transmitted under paragraph (1) would create a
conflict of interest for the Director, the Director shall
return the complaint or information to the Inspector General
with that determination and the Inspector General shall make
the transmission to the Director of National Intelligence. In
such a case, the requirements of this subsection for the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency apply to the
Director of National Intelligence]
[(C) Upon receipt of a transmittal from the Inspector General
under subparagraph (B), the Director shall, within 7 calendar
days of such receipt, forward such transmittal to the
intelligence committees, together with any comments the
Director considers appropriate.]
[(D)] (C)(i) If the Inspector General does not find credible
under subparagraph (B) a complaint or information submitted
under subparagraph (A), or does not transmit the complaint or
information to [the Director] the intelligence committees in
accurate form under subparagraph (B), the employee (subject to
clause (ii)) may submit the complaint or information to
Congress by contacting either or both of the intelligence
committees directly.
(ii) The employee may contact the intelligence committees
directly as described in clause (i) only if the employee--
(I) before making such a contact, furnishes to [the
Director, through the Inspector General,] the Inspector
General a statement of the employee's complaint or
information and notice of the employee's intent to
contact the intelligence committees directly; and
(II) obtains and follows from [the Director, through
the Inspector General,] the Inspector General, in
consultation with the Director, direction on how to
contact the intelligence committees in accordance with
appropriate security practices.
(iii) A member or employee of one of the intelligence
committees who receives a complaint or information under clause
(i) does so in that member or employee's official capacity as a
member or employee of that committee.
[(E)] (D) The Inspector General shall notify an employee who
reports a complaint or information to the Inspector General
under this paragraph of each action taken under this paragraph
with respect to the complaint or information. Such notice shall
be provided not later than 3 days after any such action is
taken.
[(F)] (E) An action taken by the Director or the Inspector
General under this paragraph shall not be subject to judicial
review.
[(G)] (F) In this paragraph:
(i) The term ``urgent concern'' means any of the
following:
(I) A serious or flagrant problem, abuse,
violation of law or Executive order, or
deficiency relating to the funding,
administration, or operations of an
intelligence activity involving classified
information, but does not include differences
of opinions concerning public policy matters.
(II) A false statement to Congress, or a
willful withholding from Congress, on an issue
of material fact relating to the funding,
administration, or operation of an intelligence
activity.
(III) An action, including a personnel action
described in section 2302(a)(2)(A) of title 5,
United States Code, constituting reprisal or
threat of reprisal prohibited under subsection
(e)(3)(B) in response to an employee's
reporting an urgent concern in accordance with
this paragraph.
(ii) The term ``intelligence committees'' means the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House
of Representatives and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate.
[(H)] (G) An individual who has submitted a complaint or
information to the Inspector General under this section may
notify any member of the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives or the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, or a staff member of
either such Committee, of the fact that such individual has
made a submission to the Inspector General, and of the date on
which such submission was made.
(e) Authorities of the Inspector General.--(1) The Inspector
General shall have direct and prompt access to the Director
when necessary for any purpose pertaining to the performance of
his duties.
(2) The Inspector General shall have access to any employee
or any employee of a contractor of the Agency whose testimony
is needed for the performance of his duties. In addition, he
shall have direct access to all records, reports, audits,
reviews, documents, papers, recommendations, or other material
which relate to the programs and operations with respect to
which the Inspector General has responsibilities under this
section. Failure on the part of any employee or contractor to
cooperate with the Inspector General shall be grounds for
appropriate administrative actions by the Director, to include
loss of employment or the termination of an existing
contractual relationship.
(3) The Inspector General is authorized to receive and
investigate complaints or information from any person
concerning the existence of an activity constituting a
violation of laws, rules, or regulations, or mismanagement,
gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial and
specific danger to the public health and safety. Once such
complaint or information has been received from an employee of
the Agency--
(A) the Inspector General shall not disclose the
identity of the employee without the consent of the
employee, unless the Inspector General determines that
such disclosure is unavoidable during the course of the
investigation or the disclosure is made to an official
of the Department of Justice responsible for
determining whether a prosecution should be undertaken;
and
(B) no action constituting a reprisal, or threat of
reprisal, for making such complaint or providing such
information may be taken by any employee of the Agency
in a position to take such actions, unless the
complaint was made or the information was disclosed
with the knowledge that it was false or with willful
disregard for its truth or falsity.
(4) The Inspector General shall have authority to administer
to or take from any person an oath, affirmation, or affidavit,
whenever necessary in the performance of his duties, which oath
affirmation, or affidavit when administered or taken by or
before an employee of the Office designated by the Inspector
General shall have the same force and effect as if administered
or taken by or before an officer having a seal.
(5)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the Inspector
General is authorized to require by subpoena the production of
all information, documents, reports, answers, records,
accounts, papers, and other data in any medium (including
electronically stored information or any tangible thing) and
documentary evidence necessary in the performance of the duties
and responsibilities of the Inspector General.
(B) In the case of Government agencies, the Inspector General
shall obtain information, documents, reports, answers, records,
accounts, papers, and other data and evidence for the purpose
specified in subparagraph (A) using procedures other than by
subpoenas.
(C) The Inspector General may not issue a subpoena for or on
behalf of any other element or component of the Agency.
(D) In the case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena
issued under this paragraph, the subpoena shall be enforceable
by order of any appropriate district court of the United
States.
(6) The Inspector General shall be provided with appropriate
and adequate office space at central and field office
locations, together with such equipment, office supplies,
maintenance services, and communications facilities and
services as may be necessary for the operation of such offices.
(7)(A) Subject to applicable law and the policies of the
Director, the Inspector General shall select, appoint and
employ such officers and employees as may be necessary to carry
out his functions. In making such selections, the Inspector
General shall ensure that such officers and employees have the
requisite training and experience to enable him to carry out
his duties effectively. In this regard, the Inspector General
shall create within his organization a career cadre of
sufficient size to provide appropriate continuity and
objectivity needed for the effective performance of his duties.
(B) Consistent with budgetary and personnel resources
allocated by the Director, the Inspector General has final
approval of--
(i) the selection of internal and external candidates
for employment with the Office of Inspector General;
and
(ii) all other personnel decisions concerning
personnel permanently assigned to the Office of
Inspector General, including selection and appointment
to the Senior Intelligence Service, but excluding all
security-based determinations that are not within the
authority of a head of other Central Intelligence
Agency offices.
(C)(i) The Inspector General may designate an officer or
employee appointed in accordance with subparagraph (A) as a law
enforcement officer solely for purposes of subchapter III of
chapter 83 or chapter 84 of title 5, United States Code, if
such officer or employee is appointed to a position with
responsibility for investigating suspected offenses against the
criminal laws of the United States.
(ii) In carrying out clause (i), the Inspector General shall
ensure that any authority under such clause is exercised in a
manner consistent with section 3307 of title 5, United States
Code, as it relates to law enforcement officers.
(iii) For purposes of applying sections 3307(d), 8335(b), and
8425(b) of title 5, United States Code, the Inspector General
may exercise the functions, powers, and duties of an agency
head or appointing authority with respect to the Office.
(8)(A) The Inspector General shall--
(i) appoint a Counsel to the Inspector General who
shall report to the Inspector General; or
(ii) obtain the services of a counsel appointed by
and directly reporting to another Inspector General or
the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and
Efficiency on a reimbursable basis.
(B) The counsel appointed or obtained under subparagraph (A)
shall perform such functions as the Inspector General may
prescribe.
(9)(A) The Inspector General may request such information or
assistance as may be necessary for carrying out the duties and
responsibilities of the Inspector General provided by this
section from any Federal, State, or local governmental agency
or unit thereof.
(B) Upon request of the Inspector General for information or
assistance from a department or agency of the Federal
Government, the head of the department or agency involved,
insofar as practicable and not in contravention of any existing
statutory restriction or regulation of such department or
agency, shall furnish to the Inspector General, or to an
authorized designee, such information or assistance.
(C) Nothing in this paragraph may be construed to provide any
new authority to the Central Intelligence Agency to conduct
intelligence activity in the United States.
(D) In this paragraph, the term ``State'' means each of the
several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands,
and any territory or possession of the United States.
(f) Separate Budget Account.--(1) Beginning with fiscal year
1991, and in accordance with procedures to be issued by the
Director of National Intelligence in consultation with the
intelligence committees, the Director of National Intelligence
shall include in the National Intelligence Program budget a
separate account for the Office of Inspector General
established pursuant to this section.
(2) For each fiscal year, the Inspector General shall
transmit a budget estimate and request through the Director to
the Director of National Intelligence that specifies for such
fiscal year--
(A) the aggregate amount requested for the operations
of the Inspector General;
(B) the amount requested for all training
requirements of the Inspector General, including a
certification from the Inspector General that the
amount requested is sufficient to fund all training
requirements for the Office; and
(C) the amount requested to support the Council of
the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency,
including a justification for such amount.
(3) In transmitting a proposed budget to the President for a
fiscal year, the Director of National Intelligence shall
include for such fiscal year--
(A) the aggregate amount requested for the Inspector
General of the Central Intelligence Agency;
(B) the amount requested for Inspector General
training;
(C) the amount requested to support the Council of
the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency; and
(D) the comments of the Inspector General, if any,
with respect to such proposed budget.
(4) The Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
Committee on Appropriations and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on Appropriations
and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House
of Representatives for each fiscal year--
(A) a separate statement of the budget estimate
transmitted pursuant to paragraph (2);
(B) the amount requested by the Director of National
Intelligence for the Inspector General pursuant to
paragraph (3)(A);
(C) the amount requested by the Director of National
Intelligence for training of personnel of the Office of
the Inspector General pursuant to paragraph (3)(B);
(D) the amount requested by the Director of National
Intelligence for support for the Council of the
Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency pursuant
to paragraph (3)(C); and
(E) the comments of the Inspector General under
paragraph (3)(D), if any, on the amounts requested
pursuant to paragraph (3), including whether such
amounts would substantially inhibit the Inspector
General from performing the duties of the Office.
(g) Transfer.--There shall be transferred to the Office the
office of the Agency referred to as the ``Office of Inspector
General.'' The personnel, assets, liabilities, contracts,
property, records, and unexpended balances of appropriations,
authorizations, allocations, and other funds employed, held,
used, arising from, or available to such ``Office of Inspector
General'' are hereby transferred to the Office established
pursuant to this section.
(h) Information on Website.--(1) The Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency shall establish and maintain on the
homepage of the Agency's publicly accessible website
information relating to the Office of the Inspector General
including methods to contact the Inspector General.
(2) The information referred to in paragraph (1) shall be
obvious and facilitate accessibility to the information related
to the Office of the Inspector General.
* * * * * * *
----------
NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
short title
That this Act may be cited as the ``National Security Act of
1947''.
* * * * * * *
Title I--Coordination for National Security
* * * * * * *
[Sec. 103F. National Counterintelligence Executive.]
Sec. 103F. Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security
Center.
* * * * * * *
Title V--Accountability for Intelligence Activities
* * * * * * *
Sec. 506K. Reports on major defense intelligence acquisition programs at
each milestone approval.
* * * * * * *
TITLE I--COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
* * * * * * *
responsibilities and authorities of the director of national
intelligence
Sec. 102A. (a) Provision of Intelligence.--(1) The Director
of National Intelligence shall be responsible for ensuring that
national intelligence is provided--
(A) to the President;
(B) to the heads of departments and agencies of the
executive branch;
(C) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
senior military commanders;
(D) to the Senate and House of Representatives and
the committees thereof; and
(E) to such other persons as the Director of National
Intelligence determines to be appropriate.
(2) Such national intelligence should be timely, objective,
independent of political considerations, and based upon all
sources available to the intelligence community and other
appropriate entities.
(b) Access to Intelligence.--Unless otherwise directed by the
President, the Director of National Intelligence shall have
access to all national intelligence and intelligence related to
the national security which is collected by any Federal
department, agency, or other entity, except as otherwise
provided by law or, as appropriate, under guidelines agreed
upon by the Attorney General and the Director of National
Intelligence.
(c) Budget Authorities.--(1) With respect to budget requests
and appropriations for the National Intelligence Program, the
Director of National Intelligence shall--
(A) based on intelligence priorities set by the
President, provide to the heads of departments
containing agencies or organizations within the
intelligence community, and to the heads of such
agencies and organizations, guidance for developing the
National Intelligence Program budget pertaining to such
agencies and organizations;
(B) based on budget proposals provided to the
Director of National Intelligence by the heads of
agencies and organizations within the intelligence
community and the heads of their respective departments
and, as appropriate, after obtaining the advice of the
Joint Intelligence Community Council, develop and
determine an annual consolidated National Intelligence
Program budget; and
(C) present such consolidated National Intelligence
Program budget, together with any comments from the
heads of departments containing agencies or
organizations within the intelligence community, to the
President for approval.
(2) In addition to the information provided under paragraph
(1)(B), the heads of agencies and organizations within the
intelligence community shall provide the Director of National
Intelligence such other information as the Director shall
request for the purpose of determining the annual consolidated
National Intelligence Program budget under that paragraph.
(3)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall
participate in the development by the Secretary of Defense of
the annual budget for the Military Intelligence Program or any
successor program or programs.
(B) The Director of National Intelligence shall provide
guidance for the development of the annual budget for each
element of the intelligence community that is not within the
National Intelligence Program.
(4) The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure the
effective execution of the annual budget for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities.
(5)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall be
responsible for managing appropriations for the National
Intelligence Program by directing the allotment or allocation
of such appropriations through the heads of the departments
containing agencies or organizations within the intelligence
community and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,
with prior notice (including the provision of appropriate
supporting information) to the head of the department
containing an agency or organization receiving any such
allocation or allotment or the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
(B) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, pursuant to
relevant appropriations Acts for the National Intelligence
Program, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
shall exercise the authority of the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget to apportion funds, at the exclusive
direction of the Director of National Intelligence, for
allocation to the elements of the intelligence community
through the relevant host executive departments and the Central
Intelligence Agency. Department comptrollers or appropriate
budget execution officers shall allot, allocate, reprogram, or
transfer funds appropriated for the National Intelligence
Program in an expeditious manner.
(C) The Director of National Intelligence shall monitor the
implementation and execution of the National Intelligence
Program by the heads of the elements of the intelligence
community that manage programs and activities that are part of
the National Intelligence Program, which may include audits and
evaluations.
(6) Apportionment and allotment of funds under this
subsection shall be subject to chapter 13 and section 1517 of
title 31, United States Code, and the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 621 et seq.).
(7)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall provide a
semi-annual report, beginning April 1, 2005, and ending April
1, 2007, to the President and the Congress regarding
implementation of this section.
(B) The Director of National Intelligence shall report to the
President and the Congress not later than 15 days after
learning of any instance in which a departmental comptroller
acts in a manner inconsistent with the law (including permanent
statutes, authorization Acts, and appropriations Acts), or the
direction of the Director of National Intelligence, in carrying
out the National Intelligence Program.
(d) Role of Director of National Intelligence in Transfer and
Reprogramming of Funds.--(1)(A) No funds made available under
the National Intelligence Program may be transferred or
reprogrammed without the prior approval of the Director of
National Intelligence, except in accordance with procedures
prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence.
(B) The Secretary of Defense shall consult with the Director
of National Intelligence before transferring or reprogramming
funds made available under the Military Intelligence Program or
any successor program or programs.
(2) Subject to the succeeding provisions of this subsection,
the Director of National Intelligence may transfer or reprogram
funds appropriated for a program within the National
Intelligence Program--
(A) to another such program;
(B) to other departments or agencies of the United
States Government for the development and fielding of
systems of common concern related to the collection,
processing, analysis, exploitation, and dissemination
of intelligence information; or
(C) to a program funded by appropriations not within
the National Intelligence Program to address critical
gaps in intelligence information sharing or access
capabilities.
(3) The Director of National Intelligence may only transfer
or reprogram funds referred to in paragraph (1)(A)--
(A) with the approval of the Director of the Office
of Management and Budget; and
(B) after consultation with the heads of departments
containing agencies or organizations within the
intelligence community to the extent such agencies or
organizations are affected, and, in the case of the
Central Intelligence Agency, after consultation with
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(4) The amounts available for transfer or reprogramming in
the National Intelligence Program in any given fiscal year, and
the terms and conditions governing such transfers and
reprogrammings, are subject to the provisions of annual
appropriations Acts and this subsection.
(5)(A) A transfer or reprogramming of funds may be made under
this subsection only if--
(i) the funds are being transferred to an activity
that is a higher priority intelligence activity;
(ii) the transfer or reprogramming supports an
emergent need, improves program effectiveness, or
increases efficiency;
(iii) the transfer or reprogramming does not involve
a transfer or reprogramming of funds to a Reserve for
Contingencies of the Director of National Intelligence
or the Reserve for Contingencies of the Central
Intelligence Agency;
(iv) the transfer or reprogramming results in a
cumulative transfer or reprogramming of funds out of
any department or agency, as appropriate, funded in the
National Intelligence Program in a single fiscal year--
(I) that is less than $150,000,000, and
(II) that is less than 5 percent of amounts
available to a department or agency under the
National Intelligence Program; and
(v) the transfer or reprogramming does not terminate
an acquisition program.
(B) A transfer or reprogramming may be made without regard to
a limitation set forth in clause (iv) or (v) of subparagraph
(A) if the transfer has the concurrence of the head of the
department involved or the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency (in the case of the Central Intelligence Agency). The
authority to provide such concurrence may only be delegated by
the head of the department involved or the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency (in the case of the Central
Intelligence Agency) to the deputy of such officer.
(6) Funds transferred or reprogrammed under this subsection
shall remain available for the same period as the
appropriations account to which transferred or reprogrammed.
(7) Any transfer or reprogramming of funds under this
subsection shall be carried out in accordance with existing
procedures applicable to reprogramming notifications for the
appropriate congressional committees. Any proposed transfer or
reprogramming for which notice is given to the appropriate
congressional committees shall be accompanied by a report
explaining the nature of the proposed transfer or reprogramming
and how it satisfies the requirements of this subsection. In
addition, the congressional intelligence committees shall be
promptly notified of any transfer or reprogramming of funds
made pursuant to this subsection in any case in which the
transfer or reprogramming would not have otherwise required
reprogramming notification under procedures in effect as of the
date of the enactment of this subsection.
(e) Transfer of Personnel.--(1)(A) In addition to any other
authorities available under law for such purposes, in the first
twelve months after establishment of a new national
intelligence center, the Director of National Intelligence,
with the approval of the Director of the Office of Management
and Budget and in consultation with the congressional
committees of jurisdiction referred to in subparagraph (B), may
transfer not more than 100 personnel authorized for elements of
the intelligence community to such center.
(B) The Director of National Intelligence shall promptly
provide notice of any transfer of personnel made pursuant to
this paragraph to--
(i) the congressional intelligence committees;
(ii) the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate
and the House of Representatives;
(iii) in the case of the transfer of personnel to or
from the Department of Defense, the Committees on Armed
Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives; and
(iv) in the case of the transfer of personnel to or
from the Department of Justice, to the Committees on
the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of
Representatives.
(C) The Director shall include in any notice under
subparagraph (B) an explanation of the nature of the transfer
and how it satisfies the requirements of this subsection.
(2)(A) The Director of National Intelligence, with the
approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
and in accordance with procedures to be developed by the
Director of National Intelligence and the heads of the
departments and agencies concerned, may transfer personnel
authorized for an element of the intelligence community to
another such element for a period of not more than 2 years.
(B) A transfer of personnel may be made under this paragraph
only if--
(i) the personnel are being transferred to an
activity that is a higher priority intelligence
activity; and
(ii) the transfer supports an emergent need, improves
program effectiveness, or increases efficiency.
(C) The Director of National Intelligence shall promptly
provide notice of any transfer of personnel made pursuant to
this paragraph to--
(i) the congressional intelligence committees;
(ii) in the case of the transfer of personnel to or
from the Department of Defense, the Committees on Armed
Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives; and
(iii) in the case of the transfer of personnel to or
from the Department of Justice, to the Committees on
the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of
Representatives.
(D) The Director shall include in any notice under
subparagraph (C) an explanation of the nature of the transfer
and how it satisfies the requirements of this paragraph.
(3)(A) In addition to the number of full-time equivalent
positions authorized for the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence for a fiscal year, there is authorized for such
Office for each fiscal year an additional 100 full-time
equivalent positions that may be used only for the purposes
described in subparagraph (B).
(B) Except as provided in subparagraph (C), the Director of
National Intelligence may use a full-time equivalent position
authorized under subparagraph (A) only for the purpose of
providing a temporary transfer of personnel made in accordance
with paragraph (2) to an element of the intelligence community
to enable such element to increase the total number of
personnel authorized for such element, on a temporary basis--
(i) during a period in which a permanent employee of
such element is absent to participate in critical
language training; or
(ii) to accept a permanent employee of another
element of the intelligence community to provide
language-capable services.
(C) Paragraph (2)(B) shall not apply with respect to a
transfer of personnel made under subparagraph (B).
(D) For each of the fiscal years 2010, 2011, and 2012, the
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees an annual report on the
use of authorities under this paragraph. Each such report shall
include a description of--
(i) the number of transfers of personnel made by the
Director pursuant to subparagraph (B), disaggregated by
each element of the intelligence community;
(ii) the critical language needs that were fulfilled
or partially fulfilled through the use of such
transfers; and
(iii) the cost to carry out subparagraph (B).
(4) It is the sense of Congress that--
(A) the nature of the national security threats
facing the United States will continue to challenge the
intelligence community to respond rapidly and flexibly
to bring analytic resources to bear against emerging
and unforeseen requirements;
(B) both the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence and any analytic centers determined to be
necessary should be fully and properly supported with
appropriate levels of personnel resources and that the
President's yearly budget requests adequately support
those needs; and
(C) the President should utilize all legal and
administrative discretion to ensure that the Director
of National Intelligence and all other elements of the
intelligence community have the necessary resources and
procedures to respond promptly and effectively to
emerging and unforeseen national security challenges.
(f) Tasking and Other Authorities.--(1)(A) The Director of
National Intelligence shall--
(i) establish objectives, priorities, and guidance
for the intelligence community to ensure timely and
effective collection, processing, analysis, and
dissemination (including access by users to collected
data consistent with applicable law and, as
appropriate, the guidelines referred to in subsection
(b) and analytic products generated by or within the
intelligence community) of national intelligence;
(ii) determine requirements and priorities for, and
manage and direct the tasking of, collection, analysis,
production, and dissemination of national intelligence
by elements of the intelligence community, including--
(I) approving requirements (including those
requirements responding to needs provided by
consumers) for collection and analysis; and
(II) resolving conflicts in collection
requirements and in the tasking of national
collection assets of the elements of the
intelligence community; and
(iii) provide advisory tasking to intelligence
elements of those agencies and departments not within
the National Intelligence Program.
(B) The authority of the Director of National Intelligence
under subparagraph (A) shall not apply--
(i) insofar as the President so directs;
(ii) with respect to clause (ii) of subparagraph (A),
insofar as the Secretary of Defense exercises tasking
authority under plans or arrangements agreed upon by
the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National
Intelligence; or
(iii) to the direct dissemination of information to
State government and local government officials and
private sector entities pursuant to sections 201 and
892 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121,
482).
(2) The Director of National Intelligence shall oversee the
National Counterterrorism Center, the National
Counterproliferation Center, and the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center, and may establish such
other national intelligence centers as the Director determines
necessary.
(3)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall prescribe,
in consultation with the heads of other agencies or elements of
the intelligence community, and the heads of their respective
departments, personnel policies and programs applicable to the
intelligence community that--
(i) encourage and facilitate assignments and details
of personnel to national intelligence centers, and
between elements of the intelligence community;
(ii) set standards for education, training, and
career development of personnel of the intelligence
community;
(iii) encourage and facilitate the recruitment and
retention by the intelligence community of highly
qualified individuals for the effective conduct of
intelligence activities;
(iv) ensure that the personnel of the intelligence
community are sufficiently diverse for purposes of the
collection and analysis of intelligence through the
recruitment and training of women, minorities, and
individuals with diverse ethnic, cultural, and
linguistic backgrounds;
(v) make service in more than one element of the
intelligence community a condition of promotion to such
positions within the intelligence community as the
Director shall specify; and
(vi) ensure the effective management of intelligence
community personnel who are responsible for
intelligence community-wide matters.
(B) Policies prescribed under subparagraph (A) shall not be
inconsistent with the personnel policies otherwise applicable
to members of the uniformed services.
(4) The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure
compliance with the Constitution and laws of the United States
by the Central Intelligence Agency and shall ensure such
compliance by other elements of the intelligence community
through the host executive departments that manage the programs
and activities that are part of the National Intelligence
Program.
(5) The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure the
elimination of waste and unnecessary duplication within the
intelligence community.
(6) The Director of National Intelligence shall establish
requirements and priorities for foreign intelligence
information to be collected under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), and provide
assistance to the Attorney General to ensure that information
derived from electronic surveillance or physical searches under
that Act is disseminated so it may be used efficiently and
effectively for national intelligence purposes, except that the
Director shall have no authority to direct or undertake
electronic surveillance or physical search operations pursuant
to that Act unless authorized by statute or Executive order.
(7)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall, if the
Director determines it is necessary, or may, if requested by a
congressional intelligence committee, conduct an accountability
review of an element of the intelligence community or the
personnel of such element in relation to a failure or
deficiency within the intelligence community.
(B) The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation
with the Attorney General, shall establish guidelines and
procedures for conducting an accountability review under
subparagraph (A).
(C)(i) The Director of National Intelligence shall provide
the findings of an accountability review conducted under
subparagraph (A) and the Director's recommendations for
corrective or punitive action, if any, to the head of the
applicable element of the intelligence community. Such
recommendations may include a recommendation for dismissal of
personnel.
(ii) If the head of such element does not implement a
recommendation made by the Director under clause (i), the head
of such element shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a notice of the determination not to implement the
recommendation, including the reasons for the determination.
(D) The requirements of this paragraph shall not be construed
to limit any authority of the Director of National Intelligence
under subsection (m) or with respect to supervision of the
Central Intelligence Agency.
(8) The Director of National Intelligence shall perform such
other functions as the President may direct.
(9) Nothing in this title shall be construed as affecting the
role of the Department of Justice or the Attorney General under
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.
(g) Intelligence Information Sharing.--(1) The Director of
National Intelligence shall have principal authority to ensure
maximum availability of and access to intelligence information
within the intelligence community consistent with national
security requirements. The Director of National Intelligence
shall--
(A) establish uniform security standards and
procedures;
(B) establish common information technology
standards, protocols, and interfaces;
(C) ensure development of information technology
systems that include multi-level security and
intelligence integration capabilities;
(D) establish policies and procedures to resolve
conflicts between the need to share intelligence
information and the need to protect intelligence
sources and methods;
(E) develop an enterprise architecture for the
intelligence community and ensure that elements of the
intelligence community comply with such architecture;
(F) have procurement approval authority over all
enterprise architecture-related information technology
items funded in the National Intelligence Program; and
(G) in accordance with Executive Order No.
13526 (75 Fed. Reg. 707; relating to classified
national security information) (or any
subsequent corresponding executive order), and
part 2001 of title 32, Code of Federal
Regulations (or any subsequent corresponding
regulation), establish--
(i) guidance to standardize, in
appropriate cases, the formats for
classified and unclassified
intelligence products created by
elements of the intelligence community
for purposes of promoting the sharing
of intelligence products; and
(ii) policies and procedures
requiring the increased use, in
appropriate cases, and including
portion markings, of the classification
of portions of information within one
intelligence product.
(2) The President shall ensure that the Director of National
Intelligence has all necessary support and authorities to fully
and effectively implement paragraph (1).
(3) Except as otherwise directed by the President or with the
specific written agreement of the head of the department or
agency in question, a Federal agency or official shall not be
considered to have met any obligation to provide any
information, report, assessment, or other material (including
unevaluated intelligence information) to that department or
agency solely by virtue of having provided that information,
report, assessment, or other material to the Director of
National Intelligence or the National Counterterrorism Center.
(4) The Director of National Intelligence shall, in a timely
manner, report to Congress any statute, regulation, policy, or
practice that the Director believes impedes the ability of the
Director to fully and effectively ensure maximum availability
of access to intelligence information within the intelligence
community consistent with the protection of the national
security of the United States.
(h) Analysis.--To ensure the most accurate analysis of
intelligence is derived from all sources to support national
security needs, the Director of National Intelligence shall--
(1) implement policies and procedures--
(A) to encourage sound analytic methods and
tradecraft throughout the elements of the
intelligence community;
(B) to ensure that analysis is based upon all
sources available; and
(C) to ensure that the elements of the
intelligence community regularly conduct
competitive analysis of analytic products,
whether such products are produced by or
disseminated to such elements;
(2) ensure that resource allocation for intelligence
analysis is appropriately proportional to resource
allocation for intelligence collection systems and
operations in order to maximize analysis of all
collected data;
(3) ensure that differences in analytic judgment are
fully considered and brought to the attention of
policymakers; and
(4) ensure that sufficient relationships are
established between intelligence collectors and
analysts to facilitate greater understanding of the
needs of analysts.
(i) Protection of Intelligence Sources and Methods.--(1) The
Director of National Intelligence shall protect intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.
(2) Consistent with paragraph (1), in order to maximize the
dissemination of intelligence, the Director of National
Intelligence shall establish and implement guidelines for the
intelligence community for the following purposes:
(A) Classification of information under applicable
law, Executive orders, or other Presidential
directives.
(B) Access to and dissemination of intelligence, both
in final form and in the form when initially gathered.
(C) Preparation of intelligence products in such a
way that source information is removed to allow for
dissemination at the lowest level of classification
possible or in unclassified form to the extent
practicable.
(3) The Director may only delegate a duty or authority given
the Director under this subsection to the Principal Deputy
Director of National Intelligence.
(j) Uniform Procedures for Classified Information.--The
Director of National Intelligence, subject to the direction of
the President, shall--
(1) establish uniform standards and procedures for
the grant of access to sensitive compartmented
information to any officer or employee of any agency or
department of the United States and to employees of
contractors of those agencies or departments;
(2) ensure the consistent implementation of those
standards and procedures throughout such agencies and
departments;
(3) ensure that security clearances granted by
individual elements of the intelligence community are
recognized by all elements of the intelligence
community, and under contracts entered into by those
agencies;
(4) ensure that the process for investigation and
adjudication of an application for access to sensitive
compartmented information is performed in the most
expeditious manner possible consistent with applicable
standards for national security;
(5) ensure that the background of each employee or
officer of an element of the intelligence community,
each contractor to an element of the intelligence
community, and each individual employee of such a
contractor who has been determined to be eligible for
access to classified information is monitored on a
continual basis under standards developed by the
Director, including with respect to the frequency of
evaluation, during the period of eligibility of such
employee or officer of an element of the intelligence
community, such contractor, or such individual employee
to such a contractor to determine whether such employee
or officer of an element of the intelligence community,
such contractor, and such individual employee of such a
contractor continues to meet the requirements for
eligibility for access to classified information; and
(6) develop procedures to require information sharing
between elements of the intelligence community
concerning potentially derogatory security information
regarding an employee or officer of an element of the
intelligence community, a contractor to an element of
the intelligence community, or an individual employee
of such a contractor that may impact the eligibility of
such employee or officer of an element of the
intelligence community, such contractor, or such
individual employee of such a contractor for a security
clearance.
(k) Coordination With Foreign Governments.--Under the
direction of the President and in a manner consistent with
section 207 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C.
3927), the Director of National Intelligence shall oversee the
coordination of the relationships between elements of the
intelligence community and the intelligence or security
services of foreign governments or international organizations
on all matters involving intelligence related to the national
security or involving intelligence acquired through clandestine
means.
(l) Enhanced Personnel Management.--(1)(A) The Director of
National Intelligence shall, under regulations prescribed by
the Director, provide incentives for personnel of elements of
the intelligence community to serve--
(i) on the staff of the Director of National
Intelligence;
(ii) on the staff of the national intelligence
centers;
(iii) on the staff of the National Counterterrorism
Center; and
(iv) in other positions in support of the
intelligence community management functions of the
Director.
(B) Incentives under subparagraph (A) may include financial
incentives, bonuses, and such other awards and incentives as
the Director considers appropriate.
(2)(A) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the
personnel of an element of the intelligence community who are
assigned or detailed under paragraph (1)(A) to service under
the Director of National Intelligence shall be promoted at
rates equivalent to or better than personnel of such element
who are not so assigned or detailed.
(B) The Director may prescribe regulations to carry out this
paragraph.
(3)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall prescribe
mechanisms to facilitate the rotation of personnel of the
intelligence community through various elements of the
intelligence community in the course of their careers in order
to facilitate the widest possible understanding by such
personnel of the variety of intelligence requirements, methods,
users, and capabilities.
(B) The mechanisms prescribed under subparagraph (A) may
include the following:
(i) The establishment of special occupational
categories involving service, over the course of a
career, in more than one element of the intelligence
community.
(ii) The provision of rewards for service in
positions undertaking analysis and planning of
operations involving two or more elements of the
intelligence community.
(iii) The establishment of requirements for
education, training, service, and evaluation for
service involving more than one element of the
intelligence community.
(C) It is the sense of Congress that the mechanisms
prescribed under this subsection should, to the extent
practical, seek to duplicate for civilian personnel within the
intelligence community the joint officer management policies
established by chapter 38 of title 10, United States Code, and
the other amendments made by title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Public Law
99-433).
(4)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B) and
subparagraph (D), this subsection shall not apply with respect
to personnel of the elements of the intelligence community who
are members of the uniformed services.
(B) Mechanisms that establish requirements for education and
training pursuant to paragraph (3)(B)(iii) may apply with
respect to members of the uniformed services who are assigned
to an element of the intelligence community funded through the
National Intelligence Program, but such mechanisms shall not be
inconsistent with personnel policies and education and training
requirements otherwise applicable to members of the uniformed
services.
(C) The personnel policies and programs developed and
implemented under this subsection with respect to law
enforcement officers (as that term is defined in section
5541(3) of title 5, United States Code) shall not affect the
ability of law enforcement entities to conduct operations or,
through the applicable chain of command, to control the
activities of such law enforcement officers.
(D) Assignment to the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence of commissioned officers of the Armed Forces shall
be considered a joint-duty assignment for purposes of the joint
officer management policies prescribed by chapter 38 of title
10, United States Code, and other provisions of that title.
(m) Additional Authority With Respect to Personnel.--(1) In
addition to the authorities under subsection (f)(3), the
Director of National Intelligence may exercise with respect to
the personnel of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence any authority of the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency with respect to the personnel of the
Central Intelligence Agency under the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.), and other
applicable provisions of law, as of the date of the enactment
of this subsection to the same extent, and subject to the same
conditions and limitations, that the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency may exercise such authority with respect to
personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) Employees and applicants for employment of the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence shall have the same
rights and protections under the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence as employees of the Central Intelligence
Agency have under the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949,
and other applicable provisions of law, as of the date of the
enactment of this subsection.
(n) Acquisition and Other Authorities.--(1) In carrying out
the responsibilities and authorities under this section, the
Director of National Intelligence may exercise the acquisition
and appropriations authorities referred to in the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.) other
than the authorities referred to in section 8(b) of that Act
(50 U.S.C. 403j(b)).
(2) For the purpose of the exercise of any authority referred
to in paragraph (1), a reference to the head of an agency shall
be deemed to be a reference to the Director of National
Intelligence or the Principal Deputy Director of National
Intelligence.
(3)(A) Any determination or decision to be made under an
authority referred to in paragraph (1) by the head of an agency
may be made with respect to individual purchases and contracts
or with respect to classes of purchases or contracts, and shall
be final.
(B) Except as provided in subparagraph (C), the Director of
National Intelligence or the Principal Deputy Director of
National Intelligence may, in such official's discretion,
delegate to any officer or other official of the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence any authority to make a
determination or decision as the head of the agency under an
authority referred to in paragraph (1).
(C) The limitations and conditions set forth in section 3(d)
of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C.
403c(d)) shall apply to the exercise by the Director of
National Intelligence of an authority referred to in paragraph
(1).
(D) Each determination or decision required by an authority
referred to in the second sentence of section 3(d) of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 shall be based upon
written findings made by the official making such determination
or decision, which findings shall be final and shall be
available within the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence for a period of at least six years following the
date of such determination or decision.
(4)(A) In addition to the authority referred to in paragraph
(1), the Director of National Intelligence may authorize the
head of an element of the intelligence community to exercise an
acquisition authority referred to in section 3 or 8(a) of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403c and
403j(a)) for an acquisition by such element that is more than
50 percent funded under the National Intelligence Program.
(B) The head of an element of the intelligence community may
not exercise an authority referred to in subparagraph (A)
until--
(i) the head of such element (without delegation)
submits to the Director of National Intelligence a
written request that includes--
(I) a description of such authority requested
to be exercised;
(II) an explanation of the need for such
authority, including an explanation of the
reasons that other authorities are
insufficient; and
(III) a certification that the mission of
such element would be--
(aa) impaired if such authority is
not exercised; or
(bb) significantly and measurably
enhanced if such authority is
exercised; and
(ii) the Director of National Intelligence issues a
written authorization that includes--
(I) a description of the authority referred
to in subparagraph (A) that is authorized to be
exercised; and
(II) a justification to support the exercise
of such authority.
(C) A request and authorization to exercise an authority
referred to in subparagraph (A) may be made with respect to an
individual acquisition or with respect to a specific class of
acquisitions described in the request and authorization
referred to in subparagraph (B).
(D)(i) A request from a head of an element of the
intelligence community located within one of the departments
described in clause (ii) to exercise an authority referred to
in subparagraph (A) shall be submitted to the Director of
National Intelligence in accordance with any procedures
established by the head of such department.
(ii) The departments described in this clause are the
Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the Department
of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, the Department
of State, and the Department of the Treasury.
(E)(i) The head of an element of the intelligence community
may not be authorized to utilize an authority referred to in
subparagraph (A) for a class of acquisitions for a period of
more than 3 years, except that the Director of National
Intelligence (without delegation) may authorize the use of such
an authority for not more than 6 years.
(ii) Each authorization to utilize an authority referred to
in subparagraph (A) may be extended in accordance with the
requirements of subparagraph (B) for successive periods of not
more than 3 years, except that the Director of National
Intelligence (without delegation) may authorize an extension
period of not more than 6 years.
(F) Subject to clauses (i) and (ii) of subparagraph (E), the
Director of National Intelligence may only delegate the
authority of the Director under subparagraphs (A) through (E)
to the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence or a
Deputy Director of National Intelligence.
(G) The Director of National Intelligence shall submit--
(i) to the congressional intelligence committees a
notification of an authorization to exercise an
authority referred to in subparagraph (A) or an
extension of such authorization that includes the
written authorization referred to in subparagraph
(B)(ii); and
(ii) to the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget a notification of an authorization to exercise
an authority referred to in subparagraph (A) for an
acquisition or class of acquisitions that will exceed
$50,000,000 annually.
(H) Requests and authorizations to exercise an authority
referred to in subparagraph (A) shall remain available within
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence for a
period of at least 6 years following the date of such request
or authorization.
(I) Nothing in this paragraph may be construed to alter or
otherwise limit the authority of the Central Intelligence
Agency to independently exercise an authority under section 3
or 8(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C. 403c and 403j(a)).
(o) Consideration of Views of Elements of Intelligence
Community.--In carrying out the duties and responsibilities
under this section, the Director of National Intelligence shall
take into account the views of a head of a department
containing an element of the intelligence community and of the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(p) Responsibility of Director of National Intelligence
Regarding National Intelligence Program Budget Concerning the
Department of Defense.--Subject to the direction of the
President, the Director of National Intelligence shall, after
consultation with the Secretary of Defense, ensure that the
National Intelligence Program budgets for the elements of the
intelligence community that are within the Department of
Defense are adequate to satisfy the national intelligence needs
of the Department of Defense, including the needs of the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of the
unified and specified commands, and wherever such elements are
performing Government-wide functions, the needs of other
Federal departments and agencies.
(q) Acquisitions of Major Systems.--(1) For each intelligence
program within the National Intelligence Program for the
acquisition of a major system, the Director of National
Intelligence shall--
(A) require the development and implementation of a
program management plan that includes cost, schedule,
and performance goals and program milestone criteria,
except that with respect to Department of Defense
programs the Director shall consult with the Secretary
of Defense;
(B) serve as exclusive milestone decision authority,
except that with respect to Department of Defense
programs the Director shall serve as milestone decision
authority jointly with the Secretary of Defense or the
designee of the Secretary; and
(C) periodically--
(i) review and assess the progress made
toward the achievement of the goals and
milestones established in such plan; and
(ii) submit to Congress a report on the
results of such review and assessment.
(2) If the Director of National Intelligence and the
Secretary of Defense are unable to reach an agreement on a
milestone decision under paragraph (1)(B), the President shall
resolve the conflict.
(3) Nothing in this subsection may be construed to limit the
authority of the Director of National Intelligence to delegate
to any other official any authority to perform the
responsibilities of the Director under this subsection.
(4) In this subsection:
(A) The term ``intelligence program'', with respect
to the acquisition of a major system, means a program
that--
(i) is carried out to acquire such major
system for an element of the intelligence
community; and
(ii) is funded in whole out of amounts
available for the National Intelligence
Program.
(B) The term ``major system'' has the meaning given
such term in section 4(9) of the Federal Property and
Administrative Services Act of 1949 (41 U.S.C. 403(9)).
(r) Performance of Common Services.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall, in consultation with the heads of
departments and agencies of the United States Government
containing elements within the intelligence community and with
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, coordinate the
performance by the elements of the intelligence community
within the National Intelligence Program of such services as
are of common concern to the intelligence community, which
services the Director of National Intelligence determines can
be more efficiently accomplished in a consolidated manner.
(s) Pay Authority for Critical Positions.--(1)
Notwithstanding any pay limitation established under any other
provision of law applicable to employees in elements of the
intelligence community, the Director of National Intelligence
may, in coordination with the Director of the Office of
Personnel Management and the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, grant authority to the head of a
department or agency to fix the rate of basic pay for one or
more positions within the intelligence community at a rate in
excess of any applicable limitation, subject to the provisions
of this subsection. The exercise of authority so granted is at
the discretion of the head of the department or agency
employing the individual in a position covered by such
authority, subject to the provisions of this subsection and any
conditions established by the Director of National Intelligence
when granting such authority.
(2) Authority under this subsection may be granted or
exercised only--
(A) with respect to a position that requires an
extremely high level of expertise and is critical to
successful accomplishment of an important mission; and
(B) to the extent necessary to recruit or retain an
individual exceptionally well qualified for the
position.
(3) The head of a department or agency may not fix a rate of
basic pay under this subsection at a rate greater than the rate
payable for level II of the Executive Schedule under section
5313 of title 5, United States Code, except upon written
approval of the Director of National Intelligence or as
otherwise authorized by law.
(4) The head of a department or agency may not fix a rate of
basic pay under this subsection at a rate greater than the rate
payable for level I of the Executive Schedule under section
5312 of title 5, United States Code, except upon written
approval of the President in response to a request by the
Director of National Intelligence or as otherwise authorized by
law.
(5) Any grant of authority under this subsection for a
position shall terminate at the discretion of the Director of
National Intelligence.
(6)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall notify the
congressional intelligence committees not later than 30 days
after the date on which the Director grants authority to the
head of a department or agency under this subsection.
(B) The head of a department or agency to which the Director
of National Intelligence grants authority under this subsection
shall notify the congressional intelligence committees and the
Director of the exercise of such authority not later than 30
days after the date on which such head exercises such
authority.
(t) Award of Rank to Members of the Senior National
Intelligence Service.--(1) The President, based on the
recommendation of the Director of National Intelligence, may
award a rank to a member of the Senior National Intelligence
Service or other intelligence community senior civilian officer
not already covered by such a rank award program in the same
manner in which a career appointee of an agency may be awarded
a rank under section 4507 of title 5, United States Code.
(2) The President may establish procedures to award a rank
under paragraph (1) to a member of the Senior National
Intelligence Service or a senior civilian officer of the
intelligence community whose identity as such a member or
officer is classified information (as defined in section
606(1)).
(u) Conflict of Interest Regulations.--The Director of
National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the
Office of Government Ethics, shall issue regulations
prohibiting an officer or employee of an element of the
intelligence community from engaging in outside employment if
such employment creates a conflict of interest or appearance
thereof.
(v) Authority To Establish Positions in Excepted Service.--
(1) The Director of National Intelligence, with the concurrence
of the head of the covered department concerned and in
consultation with the Director of the Office of Personnel
Management, may--
(A) convert competitive service positions, and the
incumbents of such positions, within an element of the
intelligence community in such department, to excepted
service positions as the Director of National
Intelligence determines necessary to carry out the
intelligence functions of such element; and
(B) establish new positions in the excepted service
within an element of the intelligence community in such
department, if the Director of National Intelligence
determines such positions are necessary to carry out
the intelligence functions of such element.
(2) An incumbent occupying a position on the date of the
enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2012 selected to be converted to the excepted service under
this section shall have the right to refuse such conversion.
Once such individual no longer occupies the position, the
position may be converted to the excepted service.
(3) A covered department may appoint an individual to
a position converted or established pursuant to this
subsection without regard to the civil-service laws,
including parts II and III of title 5, United States
Code.
(4) In this subsection, the term ``covered department'' means
the Department of Energy, the Department of Homeland Security,
the Department of State, or the Department of the Treasury.
(w) Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statements Intelligence
Community Addendum.--The Director of National Intelligence, in
consultation with the heads of the appropriate elements of the
intelligence community and the Secretary of State, shall
provide to the President, the congressional intelligence
committees, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate an addendum to each Nuclear Proliferation Assessment
Statement accompanying a civilian nuclear cooperation
agreement, containing a comprehensive analysis of the country's
export control system with respect to nuclear-related matters,
including interactions with other countries of proliferation
concern and the actual or suspected nuclear, dual-use, or
missile-related transfers to such countries.
(x) Requirements for Intelligence Community Contractors.--The
Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the
head of each department of the Federal Government that contains
an element of the intelligence community and the Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency, shall--
(1) ensure that--
(A) any contractor to an element of the
intelligence community with access to a
classified network or classified information
develops and operates a security plan that is
consistent with standards established by the
Director of National Intelligence for
intelligence community networks; and
(B) each contract awarded by an element of
the intelligence community includes provisions
requiring the contractor comply with such plan
and such standards;
(2) conduct periodic assessments of each security
plan required under paragraph (1)(A) to ensure such
security plan complies with the requirements of such
paragraph; and
(3) ensure that the insider threat detection
capabilities and insider threat policies of the
intelligence community apply to facilities of
contractors with access to a classified network.
office of the director of national intelligence
Sec. 103. (a) Office of Director of National Intelligence.--
There is an Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(b) Function.--The function of the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence is to assist the Director of National
Intelligence in carrying out the duties and responsibilities of
the Director under this Act and other applicable provisions of
law, and to carry out such other duties as may be prescribed by
the President or by law.
(c) Composition.--The Office of the Director of National
Intelligence is composed of the following:
(1) The Director of National Intelligence.
(2) The Principal Deputy Director of National
Intelligence.
(3) Any Deputy Director of National Intelligence
appointed under section 103A.
(4) The National Intelligence Council.
(5) The General Counsel.
(6) The Civil Liberties Protection Officer.
(7) The Director of Science and Technology.
(8) The [National Counterintelligence Executive
(including the Office of the National
Counterintelligence Executive)] Director of the
National Counterintelligence and Security Center.
(9) The Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence
Community.
(10) The Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community.
(11) The Director of the National Counterterrorism
Center.
(12) The Director of the National Counter
Proliferation Center.
(13) The Chief Financial Officer of the Intelligence
Community.
(14) Such other offices and officials as may be
established by law or the Director may establish or
designate in the Office, including national
intelligence centers.
(d) Staff.--(1) To assist the Director of National
Intelligence in fulfilling the duties and responsibilities of
the Director, the Director shall employ and utilize in the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence a professional
staff having an expertise in matters relating to such duties
and responsibilities, and may establish permanent positions and
appropriate rates of pay with respect to that staff.
(2) The staff of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence under paragraph (1) shall include the staff of the
Office of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for
Community Management that is transferred to the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence under section 1091 of the
National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004.
(e) Temporary Filling of Vacancies.--With respect to filling
temporarily a vacancy in an office within the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence (other than that of the
Director of National Intelligence), section 3345(a)(3) of title
5, United States Code, may be applied--
(1) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by
substituting ``an element of the intelligence
community, as that term is defined in section 3(4) of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
401a(4)),'' for ``such Executive agency''; and
(2) in subparagraph (A), by substituting ``the
intelligence community'' for ``such agency''.
(f) Location of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.--The headquarters of the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence may be located in the Washington
metropolitan region, as that term is defined in section 8301 of
title 40, United States Code.
* * * * * * *
[national counterintelligence executive] director of the national
counterintelligence and security center
Sec. 103F. (a) [National Counterintelligence Executive]
Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security
Center.--The [National Counterintelligence Executive] Director
of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center under
section 902 of the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002
(title IX of Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 402b et seq.) is a
component of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.
(b) Duties.--The [National Counterintelligence Executive]
Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security
Center shall perform the duties provided in the
Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 and such other
duties as may be prescribed by the Director of National
Intelligence or specified by law.
* * * * * * *
inspector general of the intelligence community
Sec. 103H. (a) Office of Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community.--There is within the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence an Office of the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community.
(b) Purpose.--The purpose of the Office of the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community is--
(1) to create an objective and effective office,
appropriately accountable to Congress, to initiate and
conduct independent investigations, inspections,
audits, and reviews on programs and activities within
the responsibility and authority of the Director of
National Intelligence;
(2) to provide leadership and coordination and
recommend policies for activities designed--
(A) to promote economy, efficiency, and
effectiveness in the administration and
implementation of such programs and activities;
and
(B) to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in
such programs and activities;
(3) to provide a means for keeping the Director of
National Intelligence fully and currently informed
about--
(A) problems and deficiencies relating to the
administration of programs and activities
within the responsibility and authority of the
Director of National Intelligence; and
(B) the necessity for, and the progress of,
corrective actions; and
(4) in the manner prescribed by this section, to
ensure that the congressional intelligence committees
are kept similarly informed of--
(A) significant problems and deficiencies
relating to programs and activities within the
responsibility and authority of the Director of
National Intelligence; and
(B) the necessity for, and the progress of,
corrective actions.
(c) Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.--(1)
There is an Inspector General of the Intelligence Community,
who shall be the head of the Office of the Inspector General of
the Intelligence Community, who shall be appointed by the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
(2) The nomination of an individual for appointment as
Inspector General shall be made--
(A) without regard to political affiliation;
(B) on the basis of integrity, compliance with
security standards of the intelligence community, and
prior experience in the field of intelligence or
national security; and
(C) on the basis of demonstrated ability in
accounting, financial analysis, law, management
analysis, public administration, or investigations.
(3) The Inspector General shall report directly to and be
under the general supervision of the Director of National
Intelligence.
(4) The Inspector General may be removed from office only by
the President. The President shall communicate in writing to
the congressional intelligence committees the reasons for the
removal not later than 30 days prior to the effective date of
such removal. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to
prohibit a personnel action otherwise authorized by law, other
than transfer or removal.
(d) Assistant Inspectors General.--Subject to the policies of
the Director of National Intelligence, the Inspector General of
the Intelligence Community shall--
(1) appoint an Assistant Inspector General for Audit
who shall have the responsibility for supervising the
performance of auditing activities relating to programs
and activities within the responsibility and authority
of the Director;
(2) appoint an Assistant Inspector General for
Investigations who shall have the responsibility for
supervising the performance of investigative activities
relating to such programs and activities; and
(3) appoint other Assistant Inspectors General that,
in the judgment of the Inspector General, are necessary
to carry out the duties of the Inspector General.
(e) Duties and Responsibilities.--It shall be the duty and
responsibility of the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community--
(1) to provide policy direction for, and to plan,
conduct, supervise, and coordinate independently, the
investigations, inspections, audits, and reviews
relating to programs and activities within the
responsibility and authority of the Director of
National Intelligence;
(2) to keep the Director of National Intelligence
fully and currently informed concerning violations of
law and regulations, fraud, and other serious problems,
abuses, and deficiencies relating to the programs and
activities within the responsibility and authority of
the Director, to recommend corrective action concerning
such problems, and to report on the progress made in
implementing such corrective action;
(3) to take due regard for the protection of
intelligence sources and methods in the preparation of
all reports issued by the Inspector General, and, to
the extent consistent with the purpose and objective of
such reports, take such measures as may be appropriate
to minimize the disclosure of intelligence sources and
methods described in such reports; and
(4) in the execution of the duties and
responsibilities under this section, to comply with
generally accepted government auditing.
(f) Limitations on Activities.--(1) The Director of National
Intelligence may prohibit the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community from initiating, carrying out, or
completing any investigation, inspection, audit, or review if
the Director determines that such prohibition is necessary to
protect vital national security interests of the United States.
(2) Not later than seven days after the date on which the
Director exercises the authority under paragraph (1), the
Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees an appropriately classified statement of the reasons
for the exercise of such authority.
(3) The Director shall advise the Inspector General at the
time a statement under paragraph (2) is submitted, and, to the
extent consistent with the protection of intelligence sources
and methods, provide the Inspector General with a copy of such
statement.
(4) The Inspector General may submit to the congressional
intelligence committees any comments on the statement of which
the Inspector General has notice under paragraph (3) that the
Inspector General considers appropriate.
(g) Authorities.--(1) The Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community shall have direct and prompt access to
the Director of National Intelligence when necessary for any
purpose pertaining to the performance of the duties of the
Inspector General.
(2)(A) The Inspector General shall, subject to the
limitations in subsection (f), make such investigations and
reports relating to the administration of the programs and
activities within the authorities and responsibilities of the
Director as are, in the judgment of the Inspector General,
necessary or desirable.
(B) The Inspector General shall have access to any employee,
or any employee of a contractor, of any element of the
intelligence community needed for the performance of the duties
of the Inspector General.
(C) The Inspector General shall have direct access to all
records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers,
recommendations, or other materials that relate to the programs
and activities with respect to which the Inspector General has
responsibilities under this section.
(D) The level of classification or compartmentation of
information shall not, in and of itself, provide a sufficient
rationale for denying the Inspector General access to any
materials under subparagraph (C).
(E) The Director, or on the recommendation of the Director,
another appropriate official of the intelligence community,
shall take appropriate administrative actions against an
employee, or an employee of a contractor, of an element of the
intelligence community that fails to cooperate with the
Inspector General. Such administrative action may include loss
of employment or the termination of an existing contractual
relationship.
(3) The Inspector General is authorized to receive and
investigate, pursuant to subsection (h), complaints or
information from any person concerning the existence of an
activity within the authorities and responsibilities of the
Director of National Intelligence constituting a violation of
laws, rules, or regulations, or mismanagement, gross waste of
funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger
to the public health and safety. Once such complaint or
information has been received from an employee of the
intelligence community--
(A) the Inspector General shall not disclose the
identity of the employee without the consent of the
employee, unless the Inspector General determines that
such disclosure is unavoidable during the course of the
investigation or the disclosure is made to an official
of the Department of Justice responsible for
determining whether a prosecution should be undertaken,
and this provision shall qualify as a withholding
statute pursuant to subsection (b)(3) of section 552 of
title 5, United States Code (commonly known as the
``Freedom of Information Act''); and
(B) no action constituting a reprisal, or threat of
reprisal, for making such complaint or disclosing such
information to the Inspector General may be taken by
any employee in a position to take such actions, unless
the complaint was made or the information was disclosed
with the knowledge that it was false or with willful
disregard for its truth or falsity.
(4) The Inspector General shall have the authority to
administer to or take from any person an oath, affirmation, or
affidavit, whenever necessary in the performance of the duties
of the Inspector General, which oath, affirmation, or affidavit
when administered or taken by or before an employee of the
Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
designated by the Inspector General shall have the same force
and effect as if administered or taken by, or before, an
officer having a seal.
(5)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the Inspector
General is authorized to require by subpoena the production of
all information, documents, reports, answers, records,
accounts, papers, and other data in any medium (including
electronically stored information, as well as any tangible
thing) and documentary evidence necessary in the performance of
the duties and responsibilities of the Inspector General.
(B) In the case of departments, agencies, and other elements
of the United States Government, the Inspector General shall
obtain information, documents, reports, answers, records,
accounts, papers, and other data and evidence for the purpose
specified in subparagraph (A) using procedures other than by
subpoenas.
(C) The Inspector General may not issue a subpoena for, or on
behalf of, any component of the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence or any element of the intelligence
community, including the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.
(D) In the case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena
issued under this paragraph, the subpoena shall be enforceable
by order of any appropriate district court of the United
States.
(6) The Inspector General may obtain services as authorized
by section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, at rates for
individuals not to exceed the daily equivalent of the maximum
annual rate of basic pay payable for grade GS-15 of the General
Schedule under section 5332 of title 5, United States Code.
(7) The Inspector General may, to the extent and in such
amounts as may be provided in appropriations, enter into
contracts and other arrangements for audits, studies, analyses,
and other services with public agencies and with private
persons, and to make such payments as may be necessary to carry
out the provisions of this section.
(h) Coordination Among Inspectors General.--(1)(A) In the
event of a matter within the jurisdiction of the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community that may be subject to an
investigation, inspection, audit, or review by both the
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community and an
inspector general with oversight responsibility for an element
of the intelligence community, the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community and such other inspector general shall
expeditiously resolve the question of which inspector general
shall conduct such investigation, inspection, audit, or review
to avoid unnecessary duplication of the activities of the
inspectors general.
(B) In attempting to resolve a question under subparagraph
(A), the inspectors general concerned may request the
assistance of the Intelligence Community Inspectors General
Forum established under paragraph (2). In the event of a
dispute between an inspector general within a department or
agency of the United States Government and the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community that has not been
resolved with the assistance of such Forum, the inspectors
general shall submit the question to the Director of National
Intelligence and the head of the affected department or agency
for resolution.
(2)(A) There is established the Intelligence Community
Inspectors General Forum, which shall consist of all statutory
or administrative inspectors general with oversight
responsibility for an element of the intelligence community.
(B) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall
serve as the Chair of the Forum established under subparagraph
(A). The Forum shall have no administrative authority over any
inspector general, but shall serve as a mechanism for informing
its members of the work of individual members of the Forum that
may be of common interest and discussing questions about
jurisdiction or access to employees, employees of contract
personnel, records, audits, reviews, documents,
recommendations, or other materials that may involve or be of
assistance to more than one of its members.
(3) The inspector general conducting an investigation,
inspection, audit, or review covered by paragraph (1) shall
submit the results of such investigation, inspection, audit, or
review to any other inspector general, including the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community, with jurisdiction to
conduct such investigation, inspection, audit, or review who
did not conduct such investigation, inspection, audit, or
review.
(i) Counsel to the Inspector General.--(1) The Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community shall--
(A) appoint a Counsel to the Inspector General who
shall report to the Inspector General; or
(B) obtain the services of a counsel appointed by and
directly reporting to another inspector general or the
Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and
Efficiency on a reimbursable basis.
(2) The counsel appointed or obtained under paragraph (1)
shall perform such functions as the Inspector General may
prescribe.
(j) Staff and Other Support.--(1) The Director of National
Intelligence shall provide the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community with appropriate and adequate office
space at central and field office locations, together with such
equipment, office supplies, maintenance services, and
communications facilities and services as may be necessary for
the operation of such offices.
(2)(A) Subject to applicable law and the policies of the
Director of National Intelligence, the Inspector General shall
select, appoint, and employ such officers and employees as may
be necessary to carry out the functions, powers, and duties of
the Inspector General. The Inspector General shall ensure that
any officer or employee so selected, appointed, or employed has
security clearances appropriate for the assigned duties of such
officer or employee.
(B) In making selections under subparagraph (A), the
Inspector General shall ensure that such officers and employees
have the requisite training and experience to enable the
Inspector General to carry out the duties of the Inspector
General effectively.
(C) In meeting the requirements of this paragraph, the
Inspector General shall create within the Office of the
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community a career cadre
of sufficient size to provide appropriate continuity and
objectivity needed for the effective performance of the duties
of the Inspector General.
(3) Consistent with budgetary and personnel resources
allocated by the Director of National Intelligence, the
Inspector General has final approval of--
(A) the selection of internal and external candidates
for employment with the Office of the Inspector
General; and
(B) all other personnel decisions concerning
personnel permanently assigned to the Office of the
Inspector General, including selection and appointment
to the Senior Intelligence Service, but excluding all
security-based determinations that are not within the
authority of a head of a component of the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence.
(4)(A) Subject to the concurrence of the Director of National
Intelligence, the Inspector General may request such
information or assistance as may be necessary for carrying out
the duties and responsibilities of the Inspector General from
any Federal, State (as defined in section 804), or local
governmental agency or unit thereof.
(B) Upon request of the Inspector General for information or
assistance from a department, agency, or element of the Federal
Government under subparagraph (A), the head of the department,
agency, or element concerned shall, insofar as is practicable
and not in contravention of any existing statutory restriction
or regulation of the department, agency, or element, furnish to
the Inspector General, such information or assistance.
(C) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community may,
upon reasonable notice to the head of any element of the
intelligence community and in coordination with that element's
inspector general pursuant to subsection (h), conduct, as
authorized by this section, an investigation, inspection,
audit, or review of such element and may enter into any place
occupied by such element for purposes of the performance of the
duties of the Inspector General.
(k) Reports.--(1)(A) The Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community shall, not later than October 31 and
April 30 of each year, prepare and submit to the Director of
National Intelligence a classified, and, as appropriate,
unclassified semiannual report summarizing the activities of
the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community during the immediately preceding 6-month period
ending September 30 and March 31, respectively. The Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community shall provide any portion
of the report involving a component of a department of the
United States Government to the head of that department
simultaneously with submission of the report to the Director of
National Intelligence.
(B) Each report under this paragraph shall include, at a
minimum, the following:
(i) A list of the title or subject of each
investigation, inspection, audit, or review conducted
during the period covered by such report.
(ii) A description of significant problems, abuses,
and deficiencies relating to the administration of
programs and activities of the intelligence community
within the responsibility and authority of the Director
of National Intelligence, and in the relationships
between elements of the intelligence community,
identified by the Inspector General during the period
covered by such report.
(iii) A description of the recommendations for
corrective action made by the Inspector General during
the period covered by such report with respect to
significant problems, abuses, or deficiencies
identified in clause (ii).
(iv) A statement of whether or not corrective action
has been completed on each significant recommendation
described in previous semiannual reports, and, in a
case where corrective action has been completed, a
description of such corrective action.
(v) A certification of whether or not the Inspector
General has had full and direct access to all
information relevant to the performance of the
functions of the Inspector General.
(vi) A description of the exercise of the subpoena
authority under subsection (g)(5) by the Inspector
General during the period covered by such report.
(vii) Such recommendations as the Inspector General
considers appropriate for legislation to promote
economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the
administration and implementation of programs and
activities within the responsibility and authority of
the Director of National Intelligence, and to detect
and eliminate fraud and abuse in such programs and
activities.
(C) Not later than 30 days after the date of receipt of a
report under subparagraph (A), the Director shall transmit the
report to the congressional intelligence committees together
with any comments the Director considers appropriate. The
Director shall transmit to the committees of the Senate and of
the House of Representatives with jurisdiction over a
department of the United States Government any portion of the
report involving a component of such department simultaneously
with submission of the report to the congressional intelligence
committees.
(2)(A) The Inspector General shall report immediately to the
Director whenever the Inspector General becomes aware of
particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or
deficiencies relating to programs and activities within the
responsibility and authority of the Director of National
Intelligence.
(B) The Director shall transmit to the congressional
intelligence committees each report under subparagraph (A)
within 7 calendar days of receipt of such report, together with
such comments as the Director considers appropriate. The
Director shall transmit to the committees of the Senate and of
the House of Representatives with jurisdiction over a
department of the United States Government any portion of each
report under subparagraph (A) that involves a problem, abuse,
or deficiency related to a component of such department
simultaneously with transmission of the report to the
congressional intelligence committees.
(3)(A) In the event that--
(i) the Inspector General is unable to resolve any
differences with the Director affecting the execution
of the duties or responsibilities of the Inspector
General;
(ii) an investigation, inspection, audit, or review
carried out by the Inspector General focuses on any
current or former intelligence community official who--
(I) holds or held a position in an element of
the intelligence community that is subject to
appointment by the President, whether or not by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
including such a position held on an acting
basis;
(II) holds or held a position in an element
of the intelligence community, including a
position held on an acting basis, that is
appointed by the Director of National
Intelligence; or
(III) holds or held a position as head of an
element of the intelligence community or a
position covered by subsection (b) or (c) of
section 106;
(iii) a matter requires a report by the Inspector
General to the Department of Justice on possible
criminal conduct by a current or former official
described in clause (ii);
(iv) the Inspector General receives notice from the
Department of Justice declining or approving
prosecution of possible criminal conduct of any current
or former official described in clause (ii); or
(v) the Inspector General, after exhausting all
possible alternatives, is unable to obtain significant
documentary information in the course of an
investigation, inspection, audit, or review,
the Inspector General shall immediately notify, and submit a
report to, the congressional intelligence committees on such
matter.
(B) The Inspector General shall submit to the committees of
the Senate and of the House of Representatives with
jurisdiction over a department of the United States Government
any portion of each report under subparagraph (A) that involves
an investigation, inspection, audit, or review carried out by
the Inspector General focused on any current or former official
of a component of such department simultaneously with
submission of the report to the congressional intelligence
committees.
(4) The Director shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees any report or findings and
recommendations of an investigation, inspection, audit, or
review conducted by the office which has been requested by the
Chairman or Vice Chairman or ranking minority member of either
committee.
(5)(A) An employee of an element of the intelligence
community, an employee assigned or detailed to an element of
the intelligence community, or an employee of a contractor to
the intelligence community who intends to report to Congress a
complaint or information with respect to an urgent concern may
report such complaint or information to the Inspector General.
(B) Not later than the end of the 14-calendar-day period
beginning on the date of receipt from an employee of a
complaint or information under subparagraph (A), the Inspector
General shall determine whether the complaint or information
appears credible. Upon making such a determination, the
Inspector General shall transmit [to the Director] to the
congressional intelligence committees a notice of that
determination, together with the complaint or information.
[(C) Upon receipt of a transmittal from the Inspector General
under subparagraph (B), the Director shall, within 7 calendar
days of such receipt, forward such transmittal to the
congressional intelligence committees, together with any
comments the Director considers appropriate.]
[(D)] (C)(i) If the Inspector General does not find credible
under subparagraph (B) a complaint or information submitted
under subparagraph (A), or does not transmit the complaint or
information to [the Director] the congressional intelligence
committees in accurate form under subparagraph (B), the
employee (subject to clause (ii)) may submit the complaint or
information to Congress by contacting either or both of the
congressional intelligence committees directly.
(ii) An employee may contact the congressional intelligence
committees directly as described in clause (i) only if the
employee--
(I) before making such a contact, furnishes to [the
Director, through the Inspector General,] the Inspector
General a statement of the employee's complaint or
information and notice of the employee's intent to
contact the congressional intelligence committees
directly; and
(II) obtains and follows from [the Director, through
the Inspector General,] the Inspector General, in
consultation with the Director, direction on how to
contact the congressional intelligence committees in
accordance with appropriate security practices.
(iii) A member or employee of one of the congressional
intelligence committees who receives a complaint or information
under this subparagraph does so in that member or employee's
official capacity as a member or employee of such committee.
[(E)] (D) The Inspector General shall notify an employee who
reports a complaint or information to the Inspector General
under this paragraph of each action taken under this paragraph
with respect to the complaint or information. Such notice shall
be provided not later than 3 days after any such action is
taken.
[(F)] (E) An action taken by the Director or the Inspector
General under this paragraph shall not be subject to judicial
review.
[(G)] (F) In this paragraph, the term ``urgent concern''
means any of the following:
(i) A serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation
of law or Executive order, or deficiency relating to
the funding, administration, or operation of an
intelligence activity within the responsibility and
authority of the Director of National Intelligence
involving classified information, but does not include
differences of opinions concerning public policy
matters.
(ii) A false statement to Congress, or a willful
withholding from Congress, on an issue of material fact
relating to the funding, administration, or operation
of an intelligence activity.
(iii) An action, including a personnel action
described in section 2302(a)(2)(A) of title 5, United
States Code, constituting reprisal or threat of
reprisal prohibited under subsection (g)(3)(B) of this
section in response to an employee's reporting an
urgent concern in accordance with this paragraph.
[(H)] (G) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit
the protections afforded to an employee under section 17(d) of
the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(d))
or section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C.
App.).
[(I)] (H) An individual who has submitted a complaint or
information to the Inspector General under this section may
notify any member of either of the congressional intelligence
committees, or a staff member of either of such committees, of
the fact that such individual has made a submission to the
Inspector General, and of the date on which such submission was
made.
(6) In accordance with section 535 of title 28, United States
Code, the Inspector General shall expeditiously report to the
Attorney General any information, allegation, or complaint
received by the Inspector General relating to violations of
Federal criminal law that involves a program or operation of an
element of the intelligence community, or in the relationships
between the elements of the intelligence community, consistent
with such guidelines as may be issued by the Attorney General
pursuant to subsection (b)(2) of such section. A copy of each
such report shall be furnished to the Director.
(l) Construction of Duties Regarding Elements of Intelligence
Community.--Except as resolved pursuant to subsection (h), the
performance by the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community of any duty, responsibility, or function regarding an
element of the intelligence community shall not be construed to
modify or affect the duties and responsibilities of any other
inspector general having duties and responsibilities relating
to such element.
(m) Separate Budget Account.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall, in accordance with procedures issued by the
Director in consultation with the congressional intelligence
committees, include in the National Intelligence Program budget
a separate account for the Office of the Inspector General of
the Intelligence Community.
(n) Budget.--(1) For each fiscal year, the Inspector General
of the Intelligence Community shall transmit a budget estimate
and request to the Director of National Intelligence that
specifies for such fiscal year--
(A) the aggregate amount requested for the operations
of the Inspector General;
(B) the amount requested for all training
requirements of the Inspector General, including a
certification from the Inspector General that the
amount requested is sufficient to fund all training
requirements for the Office of the Inspector General;
and
(C) the amount requested to support the Council of
the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency,
including a justification for such amount.
(2) In transmitting a proposed budget to the President for a
fiscal year, the Director of National Intelligence shall
include for such fiscal year--
(A) the aggregate amount requested for the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community;
(B) the amount requested for Inspector General
training;
(C) the amount requested to support the Council of
the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency; and
(D) the comments of the Inspector General, if any,
with respect to such proposed budget.
(3) The Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives for each fiscal
year--
(A) a separate statement of the budget estimate
transmitted pursuant to paragraph (1);
(B) the amount requested by the Director for the
Inspector General pursuant to paragraph (2)(A);
(C) the amount requested by the Director for the
training of personnel of the Office of the Inspector
General pursuant to paragraph (2)(B);
(D) the amount requested by the Director for support
for the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity
and Efficiency pursuant to paragraph (2)(C); and
(E) the comments of the Inspector General under
paragraph (2)(D), if any, on the amounts requested
pursuant to paragraph (2), including whether such
amounts would substantially inhibit the Inspector
General from performing the duties of the Office of the
Inspector General.
(o) Information on Website.--(1) The Director of National
Intelligence shall establish and maintain on the homepage of
the publicly accessible website of the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence information relating to the Office of
the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community including
methods to contact the Inspector General.
(2) The information referred to in paragraph (1) shall be
obvious and facilitate accessibility to the information related
to the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community.
* * * * * * *
TITLE V--ACCOUNTABILITY FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
* * * * * * *
SEC. 506K. REPORTS ON MAJOR DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACQUISITION PROGRAMS
AT EACH MILESTONE APPROVAL.
(a) Report on Milestone A.--Not later than 15 days after
granting Milestone A or equivalent approval for a major defense
intelligence acquisition program, the milestone decision
authority for the program shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report containing a brief summary of
the following:
(1) The estimated cost and schedule for the program
established by the military department concerned,
including--
(A) the dollar values estimated for the
program acquisition unit cost and total life-
cycle cost; and
(B) the planned dates for each program
milestone and initial operational capability.
(2) The independent estimated cost for the program
established pursuant to section 2334(a)(6) of title 10,
United States Code, and any independent estimated
schedule for the program, including--
(A) the dollar values estimated for the
program acquisition unit cost and total life-
cycle cost; and
(B) the planned dates for each program
milestone and initial operational capability.
(3) A summary of the technical risks, including
cybersecurity risks and supply chain risks, associated
with the program, as determined by the military
department concerned, including identification of any
critical technologies that need to be matured.
(4) A summary of the sufficiency review conducted by
the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation
of the Department of Defense of the analysis of
alternatives performed for the program (as referred to
in section 2366a(b)(6) of such title).
(5) Any other information the milestone decision
authority considers relevant.
(b) Report on Milestone B.--Not later than 15 days after
granting Milestone B or equivalent approval for a major defense
intelligence acquisition program, the milestone decision
authority for the program shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report containing a brief summary of
the following:
(1) The estimated cost and schedule for the program
established by the military department concerned,
including--
(A) the dollar values estimated for the
program acquisition unit cost, average
procurement unit cost, and total life-cycle
cost; and
(B) the planned dates for each program
milestone, initial operational test and
evaluation, and initial operational capability.
(2) The independent estimated cost for the program
established pursuant to section 2334(a)(6) of title 10,
United States Code, and any independent estimated
schedule for the program, including--
(A) the dollar values estimated for the
program acquisition unit cost, average
procurement unit cost, and total life-cycle
cost; and
(B) the planned dates for each program
milestone, initial operational test and
evaluation, and initial operational capability.
(3) A summary of the technical risks, including
cybersecurity risks and supply chain risks, associated
with the program, as determined by the military
department concerned, including identification of any
critical technologies that have not been successfully
demonstrated in a relevant environment.
(4) A summary of the sufficiency review conducted by
the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation
of the analysis of alternatives performed for the
program pursuant to section 2366a(b)(6) of such title.
(5) A statement of whether the preliminary design
review for the program described in section 2366b(a)(1)
of such title has been completed.
(6) Any other information the milestone decision
authority considers relevant.
(c) Report on Milestone C.--Not later than 15 days after
granting Milestone C or equivalent approval for a major defense
intelligence acquisition program, the milestone decision
authority for the program shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report containing a brief summary of
the following:
(1) The estimated cost and schedule for the program
established by the military department concerned,
including--
(A) the dollar values estimated for the
program acquisition unit cost, average
procurement unit cost, and total life-cycle
cost; and
(B) the planned dates for initial operational
test and evaluation and initial operational
capability.
(2) The independent estimated cost for the program
established pursuant to section 2334(a)(6) of title 10,
United States Code, and any independent estimated
schedule for the program, including--
(A) the dollar values estimated for the
program acquisition unit cost, average
procurement unit cost, and total life-cycle
cost; and
(B) the planned dates for initial operational
test and evaluation and initial operational
capability.
(3) The cost and schedule estimates approved by the
milestone decision authority for the program.
(4) A summary of the production, manufacturing, and
fielding risks, including cybersecurity risks and
supply chain risks, associated with the program.
(5) Any other information the milestone decision
authority considers relevant.
(d) Initial Operating Capability or Full Operating
Capability.--Not later than 15 days after a major defense
intelligence acquisition program reaches initial operating
capability or full operating capability, the milestone decision
authority for the program shall notify the appropriate
congressional committees of the program reaching such
capability.
(e) Additional Information.--At the request of any of the
appropriate congressional committees, the milestone decision
authority shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees further information or underlying documentation for
the information in a report submitted under subsection (a),
(b), or (c), including the independent cost and schedule
estimates and the independent technical risk assessments
referred to in those subsections.
(f) Nonduplication of Effort.--If any information required
under this section has been included in another report or
assessment previously submitted to the congressional
intelligence committees under sections 506A, 506C, or 506E, the
milestone decision authority may provide a list of such reports
and assessments at the time of submitting a report required
under this section instead of including such information in
such report.
(g) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) The term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means the congressional intelligence committees and the
congressional defense committees (as defined in section
101(a)(16) of title 10, United States Code).
(2) The term ``major defense intelligence acquisition
program'' means a major defense acquisition program (as
defined in section 2430 of title 10, United States
Code) that relates to intelligence or intelligence-
related activities.
(3) The term ``Milestone A approval'' has the meaning
given that term in section 2366a(d) of title 10, United
States Code.
(4) The terms ``Milestone B approval'' and
``Milestone C approval'' have the meaning given those
terms in section 2366(e) of such title.
(5) The term ``milestone decision authority'' has the
meaning given that term in section 2366a(d) of such
title.
* * * * * * *
----------
SECTION 8131 OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1995
* * * * * * *
[Sec. 8131. (a) No project for the construction of any
facility, or improvement to any facility, having an estimated
Federal cost in excess of $300,000, may be undertaken in any
fiscal year unless specifically identified as a separate item
in the President's annual fiscal year budget request or
otherwise specifically authorized and appropriated if such
facility or improvement would be used primarily by personnel of
the intelligence community.
[(b) As used in this section, the term ``intelligence
community'' has the same meaning given that term in section
3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).]
* * * * * * *
----------
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995
* * * * * * *
TITLE VI--CONSTRUCTION OF FACILITIES FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
* * * * * * *
SEC. 602. LIMITATION ON CONSTRUCTION OF FACILITIES TO BE USED PRIMARILY
BY THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) In General.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in subsection
(b), no project for the construction of any facility to
be used primarily by personnel of any component of the
intelligence community which has an estimated Federal
cost in excess of $5,000,000 may be undertaken in any
fiscal year unless such project is specifically
identified as a separate item in the President's annual
fiscal year budget request and is specifically
authorized by the Congress.
(2) Notification.--In the case of a project for the
construction of any facility to be used primarily by
personnel of any component of the intelligence
community which has an estimated Federal cost greater
than $1,000,000 but less than $5,000,000, or where any
[improvement project to] project for the improvement,
repair, or modification of such a facility has an
estimated Federal cost greater than $1,000,000, the
Director of National Intelligence shall submit a
notification to the intelligence committees
specifically identifying such project.
(b) Exception.--
(1) In general.--Notwithstanding subsection (a) but
subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), a project for the
construction of a facility to be used primarily by
personnel of any component of the intelligence
community may be carried out if the Secretary of
Defense and the Director of National Intelligence
jointly determine--
(A) that the project is vital to the national
security or to the protection of health,
safety, or the quality of the environment, and
(B) that the requirement for the project is
so urgent that deferral of the project for
inclusion in the next Act authorizing
appropriations for the intelligence community
would be inconsistent with national security or
the protection of health, safety, or
environmental quality, as the case may be.
(2) Report.--(A) When a decision is made to carry out
a construction project under this subsection, the
Secretary of Defense and the Director of National
Intelligence jointly shall submit a report in writing
to the appropriate committees of Congress on that
decision. Each such report shall include (i) the
justification for the project and the current estimate
of the cost of the project, (ii) the justification for
carrying out the project under this subsection, and
(iii) a statement of the source of the funds to be used
to carry out the project. The project may then be
carried out only after the end of the 7-day period
beginning on the date the notification is received by
such committees.
(B) Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), a project
referred to in paragraph (1) may begin on the date the
notification is received by the appropriate committees
of Congress under that paragraph if the Director of
National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense
jointly determine that--
(i) an emergency exists with respect to the
national security or the protection of health,
safety, or environmental quality; and
(ii) any delay in the commencement of the
project would harm any or all of those
interests.
(3) Projects primarily for cia.--If a project
referred to in paragraph (1) is primarily for the
Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency shall make the
determination and submit the report required by
paragraphs (1) and (2).
(4) Limitation.--A project carried out under this
subsection shall be carried out within the total amount
of funds appropriated for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities that have not been
obligated.
(c) Application.--This section shall not apply to any project
which is subject to subsection (a)(1)(A) or (c) of section 601.
* * * * * * *
----------
TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE
* * * * * * *
PART III--EMPLOYEES
* * * * * * *
SUBPART D--PAY AND ALLOWANCES
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 53--PAY RATES AND SYSTEMS
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER II--EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE PAY RATES
* * * * * * *
Sec. 5313. Positions at level II
Level II of the Executive Schedule applies to the following
positions, for which the annual rate of basic pay shall be the
rate determined with respect to such level under chapter 11 of
title 2, as adjusted by section 5318 of this title:
Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Deputy Secretary of State.
Deputy Secretary of State for Management and
Resources.
Administrator, Agency for International Development.
Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration.
Deputy Secretary of Veterans Affairs.
Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security.
Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Management.
Deputy Secretary of the Treasury.
Deputy Secretary of Transportation.
Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers.
Director of the Office of Science and Technology.
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Secretary of the Air Force.
Secretary of the Army.
Secretary of the Navy.
Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration.
Director of the National Science Foundation.
Deputy Attorney General.
Deputy Secretary of Energy.
Deputy Secretary of Agriculture.
Director of the Office of Personnel Management.
Administrator, Federal Highway Administration.
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency.
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics.
Deputy Secretary of Labor.
Deputy Director of the Office of Management and
Budget.
Independent Members, Thrift Depositor Protection
Oversight Board.
Deputy Secretary of Health and Human Services.
Deputy Secretary of the Interior.
Deputy Secretary of Education.
Deputy Secretary of Housing and Urban Development.
Deputy Director for Management, Office of Management
and Budget.
Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency.
Deputy Commissioner of Social Security, Social
Security Administration.
Administrator of the Community Development Financial
Institutions Fund.
Deputy Director of National Drug Control Policy.
Members, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System.
Under Secretary of Transportation for Policy.
Chief Executive Officer, Millennium Challenge
Corporation.
Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence.
Director of the National Counterterrorism Center.
[Director of the National Counter Proliferation
Center.]
Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency.
Federal Transit Administrator.
* * * * * * *
----------
DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT OF 1950
* * * * * * *
TITLE VII--GENERAL PROVISIONS
* * * * * * *
authority to review certain mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers
Sec. 721. (a) Definitions.--For purposes of this section, the
following definitions shall apply:
(1) Committee; chairperson.--The terms ``Committee''
and ``chairperson'' mean the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States and the chairperson
thereof, respectively.
(2) Control.--The term ``control'' has the meaning
given to such term in regulations which the Committee
shall prescribe.
(3) Covered transaction.--The term ``covered
transaction'' means any merger, acquisition, or
takeover that is proposed or pending after August 23,
1988, by or with any foreign person which could result
in foreign control of any person engaged in interstate
commerce in the United States.
(4) Foreign government-controlled transaction.--The
term ``foreign government-controlled transaction''
means any covered transaction that could result in the
control of any person engaged in interstate commerce in
the United States by a foreign government or an entity
controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign
government.
(5) Clarification.--The term ``national security''
shall be construed so as to include those issues
relating to ``homeland security'', including its
application to critical infrastructure.
(6) Critical infrastructure.--The term ``critical
infrastructure'' means, subject to rules issued under
this section, systems and assets, whether physical or
virtual, so vital to the United States that the
incapacity or destruction of such systems or assets
would have a debilitating impact on national security.
(7) Critical technologies.--The term ``critical
technologies'' means critical technology, critical
components, or critical technology items essential to
national defense, identified pursuant to this section,
subject to regulations issued at the direction of the
President, in accordance with subsection (h).
(8) Lead agency.--The term ``lead agency'' means the
agency, or agencies, designated as the lead agency or
agencies pursuant to subsection (k)(5) for the review
of a transaction.
(b) National Security Reviews and Investigations.--
(1) National security reviews.--
(A) In general.--Upon receiving written
notification under subparagraph (C) of any
covered transaction, or pursuant to a
unilateral notification initiated under
subparagraph (D) with respect to any covered
transaction, the President, acting through the
Committee--
(i) shall review the covered
transaction to determine the effects of
the transaction on the national
security of the United States; and
(ii) shall consider the factors
specified in subsection (f) for such
purpose, as appropriate.
(B) Control by foreign government.--If the
Committee determines that the covered
transaction is a foreign government-controlled
transaction, the Committee shall conduct an
investigation of the transaction under
paragraph (2).
(C) Written notice.--
(i) In general.--Any party or parties
to any covered transaction may initiate
a review of the transaction under this
paragraph by submitting a written
notice of the transaction to the
Chairperson of the Committee.
(ii) Withdrawal of notice.--No
covered transaction for which a notice
was submitted under clause (i) may be
withdrawn from review, unless a written
request for such withdrawal is
submitted to the Committee by any party
to the transaction and approved by the
Committee.
(iii) Continuing discussions.--A
request for withdrawal under clause
(ii) shall not be construed to preclude
any party to the covered transaction
from continuing informal discussions
with the Committee or any member
thereof regarding possible resubmission
for review pursuant to this paragraph.
(D) Unilateral initiation of review.--Subject
to subparagraph (F), the President or the
Committee may initiate a review under
subparagraph (A) of--
(i) any covered transaction;
(ii) any covered transaction that has
previously been reviewed or
investigated under this section, if any
party to the transaction submitted
false or misleading material
information to the Committee in
connection with the review or
investigation or omitted material
information, including material
documents, from information submitted
to the Committee; or
(iii) any covered transaction that
has previously been reviewed or
investigated under this section, if--
(I) any party to the
transaction or the entity
resulting from consummation of
the transaction intentionally
materially breaches a
mitigation agreement or
condition described in
subsection (l)(1)(A);
(II) such breach is certified
to the Committee by the lead
department or agency monitoring
and enforcing such agreement or
condition as an intentional
material breach; and
(III) the Committee
determines that there are no
other remedies or enforcement
tools available to address such
breach.
(E) Timing.--Any review under this paragraph
shall be completed before the end of the 30-day
period beginning on the date of the acceptance
of written notice under subparagraph (C) by the
chairperson, or beginning on the date of the
initiation of the review in accordance with
subparagraph (D), as applicable.
(F) Limit on delegation of certain
authority.--The authority of the Committee to
initiate a review under subparagraph (D) may
not be delegated to any person, other than the
Deputy Secretary or an appropriate Under
Secretary of the department or agency
represented on the Committee.
(2) National security investigations.--
(A) In general.--In each case described in
subparagraph (B), the Committee shall
immediately conduct an investigation of the
effects of a covered transaction on the
national security of the United States, and
take any necessary actions in connection with
the transaction to protect the national
security of the United States.
(B) Applicability.--Subparagraph (A) shall
apply in each case in which--
(i) a review of a covered transaction
under paragraph (1) results in a
determination that--
(I) the transaction threatens
to impair the national security
of the United States and that
threat has not been mitigated
during or prior to the review
of a covered transaction under
paragraph (1);
(II) the transaction is a
foreign government-controlled
transaction; or
(III) the transaction would
result in control of any
critical infrastructure of or
within the United States by or
on behalf of any foreign
person, if the Committee
determines that the transaction
could impair national security,
and that such impairment to
national security has not been
mitigated by assurances
provided or renewed with the
approval of the Committee, as
described in subsection (l),
during the review period under
paragraph (1); or
(ii) the lead agency recommends, and
the Committee concurs, that an
investigation be undertaken.
(C) Timing.--Any investigation under
subparagraph (A) shall be completed before the
end of the 45-day period beginning on the date
on which the investigation commenced.
(D) Exception.--
(i) In general.--Notwithstanding
subparagraph (B)(i), an investigation
of a foreign government-controlled
transaction described in subclause (II)
of subparagraph (B)(i) or a transaction
involving critical infrastructure
described in subclause (III) of
subparagraph (B)(i) shall not be
required under this paragraph, if the
Secretary of the Treasury and the head
of the lead agency jointly determine,
on the basis of the review of the
transaction under paragraph (1), that
the transaction will not impair the
national security of the United States.
(ii) Nondelegation.--The authority of
the Secretary or the head of an agency
referred to in clause (i) may not be
delegated to any person, other than the
Deputy Secretary of the Treasury or the
deputy head (or the equivalent thereof)
of the lead agency, respectively.
(E) Guidance on certain transactions with
national security implications.--The
Chairperson shall, not later than 180 days
after the effective date of the Foreign
Investment and National Security Act of 2007,
publish in the Federal Register guidance on the
types of transactions that the Committee has
reviewed and that have presented national
security considerations, including transactions
that may constitute covered transactions that
would result in control of critical
infrastructure relating to United States
national security by a foreign government or an
entity controlled by or acting on behalf of a
foreign government.
(3) Certifications to congress.--
(A) Certified notice at completion of
review.--Upon completion of a review under
subsection (b) that concludes action under this
section, the chairperson and the head of the
lead agency shall transmit a certified notice
to the members of Congress specified in
subparagraph (C)(iii).
(B) Certified report at completion of
investigation.--As soon as is practicable after
completion of an investigation under subsection
(b) that concludes action under this section,
the chairperson and the head of the lead agency
shall transmit to the members of Congress
specified in subparagraph (C)(iii) a certified
written report (consistent with the
requirements of subsection (c)) on the results
of the investigation, unless the matter under
investigation has been sent to the President
for decision.
(C) Certification procedures.--
(i) In general.--Each certified
notice and report required under
subparagraphs (A) and (B),
respectively, shall be submitted to the
members of Congress specified in clause
(iii), and shall include--
(I) a description of the
actions taken by the Committee
with respect to the
transaction; and
(II) identification of the
determinative factors
considered under subsection
(f).
(ii) Content of certification.--Each
certified notice and report required
under subparagraphs (A) and (B),
respectively, shall be signed by the
chairperson and the head of the lead
agency, and shall state that, in the
determination of the Committee, there
are no unresolved national security
concerns with the transaction that is
the subject of the notice or report.
(iii) Members of congress.--Each
certified notice and report required
under subparagraphs (A) and (B),
respectively, shall be transmitted--
(I) to the Majority Leader
and the Minority Leader of the
Senate;
(II) to the chair and ranking
member of the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs of the Senate and of
any committee of the Senate
having oversight over the lead
agency;
(III) to the Speaker and the
Minority Leader of the House of
Representatives;
(IV) to the chair and ranking
member of the Committee on
Financial Services of the House
of Representatives and of any
committee of the House of
Representatives having
oversight over the lead agency;
and
(V) with respect to covered
transactions involving critical
infrastructure, to the members
of the Senate from the State in
which the principal place of
business of the acquired United
States person is located, and
the member from the
Congressional District in which
such principal place of
business is located.
(iv) Signatures; limit on
delegation.--
(I) In general.--Each
certified notice and report
required under subparagraphs
(A) and (B), respectively,
shall be signed by the
chairperson and the head of the
lead agency, which signature
requirement may only be
delegated in accordance with
subclause (II).
(II) Limitation on delegation
of certifications.--The
chairperson and the head of the
lead agency may delegate the
signature requirement under
subclause (I)--
(aa) only to an
appropriate employee of
the Department of the
Treasury (in the case
of the Secretary of the
Treasury) or to an
appropriate employee of
the lead agency (in the
case of the lead
agency) who was
appointed by the
President, by and with
the advice and consent
of the Senate, with
respect to any notice
provided under
paragraph (1) following
the completion of a
review under this
section; or
(bb) only to a Deputy
Secretary of the
Treasury (in the case
of the Secretary of the
Treasury) or a person
serving in the Deputy
position or the
equivalent thereof at
the lead agency (in the
case of the lead
agency), with respect
to any report provided
under subparagraph (B)
following an
investigation under
this section.
(4) Analysis by director of national intelligence.--
(A) In general.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall expeditiously carry out a
thorough analysis of any threat to the national
security of the United States posed by any
covered transaction. The Director of National
Intelligence shall also seek and incorporate
the views of all affected or appropriate
intelligence agencies with respect to the
transaction.
(B) Timing.--The analysis required under
subparagraph (A) shall be provided by the
Director of National Intelligence to the
Committee not later than 20 days after the date
on which notice of the transaction is accepted
by the Committee under paragraph (1)(C), but
such analysis may be supplemented or amended,
as the Director considers necessary or
appropriate, or upon a request for additional
information by the Committee. The Director may
begin the analysis at any time prior to
acceptance of the notice, in accordance with
otherwise applicable law.
(C) Interaction with intelligence
community.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall ensure that the intelligence
community remains engaged in the collection,
analysis, and dissemination to the Committee of
any additional relevant information that may
become available during the course of any
investigation conducted under subsection (b)
with respect to a transaction.
(D) Independent role of director.--The
Director of National Intelligence shall be a
nonvoting, ex officio member of the Committee,
and shall be provided with all notices received
by the Committee under paragraph (1)(C)
regarding covered transactions, but shall serve
no policy role on the Committee, other than to
provide analysis under subparagraphs (A) and
(C) in connection with a covered transaction.
(E) Submission to congressional intelligence
committees.--Not later than 5 days after the
completion of a review or an investigation of a
covered transaction under this subsection that
concludes action under this section, the
Director shall submit to the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate an analysis under
subparagraph (A) relating to such covered
transaction previously provided to the
Committee, including any supplements or
amendments to such analysis made by the
Director.
(F) Impact statements.--Not later than 60
days after the completion of a review or an
investigation of a covered transaction under
this subsection that concludes action under
this section, the Director shall determine
whether the covered transaction will have an
operational impact on the intelligence
community, and, if so, shall submit a report on
such impact to the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence of the House of Representatives
and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate. Each such report shall--
(i) describe the operational impact
of the covered transaction on the
intelligence community; and
(ii) describe any actions that have
been or will be taken to mitigate such
impact.
(5) Submission of additional information.--No
provision of this subsection shall be construed as
prohibiting any party to a covered transaction from
submitting additional information concerning the
transaction, including any proposed restructuring of
the transaction or any modifications to any agreements
in connection with the transaction, while any review or
investigation of the transaction is ongoing.
(6) Notice of results to parties.--The Committee
shall notify the parties to a covered transaction of
the results of a review or investigation under this
section, promptly upon completion of all action under
this section.
(7) Regulations.--Regulations prescribed under this
section shall include standard procedures for--
(A) submitting any notice of a covered
transaction to the Committee;
(B) submitting a request to withdraw a
covered transaction from review;
(C) resubmitting a notice of a covered
transaction that was previously withdrawn from
review; and
(D) providing notice of the results of a
review or investigation to the parties to the
covered transaction, upon completion of all
action under this section.
(c) Confidentiality of Information.--Any information or
documentary material filed with the President or the
President's designee pursuant to this section shall be exempt
from disclosure under section 552 of title 5, United States
Code, and no such information or documentary material may be
made public, except as may be relevant to any administrative or
judicial action or proceeding. Nothing in this subsection shall
be construed to prevent disclosure to either House of Congress
or to any duly authorized committee or subcommittee of the
Congress.
(d) Action by the President.--
(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (4), the
President may take such action for such time as the
President considers appropriate to suspend or prohibit
any covered transaction that threatens to impair the
national security of the United States.
(2) Announcement by the president.--The President
shall announce the decision on whether or not to take
action pursuant to paragraph (1) not later than 15 days
after the date on which an investigation described in
subsection (b) is completed.
(3) Enforcement.--The President may direct the
Attorney General of the United States to seek
appropriate relief, including divestment relief, in the
district courts of the United States, in order to
implement and enforce this subsection.
(4) Findings of the president.--The President may
exercise the authority conferred by paragraph (1), only
if the President finds that--
(A) there is credible evidence that leads the
President to believe that the foreign interest
exercising control might take action that
threatens to impair the national security; and
(B) provisions of law, other than this
section and the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act, do not, in the judgment of
the President, provide adequate and appropriate
authority for the President to protect the
national security in the matter before the
President.
(5) Factors to be considered.--For purposes of
determining whether to take action under paragraph (1),
the President shall consider, among other factors each
of the factors described in subsection (f), as
appropriate.
(e) Actions and Findings Nonreviewable.--The actions of the
President under paragraph (1) of subsection (d) and the
findings of the President under paragraph (4) of subsection (d)
shall not be subject to judicial review.
(f) Factors To Be Considered.--For purposes of this section,
the President or the President's designee may, taking into
account the requirements of national security, consider--
(1) domestic production needed for projected national
defense requirements,
(2) the capability and capacity of domestic
industries to meet national defense requirements,
including the availability of human resources,
products, technology, materials, and other supplies and
services,
(3) the control of domestic industries and commercial
activity by foreign citizens as it affects the
capability and capacity of the United States to meet
the requirements of national security,
(4) the potential effects of the proposed or pending
transaction on sales of military goods, equipment, or
technology to any country--
(A) identified by the Secretary of State--
(i) under section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act of 1979, as a
country that supports terrorism;
(ii) under section 6(l) of the Export
Administration Act of 1979, as a
country of concern regarding missile
proliferation; or
(iii) under section 6(m) of the
Export Administration Act of 1979, as a
country of concern regarding the
proliferation of chemical and
biological weapons;
(B) identified by the Secretary of Defense as
posing a potential regional military threat to
the interests of the United States; or
(C) listed under section 309(c) of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 on the
``Nuclear Non-Proliferation-Special Country
List'' (15 C.F.R. Part 778, Supplement No. 4)
or any successor list;
(5) the potential effects of the proposed or pending
transaction on United States international
technological leadership in areas affecting United
States national security;
(6) the potential national security-related effects
on United States critical infrastructure, including
major energy assets;
(7) the potential national security-related effects
on United States critical technologies;
(8) whether the covered transaction is a foreign
government-controlled transaction, as determined under
subsection (b)(1)(B);
(9) as appropriate, and particularly with respect to
transactions requiring an investigation under
subsection (b)(1)(B), a review of the current
assessment of--
(A) the adherence of the subject country to
nonproliferation control regimes, including
treaties and multilateral supply guidelines,
which shall draw on, but not be limited to, the
annual report on ``Adherence to and Compliance
with Arms Control, Nonproliferation and
Disarmament Agreements and Commitments''
required by section 403 of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Act;
(B) the relationship of such country with the
United States, specifically on its record on
cooperating in counter-terrorism efforts, which
shall draw on, but not be limited to, the
report of the President to Congress under
section 7120 of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004; and
(C) the potential for transshipment or
diversion of technologies with military
applications, including an analysis of national
export control laws and regulations;
(10) the long-term projection of United States
requirements for sources of energy and other critical
resources and material; and
(11) such other factors as the President or the
Committee may determine to be appropriate, generally or
in connection with a specific review or investigation.
(g) Additional Information to Congress; Confidentiality.--
(1) Briefing requirement on request.--The Committee
shall, upon request from any Member of Congress
specified in subsection (b)(3)(C)(iii), promptly
provide briefings on a covered transaction for which
all action has concluded under this section, or on
compliance with a mitigation agreement or condition
imposed with respect to such transaction, on a
classified basis, if deemed necessary by the
sensitivity of the information. Briefings under this
paragraph may be provided to the congressional staff of
such a Member of Congress having appropriate security
clearance.
(2) Application of confidentiality provisions.--
(A) In general.--The disclosure of
information under this subsection shall be
consistent with the requirements of subsection
(c). Members of Congress and staff of either
House of Congress or any committee of Congress,
shall be subject to the same limitations on
disclosure of information as are applicable
under subsection (c).
(B) Proprietary information.--Proprietary
information which can be associated with a
particular party to a covered transaction shall
be furnished in accordance with subparagraph
(A) only to a committee of Congress, and only
when the committee provides assurances of
confidentiality, unless such party otherwise
consents in writing to such disclosure.
(h) Regulations.--
(1) In general.--The President shall direct, subject
to notice and comment, the issuance of regulations to
carry out this section.
(2) Effective date.--Regulations issued under this
section shall become effective not later than 180 days
after the effective date of the Foreign Investment and
National Security Act of 2007.
(3) Content.--Regulations issued under this
subsection shall--
(A) provide for the imposition of civil
penalties for any violation of this section,
including any mitigation agreement entered into
or conditions imposed pursuant to subsection
(l);
(B) to the extent possible--
(i) minimize paperwork burdens; and
(ii) coordinate reporting
requirements under this section with
reporting requirements under any other
provision of Federal law; and
(C) provide for an appropriate role for the
Secretary of Labor with respect to mitigation
agreements.
(i) Effect on Other Law.--No provision of this section shall
be construed as altering or affecting any other authority,
process, regulation, investigation, enforcement measure, or
review provided by or established under any other provision of
Federal law, including the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act, or any other authority of the President or the
Congress under the Constitution of the United States.
(j) Technology Risk Assessments.--In any case in which an
assessment of the risk of diversion of defense critical
technology is performed by a designee of the President, a copy
of such assessment shall be provided to any other designee of
the President responsible for reviewing or investigating a
merger, acquisition, or takeover under this section.
(k) Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States.--
(1) Establishment.--The Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States, established pursuant
to Executive Order No. 11858, shall be a multi agency
committee to carry out this section and such other
assignments as the President may designate.
(2) Membership.--The Committee shall be comprised of
the following members or the designee of any such
member:
(A) The Secretary of the Treasury.
(B) The Secretary of Homeland Security.
(C) The Secretary of Commerce.
(D) The Secretary of Defense.
(E) The Secretary of State.
(F) The Attorney General of the United
States.
(G) The Secretary of Energy.
(H) The Secretary of Labor (nonvoting, ex
officio).
(I) The Director of National Intelligence
(nonvoting, ex officio).
(J) The heads of any other executive
department, agency, or office, as the President
determines appropriate, generally or on a case-
by-case basis.
(3) Chairperson.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall
serve as the chairperson of the Committee.
(4) Assistant secretary for the department of the
treasury.--There shall be established an additional
position of Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, who
shall be appointed by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate. The Assistant
Secretary appointed under this paragraph shall report
directly to the Undersecretary of the Treasury for
International Affairs. The duties of the Assistant
Secretary shall include duties related to the Committee
on Foreign Investment in the United States, as
delegated by the Secretary of the Treasury under this
section.
(5) Designation of lead agency.--The Secretary of the
Treasury shall designate, as appropriate, a member or
members of the Committee to be the lead agency or
agencies on behalf of the Committee--
(A) for each covered transaction, and for
negotiating any mitigation agreements or other
conditions necessary to protect national
security; and
(B) for all matters related to the monitoring
of the completed transaction, to ensure
compliance with such agreements or conditions
and with this section.
(6) Other members.--The chairperson shall consult
with the heads of such other Federal departments,
agencies, and independent establishments in any review
or investigation under subsection (a), as the
chairperson determines to be appropriate, on the basis
of the facts and circumstances of the covered
transaction under review or investigation (or the
designee of any such department or agency head).
(7) Meetings.--The Committee shall meet upon the
direction of the President or upon the call of the
chairperson, without regard to section 552b of title 5,
United States Code (if otherwise applicable).
(l) Mitigation, Tracking, and Postconsummation Monitoring and
Enforcement.--
(1) Mitigation.--
(A) In general.--The Committee or a lead
agency may, on behalf of the Committee,
negotiate, enter into or impose, and enforce
any agreement or condition with any party to
the covered transaction in order to mitigate
any threat to the national security of the
United States that arises as a result of the
covered transaction.
(B) Risk-based analysis required.--Any
agreement entered into or condition imposed
under subparagraph (A) shall be based on a
risk-based analysis, conducted by the
Committee, of the threat to national security
of the covered transaction.
(2) Tracking authority for withdrawn notices.--
(A) In general.--If any written notice of a
covered transaction that was submitted to the
Committee under this section is withdrawn
before any review or investigation by the
Committee under subsection (b) is completed,
the Committee shall establish, as appropriate--
(i) interim protections to address
specific concerns with such transaction
that have been raised in connection
with any such review or investigation
pending any resubmission of any written
notice under this section with respect
to such transaction and further action
by the President under this section;
(ii) specific time frames for
resubmitting any such written notice;
and
(iii) a process for tracking any
actions that may be taken by any party
to the transaction, in connection with
the transaction, before the notice
referred to in clause (ii) is
resubmitted.
(B) Designation of agency.--The lead agency,
other than any entity of the intelligence
community (as defined in the National Security
Act of 1947), shall, on behalf of the
Committee, ensure that the requirements of
subparagraph (A) with respect to any covered
transaction that is subject to such
subparagraph are met.
(3) Negotiation, modification, monitoring, and
enforcement.--
(A) Designation of lead agency.--The lead
agency shall negotiate, modify, monitor, and
enforce, on behalf of the Committee, any
agreement entered into or condition imposed
under paragraph (1) with respect to a covered
transaction, based on the expertise with and
knowledge of the issues related to such
transaction on the part of the designated
department or agency. Nothing in this paragraph
shall prohibit other departments or agencies in
assisting the lead agency in carrying out the
purposes of this paragraph.
(B) Reporting by designated agency.--
(i) Modification reports.--The lead
agency in connection with any agreement
entered into or condition imposed with
respect to a covered transaction
shall--
(I) provide periodic reports
to the Committee on any
material modification to any
such agreement or condition
imposed with respect to the
transaction; and
(II) ensure that any material
modification to any such
agreement or condition is
reported to the Director of
National Intelligence, the
Attorney General of the United
States, and any other Federal
department or agency that may
have a material interest in
such modification.
(ii) Compliance.--The Committee shall
develop and agree upon methods for
evaluating compliance with any
agreement entered into or condition
imposed with respect to a covered
transaction that will allow the
Committee to adequately assure
compliance, without--
(I) unnecessarily diverting
Committee resources from
assessing any new covered
transaction for which a written
notice has been filed pursuant
to subsection (b)(1)(C), and if
necessary, reaching a
mitigation agreement with or
imposing a condition on a party
to such covered transaction or
any covered transaction for
which a review has been
reopened for any reason; or
(II) placing unnecessary
burdens on a party to a covered
transaction.
(m) Annual Report to Congress.--
(1) In general.--The chairperson shall transmit a
report to the chairman and ranking member of the
committee of jurisdiction in the Senate and the House
of Representatives, before July 31 of each year on all
of the reviews and investigations of covered
transactions completed under subsection (b) during the
12-month period covered by the report.
(2) Contents of report relating to covered
transactions.--The annual report under paragraph (1)
shall contain the following information, with respect
to each covered transaction, for the reporting period:
(A) A list of all notices filed and all
reviews or investigations completed during the
period, with basic information on each party to
the transaction, the nature of the business
activities or products of all pertinent
persons, along with information about any
withdrawal from the process, and any decision
or action by the President under this section.
(B) Specific, cumulative, and, as
appropriate, trend information on the numbers
of filings, investigations, withdrawals, and
decisions or actions by the President under
this section.
(C) Cumulative and, as appropriate, trend
information on the business sectors involved in
the filings which have been made, and the
countries from which the investments have
originated.
(D) Information on whether companies that
withdrew notices to the Committee in accordance
with subsection (b)(1)(C)(ii) have later
refiled such notices, or, alternatively,
abandoned the transaction.
(E) The types of security arrangements and
conditions the Committee has used to mitigate
national security concerns about a transaction,
including a discussion of the methods that the
Committee and any lead agency are using to
determine compliance with such arrangements or
conditions.
(F) A detailed discussion of all perceived
adverse effects of covered transactions on the
national security or critical infrastructure of
the United States that the Committee will take
into account in its deliberations during the
period before delivery of the next report, to
the extent possible.
(3) Contents of report relating to critical
technologies.--
(A) In general.--In order to assist Congress
in its oversight responsibilities with respect
to this section, the President and such
agencies as the President shall designate shall
include in the annual report submitted under
paragraph (1)--
(i) an evaluation of whether there is
credible evidence of a coordinated
strategy by 1 or more countries or
companies to acquire United States
companies involved in research,
development, or production of critical
technologies for which the United
States is a leading producer; and
(ii) an evaluation of whether there
are industrial espionage activities
directed or directly assisted by
foreign governments against private
United States companies aimed at
obtaining commercial secrets related to
critical technologies.
(B) Release of unclassified study.--All
appropriate portions of the annual report under
paragraph (1) may be classified. An
unclassified version of the report, as
appropriate, consistent with safeguarding
national security and privacy, shall be made
available to the public.
(n) Certification of Notices and Assurances.--Each notice,
and any followup information, submitted under this section and
regulations prescribed under this section to the President or
the Committee by a party to a covered transaction, and any
information submitted by any such party in connection with any
action for which a report is required pursuant to paragraph
(3)(B) of subsection (l), with respect to the implementation of
any mitigation agreement or condition described in paragraph
(1)(A) of subsection (l), or any material change in
circumstances, shall be accompanied by a written statement by
the chief executive officer or the designee of the person
required to submit such notice or information certifying that,
to the best of the knowledge and belief of that person--
(1) the notice or information submitted fully
complies with the requirements of this section or such
regulation, agreement, or condition; and
(2) the notice or information is accurate and
complete in all material respects.
* * * * * * *
----------
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 2002
* * * * * * *
TITLE IX--COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
* * * * * * *
SEC. 902. [NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE] DIRECTOR OF THE
NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY CENTER.
[(a) Establishment.--(1) There shall be a National
Counterintelligence Executive, who shall be appointed by the
Director of National Intelligence.
[(2) It is the sense of Congress that the Director of
National Intelligence should seek the views of the Attorney
General, Secretary of Defense, and Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency in selecting an individual for appointment
as the Executive.]
(a) Establishment.--There shall be a Director of the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center (referred to in this
section as ``the Director''), who shall be appointed by the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
(b) Mission.--The mission of the [National
Counterintelligence Executive] Director of the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center shall be to serve as
the head of national counterintelligence for the United States
Government.
(c) Duties.--Subject to the direction and control of the
Director of National Intelligence, the duties of the [National
Counterintelligence Executive] Director of the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center are as follows:
(1) To carry out the mission referred to in
subsection (b).
(2) To act as chairperson of the National
Counterintelligence Policy Board under section 811 of
the Counterintelligence and Security Enhancements Act
of 1994 (title VIII of Public Law 103-359; 50 U.S.C.
402a), as amended by section 903 of this Act.
(3) To act as head of the [Office of the National
Counterintelligence Executive] National
Counterintelligence and Security Center under section
904.
(4) To participate as an observer on such boards,
committees, and entities of the executive branch as the
Director of National Intelligence considers appropriate
for the discharge of the mission and functions of the
Executive and the [Office of the National
Counterintelligence Executive] National
Counterintelligence and Security Center under section
904.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 904. [OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE]
NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY CENTER.
(a) Establishment.--There shall be an [Office of the National
Counterintelligence Executive] National Counterintelligence and
Security Center.
(b) Head [of Office] Center.--The [National
Counterintelligence Executive] Director of the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center shall be the head of
the [Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive]
National Counterintelligence and Security Center.
(c) Location [of Office] Center.--The [Office of the National
Counterintelligence Executive] National Counterintelligence and
Security Center shall be located in the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence.
(d) Functions.--Subject to the direction and control of the
[National Counterintelligence Executive] Director of the
National Counterintelligence and Security Center, the functions
of the [Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive]
National Counterintelligence and Security Center shall be as
follows:
(1) National threat identification and prioritization
assessment.--Subject to subsection (e), in consultation
with appropriate department and agencies of the United
States Government, and private sector entities, to
produce a strategic planning assessment of the
counterintelligence requirements of the United States
to be known as the National Threat Identification and
Prioritization Assessment.
(2) National counterintelligence strategy.--
(A) Requirement to produce.--Subject to
subsection (e), in consultation with
appropriate department and agencies of the
United States Government, and private sector
entities, and based on the most current
National Threat Identification and
Prioritization Assessment under paragraph (1),
to produce a strategy for the
counterintelligence programs and activities of
the United States Government to be known as the
National Counterintelligence Strategy.
(B) Revision and requirement.--The National
Counterintelligence Strategy shall be revised
or updated at least once every three years and
shall be aligned with the strategy and policies
of the Director of National Intelligence.
(3) Implementation of national counterintelligence
strategy.--To evaluate on an ongoing basis the
implementation of the National Counterintelligence
Strategy and to submit to the President periodic
reports on such evaluation, including a discussion of
any shortfalls in the implementation of the Strategy
and recommendations for remedies for such shortfalls.
(4) National counterintelligence strategic
analyses.--As directed by the Director of National
Intelligence and in consultation with appropriate
elements of the departments and agencies of the United
States Government, to oversee and coordinate the
production of strategic analyses of counterintelligence
matters, including the production of
counterintelligence damage assessments and assessments
of lessons learned from counterintelligence activities.
(5) National counterintelligence program budget.--In
consultation with the Director of National
Intelligence--
(A) to coordinate the development of budgets
and resource allocation plans for the
counterintelligence programs and activities of
the Department of Defense, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, the Central Intelligence
Agency, and other appropriate elements of the
United States Government;
(B) to ensure that the budgets and resource
allocation plans developed under subparagraph
(A) address the objectives and priorities for
counterintelligence under the National
Counterintelligence Strategy; and
(C) to submit to the National Security
Council periodic reports on the activities
undertaken [by the Office] by the Center under
subparagraphs (A) and (B).
(6) National counterintelligence collection and
targeting coordination.--To develop priorities for
counterintelligence investigations and operations, and
for collection of counterintelligence, for purposes of
the National Counterintelligence Strategy, except [that
the Office] that the Center may not--
(A) carry out any counterintelligence
investigations or operations; or
(B) establish its own contacts, or carry out
its own activities, with foreign intelligence
services.
(7) National counterintelligence outreach, watch, and
warning.--
(A) Counterintelligence vulnerability
surveys.--To carry out and coordinate surveys
of the vulnerability of the United States
Government, and the private sector, to
intelligence threats in order to identify the
areas, programs, and activities that require
protection from such threats.
(B) Outreach.--To carry out and coordinate
outreach programs and activities on
counterintelligence to other elements of the
United States Government, and the private
sector, and to coordinate the dissemination to
the public of warnings on intelligence threats
to the United States.
(C) Research and development.--To ensure that
research and development programs and
activities of the United States Government, and
the private sector, direct attention to the
needs of the counterintelligence community for
technologies, products, and services.
(D) Training and professional development.--
To develop policies and standards for training
and professional development of individuals
engaged in counterintelligence activities and
to manage the conduct of joint training
exercises for such personnel.
(e) Additional Requirements Regarding National Threat
Identification and Prioritization Assessment and National
Counterintelligence Strategy.--(1) A National Threat
Identification and Prioritization Assessment under subsection
(d)(1), and any modification of such assessment, shall not go
into effect until approved by the President.
(2) A National Counterintelligence Strategy under subsection
(d)(2), and any modification of such strategy, shall not go
into effect until approved by the President.
(3) The [National Counterintelligence Executive] Director of
the National Counterintelligence and Security Center shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees each
National Threat Identification and Prioritization Assessment,
or modification thereof, and each National Counterintelligence
Strategy, or modification thereof, approved under this section.
(4) In this subsection, the term ``congressional intelligence
committees'' means--
(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate; and
(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of
the House of Representatives.
(f) Personnel.--(1) Personnel of the [Office of the National
Counterintelligence Executive] National Counterintelligence and
Security Center may consist of personnel employed [by the
Office] by the Center or personnel on detail from any other
department, agency, or element of the Federal Government. Any
such detail may be on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis,
at the election of the head of the agency detailing such
personnel.
(2) Notwithstanding section 104(d) or any other provision of
law limiting the period of the detail of personnel on a
nonreimbursable basis, the detail of an officer or employee of
United States or a member of the Armed Forces under paragraph
(1) on a nonreimbursable basis may be for any period in excess
of one year that the [National Counterintelligence Executive]
Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security
Center and the head of the department, agency, or element
concerned consider appropriate.
(g) Treatment of Activities Under Certain Administrative
Laws.--The files [of the Office] of the Center shall be treated
as operational files of the Central Intelligence Agency for
purposes of section 701 of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 431) to the extent such files meet criteria under
subsection (b) of that section for treatment of files as
operational files of an element of the Agency.
(h) Oversight by Congress.--The location [of the Office] of
the Center of the [National Counterintelligence Executive]
Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security
Center within the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence shall not be construed as affecting access by
Congress, or any committee of Congress, to--
(1) any information, document, record, or paper in
the possession [of the Office] of the Center; or
(2) any personnel [of the Office] of the Center.
(i) Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be construed
as affecting the authority of the Director of National
Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State,
the Attorney General, or the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation as provided or specified under the National
Security Act of 1947 or under other provisions of law.
* * * * * * *
----------
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY ENHANCEMENTS ACT OF 1994
* * * * * * *
TITLE VIII--COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY
* * * * * * *
SEC. 811. COORDINATION OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
(a) Establishment of Counterintelligence Policy Board.--There
is established within the executive branch of Government a
National Counterintelligence Policy Board (in this section
referred to as the ``Board''). The Board shall report to the
President through the National Security Council.
(b) Chairperson.--[The National Counterintelligence
Executive] The Director of the National Counterintelligence and
Security Center under section 902 of the Counterintelligence
Enhancement Act of 2002 shall serve as the chairperson of the
Board.
(c) Membership.--The membership of the National
Counterintelligence Policy Board shall consist of the
following:
(1) [The National Counterintelligence Executive] The
Director of the National Counterintelligence and
Security Center.
(2) Senior personnel of departments and elements of
the United States Government, appointed by the head of
the department or element concerned, as follows:
(A) The Department of Justice, including the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(B) The Department of Defense, including the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
(C) The Department of State.
(D) The Department of Energy.
(E) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(F) Any other department, agency, or element
of the United States Government specified by
the President.
(d) Functions and Discharge of Functions.--(1) The Board
shall--
(A) serve as the principal mechanism for--
(i) developing policies and
procedures for the approval of the
President to govern the conduct of
counterintelligence activities; and
(ii) upon the direction of the
President, resolving conflicts that
arise between elements of the
Government conducting such activities;
and
(B) act as an interagency working group to--
(i) ensure the discussion and review
of matters relating to the
implementation of the
Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of
2002; and
(ii) provide advice [to the National
Counterintelligence Executive] to the
Director of the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center
on priorities in the implementation of
the National Counterintelligence
Strategy produced by the [Office of the
National Counterintelligence Executive]
National Counterintelligence and
Security Center under section 904(e)(2)
of that Act.
(2) The Board may, for purposes of carrying out its
functions under this section, establish such
interagency boards and working groups as the Board
considers appropriate.
(e) Coordination of Counterintelligence Matters With the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.--(1) Except as provided in
paragraph (5), the head of each department or agency within the
executive branch shall ensure that--
(A) the Federal Bureau of Investigation is advised
immediately of any information, regardless of its
origin, which indicates that classified information is
being, or may have been, disclosed in an unauthorized
manner to a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
power;
(B) following a report made pursuant to subparagraph
(A), the Federal Bureau of Investigation is consulted
with respect to all subsequent actions which may be
undertaken by the department or agency concerned to
determine the source of such loss or compromise; and
(C) where, after appropriate consultation with the
department or agency concerned, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation undertakes investigative activities to
determine the source of the loss or compromise, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation is given complete and
timely access to the employees and records of the
department or agency concerned for purposes of such
investigative activities.
(2) Except as provided in paragraph (5), the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation shall ensure that espionage
information obtained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
pertaining to the personnel, operations, or information of
departments or agencies of the executive branch, is provided
through appropriate channels in a timely manner to the
department or agency concerned, and that such departments or
agencies are consulted in a timely manner with respect to
espionage investigations undertaken by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation which involve the personnel, operations, or
information of such department or agency.
(3)(A) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
shall submit to the head of the department or agency concerned
a written assessment of the potential impact of the actions of
the department or agency on a counterintelligence
investigation.
(B) The head of the department or agency concerned shall--
(i) use an assessment under subparagraph (A) as an
aid in determining whether, and under what
circumstances, the subject of an investigation under
paragraph (1) should be left in place for investigative
purposes; and
(ii) notify in writing the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation of such determination.
(C) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
the head of the department or agency concerned shall continue
to consult, as appropriate, to review the status of an
investigation covered by this paragraph, and to reassess, as
appropriate, a determination of the head of the department or
agency concerned to leave a subject in place for investigative
purposes.
(4)(A) The Federal Bureau of Investigation shall notify
appropriate officials within the executive branch, including
the head of the department or agency concerned, of the
commencement of a full field espionage investigation with
respect to an employee within the executive branch.
(B) A department or agency may not conduct a polygraph
examination, interrogate, or otherwise take any action that is
likely to alert an employee covered by a notice under
subparagraph (A) of an investigation described in that
subparagraph without prior coordination and consultation with
the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(5) Where essential to meet extraordinary circumstances
affecting vital national security interests of the United
States, the President may on a case-by-case basis waive the
requirements of paragraph (1), (2), or (3), as they apply to
the head of a particular department or agency, or the Director
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Such waiver shall be in
writing and shall fully state the justification for such
waiver. Within thirty days, the President shall notify the
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives that such waiver has been issued, and at that
time or as soon as national security considerations permit,
provide these committees with a complete explanation of the
circumstances which necessitated such waiver.
(6) Nothing in this section may be construed to alter the
existingjurisdictional arrangements between the Federal Bureau
of Investigationand the Department of Defense with respect to
investigationsof persons subject to the Uniform Code of
Military Justice,nor to impose additional reporting
requirements upon the Departmentof Defense with respect to such
investigations beyondthose required by existing law and
executive branch policy.
(7) As used in this section, the terms ``foreign power'' and
``agent of a foreign power'' have the same meanings as set
forth in sections 101 (a) and (b), respectively, of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801).
* * * * * * *
----------
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004
* * * * * * *
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
* * * * * * *
Subtitle C--Counterintelligence
SEC. 341. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES FOR THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.
(a) In General.--(1) Title XI of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end
the following new section:
* * * * * * *
(2) The table of contents contained in the first section of
such Act is amended in the items relating to title XI by adding
at the end the following new item:
* * * * * * *''.
(b) Intelligence and National Security Aspects of Espionage
Prosecutions.--The Attorney General, acting through the
Assistant Attorney General for National Security, and in
consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, acting
through the [Office of the National Counterintelligence
Executive] National Counterintelligence and Security Center,
shall establish policies and procedures to assist the Attorney
General in the consideration of intelligence and national
security-related equities in the development of charging
documents and related pleadings in espionage prosecutions.
* * * * * * *
----------
TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE
* * * * * * *
SUBTITLE A--GENERAL MILITARY LAW
* * * * * * *
PART I--ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL MILITARY POWERS
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 4--OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
* * * * * * *
Sec. 142. Chief Information Officer
(a) There is a Chief Information Officer of the Department of
Defense.
(b)(1) The Chief Information Officer of the Department of
Defense--
(A) is the Chief Information Officer of the
Department of Defense for the purposes of sections
3506(a)(2) and 3544(a)(3) of title 44;
(B) has the responsibilities and duties specified in
section 11315 of title 40[;]; and
(C) has the responsibilities specified for the Chief
Information Officer in sections 2222, 2223(a), and 2224
of this title[; and].
[(D) exercises authority, direction, and control over
the Information Assurance Directorate of the National
Security Agency.]
(2) The Chief Information Officer shall perform such
additional duties and exercise such powers as the Secretary of
Defense may prescribe.
(c) The Chief Information Officer takes precedence in the
Department of Defense with the officials serving in positions
specified in section 131(b)(4) of this title. The officials
serving in positions specified in section 131(b)(4) and the
Chief Information Officer of the Department of Defense take
precedence among themselves in the order prescribed by the
Secretary of Defense.
* * * * * * *
Disclosure of Directed Rule Making
H.R. 5077 does not specifically direct any rule makings
within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. 551.
Duplication of Federal Programs
H.R. 5077 does not duplicate or reauthorize an established
program of the Federal Government known to be duplicative of
another Federal program, a program that was included in any
report from the Government Accountability Office to Congress
pursuant to section 21 of Public Law 111-139, or a program
related to a program identified in the most recent Catalog of
Federal Domestic Assistance.
MINORITY VIEWS
The Intelligence Committee advanced the bipartisan
Intelligence Authorization Act (IAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2017
by unanimous voice vote.
The annual IAA ensures that the programs and activities of
the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC), including Department of
Defense (DoD) intelligence elements, are authorized in law and
optimally resourced to protect the nation from threats at home
and abroad. Equally important, this critical piece of
legislation also ensures rigorous congressional oversight of
the IC, including over its most sensitive aspects.
This year's IAA is comprehensive, detailed, and
thoughtfully-considered. It authorizes intelligence funding in
the Base budget at a level nearly equal to the FY17 President's
Budget request, which is approximately the same as the FY16
enacted budget level. The Overseas Contingency Operations
authorization is roughly 1.5% above the request.
The bill provides substantial and appropriate oversight of
the IC by trimming unnecessary funding and reprioritizing
resource allocation; adding money to underfunded programs; and
providing congressional direction to improve processes, gain
efficiencies, and ensure greater transparency and
accountability within the IC. It also fences significant
amounts of funding to better ensure continuous IC
accountability throughout the year.
Specifically, the FY17 IAA:
a. Emphasizes the need to focus on long-term threats,
such as those from an increasingly aggressive China,
Russia, and North Korea, while maintaining focus on the
immediate threats posed by terrorism and the security
challenges in the Middle East, North Africa, and South
Asia;
b. Protects our most vital capabilities, whether in
space, cyberspace, on land or at sea, as well as our
most invaluable resources--our IC professionals--
against growing threats across domains;
c. Leverages and promotes commercial capabilities,
while investing in the most advanced technologies that
do not yet have commercial application;
d. Promotes greater capacity-building among key
partners and allies to further leverage shared
resources and competencies, and advances more strategic
approaches to these efforts;
e. Emphasizes the importance of recruiting,
developing, and retaining the most effective and
diverse workforce to answer the increasingly complex
challenges facing the IC and the defense intelligence
enterprise;
f. Continues to support HUMINT, a critical
intelligence mission;
g. Promotes, through resources and direction,
enhanced cyber security for our nation's most critical
systems; and
h. Ensures thorough oversight of surveillance
capabilities.
In light of whistleblower allegations that intelligence was
inappropriately influenced or distorted at CENTCOM, this year's
bill also includes provisions aimed at better ensuring the
integrity of DoD intelligence analysis. Additionally, this
year's IAA improves the procedure for IC whistleblowers to
report complaints to Congress.
The Minority remains committed to a strong counterterrorism
posture, but also to a more transparent one. Accordingly, the
Minority reiterates the need for the release of substantial
data on the total number of combatants and noncombatant
civilians who may have been killed or injured as a result of
counterterrorism action. Ranking Member Schiff continues to
highlight this issue within the Committee and to the
Administration.
The Minority is pleased that the IAA fully funds and, for
the first time, specifically authorizes the activities of the
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), an entity
tasked with ensuring that U.S. counterterrorism programs
advance national security while appropriately safeguarding
civil liberties. However, the Minority will remain vigilant to
ensure that the Committee does not seek to constrain PCLOB
authorities in the future--particularly in light of last year's
provision to curtail its jurisdiction over U.S. Covert Action
programs, which this year Representative Himes tried to reverse
through an amendment. The Minority continues to demonstrate its
strong support for this important and independent body, and to
oppose efforts to limit is role in overseeing counterterrorism
activities.
Unlike last year's IAA, this year's bill omits odious
transfer restrictions from the detention center at Guantanamo
Bay. This year's IAA, however, calls for a declassification
review of certain intelligence products regarding terrorist
acts committed by transferred detainees before their arrival at
Guantanamo Bay. The only detainees covered by the
declassification provision, however, are those transferred
since President Obama took office, disregarding the roughly 500
detainees transferred or released by the prior administration--
detainees whose recidivism rates generally remain far higher
than any transferred or released under President Obama.
Additionally, this year's IAA unfortunately does not fund
the President's request to enhance intelligence analysis on the
serious national security implications of climate change. Food
and water scarcity, and vast population displacement, are
inevitable features of unchecked climate change and therefore
will prove to be tremendous drivers of global instability,
which the IC needs to better anticipate and understand.
Despite these specific weaknesses, the House Intelligence
Committee reached bipartisan agreement on this year's IAA,
which includes several key provisions championed by Minority
Members, including:
a. Mr. Himes's provision to improve the timeliness
and fairness of the prepublication review process
throughout the IC, by calling for uniform guidance to
ensure that reviews only block publication of
appropriately classified material, and that employees
at each IC element receive impartial and expeditious
reviews of their works;
b. Ms. Sewell's language on investment in ``Centers
of Academic Excellence'' programs, helping to guarantee
that a diverse array of students can take part in IC
internships, and her requirement to collect data to
evaluate the IC's federally-funded academic programs;
c. Mr. Carson's provision requiring the IC to publish
insignia commonly associated with terrorist
organizations to assist public and private entities in
swiftly removing terrorist content online; his
provision on cooperation and de-confliction between the
departments of Homeland Security and State regarding
countering violent extremism programs; and his
requirement to have the Committee receive information
on the operational impacts of foreign investment in the
United States;
d. Ms. Speier's provisions to: (a) standardize
declassification photocopying fees across the IC to
promote increased availability of information and
enhance transparency; (b) expand access to graduate
education programs at the Defense Intelligence Agency,
(c) obtain information on the mental health resilience
programs available to IC civilians returning from tours
in combat zones; and (d) study reprisals taken against
IC contractors who make disclosures that would be
legally protected if made by IC employees;
e. Mr. Quigley's language to continue support to
security services in Ukraine;
f. Mr. Swalwell's provision to track foreign
fighters, his requirement to analyze the status of loan
forgiveness and debt counseling programs in the IC, and
his provision to better understand how the departments
of Homeland Security and Energy take advantage of the
expertise resident at our National Labs; and
g. Mr. Murphy's provisions to: (a) provide a report
detailing cybersecurity threats to, or vulnerabilities
in, systems employed by seaports and transshipment
hubs, including efforts to improve our preparedness and
response to a cyber attack; (b) improve intelligence
reporting with respect to Iran's compliance with the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action; and (c) requires a
report on the security threats emanating from maritime
smuggling routes and ways to better cooperate with
other nations to mitigate these threats.
The Minority strongly supports this year's Intelligence
Authorization Act. It will further ensure that the IC,
including DoD's intelligence components, are appropriately
resourced and authorized to address an increasingly complex
security environment, while safeguarding civil liberties and
privacy.
Adam B. Schiff,
Ranking Member.
Luis V. Gutierrez.
James A. Himes.
Terri A. Sewell.
Andre Carson.
Jackie Speier.
Mike Quigley.
Eric Swalwell.
Patrick Murphy.
