114th Congress
1st Session SENATE Report
114-8
_______________________________________________________________________
R E P O R T
of the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE
COVERING THE PERIOD
JANUARY 3, 2013
to
JANUARY 5, 2015
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
March 31, 2015.--Ordered to be printed
Filed under authority of the order of the Senate of March 27
(legislative day, March 26) 2015
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina, Chairman
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Vice Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho RON WYDEN, Oregon
DANIEL COATS, Indiana BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland
MARCO RUBIO, Florida MARK R. WARNER, Virginia
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
ROY BLUNT, Missouri ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
TOM COTTON, Arkansas
Mitch McConnell, Kentucky, Ex Officio Member
Harry Reid, Nevada, Ex Officio Member
John McCain, Arizona, Ex Officio Member
Jack Reed, Rhode Island, Ex Officio Member
Chris Joyner, Jack Livingston, Staff Directors
David Grannis, Minority Staff Director
Desiree T. Sayle, Chief Clerk
During the period covered by this report, the composition of the Select
Committee on Intelligence was as follows:
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Chairman
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia, Vice Chairman
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
Virginia JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
RON WYDEN, Oregon DANIEL COATS, Indiana
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland MARCO RUBIO, Florida
MARK UDALL, Colorado SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
MARK R. WARNER, Virginia TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
Harry Reid, Nevada, Ex Officio Member
Mitch McConnell, Kentucky, Ex Officio Member
Carl Levin, Michigan, Ex Officio Member
James M. Inhofe, Oklahoma, Ex Officio Member
David Grannis, Staff Director
Martha Scott Poindexter, Jack Livingston, Minority Staff Directors
Desiree T. Sayle, Chief Clerk
PREFACE
The Select Committee on Intelligence submits to the Senate
this report on its activities from January 3, 2013, to January
5, 2015. This report also includes references to activities
underway at the conclusion of the 113th Congress that the
Committee expects to continue into the future.
Under the provisions of Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th
Congress, the Committee is charged with the responsibility of
carrying out oversight of the programs and activities of the
Intelligence Community (IC) of the United States. Most of the
Committee's oversight work is conducted in secret and cannot be
discussed publicly to protect sensitive IC sources and methods.
Nevertheless, the Select Committee on Intelligence has
submitted activities reports on a biennial basis since 1977 to
provide the American public with information about its
intelligence oversight activities. We submit this report to the
Senate, in observance of this practice.
We also take this opportunity to thank all of the members
of the Committee in the 113th Congress. In particular, we take
special note of those of our colleagues who have completed
their service on the Committee. Senator Chambliss served on the
Committee from the 108th Congress until he retired from the
U.S. Senate at the end of the 113th Congress, which included
his service as Vice Chairman during the 112th and 113th
Congresses. Senator Coburn served on the Committee during the
111th Congress and during the 113th Congress. He retired from
the U.S. Senate at the end of the 113th Congress. Senator Levin
served on the Committee from the 105th Congress until he
retired from the U.S. Senate at the end of the 113th Congress.
He served as a voting member during the 105th-109th Congresses
and, in his capacity as Chairman of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, served as an Ex Officio (non-voting) member of the
Committee during the 110th-113th Congresses. Senator
Rockefeller served on the Committee from the 107th Congress
until he retired from the U.S. Senate at the end of the 113th
Congress. He served as Vice Chairman during the 108th and 109th
Congresses and as Chairman during the 110th Congress. Senator
Udall served on the Committee during the 112th and 113th
Congresses. Their tireless commitment to the important work of
the Committee has helped to ensure a strong IC and a secure
nation. We are grateful for their efforts.
We also express our deep gratitude for the work of all
members of the Committee's staff during the 113th Congress.
Their vigilance and professionalism were essential to the
Committee's fulfillment of its oversight obligations.
Richard Burr,
Chairman.
Dianne Feinstein,
Vice Chairman.
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Preface.......................................................... III
I. Introduction.....................................................1
II. Legislation......................................................2
A. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014..... 2
B. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015..... 3
C. FISA Improvements Act of 2013........................... 5
D. Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2014........... 6
III. Oversight Activities.............................................7
A. Hearings................................................ 7
1. Worldwide Threat Hearings........................... 7
2. Implementation of FISA Authorities.................. 8
3. Cybersecurity....................................... 9
4. The Arab Spring and the Arab World.................. 9
5. Iraq/Syria.......................................... 9
6. Afghanistan/Pakistan................................ 9
7. Iran................................................ 10
8. China............................................... 10
B. Inquiries and Reviews................................... 10
1. GStudy of the Central Intelligence Agency's
Detention and Interrogation Program.................... 10
2. GReview of the Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Facilities
in Benghazi, Libya, September 11-12, 2012.............. 12
3. Intelligence Collection Review...................... 12
C. Intelligence Community Issues........................... 13
1. ODNI Response to Insider Threats.................... 13
2. ODNI Strategic Human Capital Management............. 14
3. GComptroller General Access to Intelligence
Community Information.................................. 14
4. National Security Threat Assessments................ 15
5. Intelligence Community Information Technology
Enterprise............................................. 15
6. Role of the IC to Prevent Surprise for Policymakers. 15
7. Security Clearance Reform........................... 16
8. GDefense Clandestine Service and the Defense
Intelligence
Agency................................................. 16
9. GOversight of the Intelligence Community's Financial
Intelligence Efforts................................... 16
10. Oversight of Intelligence Community Counterterrorism
Efforts................................................ 17
11. Covert Action....................................... 17
12. Impact of Sequester on the IC....................... 17
13. Space Launch........................................ 18
14. GEOINT Commission................................... 18
15. Over-Classification Reform.......................... 18
D. Audits.................................................. 19
1. Whistleblowers and Matters of Urgent Concern........ 19
2. Inspectors General.................................. 19
3. Accounting Standards and Auditability............... 19
4. Future Ground Architecture Study.................... 19
5. GIC IG, DOJ IG, and DHS IG Review of National
Counterterrorism and Intelligence Centers.............. 20
IV. Nominations.....................................................20
A. John O. Brennan......................................... 20
B. John P. Carlin.......................................... 21
C. Daniel B. Smith......................................... 21
D. Caroline D. Krass....................................... 21
E. Francis X. Taylor....................................... 22
F. Nicholas J. Rasmussen................................... 22
V. Support to the Senate...........................................22
VI. Appendix........................................................23
A. Summary of Committee Actions............................ 23
1. Number of meetings.................................. 23
2. Bills and resolutions originated by the Committee... 23
3. Bills referred to the Committee..................... 23
4. Committee publications.............................. 23
VII. Additional Views................................................25
1. Additional Views of Senator Ron Wyden............... 25
114th Congress } { Report
SENATE
1st Session } { 114-8
======================================================================
COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES
_______
March 31, 2015.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Burr, from the Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
I. INTRODUCTION
The activities of the Committee during the 113th Congress
comprised passage of critical enabling legislation,
confirmation of appointees to key intelligence leadership
posts, conducting inquiries and reviews on the performance and
activities of the Intelligence Community (IC), and fulfillment
of many other oversight activities.
As described in part II of this report, the Committee's
paramount legislative priority in the 113th Congress was
enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Acts for Fiscal
Years 2014 and 2015. The Committee has now enacted six
consecutive intelligence authorization bills, following a lapse
in the enactment of intelligence authorization bills for fiscal
years 2006 through 2009.
The Committee also dedicated considerable effort to
improving the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
(FISA) and other laws pertinent to intelligence collection
activities, as reflected by the Committee's passage of the FISA
Improvements Act of 2013 (S. 1631).
Through extensive hearings and discussions, the Committee
also recognized the need to improve the sharing of information
about cybersecurity threats by both the government and private
sector. As a result, the Committee favorably reported out the
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2014 (S. 2588).
During the 113th Congress, the Committee routinely inquired
into the IC's efforts to implement new information security
measures aimed at mitigating the damaging revelations by former
NSA contractor Edward Snowden. Notably, in the 113th Congress,
the Committee completed comprehensive inquiries into, and
published reports on, the CIA's Detention and Interrogation
Program, and the terrorist attacks on U.S. facilities in
Benghazi, Libya, in September of 2012. Finally, by means of
hearings, staff briefings, site visits, and other interactions
with the IC, the Committee exercised oversight of the IC's
performance relative to national security challenges in
Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan.
II. LEGISLATION
A. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014
In the 113th Congress, the Committee emphasized continued
enactment of annual intelligence authorization acts.
The Committee's budget monitors evaluated fiscal year 2014
National Intelligence Program (NIP) and Military Intelligence
Program (MIP) budget requests submitted by the President.
The intelligence agencies covered by the annual budget
reviews included the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency
(NSA), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), the
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the intelligence
capabilities of the military services and the U.S. Coast Guard,
as well as the intelligence-related components of the Federal
Bureau of Intelligence (FBI), the Departments of State,
Treasury, Energy, and Homeland Security (DHS), and the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA).
As part of its review, the Committee received testimony
from senior IC officials in closed hearings. Additionally,
Committee staff budget monitors evaluated detailed classified
budget justifications submitted by the Executive Branch. Based
on those reviews, the Committee prepared a classified annex to
its annual authorization bill and report. This annex contained
a classified schedule of authorizations and classified
direction to IC elements.
The Committee also reviewed the Administration's
legislative proposals for the public part of the fiscal year
2014 bill, which included new or amended legislative authority
requested by the IC.
The Committee completed work on an intelligence
authorization bill for fiscal year 2014 on November 12, 2013,
and subsequently reported a bill (S. 1681) and an accompanying
report (S. Rpt. 113-120). The Committee then worked with the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and other
congressional committees on a final version of the legislation,
in this case an amendment in the nature of a substitute to S.
1681. In addition, the Committee considered the views presented
to it by members of the public. On June 11, 2014, the Senate
passed by unanimous consent an amendment in the nature of a
substitute, offered by the Chairman and Vice Chairman. The
provisions of the bill were explained in a statement by
Chairman Feinstein subsequent to the bill's passage (160 Cong.
Rec. S. 3656-3658). The House suspended the rules and passed S.
1681 as amended by voice vote on June 24, 2014. It was signed
into law on July 7, 2014 (Public Law 113-126).
The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014
authorized funding for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities across the U.S. Government and included a classified
schedule of authorizations and classified annex. The Act
contained a number of legislative provisions, including:
A requirement for the general counsel of
each intelligence agency to notify the congressional
intelligence committees of any significant legal
interpretation of the Constitution or federal law
affecting intelligence activities conducted by the
agency, to include any significant interpretations
resulting from opinions of the Justice Department's
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC);
A requirement for the Attorney General to
establish a process for the regular review for official
publication of significant OLC opinions that have been
provided to an element of the IC and to provide
Congress with any OLC opinion that would be made
public, but for its classification;
Provisions that require Senate confirmation
for the directors and inspectors general of the NSA and
the NRO;
Provisions that provide additional
whistleblower protections for IC personnel;
Authority for the DNI to establish
``functional managers'' for intelligence disciplines
that are performed by multiple agencies, including
signals intelligence, human intelligence and geospatial
intelligence;
A requirement for intelligence contractors
to notify the government of any successful unauthorized
penetration of their computer networks;
A provision making permanent a requirement,
previously set to sunset, to require government
officials to notify the congressional intelligence
committees of authorized disclosures of intelligence
information;
A requirement for the President to prepare a
plan to respond to the unauthorized public disclosure
of any covert action;
A requirement for a declassification review
of documents collected in Abbottabad, Pakistan, during
the mission that killed Osama bin Laden on May 1, 2011;
A requirement that the ODNI, CIA, DIA, NGA,
NRO, and NSA undergo full financial audits, beginning
with each agency's fiscal year 2014 financial
statements;
A requirement that the chief information
officers of each element of the IC conduct an inventory
of software licenses held by such element to achieve
economies of scale and cost savings in software
procurement and usage;
A requirement that the DNI complete an
independent assessment of the available intelligence
supporting any determination by the Executive Branch
that an identified U.S. person is engaged in acts of
international terrorism against the U.S., sufficient to
satisfy the government's criteria for approving the use
of targeted lethal action;
A provision reauthorizing through December
31, 2018, the Public Interest Declassification Board,
which was first established by Congress in 2000 to
promote public access to a thorough, accurate, and
reliable documentary record of significant U.S.
national security decisions and activities; and
Provisions requiring the DNI to improve the
efficiency of security background investigations.
B. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015
In early 2014, while finishing work on the fiscal year 2014
legislation, the Committee also began its consideration of the
President's requests for funding levels and legislative
authority for fiscal year 2015. Again, the Committee's budget
monitors evaluated the budget requests submitted by the
Executive Branch. The Executive Branch did not submit
legislative requests for fiscal year 2015. Committee staff held
briefings at the Committee and on site at agencies, and the
Committee conducted closed budget hearings.
The Committee reported the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2015 (S. 2741) on July 31, 2014, together with
an accompanying report (S. Rpt. 113-233). The House of
Representatives had previously passed an Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2014 and 2015 (H.R. 4681) on
June 2, 2014. The Committee then worked with the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and other
congressional committees on a final version of the legislation,
in this case an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R.
4681.
On December 9, 2014, the Senate passed by unanimous consent
an amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by the
Chairman and Vice Chairman. The provisions of the bill were
explained in a joint explanatory statement entered into the
Congressional Record by Chairman Feinstein subsequent to the
bill's passage (160 Cong. Rec. S. 6464-6465). The House
suspended the rules and passed H.R. 4681 as amended on December
10, 2014, by a vote of 325-100. It was signed into law on
December 19, 2014 (Public Law 113-293).
The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015
authorized funding for fiscal year 2015 for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities across the U.S. Government and
included a classified schedule of authorizations and classified
annex. The Act contained a number of legislative provisions,
including:
A provision mandating the issuance of new
regulations that require IC employees occupying
positions with access to particularly sensitive
information to regularly report any employment by,
representation of, or the provision of advice relating
to national security to, certain foreign and foreign-
controlled entities for a two-year period after the
employee ceases employment with the IC element;
A requirement for every intelligence agency
to adopt procedures to ensure that certain
communications incidentally acquired in the course of
intelligence activities conducted pursuant to Executive
Order 12333 are destroyed within five years, unless the
communications are affirmatively determined to
constitute foreign intelligence or counterintelligence,
or otherwise meet specific requirements for extended
retention;
A requirement for the DNI to develop a
national intelligence strategy every four years to
guide how the IC will use its capabilities, personnel,
technologies, and partnerships to support U.S. national
interests;
A requirement for the DNI to prepare a plan
for management of the elements of the IC that carry out
financial intelligence activities;
A provision directing the DNI to submit to
the congressional intelligence committees a plan for
applying private sector best practices for monitoring
employees who hold certain positions within the IC;
A requirement that the DNI report on the
status and effectiveness of efforts to reduce
administrative costs for the IC during the preceding
year;
Two provisions mandating new security
requirements for U.S. diplomatic facilities in, or
adjacent to, the Russian Federation, including a
requirement to provide facilities for securing
classified information at such facilities and a
requirement to reduce the number of locally employed
staff at diplomatic facilities in the Russian
Federation; and
A requirement for the DNI to report annually
to the congressional intelligence committees on
violations of law or executive order by IC personnel,
including violations of Executive Order 12333.
C. FISA Improvements Act of 2013
The Committee, since its inception in 1976, has considered
oversight of the Executive Branch's use of electronic
surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes to be one of its
most important responsibilities. This oversight has covered
collection activities conducted pursuant to FISA and collection
activities that fall outside of FISA and are governed by
Executive Order 12333. Since 2006, a central focus of that
oversight has included the Executive Branch's use of Section
215 of the USA PATRIOT Act (Section 501 of FISA) to conduct
bulk collection of ``call data records'' that contain metadata
concerning domestic and international telephone calls,
including the numbers dialed, as well as the time, date, and
duration of the calls, but not the content of the calls.
Similarly, the Committee has conducted oversight of the
implementation of Section 702 of FISA, as established in the
FISA Amendments Act of 2008, which provided procedures for
intelligence collection activities targeting non-U.S. persons
reasonably believed to be located outside the United States.
Following the unprecedented leaks of classified
information, primarily of information relating to the NSA, by
former NSA contractor Edward Snowden, key aspects of many of
these collection activities have been declassified by the DNI.
This prompted a series of Committee hearings and discussions
over ways to add additional privacy protections and
transparency measures to FISA operations, while preserving the
operational effectiveness and flexibility of the programs.
On October 31, 2013, the Committee reported the FISA
Improvements Act of 2013 (S. 1631) and accompanying report (S.
Rpt. 113-119). The bill included a series of measures that
would have made improvements to FISA as well as other laws
relating to intelligence activities carried out by the
Executive Branch. The bill contained a number of legislative
provisions, including:
Measures to codify established privacy
protections for the bulk telephone metadata program
that have been provided under Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court-approved minimization procedures or
Executive Branch policy and measures to enhance those
privacy protections, where appropriate, by placing
additional statutory limits on the telephone metadata
program that do not reduce its operational
effectiveness;
Measures to increase transparency--to the
public and to the Congress--concerning the bulk
telephone metadata program, as well as other aspects of
FISA, where it is possible to do so without
compromising the efficacy of intelligence activities
undertaken pursuant to FISA;
Provisions that require Senate confirmation
for the director and inspector general of the NSA;
Authority for the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court and the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court of Review to appoint amicus curiae
to assist the Court in the consideration of
applications that, in the opinion of the Court, present
a novel or significant interpretation of the law;
Authority for the government to continue
collection for a 72-hour transitional period, when the
collection is directed against a non-U.S. person target
who travels into the United States while the target is
the subject of collection that was lawfully initiated
while the target was abroad; and
Restrictions on the government's authority
to perform queries of communications acquired pursuant
to Section 702 of FISA that use a U.S. person's
selector only if the purpose of the query is to obtain
foreign intelligence information or information
necessary to understand foreign intelligence
information or to assess its importance.
This legislation was not considered by the Senate in the
114th Congress. A related measure, the USA FREEDOM Act, offered
by Senator Leahy, was considered by the Senate but did not
receive sufficient votes to invoke cloture.
D. Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2014
Over the last several years, the Committee has listened
with increasing alarm to the testimony of senior intelligence
officials about the growing cybersecurity threats to our
nation. The Committee has seen the extensive damage caused to
our national and economic security by the constant cyberattacks
against American private and government entities. Beyond direct
monetary losses, the continuing efforts of foreign actors to
steal intelligence information and intellectual property has
had far reaching impacts on the innovation upon which a robust
economy and strong intelligence community and military relies.
The Committee has heard testimony on the ability and intent of
foreign actors to undertake disruptive and destructive
cyberattacks. Also, open reporting about significant and
concerning cyber incidents has alerted the public to the scope
and the severity of these threats.
Through extensive hearing and discussions, the Committee
recognized the need to improve the sharing of information about
cyber threats by both the private and public sector. On July
10, 2014, the Committee reported the Cybersecurity Information
Sharing Act of 2014 (S. 2588). The bill included a series of
authorizations, procedures, and protections to improve the
ability of the private sector and the government to share
information and work together on cybersecurity threats,
including:
Requirements for procedures for the
government to increase sharing about cybersecurity
threats with the private sector, including increased
sharing of classified information and declassification
as appropriate;
Authority for private entities to monitor
their own networks for cybersecurity threats, take
countermeasures on their networks for cybersecurity
purposes, and voluntarily share information about cyber
threats with each other and the government;
Requirements for procedures to ensure
appropriate sharing of cyber threat indicators and
countermeasures within the government, establishment of
privacy guidelines, and the creation of a capability
and process at the Department of Homeland Security as
the primary means of receiving cyber threat indicators
and countermeasures;
Limitations on the government's use of cyber
threat information to cybersecurity efforts, responding
to imminent threats to life, countering computer
crimes, and threats to minors;
Provision of liability protection to private
entities that appropriately monitor their networks and
share cyber threat indicators and countermeasures; and
Requirements for multiple levels of
oversight of the information sharing system by senior
government officials, inspectors general, the Privacy
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, and the Congress.
This legislation was not considered by the Senate in the
114th Congress.
III. OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES
A. Hearings
1. Worldwide Threat Hearings
Since 1994, the Committee has held annual open hearings to
review the Intelligence Community's assessment of the current
and projected national security threats to the United States.
These ``Worldwide Threat'' hearings cover national security
concerns in all geographic regions, as well as transnational
threats such as terrorism and the proliferation of missiles and
weapons of mass destruction.
On March 12, 2013, the Committee held an open Worldwide
Threat hearing on the current and projected threats to the
United States. The lead witness before the Committee was DNI
James R. Clapper. He was joined at the witness table by John O.
Brennan, Director of the CIA; Robert S. Mueller III, Director
of the FBI; Lieutenant General Michael T. Flynn, Director of
the DIA; Matthew Olsen, Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center; and Philip Goldberg, Assistant
Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research. Director
Clapper's unclassified prepared statement for the record is
available in the Hearings section of the Committee's website
and the record of the hearing is printed as S. Hrg. 113-89. A
video recording of the full hearing can also be found on the
Committee's website.
At the hearing, Director Clapper identified sequestration
as the topic foremost on the minds of IC leadership, adding
that ``sequestration forces the Intelligence Community to
reduce all intelligence activities and functions without regard
to impact on our mission.'' He also asserted that in his almost
50 years of work in the intelligence field, he could not
``recall a period in which we've confronted a more diverse
array of threats, crises, and challenges around the world . . .
[making] sequestration even more incongruous.''
Director Clapper also explained that the threats facing the
United States are growing more interconnected and viral, and
that ``[e]vents that at first seem local and irrelevant can
quickly set off transnational disruptions that affect U.S.
national interests.'' Director Clapper's identification of
threat areas began with cyber. He warned that ``[i]ncreasingly,
state and non-state actors are gaining and using cyber
expertise . . . to achieve strategic objectives, by gathering
sensitive information from public and private sector entities,
controlling the content and flow of information, and
challenging perceived adversaries in cyberspace.''
On January 29, 2014, in the second session of the 113th
Congress, the Committee again held an open Worldwide Threat
hearing. Director Clapper presented an opening statement on
behalf of the entire IC, and was joined at the witness table by
John O. Brennan, Director of the CIA; James B. Comey, Director
of the FBI; Lieutenant General Michael T. Flynn, Director of
the DIA; and Matthew Olsen, Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center. Director Clapper's unclassified
prepared statement for the record is available in the Hearings
section of the Committee's website along with a video recording
of the full hearing.
Director Clapper highlighted a litany of crises and
threats, including terrorism, with its ``loosely connected and
now globally dispersed'' character; the sectarian war in Syria,
and ``its attraction as a growing center of radical extremism
and the potential threat this poses'' to the United States; the
spillover conflict in neighboring Lebanon and Iraq;
destabilizing population displacement in Jordan, Turkey, and
Lebanon; the implications of the U.S. force drawdown in
Afghanistan; Iraq's deteriorating internal security situation;
the growth of foreign cyber capabilities; and a host of other
state and non-state instability drivers such as transnational
crime, resource scarcity, and the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction.
2. Implementation of FISA Authorities
During the 113th Congress, the Committee held hearings and
conducted numerous staff briefings to review issues related to
the implementation of surveillance provisions contained in
FISA. These issues included implementation of Title VII
authorities (Targeting Certain Persons Outside of the United
States), as well as issues associated with the implementation
of other provisions of FISA, such as Title I (Electronic
Surveillance), Title III (Physical Searches), Title IV (Pen
Registers and Trap and Trace Devices for Foreign Intelligence
Purposes) and Title V (Access to Certain Business Records for
Foreign Intelligence Purposes).
In furtherance of its oversight responsibilities, the
Committee also reviewed reporting required under provisions in
FISA, including the annual and semi-annual reports from the
Attorney General, the DNI, and relevant agency heads and
inspectors general. Pursuant to Section 601(c) of FISA [50
U.S.C. 1871(c)], the Committee obtained copies of classified
decisions, orders, and opinions of the FISA Court that included
``significant construction or interpretation of any
provision,'' as well as the related pleadings, applications,
and memoranda of law. The Committee routinely examined these
documents, which were the subject of subsequent briefings and
hearings involving Justice Department and IC officials.
3. Cybersecurity
The Committee held six hearings on cybersecurity-related
matters in the 113th Congress and passed the ``Cybersecurity
Information Sharing Act of 2014.'' Additionally, the Committee
and its staff met frequently with IC and other government
officials, cybersecurity company representatives, and a wide
variety of technical experts and stakeholders. Hearings,
briefings, meetings, and other engagements provided the
Committee with insight into the growing cybersecurity threats
to our nation, including the rise of disruptive and destructive
attacks. The complex and dynamic nature of cyberspace
challenges had created an even greater need for the IC to find
agile, innovative solutions. The increased focus on
cybersecurity in the IC has led to increased investment and the
need to adapt mission and business processes. The Committee has
pressed the IC to increase the speed, efficiency, and
effectiveness of its cybersecurity efforts.
4. The Arab Spring and the Arab World
The 113th Congress coincided with the historic developments
of the ``Arab Spring,'' which shook some key Arab nations to
their foundations, challenging undemocratic regimes while also
contributing to instability and violence in countries such as
Tunisia, Libya, Syria, Egypt, and Iraq, with ongoing
implications for U.S. interests and security. As a result, the
Committee spent significant time in hearings, meetings, and
briefings overseeing the IC's ability to support U.S. policy
makers, as well as in debating the proper levels of IC effort.
With the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
(ISIL) and the surge of foreign fighters drawn to it, the
Committee expects these subjects to remain of high priority in
the 114th Congress.
5. Iraq/Syria
The Committee held several hearings and briefings on the
fighting in Syria and Iraq, and the regional instability caused
by the expansion of terrorist groups such as ISIL. The
Committee also reviewed the Administration's proposed
Counterterrorism Partnership Fund, which included funding for
the Department of Defense to train and equip vetted elements of
the Syrian armed opposition to counter terrorist threats.
Additionally, the Committee closely examined the role of
foreign fighters moving in and out of Syria and Iraq, and the
potential terrorist threat posed by them to the United States
and elsewhere.
6. Afghanistan/Pakistan
The Committee's efforts in the 113th Congress focused on
the IC's role in supporting U.S. policy objectives in
Afghanistan and the region as the Administration aimed to
complete its stated ``drawdown'' of forces by the end of 2014,
a goal made uncertain throughout 2013 by the prolonged,
contested Afghan presidential elections and the delayed
implementation of the U.S.-Afghan Bilateral Security Agreement.
The Committee spent considerable time and effort conducting
oversight on the significant intelligence issues related to
these developments.
Bilateral relations with Pakistan appeared to be improving,
and the Committee received numerous briefings about the
security environment in which this tentative improvement
occurred, including on the ongoing implications of a terrorist
safe haven in the tribal regions, the persistent threat of the
Haqqani network, and the Pakistan military's Zarb-e-Azb
campaign in North Waziristan.
Throughout the 113th Congress, the Committee conducted
hearings and received briefings on IC assessments regarding the
strength and long-term viability of the Afghan insurgency, and
the implications for long-term U.S. policy goals as the United
States reached the end of combat operations in Afghanistan. As
the Administration develops post-combat policies on
Afghanistan, the Committee will continue to review the role of
the IC in supporting these policies, and how the IC continues
to function as the Afghan insurgency continues.
7. Iran
The Committee held a number of hearings on Iran with the
purpose of overseeing the IC's ability to collect intelligence
and provide assessments to policymakers on Iran's intentions
and evolving capabilities in several key areas, to include its
nuclear program, role in the Middle East, support to terrorist
groups, and other matters.
8. China
The Committee held a hearing on China to evaluate the IC's
collection posture and analysis capabilities in this regard.
The Committee also received briefings and reports on China from
the National Intelligence Council, CIA, the Defense Department,
the State Department, and nongovernmental organizations. These
activities supported oversight of the intelligence agencies and
helped to inform the legislative debate over the appropriate
U.S. policy toward China, particularly in light of the Obama
Administration's ``strategic rebalance'' toward the Pacific
region and ongoing territorial disputes in the East and South
China Seas.
B. Inquiries and Reviews
1. Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and
Interrogation Program
The Committee's Study of the CIA's Detention and
Interrogation Program was an outgrowth of previous oversight
activity by the Committee. In December 2007, after press
accounts stated that the CIA had possessed and destroyed
videotapes of the interrogations of CIA detainees, the
Committee initiated a review of CIA operational documents
related to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.
On February 11, 2009, after the Committee was presented
with a staff-prepared summary of the operational cables
detailing the interrogations of Abu Zubaydah and Abd al-Rahim
al-Nashiri, the Committee began considering a broader review of
the CIA's detention and interrogation practices. On March 5,
2009, by a vote of 14 to 1, the Committee approved the Terms of
Reference for a broader study of the CIA's Detention and
Interrogation Program. The Study proceeded in a bi-partisan
manner until August 24, 2009, when Attorney General Holder
decided to re-open the criminal inquiry related to the
interrogation of certain detainees in the CIA's Detention and
Interrogation Program. Shortly thereafter, the minority
withdrew from active participation in the Study when it
determined that the Attorney General's decision would preclude
a comprehensive review of the Program, since many of the
relevant witnesses would likely decline to be interviewed by
the Committee.
The Committee continued to devote considerable resources to
completing the Study. The document production phase lasted more
than three years, produced more than 6 million pages of
material, and was completed in July 2012. The Study is based
primarily on a review of these documents, which included cable
traffic, reports, memoranda, intelligence products, records of
interviews conducted of CIA personnel by the CIA's Office of
the Inspector General and other CIA entities, as well as
internal email and other communications. In addition to CIA
materials, the Committee reviewed a smaller quantity of
documents from other Executive Branch elements, as well as
documents and information that had been provided separately to
the Committee outside of the Committee's Study effort.
On December 13, 2012, the Committee approved its Study on
the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, by a vote of 9
to 6. Vice Chairman Chambliss and Senators Burr, Risch, Coats,
Blunt, and Rubio filed their minority views on February 15,
2013, in which they presented the basis for their disagreement
with the report and its conclusions. After the December 13,
2012, approval, the Committee provided copies of the Study to
the CIA, the White House, the Department of State, the Justice
Department, and ODNI, with a request that the White House
coordinate comments on the Study from all relevant Executive
Branch agencies. The Committee requested the Administration's
comments by February 15, 2013, and informed the Executive
Branch that it would consider the comments and make appropriate
updates to the Study, including correcting any factual errors.
The Committee only received substantive comments from the CIA,
which were provided on June 27, 2013.
After the provision of the comments from the CIA, Committee
held a series of staff meetings with the CIA on the Study.
These meetings concluded in September 2013. Following these
meetings and the receipt of minority views, the Committee
revised the findings and conclusions and updated the Committee
Study.
The Committee Study of the CIA's Detention and
Interrogation Program is a lengthy, highly detailed report
exceeding 6,700 pages, including approximately 38,000
footnotes. It is divided into the following three volumes:
I. History and Operation of the CIA's Detention and
Interrogation Program. This 1,539-page volume is divided
chronologically into sections addressing the establishment,
development, and evolution of the CIA's Detention and
Interrogation Program. It includes an addendum on CIA
Clandestine Detention Sites and the Arrangements Made with
Foreign Entities in Relation to the CIA's Detention and
Interrogation Program.
II. Intelligence Acquired and CIA Representations on the
Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques.
This 1,858-page volume addresses the intelligence the CIA
attributed to CIA detainees and the use of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques, specifically focusing on CIA
representations regarding the effectiveness of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques, as well as how the CIA's
Detention and Interrogation Program was operated and managed.
It includes sections on CIA representations to the media, the
Justice Department, and the Congress.
III. Detention and Interrogation of CIA Detainees. This
2,855-page volume addresses the detention and interrogation of
119 CIA detainees, from the program's authorization on
September 17, 2001, to its official end on January 22, 2009, to
include information on their capture, detention, interrogation,
and conditions of confinement. It also includes extensive
information on the CIA's management, oversight, and day-to-day
operation of its Detention and Interrogation Program.
On April 3, 2014, by a bipartisan vote of 11-3, the
Committee agreed to send the revised Findings and Conclusions,
and the updated Executive Summary of the Committee Study, to
the President for declassification and public release. On
August 1, 2014, the CIA provided redacted versions of the
submitted documents to the Committee. The Committee Chairman at
the time, Senator Dianne Feinstein, then entered into a series
of negotiations with the administration to reduce the number of
redactions. On December 3, 2014, Chairman Feinstein and the
Administration reached an agreement on redactions. On December
9, 2014, a 683-page document, including the Executive Summary,
the Findings and Conclusions, and Additional and Minority
Views, was released publicly with redactions and is available
on the Committee's website.
2. Report on the Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Facilities in Benghazi,
Libya, September 11-12, 2012
In the 113th Congress, the Committee completed a bipartisan
report on the September 11-12, 2012, attacks on U.S. diplomatic
facilities in Benghazi, Libya. The Committee reviewed thousands
of pages of intelligence reports and internal documents
provided by the IC and the Departments of State and Defense, to
understand fully the events surrounding this terrorist attack.
The report was also based on dozens of committee hearings,
briefings, and interviews, including with survivors of the
attacks, between September 2012 and December 2013.
The Committee's review found the attacks were preventable,
based on extensive intelligence reporting on the terrorist
activity in Libya--to include prior threats and attacks against
Western targets--and given the known security shortfalls at the
temporary U.S. Mission. The report, which includes classified
and unclassified versions, included 18 recommendations designed
to improve security of American diplomatic and intelligence
facilities abroad. The unclassified final report is available
on the Committee's website.
3. Intelligence Collection Review
During the 113th Congress, the Committee initiated an in-
depth review of intelligence collection programs, entitled the
``Comprehensive Review of Intelligence Community Collection
Activities.'' The Committee assembled a staff team dedicated to
this effort to identify, describe, and assess collection
activities across the IC. The team analyzed the governance,
cost-effectiveness, legal authorities, and cross-Community
integration of U.S. intelligence collection activities.
C. Intelligence Community Issues
1. ODNI Response to Insider Threats
The Committee continued its oversight of the ODNI's
response to unauthorized disclosures of classified information.
The unauthorized disclosures to the media, and potentially to
foreign adversaries, by Edward Snowden, a contractor working at
the NSA, highlight the threat posed by insiders entrusted with
access to IC facilities and networks. Mr. Snowden's decision to
disclose classified and sensitive information to the media will
have ramifications for our national security for years to come.
Initiatives have been underway for years to deal with such
contingencies, most recently the President's National Insider
Threat Policy, signed in November 2012. However, the Committee
is concerned that this policy has not been fully implemented
across the IC. Prior to Mr. Snowden's unauthorized disclosures,
the Committee met with the newly created National Insider
Threat Task Force to review its role in establishing
government-wide minimum standards for deterring, detecting, and
mitigating insider threats. Some examples of minimum standards
issued by the Task Force include workforce threat awareness
training and procedures for responding to insider threat
concerns. The Committee remains concerned that many government
agencies are in need of substantial improvements to ensure the
security of sensitive information.
Following the initial disclosures by Mr. Snowden in June
2013, the Committee met with DNI Clapper to underscore the need
for the Executive Branch to fully investigate the intelligence
leaks, to review initiatives to reform the background
investigation process, and to explore new approaches for
deterring and detecting potentially damaging insider threats.
As part of its review of the unauthorized disclosures, the
Committee also met with the National Counterintelligence
Executive (NCIX), Frank Montoya Jr., and his successor Bill
Evanina, to assess the extent of the damage to national
security. As part of the ODNI, the Office of the NCIX is also
responsible for government-wide standards on security clearance
practices, and the Committee staff met with the NCIX on
numerous occasions to discuss the DNI's strategy for security
clearance reform.
Additionally, in an effort to modernize the security
clearance background investigation process, the Committee
undertook a review of continuous evaluation and automated
record check programs, both within the U.S. Government and the
private sector. As part of this effort, the Committee met with
numerous private sector entities from various sectors to
collect best practices related to hiring, background
investigations, insider threat monitoring, ethics, and employee
privacy.
The Committee supports substantially enhancing and
expediting efforts to deter the insider threat and believes
doing so will require an integrated counterintelligence and
security apparatus that spans the IC and the U.S. Government.
Additionally, the Committee believes the IC's information
technology modernization effort--the IC Information Technology
Enterprise--must provide the infrastructure to detect insider
threats earlier, more effectively, and more reliably. (See page
24 for more information on the IC Information Technology
Enterprise, otherwise known as ``IC ITE.'') Robust
counterintelligence data and analytic tools to monitor,
analyze, and audit personnel behavior will be critical to this
endeavor. In the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2014 and associated classified annex, the Committee recommended
additional resources to help assure the IC meets this and other
counterintelligence and security goals as soon as possible.
2. ODNI Strategic Human Capital Management
The Committee spent considerable time reviewing the ODNI's
strategic management of the IC workforce. The IC Chief Human
Capital Officer (CHCO) is responsible for workforce planning,
recruiting, career development, and many other IC-wide
personnel matters. The Committee believes the role of the IC
CHCO in managing the workforce will be vital as budget
pressures increase across the government and IC leadership is
required to strategically cut areas of declining utility. The
Committee urged the ODNI to avoid policies that result in the
loss of high-performing personnel and underscored the need for
a proactive approach in recruiting, developing, and retaining a
highly qualified workforce.
Additionally, the Committee reviewed the ODNI's plan to
expand the number of joint duty assignments available to its
workforce with the goal of diversifying the backgrounds and
experiences of IC personnel, and advance intelligence
integration. The Committee also urged the ODNI to continue to
provide information on its efforts to enhance workplace
communication, ensure fair and open competition, and encourage
employee engagement.
Lastly, the Committee expressed concern that the ODNI had
not issued a Strategic Human Capital Plan since 2006. Such a
plan will be critical for building an effective IC-wide
workforce in the years ahead to achieve the DNI's goal of an
integrated enterprise. In September 2014, the ODNI released its
``Human Capital Vision 2020.'' The Committee met with the IC
CHCO to discuss the Vision and its goal of creating a
performance-based culture that minimizes skills gaps and
attracts and retains a diverse workforce. The classified annex
of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015
required the DNI to provide an implementation plan for the
Human Capital Vision.
3. Comptroller General Access to Intelligence Community Information
The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010
required the DNI, in consultation with the Comptroller General,
to issue a written directive governing access of the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) to certain information possessed by
the IC. In response, in April 2011, the DNI issued Intelligence
Community Directive (ICD) 114, which states that it is IC
policy to cooperate with GAO audits and reviews to the fullest
extent possible and make information available to appropriately
cleared GAO personnel. During the 113th Congress the Committee
continued to conduct oversight on ICD 114, meeting multiple
times with ODNI and GAO officials to encourage open lines of
communication and collaboration between the two entities to
ensure accountability and appropriate levels of transparency
and security for IC activities. Additionally, the classified
annex of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2014 directed the development of a specific GAO review to
bolster intelligence oversight and reduce unnecessary
fragmentation, overlap, and duplication.
4. National Security Threat Assessments
The Committee has an interest in reviewing intelligence
assessments prepared by the IC as part of the Committee on
Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) process. During
the 113th Congress, the Committee reached an agreement with the
ODNI and the Senate Banking Committee regarding oversight of
the CFIUS process. Under this agreement, upon completion of a
review or investigation that concludes CFIUS action, or the
announcement by the President of a decision, for a covered
transaction, the DNI will alert the congressional intelligence
committees to the availability of any National Security Threat
Assessment (NSTA) completed by the IC. These alerts will occur
on a biweekly basis, will be included in the ``National
Intelligence Council Weekly,'' and shall include the title of
the NSTA, foreign company host country, date of publication,
and short summary. Further, the DNI shall provide a briefing on
any NSTA and the NSTA itself upon request by the congressional
intelligence committees.
5. Intelligence Community Information Technology Enterprise (IC ITE)
The Committee continues to support the objectives of
improved IC mission performance, enhanced security, and
increased savings that underpin the effort to transform the
IC's architecture, known as IC ITE. In addition to much-needed
modernization and integration of both IT assets and business
processes across the IC, IC ITE will enable several other
initiatives for improved mission performance in the IC. The
Committee held quarterly review sessions with the IC Chief
Information Officer (CIO) and the CIOs of IC elements to
discuss the design, development, adoption, and governance of IC
ITE and its key components. The Committee also held several
individual briefings and discussions with IC elements to review
how the implementation of IC ITE would affect each element's IT
posture, mission effectiveness, and workforce. In-depth
briefings were also held with IC elements tasked by the IC CIO
to provide IC community services as part of IC ITE. The
classified annex of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2014 required the DNI create a governance and
oversight model to provide the DNI and the Congress with the
insight required to ensure IC ITE meets milestones for
performance, cost, and schedule. The classified annex of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 required
the CIA, DIA, NRO, NGA, and NSA to provide specific plans for
adoption of IC ITE-compliant capabilities.
6. Role of the IC to Prevent Surprise for Policymakers
The Committee has been concerned that the government was
partly caught off guard by global events such as the Arab
Spring, Russia's incursion into Crimea, and the ability of ISIL
to quickly overrun a significant amount of territory in Iraq,
to include the city of Mosul. The Committee believes the IC can
improve in one of its core functions: warning policymakers of
important shifts in social stability and the security
environment. Specifically, during the 113th Congress the
Committee spent considerable time reviewing IC ``warning''
offices and tradecraft requirements to employ analytic
techniques to prevent surprise. The Committee directed the DNI
to develop a plan for coordinating and improving the
implementation of IC-wide adoption of alternative analysis
methodologies. The latest effort in this vein, as described in
the 2014 National Intelligence Strategy, is ``anticipatory
intelligence.'' The Committee met with senior ODNI
representatives several times to discuss various methodologies
and analytic tools that underlie the IC's unique forecasting
capability and the role ODNI will play in overseeing the IC-
wide adoption of anticipatory intelligence. The classified
annex of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2015 required the DNI to develop a governance model to ensure
effective implementation of anticipatory intelligence across
the IC.
7. Security Clearance Reform
The Committee strongly supported efforts to enhance and
expedite initiatives to deter insider threats, including
modernizing the security clearance background investigation
process. As part of this effort, the Committee reviewed
continuous evaluation and automated record check programs--both
within the U.S. Government and the private sector--and met with
private sector entities to collect best practices related to
hiring, background investigations, insider threat monitoring,
ethics, and privacy.
8. Defense Clandestine Service and the Defense Intelligence Agency
The Committee continues to closely examine the
implementation of the Defense Clandestine Service (DCS) to
ensure the intelligence needs of the Department of Defense are
adequately addressed without unnecessary duplication of human
intelligence collection elsewhere in the IC.
In addition to oversight of the DCS, the Committee received
regular briefings and reports pertinent to the DIA's
performance in providing defense intelligence to our
warfighters and national security leaders. The Committee
focused on the areas of analysis, operations, science and
technology, strategic intelligence, and crisis support,
including intelligence support related to the campaign against
ISIL, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the Ebola
outbreak in West Africa, and the disposition of Syrian chemical
weapons.
9. Oversight of the Intelligence Community's Financial Intelligence
Efforts
Financial intelligence has emerged as a significant area of
IC activity, aiming to ``follow the money'' of adversaries. It
has proven to be a powerful tool confronting a range of
challenging threats including terrorism, weapons proliferation,
and narcotics trafficking. Effective financial intelligence can
often require unique skill sets, and a number of IC elements
have developed capabilities in this regard, including the DNI's
establishment of a National Intelligence Manager for Threat
Finance. The Committee will continue to review and assess
financial intelligence to ensure that tradecraft is
standardized and unnecessary duplication of effort is
eliminated.
10. Oversight of Intelligence Community Counterterrorism Efforts
During the 113th Congress, the Committee continued its
oversight of the IC's role in U.S. counterterrorism efforts.
The Committee continued its practice of conducting regularly
scheduled meetings on this subject with IC personnel.
The Committee also devoted significant time and attention
to lethal operations against counterterrorism targets. As part
of this continuing effort during the 113th Congress, the
Committee staff held numerous in-depth oversight meetings with
government officials to review operations, examine their
effectiveness, verify the efforts made to avoid non-combatant
deaths, and understand related intelligence collection and
analysis. In addition, the Committee has worked with the
Executive Branch to understand the legal basis for these
operations.
Additionally, the Committee has conducted oversight of the
implementation of policies and practices in the area of
interrogation, such as the operations of the High-Value
Detainee Interrogation Group. It has also continued to examine
counterterrorism relations between the IC and foreign liaison
partners.
11. Covert Action
The Committee continued to conduct vigorous oversight of
covert action programs throughout the 113th Congress. The
Committee's rules require the Committee's Staff Director to
``ensure that covert action programs of the United States
government receive appropriate consideration once a quarter.''
In accordance with this rule, the Committee receives a written
report every quarter on each covert action that is being
carried out under a presidential finding. Committee staff
reviews these reports and meets with IC personnel to discuss
their substance and pose additional questions. The Committee
also holds periodic hearings and briefings on covert action
programs, and receives written reviews of covert actions from
the CIA Inspector General, which are often the basis for
additional staff inquiries.
Further, under the National Security Act, the DNI and the
heads of all departments, agencies, and entities of the United
States Government involved in a covert action are required to
keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and
currently informed of all covert actions that are the
responsibility of, are engaged in by, or are carried out for or
on behalf of any department or agency of the United States.
Upon receiving such notifications, the Committee reviews the
details of each and receives briefings to fully understand the
issues.
The Committee seeks to ensure that covert action programs
are consistent with United States foreign policy goals, and are
conducted in accordance with all applicable U.S. laws.
12. Impact of Sequester on the IC
The government shutdown that took place October 1-16, 2013,
when appropriations bills were not enacted, caused the IC to
furlough 72 percent of its civilian workforce. This furlough
had many deleterious effects, including on the IC's ability to
properly cover important national security matters. The effects
of the furlough were partially ameliorated by the Pay Our
Military Act (Public Law 113-39), which exempted Department of
Defense personnel. In addition, several IC elements were able
over time to gradually reduce their furloughs given the
mounting risks to Americans' safety and security. The Committee
had a number of concerns with how the sequestration was managed
in the IC including: (1) an apparent lack of preparation for
how to implement Office of Management and Budget guidance for
implementing a furlough; (2) wide disparities in how IC
agencies' implemented furloughs, leaving gaps in important
functions; and (3) the unavailability of IC element
sequestration plans for Committee review until sequestration
had been in effect for many days. The Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 required the DNI, the
Director of CIA, and the heads of the IC elements in the
Department of Defense to provide the Committee with a plan for
an orderly shutdown in the event of the future absence of
appropriations.
13. Space Launch
The Committee supports introduction of competition into the
national security space sector, and held several briefings with
the National Reconnaissance Office and the U.S. Air Force to
promote a robust certification process for new entrants. In
addition, the Committee is concerned with the government's
reliance on a Russian-made engine on the launch vehicles that
put national security space satellites into orbit. The
Committee supports Air Force efforts to secure an alternative
means of propulsion to launch U.S. satellites that does not
present this risk.
14. GEOINT Commission
In the 113th Congress, the Committee received testimony
from the four commissioners named to the GEOINT Commission,
which was chartered by the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2013. The Commission's report provided important
analysis to help frame Committee decisions on the future of
overhead architecture and is the subject of ongoing oversight
and legislative interest of the Committee.
15. Over-Classification Reform
The Committee continued its oversight of ODNI's efforts to
improve the discoverability and sharing of information across
the IC. Specifically, the Committee has been concerned about
the IC's misapplication and overuse of the originator control
marking (ORCON), which can impede the complete and timely
dissemination of intelligence, as the agency that originates
the information retains control over its dissemination. During
the 113th Congress, Committee staff reviewed this matter and
met with IC officials responsible for establishing the policies
and procedures that govern classification and control markings,
and for ensuring classified national intelligence is properly
disseminated. Committee staff concluded that the use of the
ORCON marking by certain IC elements had increased
substantially, and that in some cases classification and
control marking policies had been violated. The classified
annex of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2014 directed ODNI to adopt new policies ensuring the ORCON
marking is used judiciously, so that classified national
intelligence is disseminated appropriately and without undue
delay or restriction. In response, ODNI promulgated new
guidance to the IC, designed to facilitate dissemination of
ORCON information to all intended consumers, including the
Congressional Oversight Committees.
D. Audits
1. Whistleblowers and Matters of Urgent Concern
The Committee annually receives hundreds of phone calls,
facsimiles, mail, and email communications from self-identified
whistleblowers on matters they believe to be of urgent concern.
Committee staff reviewed and investigated these communications.
2. Inspectors General
The Committee continued its strong relationship with, and
oversight of, the Inspectors General of agencies in the IC.
Regular oversight consisted of reviews of agency Semiannual
Reports and Annual Work Plans.
3. Accounting Standards and Auditability
The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002
required the CIA, DIA, NGA, NRO, and NSA to produce auditable
financial statements by March 1, 2005. This deadline was
extended several times as the IC struggled to make progress
over the last decade. Section 369 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 directed the DNI ``to
develop a plan and schedule to achieve a full, unqualified
audit of each element of the intelligence community not later
than September 30, 2013.'' The Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2011 stipulated that the DNI certify in writing
that ``the heads of the CIA, DIA, NGA, NSA, and ODNI are
committed to achieving an unqualified, now unmodified, opinion
on the financial statements of these agencies by an independent
auditor within the timeframe of the Future Year Intelligence
Plan for Fiscal Year 2011 [2016].''
The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014
required that the CIA, DIA, NGA, NRO, NSA, and ODNI conduct
full-scope audits of their financial statements beginning in
fiscal year 2014. During the 113th Congress, the Committee held
periodic briefings with the IC, to include Chief Financial
Officers, Inspectors General, and other officials, to determine
and assess progress made towards achieving financial
auditability by 2016. The CIA, NGA, NRO, and NSA conducted
audits of their fiscal year 2014 financial statements. The NRO
received an unmodified opinion, and the CIA, NGA, and NSA
received disclaimers of opinion. While the DIA and ODNI did not
conduct an audit, both plan to do so in 2015. The Committee
will continue to hold regular meetings with financial managers
to measure the Community's progress on this issue until all
agencies have received unmodified audit opinions. While a great
deal of work remains, the Committee notes the significant
efforts by the intelligence agencies involved and views the
progress to date as a significant accomplishment.
4. Future Ground Architecture Study
Committee staff conducted a ``deep-dive'' evaluation of two
classified NRO ground programs. This oversight led to immediate
and continued improvement to the entire ground architecture.
5. IC IG, DOJ IG, and DHS IG Review of National Counterterrorism and
Intelligence Centers
The Committee, along with the Senate Judiciary Committee
and the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Committee requested that the Inspector General of the IC, and
the Inspectors General of the Justice Department and the
Department of Homeland Security, conduct a joint audit of the
IC's National Counterterrorism and Intelligence Centers that
have domestic roles and responsibilities. That audit is
expected to conclude during the 114th Congress.
IV. NOMINATIONS
During the 113th Congress, the Committee considered six
nominations upon referral, five directly upon receipt of the
nomination in the Senate, and one sequentially after referral
to, and reporting by, another committee.
The Committee held hearings for all six of the pending
nominees and recommended to the Senate that it give its advice
and consent to each of the pending nominations. The Senate
confirmed all six of the individuals recommended by the
Committee in the 113th Congress.
Throughout the 113th Congress, Section 17 of S. Res. 400 of
the 94th Congress, which had been added by S. Res. 445 of the
108th Congress and was further augmented during the 109th
Congress, governed referrals to the Committee. Section 17 was
further amended in the 113th Congress, as regarding the
confirmation of the Directors and Inspectors General at the NSA
and NRO. As a result of S. Res. 445, all nominations to
positions in the IC requiring the Senate's advice and consent
are referred to the Select Committee on Intelligence, even when
they are positions--such as the Assistant Attorney General for
National Security--that are within departments that are
primarily under the jurisdiction of other Senate committees.
The following were the nominations referred to the
Committee during the 113th Congress, listed in order of the
date of the nomination:
A. John O. Brennan, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
On January 7, 2013, the President nominated John O. Brennan
to be the Director of the CIA. At that time, Mr. Brennan was
the Deputy National Security Advisor for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism.
After receiving Mr. Brennan's responses to the Committee's
standard questionnaire and responses to the Committee's
prehearing questions about his understanding of the duties and
responsibilities of the office to which he had been nominated,
the Committee held a nomination hearing on February 7, 2013.
Mr. Brennan's testimony and his responses to the Committee's
questionnaire, prehearing questions, and questions for the
record are printed in S. Hrg. 113-31 and posted on the
Committee's website. Following the hearing, the Committee
reported the nomination favorably on March 5, 2013, by a vote
of 12-3. The Senate approved the nomination by a vote of 63-34
on March 7, 2013.
B. John P. Carlin, Assistant Attorney General for National Security
On September 10, 2013, the President nominated John P.
Carlin to be Assistant Attorney General for National Security
at the Department of Justice. At that time, Mr. Carlin was the
Acting Assistant Attorney General for National Security at the
Department of Justice.
Mr. Carlin's nomination was first referred to the Senate
Judiciary Committee, which recommended confirmation on February
6, 2014, at which point the nomination was sequentially
referred to the SSCI. After receiving Mr. Carlin's responses to
the Committee's standard questionnaire and responses to the
Committee's prehearing questions about his understanding of the
duties and responsibilities of the office to which he had been
nominated, the Committee held a nomination hearing on February
25, 2014. Mr. Carlin's testimony and his responses to the
Committee's questionnaire, prehearing questions, and questions
for the record are printed in S. Hrg. 113-601 and posted on the
Committee's website. Following the hearing, the Committee
reported the nomination favorably on March 4, 2014, by a voice
vote. The Senate approved the nomination by a vote of 99-1 on
April 1, 2014.
C. Daniel B. Smith, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and
Research
On October 4, 2013, the President nominated Daniel B. Smith
to be the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research at
the Department of State. Mr. Smith had most recently served as
the U.S. Ambassador to Greece from 2010 to 2013.
After receiving Mr. Smith's responses to the Committee's
standard questionnaire and responses to the Committee's
prehearing questions about his understanding of the duties and
responsibilities of the office to which he had been nominated,
the Committee held a nomination hearing on December 17, 2013.
Mr. Smith's testimony and his responses to the Committee's
questionnaire, prehearing questions, and questions for the
record are printed in S. Hrg. 113-606 and posted on the
Committee's website. Following the hearing, the Committee
reported the nomination favorably on January 16, 2014, by a
voice vote. The Senate approved the nomination by a vote of 98-
0 on February 12, 2014.
D. Caroline D. Krass, General Counsel of the Central Intelligence
Agency
On November 7, 2013, the President nominated Caroline D.
Krass to be the General Counsel of the CIA. At that time, Ms.
Krass was Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the
Office of Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice.
After receiving Ms. Krass' responses to the Committee's
standard questionnaire and responses to the Committee's
prehearing questions about her understanding of the duties and
responsibilities of the office to which she had been nominated,
the Committee held a nomination hearing on December 17, 2013.
Ms. Krass' testimony and her responses to the Committee's
questionnaire, prehearing questions, and questions for the
record are printed in S. Hrg. 113-606 and posted on the
Committee's website. Following the hearing, the Committee
reported the nomination favorably on March 4, 2014, by a vote
of 13-2. The Senate approved the nomination by a vote of 95-4
on March 13, 2014.
E. Francis X. Taylor, Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis,
Department of Homeland Security
On February 12, 2014, the President nominated Francis X.
Taylor to be the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis
at DHS. At that time, Mr. Taylor was President and CEO at
FXTaylor Associates.
After receiving Mr. Taylor's responses to the Committee's
standard questionnaire and responses to the Committee's
prehearing questions about his understanding of the duties and
responsibilities of the office to which he had been nominated,
the Committee held a nomination hearing on February 25, 2014.
Mr. Taylor's testimony and his responses to the Committee's
questionnaire, prehearing questions, and questions for the
record are printed in S. Hrg. 113-607 and posted on the
Committee's website. Following the hearing, the Committee
reported the nomination favorably on March 4, 2014, by a voice
vote. The Senate approved the nomination by a voice vote on
April 7, 2014.
F. Nicholas J. Rasmussen, Director of the National Counterterrorism
Center
On November 7, 2014, the President nominated Nicholas J.
Rasmussen to be Director of the National Counterterrorism
Center. At that time, Mr. Rasmussen was Deputy Director of the
National Counterterrorism Center.
After receiving Mr. Rasmussen's responses to the
Committee's standard questionnaire and responses to the
Committee's prehearing questions about his understanding of the
duties and responsibilities of the office to which he had been
nominated, the Committee held a nomination hearing on November
20, 2014. Mr. Rasmussen's testimony and his responses to the
Committee's questionnaire, prehearing questions, and questions
for the record are printed in S. Hrg. 113-609 and posted on the
Committee's website. Following the hearing, the Committee
reported the nomination favorably on December 1, 2014, by a
voice vote. The Senate approved the nomination by a voice vote
on December 16, 2014.
V. SUPPORT TO SENATE
Under Senate Resolution 400, which established the
Committee in 1976, the Select Committee on Intelligence has an
important role in assuring that the IC provides ``informed and
timely intelligence necessary for the executive and legislative
branches to make sound decisions affecting the security and
vital interests of the Nation.'' The Committee fulfills this
responsibility by providing access to IC information and
officials to the U.S. Senate.
The Committee facilitated access to intelligence
information for members and staff outside the Committee by
inviting them to participate in briefings and hearings on
issues of shared jurisdiction or interest. The Committee also
provided intelligence briefings by its professional staff to
Members outside the Committee and assisted Members in resolving
issues with intelligence agencies.
VI. APPENDIX
A. Summary of Committee Actions
1. Number of meetings
During the 113th Congress, the Committee held a total of
137 on-the-record interviews, meetings, briefings, and
hearings, and numerous off-the-record briefings. These included
two joint hearings with the Senate Armed Services Committee and
one joint hearing with the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence. There were 108 oversight hearings, including
seven hearings on the IC budget and 12 on legislative matters,
and six open confirmation hearings. Of these 108 hearings,
eight were open to the public and 100 were closed to protect
classified information pursuant to Senate rules. The Committee
also held 31 on-the-record briefings and meetings, and four
business meetings including mark-ups of legislation.
Additionally, the Committee staff conducted seven on-the-record
briefings and interviews and numerous off-the-record briefings.
2. Bills and resolutions originated by the Committee
S. Res. 50--An original resolution authorizing expenditures
by the Select Committee on Intelligence.
S. Res. 470--An original resolution amending S. Res. 400 to
clarify the responsibility of committees of the Senate in the
provision of the advice and consent of the Senate to
nominations to positions in the intelligence community.
S. 1631--An original bill to consolidate the congressional
oversight provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978 and for other purposes.
S. 1681--An original bill to authorize appropriations for
fiscal year 2014 for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the United States Government, the Community
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.
S. 2741--An original bill to authorize appropriations for
fiscal year 2015 for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the United States Government, the Community
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.
3. Bills referred to the Committee
S. 2439--NSA Internal Watchdog Act.
S. Res. 281--A resolution expressing the sense of the
United States Senate that President Obama should issue a
statement regarding spying on His Holiness, Pope Francis.
S. 1201--Protecting Americans from the Proliferation of
Weapons to Terrorists Act of 2013.
S. 1035--Targeted Strike Oversight Reform Act of 2013.
H.R. 624--Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act
4. Committee publications
Report 113-7--Report of the Select Committee on
Intelligence covering the period January 5, 2011-January 3,
2013.
S. Prt. 113-7--Rules of Procedure (amended February 15,
2011).
S. Hrg. 113-31--Nomination of John O. Brennan to be
Director, Central Intelligence Agency--February 7, 2013 and
March 5, 2013.
S. Hrg. 113-89--Current and Projected National Security
Threats to the United States--March 12, 2013.
Report 113-119--Report to accompany the FISA Improvements
Act (S. 1631).
Report 113-120--Report to accompany the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (S. 1681).
Report 113-134--Review of the Terrorist Attacks on U.S.
Facilities in Benghazi, Libya, September 11-12, 2012, together
with additional views--January 15, 2014.
Report 113-233--Report to accompany the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (S. 2741).
Report 113-288--Committee Study of the Central Intelligence
Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program together with
Foreword by Chairman Feinstein and Additional and Minority
Views--December 9, 2014.
VII. ADDITIONAL VIEWS
1. Additional Views of Senator Ron Wyden
This report notes that the Select Committee on Intelligence
reported both the FISA Improvements Act of 2013 and the
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2014 in the 113th
Congress. The Committee was not unanimous on these bills, and I
would not necessarily describe these bills or the 2013
surveillance disclosures in the same terms that are used in
this report. Rather than restate my views here, I would
encourage anyone interested in the debate over these issues to
read Senate Report 113-119 and the Senate Report accompanying
the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 for a fuller
discussion of relevant issues.
Ron Wyden.
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