[Congressional Record Volume 160, Number 156 (Friday, January 2, 2015)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6935-S6937]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NOMINATION OF FRANK ROSE AND OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE FROM THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE ON PROPOSED EUROPEAN UNION CODE OF CONDUCT FOR
OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES
Mr. VITTER. Mr. President, I am deeply concerned by proposals
for arms control plans related to missile defense and outer space arms,
including the EU Code of Conduct for Outer Space activities, which the
Obama administration has embraced. These plans were confirmed by Rose
Gottemoeller, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security, during a House subcommittee hearing last week.
I firmly believe any international agreement on a code of conduct for
space should be submitted for Senate advice and consent as part of its
treaty powers, and not be an ``executive agreement'' that sidesteps
that process.
I have engaged with the State Department to ensure that this
agreement will not be a unilateral act and that it will be fully
presented to Congress before moving forward. I strongly believe, given
the importance of this issue, that the U.S. Senate should be consulted
as part of their advice and consent role in any decision to move
forward.
I ask to have printed in the Record at the end of my remarks official
letters and correspondence with the nominee, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State, Frank Rose that demonstrate three important points. First,
due to serious ongoing concerns related to national security, the
administration has not pursued plans to propose the negotiation of a
debris-generating ASAT testing moratorium at this time; second, that
any decision to subscribe to a code in the future will not in any way
constrain our national security-related activities in space or ability
to protect the U.S. or allies; third, and most importantly, that the
Senate will be given access to the details surrounding any plan once
and if any format is determined, and again before any agreement is
entered.
Space is vital to our national security, and we must maintain the
ability to use satellites and various missile capabilities. In
particular, space is of critical importance to our national
intelligence and warfighting capabilities. The development of anti-
satellite capabilities by countries such as China and Russia is well
documented, as in the example of China successfully testing a direct-
ascent, anti-satellite SC-19 missile against one of its own satellites.
It is vital that the United States ensure we are not restricting
activity in ways that put our security at risk. Members of Congress
have been clear in their view that they see ample disadvantage to such
a code for the United States; according to assessments by the uniformed
military, implementation of this code would result in real world
operational impacts. Congress has previously voted to limit
international agreements concerning outer space activities. Section 913
of the fiscal year 2013 National Defense Authorization Act, H.R. 4310,
states that any agreement will have no legally binding effect or basis
for limiting the activities of the United States in outer space, and it
requires certification that any such agreement will be equitable,
enhance national security, and have no militarily significant impact on
the ability of the United States to conduct military or intelligence
activities in space.
There are several key areas that the administration must resolve
before moving forward on pursuing any decision. Pentagon officials have
long expressed concern that the arms initiative will be exploited by
states such as China and Russia to constrain U.S. missile defenses,
while both states continue to develop their own advanced missile
defenses. In 2007, the Department of Defense concluded that the
progress in addressing the vulnerability of U.S. space assets has not
kept pace with growing threat capabilities; consequently, the
vulnerability of our space assets continues to grow. Additionally, a
previous U.S. Commission to Assess United States National Security
Space Management and Organization released a report that predicted that
future warfare in space was a ``virtual certainty'' and urged the
United States to begin to develop the means both to deter and defend
against attacks on its space assets, and to mount offensive operations
to deny the use of space to potential adversaries. To do otherwise, the
commission warned, would invite a ``space Pearl Harbor.''
Further troubling, a 2014 Department of Defense report noted that
China is ``developing a multi-dimensional program to improve its
capabilities to limit or prevent the use of space-based assets by
adversaries during times of crisis or conflict,'' including
``destroying or capturing satellites and other sensors.'' To protect
against these types of attacks, the Department of Defense's ongoing
policy is aimed at retaining the capabilities to respond at the time
and place of our choosing. Any effort to move forward must address our
national security needs and Congressional concerns.
Therefore, any State Department effort to move forward with a code or
a debris-generating ASAT testing moratorium should fully overcome
existing concerns and ensure the plan does not undermine current
Department of Defense policy, U.S. capabilities, or congressional
concerns. Our growing dependence on space makes it fundamental to U.S.
national security interests. I remain extremely concerned by what
appears to be previous endeavors by the administration to avoid
addressing space policy concerns and potential administration efforts
to bypass Congress.
While I am pleased at the assurances that Mr. Rose has provided and
that relevant offices will engage with Congress if a path forward is
agreed upon,
[[Page S6936]]
I remain extremely concerned about the decision to negotiate a measure
using past measures such as the European Union's Code of Conduct as a
starting point. Russia has demonstrated its willingness to break its
agreements, as seen with the ongoing violation of the 1987
Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty. We need to improve our
capacity to understand what is going on in space, and we need to ensure
we are adequately capable of deterring the growing number of countries
that are pursuing weapons capable of targeting U.S. satellites.
While necessary, the development of transparency and confidence-
building measures and behavioral norms promoting responsible space
operations should not come at the expense of America's national
security. The President's own Space Policy released in 2010 states:
``The United States will employ a variety of measures to help assure
the use of space for all responsible parties, and, consistent with the
inherent right of self-defense, deter others from interference and
attack, defend our space systems and contribute to the defense of
allied space systems, and, if deterrence fails, defeat efforts to
attack them.'' With a growing number of states acquiring the ability to
degrade or destroy U.S. space capabilities, the probability that space
systems will come under attack in a future crisis or conflict is ever
increasing. The State Department cannot have the attitude that they are
going to go it alone. The United States cannot afford it.
The material is as follows:
Congress of the United States,
Washington, DC, November 12, 2014.
Mr. Frank Rose,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Space and Defense
Policy,
U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC.
Dear Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Rose: We write to
ask for your clarification regarding the Administration's
space arms control posture. Like you, we are deeply concerned
by the rising threats of anti-satellite weapons in the hands
of states like the People's Republic of China. That said, we
believe the Administration would do better to focus on real
solutions to these threats, as opposed to more feel good
measures like the European Union's (EU) Code of Conduct for
Outer Space activities or other similar measures.
We are concerned by proposals for outer space arms control,
including the EU Code of Conduct for Outer Space activities,
which the Administration has embraced. We see no advantage to
such a Code for the United States; according to assessments
by the uniformed military, implementation of this code would
result in real world operational impacts. The product of this
equation demands the opposition of the entire United States
government.
With the languishing of that Code, we fear a new threat to
our ability to protect U.S. outer space capabilities, and,
perhaps even to develop our missile defenses. We seek your
understanding of the Administration's position on space arms
control, specifically, the ``debris generating kinetic energy
ASAT testing moratorium'' which, as we have been informed,
you proposed to U.S. allies. We are unfamiliar with any such
proposal having been coordinated with the Department of
Defense or the uniformed military, and therefore we ask for
your answers to the following questions:
1) Please indicate the date, and by which Department
official, the State Department Circular 175 request was
signed. What was the scope of this Circ-175 and has the
Department determined if this moratorium would be submitted
to the Senate for its advice and consent?
2) If this Circ-175 will not be submitted to the Senate, on
what basis would such an international agreement be
negotiated and to what end?
3) Please detail the potential implications for United
States space and missile defense activities. How would such
an agreement protect our ability to fully develop our missile
defenses, including our test and targets program?
4) Please further detail how such agreement will ensure
full freedom of action for the United States to take needed
defensive and other action in space.
5) Please provide the Joint Staff assessment of impacts to
military operations you obtained before discussing this
moratorium with our allies.
6) Please detail the specific allies with which you have
discussed this moratorium and the respective dates of
discussion. Please further detail which State Department
official authorized these discussions.
We appreciate your prompt responses to these questions.
Sincerely,
David Vitter,
United States Senator.
Doug Lamborn,
Member of Congress.
____
U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC, November 17, 2014.
Dear Senator Vitter: Thank you for your letter of November
12 regarding the Administration's efforts to enhance the
security and sustainability of the outer space environment.
The Administration is deeply concerned about the
development of anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities by
countries like China and Russia. In response to this
increasing threat, the Department of State is pursuing a
comprehensive approach to space security, including the
development of bilateral and multilateral transparency and
confidence building measures (TCBMs) such as the
International Code of Conduct, development of international
long-term sustainability guidelines by the UN Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, and other measures. The
Administration believes that pragmatic TCBMs like the Code
are a much more effective way to ensure the long-term
security of the space environment as compared to
fundamentally flawed space arms control proposals like the
Russian-Chinese sponsored Prevention of Placement of Weapons
in Outer Space Treaty.
The United States has made clear to our partners that we
will not enter into a code of conduct, or other agreement,
that in any way constrains our national security-related
activities in space or our ability to protect the United
States and our allies. We have worked closely with our
colleagues in the Defense Department and Intelligence
Community to ensure that the Code does not have any adverse
impact on U.S. operations, including the development and
testing of missile defenses. The Department, in coordination
with the interagency, provided a series of briefings to
Congress on the Administration's decision-making process
regarding our willingness to work with our European allies to
help craft a Code that would benefit U.S. national security.
We are available to provide updates at any time.
The Administration has been clear that we are open to space
arms control proposals. However, any such proposal would need
to meet the criteria as outlined in the President's 2010
National Space Policy (NSP)--that it be effectively
verifiable, equitable, and in the interests of the United
States and its allies. At this time, the Administration has
made no decision to propose the negotiation of a debris-
generating ASAT testing moratorium, and therefore, no C-175
request has been signed. If a decision were made to move
forward with a proposal in the future, we would work closely
with the Department of Defense and Intelligence Community to
ensure there were no adverse operational impacts from our
efforts, especially on our missile defense and space systems.
Furthermore, while we discuss a wide variety of space
security issues with allies--including the potential for a
Code of Conduct and ways to address the development of ASAT
systems--we have not made a specific proposal to allies for
negotiation of a debris-generating ASAT testing moratorium.
The Department is fully committed to closely coordinating
all diplomatic space security proposals within the U.S.
interagency. We would not table a proposal that had not
received full U.S. Government approval and took into account
all agencies' perspectives.
Should you wish to have further discussions on this issue,
the Administration would be happy to assemble an interagency
team to meet with you to provide further background on our
efforts, and answer any additional questions you may have.
We hope this information is useful. Please do not hesitate
to contact us if we can be of further assistance.
Sincerely,
Julia Frifield,
Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs.
____
U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC, December 10, 2014.
Dear Senator Vitter, In response to follow-up questions
from your staff, we would like to provide the following
clarifications about our efforts to promote the security and
long-term sustainability of the outer space environment.
As I noted in my letter of November 12, 2014, the
Administration is seriously concerned about the development
of anti-satellite capabilities by countries like China. We
believe that effective diplomatic efforts are a critical tool
in the United States' comprehensive response to countering
this threat. At the same time, we recognize your concerns and
want to assure you that we share them. We have made every
effort to ensure that our diplomatic efforts to promote the
security and sustainability of outer space do not have an
adverse impact on our national security activities,
especially on our missile defense and space systems.
The administration has no plans to propose the negotiation
of a debris-generating ASAT testing moratorium at this time.
Moreover, there has been no consideration as to what format
we would seek for any proposed debris-generating ASAT testing
moratorium. As a result, no C-175 package has been prepared.
Currently, our diplomatic focus is on the development of an
International Code of Conduct on Outer Space Activities. At
this time, the European Union is considering its next steps
on the Code. As we stated in 2012, the United States has
decided to work with the European Union and other nations to
help develop a code which can help maintain the long-term
sustainability, safety, stability and security of outer space
by establishing guidelines for the responsible use of outer
space. Since the text of the Code has not been finalized, the
Administration has
[[Page S6937]]
made no decision on whether to subscribe to the code. Only
after the text is finalized and open for subscription will
the Administration consider whether to subscribe to the Code.
Such a decision will be made only after it received full U.S.
Government approval that takes into account perspectives from
all departments and agencies.
As former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated in
January 2012, the United States will not sign-up to a Code of
Conduct that any way constrains our national security-related
activities in space or our ability to protect the United
States or our allies. If the United States were to make a
decision to subscribe to a Code in the future, it would be
implemented in a way that is fully consistent with this
statement.
Let me also assure you that we are in close contact with
our Department of Defense and Intelligence Community
colleagues on the development of the Code to ensure the Code
does not have any adverse impacts on U.S. operations,
including the development and testing of missile defenses.
Should you wish to have further discussions on this issue,
we would be prepared to assemble an interagency team to meet
with you or your staff. Please do not hesitate to contact us
if we can be of further assistance.
Sincerely,
Julia Frifield,
Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs.
____
U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC, December 11, 2014.
Dear Senator Vitter: I wanted to follow-up with regarding
the conversation I had with your staff regarding a potential
debris generating anti-satellite (ASAT) testing moratorium
and the European Union's proposed International Code of
Conduct for Outer Space Activities.
As Assistant Secretary of State Julia Frifield noted in her
December 10, 2014, letter to you, the Administration has no
plans to propose the negotiation of a debris-generating ASAT
testing moratorium at this time. Should we determine to
pursue such an agreement in the future, I pledge to keep you
and your staff informed, including on the form of which a
potential agreement might take.
With regard to the Code of Conduct, it is my understanding
that there are no implementation issues for the Department of
Defense related to the current draft of the Code. That said,
only after the text of the Code is finalized will we have a
full understanding of any potential implementation issues.
Therefore, we continue to be in close contact with our
colleagues at the Department of Defense and the Intelligence
Community to ensure that our efforts to promote the security
and sustainability of outer space do not have an adverse
impact on our national security activities, especially on our
missile defense and national security space systems.
Before a final decision is made to subscribe to the Code,
the Department, along with our interagency colleagues, will
make sure to provide a briefing, including relevant materials
such as the text of the Code and other materials, to you and
the relevant committees on the terms of the agreement, its
implementation, and any other issues of interest.
I appreciate your interest in these issues. Please do not
hesitate to reach out to me or my staff in the future with
any questions you may have.
Regards,
Frank A. Rose,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Space and Defense Policy.
____________________
