[Congressional Record Volume 161, Number 79 (Thursday, May 21, 2015)]
[House]
[Pages H3550-H3555]



                   CONGRESSIONAL ROLE IN TRADE POLICY

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of 
January 6, 2015, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Levin) is recognized 
for 60 minutes as the designee of the minority leader.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Speaker, it has been over 12 years since the last 
debate over trade promotion authority, the last time we considered the 
role of Congress in trade negotiations. Much has changed since then: 
the world has changed; trade negotiations have changed; and the role of 
Congress in trade negotiations has changed.

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  There are several other TPP issues that need to be addressed. Food 
safety is one of them. There is a very broad consensus that not enough 
resources are being devoted to ensure the safety of our imports. What 
are we going to do about this issue? It is a real issue in the debate. 
Unfortunately, specific portions of the negotiations and the 
shortcomings in TPP are often difficult to discuss because the 
documents are classified.
  I have not argued that the entire negotiations should be open to the 
public. I understand that, in a wide range of contexts, from peace 
negotiations to labor negotiations, it is widely assumed that 
negotiations at times need to be held behind closed doors, and at this 
point, I am not convinced that trade negotiations are different. The 
negotiators need to communicate frequently and effectively with 
stakeholders to ensure that they are seeking the right provisions in 
negotiations. In a number of respects, our negotiators were not doing 
that when the TPP negotiations were in the early or even not so early 
stages.
  Thanks to constant pressure from Members of Congress over the past 
several years, we have made some progress in this regard. For example, 
just a couple of years ago, USTR refused to share the bracketed text--
laying out the positions of various parties--with any Member of 
Congress. We got them to change that. Much more recently, they refused 
to let staff from personal offices assist their Members with the text 
even where the staff member had a top secret security clearance. We got 
them to change that.
  Still, there remain unreasonable and burdensome restrictions on 
access to the text. For example, Congress created a system of 
stakeholder advisers many years ago to provide advice to our 
negotiators and to Congress on the negotiations, but those advisers 
still can only see U.S. negotiating proposals. They cannot see the 
proposals of our trading partners. It is very difficult, if not 
impossible, for them to provide negotiating advice if they can't know 
what the other side is seeking. Moreover, personal office staff with 
top secret security clearances still cannot see the negotiating text 
until the Member is present.
  Let me say a few more words about this.
  I am not at all confident that our negotiators are sharing with 
Members of Congress or the stakeholder advisers all of the texts that 
are being exchanged with other TPP countries. For example, we know our 
negotiators, as I have said, have been discussing a labor consistency 
plan with Vietnam for many months now at least, but there is still no 
text for Members of Congress to review. This is one of the major 
outstanding issues in TPP, and yet there is no text to review despite 
the fact that USTR has told us for at least a year now that the 
negotiations were nearly complete. At a recent meeting to discuss 
Vietnam, it was classified so that the status of negotiations on this 
issue cannot be discussed publicly. Many of us left less confident that 
there has been any progress in the negotiations.
  Or take currency manipulation. For years, literally, we have pressed 
what the administration's position is on the issue given that 
majorities in both the House and the Senate have urged that strong and 
enforceable currency disciplines be included in TPP. For years, the 
administration said it was still deliberating on the issue and had no 
answer. Now, when pushed through the TPA debate in Congress, the 
administration claims that they could not possibly include enforceable 
disciplines in TPP because they would be a poison pill.
  Finally, I do not understand why the administration is selectively 
able to reveal to the public certain aspects that they think the public 
will like, but those of us who have concerns cannot reveal them. We 
have examples of officials revealing to the press very specific things 
from the negotiating text, like when tariffs will be eliminated on a 
particular product. In my view, as to the Environment Chapter, the 
problem with that chapter is that many of the verbs used in those 
obligations--the essence of the commitments--are very weak, but I, 
presumably, can't tell you what those verbs are.
  So one has a hard time understanding the rationale for this process. 
The way it has been handled by the administration does not make Members 
and other key parties real participants with a meaningful role, 
understanding and impacting decisions undertaken in this important 
negotiation.

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