[Congressional Record Volume 161, Number 173 (Tuesday, December 1, 2015)]
[House]
[Pages H8663-H8676]
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill
(H.R. 4127) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2016 for
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other
purposes.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The text of the bill is as follows:
H.R. 4127
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the
``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
Sec. 3. Budgetary effects.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.
Sec. 105. Clarification regarding authority for flexible personnel
management among elements of intelligence community.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Provision of information and assistance to Inspector General
of the Intelligence Community.
Sec. 304. Inclusion of Inspector General of Intelligence Community in
Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and
Efficiency.
Sec. 305. Clarification of authority of Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board.
Sec. 306. Enhancing government personnel security programs.
Sec. 307. Notification of changes to retention of call detail record
policies.
Sec. 308. Personnel information notification policy by the Director of
National Intelligence.
Sec. 309. Designation of lead intelligence officer for tunnels.
[[Page H8664]]
Sec. 310. Reporting process required for tracking certain requests for
country clearance.
Sec. 311. Study on reduction of analytic duplication.
Sec. 312. Strategy for comprehensive interagency review of the United
States national security overhead satellite architecture.
Sec. 313. Cyber attack standards of measurement study.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Sec. 401. Appointment and confirmation of the National
Counterintelligence Executive.
Sec. 402. Technical amendments relating to pay under title 5, United
States Code.
Sec. 403. Analytic objectivity review.
Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency and Other Elements
Sec. 411. Authorities of the Inspector General for the Central
Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 412. Prior congressional notification of transfers of funds for
certain intelligence activities.
TITLE V--MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES
Subtitle A--Matters Relating to Russia
Sec. 501. Notice of deployment or transfer of Club-K container missile
system by the Russian Federation.
Sec. 502. Assessment on funding of political parties and
nongovernmental organizations by the Russian Federation.
Sec. 503. Assessment on the use of political assassinations as a form
of statecraft by the Russian Federation.
Subtitle B--Matters Relating to Other Countries
Sec. 511. Report on resources and collection posture with regard to the
South China Sea and East China Sea.
Sec. 512. Use of locally employed staff serving at a United States
diplomatic facility in Cuba.
Sec. 513. Inclusion of sensitive compartmented information facilities
in United States diplomatic facilities in Cuba.
Sec. 514. Report on use by Iran of funds made available through
sanctions relief.
TITLE VI--MATTERS RELATING TO UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO
BAY, CUBA
Sec. 601. Prohibition on use of funds for transfer or release of
individuals detained at United States Naval Station,
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to the United States.
Sec. 602. Prohibition on use of funds to construct or modify facilities
in the United States to house detainees transferred from
United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Sec. 603. Prohibition on use of funds for transfer or release to
certain countries of individuals detained at United
States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
TITLE VII--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS
Subtitle A--Reports
Sec. 701. Repeal of certain reporting requirements.
Sec. 702. Reports on foreign fighters.
Sec. 703. Report on strategy, efforts, and resources to detect, deter,
and degrade Islamic State revenue mechanisms.
Sec. 704. Report on United States counterterrorism strategy to disrupt,
dismantle, and defeat the Islamic State, al-Qai'da, and
their affiliated groups, associated groups, and
adherents.
Sec. 705. Report on effects of data breach of Office of Personnel
Management.
Sec. 706. Report on hiring of graduates of Cyber Corps Scholarship
Program by intelligence community.
Sec. 707. Report on use of certain business concerns.
Subtitle B--Other Matters
Sec. 711. Use of homeland security grant funds in conjunction with
Department of Energy national laboratories.
Sec. 712. Inclusion of certain minority-serving institutions in grant
program to enhance recruiting of intelligence community
workforce.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(a) Congressional Intelligence Committees.--The term
``congressional intelligence committees'' means--
(1) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives.
(b) Intelligence Community.--The term ``intelligence
community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4)
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).
SEC. 3. BUDGETARY EFFECTS.
The budgetary effects of this Act, for the purpose of
complying with the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go-Act of 2010, shall
be determined by reference to the latest statement titled
``Budgetary Effects of PAYGO Legislation'' for this Act,
submitted for printing in the Congressional Record by the
Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, provided that such
statement has been submitted prior to the vote on passage.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal
year 2016 for the conduct of the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the following elements of
the United States Government:
(1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(3) The Department of Defense.
(4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(5) The National Security Agency.
(6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force.
(7) The Coast Guard.
(8) The Department of State.
(9) The Department of the Treasury.
(10) The Department of Energy.
(11) The Department of Justice.
(12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
(14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(16) The Department of Homeland Security.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Levels.--The
amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 and,
subject to section 103, the authorized personnel ceilings as
of September 30, 2016, for the conduct of the intelligence
activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through
(16) of section 101, are those specified in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany this bill.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of
Authorizations.--
(1) Availability.--The classified Schedule of
Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made
available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate,
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives, and to the President.
(2) Distribution by the president.--Subject to paragraph
(3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of
the classified Schedule of Authorizations, or of appropriate
portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch.
(3) Limits on disclosure.--The President shall not publicly
disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any
portion of such Schedule except--
(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C.
3306(a));
(B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or
(C) as otherwise required by law.
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
(a) Authority for Increases.--The Director of National
Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel
in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2016 by
the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in
section 102(a) if the Director of National Intelligence
determines that such action is necessary to the performance
of important intelligence functions, except that the number
of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized
under such section may not, for any element of the
intelligence community, exceed 3 percent of the number of
civilian personnel authorized under such schedule for such
element.
(b) Treatment of Certain Personnel.--The Director of
National Intelligence shall establish guidelines that govern,
for each element of the intelligence community, the treatment
under the personnel levels authorized under section 102(a),
including any exemption from such personnel levels, of
employment or assignment in--
(1) a student program, trainee program, or similar program;
(2) a reserve corps or as a reemployed annuitant; or
(3) details, joint duty, or long-term, full-time training.
(c) Notice to Congressional Intelligence Committees.--The
Director of National Intelligence shall notify the
congressional intelligence committees in writing at least 15
days prior to each exercise of an authority described in
subsection (a).
SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management
Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal
year 2016 the sum of $516,306,000. Within such amount, funds
identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and
development shall remain available until September 30, 2017.
(b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the
Intelligence Community
[[Page H8665]]
Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence
are authorized 785 positions as of September 30, 2016.
Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees
of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence or
personnel detailed from other elements of the United States
Government.
(c) Classified Authorizations.--
(1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to
amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence
Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are
authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management
Account for fiscal year 2016 such additional amounts as are
specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for
advanced research and development shall remain available
until September 30, 2017.
(2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the
personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the
Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30,
2016, there are authorized such additional personnel for the
Community Management Account as of that date as are specified
in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in
section 102(a).
SEC. 105. CLARIFICATION REGARDING AUTHORITY FOR FLEXIBLE
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT AMONG ELEMENTS OF
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) Clarification.--Section 102A(v) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(v)) is amended--
(1) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4); and
(2) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following new
paragraph (3):
``(3) A covered department may appoint an individual to a
position converted or established pursuant to this subsection
without regard to the civil-service laws, including parts II
and III of title 5, United States Code.''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a)
shall apply with respect to an appointment under section
102A(v) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3024(v)) made on or after the date of the enactment of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public
Law 112-87) and to any proceeding pending on or filed after
the date of the enactment of this section that relates to
such an appointment.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal
year 2016 the sum of $514,000,000.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay,
retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be
increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may
be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits
authorized by law.
SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not
be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any
intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by
the Constitution or the laws of the United States.
SEC. 303. PROVISION OF INFORMATION AND ASSISTANCE TO
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.
Section 103H(j)(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3033(j)(4)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``any department,
agency, or other element of the United States Government''
and inserting ``any Federal, State (as defined in section
804), or local governmental agency or unit thereof''; and
(2) in subparagraph (B), by inserting ``from a department,
agency, or element of the Federal Government'' before ``under
subparagraph (A)''.
SEC. 304. INCLUSION OF INSPECTOR GENERAL OF INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY IN COUNCIL OF INSPECTORS GENERAL ON
INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY.
Section 11(b)(1)(B) of the Inspector General Act of 1978
(Public Law 95-452; 5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by striking
``the Office of the Director of National Intelligence'' and
inserting ``the Intelligence Community''.
SEC. 305. CLARIFICATION OF AUTHORITY OF PRIVACY AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD.
Section 1061(g) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (42 U.S.C. 2000ee(g)) is amended by
adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(5) Access.--Nothing in this section shall be construed
to authorize the Board, or any agent thereof, to gain access
to information regarding an activity covered by section
503(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3093(a)).''.
SEC. 306. ENHANCING GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAMS.
(a) Enhanced Security Clearance Programs.--
(1) In general.--Part III of title 5, United States Code,
is amended by adding at the end the following:
``Subpart J--Enhanced Personnel Security Programs
``CHAPTER 110--ENHANCED PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAMS
``Sec.
``11001. Enhanced personnel security programs.
``SEC. 11001. ENHANCED PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAMS.
``(a) Enhanced Personnel Security Program.--The Director of
National Intelligence shall direct each agency to implement a
program to provide enhanced security review of covered
individuals--
``(1) in accordance with this section; and
``(2) not later than the earlier of--
``(A) the date that is 5 years after the date of the
enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2016; or
``(B) the date on which the backlog of overdue periodic
reinvestigations of covered individuals is eliminated, as
determined by the Director of National Intelligence.
``(b) Comprehensiveness.--
``(1) Sources of information.--The enhanced personnel
security program of an agency shall integrate relevant and
appropriate information from various sources, including
government, publicly available, and commercial data sources,
consumer reporting agencies, social media, and such other
sources as determined by the Director of National
Intelligence.
``(2) Types of information.--Information obtained and
integrated from sources described in paragraph (1) may
include--
``(A) information relating to any criminal or civil legal
proceeding;
``(B) financial information relating to the covered
individual, including the credit worthiness of the covered
individual;
``(C) publicly available information, whether electronic,
printed, or other form, including relevant security or
counterintelligence information about the covered individual
or information that may suggest ill intent, vulnerability to
blackmail, compulsive behavior, allegiance to another
country, change in ideology, or that the covered individual
lacks good judgment, reliability, or trustworthiness; and
``(D) data maintained on any terrorist or criminal watch
list maintained by any agency, State or local government, or
international organization.
``(c) Reviews of Covered Individuals.--
``(1) Reviews.--
``(A) In general.--The enhanced personnel security program
of an agency shall require that, not less than 2 times every
5 years, the head of the agency shall conduct or request the
conduct of automated record checks and checks of information
from sources under subsection (b) to ensure the continued
eligibility of each covered individual to access classified
information and hold a sensitive position unless more
frequent reviews of automated record checks and checks of
information from sources under subsection (b) are conducted
on the covered individual.
``(B) Scope of reviews.--Except for a covered individual
who is subject to more frequent reviews to ensure the
continued eligibility of the covered individual to access
classified information and hold a sensitive position, the
reviews under subparagraph (A) shall consist of random or
aperiodic checks of covered individuals, such that each
covered individual is subject to at least 2 reviews during
the 5-year period beginning on the date on which the agency
implements the enhanced personnel security program of an
agency, and during each 5-year period thereafter.
``(C) Individual reviews.--A review of the information
relating to the continued eligibility of a covered individual
to access classified information and hold a sensitive
position under subparagraph (A) may not be conducted until
after the end of the 120-day period beginning on the date the
covered individual receives the notification required under
paragraph (3).
``(2) Results.--The head of an agency shall take
appropriate action if a review under paragraph (1) finds
relevant information that may affect the continued
eligibility of a covered individual to access classified
information and hold a sensitive position.
``(3) Information for covered individuals.--The head of an
agency shall ensure that each covered individual is
adequately advised of the types of relevant security or
counterintelligence information the covered individual is
required to report to the head of the agency.
``(4) Limitation.--Nothing in this subsection shall be
construed to affect the authority of an agency to determine
the appropriate weight to be given to information relating to
a covered individual in evaluating the continued eligibility
of the covered individual.
``(5) Authority of the president.--Nothing in this
subsection shall be construed as limiting the authority of
the President to direct or perpetuate periodic
reinvestigations of a more comprehensive nature or to
delegate the authority to direct or perpetuate such
reinvestigations.
``(6) Effect on other reviews.--Reviews conducted under
paragraph (1) are in addition to investigations and
reinvestigations conducted pursuant to section 3001 of the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50
U.S.C. 3341).
``(d) Audit.--
``(1) In general.--Beginning 2 years after the date of the
implementation of the enhanced personnel security program of
an agency under subsection (a), the Inspector General of the
agency shall conduct at least 1 audit to assess the
effectiveness and fairness, which shall be determined in
accordance with performance measures and standards
established by the Director of National
[[Page H8666]]
Intelligence, to covered individuals of the enhanced
personnel security program of the agency.
``(2) Submissions to dni.--The results of each audit
conducted under paragraph (1) shall be submitted to the
Director of National Intelligence to assess the effectiveness
and fairness of the enhanced personnel security programs
across the Federal Government.
``(e) Definitions.--In this section--
``(1) the term `agency' has the meaning given that term in
section 3001 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341);
``(2) the term `consumer reporting agency' has the meaning
given that term in section 603 of the Fair Credit Reporting
Act (15 U.S.C. 1681a);
``(3) the term `covered individual' means an individual
employed by an agency or a contractor of an agency who has
been determined eligible for access to classified information
or eligible to hold a sensitive position;
``(4) the term `enhanced personnel security program' means
a program implemented by an agency at the direction of the
Director of National Intelligence under subsection (a);
and''.
(2) Technical and conforming amendment.--The table of
chapters for part III of title 5, United States Code, is
amended by adding at the end following:
``Subpart J--Enhanced Personnel Security Programs
``110. Enhanced personnel security programs...............11001''.....
(b) Resolution of Backlog of Overdue Periodic
Reinvestigations.--
(1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall develop and implement a plan to eliminate the backlog
of overdue periodic reinvestigations of covered individuals.
(2) Requirements.--The plan developed under paragraph (1)
shall--
(A) use a risk-based approach to--
(i) identify high-risk populations; and
(ii) prioritize reinvestigations that are due or overdue to
be conducted; and
(B) use random automated record checks of covered
individuals that shall include all covered individuals in the
pool of individuals subject to a one-time check.
(3) Definitions.--In this subsection:
(A) The term ``covered individual'' means an individual who
has been determined eligible for access to classified
information or eligible to hold a sensitive position.
(B) The term ``periodic reinvestigations'' has the meaning
given such term in section 3001(a)(7) of the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C.
3341(a)(7)).
SEC. 307. NOTIFICATION OF CHANGES TO RETENTION OF CALL DETAIL
RECORD POLICIES.
(a) Requirement To Retain.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 15 days after learning that
an electronic communication service provider that generates
call detail records in the ordinary course of business has
changed the policy of the provider on the retention of such
call detail records to result in a retention period of less
than 18 months, the Director of National Intelligence shall
notify, in writing, the congressional intelligence committees
of such change.
(2) Report.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report identifying
each electronic communication service provider that has, as
of the date of the report, a policy to retain call detail
records for a period of 18 months or less.
(b) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Call detail record.--The term ``call detail record''
has the meaning given that term in section 501(k) of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C.
1861(k)).
(2) Electronic communication service provider.--The term
``electronic communication service provider'' has the meaning
given that term in section 701(b)(4) of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881(b)(4)).
SEC. 308. PERSONNEL INFORMATION NOTIFICATION POLICY BY THE
DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
(a) Directive Required.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall issue a directive containing a written
policy for the timely notification to the congressional
intelligence committees of the identities of individuals
occupying senior level positions within the intelligence
community.
(b) Senior Level Position.--In identifying positions that
are senior level positions in the intelligence community for
purposes of the directive required under subsection (a), the
Director of National Intelligence shall consider whether a
position--
(1) constitutes the head of an entity or a significant
component within an agency;
(2) is involved in the management or oversight of matters
of significant import to the leadership of an entity of the
intelligence community;
(3) provides significant responsibility on behalf of the
intelligence community;
(4) requires the management of a significant number of
personnel or funds;
(5) requires responsibility management or oversight of
sensitive intelligence activities; and
(6) is held by an individual designated as a senior
intelligence management official as such term is defined in
section 368(a)(6) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-259; 50 U.S.C. 404i-1 note).
(c) Notification.--The Director shall ensure that each
notification under the directive issued under subsection (a)
includes each of the following:
(1) The name of the individual occupying the position.
(2) Any previous senior level position held by the
individual, if applicable, or the position held by the
individual immediately prior to the appointment.
(3) The position to be occupied by the individual.
(4) Any other information the Director determines
appropriate.
(d) Relationship to Other Laws.--The directive issued under
subsection (a) and any amendment to such directive shall be
consistent with the provisions of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.).
(e) Submission.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees the directive issued
under subsection (a).
SEC. 309. DESIGNATION OF LEAD INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR
TUNNELS.
(a) In General.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall designate an official to manage the collection and
analysis of intelligence regarding the tactical use of
tunnels by state and nonstate actors.
(b) Annual Report.--Not later than the date that is 10
months after the date of the enactment of this Act, and
biennially thereafter until the date that is 4 years after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of
National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees and the congressional defense
committees (as such term is defined in section 101(a)(16) of
title 10, United States Code) a report describing--
(1) trends in the use of tunnels by foreign state and
nonstate actors; and
(2) collaboration efforts between the United States and
partner countries to address the use of tunnels by
adversaries.
SEC. 310. REPORTING PROCESS REQUIRED FOR TRACKING CERTAIN
REQUESTS FOR COUNTRY CLEARANCE.
(a) In General.--By not later than September 30, 2016, the
Director of National Intelligence shall establish a formal
internal reporting process for tracking requests for country
clearance submitted to overseas Director of National
Intelligence representatives by departments and agencies of
the United States. Such reporting process shall include a
mechanism for tracking the department or agency that submits
each such request and the date on which each such request is
submitted.
(b) Congressional Briefing.--By not later than December 31,
2016, the Director of National Intelligence shall brief the
congressional intelligence committees on the progress of the
Director in establishing the process required under
subsection (a).
SEC. 311. STUDY ON REDUCTION OF ANALYTIC DUPLICATION.
(a) Study and Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than January 31, 2016, the
Director of National Intelligence shall--
(A) carry out a study to evaluate and measure the incidence
of duplication in finished intelligence analysis products;
and
(B) submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
report on the findings of such study.
(2) Methodology requirements.--The methodology used to
carry out the study required by this subsection shall be able
to be repeated for use in other subsequent studies.
(b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a)(1)(B)
shall include--
(1) detailed information--
(A) relating to the frequency of duplication of finished
intelligence analysis products; and
(B) that describes the types of, and the reasons for, any
such duplication; and
(2) a determination as to whether to make the production of
such information a routine part of the mission of the
Analytic Integrity and Standards Group.
(c) Customer Impact Plan.--Not later than 180 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of
National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a plan for revising analytic
practice, tradecraft, and standards to ensure customers are
able to clearly identify--
(1) the manner in which intelligence products written on
similar topics and that are produced contemporaneously differ
from one another in terms of methodology, sourcing, or other
distinguishing analytic characteristics; and
(2) the significance of that difference.
(d) Construction.--Nothing in this section may be construed
to impose any requirement that would interfere with the
production of an operationally urgent or otherwise time-
sensitive current intelligence product.
SEC. 312. STRATEGY FOR COMPREHENSIVE INTERAGENCY REVIEW OF
THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY OVERHEAD
SATELLITE ARCHITECTURE.
(a) Requirement for Strategy.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall collaborate with the Secretary of Defense
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop a
strategy, with milestones and benchmarks, to ensure that
there is a comprehensive interagency review of policies and
practices for planning and acquiring national security
satellite systems and architectures,
[[Page H8667]]
including the capabilities of commercial systems and partner
countries, consistent with the National Space Policy issued
on June 28, 2010. Such strategy shall, where applicable,
account for the unique missions and authorities vested in the
Department of Defense and the intelligence community.
(b) Elements.--The strategy required by subsection (a)
shall ensure that the United States national security
overhead satellite architecture--
(1) meets the needs of the United States in peace time and
is resilient in war time;
(2) is fiscally responsible;
(3) accurately takes into account cost and performance
tradeoffs;
(4) meets realistic requirements;
(5) produces excellence, innovation, competition, and a
robust industrial base;
(6) aims to produce in less than 5 years innovative
satellite systems that are able to leverage common,
standardized design elements and commercially available
technologies;
(7) takes advantage of rapid advances in commercial
technology, innovation, and commercial-like acquisition
practices;
(8) is open to innovative concepts, such as distributed,
disaggregated architectures, that could allow for better
resiliency, reconstitution, replenishment, and rapid
technological refresh; and
(9) emphasizes deterrence and recognizes the importance of
offensive and defensive space control capabilities.
(c) Report on Strategy.--Not later than February 28, 2016,
the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of
Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall
jointly submit to the congressional intelligence committees,
the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, and the
Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a
report on the strategy required by subsection (a).
SEC. 313. CYBER ATTACK STANDARDS OF MEASUREMENT STUDY.
(a) Study Required.--The Director of National Intelligence,
in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the
Secretary of Defense, shall carry out a study to determine
appropriate standards that--
(1) can be used to measure the damage of cyber incidents
for the purposes of determining the response to such
incidents; and
(2) include a method for quantifying the damage caused to
affected computers, systems, and devices.
(b) Reports to Congress.--
(1) Preliminary findings.--Not later than 180 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of
National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees the initial findings of the study
required under subsection (a).
(2) Report.--Not later than 360 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
report containing the complete findings of such study.
(3) Form of report.--The report required by paragraph (2)
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a
classified annex.
(c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means the following:
(1) The congressional intelligence committees.
(2) The Committees on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives and the Senate.
(3) The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate.
(4) The Committee on Homeland Security of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
SEC. 401. APPOINTMENT AND CONFIRMATION OF THE NATIONAL
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE.
(a) In General.--Section 902(a) of the Counterintelligence
Enhancement Act of 2002 (50 U.S.C. 3382) is amended to read
as follows:
``(a) Establishment.--There shall be a National
Counterintelligence Executive who shall be appointed by the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate.''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a)
shall take effect on the date that is one year after the date
of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 402. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO PAY UNDER TITLE 5,
UNITED STATES CODE.
Section 5102(a)(1) of title 5, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) in clause (vii), by striking ``or'';
(2) by inserting after clause (vii) the following new
clause:
``(viii) the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence;''; and
(3) in clause (x), by striking the period and inserting a
semicolon.
SEC. 403. ANALYTIC OBJECTIVITY REVIEW.
(a) Assessment.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall assign the Chief of the Analytic Integrity and
Standards Group to conduct a review of finished intelligence
products produced by the Central Intelligence Agency to
assess whether the reorganization of the Agency, announced
publicly on March 6, 2015, has resulted in any loss of
analytic objectivity.
(b) Submission.--Not later than March 6, 2017, the Director
of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees, in writing, the results of the
review required under subsection (a), including--
(1) an assessment comparing the analytic objectivity of a
representative sample of finished intelligence products
produced by the Central Intelligence Agency before the
reorganization and a representative sample of such finished
intelligence products produced after the reorganization,
predicated on the products' communication of uncertainty,
expression of alternative analysis, and other underlying
evaluative criteria referenced in the Strategic Evaluation of
All-Source Analysis directed by the Director;
(2) an assessment comparing the historical results of
anonymous surveys of Central Intelligence Agency and
customers conducted before the reorganization and the results
of such anonymous surveys conducted after the reorganization,
with a focus on the analytic standard of objectivity;
(3) a metrics-based evaluation measuring the effect that
the reorganization's integration of operational, analytic,
support, technical, and digital personnel and capabilities
into Mission Centers has had on analytic objectivity; and
(4) any recommendations for ensuring that analysts of the
Central Intelligence Agency perform their functions with
objectivity, are not unduly constrained, and are not
influenced by the force of preference for a particular
policy.
Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency and Other Elements
SEC. 411. AUTHORITIES OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
(a) Information and Assistance.--Paragraph (9) of section
17(e) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C. 3517(e)(9)) is amended to read as follows:
``(9)(A) The Inspector General may request such information
or assistance as may be necessary for carrying out the duties
and responsibilities of the Inspector General provided by
this section from any Federal, State, or local governmental
agency or unit thereof.
``(B) Upon request of the Inspector General for information
or assistance from a department or agency of the Federal
Government, the head of the department or agency involved,
insofar as practicable and not in contravention of any
existing statutory restriction or regulation of such
department or agency, shall furnish to the Inspector General,
or to an authorized designee, such information or assistance.
``(C) Nothing in this paragraph may be construed to provide
any new authority to the Central Intelligence Agency to
conduct intelligence activity in the United States.
``(D) In this paragraph, the term `State' means each of the
several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands, and any territory or possession of the United
States.''.
(b) Technical Amendments Relating to Selection of
Employees.--Paragraph (7) of such section (50 U.S.C.
3517(e)(7)) is amended--
(1) by inserting ``(A)'' before ``Subject to applicable
law''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(B) Consistent with budgetary and personnel resources
allocated by the Director, the Inspector General has final
approval of--
``(i) the selection of internal and external candidates for
employment with the Office of Inspector General; and
``(ii) all other personnel decisions concerning personnel
permanently assigned to the Office of Inspector General,
including selection and appointment to the Senior
Intelligence Service, but excluding all security-based
determinations that are not within the authority of a head of
other Central Intelligence Agency offices.''.
SEC. 412. PRIOR CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION OF TRANSFERS OF
FUNDS FOR CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
(a) Limitation.--Except as provided in subsection (b), none
of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or
otherwise made available for the intelligence community for
fiscal year 2016 may be used to initiate a transfer of funds
from the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Fund or the
Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund to be used for
intelligence activities unless the Director of National
Intelligence or the Secretary of Defense, as appropriate,
submits to the congressional intelligence committees, by not
later than 30 days before initiating such a transfer, written
notice of the transfer.
(b) Waiver.--
(1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence or
the Secretary of Defense, as appropriate, may waive
subsection (a) with respect to the initiation of a transfer
of funds if the Director or Secretary, as the case may be,
determines that an emergency situation makes it impossible or
impractical to provide the notice required under such
subsection by the date that is 30 days before such
initiation.
[[Page H8668]]
(2) Notice.--If the Director or Secretary issues a waiver
under paragraph (1), the Director or Secretary, as the case
may be, shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees, by not later than 48 hours after the initiation
of the transfer of funds covered by the waiver, written
notice of the waiver and a justification for the waiver,
including a description of the emergency situation that
necessitated the waiver.
TITLE V--MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES
Subtitle A--Matters Relating to Russia
SEC. 501. NOTICE OF DEPLOYMENT OR TRANSFER OF CLUB-K
CONTAINER MISSILE SYSTEM BY THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION.
(a) Notice to Congress.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees written notice if the intelligence community
receives intelligence that the Russian Federation has--
(1) deployed, or is about to deploy, the Club-K container
missile system through the Russian military; or
(2) transferred or sold, or intends to transfer or sell,
the Club-K container missile system to another state or non-
state actor.
(b) Notice to Congressional Intelligence Committees.--Not
later than 30 days after the date on which the Director
submits a notice under subsection (a), the Director shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a written
update regarding any intelligence community engagement with a
foreign partner on the deployment and impacts of a deployment
of the Club-K container missile system to any potentially
impacted nation.
(c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means the following:
(1) The congressional intelligence committees.
(2) The Committees on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives and the Senate.
(3) The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate.
SEC. 502. ASSESSMENT ON FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND
NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS BY THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees an intelligence community assessment on the
funding of political parties and nongovernmental
organizations in former Soviet states and countries in Europe
by the Russian Security Services since January 1, 2006. Such
assessment shall include the following:
(1) The country involved, the entity funded, the security
service involved, and the intended effect of the funding.
(2) An evaluation of such intended effects, including with
respect to--
(A) undermining the political cohesion of the country
involved;
(B) undermining the missile defense of the United States
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; and
(C) undermining energy projects that could provide an
alternative to Russian energy.
(b) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
(c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means the following:
(1) The congressional intelligence committees.
(2) The Committees on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives and the Senate.
(3) The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate.
SEC. 503. ASSESSMENT ON THE USE OF POLITICAL ASSASSINATIONS
AS A FORM OF STATECRAFT BY THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION.
(a) Requirement for Assessment.--Not later than 180 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of
National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees an intelligence community assessment
on the use of political assassinations as a form of
statecraft by the Russian Federation since January 1, 2000.
(b) Content.--The assessment required by subsection (a)
shall include--
(1) a list of Russian politicians, businessmen, dissidents,
journalists, current or former government officials, foreign
heads-of-state, foreign political leaders, foreign
journalists, members of nongovernmental organizations, and
other relevant individuals that the intelligence community
assesses were assassinated by Russian Security Services, or
agents of such services, since January 1, 2000; and
(2) for each individual described in paragraph (1), the
country in which the assassination took place, the means
used, associated individuals and organizations, and other
background information related to the assassination of the
individual.
(c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means the following:
(1) The congressional intelligence committees.
(2) The Committees on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives and the Senate.
(3) The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate.
Subtitle B--Matters Relating to Other Countries
SEC. 511. REPORT ON RESOURCES AND COLLECTION POSTURE WITH
REGARD TO THE SOUTH CHINA SEA AND EAST CHINA
SEA.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees an intelligence community assessment on the
resources used for collection efforts and the collection
posture of the intelligence community with regard to the
South China Sea and East China Sea.
(b) Elements.--The intelligence community assessment
required by subsection (a) shall provide detailed information
related to intelligence collection by the United States with
regard to the South China Sea and East China Sea, including--
(1) a review of intelligence community collection
activities and a description of these activities, including
the lead agency, key partners, purpose of collection
activity, annual funding and personnel, the manner in which
the collection is conducted, and types of information
collected;
(2) an explanation of how the intelligence community
prioritizes and coordinates collection activities focused on
such region; and
(3) a description of any collection and resourcing gaps and
efforts being made to address such gaps.
SEC. 512. USE OF LOCALLY EMPLOYED STAFF SERVING AT A UNITED
STATES DIPLOMATIC FACILITY IN CUBA.
(a) Supervisory Requirement.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), not
later than one year after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Secretary of State shall ensure that each key
supervisory position at a United States diplomatic facility
in Cuba is occupied by a citizen of the United States.
(2) Extension.--The Secretary of State may extend the
deadline to carry out paragraph (1) by not more than one year
if the Secretary submits to the appropriate congressional
committees written notification and justification of such
extension before making such extension.
(b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the heads of other appropriate departments
or agencies of the Federal Government, shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report on--
(1) the progress made by the Secretary with respect to
carrying out subsection (a)(1); and
(2) the use of locally employed staff in United States
diplomatic facilities, including--
(A) the number of such staff;
(B) the responsibilities of such staff;
(C) the manner in which such staff are selected, including
efforts to mitigate counterintelligence threats to the United
States; and
(D) the potential cost and effect on the operational
capacity of the diplomatic facility if the number of such
staff was reduced.
(c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate; and
(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
SEC. 513. INCLUSION OF SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION
FACILITIES IN UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC
FACILITIES IN CUBA.
(a) Restricted Access Space Requirement.--The Secretary of
State shall ensure that each United States diplomatic
facility in Cuba that, after the date of the enactment of
this Act, is constructed or undergoes a construction upgrade
includes a sensitive compartmented information facility.
(b) National Security Waiver.--The Secretary of State may
waive the requirement under subsection (a) if the Secretary--
(1) determines that such waiver is in the national security
interest of the United States;
(2) submits to the appropriate congressional committees
written justification for such waiver; and
(3) a period of 90 days elapses following the date of such
submission.
(c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate; and
(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
SEC. 514. REPORT ON USE BY IRAN OF FUNDS MADE AVAILABLE
THROUGH SANCTIONS RELIEF.
(a) In General.--At the times specified in subsection (b),
the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with
the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report assessing the
following:
(1) The monetary value of any direct or indirect forms of
sanctions relief that Iran has
[[Page H8669]]
received since the Joint Plan of Action first entered into
effect.
(2) How Iran has used funds made available through
sanctions relief, including the extent to which any such
funds have facilitated the ability of Iran--
(A) to provide support for--
(i) any individual or entity designated for the imposition
of sanctions for activities relating to international
terrorism pursuant to an executive order or by the Office of
Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury as
of the date of the enactment of this Act;
(ii) any organization designated by the Secretary of State
as a foreign terrorist organization under section 219(a) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)) as of
the date of the enactment of this Act;
(iii) any other terrorist organization; or
(iv) the regime of Bashar al Assad in Syria;
(B) to advance the efforts of Iran or any other country to
develop nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles overtly or
covertly; or
(C) to commit any violation of the human rights of the
people of Iran.
(3) The extent to which any senior official of the
Government of Iran has diverted any funds made available
through sanctions relief to be used by the official for
personal use.
(b) Submission to Congress.--
(1) In general.--The Director shall submit the report
required by subsection (a) to the appropriate congressional
committees--
(A) not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act and every 180 days thereafter during the period
that the Joint Plan of Action is in effect; and
(B) not later than 1 year after a subsequent agreement with
Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran takes effect and
annually thereafter during the period that such agreement
remains in effect.
(2) Nonduplication.--The Director may submit the
information required by subsection (a) with a report required
to be submitted to Congress under another provision of law
if--
(A) the Director notifies the appropriate congressional
committees of the intention of making such submission before
submitting that report; and
(B) all matters required to be covered by subsection (a)
are included in that report.
(c) Form of Reports.--Each report required by subsection
(a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include
a classified annex.
(d) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
the Committee on Finance, the Committee on Foreign Relations,
and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.
(2) Joint plan of action.--The term ``Joint Plan of
Action'' means the Joint Plan of Action, signed at Geneva
November 24, 2013, by Iran and by France, Germany, the
Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, the
United Kingdom, and the United States, and all implementing
materials and agreements related to the Joint Plan of Action,
including the technical understandings reached on January 12,
2014, the extension thereto agreed to on July 18, 2014, and
the extension thereto agreed to on November 24, 2014.
TITLE VI--MATTERS RELATING TO UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO
BAY, CUBA
SEC. 601. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR TRANSFER OR RELEASE
OF INDIVIDUALS DETAINED AT UNITED STATES NAVAL
STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA, TO THE UNITED
STATES.
No amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made
available to an element of the intelligence community may be
used during the period beginning on the date of the enactment
of this Act and ending on December 31, 2016, to transfer,
release, or assist in the transfer or release, to or within
the United States, its territories, or possessions, Khalid
Sheikh Mohammed or any other detainee who--
(1) is not a United States citizen or a member of the Armed
Forces of the United States; and
(2) is or was held on or after January 20, 2009, at United
States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department
of Defense.
SEC. 602. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS TO CONSTRUCT OR MODIFY
FACILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES TO HOUSE
DETAINEES TRANSFERRED FROM UNITED STATES NAVAL
STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA.
(a) In General.--No amounts authorized to be appropriated
or otherwise made available to an element of the intelligence
community may be used during the period beginning on the date
of the enactment of this Act and ending on December 31, 2016,
to construct or modify any facility in the United States, its
territories, or possessions to house any individual detained
at Guantanamo for the purposes of detention or imprisonment
in the custody or under the control of the Department of
Defense unless authorized by Congress.
(b) Exception.--The prohibition in subsection (a) shall not
apply to any modification of facilities at United States
Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
(c) Individual Detained at Guantanamo Defined.--In this
section, the term ``individual detained at Guantanamo'' means
any individual located at United States Naval Station,
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, as of October 1, 2009, who--
(1) is not a citizen of the United States or a member of
the Armed Forces of the United States; and
(2) is--
(A) in the custody or under the control of the Department
of Defense; or
(B) otherwise under detention at United States Naval
Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
SEC. 603. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR TRANSFER OR RELEASE
TO CERTAIN COUNTRIES OF INDIVIDUALS DETAINED AT
UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY,
CUBA.
No amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made
available to an element of the intelligence community may be
used during the period beginning on the date of the enactment
of this Act and ending on December 31, 2016, to transfer,
release, or assist in the transfer or release of any
individual detained in the custody or under the control of
the Department of Defense at United States Naval Station,
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to the custody or control of any
country, or any entity within such country, as follows:
(1) Libya.
(2) Somalia.
(3) Syria.
(4) Yemen.
TITLE VII--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS
Subtitle A--Reports
SEC. 701. REPEAL OF CERTAIN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.
(a) Quadrennial Audit of Positions Requiring Security
Clearances.--Section 506H of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3104) is amended--
(1) by striking subsection (a);
(2) by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections
(a) and (b), respectively; and
(3) in subsection (b), as so redesignated, by striking
``The results required under subsection (a)(2) and the
reports required under subsection (b)(1)'' and inserting
``The reports required under subsection (a)(1)''.
(b) Reports on Role of Analysts at FBI.--Section 2001(g) of
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
(Public Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3700; 28 U.S.C. 532 note) is
amended by striking paragraph (3) and redesignating paragraph
(4) as paragraph (3).
(c) Report on Outside Employment by Officers and Employees
of Intelligence Community.--
(1) In general.--Section 102A(u) of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(u)) is amended--
(A) by striking ``(1) The Director'' and inserting ``The
Director''; and
(B) by striking paragraph (2).
(2) Conforming amendment.--Subsection (a) of section 507 of
such Act (50 U.S.C. 3106) is amended--
(A) by striking paragraph (5); and
(B) by redesignating paragraph (6) as paragraph (5).
(3) Technical amendment.--Subsection (c)(1) of such section
507 is amended by striking ``subsection (a)(1)'' and
inserting ``subsection (a)''.
(d) Reports on Nuclear Aspirations of Non-State Entities.--
Section 1055 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2010 (50 U.S.C. 2371) is repealed.
(e) Reports on Espionage by People's Republic of China.--
Section 3151 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2000 (42 U.S.C. 7383e) is repealed.
(f) Reports on Security Vulnerabilities of National
Laboratory Computers.--Section 4508 of the Atomic Energy
Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2659) is repealed.
SEC. 702. REPORTS ON FOREIGN FIGHTERS.
(a) Reports Required.--Not later than 60 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, and every 60 days
thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report
on foreign fighter flows to and from Syria and to and from
Iraq. The Director shall define the term ``foreign fighter''
in such reports.
(b) Matters To Be Included.--Each report submitted under
subsection (a) shall include each of the following:
(1) The total number of foreign fighters who have traveled
to Syria or Iraq since January 1, 2011, the total number of
foreign fighters in Syria or Iraq as of the date of the
submittal of the report, the total number of foreign fighters
whose countries of origin have a visa waiver program
described in section 217 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (8 U.S.C. 1187), the total number of foreign fighters who
have left Syria or Iraq, the total number of female foreign
fighters, and the total number of deceased foreign fighters.
(2) The total number of United States persons who have
traveled or attempted to travel to Syria or Iraq since
January 1, 2011, the total number of such persons who have
arrived in Syria or Iraq since such date, and the total
number of such persons who have
[[Page H8670]]
returned to the United States from Syria or Iraq since such
date.
(3) The total number of foreign fighters in the Terrorist
Identities Datamart Environment and the status of each such
foreign fighter in that database, the number of such foreign
fighters who are on a watchlist, and the number of such
foreign fighters who are not on a watchlist.
(4) The total number of foreign fighters who have been
processed with biometrics, including face images,
fingerprints, and iris scans.
(5) Any programmatic updates to the foreign fighter report
since the last report was submitted, including updated
analysis on foreign country cooperation, as well as actions
taken, such as denying or revoking visas.
(6) A worldwide graphic that describes foreign fighters
flows to and from Syria, with points of origin by country.
(c) Additional Report.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report that includes--
(1) with respect to the travel of foreign fighters to and
from Iraq and Syria, a description of the intelligence
sharing relationships between the United States and member
states of the European Union and member states of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization; and
(2) an analysis of the challenges impeding such
intelligence sharing relationships.
(d) Form.--The reports submitted under subsections (a) and
(c) may be submitted in classified form.
(e) Termination.--The requirement to submit reports under
subsection (a) shall terminate on the date that is 3 years
after the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 703. REPORT ON STRATEGY, EFFORTS, AND RESOURCES TO
DETECT, DETER, AND DEGRADE ISLAMIC STATE
REVENUE MECHANISMS.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the intelligence community should dedicate necessary
resources to defeating the revenue mechanisms of the Islamic
State.
(b) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
report on the strategy, efforts, and resources of the
intelligence community that are necessary to detect, deter,
and degrade the revenue mechanisms of the Islamic State.
SEC. 704. REPORT ON UNITED STATES COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY
TO DISRUPT, DISMANTLE, AND DEFEAT THE ISLAMIC
STATE, AL-QA'IDA, AND THEIR AFFILIATED GROUPS,
ASSOCIATED GROUPS, AND ADHERENTS.
(a) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to
the appropriate congressional committees a comprehensive
report on the counterterrorism strategy of the United States
to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat the Islamic State, al-
Qa'ida, and their affiliated groups, associated groups, and
adherents.
(2) Coordination.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be
prepared in coordination with the Director of National
Intelligence, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the
Treasury, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of Defense,
and the head of any other department or agency of the Federal
Government that has responsibility for activities directed at
combating the Islamic State, al-Qa'ida, and their affiliated
groups, associated groups, and adherents.
(3) Elements.--The report under by paragraph (1) shall
include each of the following:
(A) A definition of--
(i) core al-Qa'ida, including a list of which known
individuals constitute core al-Qa'ida;
(ii) the Islamic State, including a list of which known
individuals constitute Islamic State leadership;
(iii) an affiliated group of the Islamic State or al-
Qa'ida, including a list of which known groups constitute an
affiliate group of the Islamic State or al-Qa'ida;
(iv) an associated group of the Islamic State or al-Qa'ida,
including a list of which known groups constitute an
associated group of the Islamic State or al-Qa'ida;
(v) an adherent of the Islamic State or al-Qa'ida,
including a list of which known groups constitute an adherent
of the Islamic State or al-Qa'ida; and
(vi) a group aligned with the Islamic State or al-Qa'ida,
including a description of what actions a group takes or
statements it makes that qualify it as a group aligned with
the Islamic State or al-Qa'ida.
(B) An assessment of the relationship between all
identified Islamic State or al-Qa'ida affiliated groups,
associated groups, and adherents with Islamic State
leadership or core al-Qa'ida.
(C) An assessment of the strengthening or weakening of the
Islamic State or al-Qa'ida, its affiliated groups, associated
groups, and adherents, from January 1, 2010, to the present,
including a description of the metrics that are used to
assess strengthening or weakening and an assessment of the
relative increase or decrease in violent attacks attributed
to such entities.
(D) An assessment of whether an individual can be a member
of core al-Qa'ida if such individual is not located in
Afghanistan or Pakistan.
(E) An assessment of whether an individual can be a member
of core al-Qa'ida as well as a member of an al-Qa'ida
affiliated group, associated group, or adherent.
(F) A definition of defeat of the Islamic State or core al-
Qa'ida.
(G) An assessment of the extent or coordination, command,
and control between the Islamic State or core al-Qa'ida and
their affiliated groups, associated groups, and adherents,
specifically addressing each such entity.
(H) An assessment of the effectiveness of counterterrorism
operations against the Islamic State or core al-Qa'ida, their
affiliated groups, associated groups, and adherents, and
whether such operations have had a sustained impact on the
capabilities and effectiveness of the Islamic State or core
al-Qa'ida, their affiliated groups, associated groups, and
adherents.
(4) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
(b) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means the following:
(1) The congressional intelligence committees.
(2) The Committees on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives and the Senate.
(3) The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate.
SEC. 705. REPORT ON EFFECTS OF DATA BREACH OF OFFICE OF
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT.
(a) Report.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on the data
breach of the Office of Personnel Management disclosed in
June 2015.
(b) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (a)
shall include the following:
(1) The effects, if any, of the data breach on the
operations of the intelligence community abroad, including
the types of operations, if any, that have been negatively
affected or entirely suspended or terminated as a result of
the data breach.
(2) An assessment of the effects of the data breach on each
element of the intelligence community.
(3) An assessment of how foreign persons, groups, or
countries may use the data collected by the data breach
(particularly regarding information included in background
investigations for security clearances), including with
respect to--
(A) recruiting intelligence assets;
(B) influencing decisionmaking processes within the Federal
Government, including regarding foreign policy decisions; and
(C) compromising employees of the Federal Government and
friends and families of such employees for the purpose of
gaining access to sensitive national security and economic
information.
(4) An assessment of which departments or agencies of the
Federal Government use the best practices to protect
sensitive data, including a summary of any such best
practices that were not used by the Office of Personnel
Management.
(5) An assessment of the best practices used by the
departments or agencies identified under paragraph (4) to
identify and fix potential vulnerabilities in the systems of
the department or agency.
(c) Briefing.--The Director of National Intelligence shall
provide to the congressional intelligence committees an
interim briefing on the report under subsection (a),
including a discussion of proposals and options for
responding to cyber attacks.
(d) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
SEC. 706. REPORT ON HIRING OF GRADUATES OF CYBER CORPS
SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM BY INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the
National Science Foundation, shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on the
employment by the intelligence community of graduates of the
Cyber Corps Scholarship Program. The report shall include the
following:
(1) The number of graduates of the Cyber Corps Scholarship
Program hired by each element of the intelligence community.
(2) A description of how each element of the intelligence
community recruits graduates of the Cyber Corps Scholar
Program.
(3) A description of any processes available to the
intelligence community to expedite the hiring or processing
of security clearances for graduates of the Cyber Corps
Scholar Program.
(4) Recommendations by the Director of National
Intelligence to improve the hiring by the intelligence
community of graduates of the Cyber Corps Scholarship
Program, including any recommendations for legislative action
to carry out such improvements.
(b) Cyber Corps Scholarship Program Defined.--In this
section, the term ``Cyber Corps Scholarship Program'' means
the Federal Cyber Scholarship-for-Service Program under
section 302 of the Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014 (15
U.S.C. 7442).
SEC. 707. REPORT ON USE OF CERTAIN BUSINESS CONCERNS.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall
[[Page H8671]]
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report
on the representation, as of the date of the report, of
covered business concerns among the contractors that are
awarded contracts by elements of the intelligence community
for goods, equipment, tools, and services.
(b) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (a)
shall include the following:
(1) The representation of covered business concerns as
described in subsection (a), including such representation
by--
(A) each type of covered business concern; and
(B) each element of the intelligence community.
(2) If, as of the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Director does not record and monitor the statistics required
to carry out this section, a description of the actions taken
by the Director to ensure that such statistics are recorded
and monitored beginning in fiscal year 2016.
(3) The actions the Director plans to take during fiscal
year 2016 to enhance the awarding of contracts to covered
business concerns by elements of the intelligence community.
(c) Covered Business Concerns Defined.--In this section,
the term ``covered business concerns'' means the following:
(1) Minority-owned businesses.
(2) Women-owned businesses.
(3) Small disadvantaged businesses.
(4) Service-disabled veteran-owned businesses.
(5) Veteran-owned small businesses.
Subtitle B--Other Matters
SEC. 711. USE OF HOMELAND SECURITY GRANT FUNDS IN CONJUNCTION
WITH DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL
LABORATORIES.
Section 2008(a) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6
U.S.C. 609(a)) is amended in the matter preceding paragraph
(1) by inserting ``including by working in conjunction with a
National Laboratory (as defined in section 2(3) of the Energy
Policy Act of 2005 (42 U.S.C. 15801(3))),'' after ``plans,''.
SEC. 712. INCLUSION OF CERTAIN MINORITY-SERVING INSTITUTIONS
IN GRANT PROGRAM TO ENHANCE RECRUITING OF
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WORKFORCE.
Section 1024 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3224) is amended--
(1) in subsection (c)--
(A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``historically black
colleges and universities and Predominantly Black
Institutions'' and inserting ``historically black colleges
and universities, Predominantly Black Institutions, Hispanic-
serving institutions, and Asian American and Native American
Pacific Islander-serving institutions''; and
(B) in the subsection heading, by striking ``Historically
Black'' and inserting ``Certain Minority-Serving''; and
(2) in subsection (g)--
(A) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (7); and
(B) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following new
paragraphs (5) and (6):
``(5) Hispanic-serving institution.--The term `Hispanic-
serving institution' has the meaning given that term in
section 502(a)(5) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20
U.S.C. 1101a(a)(5)).
``(6) Asian american and native american pacific islander-
serving institution.--The term `Asian American and Native
American Pacific Islander-serving institution' has the
meaning given that term in section 320(b)(2) of the Higher
Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1059g(b)(2)).''.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from
California (Mr. Nunes) and the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff)
each will control 20 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. Nunes).
General Leave
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may
have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and include
extraneous material on the bill, H.R. 4127.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from California?
There was no objection.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, when Ranking Member Schiff and I assumed the helm of the
Intelligence Committee, we committed to carrying on the practice of
passing annual intelligence authorization bills, which is the most
important tool Congress can use to control the intelligence activities
of the United States Government. Today, building on the legacy of
Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger, we are bringing the
sixth consecutive intelligence authorization bill to the floor.
Earlier this year the House passed its version of the bill with a
strong vote. Since then, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
reported out its version of the bill by a unanimous consent vote. I
commend Chairman Burr and Vice Chairman Feinstein for their leadership
on the bill, and I look forward to working with them in future years.
The current bill contains text agreed to by both the House and the
Senate committees. It preserves key House initiatives while adding
several important provisions from the Senate. None of these provisions
are considered controversial.
As most of the intelligence budget involves highly classified
programs, the bulk of the direction is found in the bill's classified
annex, which has been available in HVC-304 for all Members to review
since yesterday.
At an unclassified level, I can report that the classified annex is
consistent with the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015. It reduces the
President's request by less than 1 percent while still providing an
increase above last year's level.
The agreed text preserves key committee and House funding initiatives
that are vital to national security. These initiatives are offset by
reductions to unnecessary programs and increased efficiencies. The
agreement also provides substantial intelligence resources to help
defeat ISIS and other terrorist groups.
Mr. Speaker, today the threat facing America is higher than at any
time since 9/11. ISIS has established a safe haven across Iraq and
Syria, and the group hopes to create a state stretching from Lebanon to
Iraq, including Syria, Jordan, and Israel.
The goal of our counterterrorism strategy should be to deny safe
havens from which terrorists can plot attacks against the United States
and our allies. Regrettably, we have not prevented ISIS from
establishing a safe haven and the group has become skilled at hiding
from western intelligence services.
ISIS members have used that breathing room to plan attacks in Europe,
North Africa, and the Middle East, and they are undoubtedly planning
attacks against the United States.
We rightly demand that our intelligence agencies provide policymakers
with the best and most timely information possible on the threats we
face. We ask them to track terrorists wherever they train, plan, and
fundraise. We ask them to stop devastating cyber attacks that steal
American jobs. We ask them to track nuclear missile threats. We demand
that they get it right every time.
This bill will ensure that the dedicated men and women of our
intelligence community have the funding, authorities, and support they
need to carry out their mission and to keep us safe.
Before closing, I want to take a moment to thank the men and women of
this country who serve in our intelligence community. I am honored to
get to know so many of them in the course of our oversight work.
I would also like to thank all the staff of the committee, both
majority and minority, for their hard work on the bill and for their
daily oversight of the intelligence community.
I would especially like to thank Jeff Shockey, Shannon Stuart, Andy
Peterson, Jake Crisp, and Michael Ellis for all the long hours they put
in to get this bill across the finish line.
From the minority staff, I would like to thank Michael Bahar, Tim
Bergreen, Carly Blake, and Wells Bennett for their work on the bill.
Finally, thank you to the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff). It
has been a pleasure to work with him on this bill, and I look forward
to continuing the committee's oversight work with him over the next
year.
I would also like to recognize one member of the committee staff,
Bill Flanigan. Bill is undergoing surgery today. We wish him all the
best in his recovery.
I urge passage of H.R. 4127.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Joint Explanatory Statement to Accompany the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2016
The following consists of the joint explanatory statement
to accompany the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2016.
This joint explanatory statement reflects the status of
negotiations and disposition of issues reached between the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (hereinafter, ``the
Agreement''). The joint explanatory statement shall have the
same effect with respect to the implementation of this Act as
if it were a joint explanatory statement of a committee of
conference.
[[Page H8672]]
The joint explanatory statement comprises three parts:
first, an overview of the application of the annex to
accompany this statement; second, select unclassified
congressional direction; and third, a section-by-section
analysis of the unclassified legislative text.
PART I: APPLICATION OF THE CLASSIFIED ANNEX
The classified nature of U.S. intelligence activities
prevents the congressional intelligence committees from
publicly disclosing many details concerning the conclusions
and recommendations of the Agreement. Therefore, a classified
Schedule of Authorizations and a classified annex have been
prepared to describe in detail the scope and intent of the
congressional intelligence committees' actions. The Agreement
authorizes the Intelligence Community to obligate and expend
funds not altered or modified by the classified Schedule of
Authorizations as requested in the President's budget,
subject to modification under applicable reprogramming
procedures.
The classified annex is the result of negotiations between
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. It reconciles the
differences between the committees' respective versions of
the bill for National Intelligence Program (NIP) and the
Homeland Security Intelligence Program for Fiscal Year 2016.
The Agreement also makes recommendations for the Military
Intelligence Program (MIP), and the Information Systems
Security Program, consistent with the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, and provides certain
direction for these two programs
The Agreement supersedes the classified annexes to the
reports accompanying H.R. 2596, as passed by the House on
June 16, 2015, and S. 1705, as reported by the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence on July 7, 2015. All references to
the House-passed and Senate-reported annexes are solely to
identify the heritage of specific provisions.
The classified Schedule of Authorizations is incorporated
into the bill pursuant to Section 102. It has the status of
law. The classified annex supplements and adds detail to
clarify the authorization levels found in the bill and the
classified Schedule of Authorizations. The classified annex
shall have the same legal force as the report to accompany
the bill.
PART II: SELECT UNCLASSIFIED CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTION
Enhancing Geographic and Demographic Diversity
The Agreement directs the Office of the Director for
National Intelligence (ODNI) to conduct an awareness,
outreach, and recruitment program to rural, under-represented
colleges and universities that are not part of the IC Centers
of Academic Excellence (IC CAE) program. Further, the
Agreement directs that ODNI shall increase and formally track
the number of competitive candidates for IC employment or
internships who studied at IC CAE schools and other
scholarship programs supported by the IC.
Additionally, the Agreement directs that ODNI, acting
through the Executive Agent for the IC CAE program, the IC
Chief Human Capital Officer, and the Director, IC Equal
Opportunity & Diversity, as appropriate, shall:
1. Add a criterion to the IC CAE selection process that
applicants must be part of a consortium or actively
collaborate with under-resourced schools in their area;
2. Work with CAE schools to reach out to rural and under-
resourced schools, including by inviting such schools to
participate in the annual IC CAE colloquium and IC
recruitment events;
3. Increase and formally track the number of competitive IC
internship candidates from IC CAE schools, starting with
Fiscal Year 2016 IC summer internships, and provide a report,
within 180 days of the enactment of this Act, on its plan to
do so;
4. Develop metrics to ascertain whether IC CAE, the Pat
Roberts Intelligence Scholars Program, the Louis Stokes
Educational Scholarship Program, and the Intelligence Officer
Training Program reach a diverse demographic and serve as
feeders to the IC workforce;
5. Include in the annual report on minority hiring and
retention a breakdown of the students participating in these
programs who serve as IC interns, applied for full-time IC
employment, received offers of employment, and entered on
duty in the IC;
6. Conduct a feasibility study with necessary funding
levels regarding how the IC CAE could be better tailored to
serve under-resourced schools, and provide such study to the
congressional intelligence committees within 180 days of the
enactment of this Act;
7. Publicize all IC elements' recruitment activities,
including the new Applicant Gateway and the IC Virtual Career
Fair, to rural schools, Historically Black Colleges and
Universities, and other minority-serving institutions that
have been contacted by IC recruiters;
8. Contact new groups with the objective of expanding the
IC Heritage Community Liaison Council; and
9. Ensure that IC elements add such activities listed above
that may be appropriate to their recruitment plans for Fiscal
Year 2016.
ODNI shall provide an interim update to the congressional
intelligence committees on its efforts within 90 days of the
enactment of this Act and include final results in its annual
report on minority hiring and retention.
Analytic Duplication & Improving Customer Impact
The congressional intelligence committees are concerned
about potential duplication in finished analytic products.
Specifically, the congressional intelligence committees are
concerned that contemporaneous publication of substantially
similar intelligence products fosters confusion among
intelligence customers (including those in Congress), impedes
analytic coherence across the IC, and wastes time and effort.
The congressional intelligence committees value competitive
analysis, but believe there is room to reduce duplicative
analytic activity and improve customer impact.
Therefore, the Agreement directs ODNI to pilot a repeatable
methodology to evaluate potential duplication in finished
intelligence analytic products and to report the findings to
the congressional intelligence committees within 60 days of
the enactment of this Act. In addition, the Agreement directs
ODNI to report to the congressional intelligence committees
within 180 days of enactment of this Act how it will revise
analytic practice, tradecraft, and standards to ensure
customers can clearly identify how products that are produced
contemporaneously and cover similar topics differ from one
another in their methodological, informational, or temporal
aspects, and the significance of those differences. This
report is not intended to cover operationally urgent analysis
or current intelligence.
Countering Violent Extremism and the Islamic State in Iraq
and the Levant
The Agreement directs ODNI, within 180 days of enactment of
this Act and in consultation with appropriate interagency
partners, to brief the congressional intelligence committees
on how intelligence agencies are supporting both (1) the
Administration's Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) program
first detailed in the 2011 White House strategy Empowering
Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United
States, which was expanded following the January 2015 White
House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism, and (2) the
Administration's Strategy to Counter the Islamic State of
Iraq and the Levant, which was announced in September 2014.
Analytic Health Reports
The Agreement directs the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
to provide Analytic Health Reports to the congressional
intelligence committees on a quarterly basis, including an
update on the specific effect of analytic modernization on
the health of the Defense Intelligence Analysis Program
(DIAP) and its ability to reduce analytic risk.
All-Source Analysis Standards
The Agreement directs DIA to conduct a comprehensive
evaluation of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise's (DIE)
all-source analysis capability and production in Fiscal Year
2015. The evaluation should assess the analytic output of
both NIP and MIP funded all-source analysts, separately and
collectively, and apply the following four criteria
identified in the ODNI Strategic Evaluation Report for all-
source analysis: 1) integrated, 2) objective, 3) timely, and
4) value-added. The results of this evaluation shall be
included as part of the Fiscal Year 2017 congressional budget
justification book.
Terrorism Investigations
The Agreement directs the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) to submit to the congressional intelligence committees,
within 180 days of enactment of this Act, a report detailing
how FBI has allocated resources between domestic and foreign
terrorist threats based on numbers of investigations over the
past 5 years. The report should be submitted in unclassified
form but may include a classified annex.
Investigations of Minors Involved in Radicalization
The Agreement directs the FBI to provide a briefing to the
congressional intelligence committees within 180 days of
enactment of this Act on investigations in which minors are
encouraged to turn away from violent extremism rather than
take actions which that would lead to Federal terrorism
indictments. This briefing should place these rates in the
context of all investigations of minors for violent extremist
activity and should describe any FBI engagement with minors'
families, law enforcement, or other individuals or groups
connected to the minor during or after investigations.
Furthermore, the Agreement directs the FBI to include how
often undercover agents pursue investigations based on a
location of interest related to violent extremist activity
compared to investigations of an individual or group believed
to be engaged in such activity. Included should be the number
of locations of interest associated with a religious group or
entity. This briefing also should include trend analysis
covering the last five years describing violent extremist
activity in the U.S.
PART III: SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS AND EXPLANATION OF LEGISLATIVE
TEXT
The following is a section-by-section analysis and
explanation of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2016.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Section 101. Authorization of appropriations
Section 101 lists the United States Government departments,
agencies, and other elements for which the Act authorizes
appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities for Fiscal Year 2016.
[[Page H8673]]
Section 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations
Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities and the applicable personnel
levels by program for Fiscal Year 2016 are contained in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations and that the classified
Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the
Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of
Representatives and to the President.
Section 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments
Section 103 is intended to provide additional flexibility
to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in managing
the civilian personnel of the Intelligence Community (IC).
Section 103 provides that the DNI may authorize employment of
civilian personnel in Fiscal Year 2016 in excess of the
number of authorized positions by an amount not exceeding
three percent of the total limit applicable to each IC
element under Section 102. The DNI may do so only if
necessary to the performance of important intelligence
functions.
Section 104. Intelligence Community Management Account
Section 104 authorizes appropriations for the Intelligence
Community Management Account (ICMA) of the Director of
National Intelligence and sets the authorized personnel
levels for the elements within the ICMA for Fiscal Year 2016.
Section 105. Clarification regarding authority for flexible
personnel management among elements of intelligence
community
Section 105 clarifies that certain Intelligence Community
elements may make hiring decisions based on the excepted
service designation.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Section 201. Authorization of appropriations
Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of
$514,000,000 for Fiscal Year 2016 for the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself as much time as I may
consume.
First, I want to begin by thanking Chairman Nunes. It has been a
great pleasure to work with him. I greatly appreciate his dedication to
the responsibilities that we have, the bipartisan way that he has run
this committee, the professional way that he and his staff have
conducted all the business of the committee. It has just been an honor
to work with him, and I am greatly appreciative of all he has done to
bring this bill forward.
I also want to express my gratitude to Senators Burr and Feinstein
for their efforts at producing this bipartisan, bicameral work product.
Earlier this year the House passed its version of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for the fiscal year 2016. After the Senate's
Intelligence Committee advanced its version out of committee, we worked
together to produce the bill that is before us today. It is the result
of careful negotiations and of a bipartisan and bicameral commitment to
produce a strong intelligence bill for the sake of our country and of
our allies.
I was not able to vote for the intelligence authorization when it
first came before the House in June, but I am proud to support it
today. Many of the underlying issues have been resolved or
significantly improved. This annual bill, like those that came before
it, funds, equips, and sets priorities for the U.S. intelligence
community, which is critical in the world that we inhabit today.
The recent Paris attacks drive home just how vigilant we need to be,
and the bill before us provides urgent resources for the fight against
ISIS and al Qaeda. At the same time, we must never let our focus on any
one threat or terror group distract us from the other challenges we
face, like those posed by Iran, North Korea, Russia, and China.
This bill strikes the right balance by providing the necessary means
to counter other wide-ranging threats from state and nonstate actors,
particularly in cyberspace, outer space, and in the undersea
environment. The bill also takes critical steps to shore up our
counterintelligence capabilities. This is of particular significance
after the devastating OPM breach.
Additionally, the intelligence authorization continues to be the
single most important means by which Congress conducts oversight of the
intelligence community. We much support the IC, but we also have to
rigorously oversee it and make sure that what it does in our name
comports with our values.
The bill, therefore, prioritizes and provides detailed guidance,
strict authorizations, and precise limitations on the activities of the
intelligence community. It also fences funds to ensure that throughout
the year congressional guidance is strictly followed.
Some of the other highlights of the bill include emphasizing
collection to monitor and ensure Iran's compliance with the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action--this is critical--funding our most
important space programs, investing in space protection and resiliency,
preserving investments in cutting-edge technologies, and enhancing
oversight of contracting and procurement practices. I am particularly
pleased with where the revised bill ends up with respect to our space
programs.
Other highlights of the bill are promoting enhancements to our
foreign partner capabilities, which are crucial to multiplying the
reach and impact of our own intelligence efforts; enhancing human
intelligence capabilities, which is often the key to understanding and
predicting global events; greatly intensifying oversight of defense
special operation forces activities worldwide.
The revised bill also continues to incorporate some of the excellent
provisions championed by many of the Democratic members of the House
Intelligence Committee as well as Republicans, in particular, Mr.
Himes' effort to enhance the quality of metrics we use to enable more
thorough oversight, Ms. Sewell's provisions to enhance diversity within
the intelligence community, Mr. Carson's provisions to better
understand FBI resource allocation against domestic and foreign threats
and the role of FBI and DNI in countering violent extremism
particularly in minors, Ms. Speier's provision to provide greater human
rights oversight of the IC's relationships with certain foreign
partners, Mr. Quigley's provision regarding intelligence support to
Ukraine, and Mr. Swalwell's provision to ensure that Department of
Energy's national labs can work with State and local government
recipients of Homeland Security grants.
As I said earlier, I was not able to support the prior version of the
bill, but I am proud to support this version. I urge my colleagues to
do the same. This version corrects the misguided overreliance on short-
term overseas contingency operations funding to evade the Budget
Control Act caps at the expense of our domestic programs.
The bill still contains unwelcome restrictions, in my view, on the
closure of our facility at Guantanamo Bay, but it modifies them to
mirror the provisions, which passed in the National Defense
Authorization Act and which the President recently signed into law. To
the extent there are any intelligence funds which could be used to
close the prison, these IAA provisions would subject them to the same
restrictions as govern the spending of defense funds in the NDAA.
I remain strongly opposed to any restrictions on closing the prison
at Guantanamo Bay. As these provisions reflect what is currently in
law, I support the larger bill. Especially with what happened in Paris,
we need to act now to fund and enable our intelligence agencies.
Once again, I want to thank Chairman Nunes, Chairman Burr, and Vice
Chairman Feinstein, as well as the wonderful and hardworking staff of
the HPSCI and the SSCI. I also want to thank the administration for
their good work.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I insert in the Record at this point the
second part of the joint explanatory statement.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits
authorized by law
Section 301 provides that funds authorized to be
appropriated by the Act for salary, pay, retirement, and
other benefits for federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for
increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law.
Section 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence
activities
Section 302 provides that the authorization of
appropriations by the Act shall not be deemed to constitute
authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity that
is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of
the United States.
Section 303. Provision of information and assistance to
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
Section 303 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to
clarify the Inspector General
[[Page H8674]]
of the Intelligence Community's authority to seek information
and assistance from federal, state, and local agencies or
units thereof.
Section 304. Inclusion of Inspector General of Intelligence
Community in Council of Inspectors General on Integrity
and Efficiency
Section 304 amends Section 11(b)(1)(B) of the Inspector
General Act of 1978 to reflect the correct name of the Office
of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community. The
section also clarifies that the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community is a member of the Council of the
Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.
Section 305. Clarification of authority of Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board
Section 305 amends the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) to clarify that nothing in the
statute authorizing the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight
Board should be construed to allow that Board to gain access
to information regarding an activity covered by section 503
of the National Security Act of 1947.
Section 306. Enhancing government personnel security programs
Section 306 directs the Director of National Intelligence
(DNI) to develop and implement a plan for eliminating the
backlog of overdue periodic investigations, and further
requires the DNI to direct each agency to implement a program
to provide enhanced security review to individuals determined
eligible for access to classified information or eligible to
hold a sensitive position.
These enhanced personnel security programs will integrate
information relevant and appropriate for determining an
individual's suitability for access to classified
information; be conducted at least 2 times every 5 years; and
commence not later than 5 years after the date of enactment
of the Fiscal Year 2016 Intelligence Authorization Act, or
the elimination of the backlog of overdue periodic
investigations, whichever occurs first.
Section 307. Notification of changes to retention of call
detail record policies
Section 307 requires the Director of National Intelligence
to notify the congressional intelligence committees in
writing not later than 15 days after learning that an
electronic communication service provider that generates call
detail records in the ordinary course of business has changed
its policy on the retention of such call details records to
result in a retention period of less than 18 months. Section
307 further requires the Director to submit to the
congressional intelligence committees within 30 days of
enactment a report identifying each electronic communication
service provider (if any) that has a current policy in place
to retain call detail records for 18 months or less.
Section 308. Personnel information notification policy by the
Director of National Intelligence
Section 308 requires the Director of National Intelligence
to establish a policy to ensure timely notification to the
congressional intelligence committees of the identities of
individuals occupying senior level positions within the
Intelligence Community.
Section 309. Designation of lead intelligence officer for
tunnels
Section 309 requires the Director of National Intelligence
to designate an official to manage the collection and
analysis of intelligence regarding the tactical use of
tunnels by State and non-State actors.
Section 310. Reporting process for tracking country clearance
requests
Section 310 requires the Director of National Intelligence
(DNI) to establish a formal reporting process for tracking
requests for country clearance submitted to overseas DNI
representatives. Section 310 also requires the DNI to brief
the congressional intelligence committees on its progress.
Section 311. Study on reduction of analytic duplication
Sec. 311 requires DNI to carry out a study to identify
duplicative analytic products and the reasons for such
duplication, ascertain the frequency of and reasons for
duplication, and determine whether this review should be
considered a part of the responsibilities assigned to the
Analytic Integrity and Standards office inside the Office of
the DNI. Sec. 311 also requires DNI to provide a plan for
revising analytic practice, tradecraft and standards to
ensure customers are able to readily identify how analytic
products on similar topics that are produced
contemporaneously differ from one another and what is the
significance of those differences.
Section 312. Strategy for comprehensive interagency review of
the United States national security overhead satellite
architecture
Section 312 requires the Director of National Intelligence,
in collaboration with the Secretary of Defense, and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to develop a strategy,
with milestones and benchmarks, to ensure that there is a
comprehensive interagency review of policies and practices
for planning and acquiring national security satellite
systems and architectures, including the capabilities of
commercial systems and partner countries, consistent with the
National Space Policy issued on June 28, 2010. Where
applicable, this strategy shall account for the unique
missions and authorities vested in the Department of Defense
and the Intelligence Community.
Section 313. Cyber attack standards of measurement study
Section 313 directs the Director of National Intelligence,
in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the
Secretary of Defense, to carry out a study to determine the
appropriate standards to measure the damage of cyber
incidents.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Section 401. Appointment and confirmation of the National
Counterintelligence Executive
Section 401 makes subject to Presidential appointment and
Senate confirmation, the executive branch position of
National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX), which was
created by the 2002 Counterintelligence Enhancement Act.
Effective December 2014, the NCIX was also dual-hatted as the
Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security
Center.
Section 402. Technical amendments relating to pay under title
5, United States Code
Section 402 amends 5 U.S.C. Sec. 5102(a)(1) to expressly
exclude the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
(ODNI) from the provisions of chapter 51 of title 5, relating
to position classification, pay, and allowances for General
Schedule employees, which does not apply to ODNI by virtue of
the National Security Act. This proposal would have no
substantive effect.
Section 403. Analytic Objectivity Review
The ODNI's Analytic Integrity and Standards (AIS) office
was established in response to the requirement in IRTPA for
the designation of an entity responsible for ensuring that
the Intelligence Community's finished intelligence products
are timely, objective, independent of political
considerations, based upon all sources of available
intelligence, and demonstrative of the standards of proper
analytic tradecraft.
Consistent with responsibilities prescribed under IRTPA,
Section 403 requires the AIS Chief to conduct a review of
finished intelligence products produced by the CIA to assess
whether the reorganization of the Agency, announced publicly
on March 6, 2015, has resulted in any loss of analytic
objectivity. The report is due two years from the date that
the reorganization was announced, March 6, 2017.
Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency and Other Elements
Section 411. Authorities of the Inspector General for the
Central Intelligence Agency
Section 411 amends Section 17 of the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949 to consolidate the Inspector General's
personnel authorities and to provide the Inspector General
with the same authorities as other Inspector Generals to
request assistance and information from federal, state, and
local agencies or units thereof.
Section 412. Prior congressional notification of transfers of
funds for certain intelligence activities
Section 412 requires notification to the congressional
intelligence committees before transferring funds from the
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Fund or the
Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund that are to be used for
intelligence activities.
TITLE V--MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES
Subtitle A--Matters Relating to Russia
Section 501. Notice of deployment or transfer of Club-K
container missile system by the Russian Federation
Section 501 requires the Director of National Intelligence
to submit written notice to the appropriate congressional
committees if the Intelligence Community receives
intelligence that the Russian Federation has deployed, or is
about to deploy, the Club-K container missile system through
the Russian military, or transferred or sold, or intends to
transfer or sell, such system to another state or non-state
actor.
Section 502. Assessment on funding of political parties and
nongovernmental organizations by the Russian Federation
Section 502 requires the Director of National Intelligence
to submit an Intelligence Community assessment to the
appropriate congressional committees concerning the funding
of political parties and nongovernmental organizations in the
former Soviet States and Europe by the Russian Security
Services since January 1, 2006, not later than 180 days after
the enactment of the Fiscal Year 2016 Intelligence
Authorization Act.
Section 503. Assessment on the use of political
assassinations as a form of statecraft by the Russian
Federation
Section 503 requires the Director of National Intelligence
to submit an Intelligence Community assessment concerning the
use of political assassinations as a form of statecraft by
the Russian Federation to the appropriate congressional
committees, not later than 180 days after the enactment of
the Fiscal Year 2016 Intelligence Authorization Act.
Subtitle B--Matters Relating to Other Countries
Section 511. Report of resources and collection posture with
regard to the South China Sea and East China Sea
Section 511 requires the Director of National Intelligence
to submit to the appropriate congressional committees an
Intelligence Community assessment on Intelligence Community
resourcing and collection posture with regard to the South
China
[[Page H8675]]
Sea and East China Sea, not later than 180 days after the
enactment of the Fiscal Year 2016 Intelligence Authorization
Act.
Section 512. Use of locally employed staff serving at a
United States diplomatic facility in Cuba
Section 512 requires the Secretary of State, not later than
one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, to
ensure that every supervisory position at a United States
diplomatic facility in Cuba is occupied by a citizen of the
United States who has passed a thorough background check.
Further, not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the provision requires the Secretary
of State, in coordination with other appropriate government
agencies, to submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a plan to further reduce the reliance on locally
employed staff in United States diplomatic facilities in
Cuba. The plan shall, at a minimum, include cost estimates,
timelines, and numbers of employees to be replaced.
Section 513. Inclusion of sensitive compartmented information
facilities in United States diplomatic facilities in Cuba
Section 513 requires that each United States diplomatic
facility in Cuba that is constructed, or undergoes a
construction upgrade, be constructed to include a sensitive
compartmented information facility.
Section 514. Report on use by Iran of funds made available
through sanctions relief
Section 514 requires the Director of National Intelligence,
in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, to submit
to the appropriate congressional committees a report
assessing the monetary value of any direct or indirect form
of sanctions relief Iran has received since the Joint Plan of
Action (JPOA) entered into effect, and how Iran has used
funds made available through such sanctions relief. This
report shall be submitted every 180 days while the JPOA is in
effect, and not later than 1 year after an agreement relating
to Iran's nuclear program takes effect, and annually
thereafter while that agreement remains in effect.
TITLE VI--MATTERS RELATING TO UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO
BAY, CUBA
Section 601. Prohibition on use of funds for transfer or
release of individual detained at United States Naval
Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to the United States
Section 601 states that no amounts authorized to be
appropriated or otherwise made available to an element of the
Intelligence Community may be used to transfer or release
individuals detained at Guantanamo Bay to or within the
United States, its territories, or possessions.
Section 602. Prohibition on use of funds to construct or
modify facilities in the United States to house detainees
transferred from United States Naval Station, Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba
Section 602 states that no amounts authorized to be
appropriated or otherwise made available to an element of the
Intelligence Community may be used to construct or modify
facilities in the United States, its territories, or
possessions to house detainees transferred from Guantanamo
Bay.
Section 603. Prohibition on use of funds for transfer or
release to certain countries of individuals detained at
United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
Section 603 states that no amounts authorized to be
appropriated or otherwise made available to an element of the
Intelligence Community may be used to transfer or release an
individual detained at Guantanamo Bay to the custody or
control of any country, or any entity within such country, as
follows: Libya, Somalia, Syria, or Yemen.
TITLE VII--Reports and other Matters
Subtitle A--Reports
Section 701. Repeal of certain reporting requirements
Section 701 repeals certain reporting requirements.
Section 702. Reports on foreign fighters
Section 702 requires the Director of National Intelligence
to submit a report every 60 days for the three years
following the enactment of this Act to the congressional
intelligence committees on foreign fighter flows to and from
Syria and Iraq. Section 702 requires information on the total
number of foreign fighters who have traveled to Syria or
Iraq, the total number of United States persons who have
traveled or attempted to travel to Syria or Iraq, the total
number of foreign fighters in Terrorist Identities Datamart
Environment, the total number of foreign fighters who have
been processed with biometrics, any programmatic updates to
the foreign fighter report, and a worldwide graphic that
describes foreign fighter flows to and from Syria.
Section 703. Report on strategy, efforts, and resources to
detect, deter, and degrade Islamic State revenue
mechanisms
Section 703 requires the Director of National Intelligence
to submit a report on the strategy, efforts, and resources of
the intelligence community that are necessary to detect,
deter, and degrade the revenue mechanisms of the Islamic
State.
Section 704. Report on United States counterterrorism
strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat the Islamic
State, al-Qa'ida, and their affiliated groups, associated
groups, and adherents
Section 704 requires the President to submit to the
appropriated congressional committees a comprehensive report
on the counterterrorism strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and
defeat the Islamic State, al-Qa'ida, and their affiliated
groups, associated groups, and adherents.
Section 705. Report on effects of data breach of Office of
Personnel Management
Section 705 requires the President to transmit to the
congressional intelligence communities a report on the data
breach of the Office of Personnel Management. Section 705
requires information on the impact of the breach on
intelligence community operations abroad, in addition to an
assessment of how foreign persons, groups, or countries may
use data collected by the breach and what Federal Government
agencies use best practices to protect sensitive data.
Section 706. Report on hiring of graduates of Cyber Corps
Scholarship Program by intelligence community
Section 706 requires the Director of National Intelligence
(DNI) to submit to the congressional intelligence committees
a report on the employment by the intelligence community of
graduates of the Cyber Corps Scholarship Program. Section 706
requires information on the number of graduates hired by each
element of the intelligence community, the recruitment
process for each element of the intelligence community, and
DNI recommendations to improve the hiring process.
Section 707. Report on use of certain business concerns
Section 707 requires the Director of National Intelligence
to submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
report of covered business concerns--including minority-
owned, women-owned, small disadvantaged, service-enabled
veteran-owned, and veteran-owned small businesses--among
contractors that are awarded contracts by the intelligence
community for goods, equipment, tools and services.
Subtitle B--Other Matters
Section 711. Use of homeland security grant funds in
conjunction with Department of Energy national
laboratories
Section 711 amends Section 2008(a) of the Homeland Security
Act of 2002 to clarify that the Department of Energy's
national laboratories may seek access to homeland security
grant funds.
Section 712. Inclusion of certain minority-serving
institutions in grant program to enhance recruiting of
intelligence community workforce
Section 712 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to
include certain minority-serving institutions in the
intelligence officer training programs established under
Section 1024 of the Act.
{time} 1315
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the remainder of my time.
The world is a dangerous place, and our intelligence agencies and
professionals are on the front lines of keeping us, our allies, and our
partners safe. We also have to ensure that no matter how dangerous the
world becomes, the United States adheres to its values. What is done to
protect America cannot undermine America, and this legislation ensures
consistent and rigorous oversight.
To the men and women of our intelligence community, you continue to
have my sincerest gratitude and respect for all that you do and my full
appreciation of your dedication, your patriotism, and your unparalleled
skills.
We in Congress must now do our part by passing this bill, and then we
must turn to completing work on cyber legislation and to beginning the
urgent task of preparing for the fiscal year 2017 authorization bill.
To Chairman Nunes, Chairman Burr, and Vice Chair Feinstein, thank you
again for your leadership, your bipartisanship, and your determination
to do what is right.
To all the Members of the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, I thank you for your good work as well.
Finally, thank you to our very superb professional staff. You do a
great job each and every day, and often for very, very long hours.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, before I close, I want to reiterate that the
bill is the most effective way for Congress to carry out oversight of
intelligence activities. This bill forces the executive branch to
remain responsive to congressional direction and priorities.
As the recent terrorist attacks in Paris show, our enemies are
rapidly improving their ability to launch deadly strikes against the
United States and our allies. Given these elevated threat levels, it is
crucial that our intelligence professionals receive the resources they
need to keep Americans
[[Page H8676]]
safe. This bill will authorize those resources while ensuring full
congressional oversight of the intelligence community. I urge my
colleagues to vote for the bill.
In closing, Mr. Speaker, I want to again thank Mr. Schiff for his
congeniality and all of his staff's work and our staff's work on our
side.
Mr. Speaker, I urge passage of the bill.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, as a senior member of the Homeland
Security Committee and Ranking member of the Judiciary Committee's
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and
Investigations, I rise in support of H.R. 4127, the ``Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016,'' for several reasons.
With bipartisan legislative changes negotiated and incorporated, H.R.
4127, is an improved and acceptable bill that will provide critical
funding for our nation's 16 intelligence agencies.
While this measure is not perfect, H.R. 4127 corrects many of the
provisions that were objectionable by providing a more balanced and
realistic budget for our Intelligence Community.
The revised Intelligence Authorization Act makes cuts to less
effective programs, adds money to underfunded ones, and requires
intelligence agencies to keep Congress abreast of their activities to
ensure responsible and lawful spending practices.
More specifically, I am pleased that this bill will: provide critical
resources for the fight against ISIL; emphasize collection to monitor
and ensure compliance with the Iranian nuclear agreement; provide the
necessary means to counter threats from nation-state actors,
particularly in cyberspace, space and the undersea environment, and
furthermore helps to shore up our counter-proliferation and counter-
intelligence capabilities; support our overhead architecture through
the funding of critical space programs, invests in space protection and
resiliency, preserves investments in cutting-edge technologies, and
enhances the oversight of contracting and procurement practices;
promotes foreign partner capabilities; and enhance human intelligence
capabilities and oversight throughout CIA's reorganization process.
H.R. 4127 will provide funding that is 7% above last year's enacted
budget level, and only 1% less than President Obama's budget request.
Importantly, this version of the bill corrects the over-reliance on
short-term Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding to evade
Budget Control Act caps, which proved problematic in the earlier
version.
I applaud my colleagues for working together to reach agreement on a
fair and balanced budget framework that does not harm our economy or
require draconian cuts.
Additionally of concern in the prior measure, to the extent
intelligence funds might be used in an effort to shutter the Guantanamo
facility, the Guantanamo-related language in the current version will
merely subject those funds to restrictions identical to those imposed
by the FY 2016 National Defense Authorization Act, recently passed and
signed into law by the President.
Lastly, while a provision of H.R. 4127 still curtails the Privacy and
Civil Liberties Oversight Board's (PCLOB) ability to access information
regarding covert action, it does not alter the PCLOB's broader
jurisdiction or mission to provide independent oversight and to ensure
that the U.S. appropriately protects privacy and civil liberties in its
counter terrorism programs.
With respect to covert actions, the language of H.R. 4127 has been
reworded to emphasize that such actions are subject to presidential
approval and reporting to Congress pursuant to existing law.
The balance between liberty and security must be respected to
preserve our way of life and the values that countless generations have
fought to preserve.
This includes taking precautionary measures to ensure that lives are
safe from eminent danger and terrorist threats both domestically and
abroad.
On balance, Mr. Speaker, H.R. 4127 contains more salutary than
objectionable provisions, and for that reason I support this bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the
gentleman from California (Mr. Nunes) that the House suspend the rules
and pass the bill, H.R. 4127.
The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the
rules were suspended and the bill was passed.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
____________________
[Congressional Record Volume 161, Number 173 (Tuesday, December 1, 2015)]
[House]
[Page H8678]
PERMISSION TO VACATE PROCEEDINGS ON H.R. 4127, INTELLIGENCE
AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that proceedings by
which the motion to reconsider was laid upon the table and by which the
motion that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 4127)
to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2016 for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the
Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, was adopted
be vacated to the end that the Chair put the question de novo.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the title of the bill.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from California?
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Proceedings whereby the motion to reconsider
was laid on the table and by which the House adopted the motion to
suspend the rules and pass H.R. 4127 are vacated, and the Chair will
put the question de novo.
The question is, Will the House suspend the rules and pass the bill,
H.R. 4127?
The question was taken.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds
being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further
proceedings on this motion will be postponed.
____________________
[Congressional Record Volume 161, Number 173 (Tuesday, December 1, 2015)]
[House]
[Page H8679]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, the
unfinished business is the vote on the motion to suspend the rules and
pass the bill (H.R. 4127) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year
2016 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United
States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other
purposes, on which a recorded vote has been ordered.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the
gentleman from California (Mr. Nunes) that the House suspend the rules
and pass the bill.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 364,
noes 58, not voting 11, as follows:
[Roll No. 649]
AYES--364
Abraham
Adams
Aderholt
Aguilar
Allen
Amodei
Ashford
Babin
Barletta
Barr
Barton
Beatty
Becerra
Benishek
Bera
Beyer
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (MI)
Bishop (UT)
Black
Blackburn
Blum
Bonamici
Bost
Boustany
Boyle, Brendan F.
Brady (PA)
Brady (TX)
Brat
Bridenstine
Brooks (AL)
Brooks (IN)
Brown (FL)
Brownley (CA)
Buchanan
Buck
Bucshon
Burgess
Bustos
Butterfield
Byrne
Calvert
Capps
Cardenas
Carney
Carson (IN)
Carter (GA)
Carter (TX)
Cartwright
Castor (FL)
Castro (TX)
Chabot
Chaffetz
Chu, Judy
Cicilline
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Coffman
Cohen
Cole
Collins (GA)
Collins (NY)
Comstock
Conaway
Connolly
Cook
Cooper
Costa
Costello (PA)
Courtney
Cramer
Crawford
Crenshaw
Crowley
Cuellar
Culberson
Cummings
Curbelo (FL)
Davis (CA)
Davis, Rodney
DeFazio
DeGette
Delaney
DeLauro
Denham
Dent
DeSantis
DeSaulnier
Deutch
Diaz-Balart
Dingell
Doggett
Dold
Donovan
Duckworth
Duffy
Edwards
Ellmers (NC)
Emmer (MN)
Engel
Eshoo
Esty
Farenthold
Farr
Fincher
Fitzpatrick
Fleischmann
Fleming
Flores
Forbes
Fortenberry
Foster
Foxx
Frankel (FL)
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallego
Garamendi
Garrett
Gibbs
Gibson
Goodlatte
Gowdy
Graham
Granger
Graves (GA)
Graves (LA)
Graves (MO)
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Grothman
Guinta
Guthrie
Gutierrez
Hanna
Hardy
Harper
Hartzler
Hastings
Heck (NV)
Heck (WA)
Hensarling
Hice, Jody B.
Higgins
Hill
Himes
Hinojosa
Holding
Hoyer
Hudson
Huizenga (MI)
Hultgren
Hunter
Hurd (TX)
Hurt (VA)
Israel
Issa
Jackson Lee
Jeffries
Jenkins (KS)
Jenkins (WV)
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (OH)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnson, Sam
Jolly
Joyce
Kaptur
Katko
Keating
Kelly (IL)
Kelly (MS)
Kelly (PA)
Kennedy
Kildee
Kilmer
Kind
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kinzinger (IL)
Kline
Knight
Kuster
LaHood
LaMalfa
Lamborn
Lance
Langevin
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Latta
Lawrence
Levin
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Loebsack
Long
Loudermilk
Love
Lowey
Lucas
Luetkemeyer
Lujan Grisham (NM)
Lujan, Ben Ray (NM)
Lynch
MacArthur
Maloney, Carolyn
Maloney, Sean
Marchant
Marino
Matsui
McCarthy
McCaul
McClintock
McCollum
McHenry
McKinley
McMorris Rodgers
McNerney
McSally
Meadows
Meehan
Meeks
Meng
Messer
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Moolenaar
Moulton
Mullin
Murphy (FL)
Murphy (PA)
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal
Neugebauer
Newhouse
Noem
Nolan
Norcross
Nugent
Nunes
Olson
Palazzo
Palmer
Pascrell
Paulsen
Payne
Pearce
Pelosi
Perlmutter
Peters
Peterson
Pittenger
Poliquin
Pompeo
Price (NC)
Price, Tom
Quigley
Rangel
Ratcliffe
Reed
Reichert
Renacci
Ribble
Rice (NY)
Rice (SC)
Richmond
Rigell
Roby
Roe (TN)
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rohrabacher
Rokita
Rooney (FL)
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Ross
Rothfus
Rouzer
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Ruiz
Russell
Ryan (OH)
Salmon
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Scalise
Schiff
Schrader
Schweikert
Scott (VA)
Scott, Austin
Scott, David
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Sessions
Sherman
Shimkus
Shuster
Simpson
Sinema
Sires
Smith (MO)
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Speier
Stefanik
Stewart
Stivers
Stutzman
Swalwell (CA)
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thompson (PA)
Thornberry
Tiberi
Tipton
Titus
Tonko
Torres
Trott
Tsongas
Turner
Upton
Valadao
Van Hollen
Vargas
Veasey
Vela
Visclosky
Wagner
Walberg
Walden
Walker
Walorski
Walters, Mimi
Walz
Wasserman Schultz
Webster (FL)
Wenstrup
Westerman
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wilson (FL)
Wilson (SC)
Wittman
Womack
Woodall
Yoder
Yoho
Young (AK)
Young (IA)
Young (IN)
Zeldin
Zinke
NOES--58
Amash
Bass
Blumenauer
Capuano
Clark (MA)
Clarke (NY)
Clawson (FL)
Conyers
DelBene
DesJarlais
Doyle, Michael F.
Duncan (SC)
Duncan (TN)
Ellison
Fattah
Gabbard
Gohmert
Gosar
Grayson
Griffith
Grijalva
Hahn
Harris
Honda
Huelskamp
Huffman
Jones
Jordan
Labrador
Lee
Lewis
Lieu, Ted
Lofgren
Lowenthal
Lummis
Massie
McDermott
McGovern
Mooney (WV)
Moore
Mulvaney
O'Rourke
Pallone
Perry
Pingree
Pocan
Poe (TX)
Polis
Posey
Sanford
Schakowsky
Takano
Velazquez
Waters, Maxine
Watson Coleman
Weber (TX)
Welch
Yarmuth
NOT VOTING--11
Davis, Danny
Fudge
Herrera Beutler
Kirkpatrick
Pitts
Ruppersberger
Rush
Sewell (AL)
Slaughter
Takai
Williams
Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Curbelo of Florida) (during the vote).
There are 2 minutes remaining.
{time} 1433
Mr. CONYERS changed his vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
Mr. GUTIERREZ changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and
the bill was passed.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
personal explanation
Ms. SEWELL of Alabama. Mr. Speaker, during the votes held on December
1, 2015, I was inescapably detained and away handling important matters
related to my District and the State of Alabama. If I had been present,
I would have voted ``no'' on the Motion on Ordering the Previous
Question on the Rule providing for consideration of H.R. 8, S.J. Res.
23 and S.J. Res 24. Also, I would have voted ``no'' on H. Res. 539.
Finally, I would have voted ``yes'' on S. 1170, the Breast Cancer
Research Stamp Reauthorization Act of 2015, and ``yes'' on H.R. 4127,
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016.
____________________
