

TESTIMONY OF STEVEN G. BRADBURY

**Before the
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY**

**Hearing on
Examining Recommendations to Reform FISA Authorities**

February 4, 2014

Thank you, Chairman Goodlatte, Ranking Member Conyers, and distinguished Members of the Committee.

I'm honored to appear before the Committee today to discuss the foreign intelligence programs of the National Security Agency ("NSA") and to offer views on the major reforms announced by the executive branch or currently under consideration in Congress or proposed by various boards and review groups for modifying or curtailing the NSA's programs and for amending key provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or "FISA."¹

Summary

Any debate over proposals to restrict the NSA activities revealed by Edward Snowden's leaks or to make significant amendments to FISA in response to those leaks should carefully consider whether the foreign intelligence programs that would be affected by the proposals are lawful and whether they continue to be necessary to defend the country.

In his speech on January 17, 2014, the President made it clear that after extensive review of the NSA programs, he has concluded (1) that the programs are lawful in all respects—authorized by statute and consistent with the Constitution, (2) that they remain necessary to protect the United States from foreign attack, and (3) that there have been no intentional abuses of the programs. If the NSA

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programs are lawful and consistent with the Constitution and if, in the estimation of the executive branch and the relevant committees of Congress, they remain necessary to protect the Nation from foreign threats, then the President and Congress should be very wary indeed about approving any changes in the programs that might undermine their effectiveness or that might diminish the ample existing security measures, privacy protections, and oversight protocols under which they operate.

For the reasons I explain in detail in part I of this testimony (pages 5-14 below), I agree with the President that there is no serious argument that the NSA programs as currently configured violate any applicable statutory or constitutional restrictions. The independent federal judges who sit on the FISA court have repeatedly scrutinized these programs over the past several years and ensured that they comply in all respects with the requirements of FISA and are fully consistent with the Fourth and First Amendments of the Constitution. The FISA court's decisions confirm that both the bulk telephone metadata acquisition and focused analysis currently occurring under the business records provision of FISA (commonly known as section 215 of the PATRIOT Act) and the broad foreign-targeted surveillance of international communications conducted under section 702 of FISA comply in all respects with the Constitution and the terms of the relevant statutes and are consistent with the intent of Congress.

With respect to the telephone metadata collection, in particular, this program has been approved on 37 occasions by at least 15 different federal judges on the FISA court and at least two other district court judges. No court has held that the telephone metadata program exceeds the statutory authority granted in section 215 to acquire business records that are "relevant to" an authorized counterterrorism investigation. The recent decision by Judge Richard Leon, which is currently stayed pending appeal to the D.C. Circuit, addressed the Fourth Amendment implications of the telephone metadata collection but did not address its compliance with section 215.

Moreover, a review of the FISA court opinions recently declassified and released to the public amply demonstrates that the FISA court is no rubber stamp for the surveillance policies of the executive branch. The judges of the FISA court, as well as the attorneys of the National Security Division of the Justice Department, the Inspectors General of the Intelligence Community and the Justice

Department, and the diligent oversight of the Intelligence Committees of Congress, have held the NSA to the highest standards in the operations of these programs, including by ordering the prompt correction of significant compliance issues identified to the court by the Agency and its overseers.

Indeed, I understand that all Members of Congress, specifically including the Judiciary Committees, were informed about the details of these two NSA programs or were at least given the opportunity to receive such briefings in connection with the reauthorizations of sections 215 and 702. The large majorities of both Houses that voted to reauthorize these statutes in 2011 and 2012 therefore represented, at least constructively, a clear approval and ratification of the legal interpretations supporting the NSA's collection and surveillance activities, including the bulk acquisition of telephone metadata.

As explained in part II of this testimony (pages 15-16 below), I also accept the judgment of the President, the Director of National Intelligence ("DNI"), and Gen. Alexander, the outgoing Director of the NSA, that the NSA programs revealed by Snowden are critically important to preserving the security of the United States and its allies and that these programs continue to make an essential contribution to our counterterrorism defenses. From everything I know, these programs are, as they were designed to be, among the most effective tools for detecting and identifying connections between foreign terrorist organizations and active cells within the United States and for discovering new leads, including new phone numbers, in furtherance of counterterrorism investigations. With respect to the telephone metadata program conducted under section 215, both the President and Michael Morrell, former Deputy Director of the CIA and a member of the President's Review Group, have stated that if this program had been in place before September 2001, it might have prevented the attacks of 9/11, and it has the potential to help prevent the next 9/11.

If that's true, it is the duty of the President to stand up and defend the programs before the American people and Congress. I'm pleased that the President finally spoke out in strong defense of these programs and the work of the dedicated officers of our intelligence agencies in his speech of January 17, though, as explained more fully below, it's disappointing that the President nevertheless felt the need to bow to political pressures and to propose changes in the operation

of the telephone metadata program that could significantly diminish the effectiveness of the program and could compromise the security of the database.

I'm also gratified that the leaders of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees have clearly and consistently defended the programs and the integrity of the NSA. I'm hopeful that through these hearings and debates, a majority of all Members of the House and the Senate will be convinced of the need to support and preserve these essential foreign intelligence capabilities in the face of popular reaction. The national interest must trump narrow political interests.

Finally, in part III of this testimony (pages 16-21), I explain the reasons for my conviction that all of the major proposals under consideration for curtailing, restricting, or modifying the NSA programs (most especially the section 215 telephone metadata program) and for reforming the scope and use of FISA authorities in reaction to the Snowden leaks should be rejected. These include the President's announced reforms to the section 215 telephone metadata program and the major reform recommendations of the President's Review Group and the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board.

As discussed in more detail below, certain of these reforms or reform proposals would expose the Nation to vulnerability by substantially weakening or even destroying outright the effectiveness of the 215 program. Other proposals would significantly diminish the ability of the government to ensure the security and oversight of the program. Still others would unnecessarily hamper foreign intelligence efforts by adding layers of lawyering or litigation-like process that would not actually achieve greater civil liberties protections for the public but that would, I fear, prove dangerously unworkable in the event of the next catastrophic attack on the United States.

I therefore strongly urge the Committee to avoid endorsing proposals for substantial modification of the NSA programs or FISA provisions. If reforms are adopted that would severely constrain the effectiveness and utility of the NSA programs, then Edward Snowden and his collaborators will have achieved their explicit objective of weakening the national security defenses and capabilities of the United States and diminishing the position of strength that America occupies in the world post-9/11. These harms to our national security would come with no significant corresponding enhancements to civil liberties.

I. The NSA Programs Satisfy All Statutory and Constitutional Requirements

I have previously explained in detail why both the section 215 bulk acquisition of telephone metadata and the section 702 foreign-targeted surveillance of international communications are authorized by statute, consistent with the Constitution and congressional intent, and appropriately protective of privacy and civil liberties.² I will not repeat the full analysis here, but I do offer the following points.

Section 215 Telephone Metadata Program.

The telephone metadata acquired by the NSA under the section 215 business records order consists only of tables of numbers indicating which phone numbers called which numbers and the time and duration of the calls. It does not reveal any other subscriber information, and it does not enable the government to listen to anyone's phone calls.

The Fourth Amendment does not require a search warrant or other individualized court order for the government to acquire this type of purely transactional metadata, as distinct from the content of communications. The acquisition of such call-detail information, either in bulk or for the communications of identified individuals, does not constitute a "search" for Fourth Amendment purposes with respect to the individuals whose calls are detailed in the records. The information is voluntarily made available to the phone company to complete the call and for billing purposes, and courts have therefore consistently held that there is no reasonable expectation by the individuals making the calls that this information will remain private. *See Smith v. Maryland*, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979).

In his recent decision granting a motion for a preliminary injunction of the metadata program, which is now stayed pending appeal, Judge Richard Leon of the federal district court in D.C. reasoned that the Supreme Court's decision in *Smith*

² See Steven G. Bradbury, *Understanding the NSA Programs: Bulk Acquisition of Telephone Metadata under Section 215 and Foreign-Targeted Collection under Section 702*, 1 Lawfare Res. Paper Series No. 3 (Sept. 2013), available at <http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Bradbury-Vol-1-No-3.pdf>.

v. Maryland has become obsolete in the era of smartphones and fully functional wireless digital communications. But the calling-record data collected by the NSA is almost exactly the same data the police collected in *Smith*: the phone numbers dialed and the date and time of those calls. In *Smith*, the Court held that telephone customers have no reasonable expectation of privacy in these transactional records, and ever since the Court's 1967 decision in *Katz v. United States*, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), a reasonable expectation of privacy has been the measure for what constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. For that reason, the federal courts of appeals and all other district courts before Judge Leon have consistently followed *Smith* and applied its holding to other developing technologies, including the collection of e-mail metadata.³

Although Judge Leon's ruling emphasizes the "all-encompassing" and "indiscriminate" nature of the NSA's metadata collection, the breadth of the data collection does not alter anyone's reasonable expectations of privacy. If anything, the use of a pen register to target a single suspect's personal phone line, as occurred in the *Smith* case, is more intrusive than the NSA's metadata collection, given the vastness and anonymity of the data set and the minuscule chance that any particular person's calling records will be reviewed by an NSA analyst. In other words, the individual privacy interests of the tens of millions of telephone customers whose calling records are collected by the NSA are lessened even further, not increased, by the breadth of the database.

Judge Leon also cited the Supreme Court's 2012 decision in *United States v. Jones*, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012), involving the GPS tracking of a criminal suspect, but that case is not germane. In *Jones*, the police trespassed on the suspect's property by installing a GPS device on his car and tracked his every move. The NSA's bulk collection, in contrast, entails no physical invasion of property and does not comprehensively track individual customers' movements and activities.

The NSA's acquisition of telephone metadata is also authorized under the terms of section 215, which permits the acquisition of business records that are "relevant to an authorized investigation." Here, the telephone metadata is "relevant" to counterterrorism investigations because the use of the database is essential to conduct a link analysis of terrorist phone numbers, and this type of

³ *Accord Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co.*, 529 F.3d 892, 904-05 (9th Cir. 2008) (same analysis for email addressing information).

analysis is a critical building block in these investigations. Acquiring a comprehensive database is needed to enable effective analysis of the telephone links and calling patterns of terrorist suspects, which is often the only way to discover new phone numbers being used by terrorists. To “connect the dots” effectively requires the broadest set of telephone metadata.

The legal standard of relevance incorporated into section 215 is the same common standard that courts have long held governs the enforcement of administrative subpoenas, grand jury subpoenas, and document production orders in civil litigation, which, unlike section 215 business records orders, do not require the advance approval of a court.⁴

The Supreme Court has long held that courts must enforce administrative subpoenas so long as the agency can show that the subpoena was issued for a lawfully authorized purpose and seeks information relevant to the agency’s inquiry.⁵ This standard of relevance is exceedingly broad; it permits agencies to obtain “access to virtually any material that might cast light on” the matters under inquiry,⁶ and to subpoena records “of even *potential* relevance to an ongoing investigation.”⁷ Grand jury subpoenas are given equally broad scope and may only be quashed where “there is no reasonable possibility that the category of materials the Government seeks will produce information relevant to the general subject of the grand jury’s investigation.”⁸ And in civil discovery, the concept of relevance is applied “broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.”⁹

⁴ See 152 Cong. Rec. 2426 (2006) (Statement of Sen. Kyl) (explaining the “relevant to” language added to section 215 in 2006) (“Relevance is a simple and well established standard of law. Indeed, it is the standard for obtaining every other kind of subpoena, including administrative subpoenas, grand jury subpoenas, and civil discovery orders.”).

⁵ See *United States v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank*, 437 U.S. 298, 313 (1978); *United States v. Powell*, 379 U.S. 48, 57 (1964); *Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling*, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946).

⁶ *EEOC v. Shell Oil Co.*, 466 U.S. 54, 68-69 (1984).

⁷ *United States v. Arthur Young & Co.*, 465 U.S. 805, 814 (1984) (emphasis in original).

⁸ *United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc.*, 498 U.S. 292, 301 (1991).

⁹ *Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders*, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978).

The relevance standard does not require a separate showing that every individual record in a subpoenaed database is “relevant” to the investigation.¹⁰ The standard is satisfied if there is good reason to believe that the database contains information pertinent to the investigation and if, as here, the acquisition of the database is needed to preserve the data and to be able to conduct focused queries to find particular records useful to the investigation.¹¹ Similar subpoena authority is used by numerous different federal regulatory and law enforcement agencies, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and others, to conduct broad investigations of conduct within their statutory jurisdictions.

Of course, the NSA’s mission is far more important and essential than the mere regulatory missions of most other federal agencies because the NSA is charged with nothing less than the protection of our way of life from catastrophic foreign attack. The importance of the interest at stake informs any analysis of the reasonableness of the scope of data collected. The effective analysis of terrorist calling connections and the discovery through that analysis of new phone numbers being used by terrorist suspects, including previously undetected terrorist cells operating in the U.S., require the NSA to assemble and maintain the most comprehensive set of telephone metadata, and the section 215 order provides that unique capability.

¹⁰ See *In re Grand Jury Proceedings*, 616 F.3d 1186, 1202, 1205 (10th Cir. 2010) (confirming (1) that the categorical approach to relevance for grand jury subpoenas “contemplates that the district court will assess relevancy based on the broad types of material sought” and will not “engag[e] in a document-by-document” or “line-by-line assessment of relevancy,” and (2) that “[i]ncidental production of irrelevant documents . . . is simply a necessary consequence of the grand jury’s broad investigative powers and the categorical approach to relevancy”).

¹¹ See, e.g., *In re Subpoena Duces Tecum*, 228 F.3d 341, 350-51 (4th Cir. 2000); *FTC v. Invention Submission Corp.*, 965 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1992); *In re Grand Jury Proceedings*, 827 F.2d 301, 305 (8th Cir. 1987); *Associated Container Transp. (Aus.) Ltd. v. United States*, 705 F.2d 53, 58 (2d Cir. 1983). The same approach is sanctioned in the federal rules governing criminal search warrants. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e)(2)(B) (“A warrant . . . may authorize the seizure of electronic storage media or . . . information” subject to “a later review of the media or information consistent with the warrant”); *United States v. Hill*, 459 F.3d 966, 975 (9th Cir. 2006) (sanctioning “blanket seizure” of computer system based on showing of need); *United States v. Upham*, 168 F.3d 532, 535 (1st Cir. 1999) (sanctioning “seizure and subsequent off-premises search” of computer database).

While the metadata order is extraordinary in terms of the amount of data acquired, which is far greater than the amount of data involved in most other federal agency investigations, the metadata order is also extraordinarily narrow and focused because of the strict limitations placed on accessing the data. There's no data mining or trolling through the database looking for suspicious patterns. By court order, the data can only be accessed when the government has reasonable suspicion that a particular phone number is associated with a foreign terrorist organization, and then that number is tested against the database to discover its connections. If it appears to be a U.S. number, the necessary suspicion cannot be based solely on First Amendment-protected activity.

Because of this limited focus, only a tiny fraction of the total data has ever been reviewed by analysts. The database is kept segregated and is not accessed for any other purpose, and FISA requires the government to follow procedures overseen by the court to minimize any unnecessary dissemination of U.S. numbers. Any data records older than five years are continually deleted from the system.

The order must be reviewed and reapproved every 90 days, and since 2006, this metadata order has been approved at least 37 times by at least 15 different federal judges. The telephone metadata program was also recently upheld as lawful in all respects in an independent decision by Judge William Pauley of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The contrary analysis offered by three members of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board in their recent report is entirely unconvincing.

In addition to court approval, the 215 program is also subject to oversight by the executive branch and Congress. FISA mandates periodic audits by inspectors general and reporting to the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees of Congress. When section 215 was reauthorized in 2011, the administration briefed the leaders of Congress and the members of these Committees on the details of this program. The administration also provided detailed written descriptions of the program to the chairs of the Intelligence Committees, and the administration requested that those descriptions be made available to all Members of Congress in connection with the renewal of section 215.

These briefing documents specifically included the disclosure that under this program, the NSA acquires the call-detail metadata for “substantially all of the telephone calls handled by the [phone] companies, including both calls made between the United States and a foreign country and calls made entirely within the United States.”¹² Public reports indicate that the Intelligence Committees provided briefings on the details of the program to all interested Members of Congress, and the administration has conducted further detailed briefings on this program since the Snowden leaks became public.

Section 702 Collection.

The second NSA program revealed by the Snowden leaks—the foreign-targeted surveillance of international communications—is conducted under section 702 of FISA.

With court approval, section 702 authorizes a program of foreign-focused surveillance for periods of one year at a time. This authority may only be used if the surveillance does *not* (1) intentionally target any person, of any nationality, known to be located in the United States, (2) target a person outside the U.S. if the purpose is to reverse target any particular person believed to be in the U.S., (3) intentionally target a U.S. person anywhere in the world, and (4) intentionally acquire any communication as to which the sender and all recipients are known to be in the U.S.

Section 702 mandates court approval of the targeting protocols and of minimization procedures to ensure that any information about U.S. persons that may be captured in this surveillance will not be retained or disseminated except as necessary for foreign intelligence purposes.

From everything that’s been disclosed about the foreign-targeted surveillance program, including the so-called PRISM Internet collection, it appears to be precisely what section 702 was designed to permit.

¹² Report on the National Security Agency’s Bulk Collection Programs for USA PATRIOT Act Reauthorization at 3, *enclosed with* Letters for Chairmen of House and Senate Intelligence Committees from Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, Department of Justice (Feb. 2, 2011). The identical disclosure was also made in a similar report enclosed with letters dated December 14, 2009.

The 702 program is also fully consistent with the Constitution. As a background principle, the Fourth Amendment does not require the government to obtain a court-approved warrant supported by probable cause before conducting foreign intelligence surveillance. The Supreme Court has reserved judgment on the question,¹³ but the courts of appeals have consistently held that the President has inherent constitutional authority to conduct warrantless searches and surveillance to obtain intelligence information about the activities of foreign powers, both inside and outside the United States and both in wartime and peacetime.¹⁴

The absence of a warrant requirement does not mean the Fourth Amendment has no application to foreign intelligence surveillance. Rather, searches and surveillance conducted in the United States by the executive branch for foreign intelligence purposes are subject to the general reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment. *See Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton*, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (holding that the touchstone for government compliance with the Fourth Amendment is whether the search is “reasonable” and recognizing that the warrant requirement is inapplicable in situations involving “special needs” that go beyond routine law enforcement).

The reasonableness of foreign intelligence surveillance, like other “special needs” searches, is judged under a general balancing standard “by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which [the search] intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” *United States v. Knights*, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001)

¹³ *See United States v. United States District Court* (the “Keith” case), 407 U.S. 297, 308 (1972) (explaining that the Court did not have occasion to judge “the scope of the President’s surveillance power with respect to the activities of foreign powers, within or without this country”); *Katz v. United States*, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).

¹⁴ *See, e.g., In re Sealed Case*, 310 F.3d 717, 742 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. of Rev. 2002); *United States v. Truong Dinh Hung*, 629 F.2d 908, 914-15 (4th Cir. 1980), *cert. denied*, 454 U.S. 1144 (1982); *United States v. Buck*, 548 F.2d 871, 875 (9th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 434 U.S. 890 (1977); *United States v. Butenko*, 494 F.2d 593, 605 (3d Cir.), *cert. denied sub nom. Ivanov v. United States*, 419 U.S. 881 (1974); *United States v. Brown*, 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir.1973), *cert. denied*, 415 U.S. 960 (1974). *But see Zweibon v. Mitchell*, 516 F.2d 594, 619-20 (D.C.Cir.1975) (en banc) (plurality opinion suggesting in dicta that a warrant may be required even in a foreign intelligence investigation), *cert. denied*, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).

(quoting *Wyoming v. Houghton*, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)). In the context of authorized NSA surveillance directed at protecting against foreign threats to the United States, the governmental interest is of the highest order. See *Haig v. Agee*, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (“It is ‘obvious and unarguable’ that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.”).

On that basis, prior to 1978, Presidents conducted surveillance of national security threats without court supervision. That practice led to the abuses that were documented by the Church and Pike Committees and eventually resulted in the passage of FISA.

FISA was enacted as an accommodation between Congress and the executive branch. It was designed to ensure the reasonableness of surveillance by requiring the approval of a federal judge for certain defined types of clandestine foreign intelligence surveillance conducted in the United States, instituting oversight of the process by the Intelligence Committees of Congress, providing for procedures to “minimize” the retention and dissemination of information about U.S. persons collected as part of foreign intelligence investigations, and regularizing procedures for the use of evidence obtained in such investigations in criminal proceedings.

Under FISA, electronic surveillance of persons in the United States for foreign intelligence purposes requires an order approved by a judge and supported by individualized probable cause to believe the target is an agent of a foreign power or engaged in international terrorism.

Ever since FISA was enacted, it’s been recognized that FISA raises significant constitutional issues to the extent it might impinge on the President’s ability to carry out his constitutional duty to protect the United States from foreign attack.

Importantly, in its original conception, FISA was not intended to govern the conduct of communications intelligence anywhere overseas or the NSA’s collection and surveillance of international communications into and out of the United States. FISA’s definition of “electronic surveillance” focuses on the interception of wire communications on facilities in the United States and on the interception of certain categories of domestic radio communications. See 50

U.S.C. § 1801(f). In 1978, most international calls were carried by satellite, and thus the statute’s definition of “electronic surveillance” was carefully designed at the time to exclude from the jurisdiction of the FISA court not only all surveillance conducted outside the United States, but also the surveillance of nearly all international communications.¹⁵

FISA also exempted from statutory regulation the acquisition of intelligence information from “international or foreign communications” not involving “electronic surveillance” as defined in FISA,¹⁶ and this change, too, was “designed to make clear that the legislation does not deal with the international signals intelligence activities as currently engaged in by the National Security Agency and electronic surveillance conducted outside the United States.”¹⁷ Congress specifically understood that the NSA surveillance that these carve-outs would categorically exclude from FISA included the monitoring of international communications into and out of the United States of U.S. citizens.¹⁸

In the years following the passage of FISA, however, communications technologies evolved in ways that Congress had not anticipated. International lines of communications that once were transmitted largely by satellite migrated to undersea fiber optic cables. This evolution increased greatly with the advent of the Internet. In the new world of packet-switched Internet communications and international fiber optic cables, FISA’s original regime of individualized court orders for foreign intelligence surveillance conducted on facilities in the United States became cumbersome, because it now required case-by-case court approvals for the surveillance of international communications that were previously exempt from FISA coverage. Nevertheless, prior to 9/11, the executive branch found the FISA system to be adequate and workable for most national security purposes.

¹⁵ See S. Rep. No. 95-604, at 33-34, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3934-36.

¹⁶ See Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 201(b), (c), 92 Stat. 1783, 1797 (1978), *codified at* 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) (1982).

¹⁷ S. Rep. No. 95-604, at 64, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3965.

¹⁸ See *id.* at 64 n.63 (describing the excluded NSA activities by reference to a Church Committee report, S. Rep. No. 94-755, at Book II, 308 (1976), which stated: “[T]he NSA intercepts messages passing over international lines of communication, some of which have one terminal within the United States. Traveling over these lines of communication, especially those with one terminal in the United States, are messages of Americans . . .”).

All of that changed with the attacks of 9/11. In the estimation of the President and the NSA, the imperative of conducting fast, flexible, and broad-scale signals intelligence of international communications in order to detect and prevent further terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland proved to be incompatible with the traditional FISA procedures for individualized court orders and the cumbersome approval process then in place. As the Justice Department later explained in a public white paper addressing the legal basis for the NSA's warrantless surveillance of international communications involving suspected terrorists that was authorized by special order of the President following 9/11, "[t]he President ha[d] determined that the speed and agility required to carry out the[se] NSA activities successfully could not have been achieved under FISA."¹⁹

The public disclosures in 2005 and 2006 concerning the President's authorization of warrantless surveillance by the NSA precipitated extensive debates and hearings in Congress. Ultimately, these debates culminated in passage of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 and the addition of section 702 to FISA. Section 702 was designed to return to a model of foreign surveillance regulation similar to the original conception of FISA by greatly streamlining the court review and approval of a program of surveillance of international communications targeted at foreign persons believed to be outside the United States. Under section 702, such foreign-targeted surveillance may be authorized by the Attorney General and DNI without individualized court orders for periods of up to one year at a time upon the approval by the FISA court of the required targeting protocols and minimization procedures. *See* 50 U.S.C. § 1881a.

By establishing procedures for court approval (albeit more streamlined and "programmatic" approval than required for traditional individualized FISA surveillance orders) and by strengthening congressional oversight of the resulting program, section 702 continues to provide a system of foreign intelligence surveillance, including for international communications and surveillance targeted at foreign persons outside the U.S., that is more restrictive and protective than the Constitution would otherwise require.

¹⁹ U.S. Department of Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National Security Agency Described by the President 34 (Jan. 19, 2006).

As publicly described, the NSA's section 702 program of foreign-targeted Internet surveillance easily meets the reasonableness requirements of the Fourth Amendment. The surveillance is conducted for foreign intelligence purposes, which carry great weight in the Fourth Amendment balance, and the retention and use of information collected in the program about U.S. persons are subject to extensive and detailed minimization procedures designed to protect the reasonable privacy interests of Americans, and these minimization procedures have been reviewed and approved by a federal court.

II. There Is Every Reason to Believe that the NSA Programs Remain Necessary to Protect the National Security of the United States and Its Allies

Both of the NSA programs discussed above are intended to provide quick and efficient detection and identification of contacts between suspected agents of foreign terrorist organizations and unknown operatives that may be hiding out within the United States. For my part, I believe that the need for such detection is just as acute today as it was in the immediate wake of 9/11. The President and both the Republican and Democratic leaders of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees firmly agree; otherwise, I'm confident that they would not support the continuation of these programs, in light of the public controversy the programs have generated following the Snowden leaks.

More specifically with regard to the 215 order, from all that I know, I have every confidence that the bulk acquisition of the telephone metadata is necessary to preserve the data for use in the FBI's counterterrorism investigations and to combine the call-detail records generated by multiple telephone companies into a single searchable database. Furthermore, the use of the entire integrated database is essential to conduct focused link analysis and contact chaining of terrorist phone numbers and thereby discover new terrorist phone numbers that we did not know about before.

It is necessary to retain the data for a sufficient period, such as five years, to be able to conduct historical analysis to find connections between newly discovered phone numbers and the numbers of previously identified terrorist agents that may have been the subjects of past investigations.

I believe that the 215 program provides a frequent and important input for ongoing investigations of terrorist activities. I don't believe the proper test of the program's necessity is whether it has provided the one primary piece of information required to thwart a specific terrorist plot just before an attack has been carried out. Any such narrow focus on the interdiction of particular mature plots is unrealistic because it does not take account of how these investigations are conducted and the fact that nearly all counterterrorism efforts involve numerous inputs from diverse sources over an extended period of time. A counterterrorism investigation is like assembling a jigsaw puzzle; every input is important, and it is rare that any one input can be identified as singularly critical.

A more suitable and relevant high-level metric of the program's utility might be to ask the following: For how many of the particular threat items reported to the President by the DNI in the President's Daily Intelligence Briefing ("PDB") has the section 215 telephone metadata program been used in developing the underlying investigation that resulted in that PDB item?

III. The Major Proposals for Curtailing or Modifying the NSA Programs and for Amending the FISA Authorities Should Be Rejected

I offer the following thoughts on why the President's reforms to the section 215 telephone metadata program and the other principal reform proposals, including legislative proposals, for modifying the authorities of the NSA under FISA should not be approved.

The most sweeping change under consideration, as I understand it, would restrict the government's authority under section 215 to acquiring on an item-by-item basis only those individual business records, including telephone call-detail records, that directly pertain to the person who is the subject of the counterterrorism investigation. A variation on this proposal would limit the NSA to conducting one-by-one queries of the call-detail databases of the phone companies only while the data is retained by the companies in the ordinary course of business.

Such requirements would kill the NSA's telephone metadata program, because they would, by design, deny the NSA the broad field of data needed to conduct in an efficient and workable manner the link analysis and contact chaining that is enabled by the current program.

At the same time, denying the NSA the authority to acquire the metadata in bulk and to retain it for a period of years would preclude any historical analysis of connections between a terrorist phone number and other, yet undiscovered numbers, and the ability to examine historical connections and patterns is among the most valuable capabilities of the 215 metadata program. Indeed, any proposal to limit the length of metadata retention to a period of less than the current five years should be approached with great care, because it would by definition diminish the capacity of the NSA to conduct this important historical contact analysis. I'm encouraged that the President has not proposed to limit the NSA's retention of the data to less than five years.

A less sweeping but still very significant restriction would prohibit the NSA from taking possession of the call-detail records obtained under the 215 order and would instead require that the data be maintained for an extended period under the control of the telephone companies, presumably at the expense of the federal government. This alternative was recommended by the President's Review Group, and the President indicated in his January 17 speech that he wishes to move the database to private hands and has tasked the Attorney General and DNI to study how that might be accomplished. At the same time, the President acknowledged the difficulties of doing so and the fact that this option may affect the speed and flexibility of the program and could exacerbate privacy concerns.

The current program enables the NSA to acquire all of the telephone metadata on an ongoing basis from several companies in order to preserve the data in a segregated and secure manner and combine it together in a form that is efficiently usable and searchable. Ceding control of the combined database to the phone companies would presumably require the involvement of a private, third-party contractor to house and manage the data, since no single phone company has the ability or inclination to maintain and aggregate all of the data of the several companies and host the data on servers for a sufficient period of years in a searchable form.

Today the database is locked down and kept secure and segregated by the NSA in the basement of Fort Meade. If the database were outsourced to a private contractor, it would in all likelihood be housed off-site, probably in some suburban office park, and it would certainly be kept on less secure servers. In that event, the

database would be far more vulnerable to privacy breaches and cyber incursions from foreign governments, terrorist groups, criminal organizations, and sophisticated hackers. Furthermore, unless Congress provided otherwise by statute, the data would be exposed to court-ordered discovery by private litigants in all manner of civil lawsuits. The private contractors with access to the database would also be much less subject to effective oversight by the executive branch, the FISA court, and Congress.

Any such arrangement involving a third-party contractor, therefore, would be distinctly less efficient, less secure, and less subject to effective oversight than the current program. That result cannot be a desirable one, both in terms of national security and in terms of the privacy of the data and the potential for its abuse.

Another proposal recommended by the Review Group and reflected in some bills pending in Congress would require prior FISA court approval for querying the telephone metadata—in other words, a prior court determination that there is reasonable articulable suspicion that the phone number to be queried against the database is associated with one of the specified foreign terrorist organizations. The President has ordered the NSA to put in place some version of this proposal, subject to the Attorney General’s working out acceptable procedures in consultation with the FISA judges. Depending on how it’s implemented, such a requirement would place a significant and potentially unwieldy restraint on the speed and flexibility of the program, particularly if it requires one-by-one court approval of each query, and will likely place a substantial new burden on the operations of the FISA court. If applied to the “hops” from the original seed number, for example, this requirement of prior court approval would throttle the utility of the program entirely.

The President has also ordered that the NSA not analyze calling records out to the third “hop” from the seed number. This change, too, poses a significant risk of diminishing the speed, flexibility, and utility of the program, since, as I understand it, the NSA currently analyzes third-hop data only where the Agency identifies a specific intelligence reason for doing so. Why needlessly prevent the NSA from pursuing valid and potentially important intelligence leads or interpose a new requirement of court approval before the NSA may do so?

Moreover, requiring court approval of each reasonable articulable suspicion determination before the NSA may access the database would impose a legalistic judicial overlay on a judgment that is designed to be made by and is far more appropriately made by seasoned intelligence analysts. Insisting on prior court approval will inevitably require the involvement of more and more lawyers as intermediaries between the intelligence officers and the judges of the court and will inevitably involve the translation of reasonable suspicion determinations into more and more paper in order to communicate the real-time intelligence judgments of NSA professionals into the language understood by the judges and their legal advisers. The alternative included in some legislative proposals of requiring approval by the lawyers of the National Security Division of the Justice Department would suffer from the same defect: It would interpose a lawyer's sensibility in place of the practical judgment of intelligence professionals.

One further proposal often raised is to attempt to graft onto the traditionally *ex parte* procedures of the FISA court a litigation-like adversary process—for example, by creating the position of a “Public Advocate” for the FISA court. Under certain of these proposals, the Public Advocate would be charged with representing the “public interest” or the “privacy interests” of the targets of the surveillance and would be expected to oppose the government's applications, at least in cases raising novel interpretations of FISA or asking to extend the law beyond how it has previously been applied. One such proposal would require that the Public Advocate receive a copy of each application for a FISA order and would give the Public Advocate the independent right to decide when to intervene and even the right to appeal any FISA order approved by the court.

This concept of introducing a Public Advocate with independent authority and appeal powers into the FISA process raises serious constitutional concerns. Because the review of FISA applications requires access to the most sensitive national security information, including both current threat assessments and descriptions of the proposed intelligence operations, any appointed advocate would have to be a permanent, trusted officer of the executive branch or of the FISA court with the necessary security clearances. Constitutional issues would arise in any statutory mandate that the President invariably permit the Public Advocate to have access to such sensitive classified information. The protection of national security secrets is a duty the Constitution assigns exclusively to the President; Congress may not direct the exercise of this duty by statute. Constitutional issues would also

follow if the Public Advocate were given the power to appeal a decision of the FISA court over the objections of the executive branch.

Moreover, introducing such an advocate position would not likely achieve the meaningful benefits that proponents hope for. The judges assigned to the FISA court are already assisted by permanent legal advisers who are steeped in the precedents of the court and whose job is to second guess the arguments and analyses of the executive branch. If a particular FISA application raises significant questions, the legal advisers are already asked to prepare separate, in-depth analyses for the judges. The recently disclosed opinions of the FISA court convincingly show that the judges of the court and their legal advisers are not shy about applying a thoroughly independent review of the issues that is in no way beholden to the executive branch. If a Public Advocate were part of the executive branch, the advocate would always ultimately be answerable to the President. If employed by the court, the advocate would be little different from the existing legal advisers. Either way, the Public Advocate could never actually be a true independent adversary representing the interests of those under surveillance.

The President evidently disapproves the idea of a more formal Public Advocate, as described above. Instead, he has announced his support for the formation of a “panel” of pre-cleared advocates who could be called upon by the FISA judges to submit briefs—presumably only in the form of amicus briefs—on significant issues facing the court. This proposal may be unobjectionable, if it leaves to the FISA judges the decision to call for amicus input from a member of the panel where the judges believe a particular application merits such independent input and if leaves to the President and the executive branch the authority to grant security clearances to the panel members and to decide what sensitive intelligence information is appropriate for sharing with the amicus in a particular case.

Furthermore, it must be recognized that any requirement that the panel of outside amici be granted access to classified information will have the potential to chill the executive branch’s willingness to share the sensitive details of national security operations and intelligence information relevant to particular FISA applications. As Judge John Bates recently pointed out in his letter on behalf of all current and former judges of the FISA court, such a disincentive would threaten to hamper the important relationship of trust and confidence that currently exists

between the National Security Division of the Justice Department and the FISA court. It should be a top priority of this Committee to avoid that result.

One final observation that I believe is important to keep in mind: Many of the reform proposals discussed above, including those that would attempt to convert the FISA process into an adversary proceeding and those that would impose more frequent judicial approvals or bureaucratic processing of decisions heretofore made in real time by intelligence analysts, would run the risk of recreating the type of cumbersome, over-lawyered foreign intelligence regime that proved so inadequate in the face of 9/11.

Those currently in positions of responsibility in the Intelligence Community and the Members of this Committee and the Intelligence Committees who are briefed on the latest threat reporting know far better than I how likely it is (or rather how inevitable) that America will suffer another catastrophic terrorist attack at some point in the years ahead. In the event of such an attack, I fear that the constrained and lawyerly process for conducting signals intelligence required under the most intrusive reform proposals would prove inadequate, and the President, any President, would be forced once again to fall back on his Article II authority to conduct the effective surveillance he determines necessary to protect the country from follow-on attacks. Indeed, I believe the American people would demand no less.

That cannot be a result this Congress would prefer. But it is, unfortunately, a very real possibility if several of the proposals currently under consideration were to be adopted.