[Congressional Record Volume 160, Number 83 (Friday, May 30, 2014)]
[House]
[Pages H5029-H5034]
PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 4745, TRANSPORTATION, HOUSING AND
URBAN DEVELOPMENT, AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2015;
PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 4681, INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION
ACT FOR FISCAL YEARS 2014 AND 2015; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Mr. BISHOP of Utah. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on
Rules, I call up House Resolution 604 and ask for its immediate
consideration.
The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:
H. Res. 604
Resolved, That at any time after adoption of this
resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 2(b) of rule
XVIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the
Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of
the bill (H.R. 4745) making appropriations for the
Departments of Transportation, and Housing and Urban
Development, and related agencies for the fiscal year ending
September 30, 2015, and for other purposes. The first reading
of the bill shall be dispensed with. All points of order
against consideration of the bill are waived. General debate
shall be confined to the bill and shall not exceed one hour
equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking
minority member of the Committee on Appropriations. After
general debate the bill shall be considered for amendment
under the five-minute rule. Points of order against
provisions in the bill for failure to comply with clause 2 of
rule XXI are waived. During consideration of the bill for
amendment, the chair of the Committee of the Whole may accord
priority in recognition on the basis of whether the Member
offering an amendment has caused it to be printed in the
portion of the Congressional Record designated for that
purpose in clause 8 of rule XVIII. Amendments so printed
shall be considered as read. When the committee rises and
reports the bill back to the House with a recommendation that
the bill do pass, the previous question shall be considered
as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final
passage without intervening motion except one motion to
recommit with or without instructions.
Sec. 2. (a) At any time after adoption of this resolution
the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 2(b) of rule XVIII,
declare the House resolved into the Committee of the Whole
House on the state of the Union for consideration of the bill
(H.R. 4681) to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 2014
and 2015 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities
of the United States Government, the Community Management
Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and
Disability System, and for other purposes. The first reading
of the bill shall be dispensed with. All points of order
against consideration of the bill are waived. General debate
shall be confined to the bill and amendments specified in
this resolution and shall not exceed one hour equally divided
and controlled by the chair and ranking minority member of
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. After general
debate the bill shall be considered for amendment under the
five-minute rule.
(b) In lieu of the amendment in the nature of a substitute
recommended by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
now printed in the bill, it shall be in order to consider as
an original bill for the purpose of amendment under the five-
minute rule an amendment in the nature of a substitute
consisting of the text of Rules Committee Print 113-45. That
amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be considered
as read. All points of order against that amendment in the
nature of a substitute are waived.
(c) No amendment to the amendment in the nature of a
substitute made in order as original text shall be in order
except those printed in the report of the Committee on Rules
accompanying this resolution and amendments en bloc described
in subsection (f).
(d) Each amendment printed in the report of the Committee
on Rules shall be considered only in the order printed in the
report, may be offered only by a Member designated in the
report, shall be considered as read, shall be debatable for
the time specified in the report equally divided and
controlled by the proponent and an opponent, shall not be
subject to amendment, and shall not be subject to a demand
for division of the question in the House or in the Committee
of the Whole.
(e) All points of order against amendments printed in the
report of the Committee on Rules or amendments en bloc
described in subsection (f) are waived.
(f) It shall be in order at any time for the chair of the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence or his designee to
offer amendments en bloc consisting of amendments printed in
the report of the Committee on Rules not earlier disposed of.
Amendments en bloc offered pursuant to this subsection shall
be considered as read, shall be debatable for 20 minutes
equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking
minority member of the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence or their designees, shall not be subject to
amendment, and shall not be subject to a demand for division
of the question in the House or in the Committee of the
Whole.
(g) At the conclusion of consideration of the bill for
amendment the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the
House with such amendments as may have been adopted. Any
Member may demand a separate vote in the House on any
amendment adopted in the Committee of the Whole to the bill
or to the amendment in the nature of a substitute made in
order as original text. The previous question shall be
considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to
final passage without intervening motion except one motion to
recommit with or without instructions.
Sec. 3. On any legislative day during the period from June
2, 2014, through June 6, 2014--
(a) the Journal of the proceedings of the previous day
shall be considered as approved; and
(b) the Chair may at any time declare the House adjourned
to meet at a date and time, within the limits of clause 4,
section 5, article I of the Constitution, to be announced by
the Chair in declaring the adjournment.
Sec. 4. The Speaker may appoint Members to perform the
duties of the Chair for the duration of the period addressed
by section 3 of this resolution as though under clause 8(a)
of rule I.
Sec. 5. The Committee on Appropriations may, at any time
before 5 p.m. on Wednesday, June 4, 2014, file privileged
reports to accompany measures making appropriations for the
fiscal year ending September 30, 2015.
Sec. 6. House Resolution 567 is amended by adding the
following:
``SEC. 7. TRAVEL.
``Clauses 8(a), (b), and (c) of rule X of the Rules of the
House of Representatives shall apply to the Select
Committee.''.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Poe of Texas). The gentleman from Utah
is recognized for 1 hour.
[[Page H5030]]
Mr. BISHOP of Utah. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I
yield the customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr.
McGovern), pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume.
During consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for the
purpose of debate only.
General Leave
Mr. BISHOP of Utah. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all
Members have 5 legislative days with which to revise and extend their
remarks.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Utah?
There was no objection.
Mr. BISHOP of Utah. Mr. Speaker, I am happy to be with you here
today. It seems as if only a few hours ago we were all here together--
because it was only a few hours ago.
Mr. Speaker, this resolution before us today provides a structured
rule for consideration of H.R. 4681, the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Years 2014 and 2015, and it makes in order a number of
amendments for consideration. In addition, this combined resolution
provides for an open rule for the consideration of H.R. 4745, the
Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act of 2015.
This resolution provides for 1 hour of general debate on each of
these bills equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking
minority member of the appropriate committees of jurisdiction.
The intention of the Rules Committee was to provide ample opportunity
to debate issues related to our intelligence community. The
intelligence community has done very good bipartisan work on this bill,
which is being brought forward under regular order. And while the
committee was able to work with some Members to modify their amendments
so they would comply with House rules and be made in order, some
amendments were still subject to a point of order or were already
debated and voted on last week during the USA FREEDOM Act. Some
amendments were simply not possible to debate on the floor in open
session due to the national security implications.
The net result is that this rule makes in order a total of 11
amendments to the intelligence bill, four Republican, six Democrat, and
one bipartisan amendment. So the process is inclusive, the rule is
fair, and will provide a wide ranging debate on a topic of interest to
all Americans.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman for Utah for
yielding me the customary 30 minutes.
I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. McGOVERN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, once again, we are considering a rule that
combines two bills together under one single rule. That rule provides
an open rule for the Transportation, Housing and Urban Development
appropriations bill, or T-HUD, and a structured rule for the Fiscal
Years 2014 and 2015 Intelligence Authorization Act.
T-HUD is an appropriate acronym, Mr. Speaker, because that is how we
can describe this House's action on the bill last year. The
Appropriations Committee tried to come up with a bill that funds our
Transportation, Housing and Urban Development programs, but it was so
woefully inadequate that it never made it to the House floor.
Although the T-HUD bill may be $1.2 billion above last year's enacted
levels, due to a reduction in offsets caused by a decline in Federal
Housing Administration receipts, the program level in this bill is
actually $1.8 billion below last year's level.
On the transportation side, this bill provides no funding for high-
speed rail, and it cuts $200 million from Amtrak's capital funding. And
if that weren't bad enough, I want to highlight one particularly
egregious rider in the T-HUD bill, a rider that would exempt Wisconsin,
Mississippi, and Idaho from Federal truck weight limits on their
interstates.
Mr. Speaker, there have been no reviews by highway safety experts or
cost-benefit analysis on the effect of increased size and weight limits
on these roads and bridges, yet the majority decided to go forward with
these extraneous riders anyway.
I would remind my colleagues that in the last surface transportation
reauthorization bill, Congressman Lou Barletta offered an amendment
that required DOT to conduct a comprehensive study on the impact of
increasing truck size and weight on road safety and infrastructure
costs. It passed with strong bipartisan support, and the Department of
Transportation is currently in the process of completing the study,
which should be finished by the fall of this year.
Mr. Barletta sent a letter to the Rules Committee before last night's
meeting requesting that a point of order against this rider be made
available. I support Mr. Barletta's request, and I wish the Rules
Committee would not have protected this provision. We should not be
raising truck size and weights in a State-by-State patchwork approach
before DOT even has a chance to finish its study, especially when the
highway trust fund is expected to run out of money this summer and our
roads and our bridges are already in horrible disrepair.
I will insert letters from AAA, the Owner-Operator Independent
Drivers Association, law enforcement officers, first responders, and
road safety groups all opposing this rider.
American
Automobile Association,
Washington, DC, May 20, 2014.
Hon. Harold Rogers,
Chair, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Nita Lowey,
Ranking Member, Committee on Appropriations, House of
Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Lowey: AAA opposes
Section 125 of the Transportation, Housing and Urban
Development (THUD) Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 2015
that would increase the current federal truck size and weight
limits. This section carves out special interest exemptions
from federal truck size and weight regulations for Idaho,
Mississippi and Wisconsin. We urge you to remove Section 125
from the bill.
Study after study has shown that increasing truck size or
weight increases wear and tear on roads and dramatically
impacts bridges. At a time when the federal Highway Trust
Fund and many state budgets across the country are nearly
tapped out, we cannot afford to allow bigger trucks to run up
the cost of maintaining infrastructure.
We also are concerned with the safety impact of allowing
heavier trucks on the nation's roadways. According to NHTSA,
fatalities in crashes involving large trucks increased four
percent from 3,781 in 2011 to 3,921 in 2012. Of these
fatalities in 2012, 73 percent were occupants of other
vehicles, 10 percent were non-occupants, and 18 percent were
occupants of large trucks.
Congress has recognized the importance of a stronger
national freight program and work is underway to establish a
robust national freight strategy. Considering changes to
truck size and weight limits outside the context of this
national discussion, and the two-year truck size and weight
study required by MAP-21, is premature.
Thank you for consideration of AAA's views on this
important safety issue.
Sincerely,
Avery Ash,
Director, Federal Relations.
____
Owner-Operator
Independent Drivers Association,
May 20, 2014.
Hon. Harold Rogers,
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations, House of
Representatives, Washington, DC.
Hon. Nita M. Lowey,
Ranking Member, Committee on Appropriations, House of
Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Lowey: On behalf of
our nation's small business trucking professionals, the
Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association (OOIDA) writes
in opposition to language in the FY2015 Transportation and
Housing and Urban Development Appropriations Bill that allows
trucks weighing up to 129,000 pounds on Interstate Highways
in Idaho.
Not only is the expansion of existing weight limits on
these roads outside of the highway reauthorization process,
but this provision comes as the Department of Transportation
is conducting a Congressionally-mandated study on truck size
and weight provisions nationally. This study should be
allowed to continue without Congress passing legislation,
such as the Idaho provision, which would put heavier trucks
on Interstate Highway System miles where they currently are
not permitted.
Current federal Interstate System weight limits were put in
place to halt an ``arms race'' between states attempting to
garner favor with major shippers as a way to attract
business. Today's generally uniform limits focus attention on
the national nature of our
[[Page H5031]]
Interstate System. The Idaho provision, a state-wide
allowance of trucks on currently designated Interstate
Highway miles above the existing Interstate weight cap, would
be a step backwards from this sensible approach.
While proponents of this provision argue that Idaho is at a
disadvantage compared to neighboring states with higher
weight limits on Interstate highways, it is critical to
remember that those states operated these heavier-weight
vehicles on their Interstate system prior to the passage of
federal legislation in 1991 that froze maximum weights on
longer-combination vehicles. Idaho's state government could
have enacted legislation prior to the 1991 freeze setting an
Interstate weight allowance equal to its neighboring states,
but it did not. Additionally, neighboring states also have
strict permitting requirements for these heavier weight
loads, requirements that are absent from the provision
included in the THUD bill.
While Idaho conducted a pilot study regarding use of
heavier weight trucks, it is important to note that none of
those trucks in the study operated on Idaho Interstate System
roads. Federal studies that have examined operations of
heavier vehicles on Interstate System roads, including the
initial work completed for the on-going MAP-21 truck size and
weight study, show significant infrastructure and safety
concerns with bigger and heavier trucks. These are facts that
OOIDA members and other small business truckers know full
well given that the highway is their workplace.
Further, while proponents of bigger and heavier trucks
argue that the entire trucking industry is supportive of a
weight increase, the overwhelming majority of drivers and
motor carriers do not see a benefit from increasing truck
size and weights. Heavier weights may lead to cost savings
for shippers and receivers; however, for the small business
truckers that make up more than 90 percent of the trucking
industry, heavier trucks only mean higher fuel, repair, and
equipment costs.
Bearing in mind that that MAP-21 study has yet to be
completed, we urge the Appropriations Committee to remove
this language from the FY2015 Transportation Appropriations
Bill. Should you have any questions, please contact Ryan
Bowley in our Washington Office.
Sincerely,
Todd Spencer,
Executive Vice President.
____
National Troopers Coalition, NAEMT, and National
Sheriffs' Association.
May 29, 2014.
Dear Members of Congress, We are writing on behalf of the
nation's law enforcement officers and first responders to
express our opposition to any truck size or weight increases.
We understand that proposals to allow heavier trucks and thaw
the freeze on longer combination vehicles are being
considered as part of annual appropriations legislation. We
urge you to reject these proposals.
Bigger trucks would add new dangers to our roads. Allowing
heavier or longer trucks would threaten the safety of
motorists as well as law enforcement officers and first
responders because heavier and longer trucks would be more
difficult to control, take longer to stop, and increase crash
severity. Studies conducted by the U.S. Department of
Transportation have found that trucks with multiple trailers
and trucks that are heavier are associated with higher crash
rates. (2000 US DOT Comprehensive Truck Size and Weight
Study; 2013 US DOT ``Desk Scan'')
Bigger trucks also would impose a huge economic cost in
terms of further damage to our already deteriorating highway
infrastructure, the additional strain to our aging and
deficient bridges and the costs associated with cleaning up
crashes. These are additional costs that would be borne by
all levels of government and ultimately by the taxpayers.
The current proposals to allow bigger trucks have not been
the subject of congressional hearings. We question the
appropriateness of making changes such as these that affect
public safety in a funding bill without full and open public
debate.
Representing law enforcement and first responders across
the country, we are united in opposing bigger trucks. Not
only do these trucks endanger the traveling public, but they
also put at risk law enforcement officers and first
responders. Please oppose any provisions that would increase
the size or weight of trucks.
Thank you,
Mat Hodapp,
Chairman, National Troopers Coalition.
Don Lundy, BS,
NREMT-P,
President, National Association of Emergency Management
Technicians.
Aaron D. Kennard,
Executive Director, National Sheriffs' Association.
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, this rule, as I noted earlier, also covers
debate on H.R. 4681, the Fiscal Years 2014 and 2015 Intelligence
Authorization Act.
The intelligence authorization bill is one of the many important
pieces of legislation that comes before the House every year--or nearly
every year. Last year, for fiscal year 2014, the bill was marked up in
committee, but the majority never seemed to be able to find the time to
bring it to the House floor, which is why today we are dealing with a
2-year authorization for both the current fiscal year, FY 2014, and the
coming fiscal year, FY 2015.
Now, a great deal has happened since the fiscal year 2013
intelligence bill was approved in December of 2012--everything from
Edward Snowden to the sequester, from extreme weather events to drone
strikes that also killed innocent civilians, from new technologies and
cyber sabotage to protecting our human assets on the ground in
dangerous regions. While the underlying bill attempts to deal with
these and other issues in a bipartisan manner, some of the choices it
makes weaken rather than strengthen our ability to accurately assess
potential and real threats to our security.
One particularly troubling example is the bill's failure to
strengthen the intelligence community's ability to analyze and assess
how climate change affects our national security. Over a decade ago,
the National Intelligence Estimate--or NIE--noted with grave concern
how extreme weather and environmental changes were adversely affecting
global food security, as well as increased refugee and IDP populations
due to droughts, floods, and other extreme weather events.
{time} 0930
The NIE described how such events contribute or can even drive social
and political instability, which might threaten our national security
interests. Given the acceleration of extreme weather and climate change
over the last decade or so, I would think that we would want to
encourage our intelligence agencies to analyze the national security
implications of climate change, whether that is how storm surges and
rising sea levels and temperatures might affect our Navy, or how
competition over resources might affect the opening of the Arctic or
water wars in the Middle East and northern Africa--but no.
Instead, this bill continues the Republican foolishness of pretending
that climate change does not exist. Some of my Republicans colleagues
would rather stick their heads in the stand. That is not the way to run
a government, Mr. Speaker.
Over 30 amendments were submitted to the Rules Committee for
consideration, and I wish that all of them were made in order under
this rule. It doesn't take long to debate 30-something amendments. I
believe that the House is fully capable of handling such a debate.
After all, we should be pretty rested after a 5\1/2\-day break at the
beginning of this week and a 9-day recess starting tomorrow. Surely, we
could use the 2\1/2\ days when we are in Washington to actually debate
the intelligence bill.
Several of these amendments dealt with highly controversial aspects
of drone strikes, many of which have killed or wounded innocent
civilians. I was glad to see that the U.S. did not carry out any drone
strikes for the past month in Pakistan, where our use of drones has
contributed to tensions between our two nations.
Our colleague and a member of the Intelligence Committee, the
gentlewoman from Illinois (Ms. Schakowsky), submitted an amendment to
ban so-called signature strikes against unknown targets.
Her amendment modestly calls for the U.S. Government to know, with
near-certainty, that at least one individual who is a known target will
be present before the strike is launched. I am outraged that her
amendment was not made in order under this rule.
Other amendments, including bipartisan amendments, dealt with
increasing the transparency of decisionmaking and reporting from drone
strikes; others would have simply banned their use.
The U.S. is increasingly dependent on the use of unmanned weaponized
aerial vehicles to deliver deadly force against individuals and groups
residing or operating in other countries.
As we wind down the war in Afghanistan, we need to take a hard look
at how we should pursue the so-called global war on terror, especially
the use of drone strikes and operations outside the boundaries of
international law enforcement.
[[Page H5032]]
I regret that all of the amendments brought before the Rules
Committee dealing with drone strikes were not made in order, as each
dealt with a different facet of the policy and each deserved to be
debated by this House.
I would also like to say a word about the McCollum amendment, which
was also denied by the Rules Committee. Our intelligence agencies
should never ever use humanitarian work or workers as a cover for
covert operations or a means to gather intelligence.
Whether we are talking about a vaccination campaign to protect
children from polio or the delivery of food to desperate refugees,
leave such plots and machinations to the movies. Keep them out of U.S.
policy and covert operations.
They endanger all humanitarian workers and place obstacles in the way
of carrying out urgent and essential global health and humanitarian
work in places where too many dangers already exist.
Mr. Speaker, before I reserve my time, I also want to point out that
this rule contains a provision which makes a change in the procedures
for the special Select Committee on Benghazi, which was established by
the House just a few weeks ago. The new provision allows the chairman
of the new select committee to authorize foreign travel as part of the
investigation.
Mr. Speaker, the Congress has already conducted seven investigations
of the Benghazi matter--seven. Many of us have argued that an
additional eighth inquiry is not necessary, but since the House insists
on proceeding, we would like to make sure that some of the partisan
abuses that marked the previous inquiries will not be repeated by the
new select committee, particularly with regard to foreign travel.
Mr. Cummings has often protested the partisan abuses of foreign
travel at the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and I
insert in the Record a letter from Mr. Cummings to Mr. Issa, asking him
to delay a Republican-only delegation to Libya, so that Democrats could
join the delegation as well.
House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform,
Washington, DC, September 20, 2013.
Hon. Darrell E. Issa,
Chairman, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House
of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing to request that you
immediately postpone your upcoming delegation to Libya and
several other countries until you come into compliance with
your own Committee directives, stop your partisan efforts to
deliberately exclude Democrats from this trip, and provide
adequate notice to allow Democratic Members to join this
delegation at a later date.
On April 6, 2011, upon becoming Chairman of the Committee,
you issued a memorandum to all Committee Members entitled
``Rules for Committee-Authorized Foreign Travel.'' According
to that memorandum, ``All delegations must be bipartisan.''
Earlier today, however, I obtained a copy of an itinerary
for a trip you apparently have been planning to Libya and
several other countries next week, presumably as part of the
Committee's ongoing investigation into the attack in Benghazi
in 2012. The only congressional travelers on this itinerary
are you and your Republican staffer. No Democratic Members
are listed on the itinerary, and you have not contacted me or
my staff about this trip. According to this itinerary, you
are planning to leave this Sunday, which means Democratic
participation at this late date is impossible.
Your 2011 memo also says that the ``purpose must be very
specific for each country.'' Yet, your itinerary states only
that the Libya portion of the trip is ``TBD,'' although it
may include a ``visit'' to the embassy and a ``working
lunch.'' Your itinerary does not identify a single U.S.
government official, Libyan official, or other individual the
Committee plans to interview or speak with during this
delegation.
Your 2011 memo also says that the only exception to
conducting bipartisan international delegations is ``in rare
circumstances and at the sole discretion of the Chairman.''
However, you have not identified any such circumstances in
this case that would justify excluding Democratic Members.
Moreover, I have obtained other documents showing that you
have been planning this delegation for more than a week, so
there are no exigencies that would have prohibited you from
consulting with Democrats.
Although you claim that your investigation of the Benghazi
attacks is bipartisan, your efforts to secretly plan an
official trip to Libya--and then deliberately exclude
Democrats from joining--is part of an unfortunate pattern of
partisanship that undermines the credibility of this
investigation.
Last October, Rep. Jason Chaffetz undertook exactly the
same partisan maneuver when he traveled to Libya--at your
direction--and excluded Democratic Members from that trip. At
that time, my staff obtained a last-minute copy of his
itinerary that listed the Committee activity in Libya as
``TBD'' and failed to identify any officials to be
interviewed. We now know that Rep. Chaffetz met personally
with General Carter Ham, the Commander of AFRICOM, as well as
Gregory Hicks, the Deputy Chief of Mission, who was then
called before the Committee to testify.
The problem with these actions is that they effectively
deny Democratic Members the ability to effectively
investigate this incident. Since your secret delegation
appears to violate your own directive to the Committee, I
request that you postpone it until such time as Democratic
Members are given an adequate opportunity to join.
Sincerely,
Elijah E. Cummings,
Ranking Member.
Mr. McGOVERN. In October of 2012, Oversight Committee Republicans
went on a delegation to Libya, but they did not inform Democratic
members until 24 hours before they departed.
In September 2013, Oversight Committee Republicans planned a second
delegation to Libya without contacting Democratic members at all.
Ranking Member Cummings requested that the trip be postponed to allow
Democrats to join, but his request was denied.
This is no way to conduct a serious investigation, and this is one of
the reasons why so many people on our side of the aisle have called
foul over the way the House Republican leadership is dealing with this
important issue.
So before the House grants any new authorities to the select
committee, I would be grateful for some assurance from my chairman that
this new authority will not be misused in the highly partisan manner
demonstrated by Chairman Issa at the Oversight Committee.
Mr. SESSIONS. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. McGOVERN. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. SESSIONS. I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. McGovern)
for yielding to me, and I appreciate him bringing this issue up, as he
did in the Rules Committee at the time of the hearing.
I want to assure the gentleman and each of the Members of this body
that the gentleman who will be the new chairman of the committee, the
gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Gowdy), has every intent to make
sure that his work, the assignments that will be given as they move
forward, including travel, will be done on a fair basis.
Mr. Gowdy is aware of and knows the sensitive nature of not only the
investigation, but also how this will be handled; and Mr. Gowdy, I
assure you, is very prepared to match and to meet the Members that Ms.
Pelosi has put on the committee, and I think that you will see that the
Members who will serve as a result of the Speaker appointing them will
serve with honor and distinction and will work well and fairly
together.
I thank the gentleman for asking the question.
Mr. McGOVERN. I thank the gentleman for his answer and for his
reassurances, and we will certainly be watching. In our opinion,
fairness means consultation with the Democrats and not leaving us out
of the loop.
Again, I would point out to my colleagues that the inquiries into the
Benghazi situation thus far have been highly partisan, and the
Oversight Committee, in particular, I think, has been run in an
inappropriate manner.
So I appreciate the gentleman's assurances, and we will watch and
hope that what the gentleman just said will actually occur.
With that, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. BISHOP of Utah. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Mississippi (Mr. Thompson), the distinguished ranking member of the
Committee on Homeland Security.
Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to
this rule that allows for consideration of H.R. 4681, the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2014 and 2015.
I am troubled that just 11 amendments were allowed under the rule and
many solid amendments that would enhance oversight and transparency
were blocked, particularly an amendment by
[[Page H5033]]
Representative Gabbard to expand the authority and oversight of the
intelligence community by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight
Board.
With respect to the underlying bill, I would like to discuss a number
of provisions that deserve to be highlighted.
The bill sets the stage for potentially significant reforms to
government contract employees' ability to access classified information
that warrant thoughtful consideration by the House and further
clarification.
Specifically, H.R. 4681 directs the Director of National Intelligence
to ensure that elements of the intelligence community engage in
continuous evaluation of its employees to detect behaviors that may
result in unauthorized disclosures.
The bill also directs a cost-benefit analysis of replacing the
standard periodic reinvestigation process with automated continuous
evaluation programs. While I agree that there are weaknesses in the
current security clearance process that warrant reform, it is important
that, before wholesale changes are made, Congress expresses its
expectations about the scope of such programs, establishes metrics for
evaluating their efficacy, and ensures that due process protections for
impacted individuals are available.
We have an obligation to 5.2 million Americans whose livelihoods
depend on maintaining their security clearances to ensure that agencies
that establish these programs do so in a manner that guards against
abuses, including targeting and retaliation by supervisors, as well as
improper or excessive invasions of privacy.
The urge to adopt continuous evaluation in response to high-profile
incidents involving individuals with access to classified information
who violated the terms of their oath is understandable. However, the
adoption of continuous evaluation does not absolve the intelligence
community of its obligations to bolster the protection of its
classified holdings.
Regrettably, Mr. Speaker, H.R. 4681 may send the wrong message to
agencies, as it does not include language to direct agencies to raise
the bar on access controls, thereby giving the impression that our
concern is principally about employees' actions and behaviors.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. McGOVERN. I yield an additional 2 minutes to the gentleman.
Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. I appreciate the gentleman yielding.
I also have concerns, Mr. Speaker, about the bill's view of the
future of security clearance investigations and adjudications and the
degree to which it sets the stage for computers and algorithms to
replace humans in the process.
Specifically, it direct the DNI to conduct a cost-benefit analysis on
reducing or eliminating the manual process for security clearance
investigations and adjudications.
The guiding principle in the adjudication process is the concept of
the whole person, where information is brought to bear to give a
picture of an individual. The prospect that we would empower a computer
to render judgment of a person's integrity, character, and loyalty to
our Nation is troubling.
In the coming weeks, I will be introducing a comprehensive security
clearance reform bill that, among other things, addresses known
weaknesses in the current system, establishes expectations for
continuous evaluation programs, and demands proper performance from
investigative service providers.
It also would greatly expand the resources and responsibilities of
the Public Interest Declassification Board. A well-resourced and robust
board is essential to increasing accountability of the intelligence
community. I am pleased that the underlying bill will renew the
authorization of the board.
Before I yield back, Mr. Speaker, I would note that, while I am
pleased that the bill authorizes intelligence operations within DHS, I
am disturbed that, in advance of today's vote, members of the Homeland
Security Committee staff were not granted access to the classified
annex of this legislation, as it is relevant to the committee's
oversight jurisdiction.
I would hope that, as this bill moves through the legislative
process, the stovepipes that exist within this Chamber that hinder
critical information-sharing and oversight can be overcome for the
benefit of the American people.
Mr. BISHOP of Utah. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. McGOVERN. May I inquire of the gentleman if he has any additional
speakers?
Mr. BISHOP of Utah. I am ready to close whenever you are.
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
I urge my colleagues to oppose this rule for all of the reasons I
stated earlier, but, Mr. Speaker, I want to close with one final
thought: this intelligence bill includes several provisions regarding
the use of contractors, security clearance reform, strengthening
investigations by the inspector general, and so on.
We need to recognize that these reforms were not initiated by us.
They are a result of the massive release of leaked information that
brought very serious matters about actual and potential abuses by our
intelligence agencies on how they monitor and maintain data on ordinary
law-abiding citizens.
This leaked information caused alarm throughout our society, by our
constituents, by our press, and by Members of Congress--and rightfully
so. It caused alarm among some of our closest international allies--and
rightfully so.
So while we may hold different views about the individual who
confiscated and leaked the information, let us all recognize that none
of the NSA and FISA reforms recently passed by this House--and none of
the reforms included in this bill--would have happened if that
information had not been leaked because we would not have known about
the abuses being carried on in our name by various intelligence
agencies.
Mr. Speaker, I respect those men and women who serve our Nation in
our intelligence agencies, but I don't respect a culture that
intentionally keeps the American people and the Congress in the dark
about the extent and nature of our intelligence operations.
More reforms are still needed; more transparency is still needed. I
believe we can be safe and protect the American people without
sacrificing the liberties that we all treasure.
With that, I yield back the balance of my time.
{time} 0945
Mr. BISHOP of Utah. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
I am actually pleased to stand before the House today in support of
this rule as well as the underlying pieces of the legislation, H.R.
4681 about intelligence and H.R. 4745 called the T-HUD bill.
From the testimony that we received in the Rules Committee on these
measures, it appears that both of these measures have enjoyed
bipartisan cooperation in their formation and from their respective
committee processes.
One of the toughest responsibilities that a Member of the Congress
has is to help prioritize the Federal expenditures of resources that we
take from the American people. Sometimes, worthy projects and programs
have to be trimmed to meet budget requirements and prioritization.
While there are some spending choices--which I disagree--contained in
H.R. 4745, overall, it is still a balanced measure which will provide
for American infrastructure so essential for the economic growth and
jobs, and maintains discipline by adhering to the top-line funding
levels arrived at through that 2-year budget agreement that was passed
by Congress. The $52 billion for transportation provided in these
agencies is $7.8 billion below the President's request and still
actually $1.8 billion less than the 2014 enacted level.
Members have a chance, under the open rule of this resolution
provided, to argue for changes in the prioritization. I am pleased that
one of the things this bill recognizes is that States are different.
Those of us who live in the wide-open West have been able to use
transportation to help the desert blossom. We should not try to
restrict every State to the same standards with a one-size-fits-all
approach. The committee was very wise in what they actually did.
Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman will suspend.
The Chair would ask occupants of the gallery to cease audible
conversation.
[[Page H5034]]
Mr. BISHOP of Utah. Mr. Speaker, switching gears to the intelligence
reauthorization measure, every Member of the House takes seriously our
responsibility to preserve individual liberty and freedoms under the
Constitution.
We also have a constitutional obligation to provide for the common
defense, because without a strong national defense, which includes the
indispensable work of the defense intelligence agencies, personal
freedoms are also at risk. The question is achieving and maintaining a
balance in deciding how to best preserve inalienable constitutional
rights against possible incursions by technologists, whether
inadvertent or intentional, as our Nation deals with the very real
threats both at home and abroad.
Technology gives us wonderful tools, but it can also be a fertile
ground for abuse of privacy. We have a responsibility as Members of
Congress to exercise oversight in U.S. intelligence agencies, and that
can be difficult since much cannot be debated in open forums with any
degree of specificity without bringing great harm to the national
security. That is why we have the expertise of standing committees. Not
only do they understand these issues, it saves time by allocating the
proper amount of time to the discussion of these issues in advance. And
from the testimony received in the Rules Committee, I believe that
Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger have demonstrated a
strong bipartisan commitment on this issue.
Provisions of this bill are aimed at bolstering personal and
individual privacy. Passage of H.R. 4681, when you combine it with the
passage last week of the U.S. FREEDOM Act, is a good step towards
enhancing our U.S. intelligence capability as well as congressional
oversight on these issues.
It is a good bill. It is a fair rule. I urge its adoption.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, I rise to speak on the Rule for H.R.
4681, the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2014,'' and
H.R. 4745, the ``Transportation, Housing and Urban Development and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2015.
H.R. 4681 is a bill authorizing appropriations for our nation's
intelligence agencies for Fiscal Year 2014 through Fiscal Year 2015.
The bill provides funds for the conduct of intelligence and
intelligence-related activities.
H.R. 4745 makes appropriations for the Departments of Transportation,
and Housing and Urban Development, and related agencies for the fiscal
year ending September 30, 2015.
Our nation is long past due for a Transportation and Housing and
Urban Development Appropriations bill. This bill is about jobs--jobs--
jobs.
Unfortunately, H.R. 4745's $17.1. billion in discretionary
appropriations for the Department of Transportation for fiscal year
2015, is $727.3 million below the funding for fiscal year 2014.
Included in the legislation is $15.7 billion in total budgetary
resources for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which is $7.3
million below the fiscal year 2014 enacted level and $446 million above
the request.
This will provide full funding for all air traffic control personnel,
including 14,800 air traffic controllers, 7,300 safety inspectors, and
operational support personnel.
The bill also fully funds the FAA's Next Generation Air
Transportation Systems (NextGen) at $852.4 million, and funds Contract
Towers at $140 million.
These investments will help ease future congestion and help reduce
delays for travelers in U.S. airspace.
The Bush Intercontinental Airport and William P. Hobby Airport will
benefit from funding provided under this bill: nearly 40 million
passengers traveled through Bush Intercontinental Airport (IAH) and an
additional 10 million traveled through William P. Hobby (HOU); more
than 650 daily departures occur at IAH; IAH is the 11th busiest airport
in the U.S. for total passenger traffic; IAH has 12 all-cargo airlines
handles more than 419,205 metric tons of cargo in 2012.
The funds being sent back to states will repair critical
transportation infrastructure that is vital to local, state and the
national economy.
Further the bill provides for funding for our Nation's housing and
urban development programs that fund block grants, special housing
programs that serve our Nation's elderly, young, disabled, and
veterans.
The legislation includes a total of $40.3 billion for the Department
of Housing and Urban Development, a decrease of $769 million below the
fiscal year 2014 enacted level and $2 billion below the
Administration's request.
The bill does not contain funding for any new, unauthorized
``sustainable,'' ``livable,'' or ``green'' community development
programs.
Affordable safe housing is vital to the well-being of elderly, low-
wage workers, the unemployed, under-employed, disabled persons and our
Nation's veterans.
In 2012, Texas ranked second among the 50 states among states with
workers earning at or below the federal minimum wage.
According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, of the 6.1 million
workers paid hourly rates in Texas in 2012, 282,000 earned exactly the
prevailing federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour, while 170,000 earned
less.
In the State of Texas the percentage of persons living in poverty
makes the funds provided for housing and mass transit systems including
light rail critical: 34% of children live in poverty; 21% of adults
(19-64) live in poverty; and 17% of elderly live in poverty.
The funds provided will make it possible for low wage workers to have
affordable options for travel as well as support access to affordable
housing.
SECTION 8 AND PUBLIC HOUSING
Included in the bill is $26.3 billion for Public and Indian Housing.
This is an increase of $6.2 million above the fiscal year 2014 enacted
level and $1.2 billion below the requested level. This funding will
provide for continued assistance to all families and individuals
currently served by this program. The bill also fully funds the
President's request for veterans' housing vouchers at $75 million.
COMMUNITY PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT
The bill contains $6.2 billion for Community Planning and Development
programs--a reduction of $383 million below the fiscal year 2014
enacted level.
The Community Development Block Grant formula program is funded at $3
billion--effectively equal to last year's level.
HOME Investment Partnerships Program is funded at $700 million, a
reduction of $300 million below the fiscal year 2014 enacted level.
Homeless assistance grants are funded at $2.1 billion--the same as
the previous year's level--which is sufficient for all current grants
to be continued.
My thanks to the House Rules Committee for making my amendment in
order under the rule for H.R. 4681, the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2014.
The Jackson Lee Amendment is simple and one that the majority of the
House can support.
The Jackson Lee Amendment requires the Director of the Office of
National Intelligence to conduct an assessment of the reliance of
intelligence activities on contractors to support Government
activities, including an assessment of contractors performing
intelligence activities, which would include intelligence analysis.
I want to thank the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for
including my amendment in an en bloc for consideration during the
debate on amendments, which will take place later.
I will speak more on the Jackson Lee Amendment when it comes before
the House for consideration under an en bloc amendment to H.R. 4681.
Mr. BISHOP of Utah. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time,
and I move the previous question on the resolution.
The previous question was ordered.
The resolution was agreed to.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
____________________
[Congressional Record Volume 160, Number 83 (Friday, May 30, 2014)]
[House]
[Pages H5034-H5056]
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEARS 2014 AND 2015
General Leave
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all
Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks
and include extraneous material on the bill, H.R. 4681.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Bishop of Utah). Is there objection to
the request of the gentleman from Michigan?
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 604 and rule
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House
on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 4681.
The Chair appoints the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Poe) to preside over
the Committee of the Whole.
[[Page H5035]]
{time} 0951
In the Committee of the Whole
Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the
Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill
(H.R. 4681) to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 2014 and 2015
for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United
States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other
purposes, with Mr. Poe of Texas in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIR. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered read the
first time.
The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers) and the gentleman from
Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger) each will control 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I
might consume.
The Intelligence Authorization Act is the annual blueprint for the
work of the intelligence community and America's military intelligence
efforts. The bill sets the priorities for our critical intelligence
efforts and the legal framework of guidance and oversight for those
efforts.
Since the ranking member and I have assumed the leadership of this
committee, we passed three intelligence authorization bills in a
bipartisan fashion and hope to continue the tradition and trend with
H.R. 4681. Passing a yearly intelligence authorization bill is the
primary method by which Congress exerts its budgetary and oversight
authority over the intelligence community.
As most of the intelligence budget involves highly classified
programs, the bulk of this committee's recommendations each year are
found in the classified annex to the bill which have been available for
Members to review. Among other initiatives, the bill increases funding
to address insider threats and improve personnel security programs.
At an unclassified level, I can report that the annex for fiscal year
2014 authorizes funding that is slightly below the President's budget
request level. Its funding levels are in line with the levels
appropriated by the enacted appropriations act for the National
Intelligence Program and with the National Defense Authorization Act
for the Military Intelligence Program.
For fiscal year 2015, the bill increases the President's budget
request by less than 1 percent and stays within the Bipartisan Budget
Act funding caps. The modest increase reflects the committee's concern
that the President's request does not properly fund a number of
important initiatives and leaves several unacceptable shortfalls.
The legislative provisions that the committee and Congress consider
each year are comprised of changes to statute that better enable the
community to conduct its important mission and strengthen oversight
mechanisms where needed.
Mr. Chairman, we find ourselves in a very interesting time in
history. Al Qaeda has metastasized into dangerous affiliates, safe
havens have emerged in Syria, parts of Libya, Yemen, Somalia, and the
tribal areas of Pakistan. Al Qaeda is also regaining a foothold in
northeast Afghanistan just as the President announced a complete
withdrawal of U.S. military forces and the counterterrorism capability
that comes with it by the end of 2016.
Uneven leadership in recent years has emboldened adversaries like
Russia and China, who are increasing their military and intelligence
spending and working to change the international order, as we speak, to
the detriment of U.S. interests. Russia occupies 20 percent of the
nation of Georgia, invaded and occupied Crimea, threatens invasion of
eastern Ukraine. China is bullying its neighbors and expanding claims
in the South and East China Seas through which 40 percent of world
trade travels.
At the same time, North Korea continues its belligerent behavior, and
Iran is maneuvering to preserve its capability to develop a nuclear
weapon. A nuclear Iran would threaten Israel with annihilation and send
the Middle East into a dangerous nuclear arms race.
We rightly demand that our intelligence agencies provide policymakers
with the best and most timely information possible on all these and
other threats. We ask them to track terrorists wherever they train,
plan, fundraise. We ask them to stop devastating cyber attacks that are
stealing American prosperity and American jobs. We ask them to track
nuclear and missile threats. And we demand that they get it right every
time. Now we are asking them do it with fewer resources and with what
can be described as confusing direction from our Commander in Chief.
The dedication of men and women of the intelligence community who
volunteer to serve in some of the most difficult places on Earth are
some of the finest patriots I have ever had the privilege to meet. And
within budget constraints and unclear policy guidance from the White
House, this bill ensures that they have resources and authorities
necessary to keep our Nation and our people safe and accomplish their
mission.
As this is the last authorization act I will advance as chairman of
the Intelligence Committee, I want to publicly thank my ranking member,
my friend, Dutch Ruppersberger. I can't tell what you a privilege it
has been to have a partner like Dutch in working through some very
difficult issues at a very difficult time in our Nation's history.
National security policy should not be partisan, and we have done
everything in our power to ensure that this committee at least takes as
nonpartisan a view of national security as is humanly possible. It is
an honor to work with someone who is also interested in governing and
in making progress on an issue so important to our Nation's future.
I would like to thank the Chair and urge Member support of H.R. 4681,
and I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Chairman Rogers, I thank you for your comments. I also have the same
comments for you.
When we took the leadership of this committee, we knew that the
stakes were so high and that we had to work together on behalf of the
people of the United States of America. We came together with
Republicans, Democrats, liberals, conservatives, moderates, all
realizing that we had to come together. Because of your leadership,
because of your focus, we have been able to pass FISA, and hopefully we
will be able to pass these bills today.
We are going to miss you, but you will always be there as my friend,
and I will always respect you as a great American who cares about the
United States. Thank you.
Now, we need to pass this Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Years 2014 and 2015 to ensure rigorous oversight and accountability
over all U.S. intelligence agencies and all U.S. intelligence
activities. This is so important.
We cannot go back to the days when we give the intelligence agencies
a blank check to spend as they see fit. We must have oversight.
Remember, Congress specifically amended the National Security Act of
1947 to replace blanket intelligence appropriations with specific
authorization.
Why did we do this? To ensure that our intelligence agencies spend
money only on programs of which Congress is informed and approves. So
today we need to make sure we maintain this means of critical oversight
by passing the bill.
The Intelligence Authorization Act for 2014 and 2015 is in four
parts: the unclassified legislative text; the unclassified report; the
classified annex, which explains our intent for the classified aspects
of the bill; and the classified schedule of authorizations for both
fiscal years. We have been encouraging all Members to review all parts
of the bill, and I am pleased to say that they have come to the
Intelligence Committee's SCIF, classified spaces, to do so.
The budget for fiscal year 2014 is slightly below the President's
budget request, while the budget for fiscal year 2015 is less than 1
percent above the President's budget request.
{time} 1000
We both, we made cuts to certain areas and added money in other areas
in a responsible, well thought-out way, and a fiscally prudent way.
[[Page H5036]]
Since Chairman Rogers and I assumed leadership of the committee, we
reduced the Intelligence Committee's budget by 20 percent, but this
year's bill acknowledges the need to right the ship after the storm of
sequestration.
The bill sets the priorities of our intelligence professionals and
their agencies, and it allocates resources to critical national
security programs, including those that detect, prevent, and disrupt
potential terrorist attacks.
Let me also mention some specifics. The bill continues to emphasize
the value of our satellites; scales back the intelligence community's
use of contractors; pushes for further improvements in the continuous
evaluation of insider threats; provides critical forward-looking
funding for Navy airborne intelligence surveillance reconnaissance to
maintain military intelligence capabilities during the transition to
newer, more capable aircraft; and invests in both the recruitment and
retention of the best and the brightest for our cyber workforce,
particularly within the FBI. Our younger generation, we must educate
them and have them work in this area.
We have spent months poring over this bill and its specific
authorizations in great detail--in our committee spaces, at the
agencies, and in the remotest corners of the Earth where our
intelligence professionals operate--and then I can say this is a very
good bill, and I am proud to support it.
Many of the amendments on the floor today also promise to make a
great bill even better.
For the sake of keeping the country and its allies safe, and for the
sake of rigorously overseeing even the most classified intelligence
programs, I urge my colleagues to pass this bill today.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the
gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Pittenger).
Mr. PITTENGER. Mr. Chairman, I thank Chairman Rogers for this
opportunity to speak. I just really want to commend you for your
exceptional leadership as a Member of this body and for your service on
behalf of the security of our Nation.
Over the past year, it has really been a privilege to get to know you
and work with you on several initiatives. I am just grateful for the
way that you handle the people's business, look forward to working with
you more, and also congratulate you on your future endeavors.
The legislation before us today provides the intelligence community
the authorization needed to protect and defend the United States and
supports critical national security programs, such as those protecting
Americans against terrorism and cyber attacks.
As Members of Congress, we took an oath to the Constitution, which
sets forth our duty to provide for the defense of the United States.
Passing the yearly Intelligence Authorization Act is a critical
component of living up to our constitutional obligations, ensuring
America's intelligence agencies have the resources necessary to keep
Americans safe.
Passing the intelligence authorization is also vital to our important
responsibility of providing oversight to the current administration.
This legislation ensures Congress, and not the executive branch, is
controlling how taxpayer money is being spent on intelligence
activities and doing so in the most efficient and effective way
possible.
We must remember that we have not defeated the threat of terrorism.
The terrorists we face today are not a backyard gang; they are
sophisticated and have access to the most modern of technologies.
Over the last 2 years, we have seen the number of worldwide deaths
from terrorism attacks double from 10,000 in 2012 to 20,000 in 2013.
The fact that we in America are able to sleep soundly at night is a
credit to the men and women who serve our country selflessly. We must
continue to provide these brave men and women every tool possible as
they continue to provide for our safety.
That is why I encourage all my colleagues to join me in supporting
this legislation.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman
from Illinois, Jan Schakowsky, my good friend and a member of our
committee, who has been very thoughtful and has allowed us to do the
things that we needed to do.
Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the ranking member for
yielding.
I want to begin by saying that I really appreciate the way in which
our committee operates and has come to present this authorization bill
to the floor, but I do want to raise some concerns.
One of the most controversial issues surrounding our national
security is the use of the drone program. A number of us tried to
introduce some amendments that would be considered on the floor of the
House so that we, along with the American people, could have a
conversation about that. These amendments were not made in order. And I
want to express what my amendment would have done.
It would have prohibited elements of the intelligence community from
engaging in so-called signature strikes. That is, lethal strikes in
which the target is not specifically identified but whose so-called
pattern of life fits the profile, or signature, of a terrorist.
In these situations, we don't know the identity of the target.
Instead, we draw conclusions from surveillance about whether someone is
affiliated with a terrorist organization, or engaged in terrorist
conduct. The stakes are high, and inevitably mistakes will be made.
There are reports from human rights organizations in past years that we
have already made several grave errors, and innocent lives have been
lost as a result.
We need to recognize that each mistake we make in these situations
killing innocent people spawns more numerous and more determined
adversaries, undermining our mission there in the first place.
How we are perceived abroad matters. Even if some of the strikes
reported as mistakes are not mistaken, the fact is that the rest of the
world perceives our activities as killing innocent civilians and
painting all adult male Muslims in these regions as our enemies.
I understand the targeted use, but I think that we cannot kill our
way out of this problem and our way to victory.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I
may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I just want to thank the gentlelady from Illinois for
her strong and passionate position that she takes on some of the
counterterrorism strategy issues that are very well debated and
certainly well discussed and well overseen in the spaces where
appropriate and under the appropriate form and function to do that
because they are significant. There is no aspect of that
counterterrorism strategy that isn't reviewed both in policy leading up
to the daily and monthly counterstrategy meetings that happen in the
appropriate agencies and departments and as a part of regular oversight
of these particular programs.
But I do think it is important to understand something: that all of
the focus seems to be on the type of a weapon system that we have used
or decided to use or may be using to fight what is a large and growing
threat to the United States of America.
I think it was interesting that in the Boko Haram case of the 300
girls, it caught the world's attention, that you could have a group
that would be so diabolical that they would kidnap 300 girls and sell
them into slavery or force them into marriage and do other unspeakable
things. Yes, that is right, that is who these groups are. This is the
same group that has threatened the United States of America with
terrorist attacks. It is an al Qaeda affiliate. We have watched them
cut off the heads of other human beings for the purposes of
intimidation, we have watched them cut off hands, we have watched them
shoot little girls who get on buses to try to go and get an education.
We need to understand what threat faces the United States of America.
Because our intelligence services have been so good and so aggressive,
we haven't had an attack here in the same 9/11 fashion--and some of
that, by the way, was just sheer luck preparing for the opportunity to
catch them.
We need to step back and make sure we are understanding what we are
trying to accomplish here and how we try to accomplish it. I think
disparaging the very men and women who I know
[[Page H5037]]
spent hours and months and years in preparation for any
counterterrorism strategy that we engage in, and do it in a way that is
so responsible--I think Americans would be so proud if they had the
opportunity to sit down and talk with these people about how they get
to where they are.
But I will tell you, aspects of that counterterrorism strategy--some
have been referenced--are the most impactful, disruptive activity we
have been able to do to stop attacks against the United States and our
allies overseas.
So I just again caution in this vacuum of safety and relative
security that so many have given us, we should be cautious about what
we are asking changes to do--and what that would mean for exposure of,
say, U.S. pilots or U.S. Special Forces--that we have not had to do for
some length of time and still accomplish the mission. By the way, I can
clearly say that any reference to some mass civilian casualties or
collateral damage is absolutely false, it is false, it is a false
narrative for those who seek to stop an effort that we know, in fact,
is degrading the ability for attacks against the United States.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman
from California, Mr. Adam Schiff, a valued member of our Intelligence
Committee, who has worked closely with me and our committee on very
important issues.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
I rise in support of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Years 2014 and 2015.
This bill provides the resources and support the intelligence
community needs to accomplish their mission while enhancing oversight
in several important respects. I want to commend the bipartisan
leadership of Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger on this
bill. I congratulate them on, again, advancing an Intelligence
Authorization Act. I also want to acknowledge my colleague from Nevada,
Dr. Heck, for his work with me on the Technical and Tactical
Subcommittee. Chairman Heck did a fabulous job supporting investments
in technology and capacity that will pay dividends in years to come.
In addition to funding our intelligence priority, the bill includes
important new provisions to improve greater oversight of the NSA and
other IC elements. It creates an independent inspector general within
the NSA who will be fully empowered to investigate abuse, waste, and
fraud. The bill also requires an annual report to the Intelligence
Committees on violations of law and executive order, including
Executive Order 12333. This provision fixes a blind spot under current
law and improves the Intelligence Committee's capacity for oversight.
While I support the bill, I was disappointed that an amendment I
proposed with my colleague Walter Jones was not made in order. This
amendment would have required an annual public report on the total
number of civilian and combatant casualties caused by drone strikes. By
publicly reporting on the use of drones, we would provide additional
accountability and transparency, helping to ensure the legitimacy of
the actions that we take overseas. The report would also provide a
counterpoint to the inflated estimates of civilian casualties
frequently seen in the news, in part due to active efforts of our
enemies to mislead.
I plan to continue working with my colleagues on the committee to
provide greater transparency, but this is a very simple method of doing
so. In sum, it would simply require that there be an annual accounting
of how many combatants are killed and how many noncombatants are
killed. It would also have required that the administration or the DNI
define those terms so we understand who is being defined as a combatant
or noncombatant.
The President has set a high standard for the use of drones, that
they not be used unless there is a near certainty there will be no
civilian casualties. This is a way of holding us accountable to meet
that very high standard. It is also, I think, all the more important
when we consider that, while we may be the first Nation to use drones
in this capacity, we will not be the last, and the standard that we set
or fail to set will be one that may be emulated by others around the
world.
I support this bill. I wish we had the opportunity on the floor to
vote on this amendment, but I look forward to working with the
committee in the years that follow to incorporate this provision and
others to improve transparency and accountability.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I continue to reserve the
balance of my time.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman
from Illinois (Ms. Kelly), a great Member of Congress.
Ms. KELLY of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman and ranking
member for their hard work on this important legislation.
Every day, America faces threats to our national security. Some
threats are evolving, like cyber attacks on our infrastructure. Some
are emerging, like the radicals of Boko Haram. And some are right in
front of us demanding direct action.
Because we face a diverse array of threats, our security depends on
an intelligence community that is equally diverse. In a 2011 address to
Morehouse College, CIA Director Leon Panetta stated that we need an
intelligence community with a workforce that reflects the world it
engages.
{time} 1015
My amendment helps the intelligence community meet its strategic
diversity goals by providing grants to predominantly black institutions
that educate future generations of intelligence experts through
advanced language training, study abroad, and cultural immersion
programs.
To remain globally secure, we must have human assets on the ground
who can blend in easily abroad, especially in Africa and the Middle
East. Overcoming cultural, language, and educational barriers is
critical to achieving this goal. I ask that my colleagues support this
commonsense amendment.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I continue to reserve the
balance of my time.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlelady
from Texas, Sheila Jackson Lee, a great Member of Congress.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me thank the ranking member for yielding and, as
well, the chairperson, and let me collectively add my appreciation for
the two leaders of this committee. They have committed themselves,
without question, to the security of this Nation. I thank them for
their collaboration.
Mr. Rogers, I thank you for the work that you have done for the
Nation and, certainly, for the commitment that you have made to the
very important business of this committee.
Mr. Ruppersberger, let me thank you for your friendship as well and
for the continued collaboration on an issue of great concern to me, but
I will speak generally about this legislation and will, again,
acknowledge some of the issues that you have looked at and considered
and have even included in this legislation as it comes forward.
Mr. Chairman, I agree that detecting and disrupting and preventing a
national security crisis is of paramount responsibility for this
committee and many others, including the committee that I serve on, the
Committee on Homeland Security. For that reason, I have interfaced with
this committee on a number of issues.
I am very glad to note, in particular, that the issue of dealing with
the expansive use that has been used, which I will talk about in the en
bloc amendment, is clearly something that we should have considered,
and in this bill, it did.
It got its hand around the enormous use of outside contractors in the
intelligence business, and it emphasized recruitment and training. That
is positive. There are young, bright persons who I know are willing to
serve their country, and this legislation has committed itself to doing
that.
Now, particularly with this legislation, I also want to appreciate
the collaboration between the Judiciary Committee and this committee on
the USA FREEDOM Act, and I want to say to America that we have
corralled the megadata collection. We have done it in a bipartisan
manner, and we will do more and do better.
So it is with appreciation for this legislation and in thanking the
committee for working with my staff on
[[Page H5038]]
my amendment that I ask my colleagues to support this legislation.
Mr. Chair, I rise to speak on H.R. 4681, the Intelligence
Authorization Act for fiscal year 2014.
I want to thank the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for
including my amendment in an en bloc.
My amendment to H.R. 4681 is simple and will be an important addition
to the legislation, which I believe can be supported by every member of
this Committee.
My amendment seeks greater transparency to Congress on the people who
the Nation relies upon to perform certain types of work required of the
Intelligence Community.
The Jackson Lee amendment requires the Director of the Office of
National Intelligence to conduct an assessment of the reliance of
intelligence activities on contractors to support Government
objectives, including an assessment of contractors performing
intelligence activities, which would include intelligence analysis.
The amendment would seek information on the skills necessary to
perform intelligence related work and whether Federal employees had
these skills. The amendment would also seek statistics on contractors
preforming intelligence related work for agencies under the purview of
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Something is very wrong when the process for screening and vetting
government contractors does not identify someone who would have access
to--as well as the ability to collect and remove sensitive information
from government computers and publicly disclose that information.
If each person working in an intelligence role within the government
decided to act on their own thoughts for their own purposes on whether
they would or would not keep their oath to defend and protect our
Nation's secrets then there would be chaos.
Our Nation suffers harm in ways we can see, as well as ways that we
cannot see when unauthorized disclosures regarding intelligence
resources occur.
It harms our ability to work with other nations who rely on our
ability to keep secret the information they share with our Nation's
intelligence agencies.
If our global assets and allies cease to trust our ability to keep
their work with our intelligence, national defense or diplomatic
agencies secret then they will not cooperate with us in our efforts to
defend our Nation and our interest around the world.
Reckless disclosures make us vulnerable to our Nation's enemies who
could make changes to how they hide information because the disclosure
of national secrets reveals means and methods.
The world is a dangerous place--we have seen within the last 18
months--a bombing during the Boston Marathon, the rise in sectarian
violence in Syria that included incidents involving the use of nerve
gas; and Boko Haram which kidnapped nearly 300 girls from their school
in northern Nigeria.
According to the United States Department of State Country Report on
Terrorism 2013, published in April of this year indicates that there
are 53 Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs).
Designation of FTOs is important to our Nation's fight against
terrorism and is effective in cutting off support for those groups so
designated.
In 2013, Ansar al-Dine, Boko Haram, and Jama'atu Ansarul Muslimina Bi
Biladis-Sudan were added to the list of FTOs.
FTOs are legally defined under Section 219 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, which states the group must be: a foreign
organization; engage in terrorist activity or retain the capacity and
intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism; and participating
in terrorist activity or terrorism that threatens the security of the
United States or its citizens.
United States' National security encompasses national defense,
foreign relations, or economic interest.
The unauthorized intelligence disclosures last year impacted U.S.
national security.
The intelligence breach came as a result of a government contractor
making public sensitive information is still resonating both
internationally and within the United States, where an important debate
on privacy and civil liberties is still ongoing.
But also around the world the consequences of the unauthorized
release of international activity by intelligence agencies is still
playing out.
The timing of the release of information on the non-U.S. activity of
our intelligence agencies caused tremendous tension in our relations
with allies at a time when the United States was working to form a
global response to the use of chemical weapons against civilians in
Syria.
In addition to frustrating our efforts to form a strong global
response to the use of chemical weapons in Syria it also caused
economic harm to U.S. companies internationally.
Congress is not able to fully investigate the circumstances that
resulted in last year's intelligence breach because the person with
many of the answers to questions many of us have is now living in
Russia.
However, we can look prospectively on how the work of the
Intelligence Community under the direction of the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence should fill positions that require
security clearances.
The intelligence work by contractors and Federal employees is
critical to the protection of the United States and our interest both
domestically and around the world. We should approach the work of the
intelligence community as we do when considering the work of the
Department of Defense.
The work that our Intelligence professionals perform is critical, and
a defense in depth approach is necessary to assure that no matter the
challenge or the circumstances there will be well trained professionals
in place to do what must be done to defend and protect the nation.
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence 2013 Report on
Security Clearance Determinations provides information on the number of
persons with security clearance levels of Confidential, Secret, or Top
Secret and had access to classified information as well as those who
were favorably adjudicated but did not have access to classified
information.
I would like to acknowledge the work of the Special Security
Directorate (SSD) of the Office of the National Counterintelligence
Executive for compiling and processing the data for this report.
The 2013 Report on Security Clearance Determinations states that by
October 1, 2013 the Nation had 3,738,026 Federal agency employees
working for the: Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Scattered Castles; Department of Defense; Joint Personnel Adjudication
System; Office of Personnel Management; and Central Verification System
(CVS).
In addition to surveying these agencies a special data call was made
to the seven intelligence community agencies with delegated authority
to conduct investigations or adjudications to fulfill specific
reporting requirements directed by the fiscal year 2010 Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. These agencies were the:
Central Intelligence Agency; Defense Intelligence Agency; Federal
Bureau of Investigation; National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency;
National Reconnaissance Office; National Security Agency; and
Department of State.
In 2013, the total number of persons with a Confidential, Secret or
Top Secret security clearance totaled 5,150,379 individuals--of this
number 3,738,026 were government agency personnel, 1,056,309 were
contractors and 356,044 were categorized as other.
Between January and October 1, 2013 there were 777,168 security
clearances approved--152,490 were government agency employees and
131,209 were contractors with an additional 12,785 designated as other.
Congress must have the ability to make decisions regarding how
intelligence agencies fill positions that require security clearances
because it has implications for the appropriations process.
The Information Security Oversight Office of the National Archives
2012 Report to the President focuses on the classification practices of
intelligence agencies.
The report addresses the power of ``original classification
authorities'' also called ``original classifiers,'' which are
individuals designated with Top Secret original classification
authority to classify information.
Only original classifiers are authorized to determine what
information, if disclosed without authorization, would be expected to
cause damage to national security.
The original classification authority process comes before all other
aspects of the security classification system. In 2004, the total
number of original classifications was 351,150 and in 2012 the number
was 74,477.
The cost of government security classification in 2005 was $7.66
billion and in 2011 the total was $11.36 billion.
The amount expended in 2011 included: 5.65 billion for protection
maintenance; 1.53 billion for security management oversight and
planning; 502.51 million for professional education, training and
awareness; 352.4 million for classification management; and 52.76
million for declassification.
These costs cited are not all encompassing, but were generated by 41
executive branch agencies including the Department of Defense.
The funds expended do not include activity by the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, Office of the
Director for National Intelligence, the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the
National Security Agency.
The focus on training is critical in the work of the Intelligence
Community and it is important that this is a high priority for the
agencies represented in the National Archive report.
[[Page H5039]]
The work by the Intelligence Community to address classification in
an evenhanded way can help create and maintain a firm basis for
classification of information that is sustainable can go a long way in
addressing questions regarding what secrets are critical to our
nation's national security and what the public has a right to know.
I thank my colleagues on the Intelligence Committee for their hard
work in bringing this bill before the full House for consideration. I
ask that members of the Congress vote in favor of this bipartisan en
bloc amendment to H.R. 4681.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I continue to reserve the
balance of my time.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire as to how much time I
have remaining?
The CHAIR. The gentleman from Maryland has 17 minutes remaining.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman
from Vermont, Mr. Peter Welch, my good friend and a great Member of
Congress.
Mr. WELCH. I thank the gentleman. I thank you for your good work.
Mr. Rogers, I thank you for your good work, and we are going to miss
you. Your leadership on the Intel Committee has been of great benefit
to this institution. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I have been working with a number of my colleagues,
particularly with Cynthia Lummis of Wyoming, on a question that we
think is quite important to the security status of our country, and
that is more transparency in the budget.
This is debated because, by definition, if it is intelligence
activity, it is ``secret,'' but on the other hand, the whole point of
having transparency in budgets is so the rules of accountability apply
across the board. We have 16 different intelligence-gathering agencies,
and in all cases, the topline budget is absolutely secret.
The 9/11 Commission that was a bipartisan commission of respected
national security credentialed people--Lee Hamilton and the Governor of
New Jersey, Governor Kean--recommended that this topline number in the
intelligence agency budgets be transparent.
Why? So that there is a basis for taxpayers and for all of us to
start to evaluate whether we are getting our money's worth, whether
there is duplication in efforts, whether one agency is stumbling into
another, whether there is coordination, whether there is cooperation.
The same reasons that we would have the food stamp budget subject to
rigid review and accountability applies as well to our security. In
fact, it is enormously important that this country be getting its
money's worth.
The principle of transparency would not in any way compromise, in the
view of many respected intelligence leaders like Lee Hamilton, the
intelligence gathering and the effort and responsibility to keep us
secure.
So I was disappointed that we were not allowed to have an amendment
on that bill, but I do appreciate the willingness of the ranking member
to work with me and also of the chairman to listen to many of us in
this body who would like that opportunity to make the case that Lee
Hamilton made for transparency.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I continue to reserve the
balance of my time.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
I thank the gentleman from Vermont (Mr. Welch) for his diligent work
in the area of transparency on behalf of the American people.
As we have seen in this last year, trust in the intelligence
community by the citizens it serves is incredibly important.
As the ranking member of the House Intelligence Committee, we take
seriously the responsibility to provide to the public as much
information as possible while protecting sensitive sources and methods.
When classification permits, the budget of the intelligence community
has been released. In other cases, the American people rely on our
committee and on all of their Representatives, like Representative
Welch, to review the budget of the intelligence community on their
behalf.
I look forward to working with Representative Welch to continue to
find ways to increase the trust of the American people in the
intelligence community as it relates to transparency.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I continue to reserve the
balance of my time for the purpose of closing.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
For the sake of rigorous oversight and accountability over all U.S.
intelligence agencies and all U.S. intelligence activities, I urge my
colleagues to vote for this important, bipartisan bill. I also urge my
colleagues to support this bill for the sake of our brave intelligence
professionals, who, like our military, work day and night, often in the
most austere of places, to keep us safe and our allies safe; and for
the sake of all of us--not just in America, but around the world--who
benefit from the work of our intelligence agencies, I urge my
colleagues to vote for this bill. It is a solid bill that we should be
proud to support.
Finally, once again, Mr. Chairman, let me thank you for your
leadership, our relationship, and your commitment to the people of the
United States of America. You served in the military, and you served in
the FBI. We are going to miss you.
Thank you also to every member on the Intelligence Committee. We have
had many debates, many hard negotiations, and many tough struggles, but
at all times, whether or not one member or another agreed or disagreed,
we respected the fact that another member had another point of view,
and then we resolved those issues.
Each of us has worked even harder to find common ground on behalf of
the American people to protect us from terrorist attacks and other
issues that are out there that relate to national security.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of
my time.
I thank the ranking member for his work.
Let the American public understand what happens. There are so many
aspersions thrown at the members who serve on the Intelligence and on
other committees who must do their work in secret, and certainly, the
staff fights through and works through all of these difficult issues.
There is plenty of oversight happening. It might not be on the front
page of the newspaper. We call that ``disaster day'' in the business of
trying to protect American secrets.
When the ranking member and I first took over the committee, we
reinstituted all of the regular oversight patterns: counterintelligence
matters, covert action matters, regular counterterrorism strategy
updates, and reviews.
Again, every piece of that strategy that is implemented is reviewed
by the committee, and it is certainly read and reviewed by me,
personally, and, I know, by others on the committee as well.
There is a tremendous amount of effort and energy applied to trying
to get this right, to making sure that two things happen--one, that
they are comporting with the law. They want to do that despite what you
might read in the newspaper. They want to do that.
They, too, have taken an oath to the Constitution of the United
States of America, and they believe that following the law is the right
way to do it. They want Congress' support for what they are doing, and
they want the American people's support for what they are doing--
because it is so difficult and so hard to come to the right conclusions
in a very murky and dangerous world--so that oversight does happen. It
happens regularly.
I want to thank all of the members of both parties for rigorous
debate behind those closed doors. There is no lovefest when those doors
close and a ``let's just do what we have to do to get to tomorrow.''
The debates are real and vigorous, and we have different philosophies
on how we move forward on some of these intelligence matters and
collection matters and on how we balance privacy and civil liberties
and security. All of that happens.
Sometimes, we find members who just don't agree, but what we do in
that space is understand and try to get and make sure that we have all
of the resources and all of the policies and all of the authorities our
intelligence services need to be impactful to save the
[[Page H5040]]
United States and to, yes, maybe even save 300 girls or to, yes, maybe
even allow for girls in a place like Afghanistan to get an education.
That part needs to be right, too.
Nuclear proliferation--we have a cyber world that is the single
largest national security threat to this country that we are not
prepared to handle, and there are a lot of sidebar discussions that
have nothing to do with the fact that nation-states are stealing our
intellectual property--nation-states like China.
You have, according to public reports, countries like Iran that are
probing financial institutions right here in the United States and are
trying to do destructive attacks.
According to public reports, North Korea even attacked a bank in
South Korea some months ago. You see China rising up in its influence
in the South and East China Seas. You see potential conflict between
Vietnam, Japan, and China.
These are serious, serious matters. Because they are so far away, I
think sometimes we forget, and we come to talk about things that are
important--in how we move forward in the intelligence business and how
we empower them to do the work of the United States.
At the same time, this recent year of, I think, aspersion to the men
and women who serve in these capacities is disheartening. This isn't a
new thing. George Washington used the intelligence business to try to
win the war against the British.
Ben Franklin is credited with the first covert action programs by
trying to influence British and Tory opinion during the first years of
the war. John Jay created the first counterintelligence unit to try to
fight back against what the British were doing in spying against the
Americans.
Jefferson and Madison had secret funds that they took, by the way,
which we would no longer approve or support today--secret funds--in
order to do covert action-type activities in the earliest days of the
founding of our Nation.
We need to stop for a minute and think about what is at stake. I
think the future and safety and security of the United States is at
stake, and we have somehow, over the last year, decided that our
intelligence services are the problem.
No. I have bad news. Actually, I have good news: they are part of the
solution. If you don't want troops engaged in many countries, then you
want to support your intelligence services, and you want them to be the
best in the world.
If you don't want to have to engage in the withdrawal of certain
diplomatic and economic and trade arrangements around the world, then
you want the best intelligence services that you can possibly get. Here
is the good news: we have them. We just need to stand behind them.
When they come home from doing hard things, when they lose their
colleagues--and they do--they are not looking for a ticker tape parade
in New York City. They know that is not going to happen.
What they do want to understand is that, when they turn around, the
American population and the American citizens are standing with them.
Even though Americans can't give them the ``attaboy,'' we can. Those of
us who do this work, we can.
So I will tell them, on this floor today, on behalf of a grateful
Nation, thank you for your service. Stop reading the newspaper. Keep
doing your job. It will mean the difference of lives saved around the
world.
We have so many challenges, and I only say this--and I wasn't
planning to say this, Mr. Chairman--that someone came on this floor and
said: I don't mind the intelligence people, but I don't like their
culture.
{time} 1030
These are people who are willing to risk their lives for that flag
that stands in the well of this House. They were willing to give their
lives for the Constitution they stuck up their hand to support.
Is that the culture we don't like and appreciate anymore in America?
There have been some bumps in the road, but we ought to applaud these
people. We ought to sing their praises. We ought to thank them every
single day that they are away from their families, in dangerous places,
and risking their lives to collect that one piece of information that
maybe saves the girls of Boko Haram or maybe saves the girls who get on
their bus today in the United States of America.
I hope we shake ourselves out of this notion that we can just
continue to beat them and disparage them and call them everything but
great patriots and expect them to get up every day and do the job that
they need to do to protect this country.
This bill, I think, actually does that. We give them clear guidance.
We invest in technology that we need to make sure that we keep up with
our adversaries around the world who, by the way, are trying to beat us
and take advantage of us--places like space, places like cyber, places
like HUMINT intelligence, and what they believe is a perceived weakness
to deal with a rising tide of terrorists who want to kill Americans
here at home.
This is an important bill because it is bipartisan. A lot of these
issues that are talked about have been fought in the bowels of this
House, basically. And we worked through it and we have come to an
agreement that this is the right direction, in a bipartisan way, that
will serve to protect the United States.
So, Mr. Chair, I urge all Members to strongly support this bill. Give
them the tools, give Congress the oversight, and give America the
ability to sleep well at night, knowing that very brave men and women
will do the work that so many would not be interested in doing.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Chair, I rise today in support of H.R. 4681, the
``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2014 and 2015''.
As Chairman of the Committee on Homeland on Security, I understand
the importance of this legislation. H.R. 4681 enhances the national
security of the United States and is a vital tool for Congressional
oversight of the activities of the Intelligence Community. It is
critical that our intelligence agencies have all of the resources and
authorities they need to accomplish the important responsibility of
keeping Americans safe. I commend Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member
Ruppersberger for their tireless work on these issues and the
exhaustive process of drafting a bipartisan authorization.
H.R. 4681 authorizes Federal intelligence, intelligence-related, and
information sharing activities, including those of the Department of
Homeland Security's Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A). I&A is
an element of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as well as the
Intelligence Community, and its activities support missions in both. As
such, I&A occupies the unique role as a central conduit for analysis
and information sharing among stakeholders which include the
intelligence agencies, components of the DHS, other Federal partners,
and State, local, tribal, and territorial entities. In this role, I&A
supports and collaborates with State and local partners through the
National Network of Fusion Centers, and provides analytic support to
the DHS components.
Consistent with our jurisdiction, the Committee on Homeland Security
has conducted extensive oversight over these programs and missions, to
include the July 2013 release of a report on ``The National Network of
Fusion Centers.''
While I support the overall purpose of the bill, I am concerned that
the effort includes provisions that seek to limit the support I&A
provides DHS, its component agencies, and to the 78 fusion centers
around the nation. I believe this risks depriving the Homeland Security
Enterprise of valuable information and expertise at a time when we know
the threats to the homeland persist.
As the bill moves through the process and negotiations begin with the
Senate, I will continue to work to ensure that these issues are
addressed and that State and local law enforcement, and other first
responders, receive the support they need from the Department of
Homeland Security.
Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chair, I rise in support of my amendment to the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2014 and 2015.
Under Section 307 of this Act, the Chief Information Officer of the
Intelligence Community, along with the respective Chief Information
Officers of each element that comprise the IC, are required to conduct
an inventory of all existing software licenses--both used and unused--
and then assess the actions that could be carried out to achieve the
greatest possible economies of scale and cost-savings in software
procurement and usage.
[[Page H5041]]
My commonsense amendment simply ensures that when those assessments
are carried out, the CIOs will examine leading software license
management practices.
By adopting Connolly #12, Congress will ensure that when the IC
examines potential actions to enhance software license management and
save taxpayer dollars, four leading practices will be included in the
analysis.
The management practices contained in my amendment are derived from a
recent report issued by the U.S. Government Accountability Office on
May 22, 2014, entitled, ``Federal Software Licenses: Better Management
Needed to Achieve Significant Savings Government-Wide.''
GAO consulted with software license management experts from the
public and private sectors, prior to concluding that Federal agencies
are generally not following best practices that could achieve
significant cost-savings.
These best practices include increasing the centralization of the
management of software licenses; increasing the regular tracking and
maintaining of comprehensive inventories of software licenses using
automated discovery and inventory tools and metrics; analyzing software
license data to inform investment decisions; and providing appropriate
personnel with sufficient software licenses management training.
I urge all my colleagues to support my straightforward amendment that
will enhance the IC's ability to spend taxpayer dollars in the most
effective and efficient manner possible when procuring and managing
software licenses.
The CHAIR. All time for general debate has expired.
Pursuant to the rule, the bill shall be considered for amendment
under the 5-minute rule.
In lieu of the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, printed in the bill, it
shall be in order to consider as an original bill for the purpose of
amendment under the 5-minute rule an amendment in the nature of a
substitute consisting of the text of Rules Committee Print 113-45. That
amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be considered as read.
The text of the amendment in the nature of a substitute is as
follows:
H. R. 4681
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the
``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2014 and
2015''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Subtitle A--General Matters
Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Specific authorization of funding for High Performance
Computing Center 2.
Sec. 304. Clarification of exemption from Freedom of Information Act of
identities of employees submitting complaints to the
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
Sec. 305. Functional managers for the intelligence community.
Sec. 306. Annual assessment of intelligence community performance by
function.
Sec. 307. Software licensing.
Sec. 308. Plans to respond to unauthorized public disclosures of covert
actions.
Sec. 309. Auditability.
Sec. 310. Public Interest Declassification Board.
Sec. 311. Official representation items in support of the Coast Guard
Attache Program.
Sec. 312. Declassification review of certain items collected during the
mission that killed Osama bin Laden on May 1, 2011.
Sec. 313. Merger of the Foreign Counterintelligence Program and the
General Defense Intelligence Program.
Subtitle B--Reporting
Sec. 321. Annual report on violations of law or executive order.
Sec. 322. Submittal to Congress by heads of elements of intelligence
community of plans for orderly shutdown in event of
absence of appropriations.
Sec. 323. Reports on chemical weapons in Syria.
Sec. 324. Reports to the intelligence community on penetrations of
networks and information systems of certain contractors.
Sec. 325. Report on electronic waste.
Sec. 326. Promoting STEM education to meet the future workforce needs
of the intelligence community.
Sec. 327. Assessment of security of domestic oil refineries and related
rail transportation infrastructure.
Sec. 328. Repeal or modification of certain reporting requirements.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Sec. 401. Gifts, devises, and bequests to the Central Intelligence
Agency.
Sec. 402. Inspector General of the National Security Agency.
TITLE V--SECURITY CLEARANCE REFORM
Sec. 501. Continuous evaluation and sharing of derogatory information
regarding personnel with access to classified
information.
Sec. 502. Requirements for intelligence community contractors.
Sec. 503. Technology improvements to security clearance processing.
Sec. 504. Report on reciprocity of security clearances.
Sec. 505. Improving the periodic reinvestigation process.
Sec. 506. Appropriate committees of Congress defined.
TITLE VI--TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS
Sec. 601. Technical amendments to the Central Intelligence Agency Act
of 1949.
Sec. 602. Technical amendments to the National Security Act of 1947
relating to the past elimination of certain positions.
Sec. 603. Technical amendments to the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2013.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term
``congressional intelligence committees'' means--
(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives.
(2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence
community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4)
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal
years 2014 and 2015 for the conduct of the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the following elements of
the United States Government:
(1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(3) The Department of Defense.
(4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(5) The National Security Agency.
(6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force.
(7) The Coast Guard.
(8) The Department of State.
(9) The Department of the Treasury.
(10) The Department of Energy.
(11) The Department of Justice.
(12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
(14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(16) The Department of Homeland Security.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Levels.--
(1) Fiscal year 2014.--The amounts authorized to be
appropriated under section 101 and, subject to section 103,
the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2014,
for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the
elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of section
101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations for fiscal year 2014 prepared to accompany the
bill H.R. 4681 of the One Hundred Thirteenth Congress.
(2) Fiscal year 2015.--The amounts authorized to be
appropriated under section 101 and, subject to section 103,
the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2015,
for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the
elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of section
101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations for fiscal year 2015 prepared to accompany the
bill H.R. 4681 of the One Hundred Thirteenth Congress.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of
Authorizations.--
(1) Availability.--The classified Schedules of
Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made
available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate,
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives, and to the President.
(2) Distribution by the president.--Subject to paragraph
(3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of
the classified Schedules of Authorizations, or of appropriate
portions of the Schedules, within the executive branch.
(3) Limits on disclosure.--The President shall not publicly
disclose the classified Schedules of Authorizations or any
portion of such Schedules except--
(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C.
3306(a));
(B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or
(C) as otherwise required by law.
[[Page H5042]]
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
(a) Authority for Increases.--The Director of National
Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel
in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2014 or
2015 by the classified Schedules of Authorizations referred
to in section 102(a) if the Director of National Intelligence
determines that such action is necessary to the performance
of important intelligence functions, except that the number
of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized
under such section may not, for any element of the
intelligence community, exceed 3 percent of the number of
civilian personnel authorized under the Schedule for such
element during the fiscal year covered by such Schedule.
(b) Treatment of Certain Personnel.--The Director of
National Intelligence shall establish guidelines that govern,
for each element of the intelligence community, the treatment
under the personnel levels authorized under section 102(a),
including any exemption from such personnel levels, of
employment or assignment in--
(1) a student program, trainee program, or similar program;
(2) a reserve corps or as a reemployed annuitant; or
(3) details, joint duty, or long term, full-time training.
(c) Notice to Congressional Intelligence Committees.--The
Director of National Intelligence shall notify the
congressional intelligence committees in writing at least 15
days prior to each exercise of an authority described in
subsection (a).
SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--
(1) Fiscal year 2014.--There is authorized to be
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management
Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal
year 2014 the sum of $528,229,000. Within such amount, funds
identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and
development shall remain available until September 30, 2015.
(2) Fiscal year 2015.--There is authorized to be
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management
Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal
year 2015 the sum of $505,476,000. Within such amount, funds
identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and
development shall remain available until September 30, 2016.
(b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the
Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of
National Intelligence are authorized 855 positions as of
September 30, 2014, and 777 positions as of September 30,
2015. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent
employees of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence or personnel detailed from other elements of the
United States Government.
(c) Classified Authorizations.--
(1) Authorization of appropriations.--
(A) Fiscal year 2014.--In addition to amounts authorized to
be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management
Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be
appropriated for the Community Management Account for fiscal
year 2014 such additional amounts as are specified in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section
102(a). Such additional amounts for advanced research and
development shall remain available until September 30, 2015.
(B) Fiscal year 2015.--In addition to amounts authorized to
be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management
Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be
appropriated for the Community Management Account for fiscal
year 2014 such additional amounts as are specified in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section
102(a). Such additional amounts for advanced research and
development shall remain available until September 30, 2016.
(2) Authorization of personnel.--
(A) Fiscal year 2014.--In addition to the personnel
authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence
Community Management Account as of September 30, 2014, there
are authorized such additional personnel for the Community
Management Account as of that date as are specified in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section
102(a).
(B) Fiscal year 2015.--In addition to the personnel
authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence
Community Management Account as of September 30, 2015, there
are authorized such additional personnel for the Community
Management Account as of that date as are specified in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section
102(a).
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund
$514,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2014 and 2015.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Subtitle A--General Matters
SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay,
retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be
increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may
be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits
authorized by law.
SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not
be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any
intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by
the Constitution or the laws of the United States.
SEC. 303. SPECIFIC AUTHORIZATION OF FUNDING FOR HIGH
PERFORMANCE COMPUTING CENTER 2.
Funds appropriated for the construction of the High
Performance Computing Center 2 (HPCC 2), as described in the
table entitled Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP) in the
classified annex to accompany the Consolidated and Further
Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 (Public Law 113-6; 127
Stat. 198), in excess of the amount specified for such
activity in the tables in the classified annex prepared to
accompany the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2013 (Public Law 112-277; 126 Stat. 2468) shall be
specifically authorized by Congress for the purposes of
section 504 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3094).
SEC. 304. CLARIFICATION OF EXEMPTION FROM FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT OF IDENTITIES OF EMPLOYEES
SUBMITTING COMPLAINTS TO THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
Section 103H(g)(3)(A) of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 3033(g)(3)(A)) is amended by striking
``undertaken;'' and inserting ``undertaken, and this
provision shall qualify as a withholding statute pursuant to
subsection (b)(3) of section 552 of title 5, United States
Code (commonly known as the `Freedom of Information Act');''.
SEC. 305. FUNCTIONAL MANAGERS FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) Functional Managers Authorized.--Title I of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is
amended by inserting after section 103I the following new
section:
``SEC. 103J. FUNCTIONAL MANAGERS FOR THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.
``(a) Functional Managers Authorized.--The Director of
National Intelligence may establish within the intelligence
community one or more positions of manager of an intelligence
function. Any position so established may be known as the
`Functional Manager' of the intelligence function concerned.
``(b) Personnel.--The Director shall designate individuals
to serve as manager of intelligence functions established
under subsection (a) from among officers and employees of
elements of the intelligence community.
``(c) Duties.--Each manager of an intelligence function
established under subsection (a) shall have the duties as
follows:
``(1) To act as principal advisor to the Director on the
intelligence function.
``(2) To carry out such other responsibilities with respect
to the intelligence function as the Director may specify for
purposes of this section.''.
(b) Table of Contents Amendment.--The table of contents in
the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is
amended by inserting after the item relating to section 103I
the following new item:
``Sec. 103J. Functional managers for the intelligence community.''.
SEC. 306. ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
PERFORMANCE BY FUNCTION.
(a) Annual Assessments Required.--Title V of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by
inserting after section 506I the following new section:
``SEC. 506J. ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
PERFORMANCE BY FUNCTION.
``(a) In General.--Not later than April 1, 2016, and each
year thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence shall,
in consultation with the Functional Managers, submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on covered
intelligence functions during the preceding year.
``(b) Elements.--Each report under subsection (a) shall
include for each covered intelligence function for the year
covered by such report the following:
``(1) An identification of the capabilities, programs, and
activities of such intelligence function, regardless of the
element of the intelligence community that carried out such
capabilities, programs, and activities.
``(2) A description of the investment and allocation of
resources for such intelligence function, including an
analysis of the allocation of resources within the context of
the National Intelligence Strategy, priorities for recipients
of resources, and areas of risk.
``(3) A description and assessment of the performance of
such intelligence function.
``(4) An identification of any issues related to the
application of technical interoperability standards in the
capabilities, programs, and activities of such intelligence
function.
``(5) An identification of the operational overlap or need
for de-confliction, if any, within such intelligence
function.
``(6) A description of any efforts to integrate such
intelligence function with other intelligence disciplines as
part of an integrated intelligence enterprise.
``(7) A description of any efforts to establish consistency
in tradecraft and training within such intelligence function.
``(8) A description and assessment of developments in
technology that bear on the future of such intelligence
function.
``(9) Such other matters relating to such intelligence
function as the Director may specify for purposes of this
section.
``(c) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) The term `covered intelligence functions' means each
intelligence function for which a Functional Manager has been
established under section 103J during the year covered by a
report under this section.
``(2) The term `Functional Manager' means the manager of an
intelligence function established under section 103J.''.
[[Page H5043]]
(b) Table of Contents Amendment.--The table of contents in
the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is
amended by inserting after the item relating to section 506I
the following new item:
``Sec. 506J. Annual assessment of intelligence community performance by
function.''.
SEC. 307. SOFTWARE LICENSING.
(a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by inserting after
section 108 the following new section:
``SEC. 109. SOFTWARE LICENSING.
``(a) Requirement for Inventories of Software Licenses.--
The chief information officer of each element of the
intelligence community, in consultation with the Chief
Information Officer of the Intelligence Community, shall
biennially--
``(1) conduct an inventory of all existing software
licenses of such element, including utilized and unutilized
licenses;
``(2) assess the actions that could be carried out by such
element to achieve the greatest possible economies of scale
and associated cost savings in software procurement and
usage; and
``(3) submit to the Chief Information Officer of the
Intelligence Community each inventory required by paragraph
(1) and each assessment required by paragraph (2).
``(b) Inventories by the Chief Information Officer of the
Intelligence Community.--The Chief Information Officer of the
Intelligence Community, based on the inventories and
assessments required by subsection (a), shall biennially--
``(1) compile an inventory of all existing software
licenses of the intelligence community, including utilized
and unutilized licenses; and
``(2) assess the actions that could be carried out by the
intelligence community to achieve the greatest possible
economies of scale and associated cost savings in software
procurement and usage.
``(c) Reports to Congress.--The Chief Information Officer
of the Intelligence Community shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a copy of each
inventory compiled under subsection (b)(1).''.
(b) Initial Inventory.--
(1) Intelligence community elements.--
(A) Date.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the chief information officer of each
element of the intelligence community shall complete the
initial inventory, assessment, and submission required under
section 109(a) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added
by subsection (a) of this section.
(B) Basis.--The initial inventory conducted for each
element of the intelligence community under section 109(a)(1)
of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection
(a) of this section, shall be based on the inventory of
software licenses conducted pursuant to section 305 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public
Law 112-277; 126 Stat. 2472) for such element.
(2) Chief information officer of the intelligence
community.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Chief Information Officer of the
Intelligence Community shall complete the initial compilation
and assessment required under section 109(b) of the National
Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a).
(c) Table of Contents Amendments.--The table of contents in
the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is
amended--
(1) by striking the second item relating to section 104
(relating to Annual national security strategy report); and
(2) by inserting after the item relating to section 108 the
following new item:
``Sec. 109. Software licensing.''.
SEC. 308. PLANS TO RESPOND TO UNAUTHORIZED PUBLIC DISCLOSURES
OF COVERT ACTIONS.
Section 503 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3093) is amended by adding at the end the following new
subsection:
``(h) For each type of activity undertaken as part of a
covert action, the President shall establish in writing a
plan to respond to the unauthorized public disclosure of that
type of activity.''.
SEC. 309. AUDITABILITY.
(a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end
the following new section:
``SEC. 509. AUDITABILITY OF CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
``(a) Requirement for Annual Audits.--The head of each
covered entity shall ensure that there is a full financial
audit of such covered entity each year beginning with fiscal
year 2014. Such audits may be conducted by an internal or
external independent accounting or auditing organization.
``(b) Requirement for Unqualified Opinion.--Beginning as
early as practicable, but in no event later than the audit
required under subsection (a) for fiscal year 2016, the head
of each covered entity shall take all reasonable steps
necessary to ensure that each audit required under subsection
(a) contains an unqualified opinion on the financial
statements of such covered entity for the fiscal year covered
by such audit.
``(c) Reports to Congress.--The chief financial officer of
each covered entity shall provide to the congressional
intelligence committees an annual audit report from an
accounting or auditing organization on each audit of the
covered entity conducted pursuant to subsection (a).
``(d) Covered Entity Defined.--In this section, the term
`covered entity' means the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the
National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency.''.
(b) Table of Contents Amendment.--The table of contents in
the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is
amended by inserting after the item relating to section 508
the following new item:
``Sec. 509. Auditability of certain elements of the intelligence
community.''.
SEC. 310. PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD.
Section 710(b) of the Public Interest Declassification Act
of 2000 (Public Law 106-567; 50 U.S.C. 3161 note) is amended
by striking ``2014.'' and inserting ``2018.''.
SEC. 311. OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION ITEMS IN SUPPORT OF THE
COAST GUARD ATTACHE PROGRAM.
Notwithstanding any other limitation on the amount of funds
that may be used for official representation items, the
Secretary of Homeland Security may use funds made available
to the Secretary through the National Intelligence Program
for necessary expenses for intelligence analysis and
operations coordination activities for official
representation items in support of the Coast Guard Attache
Program.
SEC. 312. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW OF CERTAIN ITEMS COLLECTED
DURING THE MISSION THAT KILLED OSAMA BIN LADEN
ON MAY 1, 2011.
Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall--
(1) in the manner described in the classified annex to this
Act--
(A) complete a declassification review of documents
collected in Abbottabad, Pakistan, during the mission that
killed Osama bin Laden on May 1, 2011; and
(B) make publicly available any information declassified as
a result of the declassification review required under
paragraph (1); and
(2) report to the congressional intelligence committees--
(A) the results of the declassification review required
under paragraph (1); and
(B) a justification for not declassifying any information
required to be included in such declassification review that
remains classified.
SEC. 313. MERGER OF THE FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
AND THE GENERAL DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Director of
National Intelligence shall carry out the merger of the
Foreign Counterintelligence Program into the General Defense
Intelligence Program as directed in the classified annex to
this Act. The merger shall go into effect no earlier than 30
days after written notification of the merger is provided to
the congressional intelligence committees.
Subtitle B--Reporting
SEC. 321. ANNUAL REPORT ON VIOLATIONS OF LAW OR EXECUTIVE
ORDER.
(a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.), as amended by section 309, is
further amended by adding at the end the following:
``SEC. 510. ANNUAL REPORT ON VIOLATIONS OF LAW OR EXECUTIVE
ORDER.
``(a) Annual Reports Required.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall annually submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report on violations of law or
executive order by personnel of an element of the
intelligence community that were identified during the
previous calendar year.
``(b) Elements.--Each report required under subsection (a)
shall include a description of, and any action taken in
response to, any violation of law or executive order
(including Executive Order 12333 (50 U.S.C. 3001 note)) by
personnel of an element of the intelligence community in the
course of such employment that, during the previous calendar
year, was determined by the director, head, general counsel,
or inspector general of any element of the intelligence
community to have occurred.''.
(b) Initial Report.--The first report required under
section 510 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by
subsection (a), shall be submitted not later than one year
after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(c) Table of Contents Amendment.--The table of sections in
the first section of the National Security Act of 1947, as
amended by section 309 of this Act, is further amended by
adding after the section relating to section 509, as added by
such section 309, the following new item:
``Sec. 510. Annual report on violations of law or executive order.''.
SEC. 322. SUBMITTAL TO CONGRESS BY HEADS OF ELEMENTS OF
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY OF PLANS FOR ORDERLY
SHUTDOWN IN EVENT OF ABSENCE OF APPROPRIATIONS.
(a) In General.--Whenever the head of an applicable agency
submits a plan to the Director of the Office of Management
and Budget in accordance with section 124 of Office of
Management and Budget Circular A-11, pertaining to agency
operations in the absence of appropriations, or any successor
circular of the Office that requires the head of an
applicable agency to submit to the Director a plan for an
orderly shutdown in the event of the absence of
appropriations, such head shall submit a copy of such plan to
the following:
(1) The congressional intelligence committees.
(2) The Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate.
(3) The Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
[[Page H5044]]
(4) In the case of a plan for an element of the
intelligence community that is within the Department of
Defense, to--
(A) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives.
(b) Head of an Applicable Agency Defined.--In this section,
the term ``head of an applicable agency'' includes the
following:
(1) The Director of National Intelligence.
(2) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(3) Each head of each element of the intelligence community
that is within the Department of Defense.
SEC. 323. REPORTS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN SYRIA.
(a) In General.--Not later than 30 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on the Syrian
chemical weapons program.
(b) Elements.--The report required under subsection (a)
shall include the following elements:
(1) A comprehensive assessment of chemical weapon
stockpiles in Syria, including names, types, and quantities
of chemical weapons agents, types of munitions, and location
and form of storage, production, and research and development
facilities.
(2) A listing of key personnel associated with the Syrian
chemical weapons program.
(3) An assessment of undeclared chemical weapons
stockpiles, munitions, and facilities.
(4) An assessment of how these stockpiles, precursors, and
delivery systems were obtained.
(5) A description of key intelligence gaps related to the
Syrian chemical weapons program.
(6) An assessment of any denial and deception efforts on
the part of the Syrian regime related to its chemical weapons
program.
(c) Progress Reports.--Every 90 days until the date that is
18 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a
progress report providing any material updates to the report
required under subsection (a).
SEC. 324. REPORTS TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ON
PENETRATIONS OF NETWORKS AND INFORMATION
SYSTEMS OF CERTAIN CONTRACTORS.
(a) Procedures for Reporting Penetrations.--The Director of
National Intelligence shall establish procedures that require
each cleared intelligence contractor to report to an element
of the intelligence community designated by the Director for
purposes of such procedures when a network or information
system of such contractor that meets the criteria established
pursuant to subsection (b) is successfully penetrated.
(b) Networks and Information Systems Subject to
Reporting.--The Director of National Intelligence shall, in
consultation with appropriate officials, establish criteria
for covered networks to be subject to the procedures for
reporting system penetrations under subsection (a).
(c) Procedure Requirements.--
(1) Rapid reporting.--The procedures established pursuant
to subsection (a) shall require each cleared intelligence
contractor to rapidly report to an element of the
intelligence community designated pursuant to subsection (a)
of each successful penetration of the network or information
systems of such contractor that meet the criteria established
pursuant to subsection (b). Each such report shall include
the following:
(A) A description of the technique or method used in such
penetration.
(B) A sample of the malicious software, if discovered and
isolated by the contractor, involved in such penetration.
(C) A summary of information created by or for such element
in connection with any program of such element that has been
potentially compromised due to such penetration.
(2) Access to equipment and information by intelligence
community personnel.--The procedures established pursuant to
subsection (a) shall--
(A) include mechanisms for intelligence community personnel
to, upon request, obtain access to equipment or information
of a cleared intelligence contractor necessary to conduct
forensic analysis in addition to any analysis conducted by
such contractor;
(B) provide that a cleared intelligence contractor is only
required to provide access to equipment or information as
described in subparagraph (A) to determine whether
information created by or for an element of the intelligence
community in connection with any intelligence community
program was successfully exfiltrated from a network or
information system of such contractor and, if so, what
information was exfiltrated; and
(C) provide for the reasonable protection of trade secrets,
commercial or financial information, and information that can
be used to identify a specific person (other than the name of
the suspected perpetrator of the penetration).
(3) Limitation on dissemination of certain information.--
The procedures established pursuant to subsection (a) shall
prohibit the dissemination outside the intelligence community
of information obtained or derived through such procedures
that is not created by or for the intelligence community
except--
(A) with the approval of the contractor providing such
information;
(B) to the congressional intelligence committees or the
Subcommittees on Defense of the Committees on Appropriations
of the House of Representatives and the Senate for such
committees and such Subcommittees to perform oversight; or
(C) to law enforcement agencies to investigate a
penetration reported under this section.
(d) Issuance of Procedures and Establishment of Criteria.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall establish the procedures required under
subsection (a) and the criteria required under subsection
(b).
(2) Applicability date.--The requirements of this section
shall apply on the date on which the Director of National
Intelligence establishes the procedures required under this
section.
(e) Coordination With the Secretary of Defense To Prevent
Duplicate Reporting.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense shall establish
procedures to permit a contractor that is a cleared
intelligence contractor and a cleared defense contractor
under section 941 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law 112-239; 10 U.S.C. 2224
note) to submit a single report that satisfies the
requirements of this section and such section 941 for an
incident of penetration of network or information system.
(f) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Cleared intelligence contractor.--The term ``cleared
intelligence contractor'' means a private entity granted
clearance by the Director of National Intelligence or the
head of an element of the intelligence community to access,
receive, or store classified information for the purpose of
bidding for a contract or conducting activities in support of
any program of an element of the intelligence community.
(2) Covered network.--The term ``covered network'' means a
network or information system of a cleared intelligence
contractor that contains or processes information created by
or for an element of the intelligence community with respect
to which such contractor is required to apply enhanced
protection.
(g) Savings Clauses.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed to alter or limit any otherwise authorized access
by government personnel to networks or information systems
owned or operated by a contractor that processes or stores
government data.
SEC. 325. REPORT ON ELECTRONIC WASTE.
(a) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
report on the extent to which the intelligence community has
implemented the recommendations of the Inspector General of
the Intelligence Community contained in the report entitled
``Study of Intelligence Community Electronic Waste Disposal
Practices'' issued in May 2013. Such report shall include an
assessment of the extent to which the policies, standards,
and guidelines of the intelligence community governing the
proper disposal of electronic waste are applicable to covered
commercial electronic waste that may contain classified
information.
(b) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
(c) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Covered commercial electronic waste.--The term
``covered commercial electronic waste'' means electronic
waste of a commercial entity that contracts with an element
of the intelligence community.
(2) Electronic waste.--The term ``electronic waste''
includes any obsolete, broken, or irreparable electronic
device, including a television, copier, facsimile machine,
tablet, telephone, computer, computer monitor, laptop,
printer, scanner, and associated electrical wiring.
SEC. 326. PROMOTING STEM EDUCATION TO MEET THE FUTURE
WORKFORCE NEEDS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence
shall submit to the Secretary of Education and the
congressional intelligence committees a report describing the
anticipated hiring needs of the intelligence community in the
fields of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics,
including cybersecurity and computer literacy. The report
shall--
(1) describe the extent to which competitions, challenges,
or internships at elements of the intelligence community that
do not involve access to classified information may be
utilized to promote education in the fields of science,
technology, engineering, and mathematics, including
cybersecurity and computer literacy, within high schools or
institutions of higher education in the United States;
(2) include cost estimates for carrying out such
competitions, challenges, or internships; and
(3) include strategies for conducting expedited security
clearance investigations and adjudications for students at
institutions of higher education for purposes of offering
internships at elements of the intelligence community.
(b) Consideration of Existing Programs.--In developing the
report under subsection (a), the Director shall take into
consideration existing programs of the intelligence
community, including the education programs of the National
Security Agency and the Information Assurance Scholarship
Program of the Department of Defense, as appropriate.
(c) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) High school.--The term ``high school'' mean a school
that awards a secondary school diploma.
(2) Institution of higher education.--The term
``institution of higher education'' has the meaning given the
term in section 101(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965
(20 U.S.C. 1001(a)).
(3) Secondary school.--The term ``secondary school'' has
the meaning given the term in section 9101 of the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 7801).
[[Page H5045]]
SEC. 327. ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY OF DOMESTIC OIL REFINERIES
AND RELATED RAIL TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE.
(a) Assessment.--The Under Secretary of Homeland Security
for Intelligence and Analysis shall conduct an intelligence
assessment of the security of domestic oil refineries and
related rail transportation infrastructure.
(b) Submission.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of Homeland
Security for Intelligence and Analysis shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees--
(1) the results of the assessment required under subsection
(a); and
(2) any recommendations with respect to intelligence
sharing or intelligence collection to improve the security of
domestic oil refineries and related rail transportation
infrastructure to protect the communities surrounding such
refineries or such infrastructure from potential harm that
the Under Secretary considers appropriate.
SEC. 328. REPEAL OR MODIFICATION OF CERTAIN REPORTING
REQUIREMENTS.
(a) Repeal of Reporting Requirements.--
(1) Threat of attack on the united states using weapons of
mass destruction.--Section 114 of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3050) is amended by striking subsection
(b).
(2) Treaty on conventional armed forces in europe.--Section
2(5)(E) of the Senate resolution advising and consenting to
ratification of the Document Agreed Among the States Parties
to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) of
November 19, 1990, adopted at Vienna May 31, 1996 (Treaty
Doc. 105-5) (commonly referred to as the ``CFE Flank
Document''), 105th Congress, agreed to May 14, 1997, is
repealed.
(b) Modification of Reporting Requirements.--
(1) Intelligence advisory committees.--Section 410(b) of
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (50
U.S.C. 3309) is amended to read as follows:
``(b) Notification of Establishment of Advisory
Committee.--The Director of National Intelligence and the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall each notify
the congressional intelligence committees each time each such
Director creates an advisory committee. Each notification
shall include--
``(1) a description of such advisory committee, including
the subject matter of such committee;
``(2) a list of members of such advisory committee; and
``(3) in the case of an advisory committee created by the
Director of National Intelligence, the reasons for a
determination by the Director under section 4(b)(3) of the
Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) that an
advisory committee cannot comply with the requirements of
such Act.''.
(2) Intelligence information sharing.--Section 102A(g)(4)
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(g)(4))
is amended to read as follows:
``(4) The Director of National Intelligence shall, in a
timely manner, report to Congress any statute, regulation,
policy, or practice that the Director believes impedes the
ability of the Director to fully and effectively ensure
maximum availability of access to intelligence information
within the intelligence community consistent with the
protection of the national security of the United States.''.
(3) Intelligence community business system
transformation.--Section 506D(j) of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3100(j)) is amended in the matter
preceding paragraph (1) by striking ``2015'' and inserting
``2014''.
(4) Activities of privacy and civil liberties officers.--
Section 1062(f)(1) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (42 U.S.C. 2000ee-1(f)(1)) is amended
in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) by striking
``quarterly'' and inserting ``semiannually''.
(c) Conforming Amendments.--The National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended--
(1) in the table of contents in the first section, by
striking the item relating to section 114 and inserting the
following new item:
``Sec. 114. Annual report on hiring and retention of minority
employees.'';
(2) in section 114 (50 U.S.C. 3050)--
(A) by amending the heading to read as follows: ``annual
report on hiring and retention of minority employees'';
(B) by striking ``(a) Annual Report on Hiring and Retention
of Minority Employees.--'';
(C) by redesignating paragraphs (1) through (5) as
subsections (a) through (e), respectively;
(D) in subsection (b) (as so redesignated)--
(i) by redesignating subparagraphs (A) through (C) as
paragraphs (1) through (3), respectively; and
(ii) in paragraph (2) (as so redesignated)--
(I) by redesignating clauses (i) and (ii) as subparagraphs
(A) and (B), respectively; and
(II) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) (as so
redesignated), by striking ``clauses (i) and (ii)'' and
inserting ``subparagraphs (A) and (B)'';
(E) in subsection (d) (as redesignated by subparagraph (C)
of this paragraph), by striking ``subsection'' and inserting
``section''; and
(F) in subsection (e) (as redesignated by subparagraph (C)
of this paragraph)--
(i) by redesignating subparagraphs (A) through (C) as
paragraphs (1) through (3), respectively; and
(ii) by striking ``subsection,'' and inserting ``section'';
and
(3) in section 507 (50 U.S.C. 3106)--
(A) in subsection (a)--
(i) by striking ``(1) The date'' and inserting ``The
date'';
(ii) by striking ``subsection (c)(1)(A)'' and inserting
``subsection (c)(1)'';
(iii) by striking paragraph (2); and
(iv) by redesignating subparagraphs (A) through (F) as
paragraphs (1) through (6), respectively;
(B) in subsection (c)(1)--
(i) by striking ``(A) Except'' and inserting ``Except'';
and
(ii) by striking subparagraph (B); and
(C) in subsection (d)(1)--
(i) in subparagraph (A)--
(I) by striking ``subsection (a)(1)'' and inserting
``subsection (a)''; and
(II) by inserting ``and'' after ``March 1;'';
(ii) by striking subparagraph (B); and
(iii) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as subparagraph
(B).
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
SEC. 401. GIFTS, DEVISES, AND BEQUESTS TO THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
Section 12 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949
(50 U.S.C. 3512) is amended--
(1) by striking the section heading and inserting ``gifts,
devises, and bequests'';
(2) in subsection (a)(2)--
(A) by inserting ``by the Director as a gift to the
Agency'' after ``accepted''; and
(B) by striking ``this section'' and inserting ``this
subsection'';
(3) in subsection (b), by striking ``this section,'' and
inserting ``subsection (a),'';
(4) in subsection (c), by striking ``this section,'' and
inserting ``subsection (a),'';
(5) in subsection (d), by striking ``this section'' and
inserting ``subsection (a)'';
(6) by redesignating subsection (f) as subsection (g); and
(7) by inserting after subsection (e) the following:
``(f)(1) The Director may engage in fundraising in an
official capacity for the benefit of nonprofit organizations
that provide support to surviving family members of deceased
Agency employees or that otherwise provide support for the
welfare, education, or recreation of Agency employees, former
Agency employees, or their family members.
``(2) In this subsection, the term `fundraising' means the
raising of funds through the active participation in the
promotion, production, or presentation of an event designed
to raise funds and does not include the direct solicitation
of money by any other means.''.
SEC. 402. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY.
(a) Elevation of Inspector General Status.--The Inspector
General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended--
(1) in section 8G(a)(2), by striking ``the National
Security Agency,''; and
(2) in section 12--
(A) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``the National Security
Agency,'' after ``the Federal Emergency Management Agency,'';
and
(B) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``the National Security
Agency,'' after ``the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration,''.
(b) Date of Appointment.--Not later than 90 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall
nominate a person for appointment, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, as Inspector General of the National
Security Agency under section 3(a) of the Inspector General
Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) consistent with the amendments
made by subsection (a).
(c) Transition Rule.--An individual serving as Inspector
General of the National Security Agency on the date of the
enactment of this Act pursuant to an appointment made under
section 8G of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C.
App.)--
(1) may continue so serving until the President makes an
appointment under section 3(a) of such Act with respect to
the National Security Agency consistent with the amendments
made by subsection (a); and
(2) shall, while serving under paragraph (1), remain
subject to the provisions of section 8G of such Act that,
immediately before the date of the enactment of this Act,
applied with respect to the Inspector General of the National
Security Agency and suffer no reduction in pay.
(d) Special Provisions Concerning the National Security
Agency.--The Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is
amended by inserting after section 8J the following new
section:
``SEC. 8K. SPECIAL PROVISIONS CONCERNING THE NATIONAL
SECURITY AGENCY.
``(a) General Counsel to the Inspector General.--
``(1) In general.--There is a General Counsel to the
Inspector General of the National Security Agency, who shall
be appointed by the Inspector General of the National
Security Agency.
``(2) Duties.--The General Counsel to the Inspector General
of the National Security Agency shall--
``(A) serve as the chief legal officer of the Office of the
Inspector General of the National Security Agency;
``(B) provide legal services only to the Inspector General
of the National Security Agency;
``(C) prescribe professional rules of ethics and
responsibilities for employees and officers of, and
contractors to, the National Security Agency;
``(D) perform such functions as the Inspector General may
prescribe; and
``(E) serve at the discretion of the Inspector General.
``(3) Office of the general counsel.--There is an Office of
the General Counsel to the Inspector General of the National
Security Agency. The Inspector General may appoint to the
Office to serve as staff of the General Counsel such legal
counsel as the Inspector General considers appropriate.
[[Page H5046]]
``(b) Testimony.--
``(1) Authority to compel.--The Inspector General of the
National Security Agency is authorized to require by subpoena
the attendance and testimony of former employees of the
National Security Agency or contractors, former contractors,
or former detailees to the National Security Agency as
necessary in the performance of functions assigned to the
Inspector General by this Act.
``(2) Refusal to obey.--A subpoena issued under this
subsection, in the case of contumacy or refusal to obey,
shall be enforceable by order of any appropriate United
States district court.
``(3) Notification.--The Inspector General shall notify the
Attorney General 7 days before issuing any subpoena under
this section.
``(c) Prohibitions on Investigations for National Security
Reasons.--
``(1) Evaluations of prohibitions.--Not later than 7 days
after the date on which the Inspector General of the National
Security Agency receives notice or a statement under section
8G(d)(2)(C) of the reasons the Secretary of Defense is
prohibiting the Inspector General from initiating, carrying
out, or completing any audit or investigation, the Inspector
General shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services of the House
of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence
and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate an
evaluation of such notice or such statement.
``(2) Inclusion in semi-annual report.--The Inspector
General shall include in the semiannual report prepared by
the Inspector General in accordance with section 5(a) a
description of the instances in which the Secretary of
Defense prohibited the Inspector General from initiating,
carrying out, or completing any audit or investigation during
the period covered by such report.''.
TITLE V--SECURITY CLEARANCE REFORM
SEC. 501. CONTINUOUS EVALUATION AND SHARING OF DEROGATORY
INFORMATION REGARDING PERSONNEL WITH ACCESS TO
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.
Section 102A(j) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3024(j)) is amended--
(1) in the heading, by striking ``Sensitive Compartmented
Information'' and inserting ``Classified Information'';
(2) in paragraph (3), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a
semicolon;
(3) in paragraph (4), by striking the period and inserting
a semicolon; and
(4) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
``(5) ensure that the background of each employee or
officer of an element of the intelligence community, each
contractor to an element of the intelligence community, and
each individual employee of such a contractor who has been
determined to be eligible for access to classified
information is monitored on a continual basis under standards
developed by the Director, including with respect to the
frequency of evaluation, during the period of eligibility of
such employee or officer of an element of the intelligence
community, such contractor, or such individual employee to
such a contractor to determine whether such employee or
officer of an element of the intelligence community, such
contractor, and such individual employee of such a contractor
continues to meet the requirements for eligibility for access
to classified information; and
``(6) develop procedures to require information sharing
between elements of the intelligence community concerning
potentially derogatory security information regarding an
employee or officer of an element of the intelligence
community, a contractor to an element of the intelligence
community, or an individual employee of such a contractor
that may impact the eligibility of such employee or officer
of an element of the intelligence community, such contractor,
or such individual employee of such a contractor for a
security clearance.''.
SEC. 502. REQUIREMENTS FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
CONTRACTORS.
(a) Requirements.--Section 102A of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024) is amended by adding at the end
the following new subsection:
``(x) Requirements for Intelligence Community
Contractors.--The Director of National Intelligence, in
consultation with the head of each department of the Federal
Government that contains an element of the intelligence
community and the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency, shall--
``(1) ensure that--
``(A) any contractor to an element of the intelligence
community with access to a classified network or classified
information develops and operates a security plan that is
consistent with standards established by the Director of
National Intelligence for intelligence community networks;
and
``(B) each contract awarded by an element of the
intelligence community includes provisions requiring the
contractor comply with such plan and such standards;
``(2) conduct periodic assessments of each security plan
required under paragraph (1)(A) to ensure such security plan
complies with the requirements of such paragraph; and
``(3) ensure that the insider threat detection capabilities
and insider threat policies of the intelligence community
apply to facilities of contractors with access to a
classified network.''.
(b) Applicability.--The amendment made by subsection (a)
shall apply with respect to contracts entered into or renewed
after the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 503. TECHNOLOGY IMPROVEMENTS TO SECURITY CLEARANCE
PROCESSING.
(a) In General.--The Director of National Intelligence, in
consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Director
of the Office of Personnel Management, shall conduct an
analysis of the relative costs and benefits of potential
improvements to the process for investigating persons who are
proposed for access to classified information and
adjudicating whether such persons satisfy the criteria for
obtaining and retaining access to such information.
(b) Contents of Analysis.--In conducting the analysis
required by subsection (a), the Director of National
Intelligence shall evaluate the costs and benefits associated
with--
(1) the elimination of manual processes in security
clearance investigations and adjudications, if possible, and
automating and integrating the elements of the investigation
process, including--
(A) the clearance application process;
(B) case management;
(C) adjudication management;
(D) investigation methods for the collection, analysis,
storage, retrieval, and transfer of data and records; and
(E) records management for access and eligibility
determinations;
(2) the elimination or reduction, if possible, of the use
of databases and information sources that cannot be accessed
and processed automatically electronically, or modification
of such databases and information sources, to enable
electronic access and processing;
(3) the use of government-developed and commercial
technology for continuous monitoring and evaluation of
government and commercial data sources that can identify and
flag information pertinent to adjudication guidelines and
eligibility determinations;
(4) the standardization of forms used for routine reporting
required of cleared personnel (such as travel, foreign
contacts, and financial disclosures) and use of continuous
monitoring technology to access databases containing such
reportable information to independently obtain and analyze
reportable data and events;
(5) the establishment of an authoritative central
repository of personnel security information that is
accessible electronically at multiple levels of
classification and eliminates technical barriers to rapid
access to information necessary for eligibility
determinations and reciprocal recognition thereof;
(6) using digitally processed fingerprints, as a substitute
for ink or paper prints, to reduce error rates and improve
portability of data;
(7) expanding the use of technology to improve an
applicant's ability to discover the status of a pending
security clearance application or reinvestigation; and
(8) using government and publicly available commercial data
sources, including social media, that provide independent
information pertinent to adjudication guidelines to improve
quality and timeliness, and reduce costs, of investigations
and reinvestigations.
(c) Report to Congress.--Not later than 6 months after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of
Congress a report on the analysis required by subsection (a).
SEC. 504. REPORT ON RECIPROCITY OF SECURITY CLEARANCES.
The head of the entity selected pursuant to section 3001(b)
of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(b)) shall submit to the appropriate
committees of Congress a report each year through 2017 that
describes for the preceding year--
(1) the periods of time required by authorized adjudicative
agencies for accepting background investigations and
determinations completed by an authorized investigative
entity or authorized adjudicative agency;
(2) the total number of cases in which a background
investigation or determination completed by an authorized
investigative entity or authorized adjudicative agency is
accepted by another agency;
(3) the total number of cases in which a background
investigation or determination completed by an authorized
investigative entity or authorized adjudicative agency is not
accepted by another agency; and
(4) such other information or recommendations as the head
of the entity selected pursuant to such section 3001(b)
considers appropriate.
SEC. 505. IMPROVING THE PERIODIC REINVESTIGATION PROCESS.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter until
December 31, 2017, the Director of National Intelligence, in
consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Director
of the Office of Personnel Management, shall transmit to the
appropriate committees of Congress a strategic plan for
updating the process for periodic reinvestigations consistent
with a continuous evaluation program.
(b) Contents.--The plan required by subsection (a) shall
include--
(1) an analysis of the costs and benefits associated with
conducting periodic reinvestigations;
(2) an analysis of the costs and benefits associated with
replacing some or all periodic reinvestigations with a
program of continuous evaluation;
(3) a determination of how many risk-based and ad hoc
periodic reinvestigations are necessary on an annual basis
for each component of the Federal Government with employees
with security clearances;
(4) an analysis of the potential benefits of expanding the
Government's use of continuous evaluation tools as a means of
improving the effectiveness and efficiency of procedures for
confirming the eligibility of personnel for continued access
to classified information; and
(5) an analysis of how many personnel with out-of-scope
background investigations are employed by, or contracted or
detailed to, each element of the intelligence community.
[[Page H5047]]
(c) Periodic Reinvestigations Defined.--In this section,
the term ``periodic reinvestigations'' has the meaning given
that term in section 3001(a) of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(a)).
SEC. 506. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.
In this title, the term ``appropriate committees of
Congress'' means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and
(3) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on
Homeland Security of the House of Representatives.
TITLE VI--TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS
SEC. 601. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY ACT OF 1949.
Section 21 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949
(50 U.S.C. 3521) is amended--
(1) in subsection (b)(1)(D), by striking ``section (a)''
and inserting ``subsection (a)''; and
(2) in subsection (c)(2)(E), by striking ``provider.'' and
inserting ``provider''.
SEC. 602. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT
OF 1947 RELATING TO THE PAST ELIMINATION OF
CERTAIN POSITIONS.
Section 101(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3021(a)) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (5), by striking the semicolon and
inserting ``; and'';
(2) by striking paragraphs (6) and (7);
(3) by redesignating paragraph (8) as paragraph (6); and
(4) in paragraph (6) (as so redesignated), by striking
``the Chairman of the Munitions Board, and the Chairman of
the Research and Development Board,''.
SEC. 603. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE INTELLIGENCE
AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013.
(a) Amendments.--Section 506 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law 112-277;
126 Stat. 2478) is amended--
(1) by striking ``Section 606(5)'' and inserting
``Paragraph (5) of section 605''; and
(2) by inserting ``, as redesignated by section
310(a)(4)(B) of this Act,'' before ``is amended''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a)
shall take effect as if included in the enactment of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public
Law 112-277).
The CHAIR. No amendment to the amendment in the nature of a
substitute made in order as original text shall be in order except
those printed in House Report 113-465 and amendments en bloc described
in section 2(f) of House Resolution 604.
Each amendment shall be considered only in the order printed in the
report, may be offered only by a Member designated in the report, shall
be considered read, shall be debatable for the time specified in the
report equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent,
shall not be subject to amendment, and shall not be subject to a demand
for division of the question.
Amendments En Bloc No. 1 Offered by Mr. Rogers of Michigan
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, pursuant to House Resolution
604, I offer amendments en bloc.
The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendments en bloc.
Amendments en bloc No. 1 consisting of amendment Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
8, 10, and 11 printed in part A of House Report No. 113-465, offered by
Mr. McKeon of California:
AMENDMENT NO. 1 OFFERED BY MR. ROGERS OF MICHIGAN
Page 9, line 17, strike ``2014'' and insert ``2015''.
Page 24, strike lines 1 through 9 and insert the following:
``(b) Elements.--Each report required under subsection (a)
shall, consistent with the need to preserve ongoing criminal
investigations, include a description of, and any action
taken in response to, any violation of law or executive order
(including Executive Order 12333 (50 U.S.C. 3001 note))
relating to intelligence activities committed by personnel of
an element of the intelligence community in the course of the
employment of such personnel that, during the previous
calendar year, was--
``(1) determined by the director, head, or general counsel
of any element of the intelligence community to have
occurred;
``(2) referred to the Department of Justice for possible
criminal prosecution; or
``(3) substantiated by the inspector general of any element
of the intelligence community.''.
Page 24, after line 13, insert the following:
(c) Guidelines.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence, in consultation with the head of each element
of the intelligence community, shall--
(1) issue guidelines to carry out section 510 of the
National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a) of
this section; and
(2) submit such guidelines to the congressional
intelligence committees.
Page 24, line 14, redesignate subsection (c) as subsection
(d).
Page 24, before line 20 insert the following:
(e) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section or the
amendments made by this section shall be construed to alter
any requirement existing on the date of the enactment of this
Act to submit a report under any provision of law.
Page 43, line 11, strike ``the date of the enactment of
this Act'' and insert ``the date of the resignation,
reassignment, or removal of the Inspector General of the
National Security Agency appointed pursuant to section 8G of
the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) as in
effect before the date of the enactment of this Act and
serving on such date''.
Page 45, line 9, insert before ``the National Security''
the following: ``the Office of the Inspector General of''.
AMENDMENT NO. 2 OFFERED BY MR. CONNOLLY OF VIRGINIA
Page 17, line 7, strike ``usage; and'' and insert ``usage,
including--''.
Page 17, after line 7, insert the following:
``(A) increasing the centralization of the management of
software licenses;
``(B) increasing the regular tracking and maintaining of
comprehensive inventories of software licenses using
automated discovery and inventory tools and metrics;
``(C) analyzing software license data to inform investment
decisions; and
``(D) providing appropriate personnel with sufficient
software licenses management training; and
Page 17, line 23, strike ``usage.'' and insert ``usage,
including--''.
Page 17, after line 23, insert the following:
``(A) increasing the centralization of the management of
software licenses;
``(B) increasing the regular tracking and maintaining of
comprehensive inventories of software licenses using
automated discovery and inventory tools and metrics;
``(C) analyzing software license data to inform investment
decisions; and
``(D) providing appropriate personnel with sufficient
software licenses management training.
AMENDMENT NO. 3 OFFERED BY MR. KILMER OF WASHINGTON
Page 17, line 19, strike ``; and'' and insert a semicolon.
Page 17, line 23, strike the period and insert ``; and''.
Page 17, after line 23, insert the following:
``(3) based on the assessment required under paragraph (2),
make such recommendations with respect to software
procurement and usage to the Director of National
Intelligence as the Chief Information Officer considers
appropriate.
Page 18, line 2, strike the quotation mark and the second
period.
Page 18, after line 2, insert the following:
``(d) Implementation of Recommendations.--Not later than
180 days after the date on which the Director of National
Intelligence receives recommendations from the Chief
Information Officer of the Intelligence Community in
accordance with subsection (b)(3), the Director of National
Intelligence shall, to the extent practicable, issue
guidelines for the intelligence community on software
procurement and usage based on such recommendations.''.
AMENDMENT NO. 4 OFFERED BY MR. ROGERS OF MICHIGAN
After section 309, insert the following new section:
SEC. 310. RESTRICTIONS ON CERTAIN FORMER INTELLIGENCE
OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES.
(a) Restriction.--Title III of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3071 et seq.) is amended by inserting after
section 303 the following new section:
``SEC. 304. RESTRICTIONS ON CERTAIN FORMER INTELLIGENCE
OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES.
``(a) Negotiations.--A covered employee shall notify the
element of the intelligence community employing such employee
not later than 3 business days after the commencement of any
negotiation for future employment or compensation between
such covered employee and a covered entity.
``(b) Separation.--A covered employee may not commence
employment with or be contracted by a covered entity--
``(1) for a period of one year following the termination of
the service or employment of such covered employee by an
element of the intelligence community; and
``(2) for a period of two years following such termination
with respect to any matter that was a part of the official
responsibility of such covered employee during the final year
of the service or employment of such covered employee by an
element of the intelligence community.
``(c) Annual Reporting.--
``(1) Reporting required.--Each former covered employee who
was a covered employee at the time of separation from an
element of the intelligence community shall annually report
in writing to the element of the intelligence community that
most recently previously employed such covered employee any
payment received in the preceding year from a foreign
government or a covered entity.
``(2) Applicability.--The requirement to submit a report
under paragraph (1) for each former covered employee shall
terminate on the date that is 5 years after the date on which
such former covered employee was most recently employed by an
element of the intelligence community.
``(d) Determination of Foreign Governments Posing a
Significant Counterintelligence Threat.--The Director of
National Intelligence shall annually--
[[Page H5048]]
``(1) determine which foreign governments pose a
significant counterintelligence threat to the United States;
and
``(2) submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
list of such foreign governments.
``(e) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Covered employee.--The term `covered employee'
means--
``(A) an employee of an element of the intelligence
community with access to sensitive compartmented information
occupying a position--
``(i) classified at GS-15 of the General Schedule (chapter
53 of title 5, United States Code); or
``(ii) as a senior civilian officer of the intelligence
community (as defined in Intelligence Community Directive No.
610 or any successor directive); and
``(B) a person who during the preceding 12-month period was
an officer or employee of the Congress (as defined in section
109(13) of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C.
App.)) with access to sensitive compartmented information.
``(2) Covered entity.--The term `covered entity' means--
``(A) any person acting on behalf or under the supervision
of a designated foreign government; or
``(B) any entity owned or controlled by a designated
foreign government.
``(3) Designated foreign government.--The term `designated
foreign government' means a government that the Director of
National Intelligence determines poses a significant
counterintelligence threat to the United States under
subsection (d).''.
(b) Effective Date of Negotiation Period Notice.--The
requirement under section 304(a) of the National Security Act
of 1947, as added by subsection (a) of this section, shall
take effect on the date that is 30 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act.
(c) Applicability of Separation Period.--The requirement
under section 304(b) of the National Security Act of 1947, as
added by subsection (a) of this section, shall not apply to a
covered employee that has entered into an employment
agreement on or before the date of the enactment of this Act.
(d) First Reporting Requirement.--The first report required
to be submitted by each former covered employee under section
304(c) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by
subsection (a) of this section, shall be submitted not later
than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(e) First Designation Requirement.--The Director of
National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees the initial list of foreign
governments under section 304(d) of the National Security Act
of 1947, as added by subsection (a) of this section, not
later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act.
(f) Table of Contents Amendments.--The table of contents in
the first section of such Act is amended--
(1) by striking the second item relating to section 302
(Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries) and the items
relating to sections 304, 305, and 306; and
(2) by inserting after the item relating to section 303 the
following new item:
``Sec. 304. Restrictions on certain former intelligence officers and
employees.''.
AMENDMENT NO. 5 OFFERED BY MS. KELLY OF ILLINOIS
At the end of subtitle A of title III, add the following
new section:
SEC. __. INCLUSION OF PREDOMINANTLY BLACK INSTITUTIONS IN
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER TRAINING PROGRAM.
Section 1024 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3224) is amended--
(1) in subsection (c)(1), by inserting ``and Predominantly
Black Institutions'' after ``universities''; and
(2) in subsection (g)--
(A) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (5); and
(B) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new
paragraph:
``(4) Predominantly black institution.--The term
`Predominantly Black Institution' has the meaning given the
term in section 318 of the Higher education Act of 1965 (20
U.S.C. 1059e).''.
AMENDMENT NO. 8 OFFERED BY MR. CARNEY OF DELAWARE
At the end of subtitle B of title III, add the following
new section:
SEC. __. REPORT ON DECLASSIFICATION PROCESS.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit
to Congress a report describing--
(1) how to improve the declassification process across the
intelligence community; and
(2) what steps the intelligence community can take, or what
legislation may be necessary, to enable the National
Declassification Center to better accomplish the missions
assigned to the Center by Executive Order 13526.
AMENDMENT NO. 10 OFFERED BY MS. JACKSON LEE OF TEXAS
At the end of subtitle B of title III, add the following
new section:
SEC. __. DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE STUDY ON THE USE
OF CONTRACTORS IN THE CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES.
The Director of National Intelligence shall conduct an
assessment of the reliance of intelligence activities on
contractors to support Government activities, including an
assessment of--
(1) contractors performing intelligence activities
(including intelligence analysis); and
(2) the skills performed by contractors and the
availability of Federal employees to perform those skills.
AMENDMENT NO. 11 OFFERED BY MR. KEATING OF MASSACHUSETTS
At the end of subtitle B of title III, add the following
new section:
SEC. __. ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFICACY OF MEMORANDA OF
UNDERSTANDING TO FACILITATE INTELLIGENCE-
SHARING.
Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for
Intelligence and Analysis, in consultation with the Director
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Program
Manager of the Information Sharing Environment, shall submit
to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee
on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives, and the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of
the Senate an assessment of the efficacy of the memoranda of
understanding signed between Federal, State, local, tribal,
and territorial agencies to facilitate intelligence-sharing
within and separate from the Joint Terrorism Task Force. Such
assessment shall include--
(1) any language within such memoranda of understanding
that prohibited or may be construed to prohibit intelligence-
sharing between Federal, State, local, tribal, and
territorial agencies; and
(2) any recommendations for memoranda of understanding to
better facilitate intelligence-sharing between Federal,
State, local, tribal, and territorial agencies.
The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 604, the gentleman from
Michigan (Mr. Rogers) and the gentleman from Maryland (Mr.
Ruppersberger) each will control 10 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I
may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I urge the committee to adopt the amendments en bloc,
all of which have been examined by both the majority and the minority.
I believe these amendments to be noncontroversial, and intended to
enhance the underlying bill.
The manager's amendment is intended to make minor technical
modifications to clarify two provisions that were added in markup.
I have an amendment that would require employees at senior level in
the intelligence community to endure a ``cooling off'' period before
being employed by a company that is owned or controlled by a foreign
government that poses a high counterintelligence threat. It would also
make them subject to reporting procedures.
This amendment stems from my concern that some senior level employees
in the intelligence community retire or otherwise separate from the
U.S. Government and take employment with foreign companies or foreign-
controlled companies after holding positions where they likely learned
very sensitive information that would be of value to those particular
companies or governments.
It is not intended to be punitive prohibition on post-intelligence
community employment but rather to establish a procedure to establish
that sufficient time has lapsed to avoid conflicts of interest or the
appearance of impropriety.
Mr. Carney has an amendment that would provide the Congress with a
useful report on ways to improve the declassification process across
the intelligence community. The intelligence community has declassified
a massive amount of documents. Increased transparency through an
improved declassification process will help rebuild the confidence of
the American people in their intelligence agencies.
Mr. Connolly has an amendment that will add several best practices to
the assessment our bill requires for intelligence community software
licenses. This amendment is all the more important in light of current
efforts to improve intelligence community information technology
systems. Wise management of software licenses can help save the
taxpayers' dollars while making sure our intelligence officers have the
tools they need to do their job.
Ms. Jackson Lee has an amendment that will help us identify ways to
improve the support contractors offer to the intelligence community. It
may help us find ways to make the most of scarce resources, all the
while ensuring that contractors do not perform inherently governmental
functions.
Mr. Keating has an amendment concerning intelligence sharing between
[[Page H5049]]
Federal, State, and local entities, which has been a critical tool to
prevent terrorist attacks on American soil. Joint terrorism task forces
pool talent, skills, and knowledge from across the law enforcement and
intelligence communities into a single entity that can respond with the
flexibility and speed to stop impending threats.
Even so, we must always look for ways to improve intelligence-sharing
relationships. This amendment requires a study of the efficacy of the
memoranda of understanding signed between Federal, State, local,
tribal, and territorial agencies. The study will help identify any
obstacles to intelligence sharing between agencies and find
improvements to existing intelligence-sharing relationships.
Ms. Kelly has an amendment to expand a grant program by the Director
of National Intelligence to include predominantly black institutions.
To succeed in their mission, the intelligence agencies need our
Nation's top talent, and that means they must make full use of our
Nation's diverse population.
These grants will help provide study programs in foreign languages
such as Farsi, Pashto, Middle Eastern, South Asian, and African
dialects. Foreign language skills are critical for intelligence
officers, as we all know.
Mr. Kilmer has an amendment that will require the intelligence
community Chief Information Officer to make recommendations to the
Director of National Intelligence based on the software licensing
assessment required by section 307 of the bill. It will also require
the DNI to issue guidelines to implement those recommendations. These
recommendations and guidelines will help the IC implement the results
of the important assessment that this bill will require regarding
software licensing.
I will, therefore, support the amendment.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I ask Members to support the en bloc
amendment, and I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
I support all these amendments.
I agree with Chairman Rogers that it is very troubling when senior
U.S. officials who know our most sensitive secrets leave the Federal
Government and immediately go to work for a company that is owned by a
foreign country that poses a significant counterintelligence threat to
us.
I do have some concerns that this restriction might be seen as
singling out our intelligence professionals, since it does not apply to
every senior official in the government with a top secret clearance. I
would be in favor of a waiver procedure for when the risks are low. For
example, for someone who wants to teach English at a State-funded
university in his or her retirement. But on the whole, I agree with Mr.
Rogers and support this provision.
I also agree with Mr. Connolly and Mr. Kilmer that we need to find
efficiencies in the intelligence community's use of software. In fact,
we just don't need to find them, we need to fix them. Finding and
fixing inefficiencies translates into saving taxpayer dollars, which is
something we must always strive to do.
I agree with Ms. Robin Kelly that we need to increase the diversity
of our intelligence workforce by adding predominantly black
institutions to ongoing intelligence community programs currently
designed for Historically Black Colleges. Diversity is a good thing in
its own right, and it will create even greater opportunities for
intelligence collection.
I agree with Mr. Carney that we must reduce our declassification
backlog. As The New York Times reported just this week, even material
that should be automatically declassified isn't. So we need the
Director of National Intelligence to look across the intelligence
community and figure out how to improve the declassification process so
that more national security information can be made available to the
American people now.
I also agree with Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee that we need to get a handle
on how we are employing our contractors. We need to know whether they
are doing the type of work that should be done by U.S. Government
employees.
Let me be clear, however, that contractors perform a very valuable
service, and our companies are among the very best in the world. But
there needs to be a clear line between what we expect from our
employees, who owe 100 percent of their loyalty to the government, and
what we expect from our contractors, whose patriotism is without
question, but whose loyalty is also to the company that employs them.
Finally, I agree with Mr. Keating, Mr. Rooney, and Mr. Hanna that we
need to take a close look at the memoranda of agreement between the
Federal Government and the State, local, tribal, and territorial
governments to make sure they are written clearly enough and well
enough to ensure the free flow of intelligence, while still making sure
to protect sources and methods.
Intelligence is critical, particularly in the midst of a domestic
crisis. And for it to be useful, it must get to those who need it.
In addition to the manager's amendment, which makes technical and
clarifying changes to the bill, I support all these amendments.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my
time.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman
from Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee).
Ms. JACKSON LEE of Texas. Mr. Chair, let me again thank the ranking
member and the chairman. Let me also acknowledge the very fine men and
women that work in our intelligence community in the United States and
around the world.
I would like to thank the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence for their efforts to include the Jackson Lee amendment in
the en bloc amendments and thank them for working with my staff in a
very cooperative manner.
The Jackson Lee amendment seeks greater transparency to Congress on
the people the Nation relies upon to perform certain types of work for
the intelligence community.
The Jackson Lee amendment requires the Director of the Office of
National Intelligence to conduct an assessment of the reliance of
intelligence activities on contractors to support government
objectives, including an assessment of contractors performing
intelligence activities, which would include intelligence analysis.
This complements the underlying bill, because the underlying bill has
determined to assess the utilization and reduce the number of private
contractors.
In a Time article dated Monday, July 19, 2010, a comment says:
Explosion of contractors in the intelligence community.
And that has been the case.
It is important that we recognize that contractors can be useful. But
like the President stated publicly on August 26, 2013:
It is important that we have so many extraordinarily
capable folks in our military and our government who can do
this--and probably do it cheaper.
Well, I agree with the President and this committee.
I also take note of an article that cites NSA contractors using
LinkedIn profiles to cash in on national security.
I believe that with the work that we are doing here in this
legislation, along with my amendment, we will get our hands around the
idea of outsourcing our intelligence work and develop a pathway of
excellence, as we have in the past.
We will utilize our veterans, we will utilize military personnel, we
will utilize young persons who are interested in this as a career, and
we will have the finest intelligence staffing that we have ever had, as
we have had in the past.
I ask my colleagues to support this amendment. I again thank the
chairman and ranking member for including this in the en bloc
amendments. I think we are on a pathway of greater success in securing
this Nation.
Mr. Chair, I support H.R. 4681, the ``Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Years 2014,'' a bill Authorizing appropriations for our
nation's intelligence agencies for Fiscal Year 2014 through Fiscal Year
2015. The bill provides funds for the conduct of intelligence and
intelligence-related activities.
My thanks to the House Rules Committee for making my amendment in
order under the rule for H.R. 4681.
I appreciate the work of the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence efforts to include the Jackson Lee Amendment in the En
Bloc.
[[Page H5050]]
My amendment is simple and makes an important contribution to the
bill.
The Jackson Lee Amendment seeks greater transparency to Congress on
the people the nation relies upon to perform certain types of work for
the Intelligence Community.
The Jackson Lee Amendment requires the Director of the Office of
National Intelligence to conduct an assessment of the reliance of
intelligence activities on contractors to support Government
objectives, including an assessment of contractors performing
intelligence activities, which would include intelligence analysis.
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) 2013
Report on Security Clearance Determinations said that on October 1,
2013, the total number of persons with a Confidential, Secret or Top
Secrete security clearance totaled 5,150,379 individual.
According to the ODNI 3,738,026 were government agency personnel,
1,056,309 were contractors and 356,044 were categorized as other.
Between January and October 1, 2013 there were 777,168 security
clearances approved--152,490 were government agency employees and
131,209 were contractors with an additional 12,785 designated as other.
The cost of government security classification in 2oo5 was $7.66
billion and in 2011 the total was $11.36 billion.
The amount expended included: 5.65 billion for protection
maintenance; 1.53 billion for security management oversight and
planning; 502.51 million for professional education, training and
awareness; 352.4 million for classification management; 52.76 million
for declassification.
The assessment provided for through the Jackson Lee amendment would
shed light on the work that our federal agency Intelligence
professionals and the role contractors play in protecting our nation.
President Obama stated publicly on August 6, 2013 that it is
important that we have so many 'extraordinarily capable folks in our
military and our government who can do this, and probably do it
cheaper.'
I agree.
That is why I introduced H.R. 4110, the HERO Transition from
Battlespace to Workplace Act of 2014.
This legislation addresses the problem of underemployed veterans in
obtaining positions that take maximum advantage of their skills and
experience.
For some time I have worked to make sure that transparency,
accountability and oversight were firmly established to guide the work
of intelligence agencies, including introducing legislation such as
H.R. 2434.
I thank my colleagues on the Intelligence Committee for their hard
work in bringing this bill before the full House for consideration. I
ask my Colleagues in the House to vote for this en bloc.
[From Time, Jul. 19, 2010]
Time To Tame Washington's Intelligence Beast
(By Robert Baer)
I asked a former colleague who retired from the CIA not
long ago what he thought about the Washington Post article
Monday, July 19, on the explosion of contractors in the
intelligence community. ``It's a horror,'' he said, ``my tax
money blowing around Washington like confetti.'' But he
reserved his angriest comments for the contractor-driven
bureaucracy that allowed a Nigerian would-be suicide bomber--
as alleged by a resulting federal indictment--to board a
Northwest flight from Amsterdam to Detroit in December. In
spite of the billions and billions of dollars we've showered
on contractors, consultants and corporate contracts since 9/
11, no one managed to disseminate a warning from the
Nigerian's father that his son had reportedly become a
terrorist.
The raw numbers in the Post tell the story. Since 9/11,
America's intelligence budget has more than doubled, to $75
billion. The number of people working at the Defense
Intelligence Agency has gone from 7,500 to 16,500. The FBI's
Joint Terrorism Task Forces have trebled in number, rising
from 35 to io6. Personnel at the National Security Agency has
doubled. There are 854,000 people with top-secret security
clearances, including contractors--almost 1\1/2\ times the
population of Washington. It shouldn't come as a surprise,
then, that the Nigerian slipped through the cracks: there are
so many more cracks now.
But we shouldn't reduce the problem to our having become a
country saddled with a bureaucratic Frankenstein of
timeservers and people cashing in on 9/11. Recently I've been
giving talks at government agencies working on
counterterrorism. With almost no exceptions, I've found my
audiences, including contractors, better informed, more
dedicated and better educated than the generation I served
with in the CIA. (As I've said elsewhere, if I were applying
to the CIA today, I wonder whether I'd make it in.) The
problem is that I came away from these talks with the
impression that the post-9/11 workforce is bored and even
adrift--at least in the sense that there are too many people
chasing too little hard intelligence.
It's a tooth-to-tail problem. CIA Director Leon Panetta has
gone on the record as saying there are only a couple hundred
al-Qaeda dead-enders in the mountains between Paldstan and
Afghanistan, most of whom are dormant, hiding in caves. With
a prey so small and elusive and a bureaucracy so Washington-
bound, it shouldn't come as a surprise that we're tripping
over ourselves. Nor should it come as a surprise that more
money and more contractors aren't a problem of diminishing
returns but rather one of adding to the risk.
It would be considerably different if we could put this new
workforce in the field--for instance, in Afghanistan, a
country that demands years and years of on-the-ground
experience for a young American intelligence officer to
understand it. But our bases there are already overflowing
with combat forces, and anyhow, it's too dangerous for
Americans to get outside the wire to meet Afghans. Not unlike
in Washington, they're stuck behind desks and forced to look
at the country from a distance.
No one intended to create a monster bureaucracy after 9/
11--Washington has always thrown money and people at a
problem rather than good ideas. But now someone has to
seriously calculate the damage the outsourcing of
intelligence is causing. The story I keep hearing over and
over is that the bright young people who came to Washington
to fight terrorism--civil servants and contractors alike--
have become disillusioned, and they will soon turn away from
idealism and begin to transform their jobs into comfortable
careers. In the case of the contractors, it means more
contracts and more contractors. It's all the worse because
there are now contractors writing their own contracts.
For Washington to retake control of intelligence, it needs
to remember that intelligence is inherently a governmental
function, no different from the courts, the police or
legislation. I wish Washington good luck in taking back
ground from the contractors, and I hope it can move faster
than the next would-be suicide bomber.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my
time.
The Acting CHAIR (Mr. Womack). The question is on the amendments en
bloc offered by the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers).
The en bloc amendments were agreed to.
Amendment No. 6 Offered by Mr. Franks of Arizona
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 6
printed in House Report 113-465.
Mr. FRANKS of Arizona. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
At the end of subtitle B of title III, add the following
new section:
SEC. __. REPORT ON FOREIGN MAN-MADE ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE
WEAPONS.
(a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and
the Committees on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives and the Senate a report on the threat posed
by man-made electromagnetic pulse weapons to United States
interests through 2025, including threats from foreign
countries and foreign non-State actors.
(b) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 604, the gentleman
from Arizona (Mr. Franks) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Arizona.
Mr. FRANKS of Arizona. Mr. Chairman, I thank Chairman Rogers. I
believe he has exhibited the best of the House of Representatives and
has rendered this country magnificent service, both to our national
security and to the stability of this Nation. I thank him deeply for
it, and also for the time to speak on this amendment.
{time} 1045
Mr. Chairman, the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2015 is a
critical milestone toward protecting Americans at home and those who
serve our interests and Nation overseas.
However, it does not currently address one of the critical concerns,
and that is the threat of a manmade nuclear or electromagnetic pulse,
or EMP, weapon.
My amendment would task the Director of National Intelligence to
report to the Congress on the threat posed by manmade electromagnetic
pulse weapons to the United States interests through 2025, including
those threats from foreign countries and foreign nonstate actors.
[[Page H5051]]
Mr. Chairman, it is important to note that my amendment does not task
another Federal agency with the responsibility of determining our
vulnerabilities to EMP and GMD and the potential dangers these threats
represent to our civilization.
These studies have already been finalized, and their conclusions
provide our Nation's leaders and industry officials with the clarity
they need to move forward toward protecting our grid.
In fact, Mr. Chairman, there have now been nearly a dozen Federal
Government reports and studies on the dangers, threats, and
vulnerabilities the U.S. electric grid faces from EMP and GMD,
including reports from the EMP Commission, Department of Homeland
Security, Department of Defense, Department of Energy, the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, the National Academy of Sciences, and the
U.S. national laboratories. All of them come to similar conclusions.
The U.S. electric grid is dangerously vulnerable to EMP and GMD.
Further, many warn that, given the Nation's current lack of
preparedness, a nuclear or natural EMP event is potentially a
cataclysmic threat that would be a top national priority for our
national security and homeland security.
In 2008, the congressionally authorized EMP Commission stated that
Russian scientists had proliferated knowledge of a specifically
designed EMP weapon to North Korea. There may also exist a form of
mobile EMP devices that can take out our electric substations.
As The Wall Street Journal reported recently, taking out just a few
of these substations simultaneously could potentially cause a
nationwide blackout.
Our military understands this threat very well, Mr. Chairman, and has
protected many of our critical defense assets. We, as a Nation, have
spent billions of dollars, in fact, over the years, hardening our
nuclear triad, our missile defense capabilities and numerous other
critical elements of our national security apparatus against the
effects of electromagnetic pulse, particularly the type of
electromagnetic pulse that might be generated against us by an enemy.
However, our civilian grid, which the Defense Department relies upon
for nearly 99 percent of its electricity needs, is completely
vulnerable to the same kind of danger.
This constitutes, in my opinion, Mr. Chairman, an invitation on the
part of certain of our enemies to use the asymmetric capability of an
EMP weapon against us, and there is now evidence that such strategy is
being considered by certain of those enemies.
Mr. Chairman, the time is right for this action, and our efforts
today may gain us no note in the annals of history, but my hope is that
they will ultimately lead to a time when this country mitigates this
threat and disinvites our enemies to try to exploit it against us. I
pray it happens just that way.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition,
although I do not oppose the amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Maryland is
recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Franks, a leader in the bipartisan House Electromagnetic Pulse
Caucus, has brought attention to the serious threats posed by
electromagnetic pulses, whether from a solar storm or a nuclear-armed
enemy that could harm our critical infrastructure.
Given what we know about our Nation's critical infrastructure
vulnerabilities, I support this amendment's purpose, to gain even more
information that can better protect our utilities, financial systems,
medical facilities, networks, and other infrastructure.
Therefore, I support this amendment, and I urge my colleagues to do
the same.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Rhode Island
(Mr. Langevin), one of the key members of our committee and one of the
experts in the area of cybersecurity.
(Mr. LANGEVIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. LANGEVIN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 4681, the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2014 and 2015.
I am going to keep my remarks brief, but I first wanted to thank
Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger for bringing this bill
to the floor in a bipartisan way. The bill before us really is
indicative of how the committee is run in a bipartisan way under
Chairman Rogers' leadership.
In particular, I do want to commend Chairman Rogers for his years of
service on the Intelligence Committee and wish him the best in his
retirement at the end of this year. He clearly made a difference.
Mr. Chairman, this is a balanced measure and really critical to
protecting our Nation's security. I have been pleased to work with the
chairman and ranking member on several provisions included in the bill.
This bill makes critical investments in technical and tactical
intelligence, as well as in our human capabilities.
In particular, in order to support and develop the long-term health
of our most important intelligence resource--human talent--this bill
requires the Director of National Intelligence to create a plan to
promote cybersecurity and computer literacy among high school and
university students.
As cyber threats grow in quantity and sophistication, we must do more
to train and recruit into the noble calling of government service young
people with the interest and aptitude for cybersecurity.
The bill authorizes provisions to reduce the risk of information
leaks, as well, and unauthorized disclosures of classified information
by insiders, while maintaining appropriate levels of trust in our
personnel. We cannot afford a repeat of last year's breach of
classified information.
Mr. Chairman, continued focus is needed to ensure that we, of course,
are supporting the efforts of those patriotic Americans who proudly
serve our Nation in the intelligence community, while properly
safeguarding the privacy and civil liberties that our citizens hold
dear.
To that end, we must fully absorb the lessons learned over the past
decade after passage of the landmark Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act and the changes it brought to the IC.
The Acting CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield the gentleman an additional 1 minute.
Mr. LANGEVIN. I certainly look forward to working with my committee
colleagues to continue this tradition of rigorous, responsible, and
bipartisan oversight. The work that we do is critical to our national
security.
Again, I thank Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger, as
well as my colleagues on the committee; and in particular, I want to
thank the staff for the hard work that they have done in bringing this
bill to the floor on both sides of the aisle. Their work is critical as
well.
I thank my colleagues.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Franks).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 7 Offered by Mr. Poe of Texas
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 7
printed in House Report 113-465.
Mr. POE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
At the end of subtitle B of title III, add the following:
SEC. _. REPORT ON UNITED STATES COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY TO
DISRUPT, DISMANTLE, AND DEFEAT AL-QAEDA, ITS
AFFILIATED GROUPS, ASSOCIATED GROUPS, AND
ADHERENTS.
(a) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of
Congress a comprehensive report on the United States
counterterrorism strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat
al-Qaeda, its affiliated groups, associated groups, and
adherents.
[[Page H5052]]
(2) Coordination.--The report required by paragraph (1)
shall be prepared in coordination with the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General,
and the Secretary of Defense, and the head of any other
department or agency of the United States Government that has
responsibility for activities directed at combating al-Qaeda,
its affiliated groups, associated groups, and adherents.
(3) Elements.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall
include the following:
(A) A definition of--
(i) al-Qaeda core, including a list of which known
individuals constitute al-Qaeda core;
(ii) an affiliated group of al-Qaeda, including a list of
which known groups constitute an affiliate group of al-Qaeda;
(iii) an associated group of al-Qaeda, including a list of
which known groups constitute an associated group of al-
Qaeda;
(iv) an adherent of al-Qaeda, including a list of which
known groups constitute an adherent of al-Qaeda; and
(v) a group aligned with al-Qaeda, including a description
of what actions a group takes or statements it makes that
qualify it as a group aligned with al-Qaeda.
(B) An assessment of the relationship between all
identified al-Qaeda affiliated groups, associated groups, and
adherents with al-Qaeda core.
(C) An assessment of the strengthening or weakening of al-
Qaeda, its affiliated groups, associated groups, and
adherents, from January 1, 2010, to the present, including a
description of the metrics that are used to assess
strengthening or weakening and an assessment of the relative
increase or decrease in violent attacks attributed to such
entities.
(D) An assessment of whether or not an individual can be a
member of al-Qaeda core if such individual is not located in
Afghanistan or Pakistan.
(E) An assessment of whether or not an individual can be a
member of al-Qaeda core as well as a member of an al-Qaeda
affiliated group, associated group, or adherent.
(F) A definition of defeat of core al-Qaeda.
(G) An assessment of the extent or coordination, command,
and control between core al-Qaeda, its affiliated groups,
associated groups, and adherents, specifically addressing
each such entity.
(H) An assessment of the effectiveness of counterterrorism
operations against core al-Qaeda, its affiliated groups,
associated groups, and adherents, and whether such operations
have had a sustained impact on the capabilities and
effectiveness of core al-Qaeda, its affiliated groups,
associated groups, and adherents.
(4) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
(b) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means--
(1) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Armed
Services of the House of Representatives; and
(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on
Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Armed Services of the
Senate.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 604, the gentleman
from Texas (Mr. Poe) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. POE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank Chairman Rogers
for supporting this amendment but, more importantly, for his work on
the Intelligence Committee for so many years and, prior to that, your
work with the FBI.
As a former judge, I got to see a lot of FBI agents come and testify
in Texas, and they have a wonderful reputation. You also have that
reputation, and thank you for your service in law enforcement and in
the House.
I also want to thank the ranking member for his support, generally,
for this amendment.
This amendment requires the Director of National Intelligence, in
coordination with relevant agencies, to produce a strategy to defeat al
Qaeda and its affiliates.
The amendment requires that the President clearly define groups like
core al Qaeda and al Qaeda affiliates and other terms the
administration uses to define this enemy of America.
Al Qaeda continues to threaten the security of the United States and
our allies, both here at home and abroad. Our intelligence services and
our military have scored some real gains against al Qaeda, but al Qaeda
in Afghanistan and Pakistan is still able to provide technical,
tactical, and strategic direction to its affiliates throughout the
world.
Al Qaeda has gone from on the verge of strategic defeat to a serious
and growing threat, depending on who you ask in our intelligence
services or even the administration. Today, al Qaeda controls more
territory than it ever has. The fight against al Qaeda is far from
over, and it will continue to grow.
As chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Nonproliferation, and Trade, I have held over a dozen bipartisan
hearings focusing on this very topic. Once again, I want to thank the
chairman and ranking member for including this TNT Subcommittee in some
of the work we have been doing together on the very issue of
intelligence.
During these 12 hearings in our subcommittee, we have yet to find a
witness who can articulate or even agree with the administration's
counterterrorism strategy or what it is or describe how the
administration really views al Qaeda and its threat. This seems to be a
problem. This needs to be clarified, so that all of us know exactly
what our strategy is nationwide and worldwide.
So this amendment is necessary, so we can all get on the same page in
the hymnal with a clear strategy to defeat al Qaeda, so we understand
what al Qaeda is really doing today in 2014. This is a constantly
changing movement, and al Qaeda today isn't the same as the al Qaeda in
2001.
We need to have a clear understanding of who we are fighting and how
we are going to defeat the al Qaeda terrorists. Drone strikes and
target raids are not a strategy; they are tactics. Therefore, I support
this amendment, and I urge support by the committee and the whole
House.
And that's just the way it is.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition,
although I am not opposed to the amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Maryland is
recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield myself as much time as I may consume.
I support this amendment because the time is right to step back and
take stock of where we are and how we are doing in our fight against
terrorism. The threat is not going away, but it is rapidly changing.
The Director of the FBI, Jim Comey, recently said that the terrorism
threat is very much alive and growing in new and more dangerous places
around the world. It even surprised him, when he started, just how
virulent and dispersed the terrorist threat had become.
From Pakistan to Yemen, Afghanistan to Syria, north Africa to Iraq,
the threat from al Qaeda is waning in some areas, but growing in
others. Unless we approach this dangerous problem holistically and
precisely, we risk just squeezing the balloon, suppressing terrorism in
one area, only to see it grow in another.
So I think it is a good idea to sit down and take a comprehensive
look at the problem today, to make sure that we are confronting it in
the precisely right way, to make sure that we are measuring our
effectiveness correctly, and to make sure that we have the right and
most current legal authorities.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Poe).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 9 Offered by Mr. Gallego
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 9
printed in House Report 113-465.
Mr. GALLEGO. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
At the end of subtitle B of title III, add the following
new section:
SEC. __. REPORT ON RETRAINING VETERANS IN CYBERSECURITY.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in
consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of
Veterans Affairs, and the Secretary of Homeland Security,
shall submit to Congress recommendations for retraining
veterans and retired members of elements of the intelligence
community in cybersecurity.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 604, the gentleman
from Texas (Mr. Gallego) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.
[[Page H5053]]
Mr. GALLEGO. Mr. Chairman, I would like to begin by thanking Chairman
Rogers and the ranking member for an opportunity to work on this issue
with them, and I certainly wish Chairman Rogers well in his future
endeavors.
Mr. Chairman, this amendment helps us find ways to ensure that our
veterans and other former public servants can continue their service to
our country on cybersecurity, a critical national security need that
will only grow in importance over the next several years.
While Congress is well aware of the challenges that we face in
cybersecurity, it is important to understand that cyber attacks are not
only aimed at the government, where they challenge our national
security and endanger our troops, but these attacks also target our
Nation's economic advantages, our core advantages, when they steal
proprietary information and intellectual property from American firms
that lead the Nation and lead the world in innovation.
{time} 1100
In fact, for the private sector, it is important to know that an IP
theft in the U.S. costs companies upwards of $250 billion a year, and
global cyber crime costs $338 billion. And when you factor in downtime,
either way, that is a lot of money. And we spent up to--no kidding--$1
trillion fixing these problems.
These highlight an important point, that if these attacks on American
companies are so bad, just use your imagination to figure the threat of
foreign-based cyber attacks on the Department of Defense or other
critical intelligence agencies. And there is no better group of people
than our veterans and our retired members of the intelligence community
who could be ready to assist in cybersecurity.
This amendment allows us to do everything we can to support our
veterans who are looking for jobs along with those retired members of
the intelligence community who have already demonstrated their
commitment to public service.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, while I do not oppose the
amendment, I ask unanimous consent to control the time in opposition.
The Acting CHAIR. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman
from Michigan?
There was no objection.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Michigan is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I
may consume.
Our Nation owes a debt of gratitude to its veterans and to the
retired members of the intelligence community. We should look for as
many ways as possible to help them succeed in the job market. And I
want to thank the gentleman for offering the amendment for promoting
this. The amendment does, again, highlight the sheer level of threat we
face from cyber crime, cyber terrorists, cyber espionage. We are being
overwhelmed.
When you look at China, Russia, Iran, and now organized crime groups
who are approaching nation-state capability, it is as bad as I have
ever seen it. And, again, 85 percent of the networks across America are
not protected by the government because they are private sector
networks. The government, itself, is about 15 percent of those
networks.
We need to find a pathway, A, to attract the talent that the
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Gallego) is talking about; and, B, we need to
allow these private sector folks to protect themselves by gaining
information, sharing information the government has that could protect
those networks from cyber catastrophe.
It is happening each and every day. The next generation of cyber
warriors are there. And I think this amendment will go a long way to
recruit the right talent in the right place to help us meet this
growing threat of the future prosperity, safety, and the security of
the United States.
With that, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. GALLEGO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman
from Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger).
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I support this amendment, and I urge
my colleagues to do the same.
As I said in the opening hearing on worldwide threats, ``education is
the keystone of security and prosperity in the 21st century.''
The cyber threats we face are grave, and we need to train the best,
the brightest, and the most dedicated--like our veterans and our
retired intelligence professionals--to be our next generation of cyber
defenders. We call them cyber warriors.
Every day, we hear about cyber attacks in the news. Early last year,
for example, our financial sector suffered a wide-scale network denial
of service attack that proved difficult and very costly to mitigate.
The retail giant, Target, is another recent example of our
vulnerability to cyber attacks. And today, The Washington Post stated
that Iranian hackers are targeting U.S.A. officials through social
networks.
We need to pass cybersecurity legislation like CISPA, and we need to
do far more to expand our bench of cyber professionals and innovators.
We need to invest in early education in science, technology,
engineering, and math. And we equally need to leverage the experience
and wisdom of our veterans and former intelligence professionals. Our
adversaries are making heavy investments in cyber education. We must do
the same. For this reason, I support this amendment.
I thank my colleague from Texas (Mr. Gallego) for his amendment. He
represents the area of Texas that is close to the border. He
understands the threat and why we need intelligence to deal with
national security.
Mr. GALLEGO. Mr. Chairman, many of our servicemembers have made the
ultimate sacrifice. There are 4,423 that have died in Operation Iraqi
Freedom; 66 in Operation New Dawn; and, as of yesterday, 2,320 have
died in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, where I just
returned from this week. But many of the thousands upon thousands of
our troops who did make it home to see their mothers, fathers, spouses,
and kids are alive today because actionable intelligence helped them
achieve their missions more safety.
While there has been a lot of criticism about intelligence
collection--and we have had a very robust debate on these issues--I
think it is important that we concentrate on the fact that intelligence
is so critical to the lives of our men and women in uniform. And it
really does help them come back home today safe with their families
because of the work of our numerous intelligence agencies who have
provided the information they need to stay alive.
Mr. Chairman, I also want to do a shout-out to the Air Force ISR
Agency in San Antonio, in Bexar County. I know that they do critical
work to protect and defend our liberty each and every day.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Gallego).
The amendment was agreed to.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment in the nature of a
substitute, as amended.
The amendment was agreed to.
The Acting CHAIR. Under the rule, the Committee rises.
Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. Poe
of Texas) having assumed the chair, Mr. Womack, Acting Chair of the
Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that
that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 4681) to
authorize appropriations for fiscal years 2014 and 2015 for
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other
purposes, and, pursuant to House Resolution 604, he reported the bill
back to the House with an amendment adopted in the Committee of the
Whole.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is
ordered.
Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment to the amendment
reported from the Committee of the Whole?
If not, the question is on the amendment in the nature of a
substitute, as amended.
[[Page H5054]]
The amendment was agreed to.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third
reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was
read the third time.
Motion to Recommit
Mr. BISHOP of New York. Mr. Speaker, I have a motion to recommit at
the desk.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman opposed to the bill?
Mr. BISHOP of New York. In its current form, I am.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to
recommit.
The Clerk read as follows:
Mr. Bishop of New York moves to recommit the bill, H.R.
4681, to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence with
instructions to report the same back to the House forthwith
with the following amendment:
At the end of subtitle A of title III, add the following
new section:
SEC. __. PROTECTING UNITED STATES MILITARY TECHNOLOGY AND
INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS FROM CHINESE AND
OTHER STATE-SPONSORED COMPUTER THEFT.
The head of each element of the intelligence community
shall--
(1) prioritize efforts to uncover and foil attempts to
steal United States military technology, and the intellectual
property of United States corporations, by State-sponsored
computer hackers from China and other foreign countries;
(2) consistent with existing law, immediately inform
corporations and internet providers of any computer breaches
and the steps necessary to combat further intrusion;
(3) coordinate with other Federal agencies to protect
critical United States infrastructure, including the
electrical grid, nuclear power plants, oil and gas pipelines,
financial services, and air traffic safety, from repeated
computer hacking attacks; and
(4) assist the Department of Justice and other law
enforcement agencies, including by supporting the
international efforts of United States allies, in efforts to
punish and sanction individuals and governments that
perpetrate economic espionage and identity theft.
Mr. BISHOP of New York (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask
unanimous consent to dispense with the reading.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from New York?
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I object.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Objection is heard.
The Clerk will read.
The Clerk continued to read.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from New York is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. BISHOP of New York. Mr. Speaker, this is the final amendment to
the bill, which will not kill the bill or send it back to committee. If
adopted, the bill will immediately proceed to final passage, as
amended.
Mr. Speaker, my amendment responds to the increasing threat of
Chinese and other state-sponsored computer hacking of our national
infrastructure of computer networks. These cyber attacks have severely
undermined our national security and continue to threaten our economy.
Not only are the Chinese hacking into our state secrets, but they are
stealing our trade secrets, which costs us jobs, and especially jobs of
the future. China's conduct is reprehensible and unacceptable for a
major trading partner. In response, my amendment requires the heads of
the intelligence agencies to prioritize efforts to uncover, stop, and
prevent future attempts to steal U.S. military technology and
intellectual property.
The intelligence agencies are also required to notify businesses and
Internet providers when network breaches occur, collaborate with
Federal agencies to protect critical infrastructure, and assist law
enforcement, as well as our international partners in apprehending,
halting, and punishing those who infiltrate our systems.
The need for this amendment is clear. Growing evidence reveals
extensive activity on the part of the People's Liberation Army to
conduct cyber, economic, and industrial espionage. Their hacking knows
no bounds in the pursuit of state and trade secrets alike.
We have uncovered the traces and telltale signs of hacking into
Federal systems and U.S. corporations, like Alcoa, U.S. Steel, energy
companies like SolarPowerAG, and even nuclear power providers like
Westinghouse Electric Company.
This month, the Justice Department indicted five members of the
Chinese military for stealing trade secrets in order to prosper from
American ingenuity and innovation to undercut our global
competitiveness.
These are not isolated incidents. The frequency of these attacks has
increased over time, costing our economy thousands of jobs and up to
$100 billion annually. Not only are the Chinese and their partners in
cyber crime refusing to acknowledge evidence we have uncovered, but
they refuse to negotiate steps both of our nations could pursue to end
this threat.
No one single action will stop the Chinese from trying to infiltrate
American computer networks, but collaboration between our intelligence
agencies, law enforcement, and the private sector can strengthen our
defenses, deter cyber espionage from being launched on foreign shores,
and protect our jobs.
My amendment is not the only step we can take, but it is an important
addition to this bill. The United States deserves better for supporting
the rights of nations like China to trade in the global marketplace, to
be treated with respect, and to participate in the community of
nations. We must send the message to China and our rivals that this
Congress stands ready to defend our national security and our economy,
and we must send a message assuring future generations of Americans
that protecting jobs here at home will always be our priority and that
our economic might is more important than our military might. Our
national security and position as a global leader in innovation and
competitiveness depends on it.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the
motion to recommit.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for his
interest. This is exciting news.
The bill is not crafted correctly, and it opens us up to exposing
classified information to corporations that may be foreign-owned and
operated by the very counterintelligence threat we seek to push back
on. But thank you for this effort.
We should reject this. We should include resounding support for the
CISPA bill that carefully drafted language to make sure that there is a
cyber-sharing relationship, both between the government when it comes
to malicious code and the private sector who, remember, is all by
itself out there getting attacked by nation-states and large organized
criminal groups trying to steal their information.
If you think about even the last month or so that General Alexander
was the Director of the National Security Agency, just in that last bit
of time he was there, the military sites, the government sites were hit
41 million times by people trying to cause destruction or break in and
steal something. Again, this is as serious a problem as you can
imagine, Mr. Speaker, that we are not prepared to handle.
So that CISPA bill that I think you tried to get here--I mean, part
of this bill is the redundancy department of redundancy. The second
part is just not drafted correctly, and we would love to help you get
to the right place.
This bill, I think, causes a little more harm than I think you
realized without carefully considering how you construct a cyber-
sharing malicious code relationship between the government and the
private sector. It needs to happen. This way, it just exposes, again,
the information to counterintelligence groups that we don't want to
have it.
So I would strongly urge the rejection of the motion to recommit. But
I want to thank the gentleman. I look forward to working in the next
few months with the gentleman to make sure that we put in place a
fighting chance, a fighting chance for the 85 percent of those private
sector networks that are getting absolutely ravaged every single day by
cyber attackers, by people who are trying to disrupt activities.
{time} 1115
There are public reports that Iran is probing our financial
institutions. Think about the idea if they were able or successful to
go in and take down a financial institution that has trillions
[[Page H5055]]
of dollars every single day in global transactions, destroy data,
manipulate data, and you don't know who owes whom what. Imagine the
economic catastrophe that happens.
Well, guess what? This is not Orwellian. It is not next year, it is
not 6 months from now, and it is not 10 years from now. It is happening
today, and every nation on the face of the Earth is trying to get this
capability--including al Qaeda. They are advertising to try to find the
right people to develop a capability for a cyberattack to disrupt, to
destroy, and to cause chaos.
This is as important an issue as I can think of, Mr. Speaker, that I
hope we find some resolution on. Again, I have to strongly oppose this
motion to recommit for the drafting errors I find in the bill. But I
look forward to working with the gentleman on the CISPA bill that is in
the Senate and passed by this House in a huge bipartisan way so that we
can bring relief and security to the future prosperity of the United
States of America.
With that, I yield back the balance my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the previous question is
ordered on the motion to recommit.
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to recommit.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the noes appeared to have it.
Mr. BISHOP of New York. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and
nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 and clause 9 of rule
XX, this 15-minute vote on the motion to recommit will be followed by
5-minute votes on passage of the bill, if ordered, and agreeing to the
Speaker's approval of the Journal, if ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 183,
nays 220, not voting 28, as follows:
[Roll No. 270]
YEAS--183
Barber
Barrow (GA)
Bass
Beatty
Becerra
Bera (CA)
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Blumenauer
Bonamici
Brady (PA)
Braley (IA)
Brown (FL)
Brownley (CA)
Bustos
Butterfield
Capps
Capuano
Cardenas
Carney
Carson (IN)
Cartwright
Castor (FL)
Castro (TX)
Chu
Cicilline
Clark (MA)
Clarke (NY)
Cohen
Connolly
Conyers
Cooper
Costa
Courtney
Crowley
Cuellar
Cummings
Davis (CA)
Davis, Danny
DeFazio
DeGette
Delaney
DeLauro
DelBene
Deutch
Doggett
Doyle
Duckworth
Edwards
Ellison
Engel
Enyart
Eshoo
Esty
Farr
Foster
Frankel (FL)
Fudge
Gallego
Garamendi
Garcia
Grayson
Green, Gene
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Hahn
Hanabusa
Heck (WA)
Higgins
Himes
Hinojosa
Holt
Honda
Horsford
Hoyer
Huffman
Israel
Jackson Lee
Jeffries
Johnson (GA)
Johnson, E. B.
Kaptur
Keating
Kelly (IL)
Kennedy
Kildee
Kilmer
Kind
Kirkpatrick
Kuster
Langevin
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Lee (CA)
Levin
Lipinski
Loebsack
Lofgren
Lowenthal
Lowey
Lujan Grisham (NM)
Lujan, Ben Ray (NM)
Lynch
Maffei
Maloney, Carolyn
Maloney, Sean
Matheson
Matsui
McCollum
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
McNerney
Meeks
Meng
Michaud
Moore
Moran
Murphy (FL)
Nadler
Napolitano
Negrete McLeod
Nolan
O'Rourke
Owens
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor (AZ)
Payne
Pelosi
Perlmutter
Peters (CA)
Peters (MI)
Peterson
Pingree (ME)
Pocan
Polis
Price (NC)
Quigley
Rahall
Richmond
Roybal-Allard
Ruiz
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schneider
Schrader
Schwartz
Scott (VA)
Scott, David
Serrano
Sewell (AL)
Shea-Porter
Sherman
Sinema
Sires
Smith (WA)
Speier
Swalwell (CA)
Takano
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tierney
Titus
Tonko
Tsongas
Van Hollen
Vargas
Veasey
Vela
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walz
Wasserman Schultz
Waxman
Welch
Wilson (FL)
NAYS--220
Aderholt
Amash
Amodei
Bachmann
Bachus
Barletta
Barr
Barton
Bentivolio
Bilirakis
Bishop (UT)
Black
Blackburn
Boustany
Brady (TX)
Bridenstine
Brooks (AL)
Brooks (IN)
Broun (GA)
Buchanan
Bucshon
Burgess
Byrne
Calvert
Camp
Cantor
Carter
Cassidy
Chabot
Coble
Coffman
Cole
Collins (GA)
Collins (NY)
Conaway
Cook
Cotton
Crawford
Crenshaw
Culberson
Daines
Davis, Rodney
Denham
Dent
DeSantis
DesJarlais
Diaz-Balart
Duffy
Duncan (SC)
Duncan (TN)
Ellmers
Farenthold
Fincher
Fitzpatrick
Fleischmann
Fleming
Flores
Forbes
Fortenberry
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gardner
Garrett
Gerlach
Gibbs
Gibson
Gingrey (GA)
Gohmert
Goodlatte
Gosar
Gowdy
Granger
Graves (GA)
Graves (MO)
Griffin (AR)
Griffith (VA)
Grimm
Guthrie
Hall
Hanna
Harper
Harris
Hastings (WA)
Heck (NV)
Hensarling
Herrera Beutler
Holding
Hudson
Huelskamp
Huizenga (MI)
Hultgren
Hunter
Hurt
Issa
Jenkins
Johnson (OH)
Johnson, Sam
Jolly
Jones
Jordan
Joyce
Kelly (PA)
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kinzinger (IL)
Kline
Labrador
LaMalfa
Lamborn
Lance
Latham
Latta
LoBiondo
Long
Lucas
Luetkemeyer
Lummis
Marchant
Marino
Massie
McAllister
McCarthy (CA)
McCaul
McClintock
McHenry
McKeon
McKinley
McMorris Rodgers
Meadows
Meehan
Messer
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Mullin
Mulvaney
Murphy (PA)
Neugebauer
Noem
Nugent
Nunes
Nunnelee
Olson
Paulsen
Pearce
Perry
Petri
Pittenger
Pitts
Poe (TX)
Pompeo
Posey
Price (GA)
Reed
Reichert
Renacci
Ribble
Rice (SC)
Rigell
Roby
Roe (TN)
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Rokita
Rooney
Roskam
Ross
Rothfus
Royce
Runyan
Ryan (WI)
Salmon
Sanford
Scalise
Schock
Schweikert
Scott, Austin
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shimkus
Simpson
Smith (MO)
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Southerland
Stewart
Stivers
Stockman
Stutzman
Terry
Thompson (PA)
Thornberry
Tiberi
Tipton
Turner
Upton
Valadao
Wagner
Walden
Walorski
Weber (TX)
Webster (FL)
Wenstrup
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Williams
Wilson (SC)
Wittman
Wolf
Womack
Woodall
Yoder
Yoho
Young (AK)
Young (IN)
NOT VOTING--28
Benishek
Campbell
Capito
Chaffetz
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Cramer
Dingell
Fattah
Gabbard
Green, Al
Hartzler
Hastings (FL)
Lankford
Lewis
McCarthy (NY)
Miller, Gary
Miller, George
Neal
Palazzo
Rangel
Ros-Lehtinen
Shuster
Slaughter
Walberg
Waters
Yarmuth
{time} 1145
Messrs. GRIFFITH of Virginia and McHENRY changed their vote from
``yea'' to ``nay.''
So the motion to recommit was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Recorded Vote
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. This is a 5-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 345,
noes 59, not voting 27, as follows:
[Roll No. 271]
AYES--345
Aderholt
Amodei
Bachmann
Bachus
Barber
Barletta
Barr
Barrow (GA)
Beatty
Becerra
Bera (CA)
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Bishop (UT)
Black
Blackburn
Bonamici
Boustany
Brady (PA)
Brady (TX)
Braley (IA)
Bridenstine
Brooks (AL)
Brooks (IN)
Brown (FL)
Brownley (CA)
Buchanan
Bucshon
Bustos
Butterfield
Byrne
Calvert
Camp
Cantor
Capps
Cardenas
Carney
Carson (IN)
Carter
Cartwright
Cassidy
Castor (FL)
Castro (TX)
Chabot
Chu
Cicilline
Clarke (NY)
Coble
Coffman
Cole
Collins (GA)
Collins (NY)
Conaway
Connolly
Cook
Cooper
Costa
Cotton
Courtney
Crawford
Crenshaw
Crowley
Cuellar
Culberson
Cummings
Daines
Davis (CA)
Davis, Danny
Davis, Rodney
DeGette
Delaney
DeLauro
Denham
Dent
DeSantis
DesJarlais
Deutch
Diaz-Balart
Duckworth
Duffy
Edwards
Ellmers
Engel
Enyart
Eshoo
Esty
Farenthold
Farr
Fincher
Fitzpatrick
Fleischmann
Fleming
Flores
Forbes
Fortenberry
Foster
Foxx
Frankel (FL)
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Fudge
Gabbard
Gallego
Garamendi
Garcia
Gardner
Garrett
Gerlach
Gibbs
Gingrey (GA)
Goodlatte
Gowdy
Granger
Graves (GA)
Graves (MO)
Grayson
Green, Gene
Griffin (AR)
Griffith (VA)
Grimm
Guthrie
Hahn
Hall
Hanabusa
Hanna
Harper
Harris
Hastings (WA)
Heck (NV)
Heck (WA)
Hensarling
[[Page H5056]]
Herrera Beutler
Higgins
Himes
Hinojosa
Holding
Horsford
Hoyer
Hudson
Huizenga (MI)
Hultgren
Hunter
Hurt
Israel
Issa
Jackson Lee
Jeffries
Jenkins
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (OH)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnson, Sam
Jolly
Jordan
Joyce
Kaptur
Keating
Kelly (IL)
Kelly (PA)
Kennedy
Kildee
Kilmer
Kind
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kinzinger (IL)
Kirkpatrick
Kline
Kuster
LaMalfa
Lamborn
Lance
Langevin
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Latham
Latta
Levin
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Loebsack
Long
Lowenthal
Lowey
Lucas
Luetkemeyer
Lujan Grisham (NM)
Lujan, Ben Ray (NM)
Lynch
Maffei
Maloney, Sean
Marchant
Marino
Matheson
Matsui
McAllister
McCarthy (CA)
McCaul
McCollum
McHenry
McIntyre
McKeon
McKinley
McMorris Rodgers
McNerney
Meadows
Meehan
Meeks
Meng
Messer
Mica
Michaud
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Moran
Mullin
Murphy (FL)
Murphy (PA)
Napolitano
Negrete McLeod
Neugebauer
Noem
Nolan
Nugent
Nunes
Nunnelee
Olson
Owens
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor (AZ)
Paulsen
Payne
Pearce
Pelosi
Perlmutter
Peters (CA)
Peters (MI)
Peterson
Petri
Pingree (ME)
Pittenger
Pitts
Poe (TX)
Pompeo
Price (GA)
Price (NC)
Quigley
Rahall
Reed
Reichert
Renacci
Ribble
Rice (SC)
Richmond
Rigell
Roby
Roe (TN)
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Rokita
Rooney
Roskam
Ross
Rothfus
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Ruiz
Runyan
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Ryan (WI)
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Scalise
Schiff
Schneider
Schock
Schrader
Schwartz
Schweikert
Scott (VA)
Scott, Austin
Scott, David
Serrano
Sessions
Sewell (AL)
Shea-Porter
Sherman
Shimkus
Simpson
Sinema
Sires
Smith (MO)
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Southerland
Stewart
Stivers
Stutzman
Terry
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thompson (PA)
Thornberry
Tiberi
Tipton
Titus
Tonko
Tsongas
Turner
Upton
Valadao
Van Hollen
Vargas
Veasey
Vela
Visclosky
Wagner
Walden
Walorski
Walz
Wasserman Schultz
Waxman
Webster (FL)
Wenstrup
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Williams
Wilson (FL)
Wilson (SC)
Wittman
Wolf
Womack
Woodall
Yoder
Young (AK)
Young (IN)
NOES--59
Amash
Barton
Bass
Bentivolio
Blumenauer
Broun (GA)
Burgess
Capuano
Clark (MA)
Cohen
Conyers
DeFazio
DelBene
Doggett
Doyle
Duncan (SC)
Duncan (TN)
Ellison
Gibson
Gohmert
Gosar
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Holt
Honda
Huelskamp
Huffman
Jones
Kingston
Labrador
Lee (CA)
Lofgren
Lummis
Maloney, Carolyn
Massie
McClintock
McDermott
McGovern
Moore
Mulvaney
Nadler
O'Rourke
Perry
Pocan
Polis
Posey
Salmon
Sanford
Schakowsky
Sensenbrenner
Speier
Stockman
Swalwell (CA)
Takano
Tierney
Velazquez
Weber (TX)
Welch
Yoho
NOT VOTING--27
Benishek
Campbell
Capito
Chaffetz
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Cramer
Dingell
Fattah
Green, Al
Hartzler
Hastings (FL)
Lankford
Lewis
McCarthy (NY)
Miller, Gary
Miller, George
Neal
Palazzo
Rangel
Ros-Lehtinen
Shuster
Slaughter
Walberg
Waters
Yarmuth
{time} 1153
Mrs. CAROLYN B. MALONEY of New York changed her vote from ``aye'' to
``no.''
So the bill was passed.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
Stated for:
Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Speaker, on Friday, May 30, 2014, I was unable to
vote due to my duties and responsibilities in my daughter's wedding
rehearsal and ceremony on the 30th and 31st. Had I been present, I
would have voted ``yea'' on rollcall No. 271.
personal explanation
Mr. AL GREEN of Texas. Mr. Speaker, today I missed the following
votes:
Democratic Motion to Recommit H.R. 4681. Had I been present, I would
have voted ``yes'' on this bill.
H.R. 4681--Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2014 and
2015. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes'' on this bill.
____________________
